ML17264A334

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Proposed Tech Specs Containment Requirements During Mode 6 Cost Beneficial Licensing Action
ML17264A334
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Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/09/1996
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ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
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Attachment IIMarkedUpGinnaStationTechnical Specifications Includedpages(notethatnotallpagesarechanged):

3.9-43.9-5B3.9-1083.9-11B3.9-12B3.9-13B3.9-14B3.9-159602i30336 960209PDRADQCK05000244PPDR ontainment Penetrations 3.9.33.9REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3Containment Penetrations LCO3.9.3Thecontainment penetrations shallbeinthefollowing status:a.Theequipment hatchshallbeeither:1.boltedinplacewithatleastoneaccessdoorclosed,or>gcQ.gvwv+~QplJc'.

isolatedbyaclosure.platthatrestricts airflowfromcontainment; b.Onedoorinthepersonnel airlockshallbeclosed;andc~Eachpenetration providing directaccessfromthecontainment atmosphere totheoutsideatmosphere shallbeeither:1.closedbyamanualorautomatic isolation valve,blindflange,orequivalent, or2.capableofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEContainment Ventilation Isolation System.APPLICABILITY:

DuringCOREALTERATIONS, Duringmovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment.

ACTIONSCONDITION RE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETION TINEA.Oneormorecontainment penetrations notinrequiredstatus.A.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.

ANDImmediately A.2Suspendmovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment.

Immediately R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant<3.9-4Amendment No.61 ontainment Penetrations 3.9.3SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FRE(UENCY SR3.9.3.1Verifyeachrequiredcontainment penetration isintherequiredstatus.7daysSR3.9.3.2Verifyeachrequiredcontainment purgeandexhaustvalveactuatestotheisolation positiononanactualorsimulated actuation signal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-5Amendment No.61 Containment Penetrations 83.9.3B3.9REFUELING OPERATIONS B3.9.3Containment Penetrations BASESBACKGROUND DuringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment, areleaseoffissionproductradioactivity withincontainment willberestricted fromescapingtotheenvironment whentheLCOrequirements aremet.InMODES1,2,3,and4,thisisaccomplished bymaintaining containment OPERABLEasdescribed inLCO3.6.1,"Containment."

InMODE5,therearenoaccidents ofconcernwhichrequirecontainment.

InMODE6,thepotential forcontainment pressurization asaresultofanaccidentisnotlikely;therefore, requirements toisolatethecontainment fromtheoutsideatmosphere canbelessstringent.

TheLCOrequirements arereferredtoas"containment closure"ratherthan"containment OPERABILITY."

Containment closuremeansthatallpotential escapepathsareclosedorcapableofbeingclosed.Sincethereisnopotential forcontainment pressurization, theAppendixJleakagecriteriaandtestsarenotrequired.

LThecontainment servestocontainfissionproductradioactivity thatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowing anaccident, suchthatoffsiteradiation exposures aremaintained withintherequirements of10CFR100.Additionally, thecontainment providesradiation shielding fromthefissionproductsthatmaybepresentinthecontainment atmosphere following accidentconditions.

Thecontainment equipment hatch,whichispartofthecontainment pressureboundary, providesameansformovinglargeequipment andcomponents intoandoutofcontainment.

DuringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment, theequipment hatchmustbeboltedinplace.Goodengineering practicedictatesthataminimumof4boltsbeusedtoholdtheequipment hatchinplaceandthattheboltsbeapproximately euallsaced.Asanalternative, theequipment hatchcaneisolatedbyaclosureplatethatrestricts airflowfromcontainment.

~~4u~~~viva.X~

);~(.<,g.~nba,Q.

4ec.(continued)

R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-10Revision0 Containment Penetrations B3.9.3BASESBACKGROUND (continued) aw0-g<isoX~SC.CC'<cAThecontainment equipment andpersonnel airlocks,whicharealsopartofthecontainment pressureboundary, provideameansforpersonnel accessduringMODES1,2,3;and4inaccordance withLCO3.6.2,"Containment AirLocks."Eachairlockhasadooratbothends.Thedoorsarenormallyinterlocked topreventsimultaneous openingwhencontainment OPERABILITY isrequired.

Duringperiodsofplantshutdownwhencontainment closureisnotrequired, thedoorinterlock mechanism maybedisabled, allowingbothdoorsofanairlocktoremainopenforextendedperiodswhenfrequentcontainment entryisnecessary.

DuringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment, containment closureisrequired; therefore, thedoorinterlock mechanism mayremaindisabled, butoneairlockdoormustalwaysremainclosedinthepersonnel andequipment hatch(unlesstheequipment hatchisisolatedbyaclosureplate).Therequirements forcontainment penetration closureensurethatareleaseoffissionproductradioactivity withincontainment willberestricted fromescapingtotheenvironment.

Theclosurerestrictions aresufficient torestrictfissionproductradioactivity releasefromcontainment duetoafuelhandlingaccidentduringrefueling.

TheContainment PurgeandExhaustSystemincludestwosubsystems.

TheShutdownPurgeSystemincludesa36inchpurgepenetration anda36inchexhaustpenetration.

Thesecondsubsystem, aMini-Purge System,includesa6inchpurgepenetration anda6inchexhaustpenetration.

DuringMODES1,2,3,and4,theshutdownpurgeandexhaustpenetrations areisolatedbyablindflangewithtwo0-ringsthatprovidethenecessary boundary.

Thetwoairoperatedvalvesineachofthetwomini-purge penetrations canbeopenedintermittently, butareclosedautomatically bytheContainment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation System.Neitherofthesubsystems issubjecttoaSpecification inMODE5.(continued)

R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-11Revision0 Containment Penetrations B3.9.3BASES"BACKGROUND (continued)

InNODE6,largeairexchangers areusedtosupportrefueling operations.

Thenormal36inchShutdownPurgeSystemisusedforthispurpose,andeachairoperatedvalveisclosedbytheContainment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation inaccordance withLCO3.3.5,"Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation."

TheMini-Purge Systemalsoremainsoperational inMODE6,andallfourvalvesarealsoclosedbytheContainment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Theothercontainment penetrations thatprovidedirectaccessfromcontainment atmosphere tooutsideatmosphere mustbeisolatedonatleastoneside.Isolation maybeachievedbyanOPERABLEautomatic isolation valve,orbyamanualisolation valve,blindflange,orequivalent.

Equivalent isolation methodsmayincludeuseofamaterialthatcan-provide atemporary, atmospheric

pressure, ventilation barrierfortheothercontainment penetrations duringfuelmovements.

APPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSESDuringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment, themostsevereradiological consequences resultfromafuelhandlingaccident.

Thefuelhandlingaccidentisapostulated eventthatinvolvesdamagetoirradiated fuel(Ref.1).Fuelhandlingaccidents, analyzedusingthecriteriaofReference 2,includedroppingasingleirradiated fuelassemblyandhandlingtooloraheavyobjectontootherirradiated fuelassemblies.

Therequirements ofLCO3.9.6,"Refueling CavityWaterLevel,"andtheminimumdecaytimeof.100hourspriortoCOREALTERATIONS ensurethatthereleaseoffissionproductradioactivity, subsequent toafuelhandlingaccident, resultsindosesthatarewithintheguideline valuesspecified in10CFR100.StandardReviewPlan(SRP),Section15.7.4,Rev.1(Ref.2),requirescontainment closureeventhoughthisisnotanassumption oftheaccidentanalyses.

Theacceptance limitsforoffsiteradiation exposureis96rem(Ref.3).Containment penetrations satisfyCriterion 3oftheNRCPolicyStatement sincetheseareassumedintheSRP.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-12(continued)

Revision0 Containment Penetrations B3.9.3BASES(continued)

LCOThisLCOlimitstheconsequences ofafuelhandlingaccidentincontainment bylimitingthepotential escapepathsforfissionproductradioactivity releasedwithincontainment.

TheLCOrequiresanypenetration providing directaccessfromthecontainment atmosphere totheoutsideatmosphere tobeclosedexceptfortheOPERABLEcontainment purgeandexhaustpenetrations.

FortheOPERABLEcontainment purgeandexhaustpenetrations, thisLCOensuresthatatleastonevalveineachofthesepenetrations isisolablebytheContainment Ventilation Isolation System.APPLICABILITY Theco'ntainment penetration requirements areapplicable duringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment becausethisiswhenthereisapotential forafuelhandlingaccident.

InMODESI,2,3,and4,containment penetration requirements areaddressed byLCO3.6.1.InMODES5and6,whenCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment arenotbeingconducted, thepotential forafuelhandlingaccidentdoesnotexist.Therefore, undertheseconditions, norequirements areplacedoncontainment penetration status.ACTIONSA.1andA.2~>~goivaK~Ifthecontainment equipment hatch(oritsclosureplate,airlockdoors,oranycontainment penetration thatprovidesdirectaccessfromthecontainment atmosphere totheoutsideatmosphere isnotintherequiredstatus,including theContainment Ventilation Isolation Systemnotcapableofautomatic actuation whenthepurgeandexhaustvalvesareopen,theplantmustbeplacedinacondition wheretheisolation functionisnotneeded.Thisisaccomplished byimmediately suspending COREALTERATIONS andmovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment.

Performance oftheseactionsshallnotprecludecompletion ofmovementofacomponent toasafeposition.

R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.9-13(continued)

Revision0 Containment Penetrations B3.9.3BASES(continued)

SURVEILLANCE RE(UIREMENTS SR3.9.3.1ThisSRdemonstrates thateachofthecontainment penetrations requiredtobeinitsclosedpositionisinthatposition.

TheSurveillance ontheopenpurgeandexhaustvalveswilldemonstrate thatthevalvesarenotblockedorotherwise prevented Fromclosing(e.g.,solenoidunabletovent).TheSurveillance isperformed every7daysduringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment.

TheSurveillance intervalisselectedtobecommensurate withthenormaldurationoftimetocompletefuelhandlingoperations.

Assuch,thisSurveillance ensuresthatapostulated fuelhandlingaccidentthatreleasesfissionproductradioactivity withinthecontainment willnotresultinareleaseoffissionproductradioactivity totheenvironment.

SR3.9.3.2ThisSRdemonstrates thateachcontainment purgeandexhaustvalveactuatestoitsisolation positiononmanualinitiation oronanactualorsimulated highradiation signal.The24monthFrequency maintains consistency withothersimilarinstrumentation andvalvetestingrequirements.

InLCO3.3.5,theContainment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation requiresaCHANNELCHECKevery12hoursandaCOTevery92daystoensurethechannelOPERABILITY duringrefueling operations.

Every24monthsanACTUATION LOGICTESTandCHANNELCALIBRATION isperformed.

TheseSurveillances willensurethatthevalvesarecapableofclosingafterapostulated fuelhandlingaccidenttolimitareleaseoffission,productradioactivity fromthecontainment.

R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-14(continued)

Revision0 ontainment Penetrations B3.9.3BASES(continued)

REFERENCES 1.UFSAR,Section15.7.2.NUREG-800, Section15.7.4,Rev.1,July1981.3.LetterfromD.N.Crutchfield, NRC,toJ.Haier,RGLE,

Subject:

"FuelHandlingAccidentInsideContainment,"

datedOctober7,1981.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-15Revision0

Attachment IIIProposedTechnical Specifications Includedpages(notethatnotallpagesarechanged):

3.9-43.9-5B3.9-10B3.9-11B3.9-12B3.9-13B3.9-14B3.9-15 ontainment Penetrations 3.9.33.9REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3Containment Penetrations LCO3.9.3Thecontainment penetrations shallbeinthefollowing status:a.Theequipment hatchshallbeeither:1.boltedinplacewithatleastoneaccessdoorclosed,or2.isolatedbyaclosureplate,orequivalent, thatrestricts airflowfromcontainment; b.Onedoorinthepersonnel airlockshallbeclosed;andc~Eachpenetration providing directaccessfromthecontainment atmosphere totheoutsideatmosphere shallbeeither:1.closedbyamanualorautomatic isolation valve,blindflange,orequivalent, or2.'apable ofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEContainment Ventilation Isolation System.APPLICABILITY:

DuringCOREALTERATIONS, Duringmovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment.

ACTIONSCONDITION REQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETION TIMEA.Oneormorecontainment penetrations notinrequiredstatus.A.lSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.

ANDA.2Suspendmovementofi}radiatedfuelassemblies withincontainment.

Immediately Immediately R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantl3.9-1Amendment No.g Containment Penetrations 3.9.3SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR3.9.3.1Verifyeachrequiredcontainment penetration isintherequiredstatus.7daysSR3.9.3.2Verifyeachrequiredcontainment purgeandexhaustvalveactuatestotheisolation positiononanactualorsimulated actuation signal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-5Amendment No.61 j4ontainment Penetrations B3.9.3B3.9REFUELING OPERATIONS 83.9.3Containment Penetrations BASESBACKGROUND DuringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment, areleaseoffissionproductradioactivity withincontainment willberestricted fromescapingtotheenvironment whentheLCOrequirements aremet.InMODES1,2,3,and4,thisisaccomplished bymaintaining containment OPERABLEasdescribed inLCO3.6.1,"Containment."

InMODE5,therearenoaccidents ofconcernwhichrequirecontainment.

InMODE6,thepotential forcontainment pressurization asaresultofanaccidentisnotlikely;therefore, requirements toisolatethecontainment fromtheoutsideatmosphere canbelessstringent.

TheLCOrequirements arereferredtoas"containment closure"ratherthan"containment OPERABILITY."

Containment closuremeansthatallpotential escapepathsareclosedorcapableofbeingclosed.Sincethereisnopotential forcontainment pressurization, theAppendixJleakagecriteriaandtestsarenotrequired.

Thecontainment servestocontainfissionproductradioactivity thatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowing anaccident, suchthatoffsiteradiation exposures aremaintained withintherequirements of10CFR100.Additionally, thecontainment providesradiation shielding fromthefissionproductsthatmaybepresentinthecontainment atmosphere following accidentconditions.

Thecontainment equipment hatch,whichispartofthecontainment pressureboundary, providesameansformovinglargeequipment andcomponents intoandoutofcontainment.

DuringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment, theequipment hatchmustbeboltedinplace.Goodengineering practicedictatesthataminimumof4boltsbeusedtoholdtheequipment hatchinplaceandthattheboltsbeapproximately equallyspaced.Asanalternative, theequipment hatchopeningcanbeisolatedbyaclosureplate,orbyanequivalent isolation barrier(e.g.,overheaddoorassembly),

thatrestricts airflowfromcontainment.

(continued)

R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-1RevisionP llht ontainment Penetrations B3.9.3BASESBACKGROUND (continued)

Thecontainment equipment andpersonnel airlocks,whicharealsopartofthecontainment pressureboundary, provideameansforpersonnel accessduringMODESI,2,3,and4inaccordance withLCO3.6.2,"Containment AirLocks."Eachairlockhasadooratbothends.Thedoorsarenormallyinterlocked topreventsimultaneous openingwhencontainment OPERABILITY isrequired.

Duringperiodsofplantshutdownwhencontainment closureisnotrequired, thedoorinterlock mechanism maybedisabled, allowingbothdoorsofanairlocktoremainopenforextendedperiodswhenfrequentcontainment entryisnecessary.

DuringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies withincontainment, containment closureisrequired; therefore, thedoorinterlock mechanism mayremaindisabled, butoneairlockdoormustalwaysremainclosedinthepersonnel andequipment hatch(unlesstheequipment hatchisisolatedbyaclosureplateorequivalent barrier).

Therequirements forcontainment penetration closureensurethatareleaseoffissionproductradioactivity withincontainment willberestricted fromescapingtotheenvironment.

Theclosurerestrictions aresufficient torestrictfissionproductradioactivity releasefromcontainment duetoafuelhandlingaccidentduringrefueling.

TheContainment PurgeandExhaustSystemincludestwosubsystems.

TheShutdownPurgeSystemincludesa36inchpurgepenetration anda36inchexhaustpenetration.

Thesecondsubsystem, aMini-Purge System,includesa6inchpurgepenetration anda6inchexhaustpenetration.

DuringMODESI,2,3,and4,theshutdownpurgeandexhaustpenetrations areisolatedbyablindflangewithtwo0-ringsthatprovidethenecessary boundary.

Thetwoairoperatedvalvesineachofthetwomini-purge penetrations canbeopenedintermittently, butareclosedautomatically bytheContainment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation System.Neitherofthesubsystems issubjecttoaSpecification inMODE5.(continued)

R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.9-2RevisionP ontainment Penetrations B3.9.3BASESBACKGROUND (continued)

InHODE6,largeairexchangers areusedtosupportrefueling operations.

Thenormal36inchShutdownPurgeSystemisusedforthispurpose,andeachairoperatedvalveisclosedbytheContainment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation inaccordance withLCO3.3.5,"Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation."

TheHini-Purge Systemalsoremainsoperational inHODE6,andallfourvalvesarealsoclosedbytheContainment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Theothercontainment penetrations thatprovidedirectaccessfromcontainment atmosphere tooutsideatmosphere mustbeisolatedonat,leastoneside.Isolation maybeachievedbyanOPERABLE.

automatic isolation valve,orbyamanualisolation valve,blindflange,orequivalent.

Equivalent isolation methodsmayincludeuseofamaterialthatcanprovideatemporary, atmospheric

pressure, ventilation barrierfortheothercontainment penetrations duringfuel'movements.

APPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSESDuringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment, themostsevereradiological consequences resultfromafuelhandlingaccident.

Thefuelhandlingaccidentisapostulated eventthatinvolvesdamagetoirradiated, fuel(Ref.1).Fuelhandlingaccidents, analyzedusingthecriteriaofReference 2,includedroppingasingleirradiated fuelassemblyandhandlingtooloraheavyobjectontootherirradiated fuelassemblies.

Therequirements ofLCO3.9.6,"Refueling CavityWaterLevel,"andtheminimumdecaytimeof100hourspriortoCOREALTERATIONS ensurethatthereleaseoffissionproductradioactivity, subsequent toafuelhandlingaccident, resultsindosesthatarewithintheguideline valuesspecified in10CFR100.'tandard ReviewPlan(SRP),Section15.7.4,Rev.1(Ref.2),requirescontainment closureeventhoughthisisnotanassumption oftheaccidentanalyses.

Theacceptance limitsforoffsiteradiation exposureis96rem(Ref.3).Containment penetrations satisfyCriterion 3oftheNRCPolicyStatement sincetheseareassumedintheSRP.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-3(continued)

Revision0 ontainment Penetrations 83.9.3BASES(continued)

LCOThisLCOlimitstheconsequences ofafuelhandlingaccidentincontainment bylimitingthepotential escapepathsforfissionproductradioactivity releasedwithincontainment.

TheLCOrequiresanypenetration providing directaccessfromthecontainment atmosphere totheoutsideatmosphere tobeclosedexceptfortheOPERABLEcontainment purgeandexhaustpenetrations.

FortheOPERABLEcontainment purgeandexhaustpenetrations, thisLCOensuresthatatleastonevalveineachofthesepenetrations isisolablebytheContainment Ventilation Isolation System.APPLICABILITY Thecontainment penetration requirements areapplicable duringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment becausethisiswhenthereisapotential forafuelhandlingaccident.

InNODESI,2,3,and4,containment penetration requirements areaddressed byLCO3.6.1.InNODES5and6,whenCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment arenotbeingconducted, thepotential forafuelhandlingaccidentdoesnotexist.Therefore, undertheseconditions, norequirements areplacedoncontainment penetration status.ACTIONSA.landA.2Ifthecontainment equipment hatch(oritsclosureplateorequivalent),

airlockdoors,oranycontainment penetration thatprovidesdirectaccessfromthecontainment atmosphere totheoutsideatmosphere isnotintherequiredstatus,including theContainment Ventilation Isolation Systemnotcapableofautomatic actuation whenthepurgeandexhaustvalvesareopen,theplantmustbeplacedinacondition wheretheisolation functionisnotneeded.Thisisaccomplished byimmediately suspending COREALTERATIONS andmovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment.

Performance oftheseactionsshallnotprecludecompletion ofmovementofacomponent toasafeposition.

R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-4(continued)

RevisionP 00'(~dhTI 0tContainment Penetrations 83.9.3BASES(continued)

SURVEILLANCE RE(UIREHENTS SR,3.9.3.1 ThisSRdemonstrates thateachofthecontainment penetrations requiredtobeinitsclosedpositionisinthatposition.

TheSurveillance ontheopenpurgeandexhaustvalveswilldemonstrate thatthevalvesarenotblockedorotherwise prevented fromclosing(e.g.,solenoidunabletovent).TheSurveillance isperformed every7daysduringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment.

TheSurveillance intervalisselectedtobecommensurate withthenormaldurationoftimetocompletefuelhandlingoperations.

Assuch,thisSurveillance ensures'thatapostulated fuelhandlingaccidentthatreleasesfissionproductradioactivity withinthecontainment willnotresultinareleaseoffissionproductradioactivity totheenvironment.

SR3.9.3.2ThisSRdemonstrates thateachcontainment purgeandexhaustvalveactuates.to itsisolation position.

onmanualinitiation oronanactualorsimulated highradiation signal.The24monthFrequency maintains consistency withothersimilarinstrumentation andvalvetestingrequirements.

InLCO3.3.5,theContainment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation requiresaCHANNELCHECKevery12hoursandaCOTevery92daystoensurethechannelOPERABILITY duringrefueling operations.

Every24monthsanACTUATION LOGICTESTandCHANNELCALIBRATION isperformed.

TheseSurveillances willensurethatthevalvesarecapableofclosingafterapostulated fuelhandlingaccidenttolimitareleaseoffissionproductradioactivity fromthecontainment.

R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-5(continued)

Revision0 ontainment Penetrations B3.9.3BASES(continued)

REFERENCES 1.UFSAR,Section15.7.2.NUREG-800, Section15.7.4,Rev.1,July1981.3.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.Haier,RGLE,

Subject:

"FuelHandlingAccidentInsideContainment,"

datedOctober7,1981.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-6'evision0 Attachment IVI"uelHandlingAccidentInsideContainment DoseConsequence AnalysisforGinnaStation FuelHandlingAccidentInsideContainment DoseConsequence AnalysisforGinnaStation1.0BACKGROUND TheGinnaStationTechnical Specifications requirethatcontainment "closure" beineffectduringmovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withincontainment andduringcorealterations.

Containment "closure" isdefinedinLCO3.9.3asisolating, orproviding automatic isolation capability, forallpenetrations whichprovidedirectaccessfromthecontainment atmosphere totheoutsideatmosphere.

Specificrequirements areprovidedforthepersonnel andequipment airlocksinthatatleastonedoorintheassociated airlockmustbeclosed.Aclosureplatewhichrestricts airflowfromcontainment canalsobeusedinplaceoftheequipment hatchanditsassociated airlockdooi'.Thesetechnical specification requirements areprovidedeventhoughcontainment closureisnotcreditedinthefuelhandlingaccidentdoseconsequences asdescribed inthetechnical specification bases.StandardReviewPlan(SRP)15.7.4statesthatifa"fuelhandlingaccidentwilloccuronlywhenthecontainment isisolated, noradiological consequences needbecalculated."

TheSRPfurtherstatesthatif"containment willbeopenduringfuelhandlingoperations, aswithacontainment purgeexhaustsystem"itshouldbeverifiedthattheresulting dosesare"wellwithin"10CFRPart100limits(i.e.,75remforthethyroidand6remforthewhole-body).

SinceGinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheSRP,itdoesnot(andisnotrequiredto)meettheselimits.Assuch,thefuelhandlingaccidentwithincontainment forGinnaStationshowsanoffsitedoseof96remthyroidwhichhasbeenpreviously acceptedbytheNRCasbeing"wellwithin"10CFRPart100limits(UFSARSection15.7.3.3.2.2).

Insupportoftheupcomingsteamgenerator replacement outage,RG&;Eisrequesting torevisetheexistingtechnical specification requirements relatedtotheequipment hatchtoallowuseofaninstalled overheaddoorassemblytoisolatetheequipment hatchopening.ThisoverheaddoorassemblyissimilartothoseusedinBWRcontainments andintheGinnaStationAuxiliary Building(whichalsohastechnical specification requirements associated withitduringmovementofirradiated fuelassemblies withintheAuxiliary Building).

Withtheuseoftheoverheaddoorassembly, containment "closure" isessentially maintained sincethebasesforLCO3.9.3specifically statethat"sincethereisnopotential forcontainment pressurization, theAppendixJleakagecriteriaandtestsarenotrequired" fortheisolation devicesusedtomeetthisLCO.However,itisrecognized thattheoverheaddoorassemblycouldcreatealargerreleasepathfromcontainment thanfromotherpenetrations duetoitssizeandthesmallgapswhichexistbetweenthedoorandequipment hatchopening.Therefore, thepurposeofthisanalysisistocalculate wholebodyandthyroiddosesinthecontrolroomandfortheexclusion areaboundary(EAB)withtheequipment hatchopeningisolatedusingtheinstalled overheaddoorassemblyinplaceofthecurrentoptionsprovidedintechnical specifications.

Inperforming thisanalysis, severalissuesmustbeaddressed.

Thesearebrieflydiscussed below:TheGinnaStationUFSAR(Section2.3.4.2)providesanatmospheric dispersion factor(i.e.,X/Q)valueof4.8E-4sec/m'ortheEABduringthefirst2hoursofanaccident.

TheX/QvalueforthecontrolroomisprovidedinUFSARTable6.4-1as1.9E-4sec/m~.ThisvalueislessthanthatfortheEABeventhoughthecontrolroomisclosertothereleasesource.Therefore, thisanalysismustdetermine anappropriate valuetouseinordertocalculate controlroomdoses.Aleakageratefromcontainment viatheoverheaddoorassemblymustbedetermined duringthetwohourreleasefollowing thefuelhandlingaccident.

Thisincludesconsideration ofleakagefromotheravailable pathways(e.g.,purgelineswhichmaybeopened).Theanalysismustbeperformed usingthehigherenrichment fuelwithhigherpeakingfactorsthatisbeingusedfortheupcomingfuelcycle.Theseissuesareevaluated indetailbelow.2.0DETERMINATION OFX/QVALUESThebasicequationusedforthespatialdistribution ofmaterials releasedundertheinfluence ofthebuildingwakeis:X/Q=K/AUwhere:Kisthenondimensional concentration coefficient whichisafunctionoftheconfiguration ofnearbystructures, thereleaseandintakelocations, andthewindlocation; Aisthereference buildingarea;andUisthewindvelocityatthetopofthereference building.

Theplantconfiguration isshowninFigure1.Thecriticalfeaturesasshownonthisfigureisthatthecontrolroomintakesourceisontopofthecontrolroombuilding.

TheKvaluesusedintheaboveequationforthepurposeofthisanalysisarefromDr.J.Halitskybasedonfieldandwindtunnelexperiments (seeChapter5ofMeteorology andAtomicEnergy,1968,TID-24190).

Table1providestheKvaluesforeachwinddirection forthereleaseconfiguration beingevaluated atGinna.

TheTable1Kvaluesandthecontrolbuildingareaof2,964m'ereinputintheaboveequationandprocessed through3yearsofhourlyaveragedweatherdatafromtheGinnasiteweathertower(1992-1994).Theresulting X/Qvaluesatthecontrolroomintakeontopofthecontrolbuildingstructure werethenplottedinFigure2.Asshownbythisfigure,the5%probablevalueofX/Qis3.0E-4sec/m'.Theabovecalculated valueislargerthanthecontrolroomX/QvalueprovidedinUFSARTable6.4-1,butsmallerthantheX/QvalueprovidedintheGinnaStationUFSARfortheEAB.Thevaluecalculated fortheEABisbasedongeneric(i.e.,conservative) assumptions whichifweresimilarly evaluated usingplantspecificconsiderations wouldbelowered(seeUFSARSection2.3.4.2.2).

Therefore, theUFSARX/QvaluefortheEABwillbeconservatively usedinthisanalysisforboththeEABandthecontrolroom.3.0DETERMINATION OFCONTAINMENT LEAKAGERATESTheexistingUFSARanalysisforfuelhandlingaccidents assumesthatcontainment isnotisolatedatthetimeoftheevent.However,forthepurposeofthisanalysis, containment willbeintheconfiguration requiredbytechnical specifications.

Therefore, aleakageratefromcontainment mustbedetermined asdiscussed below:3.1ini-PureandhudownPrePenrinThesepenetrations maybeopenedduringfuelmovementprovidedthattheyarecapableofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEContainment Ventilation Isolation Signal.Theisolation valvesforthesepenetrations aredesignedtoclosewithin2secondsfromthetimeasignalisgenerated oratotalof5secondsfollowing theevent(seeUFSARTable6.2-15).Thistimelimitisconsistent withBranchTechnical PositionCSB6-4toensurethattheimpactondoseanalysesisminimized.

Therefore, leakagethroughthesepathwaysisconsidered negligible andignoredforthepurposeofthisanalysis.

3.2EuimenHchninTheinstalled overheaddoorassemblyhassmallgapsbetweenthedoorandtheequipment hatchopening.Thesegapscreatethepotential forareleasepathfromcontainment.

Assuch,theleakratethroughthesegapsmustbedetermined.

Thefirststepistoestimatethesizeofthegaps.Anestimateofa1/4inchgapfortheentire88feetcircumference oftheopeningisused.Thisresultsinaleakageareaof1.83ft~.Itshouldbenotedthatthis1/4"gapisindicative ofthetypeofcontainment barrierwhichtheoverheaddoorassemblyisintendedtoprovideandnotanacceptance limitforitsoperability duetotheotherconservatisms usedinthisanalysis.

Thenextstepistodetermine theleakagethroughthisarea.Asdiscussed inthebasesforLCO3.9.3,containment pressurization isnotassumedforafuelhandlingaccident.

However,somepressuredifferential mustbeassumedtocreatealeakagepathtotheoutsideenvironment.

Forconservatism, twosourcesofpressuredifferential wereconsidered asshownbelow:

Forthefirstthreeminutesfollowing thefuelhandlingaccident, containment isassumedtobepressurized by0.5psigabovetheoutsideatmosphere.

This3minutesisthetimeittakesforthecontainment freevolumetoequalizewiththeoutsideatmosphere throughthe1.83ft~gap.Thisequatestoaleakagerateof8240cfm.b.Fortheremaining twohourduration, aleakageratebasedonthemaximumtemperature difference betweencontainment (120'F)andtheoutsideatmosphere

(-2'F)isassumed.Thisequatestoaleakagerate.of320cfm.3.3theroninmenPenerinsTheremaining containment penetrations whichprovidedirectaccessfromcontainment totheoutsideenvironment mustbeclosedbyamanualorautomatic isolation valve,blindflange,orequivalent pertechnical specifications.

Asdiscussed inthebasesforLCO3.9.3,theseisolation devicesdonothavetomeet10CFR50,AppendixJleakagerequirements suchthatleakagethroughthesepenetrations canexist.AtGinnaStation,mostpenetrations whichprovidedirectaccesstotheoutsideenvironment donothaveisolation capability otherthantheinstalled containment isolation valves.Therefore, LCO3.9.3istypically metthroughtheuseoftheseinstalled containment isolation valves.Inaddition, duetotheconservative assumptions fortheequipment hatch,leakagethroughthesepathswasignored.4.0DOSECALCULATIONS Thesourceoffissionproductsreleasedfromthefuelafter100hoursdecayandtheassumptions foriodineformandremovalarebasedonRegulatory Guide1.25.Thisanalysisassumesthatthefissionproductinventory fromthehighestratedassemblywasreleasedtothereactorcavitywater.Table2showstheassumedsourcetermforeachisotope.Thewholebodydosecalculations weremadeusingthefollowing relations anddosefactorsfromTables3and4.where:fii~istheactivebreathing rate(assumedtobe3.47E-4m'/sec);fistheaveragerelativeconcentration inthecontrolroombasedonthein-leakage, filtration, andtotalvolumeofthecontrolroom(seeTable3);Q;isthecuriequantityinthecontainment available forleakage;

'wf>>;istheadultthyroidinhalation dosefactorfortheisotope;andnisthenumberofiodineisotopes.

Thewholebodydoseconservatively combinesboththegammaandbetacontributions inthefollowing relationship forasemi-infinite plume:tlnDb=Xlg[023QgBp'25QgB]llllwhereBandB,aretheaveragebetaandgammaenergiesinunitsofmevperdisintegration.

Valuesfortheseparameters aregiveninTable4.5.0RESULTSTheresultsoftheanalysisforthevariouscombinations areprovidedinTable3.Thethreecaseswhichwererunaredescribed belowwiththedifferences betweenthethreecasesstrictlyduetoassumptions withrespecttothecontrolroomventilation configurations:

5.1Qase1Thecontrolroomwasassumedtobeinthenormalconfiguration atthetimeofthefuelhandlingaccident.

Thisresultsin2000cfmofunfiltered airbeingtakenintothecontrolroomforthefirst30secondsfollowing thefuelhandlingaccidentuntilthecontrolroomisisolatedandthesystemswitchestoemergency recirculation modewithairbeingforcedthroughacharcoalsystem.5.2Qgse2Thecontrolroomwasassumedtobeisolatedpriortothefuelhandlingaccidentandsubsequently placedintherecirculation mode.5.3~se3Thecontrolroomwasassumedtobeisolatedpriortothefuelhandlingaccidentwiththerecirculation modeunavailable.

Theresultsfromeachofthesecasesdemonstrate thattheEABdosesremainfarbelowtheSRPrequirements of75rematthethyroidandthatthecontrolroomdosesremainfarbelowthelimitsofGeneralDesignCriteria19of30remthyroid.

TABLE1.CONCENTRATION COEFFICIENTS (K)VALUESFORGINNACONTROLROOMGIVENARELEASEATTHEEQUIPMENT HATCHWINDDIRECTION, 8INDSFRO3.022.54567.590112.5135157.5180202.5225247.5270292.5315337.5Reference Area,A=2964m'eference HeightforWind=36mAGL4.50.00.00.00.00.00.00.3752.254.52.251.50.750.3750.0 TABLE2.FUELGAPINVENTORY RELEASEDATTIMEOFGINNAFUELHANDLINGACCIDENT(100HoursAfterShutdown)

ISOTOPEI-131I-132I-133I-134I-135Kr-85mKr-85Kr-87Kr-88Xe-131mXe-133mXe-133Xe-135mXe-135Xe-138CURIESRELEASEDTOREACTORCAVITYORSPENTFUELPOOLWATER5.16E+04Negligible 4.50E+03Negligible 3.22E+003.12E-031.72E+03Negligible Negligible 6.35E+021.55E+03,8.33E+045.16E-011.56E+02Negligible CURIESRELEASEDTOCONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE 5.16E+02Negligible 4.50E+01Negligible 3.22E-023.12E-031.72E+03Negligible Negligible 6.35E+021.55E+038.33E+045.16E-011.56E+02Negligible 4$'.laiCl TABLE3.ASSUMPTIONS FORGINNAFUELHANDLINGACCIDENTINSIDECONTAINMENT CASE1CASE2CASE3Containment Volume(ft')Containment LeakRateDuringFirst3min(cfm)Containment LeakRateDuringLast117min(cfm)ControlRoomIn-Leakage (cfm)ControlRoomVolume(ft)ControlRoomRecirculation Rate(cfm)1.0E61.0E61.0E682408240824032032032046464645,78445,78445,784200020000IodineFilterEfficiency

-elemental (rem)-organic(rem)0.90.70.90.70.90.7FractionofIodinethatis-elemental (rem)-organic(rem)Initial(30sec)ControlRoomFlow(cfm)Breathing Rate(m'/sec)EABX/Q(sec/m')ControlRoomIntakeX/Q(sec/m')WholeBodyDose(P+y)-EAB(rem)-ControlRoom(rem)ThyroidDose-EAB(rem)-'ontrolRoom(rem)0.750.750.750.250.250.25200003.47E-43.47E-43.47E-44.8E-44.8E-44.8E-44.8E-44.8E-44.8E-40.120.120.120.050.0070.0078.18.18.10.790.160.538 TABLE4.ISOTOPICDATAFORFUELHANDLINGACCIDENTISOTOPEI-131I-132I-133I-134I-135Kr-85mKr-85Kr-87Kr-88Xe-131mXe-133mXe-133Xe-135mXe-135Xe-138EpV/DIS1.91E-14.90E-14.09E-16.08E-13.69E-12.70E-12.70E-l1.42EO4.00E-11.50E-12.00E-11.40E-11.00E-l3.40E-16.50E-1EV/DIS3.80E-12.29EO6.07E-12.63EO1.57EO1.56E-12.20E-37.84E-11.93EO1.98E-24.16E-24.48E-24.28E-12.44E-11.17EOTHYROIDDOSEFACTORM/C1.48E65.35E44.05ES2.50E41.24E5

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