ML17264A302

1995 Rept of Facility Change,Tests & Experiments Conducted Without Prior Approval for Aug 1995 - Jul 1995 Under Provisions of 10CFR50.59.

ML17264A302
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/31/1995
From:	ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
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ML17264A301	List: ML17264A300 ML17264A302
References
NUDOCS 9512210220
Download: ML17264A302 (132)

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1995REPORTOFFACILITYCHANGES,TESTSANDEXPERIMENTSCONDUCTEDWITHOUTPRIORAPPROVALFORAUGUST1994THROUGHJULY1995UNDERTHEPROVISIONSOF10CFR50.59R.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTDOCKETNO.50-244ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONDATEDDECEMBER18,1'9959512210220951218PDRADOtK05000244RPDR

SEV-1000UNDERVOLTAGEPROTECTIONSYSTEMDESIGNThepurposeofthissafetyevaluationistodetermineifthereareanyunreviewedsafetyquestionsrelatedtomodifyingtheundervoltageprotectionsystem(UVPS)forBuses14,16,17,and18.Thismodificationisnecessarytoeliminateapotentialsinglefailurepoint.TheUVPSforeachsafeguardsbusconsistsoftwochannelswitheachchannelcontainingadegradedvoltageandlossofvoltagerelay.Eitherrelaywillactivatethechannel;however,bothchannelsmustactuatetoproduceanUVsignalonthebus.Inadditiontothedegradedvoltageandlossofvoltagerelays(i.e.,27relays),theUVPScontainslogicthatisusedtotriprelays(i.e.,27Xrelays)whichpickupcontactsandinitializeloadsheddingonthebus.TheUVPSlogicisenergizedfrompowersupplyconvertersintheUVControlCabinetswhichreceivepowerviaInstrumentBusA(forBuses14and18)andC(forBuses16and17).Thesepowersupplyconvertersareusedtotransform120VACpowerto12VDCpower.AlldevicesintheUVPSlogicfailsafeuponlossofpower(i.e.,generateanUVsignal)withtheexceptionofopto-isolatorswhichareenergizedbypowersupplyconverterPS-2.ThelossofpowertoPS-2willfailtheUVPSfortherespectivesafeguardsbusunderallconditions.TheinstrumentbusessupplyingtheUVPSlogicnormallyreceivepowerfromeitherBatteryA(forInstrumentBusA)orB(forInstrumentBusC)viainverters.Afailureoftheinvertercoincidentwithanundervoltageconditionorlossofoffsitepower(LOOP)woulddeenergizePS-2andpreventanUVsignalbecausetheopto-isolatorsarede-energized.Sincethelossofaninverterisacrediblesinglefailure,andaLOOPisadesignbasisevent,itisdesirabletocorrectthisdesigndeficiency.Theproposedmodificationwillreplacethecurrent120VACinstrumentbuspowersupplytoPS-2intheUVPSControlCabinetswith125VDCpowerfromthebatteries.PowersupplyconvertersPS-1andPS-4willberemovedfromtheUVPSControlCabinetsandallUVPSlogicdevices,includingtheopto-isolators,willnowbepoweredfromPS-2.PowersupplyconvertersPS-1andPS-2intheUVPSRelayCabinetsandPS-3intheUVPSControlCabinetsonlysupplypowertoindicatinglightsanddiagnosticsystemswhicharenotrequiredtooperatethesystem.Page1 ThenewpowersupplyconverterPS-2willutilizeanexisting125VDCautomaticthrowoverswitchtoenableeitherbatterytraintoprovidepower.ThisthrowoverswitchisalreadyusedtopowerothercomponentscontainedintheUVPSdesign.Themodificationwillalsoreplacetheexisting120VACto12VDCpowersupplyconverterPS-2withanew125VDCto12VDCconverterduetotheuseofanewelectricalsource.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportant,tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARarenotincreasedbytheproposedmodification.TheUVPSisonlyusedtomitigatealossofvoltageto480VACsafeguardbusesandisnotnormallyconsideredwithrespecttoinitiatinganaccident.Inaddition,themodificationwillincreasethereliabilityoftheUVPSfollowingaLOOPbyeliminating.thefailureoftheUVPStoperformitssafetyfunctionresultingfromasinglefailureoftheinvertersandinstrumentbuses.,Consequently,thereisnoincreaseinthefailureprobabilityofanyequipmentimportanttosafety.Themodificationdoesnotdirectlyinvolvethemitigationofradiologicalconsequencesofanaccidentnoranyofthefissionproductbarriers.Therefore,themodificationwillnotincreasethecalculatedradiologicaldosetothegeneralpublicforanyeventevaluatedintheUFSAR.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.ThemodificationwillincreasethereliabilityoftheUVPSfollowingaLOOPbyeliminatingthefailureoftheUVPStoperformitssafetyfunctionresultingfromasinglefailureoftheinvertersandinstrumentbuses.SincetheDCthrowoverswitchesareutilizedinthecurrentUVPSdesign,usingthethrowoverswitchasasourceofpowerfortheUVPSlogicdoesnotcreateanewfailuremechanism.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedbytheproposedmodification.TheUVPSwillremaincapableofperformingitsfunctiontomonitorvoltageonthefour480VACsafeguardbusesunderallaccidentconditions.ThetimingresponseoftheUVPSwillalsoremainthesamesuchthatnomarginofsafetylimitsareaffected.Page2 SEV-1001RCPOILLEVELINSTRUMENTATIONUPGRADE-PHASETWOEWR4534BisthesecondphaseofamodificationwhichreplacesexistingRCPmotoroillevelmonitoringinstrumentation.PhasetwoaddressesRCPAonly;RCPBandcontrolroomworkiscomplete.ThenewoilleveltransmittersandlevelswitchesusedforthismodificationhavebeeninstalledbytheRCPvendorduringRCPmotorrefurbishment.ThisscopeofworkproposedunderthismodificationinvolvestheinstallationofNamcoquickdisconnectplugsandreceptaclesaswellastheflexibleconduitsnecessarytosupportthenewconfiguration.Nonewpowersuppliesorchangestoexistingpowersuppliesareproposedforthismodification.Thenewtransmit.ttersarethefunctionalequivalentoftheexistingones.ThepurposeofinstallingnewtransmittersistoincreaseinstrumentaccuraciesandeaseofRCPmaintenance.TheNamcoplugsandreceptaclesproposedforinstallationduringthismodificationaredesignedtofacilitatecalibrationandmaintenance.Thenewplugswillbesplicedintotheexistingtransmittercables.Thischangeisbeingproposedasamodificationwhichwillincreasetransmitteraccuraciesandeaseofcalibrationandalsosupplyplanto'peratorswithspecificalarmindicationastowhichRCPmotorbearinghasreachedanalarmsetpoint.ThisproposedmodificationdoesnotchangethecriticaldesignparametersofReactorCoolantpumps.BecausethismodificationdoesnotaffectRCPoperationitdoesnotaltertheprobabilityofthelossofaRCPcausingalossofflowtypeaccident.ShouldthefailureofaRCPcauseaLossofFlowaccident,theReactorProtectionSystemactivatesareactortripand,.inconjunctionwithRCPflowcoastdown,preventsfueldamage.Theseactionsutilizeequipmentindependentofthismodification.TheconsequencesofaLossofFlowaccidentisdependentonthesefeaturesoccurringwithinaspecifiedtimeandtheamountofheatgeneratedinthecore.Becausetheproposedmodificationdoesnotinputtotheabovefeatures,itdoesnotaltertheconsequencesofaDecreaseinReactorCoolantSystemFlow.Page3 Theproposedmodificationaddressedinthismodificationdoesnotinteractwithanysafetyrelatedpowersuppliesorinstrumentationandcontrolcircuits.Thismodificationisafunctionalequivalentoftheexistingsystem.Becausethismodificationdoesnotinteractwithequipmentimportanttosafetyandonlyprovidesindicationanddoesnotalteranysystemfunctions,thismodificationwillnotcreatethepossibilityofanewtypeofaccident.ThemarginsofsafetyassociatedwithDecreaseinReactorCoolantSystemFlowarefactoredintofueldesignandReactorProtectionSystemsensedparametersandtheircorrespondingactuationsetpoints.BecausethismodificationdoesnotinvolvetheReactorProtectionSystemoritssetpoints,noreductiontoamarginofsafetywillresult.Page4 SEV-1002LLRWINTERIMSTORAGEFACILITYEWR10018isarequesttodesign,locate,procureandinstallacontrolledfacilityforthetemporarystorageoflowlevel,solid,radioactivewastependingtheshipmentofthewasteoffsitetoalong-termstoragefacilityordisposalsite.Thelocationofthisfacilitywillbeonsite,intheNortheastquadrantoftheplantsite,ontheopenareabetweentheRadwasteStorageBuildingandtheAllVolatileTreatment(AVT)Building.ThisLowLevelRadioactiveWaste(LLRW)interimstoragefacilitywillprovidetemporarystorageforhandlinguptofive(5)yearsofprojectedsolidradioactivewaste,andincludeanyadditionaloperatingmargintostorethewastematerialgeneratedbytheGinnaNuclearPowerPlant.Theadditionofthisfacilitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedinthatthefacilityisremotelylocatedseveralhundredfeetawayfromallplantsafeguardsequipmentandfunctions.TheresultsofthedesignanalysisdemonstratesthattheresultsofanHICaccidentareboundedbyafuelhandlingaccident.Therefore,theadditionofthisfacilitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportinthatpossibleeventsarelimitedtoapotentialsolidradioactivewastespillwithconsequenceslessthanten(10)percentofthe10CFR100limits.TheadditionofthisfacilitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.TheLLRWfacilityisnotwithinthescopeoftheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,theadditionofthisfacilitydoesnotinvalueanyunreviewedsafetyquestion.Page5 SEV-1003CCWANDSWPUMPDISCHARGECHECKVALVEREPLACEMENTThisphaseofEWR5284willreplacetheComponentCoolingWater(CCW)andServiceWater(SW)pumpdischargecheckvalves.Eachofthesecheckvalveshavebeenevaluatedfortheirpresentconditionofintegrityandithasbeendeterminedthatreplacementisnecessary.Thevalvesbeingreplacedduringthe1994outageare:CCW-723Aand723BSW-4601and4602Thevalvesbeingreplacedatafuturedateare:SW-4603and4604ThepartialreplacementoftheSWvalvesdescribedabovehasbeenevaluatedforhydraulicimpactandhasbeenfoundtobeacceptable.ThereliabilityoftheexistingCCWcheckvalvesisinquestionbecauseonseveraloccasionsduringASMESectionXItestingthevalvesdidnotimmediatelyclosewhentheopposite.headerpumpwastripped.Inallcases,subsequenttestingdiddemonstratethatthevalvesproperlyresponded.Additionally,itissuspectedthatexistingvalvescauseasignificantwaterhammerastheyclose,possiblycontributingtoevidenceofcrackedflooringinthevicinityofthe,CCWpumps.TheSWsystemcheckvalvesarebeingreplacedbecauseofsignificantdegradationcausedbyvariouscorrosionmechanismswhichareprevalentintheservicewatersystem.Previousinspectionsofthesevalveshavediscoveredavarietyofcorrosiondefectswhichmayultimatelyrenderthevalveinoperable'hepumpcheckvalvesmustbeexercisedintheirfullopenandclosedpositiontoverifyfulfillmentofitssafetyfunctionperformance,inaccordancewithASMEBEPVCode,SectionXI,ArticleIWV-3522.Thesafetyfunctionsofcheckvalvesaretopreventreverseflowofthepumpswhenoneisinadvertently.orintentionallystoppedandmaintainpressureintegrityofthesystem.Inthiswaytheflowfromtherunningpumpismaintainedthroughthesystemprovidingadequatecoolingtoessentialsafetyrelatedcomponents.Page6 Replacementofthesecheckvalveswillutilizeanenhanceddesignknownasa>>nozzlecheckvalve".Anozzlecheckvalveisdistinguishedbyitsvalvediscbeingstructurallyfittedintothemiddleoftheflowstream.Theadvantagesofthisdesignare:2)3)4)Minimalflowvelocityrequiredtokeepthevalvefullyopen.Rapidresponsetoreverseflow.Minimummaintenancerequirements.Springassistformorereliableclosure.Thesefeatureswillimprovesystemdesignby:1)2)3)Minimizingwaterhammerwhenclosing.Minimizewearbybeingfullyopenandstableduringnormaloperation.Reliablyrespondingtoreverseflow.TheproposedmodificationwouldnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARbecause:a.Theequipmentproposedwouldnotintroduceanylikelyignitionsourcesthatcouldstartafire.b.NewpipingandvalvesinterfacingwiththeComponentCoolingandSWSystemwouldbesized,specified,andinstalledinaccordancewiththeexistingpipingclassificati,onsandcodedesignationsfordesign,material,andconstruction.c.TheCCWandSWSystemsareusedtomitigateaccidentsandconsequently,isnotexpectedtoaffecttheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccident.TheproposedmodificationwouldnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecause:aThereplacementcheckvalvewouldnotdegradetheabilityoftheCCWorSWpumpstodelivertheirrequiredflowduringadesign-basisaccidentsinceadesignanalysiswillconfirmthattheminimumflow,requirementsaresatisfied.b.Allequipment,pipingandconduitwillbeanchoredandsupportedsothatitdoesnotaffectsafetyrelatedequipmentduringaseismicevent.Page7 TheproposedmodificationwouldnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecause:a.Newpipingandvalveswouldbesized,specifiedandinstalledinaccordancewithexistingpipingclassificationsandcodedesignationsfordesign,materialandconstruction.b.Thevalvebeingareplacementforanexistingvalvewouldberequiredtomeettheoriginalsystemdesignbasesandperformancecriteria.C.Thenewcheckvalvewouldinfactlessentheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.Thenewvalvewillbebetterdesignedforthesystemconditionstherebyprovidingformorereliablevalveoperationduetopreventionofdamagetointernalworkingparts.Thiswillalsoensurebetterleaktightnesswhenthevalveisclosed.Theproposedmodificationwouldnotincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviously.evaluatedintheUFSARbecause:a.Thereplacementcheckvalvewouldberequiredtomeettheoriginalsystemdesignbasesandperformancecriteria.b.PlausibleaccidentshavebeenevaluatedintheUFSAR.Failureofthereplacementcheckvalvewouldresultinthesameconsequencesaswouldthefailureoftheexistingcheckvalve,whichwasevaluated.c~Sincetheproposedmodificationdoesnotimpact'nyothersystems,thereplacementofthecheckvalvewouldnotdegradefireprotection,separation,powersupplyavailability,seismicintegrityoranyotherassumptionsintheUFSARaccidentanalysis.TheproposedmodificationwouldnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecause:a.Themodificationinvolvesreplacementofanexistingvalvewithafunctionallysimilarvalve.Thereplacementvalvewillbedesigned(includingmaterialselection),fabricated,inspectedandtestedtothesamecodesandstandardsastheexistingvalvesuchthatthereplacementvalveistechnicallyequivalentorsuperiortotheexistingvalve.Page8 b.Thenewcheckvalvewillberequiredtomeettheoriginalsystemdesignbasisandperformancecriteriaoftheexistingvalve.c~AllplausibleaccidentsfortheexistingcheckvalvewereevaluatedintheUFSAR.Sincethenewvalveisasuitablereplacement,theproposedmodificationwouldnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedmodificationwouldnotcreatethepossibilityofadifferenttypeofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety'hananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecause:a.Thereplacementcheckvalvewouldberequiredtomeettheoriginalsystemdesignbasisandperformancecriteria.b.Replacementofthecheckvalvewillnotcreatethepossibilityofadifferenttypeofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetythananypreviouslyevaluatedsincethevalveistechnicallyimprovedandfunctionallyequivalenttotheexistingvalve.Theproposedmodificationwouldnotreducemarginsofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationbecause:a.Thecheckvalveisareplacementforanexistingvalveandisrequiredtomeetsystemdesignbasesandperformancecriteria.Thevalveistechnicallybetterthantheoriginalvalve.Therefore,CCWandSWpumpdeliverywillnotbesignificantlyaltered.TheproposednewvalvehasaslightlylowerCthantheexistingvalveandconsequentlyahigherdifferentialpressure.Thisdifferencewill.beevaluatedtodemonstratethatthesystemdesignmarginsarenotexceeded.Basedonthepreceding,theproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveachangeintheTechnicalSpecificationortheUFSARandisnotanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Page9 SEV-1004CONTAINMENTPLATFORMUPGRADE-PHASE3Theproposedmodificationsdetailedbelowconstitutepersonnelsafetyenhancementsonly.ThisSafetyEvaluationwilldocumentthattherearenochangestothefacilityasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReportasaresultofthesemodifications.Alifelinesystem(MANSAFE)willbeinstalledontheeastsideofthereactorcavityapproximately5'3"abovetheoperatingfloor.Itwillrunfromthenorthendoftheshieldwallapproximately12feetsouthwithsupportsanchoreddirectlytotheshieldwall.TheMANSAFEsystemconsistsofstainlesssteelcableandstainlesssteelbracketswhichareanchoredtostructuralelements.A,MANSAFEsystemwillbeinstalledonthewestsideofthereactorcavityapproximately4'-6"abovetheoperatingfloorrunningfromcolumn102tothesouthendoftheshieldwall.Itwillbesupported.atcolumn102andanchoreddirectlytotheshieldwall.AsecondMANSAFEsystemwillbeinstalledonthewestsideofthereactorcavityapproximately3'-6"abovetheoperatorfloor.Itwillrunfromcolumn107approximately15feetnorthwithsupportsattachedtocolumn107andexistingcabletraysupports.Installationofhandrailandkickplatealongaportionofthecatwalkatelevation295'eartheAsteamgenerator.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARisnotincreased.Therearenoaccidents,transients,ormalfunctionsanalyzedintheUFSARthatinvolvetheMANSAFEsystemandthesystemisnotutilizedinthemitigationofanyeventsanalyzed.Themodificationdesignandinstallationinvolvespersonnelsafety,reducingtheriskofinjuryduetopersonnelfalling.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARisnotcreated.ThemountingoftheMANSAFEsystemandstructuralintegrityoftheconcreteshieldwallsandcabletraystowhichtheMANSAFEisattachedisgovernedbyexistingdesignmethodologypreviouslyappliedfortheattachmentofthesupports.ThepossibilityofamissilebeingcreatedbythefailureoftheMANSAFEsystemduringaseismiceventdoesnotexist,becausethedesignrequirementsrequireanalysistoshowtheanchoredstructurecapableofwithstandingalldesignloads.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreduced.ThedesignandinstallationoftheMANSAFEsysteminvolvesenhancements.toensure=.personnelsafetybyreducingthepossibilityofinjuryduetofallingwhileworkingnearthereactorcavity.ThemodificationdoesnotPage10 involveanysystemsorequipmentrequiredbyTechnicalSpecifications.Page11

SEV-1005SERVICEWATERFOULINGPHASE3ThepurposeofthissafetyevaluationistoevaluatethechangesproposedunderEWR4658CwithrespecttotheoriginalsafetyconsiderationsoftheplantdesignbasisandtodetermineifNRCapprovalisrequired(ifthemodificationinvolvesanunreviewedsafetyquestionoraffectstheplantTechnicalSpecifications).EWR4658CisthethirdphaseoftheServiceWaterFoulingmodificationproject(EWR4658).Thisphaseoftheprojectaddressesissuessummarizedbelow.AFW/SAFWPumpSuctionPipingFlushingCapabilityThescopeofworkproposedunderthisportionofthemodificationinvolvesreplacingfiveexisting3/4"and1"pipingconnections(andattacheddrainvalves)withnew2"connectionsandvalvestopermithigherflushingcapacitiestobreakupandremovethesiltbuildupconditions.Otherthanprovidinghigherflowcapacities,thenewdrainvalveconfigurationsarethefunctionalequivalentoftheexistingones.ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)HeatExchangersPipingThescopeofworkproposedunderthisportionofthemodificationinvolvestheinstallationoftwonewthermowellsaridtemperatureelementsontheshell-side(CCW)outletsofeachofthetwoCCWheatexchangers.TheCCWtemperatureswillbeusedtoperformindependentthermalperformancetestingofeachCCWheatexchangerwithoutisolatingtheparallelheatexchanger.Thenewtemperatureconnectionsandassociatedinstrumentationareonlyintendedtoprovidelocalindicationduringperiodicsurveillancetesting.Nonewcontrolfeaturesorchangestoanyexistingsystem/componentcontrolsareintroducedasaresultofthismodification.Also,nonewpowersuppliesorchangestoexistingpowersuppliesareproposedforthismodification.CRFCFanMotorCoolerPipingThescopeofworkproposedunderthisportionofthemodificationinvolvestheinstallationofanewthermowellandtemperatureelementontheconnectingSWSpipingattachedtotheoutletsofeachofthefourContainmentRecirculatingFanCooler(CRFC)fanmotorcoolercoils.CRFCfanmotorcoolercoilexittemperatureswillbeusedtoperformaheatbalanceto,subsequently,determineanaccurateindicationofSWSflowthrougheachCRFCfanmotorcoolercoil.Page12 Thisinstrumentationisnecessarytosupportaperformancetestingprogramforsafety-relatedheatexchangersasdefinedinGenericLetter89-13.TheinstrumentationwillbeusedtodeterminetheheatremovalcapabilityoftheseSWSheatexchangersandtomonitor/trendtheheatremovalcapabilityovertimeviaperiodicperformancetesting.Certainsafetyrelatedheatexchangershavealreadybeenequippedwithnewpressureandtemperatureinstrumentationunderphases1and2oftheEWR4658modification.ASafetyAnalysiswaspreviouslycompletedtoevaluatethechangesperformedunderthescopeofthefirsttwophases.Thenewtemperatureconnectionsandassociatedinstrumentationareonlyintendedtoprovidelocalindicationduringperiodicsurveillancetesting.Nonewcontrolfeaturesorchangestoanyexistingsystem/componentcontrolsareintroducedasaresultofthismodification.Also,nonewpowersuppliesorchangestoexistingpowersuppliesareproposedforthismodification.Thismodificationdoesnotincrease'heprobabilityofoccurrence(orconsequences)ofanaccident,oramalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,previouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Themodificationsaltersonlypipingpressure-boundaryitemsandareindependentofaccidentmitigationfeatures.Thismodificationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccident,oramalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,ofatypedifferentfromanypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Themodificationsaffectonlythepressure-retainingfunctionofvalves,andpipingcomponents,andareindependentofaccidentmitigationfeatures.Thismodificationswillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecifications.Themodificationsdonotaffectanyautomaticactuationsignalsortheoperabilityof,anyofthecomponentsinvolved,norwillthefunctionsthatthosecomponentscurrentlyperformbealtered.Consequently,thismodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Page13 SEV-1006RCSCOLDLEGTEMPERATURERECORDINGThepurposeofthissafetyevaluationistodetermineifthereareanyunreviewedsafetyquestionsrelatedtotheworkscopeofEWR10106,"RCSColdLegTemperatureRecorder."ThismodificationisnecessarytoachieveaconfigurationwhichisconsistentwithRGRE'spositionregardingimplementationofSupplement1ofNUREG0737atGinnaStation.TheexistingconfigurationofRCScoldlegtemperaturemonitoringinstrumentationconsistsofthefollowing:1)TwoClass1Einstrumentchannels,T409B-1andT410B-l,whichprovideMainControlBoardindicationandinputtoRVLMS.2)TwoNonClass1Einstrumentchannels,T450andT451,whichprovideMainControlBoardchartrecording,annunciatoralarmsandinputstothePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS).RCScoldlegtemperature,isclassifiedasCategory1,TypeAvariablebyRGEE.RegulatoryGuide1.97,"InstrumentationforLight-Water-CooledNuclearPowerPlantstoAssessPlantandEnvironsConditionsDuringandFollowinganAccident",recommendsthatCategory1instrumentationincludeprovisionsforrecordingtheRCScoldlegtemperaturevariable.ThetwoexistinginstrumentchannelswhicharequalifiedforClass1Eservicedonotprovideameansofrecordingthetemperaturevariable.RGEEiscurrentlycommittedtotheNRCtoproviderecordingoftheClasslERCScoldlegtemperaturechannelsduringthe1994refuelingoutage.ThisEWRShallmodifythisconfigurationasfollows:1)InputoftheNonClass1Einstrumentchannels,T450andT451,toMCBchartrecorderRK-3willbedisabled.2)IsolatedinputsfromClass1Einstrumentchannels,T409B-1andT410B-1willbeprovidedtoMCBchartrecorderRK-3andthePPCS.3)MCBchartrecorderRK-3willberescaledtodisplaythe0-700'FtemperaturerangeoftheClass1Echannels.Theproposedmodificationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrence,ortheconsequenceof,anyaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.TheproposedmodificationisproperlyisolatedfromthesafetyrelatedportionsoftheTcoldindicationcircuitryviaqualifiedisolators.Theisolatorsinstalledarewithintheloadingcapabilitiesoftheracksinwhichtheyareinstalled.Therefore,theinstallationwillnotcauseamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.Page14

TheproposedmodificationdoesnotintroducethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Themodificationonlyaffectsindicationchannels,andtherefore,cannotbeanaccidentinitiator.Theproposedmodificationdoesnotalterthefunctionofanysystemusedinaccidentmitigation.Themodificationenhancestheabilityofoperatorstomitigateaccidentsbyprovidingrecordingofapost-accidentTypeAvariable.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedbyplantTechnicalSpecificationsisnotaffectedbythismodification.ThismodificationisproperlyisolatedfromanyinstrumentationrequiredbyTechnicalSpecifications,specificallytheinstrumentationspecifiedinTable3.5-3,"AccidentMonitoringInstrumentation".Page15 SEV-1007RHRREDUNDANT.FLOWLOOPThedesignoftheproposedmodificationaddressedinthissafetyanalysisisdocumentedinEWR4970,"ResidualHeatRemovalSystemRedundantFlowLoop."TheflowdeliveredtothereactorvesselbytheRHRSystemduringadesignbasisaccidentisaCategory1,TypeA,postaccidentmonitoringvariableasdefinedbyRGEE.RGEE'spositionregardingimplementationofSupplement1ofNUREG0737requiresredundantClasslEprocessmeasurementinstrumentchannelsforvariablesidentifiedasCategory1,TypeA.TheexistingpostaccidentRHRflowmeasurementinstrumentationconsistsofonlyasingleClass1EinstrumentchannelwithoutanyredundancyprovisionsandisthereforeinconsistentwithRGEE'spositionregardingimplementationofSupplement1ofNUREG0737atGinnaStation.EWR4970willinstallaredundantresidualheatremovalflowinstrumentchannel.InstallationoftheredundantchannelisnecessarytocompletearegulatorycommitmentwithrespecttoRegulatoryGuide1.97,"InstrumentationforLight-Water-CooledNuclearPowerPlantstoAssessPlantandEnvironsConditionsDuringandFollowinganAccident."Thebasicscopeofthismodificationinvolvesaddinganewpressuretransmitter,piping/tubingandvalvestoexistingsparetapsofRHRfl'oworificeFE-626,utilizingsparesignalprocessingmodulesintheFOX1Rack,changingtheexistingMainControlBoardRHRflowindicatorfromsingletoduplex,andseparatingtheRHRflowinputstotheReactorVesselLevelMonitoringSystem(RVLMS).Also,anisolatedoutputfromthenewchannelwillbeprovidedtothePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS)fordisplayandrecordingcapability.ThisproposedmodificationrepresentsachangetothefacilityasdescribedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)inthatonlyonechannelofRHRflowiscurrentlyaddressed.Thesechangesproducethebenefitofprovidingdiverse,independent,postaccidentqualifiedRHRflowindicationandalsoprovidetheabilitytomaintainonechannelofRVLMSoperablewhenperformingRHRflowinstrumentchannelmaintenance'heproposedmodificationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrence,ortheconsequenceof,anyaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.TheproposedmodificationhasnofunctionalimpactontheRHRsystem,andhasnopotentialtointroduceafailurewhichinandofitselfcanactasaprecursororinitiatingeventforanaccidentanalyzedintheUFSAR.Therefore,theproposedmodificationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofanyevaluatedaccidents.Page16 TheproposedmodificationisdesignedsuchthatthepressureboundaryinterfacewiththeRHRsystemmeetsthesystemdesignrequirements.BecausethepipingsysteminterfacesarebeingmadetoanexistingRHRflowelement,apressureboundaryfailureoftheequipmentinstalledundertheproposedmodificationwillhaveexactlythesameRHRsystemeffectsasafailureoftheexistingequipment.Theelectricalportionoftheproposedmodificationisdesignedtomeetsafetygrade(Class1E)standards.Isolationisprovidedsothatafailureinthenewequipment,willnotpropagateandintroduceafailuretoother,functionallyunrelated,safetysystems.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotintroducethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Theproposedmodificationdoesnotalterthefunctionofanysystemusedinaccidentmitigation.Thedesigncharacteristicsofthemodificationensuresnonew,unboundedfailureswillbeintroducedtoplantsystems.Becausenoplantfunctionsarechangedasaresultofthismodification,thereisnopossibilityofcreatingnewsysteminteractionswhichmightleadtoapreviouslyunanalyzedaccidentoranunboundedmalfunction.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedbyplantTechnicalSpecificationsisnotreducedasaresultofthisproposedmodification.TheRHRsystemparametercriticaltothemarginofsafetyisRHRflow(TechSpec4.5.2.1).Theproposedmodificationdoesnot~altersystemflowandthereforedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyassociatedwiththehostsystem.Page17 SEV-1008STEAMLINEMONITORSR31R32AsaresultofNUREG0737RadiationMonitorsR-31andR-32wereinstalledandtheopen/closestatusoftheMainSteamSafetyvalves(3508,3509,3510,3511,3512,3513,3114and3515),SteamGeneratorAtmosphericReliefvalves(3410and3411)andtheTurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpSteamSupplyvalves(3504Aand3505A)weremonitoredandtheoutputrecordedonstripchartrecorders(RK-47A,RK-47BandRK-47C)intheControlRoom.Thiswasdonesothatradioactivereleasescouldbequantifiedbyintegratingtheproductofsteamactivityandtheexhaustflowratewithrespecttotime.Inresponsetothe1989GinnaStationEOPauditfinding89-80-04,thesteamlinemonitorsdisplaycapabilitieswereevaluated.AnapparentweaknessintheControlRoomoperators'bilitytodiscernmainsteamlineradiationmonitor(R31andR32)readingsfromtheRK-47A,RK-47BandRK-47CchartrecorderslocatedintheRMSrackwasidentified.PerRG6EIOC,theNRCobservedoperatorsonthesimulatorandnotedthattherewasconfusionrelatingtothesteamlineradiationmonitorsandtheiruseineventdiagnosis.Presently,RK-47ArecordssteamlineradiationasdetectedbyradiationdetectorsRE-31andRE-32.RK-47BrecordsthepositionsofvalvesassociatedwiththeBSteamGenerator(3508,3510,3512,3514,3410and3504A).RK-47CrecordsthepositionsofvalvesassociatedwiththeASteamGenerator(3509,3511,3513,3515,3411and3505A).TherecordersturnonandthePPCSalarmswhenmainsteamlineactivityineithersteamlinegoesabove0.1mR/hour.TheMainControlBoarddisplaysthepositionsofvalve3504A,3505A,3410and3411.ThePlantProcessComputerSystemdisplaysandmaintainsarecordofthepositionsofvalves3504a,3505A,3410and3411andsteamlineradiationasdetectedbyradiationdetectorsRE-31andRE-32'hedurationoftimethevalvesarenotclosedisusedwithsteamlineradiationtocalculatetheamountofeffluentreleasedthroughthesteamlinesduringaccidents.Thescopeof'thismodificationistoremoverecordersRK-47A,RK-47BandRK-47C.TwoindependentindicatorswithalarmaudiblewillbeinstalledinthespacevacatedbytherecorderstoprovidecontinuousindicationandalarmcapabilityofsteamlineradiationasdetectedbyradiationdetectorsRE-31andRE-32.Anaudiblealarmwillsoundwhenmainsteamlineactivityineithersteamlinegoesabovethealarmsetpoint.MainControlBoardvalveindicationswillremainunchanged.TheinformationpresentlyavailableonthePPCSwillremainintactandinformationwillbeaddedtothePPCS.ThepositionsoftheAandBMainSteamSafetyvalves(3508to3515)willbedivertedfromtherecorderstothePPCSviatheMUXracks.Newdatapoints,withthecalculatedeffluentrelease,willbeaddedtothePPCS.Page18

Thismodificationdoes,notaffectthe.operabilityofanyofthecomponentsinvolved;Onlythemethodofmonitoringthestatusoroutputoftheequipmentisbeingchanged.Thus,thismodificationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Thecomponentsinvolvedinthismodificationwillbeinstalledtomonitortheconsequencesofaccidents,but,donotthemselvesimpacttheoperabilityofthecomponents.EveniftheindicatorsandthePPCSweretosimultaneouslymalfunction,itwouldnotaltertheconsequencesofanaccidentthoughitwouldaffectthedoseassessmentcapabilities.Therefore,thismodificationwillnotaltertheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Sincethecircuitsforthesteamlinemonitors,ARVsandTDAFWpumpsupplyvalvesarealready'inplaceandconnectedtothePPCS,theonlychange.willbetheroutingoftheoutputoftheMainSteamsafetiesfromthepresentrecorderstothePPCS~Thepresentpositionswitchesareisolatedfromthevalveanddonotbreachthepressureboundary.ThismodificationwillnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Thismodificationwillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecifications.Thereisnoimpactontheoperabilityofanyequipmentimportanttosafetyasaresultofthismodification.Page19 SEV-1009RECORDERREPLACEMENTPHASE2ThepurposeofthissafetyevaluationistodetermineifthereareanyunreviewedsafetyquestionsrelatedtotheremovalofAccidentMonitoringRecordersRK-47DandRK-47EandreplacementofTurbineMetalTemperatureRecorderRK-30B.Theserecordershavebecomeobsoleteanddifficulttorepairsincesparepartsarenolongeravailableforthem.TherecorderthatwillreplaceRK-30Bwillrecordthesamevariablesasthepresentrecorderandhasthesamefeatures.TheproposedmodificationischangingthewaySumpALevel,SumpBLevel,SubCoolingMargin(T>>T-T~)andContainmentVesselWideRangePressurearerecordedanddisplayed.OperatorswillbeabletoretrievethisdatafromthePPCS.TheaboveparametersarecurrentlydisplayedonchartrecordersRK-47DandRK-47E.OperatorswillstillbeabletoverifytheinformationfromindicatorsontheContainmentIsolationResetPaneland/or'heMainControlBoard.ThePPCSwillmaintainarecordoftheinformationfortrendingandhistoricalpurposes.AllofthevariablescurrentlyrecordedonRK-47DandRK-47EarepresentlyavailableinthePPCSwiththeexceptionofContainmentVesselWideRangePressurewhichwillbeaddedtothePPCSbyutilizingtwosparecircuitsandtwosparecomputertaps.ThePPCSisconsideredtobeanacceptablemeansoffulfillingtherequirementsofReg.Guide1.97forrecordingtheseparameters.RG&E'spositionregardingimplementationofRegulatoryGuide1.97,"InstrumentationforLight-Water-CooledNuclearPowerPlants'toAssessPlantandEnvironsConditionsDuringandFollowinganAccident,"stipulatesthatthevariablespresentlyrecordedonRK-47DandRK-47EwillbeavailableinthePPCSbutdonotneedtoberecordedonachartrecorder.TheSumpALevel,SumpBLevelandSubCoolingMargininstrumentationloopsdonotprovidelogicsignalstoanyofthesystemsneededtomitigatetheconsequencesofanyoftheseaccidents.TheContainmentVesselWideRangePressureloopprovidesalogicsignaltotheESFASsystem.Specifically,actuationofsteamlineisolationonhi-hicontainmentpressure"a"andcontainmentsprayonhi-hicontainmentpressure"b".Withinthatloopthecontrolsignalsplitsfromtheindicatingsignalataqualifiedisolator.Theproposedmodificationischangingthewaytheseinstrumentationloopsareindicated.OperatorswillbeabletoretrievethisdatafromthePPCSinsteadoffromarecorder.TheywillstillbeabletoverifytheinformationfromindicatorsontheContainmentIsolationResetPaneland/ortheMainControlBoard.Therefore,theproposedmodificationdoesnotaffectanyofthepreviouslyevaluatedaccidents,transientsandspecialeventsasdescribedintheUFSAR.Page20 Cl TheSumpALevel,SumpBLevelandSubCoolingMargininstrumentationloopsprovideindicationonlyanddonotprovidelogicsignalstoanyofthesystemsneededtomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidents.TheContainmentVesselWideRangePressureloopsprovidealogicsignaltoContainmentSprayandSteamLineIsolation.Thismodificationdoesnotaffecttheautomaticactuationoftheselogicsignals.Allindicationpresentlyavailabletotheoperatorswillcontinuetobeavailable.Thefunctionsthatthesecomponentscurrentlyperformwillnotbealteredbecausethemodificationinvolvesonlyportionsoftheelectricalloopswhichareisolatedfromthesignalsthatactuatethecontainmentspraypumpsandclosethemainsteamisolationvalves.RemovalofrecordersRK-47DandRK-47Ewilleliminateanypotentialfailuremodeassociatedwiththerecordersthemselves,theirpowersuppliesandisolationoftheserecordersfromtheupstreaminstrumentloopsandactuationsignals.Therefore,thismodificationwillnotincreasetheconsequencesorprobabilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.'hemodificationinvolvesindicationonlyandisindependentofaccidentmitigationfeatures.There-routedcircuitsfortheContainmentVesselWideRangePressurewillbeisolatedfromtheindicatorandfromtheESFASlogicsignalandthuswillnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Thismodificationwillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforany'echnicalspecification.Allindicationpresentlyavailabletotheoperatorswillcontinuetobeavailable,bothonthePPCSandontheMainControlBoardortheContainmentIsolationResetPanel.Thismodificationdoesnotaffectautomaticactuationsignalsortheoperabilityofanyofthecomponentsinvolved,norwillthefunctionsthatthesecomponentscurrentlyperformbealtered.Page21

SEV-1010UFSARCHANGEONCCWPUMPMATERIALIdentifiedDeficiencyReport(IDR)0021-92identifiedaconcernontheGinnaStationComponentCoolingWater(CCW)Pumps.TheIDRnotedthatstatements,containedintheGinnaStationUFSARandothervariousdocumentationsuchasletterstotheNRCduringtheSystematicEvaluationProgram,containedwhatappearedtobeconflictingstatementsonthematerialusedtoconstructtheCCWpumpcasings.TheintentofthisSafetyEvaluationistodocumenttheresolutionofthisdiscrepancy.Nophysicalchangestoplantsystemsarebeingperformed.TheUFSARsection3.2.2.1.3willberevisedtoshowthecorrectmaterialusedtofabricatethepump,thatis,CastIronwhichisconsistentwithUFSAR.section9.2.2.3,Table9.2-3andadditionaltestingperformedbyRG&E.CastIronisalsoconsistentwiththeoriginalWestinghouse"E"specforthepump.TheWestinghouseSystemdescriptionRGE-200/C/4dated12/27/67,p.10isbelievedtoincorrectlyrepresentthematerialascarbon.steel.ThisevaluationsupportsUFSARchange10/133.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARisnotincreased.ThechangeproposedhasbeendeterminedtohavebeenamisrepresentationofthematerialfortheCCWcasingascarbonsteelinlieuoftheactualmaterialofcastiron.Theoriginaldesignspecifiedmaterialwascastiron.AnRGKEletterinresponsetoan'NRCrequestforinformationinadvertentlylistedthematerialascarbonsteel.InasubsequentNRClettertheNRCreferencedthismaterialascarbonsteel.ThebasisfortheNRC'ssafetyevaluation,however,didnotinvolvethematerialtype,butratherthefactthatGinnahasredundantCCWpumpsandbackupcapabilitywhichcanbeprovidedinarelativelyquickperiodoftime.Ithasalsobeenestablishedthat,inconcertwiththeNRC'sstatement,fracturetoughnessrequirementswerenotimposedaspartofthedesignrequirements.Therefore,thereisnoincreasedprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionpreviouslyevaluated.ThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARisnotcreated.ThefactthattheASMEcodedoesnotrequirefracturetoughnessforthiscomponent,andthefactthatthematerialwasoriginallyspecifiedascarbonsteel,justifiestheconclusionthatafailureofthiscomponentduetoitsmaterialtypeisnotatechnicalconcern.Page22 ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationsisnotreduced.TheCCWcasingmaterialisnotassociateddirectlywithanyoftheTechSpecrequirementsontheCCWsystem.Thematerialselectionofthecasinghasbeenestablishedtohavebeenproperlythecorrectoneused,sincetheoriginalWestinghousespeccalledforcastiron,andthatmaterialisutilizedinthecurrentinstallation.Page23 SEV-1011THROTTLINGOFCCWTORHRFLOWCONTROLVALVES780AAND780BTheproposedchangeinvolvestheadditionalthrottlingofmanualbutterflyvalves780A&B,whicharetheCCWsystemoutletvalvesfromtheRHRheatexchangers.ThesevalvesaretobethrottledinordertoreducetheCCWflowthroughtheCCWheatexchangers(shellside)fromapproximately3000gpmto2500gpmandconcurrentlyreduceCCWflowthroughtheRHRheatexchangers(shellside)fromapproximately2775-gpmto1800gpm.Thebasisforthischangeistominimizethepotentialforflowinducedvibration(FIV)intheseheatexchangerscausedbyexcessiveinletflowvelocities,whilecontinuingtoprovideallheatexchangerrequirementstomeetnormalplantoperationandpost-accidentfunctions.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceor-theconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR,isnotincreased.Therearenonewcomponentsbeingaddedbytheproposedchange.Itinvolvesachangetotheopenpositionofvalves780AandBbyadjustmentofvalveposition.Thevalvesperformnofunctionduringnormalpoweroperation,becausetheRHRheatexchangerinletvalvesMOV-738AandB'areclosed.Therefore,theprobabilityofanaccidentormalfunctionoccurringatpowerorthecorrespondingconsequencesasanalyzedarenotincreased.DuringmodeswhentheRHRheatexchangerreceivesflowfromtheCCWsystem,thesevalvesservetocontrol(limit)theflowratethroughtheCCWsystem.DesignAnalyseshavedemonstratedthatsufficientheatremovalcapabilityfromRHRandCCWheatexchangerscontinuestoprovidemarginfornormalplantcooldownsandforlongtermcooldownduringtherecoveryphase(recirculationphase)post-LOCA.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotincreased.Therearenonewfailuremodesintroduced,becauseadditionalthrottlingisbeingperformedforavalvethatcurrentlyfunctionsinthethrottledposition.Thedegreeofthrottlingtobeperformediswithintherangeforthevalvetype.TheproposedchangeisbeingmadetoreducepotentialmalfunctionsresultingfromdamagetotheCCWandRHRheatexchangersduetoflowinducedvibrationandfollowstherecommendationsbybothheatexchangervendors.Theproposedchangeisnotcreating.anyadditionalopeningsinprimary(orsecondary)systemsnoraddingadditionalpipingorelectricalcontrols.Therefore,therearenonewaccidentsormalfunctionscreated.Page24 Themarginsofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreduced.ThevalvesbeingmodifiedarenotspecifiedintheTechnicalSpecificationsandtheirfunctionsarenotcreditedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecifications.ComponentCoolingwaterheatexchangeisarerequiredoperableby3.3.3.1b.andRHRheatexchangersoperableby3.3.1.1e.Byreducingthemaximumflowratethroughtheseheatexchangersto'inimizetheeffectsofflowinducedvibrations,theoperabilityandneedtorepairthesecomponentscanbeexpectedtobe,improved.Page25 ISEV-1012SAFETYEVALUATIONFORUSEOFETHANOLAMINEEthanolamine(ETA)isanalternateaminewhichisbeingincreasinglyusedatPWR'sforsecondarysystempHcontrol.ETAisbeingconsideredforuseonatrialbasisatGinna.PertherequestofSFEWR10167,thepurposeofthisSafetyEvaluationistodetermineifuseofETAatGinnawouldcreateachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsorcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestionatGinna.Ethanolamineisalsoequivalentlyreferredtoasmonoethanolamine.Alternateaminessuchas1,2diaminoethane(DAE),2-amino2-methylpropanol(AMP),3-methoxypropylamin(MPA),3-hydroxyquinuclidine(3HQ),andmorpholinearenotwithinthescopeofthissafetyevaluation.GinnacurrentlyusesAllVolatileTreatment(AVT)withammoniaforpHcontrolandhydrazinefordissolvedoxygencontrol.ETAhasalowerrelativevolatilitythanammonia(relativevolatilityissimilartotheinverseofsolubility).SinceETAtendstocondensewiththewaterphasemorethanammonia,ETAisbettersuitedtoprotectwetsteampipingfromcorrosionbycreatingahigherpHintheseareas.Thelowrelativevolatilitymayalsoallowincreasedcondensatepolisherruntimessincetheamineremainsintheheaterdrainsystemlongerthanammonia.ETAisanaminesimilartomorpholine.MorpholinewasusedatGinnapriorto1974whenthestationusedphosphatesecondarychemistry.MorpholinewasusedonatrialbasisinGinna'ssteamgeneratorsforwetlayupduringtheSpring1992RefuelingOutage.ETAisabreakdownproductofmorpholineandwasthereforepresentintheGinnaSecondarysystempriorto1974andinthesteamgeneratorsin1992.ETAisrecommendedbyEPRI'sPWRSecondaryChemistryGuidelines.ETAhasbeenusedatBeaverValleyUnit1,.DavisBesse,Catawba,PrairieIslandUnit1,NorthAnna,PaloVerde,DiabloCanyon,MillstoneUnit2,ANO-2,CrystalRiver,andConnecticutYankee.ETAstorageandinjectiondesignsforGinnahavenotbeenprepared.Thefollowingassumptionsaremadeforthepurposeofthisevaluation.Anydeviationsfromtheseassumptionsindetaileddesignswillrequireanadditionalsafetyreview.ETAwillbestoredintheTurbineBuildingnorthoftheturbinecenterlineonthebasementormezzaninelevelsoroutsidetheTurbinebuildingwithin50feetoftheammoniastoragetank.ETAwillbestoredandinjectedataconcentrationnottoexceed80%solutionstrengthandconformingwiththeMSDSoranequivalentMSDS.TheETAwillbestoredinnitrogenpressurizedstainlesssteeltanksandwillbetransferredwithcompatiblepipe/tubing.ETAstoragewillnotexceed1000gallons.Page26 ETAinjectionpoint(s)willbeinthenon-safetyrelatedportionofthecondensateorfeedwatersystems.ETAconcentrationsinthesecondarysystemwillnotexceed15ppm.PlantChemistrywillestablishETAairmonitoringmethodologyandtoxicitylimitstoensuretherequirementsofSC-6.3willbemetinthecaseofanETAspill.ETAstorageandprocessingsystemwillbecontainedsuchthatanyspillwillnotcomeintocontactwithplantmaterialsthatarenotcompatiblewith80%ETAandanyspillwillnotcomewithinSOfeetofacontrolroomairin-take.Thisactivitydoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedinthattheactivitydoesnotadverselyimpactanyexistingplantequipmentorsystemsnoraffectexistingaccidentanalyses.Thisactivitydoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreport.ThisactivitydoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationinthattheactivityisnotwithinthescopeoftheTechnicalSpecifications.Page27 SEV-1013BORICACIDPIPINGREL1EFVALVEADDITIONTworeliefvalvesareplannedtobeinstalledintheboricacidpiping.Thereliefvalvesaretoprovideoverpressureprotectionofthelinebetweenvalves826A/826Band826C/826Dintheeventthatheattracingisturnedonwiththesepairsofvalvesclosed.'entvalves1821and1822areplannedtobechangedfromnormallyclosedtonormallyopen.Thesafetyclassificationofthelinesbetween826A/826Band826C/826DisplannedtobechangedfromSafetyClass2toSafetySignificant.ReferenceTechnicalSpecificationAmendmentN57andSFEWR10178forfurtherbackground.ThepurposeofthisSafetyEvaluationistodetermineifthesechangescreateachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsorcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Theadditionofthereliefvalvesdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedinthatthereliefvalvesserveapipingsectionthatperformsnosafeguardsfunctions.Theadditionofthereliefvalvesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportinthattheeffectedtheirplacementarelimitedtononsafeguardsequipmentandsystems.TheadditionofthereliefvalvesdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationinthatthechangeistonon-safeguardsequipmentasdescribedbyTechnicalSpecificationAmendment457.Page28 SEV-1014TEMPORARYREMOVALOFPRESSURIZERCOMPARTMENTBLOCKSThepressurizercompartmenthasremovableblocksinitsroofdesigntoallowforaccesstotheupperportionsofthepressurizerarea.Theoriginalplantdesignprovidedtheseblockstopreventtheejectionofmissilesfromthecompartment.Themotiveforcebehindthesemissilesistheenergyavailabletothepressurizersubsystem.Thepressurizercompartmentisslightlysouthwestofthe"B"steamgenerator.Periodically,betweenrefuelingoutages,accessisrequiredtothepressurizercompartmenttoperformvariousequipmentsurveillanceinspections.Duetothedifficultyinreachingtheupperportionsofthecompartment,itisproposedthattheremovableblocksberepositionedduringthesesurveillancestoallowforpersonnelaccessnottoexceed192hours(8days)peryear.Thistemporarychangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysis.Theprobabilityofaninitiatingevent,combinedwiththeshortremovaltimeoftheremovableblocks,islowenoughthatthereisnosignificantimpactintheprobabilityofoccurrenceandtherefore,consequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment.Thistemporarychangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisinthatthetemporaryremovaloftheblocksdoesnotchangeorcreateany'newinitiatingevents.Inaddition,thechangedoesnotimpacttheabilitytomeetTechnicalSpecificationrequirements.MissilesarenotaneweventsinceSEPTopicIII-4.cperformedareviewofmissileeffects.ThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationinthattheremovableblocksarenotwithinthescopeoftheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Page29 SEV-1015REMOVALOFPRESSURIZERCOMPARTMENTBLOCKSFOLLOWINGREFUELINGThepressurizercompartmenthasremovableblocksinitsroofdesigntoallowforaccesstotheupperportionsofthepressurizerarea.Theoriginalplantdesignprovidedtheseblockstopreventtheejectionofmissilesfromthecompartment.Themotiveforcebehindthesemissilesistheenergyavailabletothepressurizersubsystem.Thepressurizercompartmentisslightlysouthwestofthe"B"steamgenerator.Duringrestartafterrefueling,thereisaneedto.performinspectionsinthepressurizercompartment.Duetospacelimitations,itisnecessarytorepositiononeoftheremovableblockstoallowforaccessbyplantpersonnel.Itisproposedtoleavethisblockoutofpositionuntilinspectionsarecompletedpriortocriticality,reducingboronconcentrationormovingacontrolrodfromthefullinsertposition.Thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyas,previouslyevaluatedbecausetheremovalofthepressurizerblocksdonotprovideaninitiatingmechanismandtheradiologicalconsequencesofasmallLOCAhavebeenanalyzed.Theblocksdonotinteractwithanyequipmentimpoxtanttosafetythereforenoincreaseinmalfunctionsarecreated.ThischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisbecausetheconsequencesoftheeventareboundedbyexistingMSLBanalysis.Missilesare'notanewevent,sinceSEPTopicIII-4.cperformedareviewofmissileeffectsforGinna.ThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.inthattheremovableblocksarenotwithinthescopeoftheTechnicalSpecificationsanddonotimpactanyconditionsrequiredtomeettheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Page30 BWNT77-1235965-01REPLACEMENTSTEAMGENERATORREPORTANDSAFETYEVALUATIONThisreportdiscussestheuseofBWIreplacementsteamgenerators(RSGs)attheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(Ginna).ItdemonstratesthattheRSGsmeettheexistingUFSARcriteriaandcanbeoperatedinaccordancewithNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)requirementssetforthin10CFRS0.59,withoutpriorNRCapproval.TheRSGsaremanufacturedbyBabcockEWilcoxInternational(BWI)inCambridge,Ontario,Canada.TheRSGsaredesigned,manufacturedandtestedinaccordancewiththe1986EditionofSectionIIIoftheASMECodeandwillbeN-stampedbyBWIpriortoshipmenttoGinna.Thedesign,procurement,andmanufacturingprocessisperformedunderaQualityAssuranceProgramthatcomplieswiththerequirementsofAppendixBto10CFRSOandwiththecurrentNRCrequirementsthatrelatetosteamgeneratordesign.TheRSGsoccupythesamephysicalenvelopeastheOriginalSteamGenerators(OSGs).There,arenochangestointerfaceswiththereactorcoolant,mainfeedwaterormainsteamsystems,ortomajorcomponentsupportsorpipingsupports.DifferencesbetweentheOSGandRSGdesignsinclude(1)asmallweightincrease,(2)additionofanintegralflowrestrictorinthemainsteamnozzle,(3)increasedheattransferarea,(4)useofAlloy690tubematerial,(5)reducedtubediameterandwallthickness,(6)slightlyincreasedprimarysidewaterinventoryand(7)slightlyincreasedfull-powersecondarysidewaterinventory.EvaluationsofthedifferencesbetweentheRSGsandOSGsarepresentedin~thisreport.TheseevaluationsconfirmthatuseoftheRSGsmeetstheexistingUFSARlicensingacceptancecriteria,doesnotrequireachangetotheplantTechnicalSpecificationsortheirbases,,anddoesnotcreateanUnreviewedSafetyQuestion.Thethreecriteriaidentifiedin10CFR50..59havebeenfactoredintosevenquestions.TheseareaddressedinSubsections1through7.AssessmentofeachquestionasitpertainstouseoftheRSGsdemonstratesthatuseoftheRSGsdoesnotcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.1)DoestheproposedactivityincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR?Thisquestionisaddressedinthreesteps:First,theaccidentsandtransientsevaluatedintheUFSARforwhichtheprobabilityofoccurrencecouldbeaffectedbyuseoftheRSGsareidentified.Second,thedifferencesbetweentheRSGsandtheOSGsthatcouldaffecttheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentortransientareidentified.Third,theidentifieddifferencesareevaluatedtodetermineiftheprobabilityofanaccidentortransientisincreasedbyuseoftheRSGs.Thesestepsareaddressedbelow.Page31 IdentificationofAccidentsorTransientsforWhichtheProbabilityofOccurrenceisPotentiallyAffectedbyUseoftheRSGs~Ste2MostoftheaccidentsandtransientsevaluatedintheUFSARareinitiatedbyfailuresorinadvertentactuationsofequipmentandsystemsthatarenotrelatedtouseoftheRSGs.AllaccidentsandtransientspresentedintheUFSARwereevaluatedwiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGstoidentifyanyforwhichtheprobabilityofoccurrencecouldbeaffectedbyuseoftheRSGs.TheSteamGeneratorTubeRupture(SGTR)wasidentifiedastheonlyaccidentortransientforwhichtheprobabilityofoccurrencecouldbeaffectedbyuseoftheRSGs.IdentificationofRSGDifferencesThatCouldAffectAccidentProbabilityDifferencesbetweentheRSGandOSGsthatcouldaffecttheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanSGTRaretheRSGtubebundledesign,tubesupportsystem,andtube-to-tubesheetjointdesign.ThesedifferencesareevaluatedinStep3.~Ste3-EvaluationofDifferencesTheRSGandOSGtubebundleconfigurationsaresimilar,howevertheRSGtubesaresmallerindiameter,constructedofAlloy690insteadofAlloy600,andsupportedbystainlesssteellatticegridsinsteadofthedrilledcarbonsteelplatesusedintheOSGs.TheRSGuppertubebundleshapeconsistsoftubeswithcontinuous,smooth,long-radiusbends.TheU-bendsoftheinnermostRSGtubesareskewedtoprovidealongerminimumbendradiusthanthoseintheOSGdesign.TheRSGtubebundleconfigurationisusedtoevaluatethestructuralandvibrationaladequacyoftheRSGtubes.Thetubebundledesignisanalyzedtodeterminetubevibrationcharacteristicsandtheeffectivenessoflattice,gridsinsuppressingvibration.Theresultsverifythatlatticegridsaresuperiorforstrengthandvibrationrestraint.Thisminimizeswearduetofretting.Therefore,theRSGtubesandtubebundleconfigurationareascapableofcontrollingharmfulmodesofvibrationasaretheOSGtubesandtubebundleconfiguration,andtheRSGtube..bundleconfigurationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanSGTR.AveragetubeinsideandoutsidediametersaresmallerfortheRSGthanfortheOSG,andtheRSGtubewallisthinnerthanthatoftheOSG.Nevertheless,theAlloy690materialusedintheRSGtubesisstrongerthantheAlloy600tubesusedintheOSGs,theRSGtubesarenominally0.007inchesthinnerthantheOSGtubes(consistentwiththesmallerinsidediameteroftheRSGtubes).TheRSGtubematerial(Alloy690)hasahigherallowablestressPage32 Cl thandoestheAlloy600tubing.usedintheOSGs.BecausethecriticalrupturepressureoftheRSGtubesexceedsthatoftheOSGtubes,thereducedRSGtubewallthicknessdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanSGTR.Additionally,theRSGtubematerialismoreresistanttoprimaryandsecondarysidecorrosionandcrackingthanistheOSGtubematerial.Factorsthatcontributetoincreasedcorrosionresistancearehigherchromiumcontentandhighergrainboundarycarbidedecoration.BecausetheRSGtubematerialresistscorrosionbetterthantheOSGtubematerial,thedifferenceintubematerialsdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanSGTR.TheRSGtubesarejoinedtothetubesheetsbyweldingandhydraulicexpansion.TheRSGtubesarehydraulicallyexpandedthroughthefull-depthofthetubesheet,whereastheOSGtubesarenot.Eliminationofthetubesheetcreviceinthe,.RSGprotectsagainstsecondarysidestress-corrosioncrackinginthisarea.Therefore,differencesintheOSGandRSGtube-to-tubesheetjointdesignsdonotincreasetheprobabilityofanSGTR.TheparagraphsabovedescribereviewoftheaccidentsandtransientsevaluatedintheUFSARandidentifytheSGTRastheonlyaccidentortransientforwhichprobabilityofoccurrencecouldbeaffectedbyuseoftheRSGs.ThedifferencesbetweentheRSGandOSGthatcouldaffecttheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanSGTRareidentified,andeachisevaluatedtoshowthatuseoftheRSGsdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofthisevent.BecausethedifferencesbetweentheRSGandOSGtubebundledesignthatcouldaffecttheprobabilityofanSGTRhavebeenidentifiedandshownnottoincreasetheprobabilityofanSGTR,useoftheRSGsdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanSGTRanduseoftheRSGsdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofaccidentsortransientspreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.2)DoestheproposedactivityincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR?ConsistentwithNSAC-125,consequencesofanaccidentareconsideredtobedoseconsequences.Thisquestionisaddressedinthreesteps:First,accidentsandtransientspreviously..evaluatedintheUFSARforwhichdoseconsequencescouldbeaffectedbyuseoftheRSGsareidentified.Second,thedifferencesbetweentheRSGsandOSGsthatcouldaffecttheconsequencesoftheseaccidentsandtransientsareidentified.Third,theRSGandOSGdifferencesareevaluatedtodetermineiftheconsequencesoftheseaccidentsandtransientsareincreasedbyuseoftheRSGs.Thesestepsareaddressedbelow.Page33

~SteI-IdentificationofAccidentforWhichtheConsequencesarePotentiallyAffectedbyUseoftheRSGsDoseconsequencesfromLOCAsarecalculatedindependentofanysteamgeneratorparameters,andarethereforenotpotentiallyeffectedbytheRSGs~~Ste2-IdentificationofRSGDifferenceThatCouldAffectAccidentDoseConsequencesTheparametersimportanttooffsitedoesconsequencesare(1)theintegratedleakageintothesecondarysystemand(2)theRCSactivityconcentration.Theintegratedleakageintothesecondarysystemisafunctionofthebreakarea.TheRCSactivitylevelusedintheUFSARcalculationscorrespondstotheTechnicalSpecificationlimit,whichisnotaffectedbysteamgeneratorreplacement.Therefore,theonlydifference,betweentheRSGsandOSGsthatcouldaffectSGTRdoesconsequencesistheRSGtubeinsidediameter.TheeffectofthisdifferenceontheSGTRdoseconsequencesisevaluatedbelow.~Ste3-EvaluationofDifferenceThenominalRSGtubeinsidediameteris.O.illinchessmallerthanthenominalOSGtubeinsidediameter.BecausetheRSGbrokentubeflowareaissmaller,thebreakflowwillbelower.Howeverthislowerflowwill,causeaslowerdepressurizationoftheRCS,andconsequently.alaterreactortrip.Thecombinedeffectofthesedifferencesproduces'approximatelythesameintegratedleakage,andthattheexistingGinnacalculationboundstheGinnaplantwiththeRSGswithrespecttooffsitedose.BecausethedoseconsequencesfortheSGTR(theonlyUFSARaccidentthatcouldbeaffectedbyuseoftheRSGs)areshowntobeboundedbytheexistingcalculation,useoftheRSGsdoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.3)DoestheproposedactivityincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR?Page34 Thisquestionisaddressedinthreesteps:First,thedifferencesbetweentheRSGsandOSGsthatcouldaffectmalfunctionoftheequipmentassumedtofunctionintheaccidentanalysisareidentified.Second,theequipmentthatcouldbeaffectedbytheseRSGdifferencesisidentified.Third,theeffectofthedifferencesidentifiedontheprobabilityofamalfunctionoftheequipmentidentifiedisevaluated.Forthisevaluation,meetingtheexistingstructuralacceptancecriteriaisconsideredtodemonstratethattheprobabilityofastructuralmalfunctionisnotincreased.Thesestepsareaddressedbelow.~SteIIdentificationofRSGDifferencesThatCouldAffectEquipmentMalfunctionTheprobabilityofamalfunctionoftheequipmentandprotectionfeaturesthatareassumedtofunctionintheUFSARaccidentanalysescouldbeaffectediftheequipmentorprotectionfeaturesarerequiredtooperateoutsidetheirdesignconditions.TheRSGsaredesignedtothesametemperaturesandpressuresastheOSGs.TheonlyRSGdifferencesidentifiedthatcouldchangetheoperatingconditionsofequipmentorprotectionfeaturesassumedtofunctionintheUFSARaccidentanalysesaretheRSGweightandcenterofgravity.TheRSGsareapproximatelysixpercentheavierthantheOSGsandtheircentersofgravityatoperatingconditionsareapproximately12incheshigherthanthoseoftheOSGs.~Ste2'-IdentificationofEquipmentAffectedbyRSGDifferencesTheloadsimposedontheRSGsupportsandattachedpipingareslightlyhigherthanfortheOSGsbecausetheRSGsareslightlyheavierandhaveahighercenterofgravitythantheOSGs.Evaluationof,theincreasedRSGloadsonsupportsandattachedpipingisdiscussedinStep3below.~Ste3-EvaluationofDifferencesTheeffectsofasixpercentincreaseinweightanda12-inchhighercenterofgravityfortheRSGsareevaluated.TheevaluationshowsthattheexistingsupportsandattachedpipingloadsmeettheUFSAR.,acceptancecriteriawiththeRSGsinplaceofthe,OSGs.Thecomponent,pipingandsupportloadsandstressesremainbelowtheexistingallowablevalues.BecausetheexistingallowableloadsareshownnottoincreasebeyondtheacceptancecriteriawiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs,theprobabilityofamalfunctionofthisequipmentisconsideredtobeequivalentfortheRSGsandOSGs.Therefore,useoftheRSGsdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofamalfunction.ofcomponentsupportsorattachedpiping.Page35 TheaboveparagraphsidentifyincreasedRSGweightandhighercenterofgravityastheonlyaspectsofuseoftheRSGsthatcouldaffecttheprobabilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.Steamgeneratorsupportsandattachedpipingareidentifiedastheonlyequipmentthatcouldbeaffected.Theevaluationshowsthattheincreaseinweightandhighercenterofgravitydonotaffecttheprobabilityofmalfunctionofthisequipment.Therefore,useoftheRSGsdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyanalyzedintheUFSAR.4)DoestheproposedactivityincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR?Thisquestionisaddressedinthreesteps:First,thedifferencesbetweentheRSGsandOSGsthatcouldaffecttheconsequencesofamalfunctionoftheequipmentassumedtofunctionintheUFSARaccidentanalysisareidentified.Second,theequipmentaffectedisidentified.Third,theeffectofthedifferencesontheconsequencesisevaluated.Thesestepsarepresentedbelow.~Ste1IdentificationofRSGDifferencesThatCouldAffectEquipmentMalfunctionConsequencesTheRSGscouldaffecttheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentby(a)affectingthesequenceofeventsorthermal-hydraulicresponseofanaccident,by(b)affectingassumedoperatoractions,orby(c)causingoperationofsystemsimportanttosafetyoutsidetheiroperatinglimits.DifferencesbetweentheRSGandOSGthatpotentiallyincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentassumedtofunctionintheUFSARareaddressedinturnbelow.a~TheRSGsaredesignedforthesameconditionsastheOSGs.Theacceptancecriteriafor'heaccidentsandtransientsevaluatedintheUFSARaremetwiththeRSGs~BecausethedesignconditionsfortheRSGsandOSGsareequivalent;andbecausetheacceptancecriteriafortheaccidentsandtransientsevaluatedintheUFSARaremet,theequipmentassumedtofunctionintheUFSARaccidentanalysisfunctionswithinitsoperatinglimitswiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs.Therefore,noRSGdifferencesareidentifiedthataffecttheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentassumedtofunctionintheUFSAR.b.TheoperatoractionsassumedinresponsetotheaccidentsandtransientsanalyzedintheUFSARaredocumentedintheplantemergencyoperatingprocedures.Evaluationofplantemergencyoperatingprocedures,identifiednorequiredchanges.Therefore,theactionsprescribedintheseprocedures,andtheoperatingPage36 setpointsremainappropriatefortheRSGs.BecauseuseoftheRSGsdoesnotaffecttheemergencyoperatingprocedures,noRSGdifferencesareidentifiedthataffecttheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentassumedtofunctionintheUFSAR.C.ReviewoftheplantTechnicalSpecificationswithrespecttotheaccidentanalysespresentedintheUFSAR,showedthattheoperatinglimitsusedfortheOSGsarenot,changedfortheRSGs.BecauseuseoftheRSGsdoesnotchangetheoperatinglimitsofsystemsimportanttosafety,noRSCdifferencesareidentifiedthataffecttheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentassumedtofunctionintheUFSAR.ITheparagraphaboveshowsthatuseoftheRSGsdoesnot(a)exceedanyacceptancecriteriafortheaccidentsandtransientsevaluatedintheUFSAR,(b)affecttheemergencyoperatingprocedures,or(c)causeoperationofsystemsimportanttosafetyoutsidetheiroperatinglimits.Therefore,therearenoRSGdifferencesthataffecttheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentassumedtofunctionintheUFSAR.~Ste2-EquipmentAffectedbyDifferencesSincetherearenodifferencesidentifiedthataffecttheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentassumedtofunctionintheUFSAR,noequipmentisaffected.~Ste2-EvaluationofDifferencesBecausetherearenoRSGdifferencesidentifiedthataffecttheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentassumedtofunctionintheUFSAR,andbecausenoaffectedequipmentisidentified,,therearenodifferencestoevaluate.BecausetherearenodifferencesbetweentheRSGsandOSGsthatcouldaffecttheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentassumedtofunctionintheUFSAR,useoftheRSGsdoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.5)DoestheproposedactivitycreatethepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR?Thisquestionisaddressedintwosteps:First,thedifferencesbetweentheRSGsandOSGsthatcouldhavethepotentialtocreateanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARareidentified.Second,anydifferencesidentifiedinthefirststepareevaluatedfortheirpotentialtocreateanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Page37

~Ste1-IdentificationofRSGDifferencesThatCouldCreateaDifferentTypeofAccidentTheRSGsconnecttothesamepiping(exceptforminorsmall-borepipingrelocations),instrumentconnections,andsupportsasdotheOSGs.BecausetheRSGsconnecttoandusethesamepiping,instrumentconnections,andsupportsasdotheOSGs,nodifferencesarecreatedthatcouldresultinthepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferencetypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.~Ste2-EvaluationofDifferencesBecauseuseof'theRSGsdoesnotcreatedifferencesthatcouldresultinthepossibilityofadifferenttypeofaccident,therearenodifferencestoevaluate.BecauseuseoftheRSGsdoesnotcreateanydifferencesthatcouldresultinthepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttype,theirusedoesnotresultinthepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethantypesalreadyevaluatedintheUFSAR.6)DoestheproposedactivitycreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR?Thisquestionisaddressedintwosteps:First,thedifferencesbetweentheRSGsandOSGsthatcouldhavethepotentialtocreateamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARareidentified.Second,thedifferencesidentifiedinthefirststepareevaluatedfortheirpotentialtocreateamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.~SteI-IdentificationofRSGDifferencesThatCouldCreateaDifferentTypeofMalfunctionTheRSGsconnecttothesamepiping(exceptforminorsmall-borepipingrelocations),instrumentconnections,andsupportsasdotheOSGs.BecausetheRSGsconnecttoandusethesamepiping,instrumentation,andsupportsasdotheOSGs,nodifferencesarecreatedthatcouldresultinthepossibilityofamalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.~Ste2-EvaluationofDifferencesBecauseuseoftheRSGsdoesnotcreateanydifferencesthatcouldresultinthepossibilityofadifferenttypeofmalfunction,therearenodifferencestoevaluate.Page38 ThereforeuseoftheRSGsdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.7)Doestheproposedactivityreduce'hemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecifications?'Thisquestionisaddressedinfoursteps:First,areviewoftheUFSARaccidentanalyses,structuralanalyses,andotherissuesidentifiesareaswhereuseoftheRSGsthatcouldreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnicalSpecifications.(Reductioninthemarginofsafetyis'efinedasthevalueofanyacceptancecriteriaparameterexceedingthevaluethatisreportedintheUFSARormodifiedbytheNRC'sSER.)Second,thedifferencesbetweentheRSGsandOSGsthatcouldaffecteachareaidentifiedinthefirststepareidentified.Third,eachdifferenceisevaluatedtodetermineitseffectonthemarginofsafety.Fourth,theTechnicalSpecificationsarereviewedtoidentifyanychangesthatarerequiredbyuseoftheRSGs,andtoassesstheeffectofanychangesonthemarginofsafety.Thesestepsareaddressedbelow.~SteI-IdentificationofAreasWhereUseoftheRSGsCouldAffecttheMarginofSafetyTheresultsoftheUFSARaccidentanalysisevaluationshowedthatuseoftheRSGswasboundedbytheUFSARaccidentanalysesforalleventsexceptitems1,2and3below.EvaluationofthecontainmentpressureresponsewiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs,showedthatuseoftheRSGsisboundedbytheexistingUFSARcalculationsexceptforitem4below.EvaluationoftheGinnastructuralanalyseswith'theRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs,identifieditem5belowastheonlystructuralaspectofuseoftheRSGs,thatcouldaffecttheplantstructuralanalyses.EvaluationofotherissueswiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs,identifieditems6,7and8belowaspotentiallyaffectedbyuseoftheRSGs.1.CombinedSteamGeneratorReliefValveandFeedwaterControlValveFailure.2.LossofExternalElectricLoad.3.SteamGeneratorTubeRupture4.LBLOCAcontainmentresponse.5.RSGsupportsandattachedpipingloadsandstresses.Page39 6.Overpressureprotectionduringnormaloperation.Lowtemperatureover-pressure.8.ATWS~Ste2IdentificationofRSGDifferencesTheRSGdifferencesthatcouldaffecttheItemsidentifiedinStep1areshownincorrespondingItems1through8below.CombinedSteamGeneratorReliefValveandFeedwaterControlValveFailureidentifiessecondarysideoperatingpressure(thatslightlyreducesgeneratorover-feedingandincreasesAtmosphericdumpvalveflow)asanaspectofuseoftheRSGthatcouldaffectthisevent.2.LossofExternalElectricLoadidentifiessteamproductionrateandthepressuredropfromthedowncomertothesteamexitnozzleasaspectsoftheRSGthatcouldaffectthepeaksecondarysideoperatingpressure.InitialsecondarysidepressureisanaspectoftheRSGthatcouldaffectthepeakprimarysidepressure.3.SteamGeneratorTubeRuptureidentifiesintegratedsteamgeneratorleakageandRCSactivitylevelasparametersthatcouldaffectSGTRdoseconsequences.TheonlydifferencebetweentheRSGsandOSGsthatcouldaffecttheintegratedsteamgeneratorleakageisthetubebreakarea.RCSactivitylevelisbasedontheTechnicalSpecificationlimit,andthereforeisnotaffectedbyuseoftheRSGs.InsidetubediameterandsecondarysidevolumeareaspectsoftheRSGthatcouldaffectoverfill.4.LBLOCAcontainmentpressureresponseidentifiesprimarysidevolumeandheattransferareaasaspectsoftheRSGthatcouldaffectpeakcontainmentpressure.RSGsupportsandattachedpipingloadsandstressesidentifiesweightandcenterofgravityasaspects..oftheRSGthatcouldaffectRSGsupportandattachedpipingloads.6.OverpressureprotectionduringnormaloperationidentifiesheattransferareaasanaspectoftheRSGthatcouldaffectpeakRCSpressureandpeakmainsteampressure.7.Lowtemperatureover-pressure.identifiessecondarysideliquidmassandprimarysidevolumeasaspectsoftheRSGthatcouldaffecttheseresults.Page40 8.ResultsofWCAP-8404identifiessecondarysideliquidmassandprimarysidevolumeasaspectsoftheRSGthatcouldaffecttheseresults.~Ste3-EvaluationofDifferencesThedifferencesidentifiedinStep2areevaluatedbelowfortheireffectonthemarginofsafetyforthecorrespondingareasidentifiedinStep1.CombinedSteamGeneratorReliefValveandFeedwaterControlValveFailureBecausethiseventwasnotshowntobeboundedbyevaluation,itwasanalyzedwiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs.TheanalysisshowedthatthehigherRSGsecondarysideoperatingpressurecausesslightlylessfeedwatertoreachtheRSGthanreachestheOSGduringthisevent..Thisreduces(improves)plantresponsetothisevent,andtheUFSARanalysisboundsuseoftheRSGs.ThereforeuseoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafety.2.LossofExternalElectricLoadBecausethiseventwasnotshowntobeboundedbyevaluation,itwasanalyzedwiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs~Theanalysisshowsthatprimaryandsecondarysidepressures,andminimumDNBRremainwithintheacceptancecriteriaforthiseventwiththeRSGs.ThereforeuseoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafety.3.SteamGeneratorTubeRupture(SGTR)BecausetheSGTRwasnotshowntobeboundedbyevaluation,itwasanalyzedwiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs.Theanalysisdiscussestwoaspects,oftheSGTR.Theseareoffsitedoseandsteamgeneratoroverfill.TheanalysisshowedthattheUFSARanalysesboundtheRSGsfordoseconsequencesandforsteamgeneratoroverfill.ThereforeuseoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafety.4LBLOCAcontainmentresponseAnalysisoftheLBLOCAshowsthatthepeakcontainmentpressurefollowingaLBLOCAwouldbeslightlyhigherwiththeRSGsthanwiththeOSGs.However,thepeakcontainmentpressurewouldnotexceedthecontainmentdesignpressure(theacceptancecriteriafortheLBLOCAevent).ThereforeuseoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafety.Page41 5.RSGsupportsandattachedpipingloadsandstressesAnanalysisdiscussesthestructuralanalysisoftheGinnaplantwiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs.ItshowsthattheUFSARacceptancecriteriaaremetwiththeincreasedRSGweightandhighercenterofgravity.ThereforeuseoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafety.6.OverpressureprotectionduringnormaloperationAnalysisofthiseventshowsthatthecalculatedprimaryandsecondarysidepressuresmeettheacceptancecriteriawiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs.ThereforeuseoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafety.7.LowTemperatureOver-PressureAnalysisofthiseventshowsthatthecalculatedprimaryandsecondarysidepressuresinthecalculationofrecordmeettheacceptancecriteriawiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs.ThereforeuseoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafety.8.ATWSEvaluationsoftheeffectsofuseoftheRSGsontheATWSeventsdescribedinWCAP-8404wereevaluated.TheseevaluationsshowthatuseoftheRSGsdoesnotaltertheconclusionsofWCAP-8404.ThereforeuseoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafety.EvaluationoftheUFSARaccidentanalysesshowsthatallexistingUFSARacceptancecriteriaaremetwiththeRSGs.Theresultsoftheseevaluationsaredocumented.Therefore,useoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginsofsafetyintheUFSARaccidentanalyses.EvaluationoftheuseoftheRSGsonthepeakcontainmentpressurethatresultsfromanLBLOCAorMSLBisevaluatedandshowntobebelowtheexistingdesignpressure.Therefore,useoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginsofsafetyinthepeakcontainmentpressureanalyses.IncreasedsupportloadsandstressesthatresultformuseoftheRSGsareshowntoremainbelowtheexistingacceptancecriteria.Therefore,useoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginsofsafetyintheUFSARstructuralevaluations.OtherissuesthatcouldbeaffectedbyuseoftheRSGsareevaluated.TheexistingacceptancecriteriaareshowntobemetwiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs.Therefore,useoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetywithregardtotheissuesidentified.Page42

~Ste4-EvaluationofTechnicalSpecificationsandBasesReviewoftheGinnaTechnicalSpecificationsshowedthattherearenochangesrequiredtotheTechnicalSpecificationsbyuseoftheRSGs.Therefore,theexistingTechnicalSpecificationsremainapplicablefortheRSGs.Theresultsofthisreviewaredocumented.Therefore,themarginofsafetyintheTechnicalSpecificationsisnotreducedbyuseoftheRSGs.BecausetheacceptancecriteriaintheUFSARaccidentandstructuralanalysesaremetwiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs,becausetheacceptancecriteriafortheotherissuesidentifiedaremetwiththeRSGsinplaceoftheOSGs,andbecausechangestotheTechnicalSpecificationsarenotrequired,itisconcludedthatuseoftheRSGsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetydefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecifications.Page43 SEV-1018STEAMGENERATORREPLACEMENTFACILITIESOUTSIDECONTAINMENTOldSteamGeneratorStoraeFacilitTheOldSteamGeneratorStorageFacility(OSGSF)isareinforcedconcretebuildingwhichwillprovidelong-termonsitestorageofthetwooldsteamgeneratorsandtheattachedinsulationmaterial.ThedesignlifeoftheOSGSFis40yearsandthefacilityislocatedoutsidetheexistingsecurityperimeterfence.TheOSGSFisconstructedofa21-inchreinforcedconcreteroofwith3-inchmetaldeckingandsinglespansteelbeamssupportedon30-inchreinforcedconcretewallswithastripfootingfoundation.Theoldsteamgeneratorsandsaddlebeamswillbesupportedbyreinforcedconcretepiersonspreadfootings.Afloatingslabwillbeusedforthefloorareaofthebuilding.Gradingwillbeperformedtodirectsurfacewaterrun-offawayfromtheprotectedarea.TheOSGSFisastandalonefacilityandwillhavenointerfacewithpermanentplantstructures.TheOSGSFwillinterfacewiththeoldsteamgeneratorsandtheirsupports.Furthermore,theOSGSFwillbeprovidedpowerfromthenon-safetyrelatedelectricalpowerdistributionsystem.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?TheOSGSFisclassifiedasanonsafety-related,non-seismicstructureandisnotphysicallyconnectedorimmediatelyadjacenttoanexistingsitestructure.TheOSGSFinterfaceswiththeoldsteamgenerators,theirsupportsandnonsafety-relatedelectricaldistributionsystems.TheOSGSFdoesnotinterfacewithanyexistingplantinstrumentationandcontrolsystems.Thedesignofthisfacilityensuresthatnosafety-relatedstructures,systems,orcomponentsareimpacted.Duetotheirmassiveweight,asteamgeneratorwillnotbecomeatornadomissile.Penetrationoftheconcreteresultingfromatornadomissileisprecludedbythe30inchreinforcedconcretewalls'her'efore,theeffectsofatornadostrikeortornadomissilesisnotexpectedtoresultinaradioactiverelease.TheconsequencesresultingfromapostulatedfailureoftheOSGSFontothestoredsteamgeneratorsorapostulateddropofasteamgeneratorfromthestoragepositionhasbeenaddressedaspartofthehaulrouteevaluationpresentedinsafetyevaluationSEV-1020anddeterminedtobeacceptable.Page44 Therefore,basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?ThedesignoftheOSGSFensuresthatthereisnoimpacttosafety-relatedstructures,systems,orcomponentsintheeventofadesignbasisseismicevent.Thisfacilityisdesignedforlimitedpersonnelaccessandoccupancy.-GradingoftheareaadjacenttotheOSGSFwillbeperformedtoensurethatsurfacewaterrunoffisdirectedawayfromtheprotectedarea.Therefore,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?TheOSGSFisanon-seismic,nonsafety-relatedstructurelocatedoutsidetheexistingsecurityperimeterfence.Thisfacilityisastandalonefacilitywhichisnotphysicallyconnectedorimmediatelyadjacenttoanyexistingsitestructure.TheOSGSFwillnotaffecttheintegrityofanysafeshutdownstructures,systems,orcomponents.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.ContainmentAccessFacilitThefollowingmodificationswillbeconstructedtoprovideanefficientmeansofingressandegresstotheplantfortheSGR.Atemporary,pre-engineered,ContainmentAccessFacility(CAF)willbeerectedwestoftheservicebuildingtoprovideanefficientmeansofplantaccessforworkersduringthe,SGRandwillberemovedfollowingtheSGR.Anewpermanentdoor,withsecurityelectronics,willbeins'tailedinthewestwalloftheintermediatebuildingforaccesstotheexistingcontainmentpersonnellock.Temporarywalkwayswillbeinstalledontheservicebuildingroofforaccessto1)thenewdoorinstalledintheintermediatebuildingand2)thecontainmentdomeareaviadoorS56andthestairwelllocatedinthenorthwestcorneroftheintermediatebuilding.Page45 Temporarymodificationswillbemadetopermanentstairwaysandlandings,andtemporarystairwaysandlandingswillbeinstalledinsidetheintermediatebuildingtoimproveworkeringressandegresstoandfromthecontainmentpersonnellock.ThesetemporarymodificationsconsistofremovingtheexistingupanddownstairtreadstoElevations298'-4"and278'-4"aswellastheassociatedlanding,andprovidingtemporarydownstairtreadsonly.Theexistingstairwayandlandingwillbereinstalleduponcompletionofthesteamgeneratorreplacementoutage.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?TheCAFiserectedadjacenttononsafety-relatedplantstructuresandisnotdirectlyconnectedtoanyexistingplantstructures.ThedesignoftheCAFensuresthatnosafety-relatedstructuies,systems,orcomponentsareimpacted.Thenewintermediatebuildingdoorisnotdesignedtowithstandinternallyorexternallygeneratedmissiles.However,safety-relatedequipmentandcomponentsaresufficientlyprotectedfromtheeffectsofinternalandexternalmissiles.Thematerialsutilizedinthedesignofthetemporarywalkwaysaresimilartoothertemporaryandpermanentsitestructuresandarenoworsethanexistingmaterialswhichmaybecomemissiles.Theequipmentwithintheintermediatebuildingandinthevicinityofthenewdoor,whichisrequiredforsafeshutdown,hasbeenidentifiedandisprotectedfromtheeffectsofmissiles.TheexistingstairwaysandlandingsareseismiccategoryII/I.Modificationstothesestructureswillnotadverselyaffectanysafety-relatedstructures,systems,orcomponentsintheeventofadesignbasisseismicevent.Thetemporarystairwaysarelocatedsufficientlyawayfromsafety-relatedequipmentsuchthatshouldafailureofthetemporarystairwaysandlandingsoccurduetoaseismicevent,noadverseimpacttotheequipmentwouldoccur.Theperformanceofexistingfi'reprotectionequipmentisnotadverselyaffectedbytheCAFinterfacewiththeexistingsitefirewatersystem.TheCAFfireprotectionsystemhasbeensizedtoensurethatthedemandoftheCAFfireprotectionsystemiswithinthecapacityoftheyardloopsystem.TheCAFsprinklersystemwillbeprovidedinaccordancewithNFPA13.ModificationtotheexistingintermediatebuildingstairwayrequiredtoprovideimprovedingressandegresswillrestrictaccesstoEl.298'-4".Accesstothiselevationwillremainavailableviathestairwaylocatedinthenortheastcorneroftheintermediatebuilding.Page46 Duringinstallationofthenewdoorintheintermediatebuildingtosupportthesteamgeneratorreplacement,atemporarycoverwillbeprovidedovertheopening,as.required,tominimizeanyperturbationintheintermediatebuildingventilation.Thus,noadverseimpacttotheexistingfiredetectionsystemwillresult.Therefore,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?ThedesignoftheCAF,thetemporarystairways,andmodificationstoexistingstairwaysandlandingsensuresthatnosafety-relatedstructures,systems,orcomponentsareadverselyimpactedintheeventofadesignbasisseismicevent.Theinstallation,use,andremovaloftheCAFwillnotadverselyaffecttheundergroundcommoditiesinthevicinity.AllundergroundcommoditiesbeneaththeCAFhavebeenevaluatedandwillnotbeadverselyaffectedbyCAFsurchargeloadings.ThegaslinebeneaththeCAFwillbeencapsulatedwithinaguardpipewhichwillbeventedabovegradetopreventthebuildupofnaturalgasbeneaththeCAFintheinadvertenteventofagaslinefailure.Thematerialsutilizedforthetemporarywalkwaysarenoworsethanexistingmaterialswhichmaybecomemissiles.Althoughthenewintermediatedoorisnotdesignedtowithstandinternallyorexternallygeneratedmissiles,safety-relatedequipmentandcomponentsaresufficientlyprotectedfrompostulatedmissiles.Therefore,thepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARisnotcreated.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?TheCAF,temporarywalkways,stairways,andtheintermediatebuildingdooraredesignedtoprecludeadverseimpacttosafety-relatedstructures,systems,andcomponentsduringaseismicevent.Thisensuresthatsystemsrequiredtobeoperablefollowingaseismiceventareunaffectedbythesemodifications.TheCAFandwalkwayscanbeinstalled,used,andremovedduringanymodeofplantoperation.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced..Page47 SEV-1019CONTAINMENTSTRUCTURALMODIFICATIONSCONTA1NMENTCONSTRUCTIONOPENINGSThissectionofthesafetyevaluationevaluatesthedesignandanalysisofthecontainmentdomereinforcedconcreteandlinerplateduringandafterthesteamgeneratorreplacement(SGR).Thissafetyevaluationalsoevaluatesthephysicaldesignsandconstructionactivitiesusedtoremoveandre-installthecontainmentdomereinforcedconcrete,linerplate,andassociatedcomponents.Riggingandhandlingofheavyloads,includingthesteamgenerators,linerplatesections,andconstructionequipmenttobemountedonthecontainmentdome,isaddressedineitherSEV-1020,SteamGeneratorRiggingandHandlingorSEV-1024,ContainmentDomeRigging&Handling.Tofacilitatetheremovalandreplacementofthesteamgenerators,twoconstructionopeningswillbecutinthecontainmentvesseldome.TheconstructionopeningforsteamgeneratorAislocateddirectlyoverthesteamgenerator.TheconstructionopeningforsteamgeneratorBconsistsofaslottedopeningoriginatingabovethesteamgeneratorandconnectingtoalargeropeninglocatedtowardthenortheastofthecontainmentdome.Thefollowingisadescriptionoftheplannedconstructionsequencetocreateandrestoretheconstructionopeningsinthecontainmentdome.Theconstructionsequenceisdividedinto5stagesandprovidesareferencebasisforthecontainmentdomestructuralevaluation'approach.Forcompleteness,themajoractivitiesassociatedwitheachstagearedescribedbelow.However,theevaluationofactivitiesassociatedwitheachstageorportionofastagemayappearlaterinthisdocument.Wheretheevaluationofactivitiesoccursinothersectionsofthisdocument,referencetotheappropriatesectionofthedocumenthasbeenprovided.Priortoshutdownforthesteamgeneratorreplacement(SGR)outagewiththeplantinan'Operatingmode,thefollowingconstructionactivitieswillbeaccomplished(Stage1):Temporarystructuralsteelplatformsandstructureswillbeinstalledontopofthecontainmentdometosupporttheautomatedhydraulicjackhammers,craftpersonnel,andmiscellaneousconstructionequipmentandmaterials.Preliminaryconcretescoringanddrillingoperationsmaycommence.Thesepreliminaryconcreteoperationsareperformedtofacilitateestablishmentofthecutlineboundariesforthemanualandautomaticjackhammeringactivitiesandwillbelimitedtoanapproximatedepthofeightinchesofconcrete.Concreteexcavationwillnotoccurduringthisstage.Automatedhydraulicjackhammersshallnotbeusedduringtheseoperations.Page48 WiththeplantintheColdShutdownorRefuelingCondition,withfuelinthereactorvesseland/orintheprocessofbeingoffloadedtothespentfuelpool,thefollowingconstructionactivitieswillbeaccomplished(Stage2):Supplementaldropprotectionwillbeaddedbetweenthecontainmentbridgecranebeams.Thismaterialwillbesizedtopreventanymaterialdroppedfromoverheadworkfromreachingthecavity.~Concreteexcavationoperationswillcommenceusingtheautomatedhydraulicjackhammers,manualjackhammers,androckdrills.Astherebarisexposed,itwillbecutintomanageablelengthstofacilitateremoval.Excavationactivitieswillbecompleteddowntothetopofthelinerplate.Duringtheseplantconditionsthelinerplatewillnotbepenetratedanditsleaktightintegritywillbemaintained.~Alllayersofreinforcingbarlocatedwithinconstructionopenings"A"and"B"willbecut.interferingcommoditiesontheinsideofthedome(i.e.,containmentspraypiping,HVACductwork,andpainter'strolleyrails)willbetemporarilyremoved.Withtheplantina"no-mode"conditionwithallfueloffloadedtothespentfuelpoolandallnecessaryisolationofthespentfuelpoolandsupportingcontainmentsystemsachieved,thefollowingconstructionactivitieswillbeaccomplished(Stage3):Concreteexcavationoperationsmaystillbeon-going.Oncecompleted,thesteellinerplatewillbecutinsections,liftedfromthecontainmentdome,andmovedtoapreparationareaonsitetoprepareitforre-installation.~Theoldsteamgeneratorswillberemovedandthenewsteamgeneratorswillbeinstalled.(ThisactivityisaddressedintheSafetyEval'uation'forDC-10034B,SteamGeneratorRiggingandHandling.)~Theoldlinerplatesectionsornewpatchplatesections,ifrequired,willbeprepared,riggedintoplace,welded,leakchasechannelsinstalled,NDEperformed,andleak-tested.Theinterferingcommoditiesontheinsideofthedomewillbereinstalledandtestedasappropriate.~Themajorityofreinforcingbarswillbeinstalledandcadwelded.Splicingofrebarbyweldingmayalsobeperformed,ifnecessary.WiththeplantreturnedtoaRefuelingorCold.ShutdownCondition,withfuelinthereactorvesseland/orintheprocessofbeingonloadedfromthespentfuelpool,thefollowingconstructionactivitieswillbeaccomplished(Stage4):Page49 Installationandtestingoftheinterferingcommoditiesontheinteriorofthecontainmentdomemaystillbeongoing.Thefinalpiecesofreinforcingbarwillbesetandcadwelded/stick-welded.~Allconcretewillbeplaced/pouredandcured.Strengthtestswillbeconductedandacceptableresultswillbeachieved.~Alimitedcontainmentstructuralintegritytest(SIT)andanintegratedleakratetest(ILRT)willbeconducted,andbasedonacceptabletestresults,fullcontainmentintegritywillbeproven(ColdShutdownonly).~Theautomatedhydraulicandmanualjackhammers,andanyotherlargeconstructionequipment,willberemovedfromthecontainmentdome.WiththeplantreturnedtoanOperatingCondition,thefollowingconstructionactivitieswillbeaccomplished(Stage5):~Thetemporarystructuralsteelplatformsandstructuresaswellasmiscellaneousconstructionequipmentwillberemovedfromthecontainmentdome.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?TheplantwillbeinColdShutdownandtheprimarycoolantsystemdepressurizedbeforeconcretecanbeexcavatedandreinforcingbarcanbecut.RemovalofthereinforcingsteelandconcretedowntothelinerplateduringColdShutdownorRefuelingwillnotadverselyimpactpreviouslyreviewedaccidentsormalfunctionssincetheliner'sleaktightbarrierwillbemaintainedinalloccurrenceswhereasignificantradioactivereleasemayoccur.Theloadassociatedwith'theweightoftheconcreterubblehasbeenevaluatedanddoesnotadverselyaffectthedesignrequirementsofthecontainmentconcreteorthelinerplate.Analysishasshownthatthecontainmenthassufficientcapacitytosupporttheconstructionloads.Refuelingofthereactorwillnotcommenceuntilthecontainmentlinerhasbeenrestoredandlocalleaktestsperformed.TheplantwillnotleavetheColdShutdownconditionuntilthecontainmentdomeiscompletelyrestoredandthelimitedSIT/ILRTperformed.Page50 Thefunctionalcapabilityofthecontainmentdometowithstandatornado.missileimpactwithlessthanthedesignedconcretedomethicknessinselectedareaswasevaluatedandtheprobabilityofatornadomissilestrikingasectionoftheexcavatedconcrete,penetratingthelinerplate,anddamagingsafetyrelatedcomponentsduringstages2and4isnotconsideredcredible.Duringstage3thereisnoprovisionfortornadomissileprotectionsincenoequipmentwithincontainmentisrequiredwiththereactordefueled.Thus,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?ThesizeandlocationofthecontainmentopeningshavebeenselectedbasedonCalculation22225-C-0402-01andthesafetyevaluationassociated,withDesignCriteriaDC-10034B(SEV-1020)toprecludeanyadverseimpactonthespentfuelpoolasaresultofaheavyloaddrop.TheplantwillbeinColdShutdownandtheprimarycoolantsystemdepressurizedbeforesignificantconcreteisremovedandreinforcingbarcanbecut.Breachingofthecontainmentdomelinerwillnotoccuruntiltheplanthasbeendefueled,allfuelissafelystoredwithinthespentfuelpool,andallnecessaryisolationofthespentfuelpoolandsupportingcontainmentsystemsachieved.Thecontainmentdomehasbeenanalyzedforallapplicableloadingconfigurationsassociatedwiththecontainmentconstructionopenings,toincludetheloadingassociatedwiththeadditionoftemporarystructuresandequipmentontothedome,andhasbeendemonstratedtobecapableofperformingitsrequiredfunctionsunderallmodesofplantoperationduring.whichactivitiesareconducted.Basedontheabove,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?ThecontainmentconstructionopeningsdonotinvolveachangetoanytechnicalspecificationsasdefinedinSections3.6or3.8oftheGinnaTechnicalSpecifications.ThisactivityhasbeenreviewedagainstthedesigndescriptionpresentedinSection5.2.1oftheTechnicalSpecificationsandhasbeendeterminedtonotimpactthisdescription.Thedesignbasesandperformancecriteriaofsafetyrelatedequipmenthasbeenshowntoremainconsistentwiththeapprovedsafetyanalyses.Page51 Thetemporaryconfigurationofthecontainmentopeningstoincludetheadditionalloadingsimposedbythestructuresandequipmentutilizedtoconstructtheopeninghavebeenevaluatedanddeterminedtohavenoadverseimpactonthestructuralcapabilityofthecontainment.AllspecificationsassociatedwithTechnicalSpecifications3.6,3.8,and5.2havebeenreviewedanddeterminedtonotbeimpactedbyimplementationoftheconstructionopeningsintheplantmodesassumedinthissafetyevaluation.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecifications3.6and3.8willnotbereduced.TEMPORARYPLATFORMSVariousstructuralsteelplatformsandframeswillbeinstalledonandanchoredtothecontainmentdometosupporttheautomatedhydraulicjackhammers,craftpersonnel,andmiscellaneousconstructionequipmentandmaterials.Theseplatformsaredesignedtofacilitatetheconstructionactivitiesplannedtobeperformed,provideasafemeansofworkeraccesstothedomeopenings,andtoprotectpersonnelandadjacentequipmentfromfallingdebris.Temporaryequipmentandmateriallaydown,areaswillbeerectedonthefacadestructureclosetothedomeopenings.Atemporarycraftbreakarea,stairwell(s),andpersonnelwalkwayswillalsobeerectedonthefacadestructure.Thefunctionofthetemporarycraftbreakareaistoprovideabreakareaandlunchroomforpersonnelworkingonthecontainmentdome.Thesetemporarystructuresmaybeerectedpriortoplantshutdownandmayormaynotberemoveduntilaftertheplanthasreturnedtooperationfollowingreplacementofthesteamgenerators.Thetemporaryplatformsandwalkwayshavebeen.designedtoperformtheirfunctionsunderallmodesofplantoperation.Toprovideweatherprotectionandhelpincontainingthewastefromtheconcreteremovaloperationandotherconstructionactivities,temporaryweatherenclosureswillbeplacedoverthedomeopenings.Thetemporaryweatherenclosures,walkways,andplatformswillbeattachedtothecontainmentdomeand/orthefacadestructure.HeavyloadhandlingactivitiesduringinstallationandremovalofthesetemporarystructureswillbeperformedinaccordancewiththerequirementsspecifiedinthesafetyevaluationspreparedforDesignCriteriaDC-10034Btoensureheavyloadsaremaintainedwithinpreviouslyreviewedandapprovedsafeloadpaths.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Page52 Thetemporarystructuresareclassifiedassafetysignificant,SeismicCategoryIX/Z.Thesestructureshavebeenevaluatedtoensurethattheydonotfailandimpactadjacentsafety-relatedequipmentduringaseismicevent.Thecontainmentdomeandfacadehavebeenevaluatedfortheadditionalloadingconfigurationsofthetemporarystructuresanddeterminedtobewithintheallowableloadings.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Thecontainmentstructureandfacadestructurehavebeenevaluatedfortheadditionalloadofthetemporarystructuresanddeterminedtobecapableofperformingtheirrequiredfunctionsunderallmodesofoperation.Therefore,itisacceptableforthesemodificationstobeinplaceduringanymodeofoperation.Thetemporarystructureslocatedwithinthefacadehavebeenevaluatedforeitherthenormalor132mphtornadowind.speeds,whicheverconditiongoverns.Therefore,thesestructureswillremainintactduringwindsofthismagnitude.Basedontheabove,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Thepermanentplantstructureswillnotbemodifiedasaresultoftheinstallationofthetemporarystructures.Containmentintegrity,asdefinedinTechnicalSpecification3.8,isnotaffectedbythismodification.Restorationwillnotmodifytheloadcarryingcharacteristicsofanyofthesestructures.Alloperatingdesignconditionswillremainunchanged.Thecontainmentdomeandfacadestructurewillcontinuetobecapableofperformingtheirrequiredsafety-relatedfunctions.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.PERMANENTSTEAMGENERATORSUPPORTSThemethodfordisconnectionoftheoldsteamgeneratorsandreinstallationofthenewsteamgeneratorsisaddressedinDesignCriteria10034Aandbasicallyincludes:LocklowersupportcolumnsinplacewithtemporarystructuralrestraintsPage53

~Disconnecttheoldsteamgeneratorsfromtheuppersupport(ring)snubbers/strutsandlowersupportcolumns~Installthenewsteamgenerators,replacementuppersupports(rings),andlowersupportcomponents~Connectthenewsteamgeneratorstothesupportstructures,includingallshimmingnecessarytoachieveRCSpipingfitup.Duringthesteamgeneratorreplacementoutage,newupperrestraintringsandnewportionsofthelowersupportbracketswillbeinstalled.Theupperrestraintringwillbefabricatedintwohalves,setinplaceinthefield,andthehalvesjoine'dbyfieldwelding.Thenewportionsofthelowersupportbracketwillbefabricatedintwopieces,toalloweaseoffit-upduringreinstallation.Toallowremovaloftheoldsteamgenerators,theupperrestraintringsnubberhydraulictubingmustbesevered.Followingthenewsteamgeneratorinstallation,thistubingmustbereattachedtothesnubbers.Tofacilitateremovalandreinstallationofthesteamgenerators,newsupportbracketassemblieswhichconnectthesteamgeneratorsupportfootpadstotheirrespectiveverticalsupportcolumnswillbedesigned,fabricatedandinstalled.Theexistingone-piecelowersupportbracketassemblywillbereplacedwithtwopieces:anupperbracketassemblyandalowerbracketassembly.Thisarrangementwillallowtheupperbracketassemblytobeboltedandpinnedtothesteamgeneratorsupportfootpadandthelowerbracketassemblypriortothesteamgeneratorbeingins'tailedinthecubicle.Theupperandlowersupportbracketassemblieswillsubsequentlybeboltedtogether.Uponreinstallation.,thelowersupportwillsatisfythecurrentdesignbases.Allmodificationstothesecomponentswillsatisfytheoriginaldesignrequirements.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Newuppersupports(rings)andlowersteamgeneratorsupportcomponentswillbefabricatedandinstalledinaccordancewith'hecurrentdesignrequirements.Thehydraulictubingwillberestoredtosatisfytheexistingdesignrequirements.Replacementmaterials,ifrequired,willsatisfytheoriginalcoderequirementsandwillmeettheexistinginstallationspecifications.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Page54 Willthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofa'ifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Thenewuppersupportswillbealike-for-likereplacementwithnochangeinthebasicsupportconfiguration.Theexistingone-piecelowersupportbracketassemblywillbereplacedwithtwopieces:anupperbracketassemblyandalowerbracketassembly.Alldesignbasisloadingconditionshavebeenevaluatedanddeterminedtobeacceptable.Uponreinstallation,thelowersupportwillsatisfythecurrentdesignbases.Thehydraulictubingwillberestoredtosatisfytheexistingdesignrequirements.Nooperationalchangesoccurasaresultofthetubingremovalandreplacement.Therefore,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Newuppersupports(rings)andlowersteamgeneratorsupportcomponentswillbefabricatedandinstalledinaccordancewiththecurrentdesign.Activitiesassociatedwith,thesteamgeneratorsupportswillnotbeperformeduntilthesteamgeneratorsandsupportshavebeendeclaredinoperable.Thenewuppersupportswillbelike-for-likereplacementswithnochangeinthebasicsupportconfiguration.Theexistingone-piecelowersupportbracketassemblywillbereplacedwithtwopieces:anupperbracketassemblyandalowerbracketassembly.Uponreinstallation,thelowersupportwillsatisfythecurrentdesignrequirements.TheactivitiesrequiredtoremoveandreinstallthehydraulictubingwillnotrequireanychangestotheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefined,intheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.STEAMGENERATORLOWERSUPPORTTEMPORARYRESTRAINTSThesteamgeneratorlowersupportsarepinnedcolumnswhichwillrequirestabilizationbeforebeingdisconnectedfromthesteamgenerators.Thefollowingisadescriptionoftheactivitiesperformedduringthe1995RefuelingOutageandtheremainingactivitiestobeperformedduringthesteamgeneratorreplacementoutage:~Duringthe1995RefuelingOutagenewpipeclampswereinstalledontheexistingsteamgeneratorsupportcolumns,andnewtubesteelmembersandnewconnectionplateswereinstalledontheexistingplatforms.Page55

~DuringtheSGRoutage,thetemporarystabilizingbraceswillbeinstalledbetweenthecolumnbracketsandtubesteel.Thestabilizingbracesmaybelooselyinstalledduringdefuelingbutthebracingwillnotberigidlyconnectedtothecolumnbracketsuntilallfuelhasbeenremovedfromthereactorandallnecessaryisolationofthespentfuel'oolachieved.TheturnbuckleswillbetightenedbeforetheRCSpipingiscut.Theturnbuckleswillbeloosenedandthestabilizingbracesdisconnectedafter1/3weld-outRCSpipeweldingiscompletedandbeforefuel.reload.ThetemporarybracingandcolumnbracketswillbecompletelydisconnectedfromthesteamgeneratorsupportcolumnspriortoentryinamodeaboveColdShutdown.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Thecolumnbracketsareclassifiedassafetysignificant,SeismicCategoryII/Iandhavebeenanalyzedtoensuretheywill.notfailandadverselyimpactsafetyrelatedequipmentduringaseismicevent.Thisdesignapproachensures'hattheinstallationofbracketswillnotadverselyimpactsafety-relatedstructures,systemsorcomponents.Thebracketsshallbecompletelyremovedandthelowersupportcolumnsrestoredtotheirpre-steamgeneratorreplacementconfigurationpriortoentryintoamodeaboveColdShutdown.Duringthesteamgeneratorreplacementoutage,thetemporaryrestraintbracingwillbefullyinstalled/tensionedafterallfuelhasbeenremovedfromthereactorvesselandwillberemovedbeforefuelreload.Thisadministrativecontrolensuresthatthesteamgeneratorlowersupportswillcontinuetosatisfyalldesignbasisloadingconfigurations.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbe.created?AsaresultoftheadministrativecontrolsanddesignofthebracketstoseismiccategoryII/Icriteria,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Page56 Theseismicdesignofthebracketscombinedwiththelimitsimposedregardingtheplantconditionsunderwhichfinalinstallationoftherestraintscanbeperformedensuresthatthestructuralintegrityofthereactorcoolantsystemandalldesignbasisloadingconfigurationsaremaintained.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.REACTORCAVITYDECKINGToprovideageneralworkandconstructionlaydownareainsidethecontainment,aportionofthereactorcavitywillbetemporarilycoveredwithsteeldecking.Thisdeckingwillbeinstalledinpre-fabricatedpanelsafterallfuelisremovedfromthecontainment,thereactorcavitydrained,thereactorinternalshavebeenplacedwithinthevessel,thereactorheadhasbeenre-set,andnecessaryisolationofthespentfuelpoolandsupportingcontainmentsystemsisachieved.Thereactorcavitydeckingshallberemovedpriortofuelreload.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Thereactorcavitydeckingwillbeinstalledoncethereactorvesseliscompletelydefueled,therefuelingcavitydrained,thespentfuelpoolisolated,allfuelsafelystoredwithinthespentfuelpool,thereactorinternalshavebeenplacedwithinthereactorvessel,thereactorheadhasbeenre-set,andallsafety-relatedsystemsxequiredduringthedefueledcondition,areisolatedfromcontainment.Thecavitydeckingwillberemovedpriortofuelreload.AllheavyloadmovementsduringinstallationandremovalofthecavitydeckingwillmeettherequirementsofRGEEAdministrativeProcedureA-1305toensureheavyloadsaremaintainedwithinpreviouslyreviewedandapprovedsafeloadpaths.Withtheplantinthedefueledconditionandessentialsafety-relatedsystemsisolatedfromcontainment,theimpactofaconstruction.incidentisminimized.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated'?Asaresultoftheanalysisperformedconfirmingnoimpactonpermanentplantcomponentsandthecontrolsimposedregardingwhendeckingmaybeinstalledandremoved,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluated.intheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Page57 Asaresultoftheanalysisperformedconfirmingnoimpactonpermanentplantcomponentsandthecontrolsimposedregardingwhenthedeckingmaybeinstalledandremoved,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.INTERFERINGCOMMODITIESTofacilitatetheremovalandreplacementofthesteamgenerators,twoopeningswillbemadeinthecontainmentvesseldome,oneopeningoversteamgeneratorAandaslottedopeningnearsteamgeneratorB.Fortheseopeningstobemade,certaincommoditiesmustbetemporarilyremovedfromtheinsidesurfaceofthecontainmentdomeasfollows.Sectionsofthecontainmentsprayringpipingatelevation372'-8"willbesevered,supportsdisconnectedandtemporarilyremovedfromtheinsideofthecontainmentdomeattheconstructionopeningsoversteamgeneratorsAandBtoallowaclearriggingpathforsteamgeneratorremoval.OnesectionofthecontainmentairrecirculationsystemductingwillalsobetemporarilyremovedfromtheinsideofthecontainmentdomeattheconstructionopeningoversteamgeneratorB.SectionsofthepainterstrolleyrailatEl.377'-10"willbetemporarilyremovedattheconstructionopeningoversteamgeneratorsAandB.Allremovedinterferenceswillbereinstalleduponcompletionofthesteamgeneratorreplacementtosatisfythecurrentdesign~requirements.Weldingandnon-destructiveexaminationassociatedwithweldingtothecontainmentliner,ifrequired,willbeperformedinaccordancewiththeSpecialProcessesManual.Non-destructiveexaminationoftheweldsofthesupportplatestothelinerplatewillbeconfirmedtonotadverselyaffecttheintegrityofthecontainmentliner.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Theinterferingcommoditieswillberemovedandre-installedduringthesteamgeneratorreplacement(SGR)outage.Thedesignbasesoftheaffectedequipmentwillnotbealtered.Alloftheaffectedequipmentwillbere-installedtosatisfythecurrentdesignbasis.ThecontainmentsprayandcontainmentairrecirculationsystemswillnotberemoveduntiltheplanthasreachedColdShutdown.WiththeplantintheColdShutdowncondition,thedesignbasiseventsforwhichthecontainmentsprayandcontainmentairrecirculationsystemsarerequiredtobeoperablewillnotoccur.Thus,afterreachingColdShutdown,thespraysystemandthecontainmentairrecirculationsystemarenolongerrequiredtoperformasafety.function.Page58 Reinstallationoftheairrecirculationductworkandthecontainmentspraypipinginaccordancewiththecurrentdesignrequirements,includingtheapplicablesystemtesting,willbeperformedpriortoenteringamodeaboveColdShutdown.Thisensuresthatthesystemsareavailableduringplantmodesinwhichtheymaybeexpectedtoperformtheirsafetyfunction.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Whileworkisconductedincontainment,dropprotectionandadministrativecontrolswillbeinplacetoprecludethepotentialforanaccidentalloaddropimpactingtherefuelingcavityorotherequipmentthatisperformingasafetyfunction.Asaresultofthecontrolsimposedregardingwhentheinterferingsystemscanberemovedandreinstalled,andsincethesystemswillbereinstalledinaccordancewiththecurrentdesignrequirements,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Asaresultofthecontrolsimposedregardingwhenthe,interferingsystemscanberemovedandreinstalled,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.AllrequirementsofTechnicalSpecificationSection3.3.2willbeadheredtoduringtheimplementationofthismodification.STEAMGENERATORACCESSPLATFORMSInordertofacilitatetheremovalandreinstallationofthesteamgenerators,portionsoftheexistingsteamgeneratorsecondarymanwayaccessplatformswillbetemporarilyremovedandre-installedduringthesteamgeneratorreplacementoutage.Inordertofacilitateaccesstothenewsteamgeneratorsecondarymanways,permanentsecondarymanwayaccessplatformswillbedesignedandinstalledonthesteamdomesforboththe"A"and"B"steamgenerators.Forthe"A"steamgenerator,awalkwaybetweentheexistingplatformatelevation310'-0"andthenewplatformwillbeprovided.Willtheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment.importanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Page59 Thenewaccessplatformshavebeenclassifiedassafetysignificant,SeismicCategoryXE/landhavebeenanalyzedtoensurethatthecomponentswillnotfailandadverselyimpactsafetyrelatedequipmentduringaseismicevent.AllinstallationandremovalactivitiesconductedwithfuelinthecontainmentbuildingwillsatisfytherequirementsofRGSEAdministrativeProcedureA-1305.1,asapplicable,andtheadditionaladministrativecontrol'simposedbythissafetyevaluation.ThemodificationsassociatedwiththisdesignwillbeperformedduringtheColdShutdownmode.Theadditionoftheaccessplatformsandwalkwaywillnotadverselyaffectthecontainmentspraycoverageduringapostulatedaccident.Thespraysystemwillcontinuetocoveramaximumportionofthecontainmentfreevolume.Theadditionalmiscellaneoussteeladdedtocontainmentisnegligiblewhencomparedtothetotalamountofmiscellaneoussteelincontainment'herefore,theadditionoftheplatformswillnotadverselyaffecttheheatsinksusedintheaccidentanalyses.Modificationstotheexistingplatformstoallowremovalandreinstallationwillbeperformedtoensurethattheplatformswillsatisfytheexistingdesignrequirements.Theexistingplatformswillberemovedbyunboltingexistingconnectionsorcuttingplatformmembers.Anyplatformmemberswhicharecutduringdisassembly,willbereinstalledusingfullpenetrationweldstoensurethestructuralintegrityofthememberisnotaffected.TheplatformsandwalkwaywillbecoatedwithcoatingsthatsatisfytherequirementsofCE-125toensurethatacoatingsystemapprovedforin-containmentusageisapplied.Thus,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Asaresultoftheloadhandlingadministrativecontrolsimposedbythissafetyevaluation,thedesignoftheaccessplatformsandwalkwaytowithstandseismicloadings,andthemethodofdisassembly/reinstallationoftheexistingplatforms,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?TheaccessplatformsdonotinvolveachangetoanyGinnaTechnicalSpecifications.Adequateprecautionsinthedesignandinstallation/removaloftheaccessplatformshavebeenimplementedtominimizeadverseimpacttostructures,systemsorcomponents.ThesteamgeneratoraccessplatformsarenotspecificallyaddressedintheexistingstationTechnicalSpecifications.Page60 AlltechnicalspecificationrequirementsapplicableduringColdShutdownandRefuelingwillbeadheredto.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.Page61 SEV-1020STEAMGENERATORRIGGING&HANDLINGHAULROUTESToaccomplishthesteamgeneratorreplacement,variousheavyloadswillbetransportedaroundthesite.Themostsignificantoftheseheavyloadsare:theTransi-Liftcrane,mobileconstructioncranes,thenewandoldsteamgenerators,andtestloads.ThehaulroutefortheTransi-Lifttoand.fromitsworkinglocationeastofthecontainmentisas=follows:TheTransi-Liftwilltravelfromitsassemblyandloadtestlocationinthesouthsectionofthemainparkinglot,proceednorththrougharemovedsectionofthesecurityfence,turneast,andproceedfollowingtheplantroadtotheworkinglocationeastofthecontainment.TheTransi-Liftwillbereturnedtothemainparkinglotfordisassemblyalongthesameroutebutinreverse.FormovementoftheTransi-Liftwithintheprotectedareaalongthehaulroute,theboomoftheTransi-LiftispointedWestorSouth-WestandshallnotpassovertheContaminatedStorageBuilding,theStandbyAuxiliaryFeedwater(SAFW)Building,ortheAuxiliaryBuilding.TheTransi-Liftwillbepositionedwithitsrearcrawlerontherearcrawlerfoundationwiththeboomorientedtothesouthwest.TheTransi-LiftmovementintotheprotectedareamayoccurduringeitherColdShutdown,RefuelingorDefueledcondition.Thehaulrouteforthe,newsteamgeneratorstoarriveatthesiteisasfollows:Thetransporterwillhead:westonLakeRoadfromtheBearCreekbargefacility,turnnorthontothemainplantserviceroad,crossthebridgeoverDeerCreek,turnwestintothemainparkinglot,proceedpastthewarehouse,andturn.northintothewarehouseparkinglotwherethesteamgeneratorswillbetemporarilystored.Thetransportingofthenewsteamgeneratorstothetemporarystoragelocationmayoccurduringanymodeofplantoperation.Thehaulrouteforeachofthenewsteamgeneratorsfromthetemporarystoragelocationtotheupendinglocationeastof.thecontainmentisasfollows:Thetransporterwillexitthewarehouseparkinglot,turneastintothemainparkinglot,enterthesitethroughtheeastsecuritygate,turneast,andproceedfollowingtheplantroadtotheupendinglocation.Thetransportationofthenewsteamgeneratorsfromthestoragelocationtotheupendinglocationwilloccurduringthedefueledmodeofoperation.Thehaulrouteforeachoftheoldsteamgeneratorsfromthecontainmenttotheoldsteamgeneratorstoragefacility(OSGSF)isasfollows:Page62 Fromthedownendinglocationeastofthecontainment,thetransporterwillproceedfollowingtheplantroad,exitthesitesouththroughtheeastsecuritygate,proceedwestthroughthemainparkinglot,proceedpastthewarehouse,turnnorthintothewarehouseparkinglot,andproceedtotheOSGSFlocatednorthofthewarehouse.ThetransportationoftheoldsteamgeneratorsfromthedownendinglocationtotheOSGSFwilloccurduringthedefueledmodeofoperation.Variouscommoditiesalongthehaulrouterequiretemporaryorpermanentrelocationtoallowforpassageoftheprimemover,transporter,mobileconstructioncranesandtheTransi-Lift.Additionally,protectionofundergroundfacilitiesmayberequiredforthosecommoditieswithintheinfluenceofexpectedsurchargeloads.Variousimprovementsalongthehaulroutearerequiredtoadequatelysupportheavyloadmovement.Improvementstothehaulroutemaybeperformedduringanymodeofreactoroperation.Priortoassemblyof,theTransi-liftfoundationsinthesouthernmostportionofthemainparkinglot,thereinforcedconcretepipesinthelaydown/assemblyareawillbereplacedwithcorrugatedmetalpipeandthecatchbasinsandhandholewillbefilledtoprecludefailureofthestructure.PriortomovementoftheTransi-Liftalongthehaulroute,allcatchbasins,manholesandhandholeswhichwillbeeffectedbytheTransi-liftsurchargeloadswillbefilledtoprecludefailureofthestructures.Allat-gradecommoditiessuchasvalveboxesandclean-outswillbeprotectedbyinstallingplywood,fillorplankingadjacenttotheitemwhichwillallowtheTransi-Liftcrawlertospanovertheitem.Highmastlighttowernumber7willberemovedtoallowpassageoftheTransi-Lift.Highmastlighttowernumber8mayberemoved,ifrequired,toallowpassageoftheTransi-lifttopass.Inaddition,gradingofthehaulroutewillbeperformedtoensurealllevelingrequirementsformovementoftheTransi-Liftaremet.AportionoftheAuxiliaryBuildingscreenwallandtheliquidnitrogentankfoundationwillberemoved>toallowpassageoftheprimemover,transporter,andsteamgeneratorsduringtheSteamGeneratorReplacement.Thehaulroutewillbeloadtestedutilizingtheprimemoverandtherearcrawlerloadedwithcounterweights.Movementofthehaulroutetestloadsalongthehaulroutesmaybeperformedduringanymodeofreactoroperation.Haulroutesurfaceswillbeprotectedasrequiredusingplywoodoverlaysorstructuralfill.Page63 Theexisting10-inchthickconcreteslablocatedoverthe34.5kVductbankandthe115kVductbankundertheplantroadwaywillrequiremodificationasaresultofthesurchargeloadingsassociatedwiththeTransi-LiftandhasbeenevaluatedinSafetyEvaluationSEV-1023.The34.5kVductbankandthe115kVductbanklocatedundertheSouthparkinglotwillnotbeadverselyaffectedbythesurchargeloadsandthereforedoesnotrequiremodification.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Asdescribedintheabovesections,movementofcomponents,includingtheTransi-Liftandmobileconstructioncranes,alongthehaulroutehavebeenreviewedandallburiedcommoditiesprotected,ifrequired,toensurenoadverseimpactonsafety-relatedorsafety-significantsystemsorcomponents.Furthermore,thehaulroutewill-beloadtestedpriortomovementoftheTransi-Liftorthenew/oldsteamgeneratorsintotheprotectedarea.UFSARaccidentsandtransientsarenotdirectlyimpactedbythemovementoftheTransi-Liftorthemobileconstructioncranesalongthehaulroute.Asaresultofthecontrolsimposeduponmovementsalongthehaulroute,theprobabilityofoccurrenceoftheaccidentsandtransientsisnotincreasedbeyondthatcurrentlyassumed.Therefore,theseaccidentsandtransientshavenotbeenadverselyimpactedandthemitigatingmeasuresdescribedintheUFSARhavenotbeenalteredoraffected.Theradiologicalconsequencesassociatedwithadropofthesteamgeneratorduringtransporttotheoldsteamgeneratorstoragefacilityhasbeenevaluatedanddemonstratedtobewithintheapplicableregulatoryguidelinesandlessthanthelimiting,andmorepermanentaccidentscurrentlyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Surchargeloadingsresultingfromthemovementofcomponents.,includingtheTransi-Liftandmobileconstructioncranes,alongthehaulroutehavebeenreviewedtoidentifytheeffectsontheundergroundandadjacentcommodities.'heburiedcommoditiesareeitherunaffectedbytheimpactloadingsortemporaryprotectionwillbeprovidedtoensurenoadverseimpacttotheburiedcommodities.Abovegroundcommoditieswerealsoreviewedandwillberelocated,ifnecessary,toallowsafepassageofcomponentsalongthehaulroute.Temporaryprotectivemeasures,suchastemporaryfireorsecuritywatches:,willbe..invoked,whereappropriate,toensurenoadversereductioninthedegreeofprotectionorfunctionofsystemsorcomponentsduringthecomponentrelocation.Page64 Intheunlikelyeventofasteamgeneratordropfromthetransporterduringmovementalongthehaulroute,abreachofthesteamgeneratorprimarysidecouldoccur.Thispostulateddropofasteamgeneratorisclassifiedinthesamecategoryofaccidentsasaruptureofatankcontainingradioactivematerial.TheGasDecayTankRuptureisthelimitingeventcurrentlyevaluatedintheUFSARforaccidentalgaseousreleases.Themaximumcalculatedoffsitedosefromapostulateddropattheworstlocationalongthehaulroutewas25.3mremwholebody.Thiswholebodydoseisasmallfractionofthe10CFR100guidelinevaluesforaccidentalreleasesandthemaximumwholebodydoseof1.3remforthewastegasdecaytankrupture.Basedontheabove,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?ThisactivitydoesnotaffectcompliancewithrequirementsoftheTechnicalSpecificationsnorwilltheseactivitiesrequireachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.TEMPORARYCRANESANDRIGGINGCOMPONENTSATransi-LiftLTL-1200,Series2Amobilecranewitha340-footboomanda120-footstingerwillbeusedtohandlethenewandoldsteamgeneratorsduringthesteamgeneratorreplacement.TheTransi-Liftwillbeassembledandloadtestedinthemain.parkinglotandthenmovedalonganevaluatedhaulroutetoaworking~locationeastofthecontainment.FoundationswillbeinstalledeastofthecontainmenttosupportthefrontandrearcrawlersoftheTransi-Lift.TheinstallationofthesefoundationshasbeenevaluatedinSEV-1023'Miscellaneoussmallhoistswillbeutilizedtorigloadstothecontainmentdomepriortocoldshutdown.TheseriggingactivitiesareaddressedinSEV-1024.Mobileconstructioncraneswillbeusedpriorto,during,andfollowingtheSGRoutage.Thesecranesmaybeusedto:~AssembleanddisassembletheTransi-Liftinthemainparkinglot(maybeperformedinallmodesofplantoperation).AssembletheTransi-Liftcounterweightontherearcrawlerforthehaulrouteloadtests(maybeperformedinallmodesofplantoperation).Stageandplacecounterweightsforthefoundationloadtest(maybeperformedinallmodesofplantoperation).Page65

~PlacecounterweightsontheTransi-LiftrearcrawlerwhentheTransi-Liftisinthesteamgeneratorriggingposition(willbeperformedinthedefueledmodeofplantoperation)~~Assemblethepivotstandinthealleyway(willbeperformedinthedefueledmodeofplantoperation).Aself-leveling,multi-wheeledtransporterandprimemoverwillbeusedtotransportthenewandoldsteamgeneratorstoandfromthedownending/upendinglocation(willbeperformedinthedefueledmodeofplantoperation).VariousriggingcomponentswillbeusedtoattachtheTransi-Lifttotheoldandnewsteamgenerators.Thesecomponentswillincludeaspreaderbeam,linkassemblies,liftingtrunnions,mainsteamnozzleplug(fortheoldsteamgenerators),'linkplates,andassociatedpinsandbolts.Undergroundandadjacentcommoditiesmustbeprotectedorrelocatedtoallowfortheinstallation,use,andremovalofthetemporarycranesandriggingcomponents.Thissectionevaluatestheaffectontheundergroundandadjacentcommoditiesasaresultofapostulatedloaddrop/cranefailureduringtheutilizationofthetemporarycranesandriggingactivitiesintheirinstalledpositions.Apivotstandwillbeusedtoupendthenewsteamgeneratorsandtodownendtheoldsteamgenerators.ThepivotstandwillbelocatedinthealleywayeastofthecontainmentandpositionedsuchthatthestandisalignedwiththeTransi-Lifttoallowdownending/upendingofthesteamgeneratorsaswellasbeingaccessibletothesitetransporter.Theactivitiesassociatedwiththetemporarycranesandriggingwillbeconductedinthefollowingplantmodesofoperation.LoadtestingoftheTransi-Liftwillbeperformedinthemainparkinglot.TheTransi-Liftloadtestisanticipatedtobeperformedwiththeplantinoperationbutmaybeperformedduringanymodeofreactoroperation.Riggingofthesteamgeneratorstoandfromthecontainmentmayonlybeperformedwiththereactorvesselcompletelydefueled,allnecessaryisolationofthespentfuelpoolandsupportingcontainmentsystemsachieved,andthetemporaryspentfuelpoolcoolingsystemoperable.Thepivotstandshallbeinstalled,utilizedandremovedoncethereactorvesseliscompletelydefueled,allnecessaryisolationofthespentfuelpoolandsupportingcontainmentsystemsisachieved,andthetemporaryspentfuelpoolcoolingsystemisoperable.TheloadtestoftheTransi-Liftfoundationsisanticipatedtobeperformedwiththeplantinoperationbutmaybeperformedduringanymodeofoperation.Page66 WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Theseliftingandhandlingactivitiesareperformedwithtemporarycraneswhichhavenodirectinterfacewithpermanentplantsystemsorcomponents.Thedesign,material,andconstructionstandardsapplicabletopermanentplantSSCsareunaffectedbythetemporaryinstallationoftheSteamGeneratorReplacementcranesandassociatedheavyloadoperations.Thecranesandriggingutilizedfortheone-piecesteamgeneratorreplacementareengineeredandcertifiedinaccordancewithappropriatestandardswhichensurethatacceptablefactorsofsafetyareutilizedinthedesignofthecranesandprovidesreasonableassurancethatthecraneswillsafelyperformtheirintendedfunction.ThetemporarycranesassociatedwiththeSteamGeneratorReplacementdonotinteractwiththefunctionofplantsystemsanddonotaffecttheenvironmentinwhichthesystemsoperate.Thedefense-in-depthphilosophydescribedinthissafetyevaluation,whichincludesengineeredlifts,identificationofsafeloadpaths,localizedprotection'ofkeyshutdownsafetyfunctions,proceduralcontrolsofliftingactivitiesaswellasbackupspentfuelpoolcoolingensuresthecontinuityofkeyshutdownsafetyfunctions.Furthermore,theliftingequipmentusedtoaccomplishtheone-piecesteam,.generatorremovalhasbeensuccessfullyutilizedfornumerousheavyloadlifts,withmanyoftheseliftsataliftedloadinexcessoftheweightofasteamgeneratorandassociatedhandlingequipment.Thetemporaryinstallationofthecranesandtheassociatedheavyloadhandlingoperationsdonotchange,degrade,orpreventactionsdescribedorassumedinanyaccidentdiscussedintheUFSAR.SafeloadpathspreventthemovementofloadsoverrequiredplantSSCs,withtheexceptionoftheContainmentfollowingreactorshutdownandcooldown.Asde'scribedinUFSARSection15.7.1,theruptureofthegasdecaytankassumestheinstantaneousreleaseoftheentirecontentsdirectlytotheatmosphereatgroundlevel.ThesteamgeneratordropattheworstlocationalongthehaulrouteresultsinthereleaseofaCurieinventorysignificantlylessthanthatpostulatedforagasdecaytankrupture.Todeterminetheconsequencesofasteamgeneratordropattheworstlocationalongthehaulroute,anewatmosphericdispersionfactorwascalculated.Tocalculatetheoffsitedoseassociatedwitha.steamgeneratordropattheworstlocationalongthehaulroute,thiscalculatedaccidentdispersionfactorwasutilizedtomaximizetheoffsitedose.Utilizingthiscalculatedaccidentdispersionfactor,intheunlikelyeventofasteamgeneratordrop,theestimatedradiologicalconsequenceshavebeendeterminedandareenvelopedbytheconsequencesofagasdecaytankrupturedescribedinUFSARSection15.7.1,whichisthehighestoffsitedoseforafailureofanyradwastesystemcurrentlyanalyzedintheUFSAR.Page67 Althoughthegasdecaytanksarenotwithintheconservativezone-of-influence,inthefurtherunlikelyeventthatthedroppedsteamgeneratorresultsinagasdecaytankrupture(inspiteofinterveningconcretewallsandfloors)concurrentwithabreachofthesteamgeneratorintegrity,thecombinedradiologicalconsequencesremainasmallfractionofandwellwithintheguidelinesof10CFR100.AsspecifiedintheSafetyEvaluationpreparedbytheDivisionofReactorLicensing,theAECutilizedthecriteriaof"wellwithin10CFRPart100guidelines"toestablishtheacceptancelimitforthewastegasdecaytankfailuresThus,theoffsiteconsequencesofacombinedreleaseduetoabreachedsteamgeneratorconcurrentwiththefailureofagasdecaytankiswithintheestablishedacceptancelimitforthegasdecaytankruptureand,infact,issignificantlylessthanthe10CFRPart100guidelines.Therefore,theliftingandhandlingactivitiesassociatedwiththeonepiecesteamgeneratorreplacementwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARandidentifiedabove.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?TheapplicableaccidenttypespreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARareheavyloadhandlingandliquidandgaswastesystemfailures,includingtankruptures.ThepotentialeffectsofaloaddropareevaluatedusingtheguidelinesofNUREG-0612,consistentwiththeapproachdocumentedintheUFSARforotherheavyloadswiththepotentialforinteractingwiththespentfuelorassociatedSSCs.SafeloadpathsaredefinedforcranemovementandloadhandlingthatprecludeheavyloadsbeingmovedoverplantSSCsperformingkeyshutdownsafetyfunctions.Appropriateplantrestrictionsarespecifiedandbackupsystemsareprovidedsothatspentfuelpoolcooling,inventorycontrol,andreactivitycontrolaremaintained.Thepotentialradiologicalreleasefromadroppedsteamgeneratorisevaluatedinthesamemannerastheruptureofanyothertankcontainingradioactivematerialandtheconse'quencesareenvelopedbythefailureofagasdecaytank.Evenifthedropofasteamgeneratorshouldcausethefailureofagasdecaytank,thecombinedradiologicalconsequencesarewellwithin,andareinfact,asmallfractionofthe10CFR100guidelines.Theproposedactiondoesnotadd,delete,ormodifyanyexistingSSCsrequiredtoperformakeyshutdownsafetyfunction.TheambientenvironmentinwhichplantSSCsoperateis.notaffectedbythetemporaryinstallationofthecranes.Therefore,theliftingandhandlingactivitiesassociatedwithsteamgeneratorreplacementwillnotcreateapossibilityforanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Page68 TheliftingandhandlingactivitiesassociatedwithsteamgeneratorreplacementwillnotreduceanymarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecifications.TheinstallationanduseofthetemporarycranesdoesnotadverselyaffecttheoperationofanysafetyrelatedSSCs.Safeloadpathsaredefinedfortheliftstobemadebythecranesthatprecludeloadsbeingmovedoverrequiredsafetyrelatedcomponentswithoutfirstbeinganalyzedorbyprovidingadequatedropprotection.Thesteamgeneratorswillonlybeliftedwhilethereactorisshutdownanddefueled.TheprovisionofatemporaryspentfuelpoolcoolingsystemsatisfiesthebasesforTechnicalSpecification3.11.4.Theproposedactiondoesnotaffectanyinstrumentaccuraciesortripsetpoints.Therefore,themarginof.safetyismaintained.STEAMGENERATORSUPPORTSADDLESSupportsaddleswillbeusedwiththesitetransporter.Thesesaddleswillbeusedduringtransportoperationsandforthelong-termstorageoftheoldsteamgeneratorsintheoldsteamgeneratorstoragefacility.Useofthesteamgeneratorsupportsaddlesmayoccurduringanymodeofreactoroperation.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Thesteamgeneratorsupportsaddlesareclassifiedasnon-safetyrelated,non-seismicandhavebeenlocatedtoensuretheirfailurewillnotadverselyimpactsafety-relatedstructures.Thedropofanoldsteamgeneratorfromthesupportsaddle,whichresultsinabreachoftheoldsteamgenerators,doesnotresultindoseswhichexceedthedoselimitsof10CFR100andSectionC.l.pofRegulatoryGuide1.29.Thiscalculateddoseisalsolessthanthedoses,calculatedforpreviouslyevaluatedaccidentsintheUFSAR.Furthermore,duetotheirmassiveweight,thesteamgeneratorswillnotbecometornadomissiles.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?ThisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Page69 NodirectimpacttoTechnicalSpecificationsystemsoccurasaresultoftheinstallationanduseofthesteamgeneratorsupportsaddles.AllTechnicalSpecificationswillbeadheredtoduringinstallationanduseofthesupportsaddles.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.CONTAINMENTAUXILIARYCRANETofacilitatetheriggingofmiscellaneousloadsduringthesteamgeneratorreplacementoutage,atemporaryauxiliarycrane(AlliedMarineSystemsS/N1663or1664)willbeinstalledonthecontainmentflooratelevation278'-4"adjacenttothenortheastcornerofthereactorcavity.Theauxiliarycraneandsupporttowerwillbeinstalled,used,andremovedduringthesteamgeneratorreplacementoutage.Anchorboltsforthesupporttowerwereinstalledduringthe1995refuelingoutage.TheanchorboltswereevaluatedinSafetyEvaluationSEV-1022.Duringthe1996SGRoutage,theauxiliarycranebaseandtowerwillbeinstalled,usedandremovedduringtheColdShutdown,Refuelingordefueledconditions.Powerfortheauxiliarycranewillbesuppliedfromatemporarypowerdistributionsysteminstalledinsidecontainmentforthesteamgeneratorreplacementactivities.ThistemporarypowerdistributionsystemisaddressedintheSafetyEvaluationforDC-10034D,TemporaryUtilitiesSServices.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Theauxiliarycraneandsupporttowerareclassifiedassafetysignificant,seismiccategoryII/Iandhavebeenanalyzedtoensurethatthecraneandtowerwillnotfailandadverselyimpactsafetyrelatedequipmentduringadesignbasisseismicevent.AllinstallationactivitiesconductedwithfuelinthecontainmentbuildingwillsatisfytherequirementsofRGEEAdministrativeProcedureA-1301.Theauxiliarycraneandsupporttowerwillbeinstalled,used,andremovedduringthesteamgeneratorreplacementoutage.Becausetheauxiliarycraneandsupporttowerareonlyinstalled,usedandremovedduringtherefuelingoutageinColdShutdown,Refueling,ordefueledconditionsthecoatingsareclassifiedasnon-safetyrelated.Therefore,theinstallation,use,andremovaloftheauxiliarycraneandsupporttowerwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Page70 WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?AsaresultoftheloadhandlingadministrativecontrolsimposedbyRGSEAdministrativeProcedureA-1305.1anddesignoftheauxiliarycraneandsupporttowertoseismiccategoryII/Icriteria,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Theinstallation,use,andremovalofthetemporaryauxiliarycraneandsupporttowerdoesnotinvolveachangetoanyGinnaTechnicalSpecification.'ThetemporaryauxiliarycraneandtowersupportarenotspecificallyaddressedintheexistingstationTechnicalSpecifications.AllTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsapplicableduringColdShutdownorRefueling/defuelingwillbeadheredto.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.Page71 SEV-1021STEAMGENERATORVESSELSTEAMGENERATORPIPINGANDINSULATIONSTEAMGENERATORVESSELThissectionofSEV-1021evaluatesthepreparationofthesteamgeneratorsforinstallationintocontainmentincludingtheremovalofthenitrogenblanket,removalofweldedclosuresonallpipingnozzles(providedtopreventcontaminationofthegeneratorinternalsduringtransitandstorage),removalofshippingprotection/supports,themachiningofprimarynozzlestoallowfit-upwiththeexistingreactorcoolantpiping,andthemachiningofsecondarysidenozzlestoallowforfit-upwiththeexistingsecondarysidepiping.Allpreparatoryactivitieswillbeperformedinaccordancewiththevendorrecommendations,asapplicable,toensurethatanyassumptionsutilizedbythevendorinthedesignofthesteamgeneratorsarenotadverselyaffected.Riggingandhandlingofthesteamgenerators,toincludestagingofthesteamgeneratorsinsidetheprotectedarea,isaddressedintheSafetyEvaluationforDC-10034B,SteamGeneratorRiggingandHandling.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Thenewsteamgeneratorpreparatoryactivitiesonlyaffectthesteamgeneratorvessels.Allpreparatoryactivitieswillbeperformedpriortothevesselsenteringcontainment,andwillcomplywiththeapplicablecodesandstandardstoensuretheexistingdesignbasisissatisfied.In'addition,allpreparatoryactivitieswillbeperformedinaccordancewiththevendorrecommendations,asapplicable,toensurethatanyassumptionsutilizedbythevendorinthedesignofthesteamgeneratorarenotadverselyaffected.Oncethenozzleshippingcovershavebeenremovedandwhenactivitiesareconductedwithinthesteamgenerators,appropriatemeasureswillbetakentoensurethatonlymaterialscompatiblewiththesteamgeneratorsareutilizedandthatnoforeignobjectsareintroduced.AllconsumablematerialsutilizedinthepreparationofthesteamgeneratorsforinstallationwillbecontrolledinaccordancewithProcedureA-805,ControlofConsumableMaterialsatGinnaStation.Proceduralcontrolswillbeestablishedtoinventoryallmaterials/toolsenteringthesteamgeneratorandtoprovideforaforeignobjectsearchfollowingcompletionofinternalsteamgeneratoractivities.Thus,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Page72 SteamgeneratorpreparatoryactivitieswillonlyimpactthereplacementsteamgeneratorsandwillbeperformedinaccordancewiththeapplicableASMEcodestoensurenoadverseimpacttothesteamgenerators.Proceduralguidanceforforeignobjectandconsumablematerialcontrolshallbeinplacetopreventdeleteriousmaterialsfromenteringthesteamgenerators.ThisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Thepreparationofnewsteamgeneratorsdoesnotinvolveacha'ngetotheTechnicalSpecifications.Thedesignbasesandperformancecriteriaofthesafetyrelatedsteamgeneratorshasbeenshowntoremaincons'istentwiththeapplicableDesignCriteria.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.STEAMGENERATORPIPINGToreplacethetwoexistingsteamgenerators,allconnectedpiping/tubingmustbeseveredtoallowforremovalofthesteamgenerators.Followingnewsteamgeneratorinstallation,thepiping/tubingmustbereattachedtothenewsteamgenerators.Thesystemsaffectedare:oReactorcoolanthotandcross-overlegpipingoFeedwaterpipingoMainsteampipingoSteamgeneratorblowdownandshelldrainpipingoSteamgenerator/mainsteamflowelementinstrumentationtubingoLoosepartsmonitoringsystemFollowingseveranceoftheoldsteamgeneratorfromtheconnectedreactorcoolantsystempiping,theextentofRCSpipemovementagainstmachiningandweldingtoleranceswillbeassessed,and,ifunacceptable,thecoldlegelbowsmaybereplaced.Duetothedesignofthefeedwaterandlevelinstrumentationnozzlesonthereplacementsteamgenerators,minormodificationstothepiping/tubingisrequired.Inaddition,theexistingcondensatepotassembliesinstalledonthesteamgeneratorlevelinstrumentationuppernozzlesandthemainsteamfloQelements,willberemoved,discardedandreplaced.Tofacilitatenon-destructiveexaminations,radiographyaccessportswillbeinstalledonthemainsteamandfeedwaterpipingsectionstoberemovedandreplaced.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Page73 Allreactorcoolantsystemandsecondarysidepiping/tubingwillberestoredtosatisfytheexistingdesignrequirementsinaccordancewithASMESectionXIandIlI.Replacementmaterials,includingallweldmetalutilized,willsatisfytheoriginalcoderequirementsandwillmeettheexistinginstallationspecification.Noadditionalweldswillbeaddedtothereactorcoolantsystemasthenewweldswillreplaceexistingwelds.However,thelocationofthesafeendtoelbowweldwillchangetoimprovetheinserviceinspectionprofileoftheweld.Newweldlocationsinthemainsteamandfeedwaterpiping,ifrequiredduetofitup,andthesafeendtoelbowweldwillbeperformedinaccordancewithapprovedprocedureswhichwillsatisfytheoriginaldesignrequirements'nychangesinpiping/tubingconfigurationwillbereanalyzedasrequiredtodocumenttheacceptabilityofthenewconfiguration.AllnewweldswillreceivenondestructiveexaminationsinaccordancewithASMESectionIIIandwillbehydrostaticallypressuretested,asrequired.Alloperatingdesignconditionsshallremainunchanged.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?PriortoseveranceoftheRCSpipinganduntilweld-outiscomplete,adesignateddeadweightsupportconfigurationwillbeestablishedfortheRCSloopsthatensuresnoadverseeffectswillresulttoanysafety-relatedcomponents.TheRCSpipingwillbeseveredusingamachinecutting'methodtopreventdebrisfromenteringthepipingduringthecuttingprocessanddebrisdamswillbeinstalledduringfinalweldendpreparation.Loopinspectionsfordebriswillbeperformedfollowingcompletionofthecuttingandmilling.Secondaryplantpipingsystemsincludingmainsteam,feedwater,blowdown,shelldrain,steamgenerator/mainsteaminstrumentationtubing,andtheloosepartsmonitoringsystemmaybeseveredfromthesteamgeneratorswhilefuelisinthereactorvessel.Inthisconfiguration,theRHRsystemremainsavailablefordecayheatremoval.Priortopipingseverance,adesignatedsupportconfigurationshallbeestablishedthatensuresnoadverseeffects,includinggravitymissilesandswayinteractionconcerns,willresulttoanysafety-relatedcomponents.Thisconfigurationwillbemaintaineduntildefuelingiscompleteoruntilthesupportisnolongerrequired.Duringthecuttingandweldingprocessforsecondarypiping,debriscontrol/protectionwillbeprovidedtominimizetheintroductionofdebrisintothepipingsystems.Proceduralcontrolswillbeestablishedtoprovideforaforeignobjectsearchfollowingcompletionofpipingactivities.Page74 Allreactorcoolantsystemandsecondarysidepiping/tubingwillberestoredtosatisfytheexistingdesignrequirementsusingmaterialwhichmeetorexceedtheoriginaldesignrequirements.Nooperationalchangesoccurasaresultofthepiping/tubingreplacements.Basedontheabove,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Willthemarginofsafetyasdefinedin'thebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Theactivitiesrequiredtoremoveancereinstallthepiping/tubingconnectedtothesteamgeneratorswillnotrequireanychangestothetechnicalspecifications.Alloperatingdesignconditionswillremainunchangedandtheaffectedpipingsystemswillcontinuetobecapableofperformingtheirrequiredsafety-relatedfunctions.Noactivitieswillbe.performedonpermanentplantsystemsuntilthesystemhasbeenreleasedbyoperations.Thisensuresthetechnicalspecificationoperabilityrequirementsaremaintained.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.INSULATIONTheexternalfeaturesofthereplacementsteamgeneratorsaresufficientlydifferentfromtheexistinggeneratorstowarrantthereplacementoftheexistingsteamgeneratorthermalinsulation.Tofacilitateseveringofthesteamgeneratorsfromtheconnectingpipingsystems,aportionofthepipinginsulationmustberemovedandreplaced.Becausesomeofthisinsulationcontainedasbestos,.theasbestosinsulationwasdisposedofandnewinsulationwasinstalledinits,placeduringthe1995outage.ThepipinginsulationreplacementwasevaluatedinSafetyEvaluationSEV-1022.ThisSafetyEvaluationaddressestheinstallationofinsulationonthereplacementsteamgeneratorswhichwillbecompletedduringthesteamgeneratorreplacement.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Thesteamgeneratorinsulationdoesnotperformanysafetyfunction.Failureofthereplacementinsulationduringpostulatedaccidentsas'escribedintheUFSARhavebeenevaluated.TheinsulationwillbedesignedandinstalledtoSeismicII/Icriteriatoensurethattheinsulationremainsinplacefollowingaseismicoccurrence.Xnaddition,theinsulationhasbeenprocuredtomeetorexceedthecontainmentPage75 post-accidentenvironmentalconditions.Adebrisanalysishas,beenpreparedtoaddresstheeffectofthereplacementinsulationonthecontainmentsumpanalysisandhasdeterminedthatnoadverseimpactonthecapabilityofsafety-relatedcomponentstoperformtheirsafetyfunctionhasoccurred.Therefore,thecapabilityofthesafety-relatedcomponentswillnotbeadverselyaffectedbythereplacementinsulation.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?ThereplacementinsulationperformsthesamefunctionastheoriginalinsulationandisinstalledtoSeismicII/Icriteria.FailureoftheSGinsulationdoesnot,initself,initiateanaccidentnordoesthethermalinsulationperformasafetyfunction.Therefore,.thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?TheactivitiesrequiredtoinstallthethermalinsulationonthesteamgeneratorswillnotrequireanychangestotheTechnicalSpecifications.Alloperatingdesignconditionswillremainunchangedandplantsystemswillcontinuetobecapableofperformingtheirrequiredsafety-relatedfunctions.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.LASERTEMPLATINGUponcompletionofthesteamgeneratorreplacement,thetargetnestsinstalledinthe1995outagewillberemovedandthetargetnestanchorboltswillbecutoffflushwiththesurfaceofthecubiclewall,drivenintothewallslightly,andtheholesgrouted.GroutingwillbeperformedinaccordancewithRG&ESpecificationCE-153andisclassifiedassafetysignificant.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Theremovalofthetargetnestsandgroutingofthedrilledboltholeswillbeperformedinaccordancewithapprovedprocedurestoensurethestructuralintegrityofthecubiclewallisnotcompromised.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Page76 WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Asaresultoftheproceduralcontrolsassociatedwiththeremovalofthetargetnests,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced'?Theremovalofthetargetnestswillnotrequireanychangestothetechnicalspecifications.Alloperatingdesignconditionswillremainunchangedandplantsystemswillcontinuetobecapableofperformingtheirrequiredsafety-relatedfunctions.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.Page77 SEV-1022STEAMGENERATORREPLACEMENT1995OUTAGEMODIFICATIONSSTEAMGENERATORLOWERSUPPORTTEMPORARYRESTRAINTSThesteamgeneratorlowersupportsarepinnedcolumnswhichwillrequirestabilizationduringthesteamgeneratorreplacementoutagebeforebeingdisconnectedfromthesteamgenerators.Thefollowingisadescriptionoftheplannedactivitiesassociatedwiththelowersupportswhichwillbeperformedinthe1995refuelingoutageinpreparationforthesteamgeneratorreplacement(SGR)outage:~Bracketswillbeinstalled(clamped)ontothesupportcolumnsandtubesteelwillbeweldedtotheexistingprimarymanwayaccessplatforms.Temporarystabilizingbraceswithintegralturnbuckleswillbelooselyfit-up(trialfit)tothecolumnbracketsandtubesteel.Theintegralturnbuckleassemblieswillnotbeconnectedtothepipeclamps,newtubesteelorplatformsatanytimeduringthe1995outage.ThecolumnbracketsandtubesteelwillremaininplaceduringplantoperationandwillnotberemoveduntiltheendoftheSGRoutage.~Thecolumnbracketsandthetubesteelwillbeinstalledinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingmode.Thetemporarystabilizingbraces,includingturnbuckles,willbetrialfitinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingmodeandremovedfromcontainmentpriortoentryinamodeaboveColdShutdown.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbei.ncreased?Thecolumnbracketsandtubesteelareclassifiedassafetysignificant,SeismicCategoryII/Iandhavebeenanalyzedtoensuretheywillnotfailandadverselyimpactsafetyrelatedequipmentduringaseismicevent.Thisdesignapproachensuresthattheinstallationofthebracketsandtubesteelwillnotadverselyimpactsafety-relatedstructures,systemsorcomponents.Duringthe1995refuelingoutage,thetemporaryrestraintbracingwillbetrial-fitaftertheplanthasenteredColdShutdownorRefueling.However,theturnbuckleassembliesassociatedwiththetemporaryrestraintwillnotbeconnectedduringthe1995outage.Thisadministrativecontrolensuresthatthesteamgeneratorlowersupportswillcontinuetosatisfyalldesignbasisloadingconfigurations.Theimpactoftheaddi.tionalstructuralsteelwhichwillbeaddedtocontainmentduringthe1995to1996operatingcyclehasbeenqualitativelyevaluatedinthissafetyevaluationanddeterminedtohaveaninsignificantimpactonthepassiveheatsinksandconsequentlytheLOCAanalyses.Page78 Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Willthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedinthe,UFSARbecreated'?AdministrativecontrolsanddesignofthebracketsandtubesteeltoSeismicCategoryII/Icriteriah'asbeenprovidedtoensurenoadverseimpacttosafetyrelatedstructures,systemsorcomponentsintheeventofadesignbasisearthquake.Inaddition,thetemporarystabilizingbracingwillonlybetrialfittothecolumnbracing.TheintegralturnbuckleassemblieswillnotbeconnectedtothebracingandwillberemovedpriortoenteringamodeaboveColdShutdown.Thus,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccide'ntormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?TheSeismicCategoryII/Idesignofthebracketscombinedwiththelimitsimposedregardingtheplantconditionsunderwhichtrialfitupofthetemporarystabilizingbracescanbeperformedensuresthatthestructuralintegrityofthereactorcoolantsystemandalldesignbasisloadingconfigurationsaremaintained.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.AUXILIARYCRANEANCHORBOLTSAtemporaryauxiliarycranewillbeinstalledandusedinthecontainmentduringthesteamgeneratorreplacement(SGR)outage.Tosupporttheinstallationoftheauxiliarycrane,anchorboltswillbeinstalledintheElevation278'-4"floorslabduringthe1995refuelingoutage.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?TheanchorboltinstallationwillbeinaccordancewithexistingstationtechnicalspecificationsandhasbeenevaluatedtoensurenoadverseimpacttheElevation278'-4"floorslab.InstallationoftheanchorboltsinaccordancewithRG&ETechnicalSpecificationCE-153willensurethattheexistingdesignbasisforthefloorslabismaintained.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Page79 Nonewaccidentsormalfunctionshavebeenpostulatedsincenonewfailuremodeshavebeencreated.Noadversechangeinthestructuralintegrityoftheaffectedstructurewillresultfortheimplementationofthemodificationsaddressedinthissafetyevaluation.Theimpactoftheanchorboltinstallationonthesafety-relatedfloorslabhasbeenevaluatedanddeterminedtobeacceptable.Thefinalconfigurationofthefloorslabfollowingtheinstallationoftheanchorboltswillsatisfytheexistingdesignbasis.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?TheactivitiesassociatedwithinstallationoftheanchorboltstosupporttheauxiliarycraneandtowerwillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdescribedinthebasisfortheTechnicalSpecification3.6.TheinstallationoftheanchorboltshavebeenevaluatedtobeacceptableandwillbeinstalledinaccordancewithexistingstationSpecificationCE-153toensuretheElevation278'-4"floorslabisnotadverselyaffected.CONTAINMENTHVACDUCTMODIFICATIONSAportionofthecontainmentHVACductinstalledonthecontainmentdomeisaninterferencetothesteamgeneratorBconstructionopeningandmustbetemporarilyremovedduringtheSGRoutage.Twoflexibleductconnectionscontainingasbestoswillalsoberemovedanddiscardedaspartofthismodification.TofacilitatetheremovalofthisductandeliminateconcernsassociatedwithasbestosabatementduringtheSGRoutage,theexpansionjointfabricconnectionswillbedisassembledandremovedduringthe1995refuelingoutage(RFO).Existingplantdrawingsdonotclearlyidentifytheas-builtconfigurationoftheexpansionjoints.However,basedonavisualexaminationofsimilaraccessibleexpansionjointswithinthecontainment,aninnermetalsleevemaybeinstalledwhichextendsthefulllengthoftheexpansionjoint.Consequently,replacementoftheexpansionjointfabricwillbeperformedunderoneofthefollowingtwoscenarios:Zftheexpansionjointdoesnotcontainaninnermetalsleeve,newnon-asbestosbearingfabricwillbeinstalledduringthe1995RFO.Xftheexpansionjointcontainsaninnermetalsleeve,newnon-asbestosbearingfabricwillnotbeinstalleduntiltheendofthe1996SGRoutage.Toprovideflexibility,eachofthesereplacementscenariosmustbeevaluatedanddeterminedtobeacceptable.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Page80 Thedesignbasesoftheaffectedsystemwillnotbealtered.Alloftheaffectedequipmentwillbere-installedtosatisfythecurrentdesignbasis.ThecontainmentrecirculationandcoolingsystemswillnotbemodifieduntiltheplanthasreachedColdShutdown.Withtheplantinthecoldshutdowncondition,'thedesignbasiseventsforwhichthecontainmentventilationsystemisrequiredtobeoperablewillnotoccur.Thus,afterreachingColdShutdown,thecontainmentventilationsystemisnolongerrequiredtoperformasafetyfunction.Thecontainmentrecirculationandcoolingsystemexpansionjointreplacementiswlike-for-likereplacement,withtheexceptionofthematerialrequirements.ThematerialshavebeenselectedinaccordancewiththeexistingRGEETechnicalSpecificationSP-5342.Theeffectsofpotentiallynotre-installingtheexpansionjointfabricmaterialuntiltheendofthe1996SGRoutagehavebeenevaluatedanddeterminedto-be,acceptable.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Willthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionof.a.differenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Asaresultofthecontrolsimposedregardingwhenthesystemcanbemodified,andsincethesystemwillbereinstalledinaccordancewit'hthecurrentdesignrequirements,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Asaresultofthecontrolsimposedregardingwhenthesystemcanbemodified,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.AllrequirementsofTechnicalSpecificationSection3.3.2willbeadheredtoduringtheimplementationofthismodification.LASERTEMPLATINGToachieveaccuratefit-upofthenewsteamgeneratorstotheexistingRCSpiping,lasertemplatingtechniqueswillbeemployedtoobtainaccuratemeasurementsofthepertinentfeaturesoftheexistingandnewsteamgeneratorsandtheseveredendsoftheRCSpipes.Thelasertemplatingtechniquerequiresthemountingoffixedtargetnests(referencepoints)onthesteamgeneratorcubiclewallsandlaserreflectingtargetsplacedatstrategicpointsonthecubiclewalls,generatorsandpiping.Thetargetnestswillremaininplaceduringplantoperationandwillberemoveduponcompletionofsteamgeneratorreplacement.Thelaserreflectingtargetsareonlyinstalledduringthemeasurementprocessandwillberemovedpriortoplantrestart.Page81 Theanchorboltsusedtoinstallthetargetnestshavesufficientcapacitytosupportthenests,whichweighlessthanonepound.AcidetchingandmechanicalbuffingmaybeperformedtoexposetheexistingsteamgeneratornozzletoRCSpipingweld.Lowstresspunchmarksmayalsobeappliedtomarkreferencelocationson'thesteamgeneratornozzletoRCSpipingwelds.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Mechanicalbuffing,acidetching,andtheapplicationoflowstresspunchmarkstotheRCSpipingwillbeperformedinaccordancewithapprovedprocedures.PerformanceoftheseactivitieswillbeprocedurallycontrolledtolimittheeffectontheRCSpiping.TheamountofbasemetalremovedbybuffingandetchingandthedepthofthepunchmarksareinsignificantwhencomparedtothethicknessoftheRCSpipingandwillhavenoeffectonthecapabilityoftheRCStomaintainthereactorcoolantpressureboundary.Minimumwallthicknessforthereactorcoolantpipingwillbemaintained.Theamountofaluminumaddedhasbeenevaluatedanddeterminedtohaveanegligibleimpactonthehydrogengenerationwithincontainmentfollowingaloss-of-coolantaccident.Cuttingofrebarduringinstallationoftheanchorboltstosupportthetargetnestsisnotpermittedunlesspreviouslyapprovedbyengineering,andthestructuraladequacyoftheaffectedstructurewithcutrebarhasbeenconfirmedby.analysisorevaluation.Therefore,thisactivitywillhavenoeffectonthestructuralintegrityofthesteamgeneratorcubiclewall.Inaddition,thetargetnestswillbeinstalledwithanchorboltssize'dtoensurethetargetnestsremainintactduringaseismicevent.Theadditionalloadsofthetargetnestsonthesteamgeneratorcubiclewallsareinsignificant.,Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccident'rmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?AsaresultoftheproceduralcontrolsanddesignoftheneststoseismicII/Icriteria,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Thelasertemplatingactivitieswillnot"requireanychangestothetechnicalspecifications.Alloperatingdesignconditionswillremainunchangedandplantsystemswillcontinuetobecapableofperformingtheirrequiredsafety-relatedfunctions.0Page82 Therefore,themarginofsafety.asdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.ASBESTOSABATEMENTANDINSULATIONREPLACEMENTTofacilitatereplacementofthesteamgeneratorsinthe1996outage,asbestos-bearingandnon-asbestosinsulationintheareaoftheproposedpipingcutlocationswillberemovedandreplacedwithnon-asbestosbearingblanketinsulationduringthe1995refuelingoutage.Replacingtheexistinginsulationwithfiberglassblanketinsulationintheareaofthepipingcutlocationsduringthe1995refuelingoutagewillminimizetheneedforasbestosabatementduringthe1996steamgeneratorreplacement(SGR)outage.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Thethermalinsulationperformsnosafetyfunction.FailureofthereplacementinsulationduringpostulatedaccidentsasdescribedintheUFSARhavebeenevaluated.TheinsulationwillbedesignedandinstalledtoSeismicII/Icriteriatoensurethattheinsulationremainsinplacefollowingaseismicoccurrence.Inaddition,theinsulationhasbeenprocuredtomeetorexceedthecontainmentpost-accidentenvironmentalconditions.Areviewofthereplacementinsulationwithrespecttotheimpactonthecontainmentsumphasbeenperformed.Thisreviewhasdeterminedthatreplacingtheexistinginsulationwithblanketinsulationinthevicinityofthepipingcutlocationsisnoworsethantheexistinginsulationorhasbeenevaluatedtohaveanegligibleimpact.Therefore,thecapabilityofthesafety-relatedcomponentswillnotbeadverselyaffectedbythereplacementofinsulationinthevicinityofthepipingcutlocations.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?ThereplacementinsulationperformsthesamefunctionastheoriginalinsulationandisinstalledtoSeismicII/Icriteria.Failureofthepipinginsulationdoesnot,initself,initiateanaccidentnordoesthethermalinsulationperformasafetyfunction.Therefore,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?Page83 TheactivitiesrequiredtoremoveandreinstallthethermalinsulationontheconnectedpipingwillnotrequireanychangestotheTechnicalSpecifications.Alloperatingdesignconditionswillremainunchangedandplantsystemswillcontinuetobecapableofperformingtheirrequiredsafety-relatedfunctions.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotb'ereduced.TEMPORARYBRIDGECRANEWORKPLATFORMInordertoremovethesteamgeneratorsthroughopeningsinthecontainmentdome,portionsofthecontainmentspraypiping,containmentHVACduct,andpainter'strolleyrailsmustberemovedandre-installed.Toperformtheseandotherrelatedactivities,workeraccesstotheinsideofthecontainmentdomeisrequiredduringthe1995and1996refuelingoutages.Forthe1995refuelingoutage,workeraccesstothedomeisrequiredtosupportdecontaminationofthelinerplateandtosupportthecontainmentHVACductworkmodifications.Toprovidethisaccess,atemporaryworkplatformwillbeerectedontopofthebridgecranetrolley.Theworkplatformwillconsistofastructuralsteelframeandscaffolding.Thestructuralsteelframewillbeboltedtothebridgecranetrolleywhichwillactasabaseforthescaffoldstructureabove.Uponcompletionofthe1995refuelingoutage,thestructuralsteelframewillremainattachedtothebridgecranetrolleyduringthe1995-1996operatingcycletoallowreuseduringthesteamgeneratorreplacementoutage.Thescaffoldingconnectedtothesteelframewillberemoveduponcompletionofthe1995refuelingoutageandreinstalledtosupportthe1996steamgeneratorreplacementoutage.Uponcompletionofthesteamgeneratorreplacementoutage,thestructuralsteelframeandscaffoldingwillberemovedfromcontainment.Inadditiontotheinstallationofthestructuralsteelframeandscaffolding,theexistingjibcranemountedontopofthebridgecranetrolleymayalsobemodified,ifrequired,tosupportinstallationofthestructuralsteelframeandscaffolding.Thissectionofthesafetyevaluationaddressesthesafetyimpactoferectingandutilizingthetemporaryworkplatformandjibcranemodificationsontopofthebridgecranetrolley.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Thebridgecranetemporaryworkplatform,toincludethescaffolding,andthejibcranemodificationshavebeenclassifiedassafetysignificant,seismicCategoryII/Iandhavebeenanalyzedtoensurethatthecomponentswillnotfailandadverselyimpactsafetyrelatedequipmentduringaseismicevent.AllinstallationandremovalactivitiesconductedwithfuelinthecontainmentbuildingwillsatisfytherequirementsofRGEEPage84 AdministrativeProcedureA-1305.1,asapplicable,andtheadditionaladministrativecontrolsimposedbythissafetyevaluation.Thescaffoldingassociatedwiththetemporaryworkplatformwillberemovedpriortoleavingthecoldshutdownmode.Theadditionofthestructuralsteelbaseduringthe1995-1996operatingcyclewillnotadverselyaffectthecontainmentspraycoverageduringapostulatedaccident.Thespraysystemwillcontinuetocoveramaximumportionofthefreevolumespace.Theadditionalsteeladdedtocontainmentisnegligiblewhencomparedtothetotalamountofstructuralsteelincontainment.Therefore,theadditionofthebaseduringthe1995-1996operatingcyclewillnotadverselyaffecttheheatsinksusedintheaccidentanalyses.ThestructuralsteelwhichremainswithincontainmentwillbecoatedwithcoatingsthatsatisfytherequirementsofCE-125toensurethatacoatingsystemapprovedforin-containmentusageisapplied.Thisdesignapproach,ensuresthattheinstallationofthebridgecraneworkplatformandthejibcranemodifications,andoperationoftheplantthroughthe'1995-1996operatingcyclewiththeplatformbaseinstalled,willnotadverselyimpactsafety-relatedstructures,systemsorcomponents.Thetemporaryplatformwillbecompletelyremoveduponcompletionofthe1996steamgeneratorreplacementoutage.Thus,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipment'mportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Asaresultoftheloadhandlingadministrativecontrolsimposedbythissafetyevaluationandthedesignoftheworkplatformandjibcranemodificationstowithstandseismicloadings,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityfor'anaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?NeitherthebridgecranetemporaryworkplatformnorthejibcranemodificationsinvolveachangetoanyGinnaTechnicalSpecifications.Adequateprecautionsinthedesignandinstallation/removalofthetemporaryworkplatformandjibcranemodificationshavebeenimplementedtominimizeadverseimpacttostructures,systemsorcomponentswhicharerequiredtobeoperablewhilethebridgecranetemporaryworkplatformisinstalled.ThebridgecraneisnotspecificallyaddressedintheexistingstationTechnicalSpecifications.Page85 Alltechnicalspecificationrequirementsapplicableduringcoldshutdownordefueling/refuelingwillbeadheredto.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.Page86 SEV-1023STEAMGENERATORREPLACEMENTPRE-SGROUTAGEEXCAVATIONANDCONSTRUCTIONACTIVITIESToaccomplishthesteamgeneratorreplacement,aTransi-Liftcranewillbeutilizedtolifttheoldsteamgeneratorsfromthecontainmentandinstallthereplacementsteamgenerators.Tofacilitatetheseheavyloadmovements,engineeredfoundationswillbeconstructedfortheTransi-Liftataworkinglocationeastofthecontainment.Theconstructionofthefoundationswillincludeexcavation,backfill,andconcreteplacement.Constructionofthefoundationsisintendedtobeperformedwiththereactoratpowerbutmaybeaccomplishedduringanymodeofreactoroperation.Towithstandthesurchargeloadings.associatedwiththeTransi-Liftandthesitetransporter/primemoverutilizedtotransportthesteamgeneratorstoandfromthedownending/upendinglocation,theexisting10-inchthickconcreteslablocatedabovethe34kVundergroundductbankplusassociatedcontrolsectionsandthe115kVundergroundductbankwillbereplacedwitha2'-0"thickconcreteslab.Thismodificationwillincludeexcavation,backfill,andconcreteplacement.Thismodificationisintendedtobeperformedwiththereactoratpowerbutmaybeaccomplishedduringanymodeofreactoroperation.Duringexcavationactivitiesassociatedwiththefoundationsandductbankslabmodifications,soilremovedfromthe.excavatedareasmaybecontaminated.Anyexcavatedsoilremovedduringtheconstructionactivitieswillbeidentifiedandhandledinaccordancewithexistingsiteprocedures.TosupportinstallationoftheTransi-Liftfoundations,existingutilitieseitherunderneaththefoundationorlocatedabovegradewithinthefoundation'sfootprintareawillbepermanentlyrelocated.Therelocationactivitiesincludethefollowingcomponents:1)reroutingtheyardloopfireprotectionlinebetweenvalves8570and8573,2)relocatingthestepdowntransformer,the480/208/120voltdistributioncenterandpowerpoleN436-H-4servingtheoutagesupporttrailers.TosupportinstallationoftheTransi-Liftfoundations,existingutilitieseitherunderneaththefoundationorlocatedabovegradewithinthefoundation'sfootprintareawillbetemporarilydisconnected,removedandreinstalledfollowingthereplacementoutage.Thesecommoditiesincludethe300kVAtransformersupplyingpowertooutagesupporttrailersandtheequipmenthatchpersonnellocktrackincludingtherailstopsandperforatedunderdrain.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Page87 Asdescribedintheabovesections,movementofconstructionequipmentinsupportoftheconstructionactivitieshasbeenevaluatedanddeterminedtohavenoadverseimpacttotheburiedcommodities.TheconstructionvehiclesutilizedduringtheconstructionactivitiesassociatedwiththeTransi-Liftfoundationswillremainboundedbytheanalysisperformed,inEWR3681fortheGSUtransformerremovalandreplacement.Sincethesevehicleswillbeboundedbythisanalysistheywillhavenoadverseimpactontheundergroundutilitiesbeneaththe10-inchslab.Theaccidentsandtransientsevaluatedarenotdirectlyimpactedbytheconstructionequipmentorbytheconstructionactivities.AreviewoftheaccidentsintheUFSARhasbeencompletedandthemitigatingmeasuresdescribedintheUFSARhavenotbeenalteredoraffected.Theperformanceofexistingfireprotectionequipmentisnotadverselyaffectedbythereroutedpiping.Acomparisonofthereroutedfireprotectionpipingtotheexistingpipinglayouthasbeenperformed.Thiscomparisonhasdeterminedthat,duetothetypeandsizeoffittingsremovedandreplaced,thereisnodecreaseinthesystemscapability.Therefore,thereisnoadverseimpactonthecapabilityoftheexistingsystem.Administrativecontrolswillbeinvokedtoensurethatheavyequipmentremainsaminimumdistanceof10feetawayfromtheAuxiliaryBuildingorsafety-significantstructures,systems,orcomponentsidentifiedinTable1.Inthoseinstanceswherethisminimumdistancecannotbemaintained,anevaluation,onacase-by-casebasis,willbeperformedtodeterminearevisedminimumdistanceand/oradditionalcontrolsrequiredtopreventinadvertentdamagetotheAuxiliaryBuildingorsafety-.significantstructures,systems,orcomponentsidentifiedinTable1.Furthermore,asstatedabove,thebackhoedoesnotdirectlybearontheductbanksorassociatedcablesandtheintegrityoftheductbanks/cableswillnotbeadverselyaffected.Theconcreteslabwillbebrokenupintopiecesapproximatelysixinchesindiameter.Thesepiecesareofsufficientsizesuchthattheinadvertentdropofrubblefromthebackhoewillnotadverselyaffecttheintegrityoftheductbank.Therefore,theadministrativecontrols,aswellas,acombinationofmachineandmanualexcavationwillbeemployedtominimizethepotentialforaconstructionincidentwhichcouldleadtoinitiationofevent.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunction.ofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Page88 0

Movementofconstructionequipmenthasbeenreviewedtoidentifythemostseveresurchargeloadingsassociatedwiththesecomponentsandtheburiedcommodities.havebeenreviewedfortheseloadings.TheloadingsassociatedwiththeconstructionvehiclesiseitherboundedbythesurchargeloadingsassociatedwiththeTransi-Lift/transporterandprimemoverorwillbeboundedbytheEWR3681loadspreviouslyevaluatedfortheundergroundductbank.Therefore,thereisnoadverseimpacttotheburiedcommoditiesasaresultoftheconstructionactivities.Abovegroundcommoditieshavealsobeenreviewedandrelocated,ifnecessary.Relocationofabovegroundcommoditieswillbeperformedtosatisfythecurrentdesignbasistoensuretherelocatedcommoditycontinuestoperformitsdesignfunction.Temporaryprotectivemeasures,suchassecuritywatches,willbeinvoked,whereappropriate,toensurenoadversereductioninthedegreeofprotectionorfunctionofsystemsorcomponentsduringthecommodityrelocation.Asstatedabove,duringconstructionactivities,administrativecontrolswillbeestablishedtoensurethatconstructionequipment/personnelremainasuffic'ientdistanceawayfromenergizedcomponents.Inaddition,duringremovalofthe10-inchslab,thebackhoewillnotdirectlybearonthe.ductbanks/cables.Therefore,theintegrityoftheductbanks/cableswillnotbeadverselyaffected.Duringconstructionactivities,temporarybarrierswillbeutilized,asrequired,tolimitsurfacewater-runofftowardstheprotectedareas.Temporaryprovisionswillbeutilized,asnecessary,tolimitsedimentinfiltrationintothestormdrainsystem.Aftertheconstructionactivitiesarecompleted,thesitewillbegradedtoconformtothecontoursofthesitepriortotheconstructionactivities.Wherethisisnotpossible,thesoilwillbegradedsuchthatsurfacewaterrunoffisdirectedawayfromtheprotectedarea.Basedontheabove,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?ThisactivitywillnotaffectcompliancewithrequirementsoftheTechnicalSpecificationsnorwilltheseactivitiesrequireachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications.Theservicewatersystemsandtheelectricalpowerductbankshavebeenevaluatedandprotected,asrequired,toensuretherequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3.3.4and3.7,respectively,continuetobemet.Therefore,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionoftheTechnicalSpecifications3.3.4and3.7willnotbereduced.Page89

SEV-1024CONTAINMENTDOMERIGGINGANDHANDLINGWhiletheplantisinoperationandpriortoachievingColdShutdown,miscellaneousitemspillrequireinstallationeitheronthecontainmentdomeorwithintheconfinesofthefacade.Theseitemsinclude,butarenotnecessarilylimitedto,thefollowing:~Crownplatformonthecontainmentdome;~Craftbreakareaonthefacadetruss;~Walkwaysfromthebreakareatothecrown;and~Miscellaneoussmallstructuralmembersforfacadeupgrades.Thecrownplatformisastructuralsteelstructurewhichwillbetemporarilyerectedonthecontainmentdome.ThecrownplatformisaddressedintheSafetyEvaluationforDC-10034A,ContainmentStructuralModifications.ToaccomplishtheriggingandhandlingassociatedwiththesecomponentswiththereactorinamodeaboveColdShutdown,thefollowingtemporarymodificationsarerequired.Anairwinchwillbeinstalledatelevation275'-0"ontheconcretefoundationforthemoistureseparatorreliefvalvesandexhaustpiping.Thiswinchwillbeinstalledandutilizedtoliftmaterialandequipmentfromthegroundelevationtothetendonaccessplatformatelevation343'-0".Asupportbeamassemblywillbeinstalledatapproximatelyelevation378'-0"ontheeasternfacadestructuretoaccommodatethehoistsnatchblockrequiredforliftingmaterialandequipmentfromthegroundelevationtothetendonaccessplatformatelevation343'-0".Thebeamwillbe'attachedtoanewverticalmemberspanningbetweenexistingfacadetrusschordmembersatelevations360-'-0"and386'-0".'hisbeamassemblywillbeutilizedinconjunctionwiththeairwinch.Aprotectivebarrierwillbeinstalledabovetheexistingcabletunnel,routedeastofcontainmentandwithintheconfinesofthefacadestructure,toprotectthecabletunnelfromapostulatedloaddropduringtheriggingactivitiesassociatedwithliftingmaterialandequipmentfromthegroundelevationtothetendonaccessplatform.Thebarrierwillbeplacedoverthecabletunnelandwillbeconstructedofoaktimberstoa4'-0"thickness,overlaidwitha1-inchthicksteelplate.Tofacilitateinstallationofthetemporarydecking,enclosures,andwalkwaysonthefacadestructure,theexistingfacadestructurehorizontaltrusseslocatedontheWestsideofthefacadeatelevation386'-0"willbeutilizedasliftpointsfortheriggingrequiredtoliftmaterialfromthetendonaccessplatfomintopositionatelevation360'-0"forthefacademodifications.Column"G4"willbeextendedverticallyusinganextensionclampedtotheexistingcolumnflangetosupportaliftpoint.Page90 Tofacilitatetheinstallationofthecrownplatformonthecontainmentdome,theexistingfacadestructurehorizontaltrusseslocatedontheSouthsideofthefacadeatelevation386'-0"willbeutilizedasliftpointsfortheriggingrequiredtoliftmaterialfromthetendonaccessplatformintopositionfortheerectionofthecrownplatform.Tofacilitatetheinstallationofthecrownplatformonthecontainmentdome,acrownplatformerectioncranewillbeutilizedonthecontainmentdome.Thiscraneconsistsofastructuralsteelsupportframeandanintermediate-capacitytruckcrane,ModelTM-4000byAirTechnicalIndustries.Thiscraneassemblywillbeattachedbytwo,3/4-inchdiameterwireropestoa.domeanchoragelocatedattheapex'ofthecontainmentdome.Cabledollieswillbelocatedbetweenthedomeanchorageandthecranetoprovideclearancebetweenthewireropesandthecontainmentconcrete.Installationanduseofthewinch,crownplatformerectioncrane,supportbeamassembly,cabletunnelprotectivebarrieranduseoftheliftpointsonthewesternandsouthernportionsofthefacadestructuremaybeperformedinanymodeofplantoperation.Useoftheliftpointsandremovalofthewinch,crownplatformerectioncrane,supportbeamassembly,columnextension,andthecabletunnelprotectivebarriermaybeperformedduringanymodeofplantoperation.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Thedesign,material,'ndconstructionstandardsapplicabletopermanentplantSSCsareunaffectedbythetemporaryinstallationoftheseloadhandlingcomponents.Thewinch,facademodificationsandthecrownplatformerectioncranehavebeenevaluatedtoensurethatthecomponentswillnotfailandadverselyimpactsafetyrelatedequipmentduringapostulatedseismicevent.Thedefense-in-depthphilosophydescribedinthissafetyevaluation,whichincludesidentificationofsafeloadpaths,localizedprotectionofkeyshutdownsafetyfunctions,andadministrativeanddesigncontrolsofliftingactivitiesensuresthecontinuityofkeyshutdownsafetyfunctions.Thetemporaryinstallationoftheequipmentfortheassociatedloadhandlingoperationsdonotchange,degrade,orpreventactionsdescribedorassumedinanyaccidentdiscussedintheUFSAR.Therefore,theriggingactivitiesassociatedwiththeloadhandlingactivitieswillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Page91 Asaresultoftheloadhandlingadministrativecontrolsimposedbythissafetyevaluationandthedesignoftheriggingequipmenttonotadverselyaffectsafetyrelatedequipmentduringapostulatedseismicevent,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?TheloadhandlingassociatedwiththeriggingactivitieswillnotreduceanymarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecifications.Theinstallationanduseofthetemporaryriggingequipmentdoesnotadverselyaffecttheoperationofanysafety-relatedstructures,systems,orcomponents.Furthermore,thedefense-in-depthphilosophyincludesidentificationofsafeloadpaths,localizedprotectionofkeyshutdownsafetyfunctions,andadministrativeanddesigncontrolsofliftingactivitiesensuresthecontinuityofkeyshutdownsafetyfunctions.Page92

SEV-1025STEAMGENERATORREPLACEMENTTEMPORARYUTILITIESScSERVICESTemporaryconstructionpoweranddistributionsystemswillberequiredtosupporttemporaryfacilitiespriorto,during,andafterthe1996steamgeneratorreplacementoutageforconstructionactivitiesandfacilitieslocatedinsidethecontainment,onthecontainmentdome,andoutsidethecontainment.480Volttemporarypowersourceswillbelocatedwithincloseproximitytoalltemporaryfacilities(i.e.,mockup/fabrication/warehousefacility,domemock-uparea,oldsteamgeneratorstoragefacility(duringconstruction),containmentaccessfacility,containmentdomearea,andthecontaminatedstoragearea).Thetemporarypowersourcesoutsi6econtainmentaredescribedbelow.Threetemporarystepdowntransformerswillbeprovidedoutsideofcontainmenttoservicesteamgeneratorreplacementloads.Twotransformerswillbefedfromoneoftheexisting34kVoffsitetransmissionsources(Circuit751)withthethirdtransformerfedfromanexisting12kV,source(Circuit5202).Oneofthetwotransformers(I-3)fedfromCircuit751islocatedinthevicinityoftheContainmentAccessFacilityandthesecondtransformer(I-1)islocatednearthesteamgeneratorreplacementtemporaryofficesandconstructionfacilities.ThetransformerfedfromtheCircuit5202(I-2)islocatedneartheoldsteamgeneratorstoragefacilityandthedomemockupfacility.Thetemporarydistributionsysteminsidecontainmentwillutilizethe4160V,3Phase,60HzReactorCoolantPump(RCP)"B"powerfeedsuppliedfromBus11B.TheexistingRCP"B"motorleadswillbedisconnectedandcoiledback.Atemporarystepdowndrytypetransformer(4160/480V,withclosecoupledpowerdistributionswitchboard)willbetemporarilyconnectedtothe4160Vbus/RCPfeedtosupplyincontainmentsteamgeneratorreplacementelectricalloads.Fromthetemporarypowerdistributionswitchboard,fourpowerpanelswillbeinstalledwhichwillsupplypowertosupportin-containmentsteamgeneratorreplacementloads.Theseloadsincludeadditionallighting,pipecuttingandweldingequipment,pipeenddecontaminationequipment,portableventilationunits,postweldheattreatmentequipment,theauxiliarycraneaswellasothertemporaryloadsrequiredtosupportthereplacement.Allofthetemporarypowerdistributioncommoditiesinstalledpriortoorduringthesteamgeneratorreplacement,bothinsideandoutsidecontainment,willberemovedaftercompletionoftheworkactivitiesrelatedtothesteamgeneratorreplacement.Thissafetyevaluationaddressestheimpactofconnectingloadstothetemporarytransformersdescribedabove.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased'?Page93 TheRCP"B"motorfeederwillnotbedisconnectedfromthepumpmotorandutilizedasthefeederforthetemporarypowerdistributionsystemuntiltheplanthasreachedColdShutdown.De-termination,re-termination,andfunctionaltestingofthereactorcoolantpumpwillbeperformed.Thedesignbasesoftheaffectedsystemwillnotbealteredbythetemporarymodificationstothenon-ClasslEdistributionsystem.Inaddition,thetemporaryelectricalsystemwillnotinterfacewithClass1Eorassociated1Ecircuits.Alloftheaffectedequipmentwillbere-installedtosatisfythecurrentdesignbasis.Twoofthethreestepdowntransformer'swillbeprovidedpowerfromthe34kVoffsitepowersource(Circuit751).Fuseddisconnectsatthestepdowntransformeraswellasadditionalprotectionattheloadpointhavebeenprovidedtoprotectthe34kVsource.ProtectioniscoordinatedtoensurethatfaultsontemporarycircuitswillnotcausealossofCircuit751tothestationbus.TheadditionalloadingonCircuit751hasbeenevaluatedanddoesnotaffecttheabilityofCircuit751tomaintainvoltage.Movementofthetemporarytransformerandmainpowerdistributionswitchboardwithfuelin.thecontainmentwillbeperformedtosatisfytherequirementsofRGEEAdministrativeProceduresA-1305andA-1305.1,asapplicable.Furthermore,theElevation274'-6"floorslabiscapableofwithstandingthetemporarytransformerandmainpowerdistributionswitchboardloading.Safety-related'tructures,systems,andcomponentswillnotbeadverselyaffectedbythetemporarypowerdistributionsystemsince:~thelocationofthetemporarypowerdistributionsystemequipmentinsidecontainmentwillbesuchthatcomponentswillnotimpactsafety-relatedstructures,systems,andcomponentsthatarerequiredtofunctionduringColdShutdown,Refueling,orthedefueledmodeofoperation;thoseportionsofthecontainmentdometemporarypowerdistributionsystemwhosefailurecouldadverselyimpactadjacentsafety-relatedequipmentduringaseismiceventareanchored;andtheotherportionsofthedistributionsystemlocatedoutsideofcontainment,butnotonthecontainmentdome,arelocatedatasufficientdistanceawayfromsafety-relatedstructures,systems,andcomponents.Basedontheabove,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Page94 Followingcompletionofthesteamgeneratorreplacement,thetemporarypowerdistributionsystemwillberemovedandreactorcoolantpump"B"willbereturnedtoitspre-outagecondition.Noadversechangeiathefunctionalintegrityofaffectedcomponentswillresultbytheimplementationofthetemporarymodificationsaddressedinthissafetyevaluation.Theimpactofthetemporarytransformerandpowerdistributionswitchboardonpermanentplantsystemshavebeenevaluatedanddeterminedtobeacceptable.Therefore,nonewaccidentsormalfunctionshavebeenpostulatedsincenonewfailuremodeshavebeencreated.Asaresultofthecontrolsimposedregardingwhenthesystemscanbemodified,andsincethesystemswillbereinstalledinaccordancewiththecurrentdesignre'quirements,thisactivitywillnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?ThetemporarymodificationsdonotinvolveachangetoanyGinnaTechnicalSpecification.AllrequirementsofTechnicalSpecificationSections3.7and3.11willbeadheredtoduringtheimplementationof,thismodification.Protectivedevicesbothatthestepdowntransformersaswellastheloadpoi'nt.havebeenprovidedtoprotectupstreamsourcesfrompotentialfaultsduetosteamgeneratorreplacementloads.Therefore,asaresultofthecontrolsimposedregardingwhenthesystemscanbemodified,themarginofsafetyasdefinedintheBasessectionofthe.TechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereduced.Page95 SEV-1036LIMITEDCONSTRUCTIONPACKAGECARDREADERINSTALLATIONThischangeisamodificationtotheplantforinstallingnewsecuritycardreaders.ThelimitedconstructionpackageincludestheinstallationofconduitsfromRMT3toIMUZ3andRMT4toIMUX4andpullingincablefromtheSteamGeneratorBuildingtotheEastDP,fromtheSteamGeneratortotheGuardTourReaderintheSouthEastcornerofthesite,fromProjectsBuildingtotheWestDPandfromProjectsBuildingtotheGuardTourReaderintheSouthWestcornerofthesite.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.Thereisnonewcomponentsbeingaddedbytheproposedchange.Onlynewconduitinnon-safetyrelatedareasintheturbinebuildingbasementandservicebuildingbasement.Theconduitwillnotcontainsafetyrelatedcables.Theconduitsandcablesperformnosafetyrelatedorcontrolfunction.Therefore,theprobabilityofanaccidentormalfunctionarenotincreased.SincethemodificationdoesnotinterfacewithanythingthatcouldcauseanaccidentorusedtomitigateanaccidentthepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotincreased.ThemarginsofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedbecausetheproposedchangedoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanyaccident.Page96 SEV-1037AMPTECTORSETPOINTCHANGESONDBTYPEBREAKERSThissafetyevaluationreviewsthemodificationofovercurrentprotectionsetpointsforbothsafetyrelatedandnon-safetyrelatedequipmentDB-Breakers.OvercurrenttrippingofDBbreakersisaccomplishedbythefollowingbreakersub-compartments,1)threecurrenttransformers,2)anAmptectorand3)anactuator.ThecurrenttransformerssensethecurrentflowingthroughthebreakerandprovideinputintotheAmptector.TheAmptectormonitorsthelevelofcurrentandprovidesanelectricaltripsignaltotheactuatorwhenthecurrentexceedsapredeterminedlevelandmaintainsthatcurrentforapredeterminedtime.Theactuatorisanelectricalcoilwhichprovidesthemotiveforcetotripthebreaker.SetpointchangesareindicatedperdesignanalysisDA-EE-93-104-97"480VoltDBBreakerwithAmptectorRetrofitCoordinationandCircuitProtectionStudy",Revision1,EWR4225.Thisstudydocumentedsetpointcriteriaforbreakercoordinationandequipmentovercurrentprotectionandanalyzedexistingsetpointsbasedonthiscriteria.Setpointcriteriawasbasedonrecentindustrystandardsinequipmentovercurrentprotection.Theanalysisalsousedactualfieldmeasuredloadingdataforallnon-safetyandsafetyrelatedmotors.Theanalysisalsoconsideredthepostulatedconditionofdegradedbusvoltages.Setpointcriteriawasestablishedforbothsafetyrelatedmotorsandsafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcentersfortheconditionofdegradedbusvoltages.Theanalysisdemonstratesthatsatisfactoryovercurrentprotectionmarginexistsforsafetyrelatedmotorsandmotorcontrolcentersbasedonnormalbusvoltages,althoughsetpointchangesarerecommendedforpostulateddegradedvoltageconditions..Inadditiontoequipmentprotectiontheanalysisevaluatedthesetpointsforcoordinationofupstreamanddownstreambreakerstoensureselectivetrippingoccurs.Selectivetrippingisthesettingofbreakertripsetpointstoensurethebreakerclosesttotheoverloadedequipmentorelectricalfaultwilltripfirst.Selectivetrippingpreventsasinglefaultorsingleoverloadedpieceofequipmentfromtrippingthemainvoltagesourcecausingthelossofanentirebus.Includedintheselectivetrippinganalysiswastheconsiderationofafaultonsafetyrelatedbuses14,16,17or18causinganundervoltagerelaytotrippriortothebusfeederbreakertripping.SelectivetrippingensuresafaultononeofthesebuseswillresultinthefeederbreakertrippingfirstpreventingtheDieselGeneratorsfromclosinginonafaultedbus.Page97 Completionofthesuggestedsetpointmodificationswill1)establishconsistentovercurrentprotectionmarginsforsimilartypeloads,2)ensuresafetyrelatedmotorsandmotorcontrolcenterswillremainenergizedduringconditionsofdegradedbusvoltages,3)ensurecableandtransformerthermaldesignlimitsarenotexceeded,4)ensureselectivetrippingoccurs.Forallaffectedloadsthismodificationwillincreasetheequipmentreliabilityandmaximizeitspotentialavailabilitybyensuringequipmentisnotlostuntilovercurrenttrippingisrequiredandbyensuringselectivetrippingresultsinthebreakerclosesttotheoverloadedequipmentorfaulttripsfirst.Thecausesofovercurrentconditionsaffectingequipmentimportanttosafetyareindependentofthemitigationfeaturesusedtoisolateaffectedloads.Theprobabilityassociatedwiththeoccurrenceofanovercurrentconditionaffectingequipmentimportanttosafetyisthereforeunrelatedtothesetpointsoftheequipmentusedtomitigateovercurrentconditions.Theconsequencesofanovercurrentconditionwillbeunchangedasaresultofthismodificationbecausethemodificationwillnotaltertheessentialprotectionprocessesusedtosecurevitalequipmentavailability.Thesetpointchangesproposedforthismodificationarewithinstandardsthatwereestablishedtoensurethatovercurrentprotectionandbreakerselectivetrippingpreservestheintegrityofthevital'buses.ZtcanbeconcludedthattheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbeincreasedasaresultofthisproposedmodification.Aftercompletionoftheproposedmodificationtheelectricaldistributionsystemwillfunctioninthesamemannerasbeforethechange.BecausenocomponentsarebeingaddedorremovedandbecausethefunctionsoftheexistingequipmentwillremainunchangedthepossibilityforintroducinganaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotcreated.Overcurrentprotectiondevicesetpointsarebe'lowthelevelofdetaildiscussedintheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportandPlantTechnicalSpecifications.Theovercurrenttripfeaturesofbreakersarenotutilizedindefiningthemarginofsafetyfor'anytechnicalspecification.BecausetheamptectorsetpointsarenotfactoredintotheTechnicalSpecifications,changestothesesetpointswillnotresultinthereductioninamarginofsafety.Page98

SEV-1038REMOVALOFTHERADWASTECOMPUTERSYSTEMThissafetyevaluationexaminestheproposedremovalorabandonmentoftheRadwasteComputerSystem.Thissystemwasdesignedtoprovideremotemonitoringofselectwasteprocessingparametersunderpostaccidentconditions.TheRadwasteComputerSystemcontainsoperatinganddisplayterminalsintheTechnicalSupportCenterandatthedrummingstationintheAuxiliaryBuilding.SysteminterfaceracksandmultiplexersarealsolocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhilethecontrolprocessingunitisinthetechnicalsupportcenter.ThescopeofthisproposedmodificationistheremovalorabandonmentoftheRadwasteComputerSystemoperatingterminals(two),centralprocessingunit,interfacerack,multiplexers,andassociatedcabling.Aftercompletionofthischangeallwastedisposalsystemlocalindicationswillremainfunctional.CompletionofthismodificationwillresultindeletionofaregulatorycommitmentandseveralUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)changes.TheRadwasteComputerSystemdoesnotinterfacewithNuclearSafetygradeequipment,norisinformationdisplayedonthesystemusedasthebasisformanualoperationofequipmentimportanttosafety.BecausethesystemprovidesnoinformationorcontrolwithrespecttoequipmentimportanttosafetyabandonmentorremovaloftheRadwastecomputercannothaveanyaffectontheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.RemovalorabandonmentoftheRadwasteComputerSystemcannotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportbecausenoRadwasteorElectricpowersystemfunctionsarechanged.Thesystemisnotutilizedinthemitigationofanyaccidentsequencesandisnotnowincludedinemergencyoperatingorlongtermnecessarypr'ocedures.Therefore,itsabandonmentinplace,cannotcreatethepossibilityofanewmalfunction.TheRadwasteComputerisnotrelatedtoanytechnicalspecificationandthereforethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreduced.Page99 SEV-10395A5BFEEDWATERHEATERSEWR4812wasinitiatedasamodificationtoprocureandreplacethenumber5Aand5Bfeedwaterheaters.Thecurrentconfigurationofthe5A/5Bhighpressurefeedwaterheaters(EFW05A/EFW05B)utilizescopperbasedalloytubes.CopperhasbeendeterminedtobeacontributingfactorinthecorrosionmechanismwhichcausessteamgeneratortubewastageatGinnaStation.Tubematerialinthe5A/5Bheatershasdegradedthroughtheyearsduetonormaloperationandchemicalcleaning.Thenumber1,2,3A/3Band4A/4Blowpressurefeedwaterheaterswerepreviouslyremovedandreplacedwithheaterswhichutilizestainlesssteeltubing.Theinstallationofnewhighpressurefeedwaterheatersisthenextstepinaplannedphaseoutofcopperbasedmaterialsinthecondensate/feedwatersystems.IthasbeenconcludedinDesignAnalysisME-93-026thattheexisting5Aand5BFeedwaterHeaterswillbereplacedwithheatersmanufacturedbyMarleyHeatTransfer,adivisionoftheEngineersandFabricatorsCorporation(EFCO).ThereplacementheatershavebeenprocuredwithintheintentofMechanicalEngineeringEquipmentSpecME-312.Thisspecificationrequiresthereplacementheatertobeequivalenttotheexistingheatersinfitformandfunctionwiththeexceptionofusingincreasedsurfaceareaoftubingtoaccountforthelowerheattransfercharacteristicsofstainlesssteeltubesascomparedtotheexistingcopperbasedtubes.TheproposedmodificationwouldnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARbecause:a.Theequipmentproposedwouldnotintroduceanylikelyignitionsourcesthatcouldstartafire.b.Allfeedwaterheaterrelatedeventshadonechangethataffectedtheaccidentanalyses.Thischangewasanincreaseinflowresistanceoverfeedwaterheaters5Aand5B.Thischangehadeitherapositiveaffectorlittletonoaffectontherelatedevents.C.d.Someaccidentsareconservativewithhighfeedwatertemperatureandsomeareconservativewithlowfeedwatertemperature.Theoverallimportanceoffeedwatertemperatureaspreviouslyevaluatedaccidentsisexpectedtobeminor,withaccidentresultsbeingrelativelyinsensitivetochangesinfeedwatertemperature.Performancetestswillberuntodocumentoutletfeedwatertemperatures.TheresultswillbeprovidedtoNSELforreview.Otheranalyzedincidentssuchasfloods,turbinemissileandstationblackoutwerenotthoughttobeaffectedbytheproposedmodification.Page100 TheproposedmodificationwouldnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecause:a~Thefeedwaterheaters5AandSBhaveturbineextractionsteamontheshellsideandmainfeedwateronthetubeside.Mainfeedwaterandsecondarysteamsystemsarenotrequiredduringadesignbasisaccidentsincetheyarenotsafetyrelatedsystems.TheproposedmodificationwouldnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecause:a~Theproposedequipmentwouldbesized,specifiedandinstalledinaccordancewithexistingpipingandheatexchangerclassificationsandcodedesignationsfordesign,materialandconstruction.b.Theproposedmodificationisnotsafety-relatedanddoesnotperformanysafetyfunction.TheproposedmodificationwouldnotincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecause:a~Theonlytypeofaccidentthatwouldallowradioactivematerialinthesecondarysystemisasteamgeneratortuberupture.Allotheraccidentsandnormaloperationswouldnothaveradioactivematerialsinthesecondarysystem,wheretheproposedmodificationwilltakeplace.Eventhoughtheflowresistanceinthefeedwaterheatershasincreased,thetotalflowresistanceandthetotalflowwillremainthesameandhencecausenomoreorlesscontaminationofthesecondarysystem.TheproposedmodificationwouldnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecause:a.Theproposedmodificationequipmentisnotsafety-relatedandwillnotbereliedupontomitigateanaccident.AllplausibleaccidentsthatinvolvethefeedwatersystemwereevaluatedintheUFSAR.Sincetheproposedmodificationisasuitablereplacement,theproposedmodificationwouldnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluated.Page101 TheproposedmodificationwouldnotcreatethepossibilityofadifferenttypeofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetythananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecause:a.Replacementofthefeedwaterheaters5Aand5Bwillnotcreatethepossibilityofadifferenttypeofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetythananypreviouslyevaluatedsincethefeedwaterheatersaretechnicallyimprovedandfunctionallyequivalenttotheexistingfeedwaterheaters.Theproposedmodificationwouldnotreducemarginsofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationbecause:a~Thefeedwaterheaters5Aand5Barereplacementsforexistingfeedwaterheatersandarenotrequiredtomeetsystemdesignbasescriteria.Thefeedwaterheatersaretechnicallyimprovedduetothetubematerialbeingstainlesssteelinsteadofcopperbased,whichwillimprovethesteamgeneratorreliability.Thereforemainfeedwaterpumpdeliverywillnotbesignificantlyaltered.Theproposedfeedwaterheatershaveslightlymoreflowresistantthantheexistingfeedwaterheatersandconsequentlyahigherdifferentialpressure.b.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotchangeanyofthesetpointsorlimitsthatarewrittenintheGinnaTechnicalSpecifications.C.BasedontheinformationcontainedinSection5.9,themarginofsafetyshouldremain'hesameduetotheproposedmodificationbeingequivalenttotheexistingfeedwaterheaters5Aand5B.Thefeedwaterheaters5Aand5Bhavelittleimpactonthe-overallmarginofsafetysincetheequipmentisnon-safetyrelated.Basedonthepreceding,theproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveachangeintheTechnicalSpecificationortheUSFARandisnotanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Page102 SEV-1040CARDREADERINSTALLATIONThischangeisamodificationtotheplantforinstallingnewsecuritycardreaders.Theconstructionpackageincludestheremovalofexistingcardreadersanddoorcontrolpanels,installationofnewcardreadersandnewdoorcontrolpanelswiththeexistingHoffmanenclosures,removaloftheinternalsofoldsecurityMUXsandreusingtheenclosuresasterminalboxes,disconnectingsecuritydoorsandfiredoorsfromtheoldsecuritycomputersystemandreconnectingtothenewsecuritycomputersystem.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceoftheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.Themodificationprovides/deniesaccesstoplantareas.Accesscontroldoesnotaffecttheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunction.Accesscontrolcannotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofdifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluated.Ifaccesscontrolhasnoaffectontheaccidentanalysis,itcannotaffectthemarginsofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.Page103 SEV-1041RHRPUMPPITLEVELSENSORALARMTheAuxiliaryBuildingSub-Basementsumpiscurrentlydewateredbyanoriginalplantsumpsystem.Thedewateringportionofthesystemiscomprisedoftwosumppumpscontrolledbyassociatedfloattypelevelswitches.IndicationofsumppumpoperatingstatusisdisplayedontheMainControlBoard(MCB)viareadandgreenstatuslights,MCBannunciatorL10(Aux.Bldg.SumpPumpAutoStart),andthePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS)viaauxiliarymotorstartercontacts.Twodiaphragmtypelevelswitcheslocatedi'nthesumpprovideacommonsumphighlevelalarmonMCBannunciatorL9(Aux.Bldg.SumpHiLev'el).Theexistingsump.dewateringsystemiscurrentlyclassifiedasSafetySignificantandpossessesnoenvironmentalqualification.DuringanNRCsafetysystemfunctionalinspection,apotentialfloodingissuerelatedtotheAuxiliaryBuildingSub-basementwasidentified.Intheeventthataresidualheatremovalpumpsealfailureoccurstwentyfour(24)hoursintotherecirculationphaseofalossofcoolantaccident,aleakoffifty(50)gallonsperminutecreatingaharshenvironmentwouldexistintheAuxiliaryBuildingSub-Basement.Theonlydewatering/alarmsystemavailableinthesub-basementtoremovewaterandalertoperatorstotheconditionistheexistingsumpdewateringsystem.Thissumpdewatering/alarmsystemiscomprisedofcommercialgradecomponentspossessingnoenvironmentalqualificationand,therefore,cannotbereliedupontofunctioninaharshenvironment.Consequently,thesub-basementcouldfloodintheeventofaRHRpumpsealfailureandprecludetheRHRpumpsfromperformingtheirintended"safetyfunction.Itisrequiredper10CFR50.49SectionB(2)thatnon-nuclearsafetyelectriccomponentswhosefailureunderpostulatedenvironmentalconditionscouldpreventsatisfactoryaccomplishmentofasafetyfunctionbeincludedinthelicensedfacility'environmentalqualificationprogram.ThecomponentsoftheexistingsumpdewateringsystemlocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingSub-BasementarenotcurrentlyincludedintheGinnaStationEnvironmentalQualificationProgram.Thebasicscopeofthismodificationinvolvesupgradingthesumppumpmotors(MO/ASP1AandMO/ASP1B)andassociatedfloattypelevelcontrolswitches(LS-2042andLS-2043)toanenvironmentallyqualifiedstatus.Minormodificationswillalsobemadetothesumppumpmotorcontrolcircuitrytoachieveaconfigurationforwhichthelevelswitchescontrollingthepumpmotorsprovidesumplevelstatus(normalorhighlevelalarm)onthePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS).Currently,thelevelswitchesprovideonlythefunctionofcontrollingthesumppumpmotors.Page104 Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,previouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport(SAR),isnotincreasedasaresultofthismodification.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisunrelatedtothechangesproposedinthismodification.Theequipmentthismodificationaffectshasnofailuremodesthatcanleadtoinitiationormitigationofanaccident.ThemodifiedequipmentisutilizedtoprovidelongtermassuranceoffloodingprotectionfordecayheatremovalpostLOCA,wellbeyondthetimetheaccidentismitigated.TheAuxiliaryBuildingSub-Basementdewateringequipmentisphysicallyunrelatedtoanysystemorequipmentwhosefailurecouldcauseanaccidentortransient.Theconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyarenotchangedasaresultofthismodification.Shouldafailureoccurwhichplacesademandonthedewateringequipment,theequipmentwillfunctionas'isdescribedintheSAR.Becausethismodificationdoesnotmakeanyfunctionalchanges,theconsequencesassociatedwithanyaccidentormalfunctionarepreviouslyanalyzed.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Thechangesmadeforthismodificationarenotfunctionalchanges.Thismodificationdoesnotcreateanynewinteractionswithsafetyrelatedequipment,nordoesitremoveanyexistingones.Becausethismodificationdoesnotchangeanyinterfaceswithplantsafetyequipment,itisnotpossibleforittocreateanewtypeofaccidentormalfunction.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedasaresultofthisproposedchange.TheAuxiliaryBuildingSub-BasementdewateringandleakagedetectionequipmentarenotutilizedasthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.Page105 SEV-1042STEAMGENERATORLOWERPLATFORMMODIFICATIONEWRN10216isarequesttodesign,procureandinstallpermanentsteelgratingplatformsaroundeachofthetwosteamgeneratorsinsideoftheContainmentBuildingatGinnaStation.Theplatformswillbeconstructedattheworkingelevationofthereactorcoolantpumpplatformstofacilitateaccesstothesteamgeneratorhandholesusedforcamerainspectionandwaterlancingofthetubesheets.TheplatformswillcovertheentireSGcavityatthatlevel.Theadditionoftheseplatformsdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedinthattheinstallationanddesignrequirementsensurethatthestructurescannotinteractwithequipmentimportanttosafety.Theresultsofthedesignanalysisdemonstratesthattheinstallationofthetwo(2)steelgratingplatformsdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedinthe.UFSARinthattherearenoactivefunctionsperformedand,therefore,thepassivefunctionscannotinitiateanyaccidentsormalfunctions.TheadditionoftheseplatformsdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationinthattheinstallationoftheseplatformsisnotwithin,thescopeoftheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,theadditionof-theseplatformsdoesnotinvalueanyunreviewedsafetyquestion.Page106 SEV-1043CLARIFICATIONOFRULESOFUSAGFORCRITICALSAFETYFUNCTIONSTATUSTREESFORINTERMITTENTINDICATIONSThisdocumentevaluatestheproposedchangetoprocedureA-503.1,rev.12,"EmergencyandAbnormalProceduresUsersGuide",step3.4.1.8asproposedinPCN94-3558.SpecificallythisPCNchangestherulesofusageforCriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTrees(CSFST's)sothatFunctionRestoration(FR)proceduresarenotenteredforORANGEorREDpriorityconditionsthatcomeinandc3earintermittently.ThisisdifferentfromthecurrentprocedureonlyfortheINTEGRITYStatusTree,wherecurrentlytheFRprocedureisenteredevenforintermittentORANGEorREDconditions.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanyaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Theprocedurechangeevaluatedheredoesnotincreasetheprobabilityoffailureofanyequipmentimportanttosafety.ByallowingforthemostoptimumrecoveryforaccidentsortransientsthechangemayreducethepotentialconsequencesofaccidentsevaluatedintheUFSAR.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbe'created?Theproposedprocedurechangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanysystemfailurethatcouldinitiateanaccident,andthereforethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARcannotbecreatedasaresultofthischangersWillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?TheproposedchangedoesnotaffectthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationasdiscussedinsection5.3.Thereforethemarginofsafetyisnotreduced.Page107 T

SEV-1044RE-CONFIGURATIONOFTHEPRESSURIZERMISSILESHIELDBLOCKSThedesignoftheproposedmodificationaddressedinthisSafetyEvaluationisdocumentedinEWR10259,"PressurizerBlocksTieDown."Thepressurizercubicleisenclosedonthetopbythreeconcreteslabs.Thepurposeoftheslabsistoprotectvitalequipmentincontainmentfromtheeffectsofinternallygeneratedmissilesandreleasedhighenergyfluidorsteamshouldapipingfailureoccurwithinthepressurizercubicle.Theprimarymissilesassociatedwiththepressurizercompartmenttopblocksarevalvesandpartsofvalves,specificallyfromthepoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs),theirmotoroperatedblockvalvesandthepressurizersafetyreliefvalves.ThemodificationproposedunderEWR10259istoreconfiguretheplacementoftheslabssuchthatthepressurizercubicledoesnothave100%oftheavailablespacecovered.Theproposedreconfigurationisengineeredtoaccomplishtwoobjectives.Thefirstistoallowingresstothecubiclewithoutrequiringmissileshieldslabmovement.Thesecondistoallowairflowthroughthepressurizercubicle.Thechangeproposedforthismodificationsatisfiesthesetwoobjectiveswhilemaintainingtheoriginalfunctionoftheslabs.Aftertheproposedreconfigurationthepressurizercubiclemissileshieldslabswillstillprotectvitalcontainmentequipmentfromtheeffectsofahighenergylinebreakinthepressurizercompartment.Thebasicscopeofthemodificationinvolvestherepositioningoftheslabssuchthatoneslabisplacedontopof,andperpendicularto,theothertwo.Thetopslabispositionedoverthepotentialmissilesthatarenotimpededbythebottomslabs.Aftertheslabpositionsarereconfiguredtheslabswillberestrainedagainstthepossiblesteamjetthrustforcesthatcoulddevelopshouldapipebreakoccurinthepressurizercubicle.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,previouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport(SAR),isnotincreasedasaresultofthismodification.Theequipmentthismodificationaffectsisusedtoensurethat,shouldaLOCAoccur,thefeaturesnecessarytomitigatetheconsequencesofthataccidentsurvivetheaccidentunaffectedbythejetthrustsandmissilegeneratedasaresultofthataccident.Thereconfigurementoftheslabsdoesnotdetectablylowerthelevelofprotectiontheysupply.Itcanthereforebeconcludedthatthechangewillnotaltertheconsequencesofanyaccident.Page108 TheprobabilityofLOCAsisindependentofthefeaturesusedtomitigatetheconsequencesoftheaccident.Becausethemissileslabscannotcauseanaccidenttheycannotincreasetheprobabilityanaccidentoccurs.Theirfunctionissimplytolimitthepotentialconsequencesofanaccident.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Thechangesmadeforthis,modificationarenotfunctionalchanges.Theoriginalconcreteslabsarebeingreconfiguredfromthreeblockslyingsidebysidetotwoblockssidebysidewithoneblockoverlayingonthetop,perpendiculartothebottomones.Thisconfigurationreducescoverageofthetopofthepressurizercompartmentfrom100percenttoapproximately75percent.Althoughtotalcoverageisreducedbecausetheblocksarestrategicallyplacedoverallpotentialmissilestheabilityoftheslabstointerruptthetrajectoryofpotentialmissileshasbeenpreserved.Theslabsrestraintsensurethatjetforcescannotlifttheblocks.ThereforeduringaLOCAinthepressurizercubetheywillnotbemovedintoapositionwheretheycoulddropintothepressurizercompartmentandexacerbatetheaccident.Therestraintsystemwillalsoprecludeslabmovementduringseismicevents,thusremovingthepotentialfortheslabstofallandcausean.accident(LOCA).Thismodificationdoesnotcreateanynewinteractionswithsafetyrelatedequipment,nordoesitremoveanyexistingones.Becausethismodificationdoesnotchangeanyinterfaceswithplantsafetyequipment,itisnotpossibleforittocreateanewtypeofaccidentormalfunction.tThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedasaresultofthisproposedchange.Thepressurizermissileprotectionschemeisnotutilizedasthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.Page109 SEV-1045CONTAMINATEDSTORAGEBUILDING-USEEVALUATIONERR510279isarequesttoevaluateproposedchangestotheuseoftheContaminatedStorageBuilding(CSB).ThechangestotheuseoftheCSBconsistofinitiatinginventorycontrolofcontaminatedtoolsandsupplies,providingstoragefortoolcabinetsdedicatedforuseonlywithinContainment,andtheuseofoneportionofthefloorplaninthesouthwestcornerasadesignateddecontaminationarea.Theproposedchangeofusedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedinthatthischangehasnointerfaceswithequipmentimportanttosafety.ThechangesdonotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARinthatanypossibleeventsareboundedbycurrentanalyses.ThechangeofusedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification,inthattheCSBisnotwithinthescopeofTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,thechangeofuseoftheCSBdoesnotinvalueanyunreviewedsafetyquestion.Page110 SEV-1046DELTATRUNBACKLOGICCHANGEThisdocumentevaluatesthemodificationtotheDeltaTRunbackLogiccircuitry.Currently,OverTemperaturedeltaT(OTDT)andOverpowerDeltaT(OPDT)alarmrelaylogicforturbinerunbackis1outof4channels,andthisrelaylogiccausesspuriousturbinerunbacksduetosinglechannelfailures.ThisTSRwillchangetheOTDTandOPDTalarmrelaylogicto2outof4channelsthuseliminatingspuriousturbinerunbacksduetosinglechannelcomponentandpowerfailures.Inadditiontothealarmrelaylogicchange,theRodDriveControlSystem,boththeBlockofManualWithdrawalandStopAutoRodWithdrawalschemeswillbechangedfroma1outof4,toa2outof4logicscheme.Toaccomplishthechangetoa2outof4logicscheme,itwillbenecessarytorewire16BF66Frelays(a'otalof120relaycontacts),nonewrelaysarerequired.TheproposedmodificationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecausethemodificationdoesnoteffectanycomponentsthatcouldinitiateanaccident~Thismodificationeliminatesspuriousturbinerunbacksduetoasinglechannelfailure;itcannotcauseaturbinerunback.TheproposedmodificationwillnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecausetherearenoaccidentsevaluatedintheUFSARthatmayhavetheirradiologicalconsequencesalteredasaresultofthismodification.TheproposedmodificationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecausethemodificationremovesaspuriousturbinerunbackinitiationduetoasinglechannelfailure.Thisreducesunnecessarytransientsonequipmentandcouldreducetheprobabilityofequipmentmalfunction.TheproposedmodificationwillnotincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecausethismodificationdoesnotadverselyaltertheperformanceofanyengineeredsafetyfeatureasassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Consequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisreducedbythismodificationbecause..unnecessaryspuriousturbinerunbackswillbeeliminatedduetosinglechannelfailures.TheproposedmodificationwillnotcreateapossibilityforanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthisUFSARbecausethismodificationdoesnotaffectanyaccidentinitiators.Thismodificationisarelaylogicchangeonly,itpreventsaturbinerunbackduetosinglechannelfailures.Page111

/TheproposedmodificationwillnotcreateapossibilityforamalfunctionofequipmentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthisUFSARbecausetherearenotfailuremodesofadifferenttypethatarecreatedbythismodification.Thismodificationpreventsinitiationofaturbinerunbackduetoasinglechannelfailureonly.TheproposedmodificationwillnotreduceanymarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationbecausetheoverpowerandovertemperaturedeltaT.setpointswillnotbeaffectedbythismodification.TheonlychangesinvolvedwiththismodificationarethataturbinerunbackinitiationwillrequireactuationoftwooverpowerandovertemperaturedeltaTchannels.Page112 SEV-1047TEMPORARYINSTALLATIONOFPROTOTYPERCSMETERFORTEMPERATUREANDFLOWMEASUREMENTSThedesignoftheproposedtemporarymodificationaddressedinthisSafetyAnalysisisdocumentedinTemporaryModificationPackage95-010"InstallationofPrototypeRCSMotor",Rev.0.Thesystemproposedforinstallationisanexperimentalprototypewhosepurposeistodemonstratethefeasibilityofusingacoustictechnologytomeasurefluidflowandtemperature.'Shouldthetechnologyproveviableitisexpectedthatitwillleadtoanimprovementintheaccuracyofcalorimetriccalculations.Thisproposedmodificationinstallsultrasonictransducersonthehotandcoldlegsofbothreactorcoolantloops(Figure1).Basically,astripofthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)insulationwillberemoved,then.ateachmeteringlocation,thetransducerswillbemountedtothepipeusingspecial-purposestainlesssteelfixturessimilartotheoneshowninFigure3.Eachfixtureisaclampmadefromtwo1/4"x6"stainlesssteelbandsandtightenedbytwothreadedstuds.Stainlesssteelpadsfor.mountingtransducerassembliesareweldedtothebandsat45'Fintervals.Transducerassembliesareboltedtothemountingpadsandpressedagainstthepipewithaforceofapproximately1000lbs.Oneachhotlegtherewillbeonefixturefortemperaturemeasurement(cross-path)transducers.Eachcoldlegwillhavethreefixtures:oneforcross-pathtransducers,andtwoforflowmeasurement(diagonal-path)transducers.Thetransducersaremountedonceramicwaveguides.ZincfoilisusedtoacousticallycouplethewaveguidetotheRCSpiping.Thespecial-purposefixturesholdthewaveguide/transducersunitsinplace.Forthehotlegunitstheweightofthefixturesandtransducersislessthan275poundsforthecoldlegunitstheweightislessthan300pounds.PriortoplantreturntopowertheRCSpipinginsulationaroundtheassembliesisreplaced.Thetwentyeighttransducerssendandreceivesignalsfromtwoelectronicunits(oneforeachloop)mountedonexistingunistrutsoutsidetheprimaryshieldwall.Theelectronicsunitscommunicateoutsidecontainmentviaexistingcontainmenttelephonejacks.Thetransducersandelectronicsunitscommunicateviateflonjacketedtwinaxialcablesinstalledaspartofthismodification.Twotelephonecablesfromtheexistingphonejackstotheelectronicsunitswillalsobeinstalled.Theelectronicsunitsarepoweredfromnonsafety120VACcontainmentconvenienceoutlets.Thedataacquiredfromtheproposedmodificationwillnotbeusedforsafetyrelatedonsafetysignificantpurposes.ShoulddatafromthismodificationbeconsideredforfutureapplicationsatGinnaanewsafetyevaluationwillbeperformedwhichexaminesthedatauncertaintiesassociatedwiththismodification.Page113 ThetemporarymodificationdescribedinthissafetyevaluationwillbeusedtogatherRCSflowandtemperaturedatausingnoninvasiveacoustictechnology.AsdetailedinSection5.2,functionalimpact,theequipmentbeinginstalledhasnofailuremodeswhichcanleadtotheinitiationofanaccident.Likewisethenewequipmenthasnointeractionwithequipmentimportanttosafety.Theequipmentproposedforinstallationunderthistemporarymodificationhasbeendesignedtooperate,withoutfunctionallyinteractingwithequipmentimportanttosafety.BecausethismodificationcannothaveanyinfluenceonsafetyrelatedequipmentcompletionofthischangewillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR..Thechangesmadeforthismodificationarenotfunctionalchanges.Thismodificationdoesnotcreateanynewinteractionswithsafetyrelatedequipment,nordoesitremoveanyexistingones.Becausethismodificationdoesnotcreate'orchangeanyinterfaceswithplantsafetyequipment,itisnotpossibleforittocreateanewtypeofaccidentormalfunction.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedasaresultofthisproposedchange.ThetemporaryprototypeRCSflowandtemperaturemeteringequipmentisnotrelatedtothebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.Page114 SEV-1048HOUSEHEATINGSTEAMSYSTEMPIPEREMOVALINCONTAINMENTANDINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGCAPPINGPENETRATIONS301AND303TheHouseHeatingSteam(HHS)systemvalve6151hasdevelopedexcessiveleakageandhasallowedsteamtopasstotheout-of-serviceContainmentheaters.Valve6151isobsoleteanddifficulttorepairduetolackofsparepartsandsteampipingisolation.TheportionofHHSsystemsupplyingsteamtotheContainmentheaterswasonlyusedduringtheConstructionphaseofGinnaandservesnooperationalormaintenanceusetodayorintheprojectedfuture.Thepipingandpipingcomponentswillberemoved.SectionsofpipingintheintermediatebuildingandContainmentwillbepermanentlyremoved.Penetrations301and303willbesealedwithaweldedcapandredesignatedasspares.Containmentisolationiscurrentlymaintainedwithredundantmanuallockedclosedvalves(1":6152and6175,2":6151and6165).TheremovaloftheprocesspipingeliminatesanypossibilityofContainmentboundarybreech.The'anuallocked,closedvalveswillremovedandtheremainingprocesspipewillbesealedwithaweldedcap.ContainmentisolationwillbemaintainedaftertheprocesspiperemovalbypermanentlyweldedASMEClassMCinstalledcapsonthepenetrations(301and303).Thiswill,ineffect,turntheonceprocesspipeintoanextensionoftheContainment.Theproposedchangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportinthatthepurposeandfunctionof,thepenetrationremainthesameanditsabilitytoaccomplishthepurposeandfunctionremainsthesame.gIThischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportinthatthepurposeandfunctionofthepenetrationremainthesameanditsabilitytoaccomplishthepurposeandfunctionremainsthesame.ThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationinthattheabilityofthepenetrationtoaccomplishits'purposeandfunctionremainsthesame.Page115 SEV-1049TEMPORARYUSEOFTE450ASASUBSTITUTEFORTE402BINTHET~gREACTORPROTECTIONCIRCUITRYTheproposedtemporarymodificationaddressedbythissafetyevaluationentailssubstitutingathermowellmountedReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)coldlegresistancetemperaturedetector(RTD),TW-450,foradirectimmersioncoldlegRTD,TE-402B,foruseinthe"A"RCSloopaveragecoolanttemperature(T~)anddeltaTcalculationinstrumentationandcontrolcircuitry.TheproposedchangewillresultinaconfigurationdifferentthentheconfigurationdetailedintheSafetyAnalysisReport(SAR).TheSARcreditsthedirectimmersionRTDsasbeinghighaccuracy,fastresponsedevicesprovidingtheT~anddeltaTsignalsnecessaryforvariousreactorcontrolandprotectionfunctions.Aftertheproposedtemporarychangeoneloop"A"coldlegRTD(TW-450)willhaveaslowerresponsethanthedirectimmersionRTD(TE-402B)describedintheSAR.ThisSafetyEvaluationexamineswhetherornotthisproposedchangeconstitutesanunreviewedsafetyquestionandconsequentlywhethertheproposedchangeisinimicaltopublicinterest.TheReactorProtectionsystemiscurrentlybeingoperatedwiththeaffectedRCStemperaturechannelinatrippedcondition.Thisconfigurationchangestheprotectionlogicsuchthatif.anotherchannelistested,faults,orreceivesanactualsafetysignalthereactorwillscram.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidenthasnotincreasedduetosubstitutingRTDs.Thepressureboundaryhasnotchanged.ThereisnoothercharacteristicoftheRTDsthatcancauseanaccident.,TheRTDsubstitutioncannotcausemalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetybecausetheRTDiselectronicallyidenticaltotheRTDitisreplacing..Theonlydifferenceiswellmountedvs.immersion.TheconsequencesoranaccidentarenotincreasedbecausethereplacementRTDcausesanearliertriponthelimitingaccident.TheRTDsubstitutioncannotcauseanaccidentofadifferenttypeordifferentmalfunctionbecausetheRTDsareelectronicallyidentical~TheRTDonlymeasurestemperature,measuringtemperaturecannotcauseanaccident.FailureoftheRTDhasbeenaccountedforintheplantdesignandisnotanewevent.Theconsequencesoftheaccidentshavenotincreased.Theaccidentcriteriahavenotbeenexceeded.Therefore,themarginofsafetyhasnotbeenreduced.Page116 CONCLUSIONS:AlloftheabovewerereviewedbythePORCcommitteewithrespecttotheTechnicalSpecificationsandthecommitteehasdeterminedthatnoTechnicalSpecificationchangesorviolationswereinvolved.Additionally,thesechangeswerereviewedincommitteetodetermineiftheypresentedanUnreviewedSafetyQuestionandthegeneralsummationsofthesereviewsareasfollows:Thesechangesdonotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrence,ortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR,because:Thesechangeswereperformedtoensurecontinuedoperability/availabilityofplantequipmentandwillnotresultinanyequipmentbeingoperatedoutsideofitsnormaloperatingrange.Thisresults'incontinuedoperability/availabilityofequipmentimportanttosafety.Thesechangesadditionallywillnotresultinachangeofoperatingcharacteristicsofequipmentusedinthetransient/accidentmitigationwhichprecludesanincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccident.Becausethesechangesensurecontinuedavailabilityofplantequipment,thelimitsshownintheTechnicalSpecifications,andtheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysesoftheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportcontinuetobemet.Asaresultthereisnoincreaseintheconsequencesofanypresentlypostulatedaccident.2.Thesechangesdonotcreatethepossibilityforanewordifferentkindofaccident,oramalfunctionofadifferenttypefromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecause:Thechangesdonotpresentnewfailuremechanismsoutsideofthosepresentlyanticipated,andareboundedbytheeventscontainedintheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.3.Thechangesdonotreducethemarginofsafetybecause:PresentmarginsascontainedintheTechnicalSpecificationsarevalid,andthesechangesareperformedwithinthoselimits.ThesechangeswillnotresultinviolatingthebaselineassumptionsmadeforequipmentavailabilityintheTechnicalSpecificationsandtheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.Page117

,4