05000249/LER-2016-001, Regarding Alert Declared from Unit 3 HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Fire

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Regarding Alert Declared from Unit 3 HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Fire
ML16239A393
Person / Time
Site: Dresden Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/25/2016
From: Karaba P
Exelon Generation Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
SVPLTR 16-0047 LER 16-001-00
Download: ML16239A393 (4)


LER-2016-001, Regarding Alert Declared from Unit 3 HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Fire
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
LER closed by
IR 05000237/2016010 (5 December 2016)
2492016001R00 - NRC Website

text

--~-Exelon Generation SVPL TR # 16-0047 August 25, 2016 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A TIN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-25 NRG Docket No. 50-249 Dresden Generating Station 6500 North Dresden Road Morris, IL 60450 www.exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50.73

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 249/2016-001-00, Alert Declared from Unit 3 HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Fire Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 249/2016-001-00, "Alert Declared from Unit 3 HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Fire." This report describes events which are being reported in accordance with 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), "Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of... systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Bruce Franzen at (815) 416-2800.

Respectfully, Peter J Karaba Site Vice President Dresden Nuclear Power Station Enclosure Licensee Event Report 249/2016-001-00 cc:

Regional Administrator-NRG Region Ill.

NRG Senior Resident Inspector-Dresden Nuclear Power Station

NRC FORM 366

  • U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.

~~f;}J>A*EO(f~~

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

lfJ

. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER)

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections

~

Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail I

.... ~..,

+#

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form means used to impose an information collection does not display a currenijy valid OMB control htti;i://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3L) number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. PAGE Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 05000249 1 OF 3
4. TITLE Alert Declared from Unit 3 HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Fire
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06*

27 2016 2016 - 001

- 00 08 25 16 05000
9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

D 20.2201

D 20.22oa<a>(a)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A}

1 D 20.2201 <d>

D 20.22oa(a)(a)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

D 20.22oa(a)(1)

D 20.22oa(a)(4)

D 50.1a(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

D 20.22oa<a>(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 1a.11(a)(4)

D 20.2203<a><2>(m>

D 5o.3e(c><2>

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

D 13_11(a)(5)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

D 5o.4e(a)(3)<n>

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D 13_11(a)(1) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

[gl 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(D)

D 13.11<a><2>

D 20.2203(a}(2)(vi)

D 50.73(a}(2)(i)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

D 13.11<a><2><n>

D 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(C)

D OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in D.

Safety Analysis

The safety significance of this condition was low as it did not adversely impact the health and safety of the public. The fire did not cause a plant transient and did not impact any systems or equipment other than the HPCI system which was already declared inoperable for surveillance testing at the time of the event.

During the evolution redundant safety systems remained capable of performing each of the functions required by the safety analysis. The Isolation Condenser [BL] and Automatic Depressurization System [JE] remained in service and were capable of removing heat from containment while the vessel is at high pressure and lowering vessel pressure to allow for the low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems to inject. Both divisions of Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) [BO] remained capable of injection along with both divisions of Core Spray [BM].

Additionally, the Torus Cooling function of LPCI remained available as the primary method of heat removal from primary containment. The torus cooling function of LPCI provides the connection to the ultimate heat sink which was available throughout the evolution.

E.

Corrective Actions

The Unit 3 HPCI AOP motor was replaced and tested satisfactorily. Procedural controls will be enhanced for the installation of Shunt Wound DC motors with external variable shunt field resistors. An Extent of Condition review will be performed on all DC Shunt Field motors where the shunt field resistor range was determined for each motor and it will be verified that each were set appropriately. Additional training will also be conducted on DC motor operation.

Additionally, the list of DC electric motors requiring motor heaters will be validated and thermography will be performed on the listed motors to verify proper operation.

F.

Previous Occurrences

In 2015, the U3 HPCI AOP motor failed during planned maintenance due to carbon dust buildup inside the motor as a result of inadequate cleaning and inspection of the motor and commutator.

G. Component Failure Data

Manufacturer General Electric Model 5CD173XD817 A800-NM245 S/N N/A Type DC Shunt Wound Motor, 40 HP, 250 VDC, 3500 RPM Page _3_ of _3_