|
---|
Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24291A0272024-10-31031 October 2024 NRC Letter to C. Mayer Illinois SHPO Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for Subsequent License Renewal of Units 2 and 3 RS-24-103, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2024-10-21021 October 2024 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-24-102, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b, and TSTF-5912024-10-21021 October 2024 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b, and TSTF-591 RS-24-080, Request to Replace Formerly Submitted Documents Available in the Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) with Documents Redacted in .2024-10-16016 October 2024 Request to Replace Formerly Submitted Documents Available in the Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) with Documents Redacted in . RS-24-093, Response to Request for Additional Information - Alternative Request to Utilize Code Case OMN-32, Alternative Requirements for Range and Accuracy of Pressure, Flow, and Differential Pressure Instruments Used in Pump Tests2024-10-10010 October 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information - Alternative Request to Utilize Code Case OMN-32, Alternative Requirements for Range and Accuracy of Pressure, Flow, and Differential Pressure Instruments Used in Pump Tests ML24275A2442024-10-0303 October 2024 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing ML24225A2132024-09-26026 September 2024 Relief Request Regarding Examination Coverage for the Fifth Inservice Inspection Interval ML24253A0942024-09-23023 September 2024 License Renewal Regulatory Audit Regarding the Environmental Review of the License Renewal Application (EPID L-2024-Sle-0002) (Docket Numbers: 50-237 and 50-249) ML24270A0332024-09-20020 September 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report SVPLTR 24-0030, ISFSI Annual Effluent Release Report2024-09-20020 September 2024 ISFSI Annual Effluent Release Report IR 05000237/20244022024-09-19019 September 2024 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000237/2024402 and 05000249/2024402 - (Public) ML24240A1692024-09-18018 September 2024 Cy 2023 Summary of Decommissioning Trust Fund Status ML24260A2152024-09-16016 September 2024 Confirmation of Initial License Examination ML24255A8642024-09-0606 September 2024 Rscc Wire & Cable LLC Dba Marmon Industrial Energy & Infrastructure - Part 21 Retraction of Final Notification ML24249A1362024-09-0404 September 2024 EN 57304 - Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC, Final Report - No Embedded Files. Notification of the Potential Existence of Defects Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21 IR 05000237/20230052024-08-28028 August 2024 Updated Inspection Plan and Assessment Follow-Up Letter for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (Report 05000237/2023005; 05000249/2024005) ML24239A3972024-08-23023 August 2024 Rssc Wire & Cable LLC Dba Marmon - Part 21 Final Notification - 57243-EN 57243 IR 05000237/20240022024-08-14014 August 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000237/2024002 and 05000249/2024002 ML24215A2912024-08-14014 August 2024 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure Alternative Schedule to Complete Decommissioning Beyond 60-Years of Permanent Cessation of Operations IR 05000237/20240102024-08-0909 August 2024 NRC Age-Related Degradation Inspection Report 05000237/2024010 and 05000249/2024010 ML24157A0792024-08-0808 August 2024 Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and Conduct Scoping Process (EPID L-2024-Sle-0002) (Docket Numbers: 50-237, and 50-249) IR 05000237/20230112024-08-0707 August 2024 Reissue - Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000237/2023011 and 05000249/2023011 IR 05000237/20200012024-08-0606 August 2024 Reissue - Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 - Integrated Inspection Report 05000237/2020001 and 05000249/2020001 ML24184A1712024-08-0202 August 2024 SLRA Schedule Letter RS-24-073, Alternative Schedule to Complete Decommissioning Beyond 60 Years of Permanent Cessation of Operations – Additional Information Supporting Request to Withhold Security-Related Information2024-07-31031 July 2024 Alternative Schedule to Complete Decommissioning Beyond 60 Years of Permanent Cessation of Operations – Additional Information Supporting Request to Withhold Security-Related Information ML24136A1322024-07-30030 July 2024 Transmittal Letter for Renewed License ML24208A0962024-07-25025 July 2024 57243-EN 57243 - Rssc Wire & Cable LLC, Dba Marmon - Part 21 Notification ML24193A0882024-07-24024 July 2024 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Alternative Schedule to Complete Decommissioning Beyond 60-Years of Permanent Cessation of Operations (Docket 50-10) ML24204A1862024-07-24024 July 2024 – Regulatory Audit in Support of License Amendment Requests to Adopt TSTF 505, Revision 2; TSTF-591, Revision 0; and 10 CFR 50.69 IR 05000237/20243012024-06-27027 June 2024 NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000237/2024301; 05000249/2024301 ML24138A0572024-06-26026 June 2024 – Issuance of Amendment Nos. 285 and 278 Application to Adopt TSTF-564, Safety Limit MCPR ML24138A1812024-06-18018 June 2024 Aging Management Audit Plan Regarding the Subsequent License Renewal Application Review ML24128A2742024-06-14014 June 2024 Notice of Acceptance and Opportunity for Hearing - Letter RS-24-063, Response to Request for Additional Information for 10 CFR 50.55a Request No. I5R-222024-06-14014 June 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information for 10 CFR 50.55a Request No. I5R-22 RS-24-061, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2024-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2024-06-14014 June 2024 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2024-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML24156A2332024-06-11011 June 2024 Letter Supplemental Information for Alternative Schedule to Complete Decommissioning Beyond 60-Years of Permanent Cessation of Operations ML24151A6482024-06-0303 June 2024 Changes in Reactor Decommissioning Branch Project Management Assignments for Some Decommissioning Facilities ML24183A2752024-05-30030 May 2024 Registration of Use of Casks to Store Spent Fuel SVPLTR 24-0020, Registration of Use of Casks to Store Spent Fuel2024-05-30030 May 2024 Registration of Use of Casks to Store Spent Fuel RS-24-056, Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2024-05-28028 May 2024 Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors ML24079A0762024-05-23023 May 2024 Issuance of Amendments to Adopt TSTF 264 ML24145A0432024-05-23023 May 2024 Registration of Use of Casks to Store Spent Fuel 10 CFR 72.212 SVPLTR 24-0019, Registration of Use of Casks to Store Spent Fuel2024-05-23023 May 2024 Registration of Use of Casks to Store Spent Fuel ML24158A0012024-05-22022 May 2024 License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-564 (EPID L-2023-LLA-0120) Illinois State Concurrence ML24142A3352024-05-21021 May 2024 Quad Cities—Information Request to Support the NRC Annual Baseline Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes RS-24-055, 2023 Corporate Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report2024-05-17017 May 2024 2023 Corporate Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report ML24135A0722024-05-10010 May 2024 Submittal of 2023 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report ML24129A1352024-05-0808 May 2024 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b, and TSTF-59 ML24134A1132024-05-0808 May 2024 Retraction: LER 2303-001-00 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, HPCI Inoperable Due to Air Void Accumulation ML24128A1212024-05-0707 May 2024 Response to Braidwood and Dresden FOF Dates Change Request (2025) 2024-09-06
[Table view] Category:Licensee Event Report (LER)
MONTHYEARML20135G7442020-05-14014 May 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Dresden 2 (LER 237-90-006) 05000249/LER-2017-0012017-12-27027 December 2017 Unit 3 Standby Liquid Control System Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Defect Causing a Piping Leak, LER 17-001-01 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 Regarding Unit 3 Standby Liquid Control System Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Defect Causing a Piping Leak ML17252B5052017-11-0303 November 2017 LER 77-050/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Local Leak Rate Test of Drywell Personnel Air Lock During Refueling ML17252A3262017-10-21021 October 2017 LER 77-040/03L-0 for Dresden 3 Regarding the Circuit Breaker for Service Water Makeup Valve MO-3-4102 to the Isolation Condenser Found in Off Position ML17252B4922017-08-28028 August 2017 LER 78-028/01X-1 for Dresden, Units 2 and 3 Re NRC Request for Immediate Actions to Be Taken to Mitigate the Potential for a Spurious Closure of a Recirculation Loop Suction Valve with a LOCA Occurring Between the Loop Discharge and Suction 05000237/LER-2016-0032017-05-26026 May 2017 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Charcoal Filter Bank Failure to meet the Methyl Iodide Penetration Acceptance Criteria, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Cancellation of Licensee Event Report 237/2016-003-00, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Charcoal Filter Bank Failure to meet the Methyl Iodide Penetration Acceptance Criteria ML17153A0342017-05-26026 May 2017 Cancellation of Licensee Event Report 237/2016-003-00, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Charcoal Filter Bank Failure to Meet the Methyl Iodide Penetration Acceptance Criteria 05000237/LER-2016-0042017-01-0909 January 2017 Reactor Building Differential Pressure Less than Technical Specification Requirement, LER 16-004-00 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Regarding Reactor Building Differential Pressure Less than Technical Specification Requirement 05000249/LER-2016-0012016-08-25025 August 2016 Alert Declared from Unit 3 HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Fire, LER 16-001-00 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station Regarding Alert Declared from Unit 3 HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Fire 05000237/LER-2016-0022016-07-15015 July 2016 Unit 2 HPCI Inlet Steam Drain Pot Piping Leak Resulting in HPCI Inoperability, LER 16-002-00 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 Regarding HPCI Inlet Steam Drain Pot Piping Leak Resulting in HPCI Inoperability 05000237/LER-2016-0012016-04-0808 April 2016 Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Transient, LER 16-001-00 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 and 3 Regarding Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Transient 05000249/LER-2015-0012016-01-22022 January 2016 Main Steam Line Flow Switches Found Outside Tech Spec Allowed Value, LER 15-001-01, Dresden, Unit 3 Main Steam Line Flow Switched Found Outside Tech Spec Allowed Value ML1015505692009-07-24024 July 2009 Letter LS-AA-1 25-1001, Elevated Tritium Values Identified in 2 Storm Drains Due to Through-Wall Leaks in Underground Piping for Dresden Units 2 and 3. ML0602404072004-05-0505 May 2004 Final Precursor Analysis - Dresden Unit 3 - Unit 3 Scram Due to Loss of Offsite Power and Subsequent Inoperability of the Standby Gas Treatment System for Units 2 and 3 ML0234501722002-12-0202 December 2002 LER 89-029-05, Dresden Unit 2, Elevated HPCI Discharge Piping Temperature Due to Reactor Feedwater System Back Leakage ML17252B5391981-06-10010 June 1981 LER 81-034/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re J-3 CRD Was Tested for Overtravel. the Overtravel Alarm Came Up and Rod Position Indication Was Lost ML17252B5411981-06-0808 June 1981 LER 81-030/01T-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Operator Noticed the HPCI Steam Line Was Cold and Filled with Water. the HPCI System Was Declared Inoperable ML17252B5401981-06-0505 June 1981 LER 81-024/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re While Conducting Routine Review of Surveillance, It Was Found That the Monthly Surveillance Required by Tech. Spec. 4.4.c.1 for Standby Liquid Control Tank Sampling Was Three Days Overdue ML17252B5271981-06-0303 June 1981 LER 81-023/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re While Running HPCI Pump Test, the Operator Observed Torus Wide Range Level Instrument Reading 0 Inches and Narrow Range Level Instrument Reading, About - 2 Inches and Oscillating ML17252B5281981-04-14014 April 1981 LER 81-015/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re the Fire Marshall Discovered That the Heat Detectors Were Not Functionally Tested within the 6 Month Interval Required by Tech. Spec. 4.12.A.1 ML17252B5291981-03-23023 March 1981 LER 81-011-03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Observed Inadequacies in the Implementation of Administrative or Procedural Controls Which Threaten to Cause Reduction of Degree of Redundancy Provided in Reactor Protection Systems or Engineered Safe ML17252B5301981-02-20020 February 1981 LER 81-080/031-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Abnormal Degradation of Systems Other than Those Specified in Item B.1.e Above Designed to Contain Radioactive Material Resulting from the Fission Process ML17252B5321981-02-17017 February 1981 LER 81-070/03L for Dresden, Unit 2 Re While Conducting Steam Line Area Temperature Switch Calibration Surveillance, Temperature Switch TS 2-261-180 Failed to Trip ML17252B5331981-02-0202 February 1981 LER 81-020/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re During Refueling Outage LPCI Test Spray Valve Failed to Shut Electrically, One Set of Thermal Contacts Would Not Reset ML17252B5341981-01-23023 January 1981 LER 80-049/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re at Completion of Secondary Containment Leak Rate Test the Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation Valve 2A-5742 Would Not Open ML17252B5351981-01-23023 January 1981 LER 80-050/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re the 1501-62D Pressure Switch Actuated at 44.2 Inches of Water Increasing, Tech. Spec. Limit Is Less than or Equal to 41.6 Inches of Water Increasing ML17252B5371980-12-30030 December 1980 LER 80-046-00 for Dresden 2 Regarding a Failure to Receive CRD Volume During a Reactor Scram ML17252B5361980-12-29029 December 1980 LER 80-046/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Conditions Leading to on Operation in a Degraded Mode Permitted by a Limiting Condition for Operation or Plant Shutdown Required by a Limiting Condition for Operation ML17252B5381980-12-0303 December 1980 LER 80-043/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Surveillance Testing of the Condenser Low Vacuum Switches, Pressure Switch 2-503D Was Found to Have a Trip Point of 22.85 Inches Hg ML17252B5421980-11-12012 November 1980 LER 80-042/03L-0 for Dresden, Units 2 and 3 Re That Technical Staff Personnel Revealed That the Ultrasonic Testing of the Scram Discharge Volume Was Not Performed During the 1500-2300 Shift ML17252B5431980-11-12012 November 1980 LER 80-041/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Reactor Building Vent and Refueling Floor Rad Monitor Surveillance (DCP 2007-12) Was Performed ML17252B1841980-10-31031 October 1980 LER 80-40/01T-0 for Dresden Unit 3 Regarding Failure of the HPCI Inboard Steam Supply Valve to Open ML17252B5441980-10-29029 October 1980 LER 80-039/03X-1 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re HPCI Inboard Steam Supply Valve Opened and Had a Dual Light Indication ML17252B5451980-10-23023 October 1980 LER 79-017-01X2 for Dresden, Units 2 and 3 Re Inadequacies Observed in Implementation of Administrative Procedural Controls Which Threaten to Cause Reduction of Degree of Redundancy Provided in Reactor Protection System or Engineered Safety ML17252B5461980-10-0808 October 1980 LER 80-016/01T-1 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re While Shutdown and Conducting 300 Psi Primary System Hydrostatic Leak Inspection, Water Discovered Dripping from LPCI Check Valve Up Stream Drain Line ML17252B5471980-10-0707 October 1980 LER 80-036/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Discovery That the Six Month Functional Test Required by Tech. Spec. 4.12.A.1 of the Cardox System Heat Detectors Was Not Performed within the Allowable Surveillance Interval ML17252B5481980-10-0101 October 1980 LER 80-033/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re the Frequency of Water Addition to the Torus Increased. Leak Rate Tests Indicated a Leak in the 2B LPCI Heat Exchanger ML17252B1861980-08-22022 August 1980 LER 80-032/03L-0 for Dresden Unit 3 Regarding During Normal Operations While Performing APRM Rod Block and Scram Functional Tests, APRM 3 Failed to Initiate a Rod Block ML17252B5501980-08-19019 August 1980 LER 80-027/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Dropping Load in Preparation for I.E.B. 80-17 Scram Tests, Low Level of Diesel Generator Coolant Present in the Water Tank Was Noticed by Equipment Operator ML17252B5161980-08-14014 August 1980 LER 80-024/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Drywell Oxygen Concentration Indication Failed Downscale in Violation of Tech. Spec. 3.7.A.6.d ML17252B1881980-08-0404 August 1980 LER 80-030/03L-0 for Dresden Unit 3 Regarding While Reducing Power for Manual Scram Required by I.E. Bulletin 80-17, Routine Surveillance of MSIV Closure Times Showed That MSIVs 3-203-2B and 2D Closed in Less than 3 Seconds ML17252B1911980-06-13013 June 1980 LER 80-024/03L-0 for Dresden Unit 3 Regarding During Normal Operation with Reactor Level Instrument Surveillance in Progress, Level Switch LIS 3-263-58AB Tripped at Less than Tech. Spec. Limit of 84 Inches ML17252B1901980-06-13013 June 1980 LER 80-023/03L-0 for Dresden Unit 3 Regarding During Normal Operation with Reactor Level Instrument Surveillance in Progress, Level Switch LIS 3-263-58A Tripped at Less than Tech. Spec. Limit of 144 Inches ML17252B1921980-06-10010 June 1980 LER 80-025/03L-0 for Dresden Unit 3 Regarding During Normal Operation While Performing Main Steam Line High Flow Isolation Surveillance, Flow Switch DPIS 3-261-2A Was Out of Tech. Spec. Limits, Table 3.2.1 ML17252B5521980-06-0505 June 1980 LER 80-017/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Double Valve Indication Was Observed on the HPCI Inboard Isolation Valve. Upon Trying to Cycle the Valve, the Valve Failed to Close ML17252B1931980-06-0303 June 1980 LER 80-002/03X-1 for Dresden Unit 3 Regarding During Normal Operation While Performing LPCI Monthly Surveillance, MO-3-1501-118 Valve Would Not Close ML17252B5531980-05-27027 May 1980 LER 80-015/03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re During Steady State Operation, Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker 2-1601-33A Was Found Inoperable During Routine Operability Surveillance ML17252B1941980-05-27027 May 1980 LER 80-022/03L-0 for Dresden Unit 3 Regarding During Normal Shutdown Conditions, IRM 12 Downscale Rod Block Was Found to Trip at 4/125 ML17252B1951980-05-0808 May 1980 LER 80-021/01T-0 for Dresden Unit 3 Regarding During Startup Following Refueling Outage, Combinations of 3A Target Rock Valve and 3B, 3C and 3E Electromatic Relief Valves Failed to Open at Rated Reactor Pressure While Performing Operability ML17252B1961980-04-29029 April 1980 LER 80-017/03L-0 for Dresden Unit 3 Regarding During Refueling Outage, While Conducting Operability Surveillance Test, U-3 Diesel Generator Failed to Start 2020-05-14
[Table view] |
Text
..... * . ,_, ",. << 131 . . Address Reply to, 1 \.
POST OFFICE BOX 767 *CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60690 Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director Division of Reactor Licensing U.S. Atomic Energy Conunission Washington, D.C. 20545 December 17, 1971
Subject:
Report of Safety Valve Operation following a Feedwater Transient
-Dresden Unit 3 (DPR-25)
Dear Dr. Morris:
This is to report a condition in whi.ch a condensate pump tripped, which caused a reactor water level transient.
This water level transient resulted in filling the main steam line with water, opening of a safety valve, and pressurization of the drywell.
The following information pertaining to thi,s occurrence is submitted pending completion of the investigation which is currently in progress.
S\immary A 1413 on December 8, 1971, as a result of a condensate*
l:)ooster pump trip on Dresden Unit 3, the reactor feed pumps tripped.
Tripping of the feed pumps resulted in a reactor water level transient.
This eventually resulted in filling the main steam lines with water, opening of a safety valve for approximately minutes and pressurization of the drywell.
Pressurization of the drywell.resulted in a high drywell signal which initiated starting of emergency
- diesels, low pressure core cooling pumps, and HPCI. During the transient, drywell pressure reached a maximum of 20 psig. The maximum and minimum reactor pressures were 1.050 psig and 795 psig, respectively, and the reactor water level reached a minimum of -20 inches and a maximum of +130 inches. With water level at -20 inches, there is more than 9 feet of water above the fuel. A detailed sequence of events is attached.
All safety systems functioned
No significant radioactivity was released to the environment as a result of the incident.
During post incident
- recovery, both the primary system and the primary containment were maintained in a "bottled up" condition until analysis of reactor water and containment atmosphere could be made. '**
e Commonwealth Edison Comp. .or. Peter A. Morris December 17, 1971 Damage Assessment
,. A preliminary inspection in the drywell following the incident revealed damage to the following equipment: 1 -The rupture discs on all the safety valves showed cracks. This may not be related to the incident since this condition has been encountered previously on normal shutdowns. 2 -The _3A electromatic valve was damaged by :the steam jet from the "F" safety va,_lve.
One steam discharge rams horn on the "F" safety valve was directed towards the electromatic valve. The cover on the solenoid assembly of this valve was blown off. The holding coil portion of the solenoid assembly was found open. Wiring to a position indicating limit switch was also damaged rendering the position indication circuit inoperative. 3 -Miscellaneous thermal insulation was damaged and requires 4 -The top coat of paint on the containment wall over an area about 3' x 3' was removed by the steam jet from the "F" safety valve impinging on the surface of the containment. 5 -Sections of ventilating duct in the vicinity of the steam jet were dislodged and require repair. 6 -The LPRM cables were found damaged.
This c&Tube must be replaced in total. '* 7 -The SRM/IRM caJ!>lbes were tested and found to be good. Following the Dresden Unit 2 June 5 incident, this c&b.1:e was replaced on Dresden Units 2 and 3 and Quad-Cities Units 1 and 2 with cable having a higher temperature (302°F 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> rating) rating. 8 -One containment cooling fan motor was found to have a ground caused by moisture in the containment.
This motor will require drying out. The other six cooling fan motors were found to be. in good condition.
Preliminary conclusions The following conclusions have been reached the Dresden Unit 3 incident of December 8, 1971:
e Commonwealth Edison Comp. .or. Peter 17, 1971 1 -There were no radiological consequences since no significant release to the environment resulted from the incident. 2 -No compromise of the health and safety of the public resulted from the incident. 3 -All operations during the incident and post incident recovery pepiod were within Technical Specifications. 4 -All safety systems functioned as designed including High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) , Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI), Core Spray, Main Stearn and Containment Isolations, Standby Gas Treatment System, Pressure Suppression System, and Standby Diesel Generators. 5 -Feedwater control system performance during the transient was deficient, in that, the control system locked out on low air pressure, probably during rapid valve movement.
Previous experience has demonstrated the inability of the feedwater control system to automatically control level below the high water level trip point for main steam valves during a system transient.
This was the primary reason for the need to take operator.*
action. 6 -Operator response was in accordance with operating procedures the incident and post incident recovery with two exceptions.
The operator did not reset the feedwater regulating valve lockout condition when it occurred, and he did not trip the feed .pump when the water level reached +60 inches. Had he done so, the incident may have been prevented.
It is important
- to place these actions in proper perspective, and it should be emphasized that he did take a number of steps to control feedwater input to the vessel. The operator actions were: (a) He reduced the master controller set point to minimize the error signal between the actual level and set point level. This response was previously established on shift by General Electric during the startup program to compensate for the known overshoot which has been experienced ing scrams. While not specifically called for by the station operating procedure.600-ANI;'it
.is consistent with the intent of the procedure to keep the level on scale.
- Commonwealth Edison Com ply Peter A. Morris -4 December 17, 1971 (b) He closed the minimum flow feedwater valve. (c) He reduced the manual output control potentiometer on the "manual-auto" controller to zero and transferred them to manual to terminate feedwater input. 7 -The 11F" safety valve lifted at approximately 1020 psig reactor pressure.
The safety valve set point is 1240 psig. The lifting of this valve was probably caused by some mechanism resulting from the effects of feedwater flooding the main steam line. The pressurization of the drywell could probably have been avoided if this valve had not lifted. Corrective Actions The following corrective actions will be accomplishe!i prior to startup: 1 -Safety evaluations.
(a) . Effects on fuel (b) Vessel internals (c) Performance of suppression pool (d) Effects of pressure, temperature and steam impingement on *primary containment (e) Differential temperature on vessel 2 -LPRM repair 3 -Thermal insulation repair 4 -Replace 11F11 .safety valve with tested valve 5 -Check operability of 3A electromatic valve 6 Investigate reorientation of safety valve discharge
- Commonwealth Edison Comply Dr. Peter A. Morris December 17, 1971 7 -Check calibration of feedwater control system and verify water regulating, valve response to control signal. 8 -Increase torque setting on feedwater regulator isolation, valve so that it will.close urider pressure and-seat properly.' 9 -Modify and emphasize procedure for handling water level transients.
Leave control system in automatic, reduce feedwater controller set point and trip feed pump at 45". 10 -Evaluate the need for non-destructive inspection of the main steam lines. 11 -Check calibration of head-to-flange temperature indicator.
12 -Test all electrical penetrations and'main steam line bellows.
13 -Test all motors in drywell.
14 -Repair damaged paint on drywell wall. 15 -Perform test on all equipment exposed to drywell incident environment.
16 -Check system for freedom of movement during startup.
17 -Hydrostatic test of 1000 psig. Additionally, changes the feedwater control system to improve its operation are under consideration.
When our investigation is complete, we will file a final report with you. cc: Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Region III Compliance
-** .... ..1--.::.*
. : . -* ;.: * ..... J-. I .i . ":. .-. :.= .. ,' .' *.,: -r: :.***. ... -'*-.-":*'\." ..
.... e ... \ e f **-* ---*---7 I l -----__.___.
- .. : '"" ,* ].* '\: . . OF EV"m!'S 8, 1911 INCIDEB'i*
-=se -.
- , Initial
. ---*) -192 2.300 tlw c0fiditi4;ll1
.fer of sampl.ifig. . . . b)
Otjt.
flC'll .,., 9 x lcti lb/hr.
-9 11;.loiJ
-3>> .. .lCt ]D
- .(.3A ...as Q\li of SS}rri.Ce fer aJ and 1e¥.k) i * .. l& ls JC
. (JB *pump in
.:)B
- voalve 1n (JA v&l-ve in l:;.iw !low valvg
Md* no.mgl.
of
.
. .. <:: MOl'!:
ps.r&'!:ete1:Jj during the 1n:1t-I,g1 is. -. : .* " '. *.* . ..
. . -*
of
. :* .... .. :** :-' .. ,: :* . . *.-,,
c' * . .-.* *,-.. '..:..;.i,*-
.. ** '. l)
.. .-,;_ *"{** " . . . l'°AtP.Je o!: ti.1.p 1.i:D.lffiWi\.
O't' Pi;iQr tri,.p'P th* r .* .*.. . . 'E4uoo. &"'id Go:-....ner¥.1 *pe....""iloon;jl.
.....ere
.. . ' .. , .... _ ... .-,, *. *.p,;-e,aent f.he YOt:kiP._g
.iJd* a
. * -** * .* *-wter-h}'draulk.
unit. ***They not@. . .a ;;;ery lomi
.from .. :;.-' -. J. -' lC p-._JW!P.,.
lt tM in_l!.iqJ mi as HBU.l e uf met;h&i.ieal: ing. No;:Hfie-r
.at pm:J2P a t'i'j.p
.D!)t.
i1 f:fi.-9 t:M
. ... ,> .. ,,. . ' .£-... _. .. ..
the
. ... * ... ; .* ... _ _ _ ,_ .. -. . . . .
. _ .
.t.'.:< ... . :*1 * '2) .. *14:llH)9 \ 34 and 3C rNCt;QX"
.feed tripptd on lOH suction presvvre.
3j 14::11:10
... *' *::. .... .... ' i: -!*
> : . !.:* *.. , .. C:..
- . * * \ .. , ... ..,, .... ; ..... ... , ... **.** *.;*
- , :. . e .,. e . 4) ..
... 22 a) r.a.pidly.
b) 00: lqw vat:er el . lleact.or.
da: ..
to 20". (ECCS lnitiation i.;i . -5,n .) .
- 1he ti-11; l61lQViDg indtc&!f:I.ou.:
' *> 1) .?ha "f.l(Jw On" on
blinked un &nd off ...
- 2) the Ciiµ<<'1ity" ;3) U\1* .lh!s alao an iR4ic&ti1Jn..
of condition.
of Air tQ F w. . and tmla of t:o f .W. Reg .. Valve :6';
- thiS alarm at 85. P-liiig..
LO!:k{tllt. 75 paig .. .. * ...
lE"..rel t1'
.and.
.;.2ou .and ... i2° ill a*r.a;tW.
u tollaw.ij:
poiftt a to
- 11.. £ _. . . ..... . l ... * .* . . . .. . ..... . .-. -.. ; *.:;...
..
wtput.
... ctrollm;$
. * . . . , . . : *. ,
- _. *. . . . .... *'>. * . * ... : ..* ' *
. *,. * ,* * * . * ... *3) *.*.
.,, --, ...... ,. .: :****
. .* .;-. * :.' _:., ... , ... ,: -.. <: *.;. . :_.4) lw. flril.:
. +* . . . . . * :.-.:.:*'*>_.:
f) At. -1zn O?G-P.:inS
.. . , ... ***** '*f .,;: '.'?.:
- : <.: ::.,:: .. *he th@. !u,;1 . .iirn,
. "f *>*.:.
i,* ... . 1 .... i . ; ..
- t' .. .
- *-!'
- ,_:
.re<<etO°t°: .. , .* ,, * * :Litl:*_*A!I
. * . th" mot.or:
isQ).ation V.ii1ve *. .-* *:-again in of a
'"* . . -. *. *:*: .. I,5
.. . i 1* *** *! -: I j ' i11 . ::* '* .t t **. ;,,
- .*
- . .-... **.* *. -* *. *.::*, * *-1 * *I. . .\ * £;. *:
- e j) .&J the F:'!J* t.he.
Wtt.S ..
tti 5 .. i .a. 10 to. 2 ,.., ll: lu-
&: !llD6!3 .during of it Bt¥.lled hig4 fl(P!,V Q1,1t. at:
2,.3 x 10. lb/hr. ' S) * *
.. I * *Mam. tw.a l.,,v *.Group I holatio;)
.. Mam
St""il1$
Lim;:
... .
- , hol,&ti;;m Vem:. r.o na:U:t, closed *. 6) 14_;14!14 a lm1 {mint 195 patg ifa-W..
I.iile i:it'#ltiticn.o
. <* ... 1). ;_ "'O -'5:') *IJ .. * .. ... : ...
(+17") *. : :
- . h ...
, ,,** .. *. _* ..... * , It . is
.*ptmip*
. fttm.
to the peint.whei'§
. Wo a. ;-mi:Ut!i:.
{fltM
?his i$* ** * '.*
by th;; fact thllt.
.. f
.point
.5 .. 106 s.u4 * * . * * * * (;b:a(!rv.atioo Qt whicii
'.* .1ba
. r.hst. ehe
- ufl&.J tin;;* light .:::;n the 'k:nchbfierd 1 .wilich . V.0..:ld
ooly
- ipJ(ru b.eoo xunc:rut
. . c.ondtioo)"'
At
.time the
regulating valve. 1,l;!Ck£d in . .;iIJ
.pi)Siti,Qii.*
.. %baequent:
has i;;hU tM.x. t:h'I lockm,it
. h-7
....... .the val¥e. *. >*It' i.B th;it the rufiWt coodit.ion
mi level. .At tl:iis .. it&lve erif!d eo . -.. * * * *
.e
- * .. <--.' *' . *.-*.,'.*
. . . . ' ,. ,::', .* . . . .
- ,,. ** .... ** .'I** d. Oi>ex-*t.or bx:nke
. ;;eaetor *th$
put.* t.he uolati(Jll denser in BQnril:!!. this the react.or abavc.the
. . . taolo11tiDil ci;l'llcleisei-zr.upply l,ilis o!llld_ the oper.at<<;n;"
very little .. effect otl pr.enirn:n; it :!n *
- . ;* **.>_._ .-.* **'*:** .7-,:. **,-**-. **:** . ') . *: .*' .... . ,, '*.
..... ' 1 t.'-h :r ,l :; .* 1 ' . I *:. f. *" *I
.,J -* * * >-* *;, * °.-(' ';. I ... .. i . \' . .
. *.* .. .. .. ... \ -* .* .. ** ***:*. e * .8) e)
- l!.tte filled co 1020 pfJiJj * :v)
"3F-'-* lllte4
- c) .. High (2 psig). was.
. d) Meael 3 @wt 2/3
Spray
.f) .. U'CI
..
h) . fttC!
B.D cm
.
.. * {Gi"QUp II) '9) '
pres§. ..., .5 Dlys?.!'!ll-to. iJu:reruie -* ,,.
.. 20.
thl!;li t:o
.. : . . * .fi:*
- .: :1.\
-pressige
- . * * ** ... :,.._'.,**._:.
.. * ...
eloSlJ.t'e
.of the.
- -=-o. * ..
ill. the dlJ4
- *.:-> ,f . j I *l 'J 1 :t l .
Ii 1; . . I l :I I *! t '! i . .,,, * ,, . f . 4=....... 1 . 'J ... 116. 1* Js....;..
. . . . C)
- Y ;o, * .,.. . X., .a.Y . 01 fib * *.: ... '**-. **,':*,.
' .........
- \*
... .....
.* , *.*<<*. * . *. * .. *-.u .,*. <-:
--***** .... ; ** .* -. .. f .-.... '*: .:*: "-/. * . .' ., : .. *.* .. *10). **14.--.,..:..11
. . . . ....uu. -=--**
- d : *M-.:: . *'*' .,.,,. -:*. .' *-:*,* .-.:. .,, .... :**-. ..
..
1evc:l at 130".,. ,.* .. *. *.** .-. . . . ... :-t_ *. , .* -,,, :-11) : 14:20 ' . .. _,* . .. .. * . . . .*. .. . ,:. *: .. *.sut>prc:iiJ1en p14eed'"
in
.* :.--12)"
.. 14!lj .
to
....... -. ... *1::* .**, .. . -** , **; . *, '.:* _:* .. ** . ;," .. >>-*:-..... * ..
- r; : .:7 . -** *c, . . '* .* .. .**' !,, .. :" . .-... 'i r f* *f *1 /: * .it( ji. t-'
.. "':-"'-'h'
<..=._,::*,-
.. ,
ft, m *!St ,?
. . * * ' . \ .. * '* ,* .. *,J ... , ... "" .14)
. prasme haa*
to psig. U) 1$;00*
too :All id. a
.. cf
.. 8:1ld eould lw: *
. 16) *19!16 tiAtHr AA41.ye1a
..... '5..... 1 * -. .. ) .. .,..o . #,.,,/.'ff.
U .p CJ 69 .. li)
. , -wa"' * .. q,n* AA'lfr \:
..
'**.***.
.. ** ;':' -,**. *-... *:*.:.,_ . . . . .: .. *'.l'glla.alfl3 an.&1ys1s,
'!Slls ..
' . . '. . **._bl YR4
,.,';---: --... -.
i.A # -* * *-_ -*. : **
..
tiiiter i#pii't.
> ' --. :. ,o'(. . **-. "** ..... --' r r, ** _,: ., *.*::. **. *.* : .. _.,::i::
-*: .-*: .. __ ,_._ ...
_;. J, .* i .. -* -*'*' :* *. :: . .... /.
.&7 .: " * .. .;,;. . " -.... * .. -.. * ,.,_: . :-r . : *--:: *-
. :, ' -*' ' .. . -'.-... *:*19) **: :(l.4...;f}Oir . : .. :*---.
,.. .. ' -. -
. .-::
- ... ..
..
.-*-"'*:,.,;
- .: *: .... ,,;::,*::.Gld .. '.Thl!i!
-1 'bl , .T.3 ici.O *w::./cc
- * :-. * '. * .*" ** . * *, ,
. 6*l x::10-ll u:r.JC.f;
</> .* * ',
, . * * , .. , ._-: .* * :. ,, * >**4tpba
... __ :1 .. 1, I 10""14:
'.** *.* *-*-.. -
' i:. :":---. *. ,-;,_.} * ... -** ' . '::m) -01£B *
-.ei; __ * ... * .. ;
.
... .. 'i . ' ' . . . .. *' * ** '*; f; Sl:Mti;d*:
the* l to. t@:.
-* .::St.ru;.!i in
<itaticn operating dl:t.aeto-r
. .. ,*; .*
V * .::. ;:. .".J_:* ::.*' *.**-** .. _ .... * .. **.* .... *, , . \ . ' . * ... . ->21)
- 10!45 .. * > ==-= ,.* * *: ... Initti\l ilita the dryw;ell.
\A\.9 *-.Da<le to Qbtaifl s.lUaples.
.of 4ili-,;l;t0rt.t.e
I 131 S.5 *x 10-10
.
2.3 x io-_H . tif:/ce . . . -l" I . .. *
.1.a .X 10 .,. UC CC . .
. *
'* b J} , .. . .:, t Fl (j t *.-: f 1