ML17325B670

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Final Deficiency Rept (D/N#49) Re Nonconforming Weld Repair of Beam Cope Burn Cuts.Initially Reported on 830624.Total of 1,442 Beam Assemblies Examined,Including 3,318 Coped Corners.All Physical Repair Activities Completed
ML17325B670
Person / Time
Site: Satsop
Issue date: 06/20/1984
From: KOHLER A D
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To: BISHOP T W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
(CD-N#49), (D-N#49), GO3-84-397, NUDOCS 8406290336
Download: ML17325B670 (9)


Text

ACCELERATEDDOCUMENTDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEMREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)-ACCESSIONNBR:9406290336DOC.DATE:94/06/21NOTARIZED:YESDOCKETFACIE:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPower,Plant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit2,Indiana-M05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONFITPATRICK,E.IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerlyIndiana&MichiganEleRECIP.NAME-RECIPIENTAFFILIATIONRDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)I

SUBJECT:

SubmitsresponsetoviolationsnotedinInspRepts50-315/94-07&50-316/94-07.Correctiveactions:sealleakoffDproblemsledtoraisingCCWtempcorrectedduringUnit11994refuelingoutage.SDISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponse/NOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-1PDCOPIESRECIPIENTLTTRENCL'DCODE/NAME11HICKMAN,JCOPIESLTTRENCL11DDINTERNAL:AEOD/DEIBAEOD/DSP/TPABDEDRONRR/DRCH/HHFBCg~F'xr,z02EXTERNALEG&G/BRYCEiJAHNSIC111'1111111111111111AEOD/DSP/ROABAEOD/TTCNRR/DORS/OEABNRR/PMAS/ILPB1NUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS2RES/HFBNRCPDR1111111111111111DDNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTSPI'""'LPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CQNTACI'THEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPi-s7(EXT.504-2065)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR20ENCL20 indianaMichiganPowerCompanyP.O.Box16631Columbus,OH43216INDIANA'ICHIGANPolVkRAEP:NRC:1212DDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2DocketNos.50-315and50-316LicenseNos.DPR-58andDPR-74NRCINSPECTIONREPORTNOS.50-315/94007(DRS);50-316/94007(DRS)REPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATIONU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission'ocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Attn:Mr.J.B,MartinJune21,1994

DearMr.Martin:

ThisletterisinresponsetoaUSNRCletterdatedMay27,1994,thatforwardedanoticeofviolationtoIndianaMichiganPowerCompany.ThenoticeofviolationcontainedaviolationidentifiedduringaninspectionconductedbyMessrs.K.SalehiandC.GillfromApril11throughApril22,1994.TheviolationisassociatedwiththeoperatingtemperatureoftheComponentCoolingWater(CCW)system,Ourreplytothenoticeofviolationisprovidedintheattachmenttothisletter.Thisletterissubmittedpursuantto10CFR50.54(f)and,assuch,anoathstatementisattached.Sincerely,EF~p~)E.E.FitzpatrickVicePresidentdrAttachmentcc:A.A.BlindG.CharnoffW.T.Russell,NRC-Washington,D.C.NRCResidentInspectorNFEMSectionChiefJ.R.PadgettF~8~9P0b29033b9<0b>>PDRADOGK050003158PDRpalI STATEOFOHIO)COUNTYOFFRANKLIN)E.E.Fitzpatrick,beingdulysworn,deposesandsaysthatheistheVicePresidentoflicenseeIndianaMichiganPowerCompany,thathehasreadtheforgoingResponsetoNRCINSPECTIONREPORTNOS.50-315/94007(DRS);50-316/94007(DRS)REPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATIONandknowsthecontentsthereof;andthatsaidcontentsaretruetothebestofhisknowledgeandbelief..)IS/SubscribedandsworntobeforemethisdayofNOTARPUBLI,+~~>S'zrc~

ATTACHMENTTOAEP:NRC:1212DREPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATION ATTACHMENTTOAEP'NRC:1212DPage1BackgroundAroutinesafetyinspectionwasconductedbyMessrs.C.GillandK.SalehifromAprilllthroughApril22,1994.Theinspectionwastodetermineifdesign'hanges,engineeringsupport,andcorrectiveactionswereeffectivelycontrolledandimplemented.Theinspectionidentifiedoneviolation.Theviolationwasforfailuretoperformarequire'dsafetyevaluationofaproposedchangeinthefacility,asdescribedintheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR),toascertainwhethertheproposedchangeinvolvedanunreviewedsafetyquestion.TheviolationisthattheUFSARtemperatureof95'FfortheComponentCoolingWater(CCW)supplywasauthorizedtobeincreasedto105FforUnit1bytheOperationsDepartmentSuperintendentwithoutarequfredsafetyevaluatfonandwithout/',arevisiontotheCCWoperatingprocedure,whichspecifieda95Flimitation.Subsequently,theCCWsupplytemperatureincreasedto110FduringatransientinducedbyintermittentboricacidevaporatoroperationonJanuary27and28,1994.AcontributingfactorstoexceedingCCWspecifiedsupplytemperaturewasthefailureoftheoperationsdepartmenttoresettheCCWsupply(heatexchangeroutlet)temperaturealarmsetpointfrom95Fto105F.ThisviolationwassetforthinalettercontainingthenoticeofviolationdatedMay27,1994,fromMr.MarkA.Ring,Chief,OperationsBranch.TheletterwasreceivedJune6,1994.Ourresponsetothenoticeofviolationiscontainedwithinthisdocument.NRCViolation"10CFR50.59requires,inpart,thatchangesmadetothefacilityasdescribedinthesafetyanalysisreport,beevaluatedinaccordancewith50.59(a)todetermine,inpart,ifanunreviewedsafetyquestionexists.Section9.5.3oftheD.C.CookNuclearPlantUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport(USAR)statesthattheComponentCoolingWater(CCW)systemcomponentdesigndataarelistedinTable9.5-3.Table9.5-3statesthattheshellsideCCWheatexchangeroutletdesignwatertemperatureis95F.Contrarytotheabove,theUnit1CCWheatexchangeroutletwatertemperatureasdescribedinTable9.5-3oftheUSARwasauthorizedtobeexceeded,andwasactuallyexceeded,onJanuary27,1994,withouttherequiredevaluationtodetermineifanunreviewedsafetyquestionexisted.Specifically,theOperationsDepartmentSuperintendentauthorizedincreasingthetemperaturelimitto105'Fat1915hoursonJanuary27,1994,andsubsequently,theoperatorincreasedthetemperatureabove95'F.Thetemperaturewasallowedtoincreaseto110F.eThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI)."

ATTACHMENTTOAEP:NRC:1212DPage2ResponsetoViolationInthecoverlettertothenoticeofviolationtheNRCrequestedthatweaddressinourresponsethesafetysignificanceoftheevent,theidentifiedconcernsandcontributingfactors,andtheconclusionsofanongoingrootcauseteaminvestigation.Thefollowingprovidestherequestedinformation:SafetySignificanceTheoperationat105FwithsubsequentCCWsupplytemperaturesashighas110'FbecauseofatransientinducedbyintermittentboricacidevaporatoroperationonJanuary27and28,1994wasofnosafetysignificance.ThemaximumComponentCoolingWater(CCW)temperaturefortheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantsUnit1and2is120'FforWestinghousesuppliedequipment.ThereactorcoolantpumpthermalbarriersarethelimitingcomponentfortheCCWmaximumtemperature,andthelimitingmodesofoperationoccurduringtheplantcooldownorpost-LOCA.TheotherWestinghousesuppliedcomponentshavelimitsgreaterthan120F.ConcernsandContributingfactorsThereweretwoconcernsandtwocontributingfactorsidentifiedintheNRCcoverletter.Theconcernsare:1)theauthorizationbytheOperationsDepartmentSuperintendenttoincreasedCCWtemperaturefromthe95'Fto105FwithoutarequiredsafetyevaluationandwithoutarevisiontotheCCW'operatingprocedure;and'2)thesubsequentCCWsupplytemperatureincreasedto110Fduringatransientinducedbyintermittentboricacidevaporatoroperation.ThetwocontributingfactorsidentifiedintheNRCcoverletterare:1)inadequatecommunicationsbetweentheCCWsystemengineerandtheoperationsdepartment;and2)failureoftheoperationsdepartmenttoresettheCCWsupplytemperaturealarmsetpoint,from95Fto105oFTheOperationsDepartmentSuperintendentauthorizationtoincreaseCCWtemperatureabovethetemperatureof95'FwasmadeinresponsetoanRCPsealleakoffconcernandwasnotbasedondirectionreceivedthroughaformalprocess.Theauthorizationdidnotresultinanunsafecondition;however,itwasnotwithintheestablishedplantcontrolsforperformanceofsuchan,activity.TheNRCstatesthecontributingfactortothiscanbeattributedtoinadequatecommunications.TheOperationsDepartment,theSystemEngineerandtheColumbusEngineeringstaffdiscussedtheabilityof=thesystemtooperateatahighertemperature,howevernoneofthepartiesrecognizedtheneedforasafetyreview,beforeallowingtheCCWsystemtobeoperatedabove95'F.Thisissuewillbeaddressedthroughthedevelopmentofaninstructiontoestablishcontrolsontechnicalguidance.

ATTACHMENTTOAEP:NRC:1212DPage3TheCCWsupplytemperatureincreaseto110'Fduringa.transientinducedbyintermittentboricacidevaporatoroperationresultedfromthefailureoftheproceduregoverningtheactionsrequiredforblockedalarmstoaddressasituationwhereconditionswhichcauseastandingHigh/Lowalarmareintentionallycreated.Theguidanceforblockedalarmswillberevisedtocoversuchconditions.ConclusionsofRootCauseTeamInvestigationAsreferencedinsection2.3ofinspectionreport50-315/94007(DRS);50-316/94007(DRS}ConditionReportNo.94-0779wasinitiatedtoinvestigatetheconcernsandtakecorrectiveactionsasneededbasedonunresolveditem315/94002-12(DRP).TheinvestigationwasnotconfinedtothespecificCCWconcernsbutincludedrelativerelatedeventsbeginningwiththeSeptember1993RCP-14loweroilpotannunciatoralarm.Therootcauseinvestigationwasconductedbyamulti-disciplinaryteamandlookedgenerically'atthecontrolroomcommandandcontrolprocessandtheuseofengineeringjudgementinmakingunitoperationaldecisions.Theconclusionsoftherootcauseteaminvestigationareasfollows:-AsaresultoftheeventstwoOperatingPhilosophyandPractices(OPP)wererevised.OPP~1,ControlBoardMonitoringDuringNon-EmergencyOperationalConditions,wasrevisedand.becameeffectiveMay16,1994.Thedocumentspecificallyrequiresthatwhencontrollingprocessesinmanual,theUnitSupervisorwillspecifytherangeatwhichthevariableshouldbecontrolled.Theentirecontrolroomteamshouldbeawareofthevalues.Changestothecontrolrangewillbeannouncedtotheteam.The,standardalsostatesthatthecontrolroomteamwillmonitorapplicableparametersonanincreasedfrequencywhenaprocesscontrollerisinmanual.TheUnitSupervisorwillspecifyparameterstobemonitoredandthefrequencyatwhichtheparametersaretobemonitored.FinallythestandardrequirestheUnitSupervisorto'beinformedwhenoffnormaltrendsorconditionsareidentified.ThesecondOperatingPhilosophyandPracticestoberevisedwasOPP.7,AnnunciatorResponse.ThisOPPwasrevisedandbecameeffectiveMay25,1994.ThedocumentdirectsthatanysignificantunexpectedalarmsaretobeloggedinthecontrolroomlogasdeterminedbytheUnitSupervisor,andthatannunciatorresponseproceduresaretobeconsultedtoverify,thatautomaticactionsoccurredasexpectedandtocheckforapplicablenecessarysubsequentactions.

ATTACHMENTTOAEP:NRC:1212DPage4Intheareaofengineeringjudgement,theinvestigationconcludedthattheengineeringjudgementappliedthroughouttheperiodincludedmanagementreviewandapprovalandprovedtobeaccuratebasedonthesubsequentevaluationandmaintenanceofRCP-,14duringtherefuelingoutage.Itwas'oncludedbasedontheCCW'eventthatamechanismwasrequiredtocontrolactivitiesthataffectqualityasisnotedinthecorrectiveactionstakentoavoidfurtherviolations.TheresponsetotheNoticeofViolationisasfollows:l.AdmssionorDenialotheAlleedViolatioIndianaMichiganPoweradmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRC.,NoticeofViolation.ReasonsfoteVoatioTherootcauseforthiseventwastheuseofaninformalprocesstoobtaintechnicalguidanceonincreasingComponentCoolingWater(CCW}temperaturetomitigateexcessiveRCPsealleakoff.ThisresultedinthefailureoftheeffortstodevelopastrategyfordealingwithincreasedRCPsealleakoffwhichincludedallofthenecessaryactionstoincreaseCCWtemperature.Theoperationsdepartmentshould'havebeenawarethatalthoughengineeringjudgementindicatedthat105FCCWsupplywaterwouldnotsignificantlydamagetheCCWsystemortheequipmentitcooled,thistemperaturewasbeyondthesourcedocumenttemperatureof95'F.3.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedOnFebruary13,1994theComponentCoolingWater(CCW)temperaturewasrestoredbelow95F.ThesealleakoffproblemswhichledtoraisingtheCCWtemperaturewerecorrectedduringtheUnit11994refuelingoutage.4.CorrectiveetiosTakentoAvoidFurtherVoatiosInterimandlongterminstructionswillbedevelopedonacceptablemethodstoobtaintechnicaldirectionforactivitiesaffectingqualitywherethedirectionisnotderivedfromapprovedsourcedocuments.Theinteriminstructionwillbeinplaceby7/29/94.Thelongterminstructionwillbeinplaceby12/30/94.

ATTACHMENTTOAEP:NRC:1212DPage55,DateWhenFullComliancewilbeAchievedFull'compliancewasachievedonFebruary13,1994whentheComponentCoolingWatertemperaturewasrestoredtoaconditionbelow95F'.