ML17264A334

Proposed Tech Specs Containment Requirements During Mode 6 Cost Beneficial Licensing Action

ML17264A334
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	02/09/1996
From:	ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17264A332	List: ML17264A331 ML17264A333 ML17264A334
References
NUDOCS 9602130336
Download: ML17264A334 (35)

Text

AttachmentIIMarkedUpGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsIncludedpages(notethatnotallpagesarechanged):3.9-43.9-5B3.9-1083.9-11B3.9-12B3.9-13B3.9-14B3.9-159602i30336960209PDRADQCK05000244PPDR ontainmentPenetrations3.9.33.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.3ContainmentPenetrationsLCO3.9.3Thecontainmentpenetrationsshallbeinthefollowingstatus:a.Theequipmenthatchshallbeeither:1.boltedinplacewithatleastoneaccessdoorclosed,or>gcQ.gvwv+~QplJc'.isolatedbyaclosure.platthatrestrictsairflowfromcontainment;b.Onedoorinthepersonnelairlockshallbeclosed;andc~Eachpenetrationprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphereshallbeeither:1.closedbyamanualorautomaticisolationvalve,blindflange,orequivalent,or2.capableofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEContainmentVentilationIsolationSystem.APPLICABILITY:DuringCOREALTERATIONS,Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA.Oneormorecontainmentpenetrationsnotinrequiredstatus.A.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDImmediatelyA.2Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant<3.9-4AmendmentNo.61 ontainmentPenetrations3.9.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.9.3.1Verifyeachrequiredcontainmentpenetrationisintherequiredstatus.7daysSR3.9.3.2Verifyeachrequiredcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalveactuatestotheisolationpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-5AmendmentNo.61 ContainmentPenetrations83.9.3B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.9.3ContainmentPenetrationsBASESBACKGROUNDDuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,areleaseoffissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentwillberestrictedfromescapingtotheenvironmentwhentheLCOrequirementsaremet.InMODES1,2,3,and4,thisisaccomplishedbymaintainingcontainmentOPERABLEasdescribedinLCO3.6.1,"Containment."InMODE5,therearenoaccidentsofconcernwhichrequirecontainment.InMODE6,thepotentialforcontainmentpressurizationasaresultofanaccidentisnotlikely;therefore,requirementstoisolatethecontainmentfromtheoutsideatmospherecanbelessstringent.TheLCOrequirementsarereferredtoas"containmentclosure"ratherthan"containmentOPERABILITY."Containmentclosuremeansthatallpotentialescapepathsareclosedorcapableofbeingclosed.Sincethereisnopotentialforcontainmentpressurization,theAppendixJleakagecriteriaandtestsarenotrequired.LThecontainmentservestocontainfissionproductradioactivitythatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowinganaccident,suchthatoffsiteradiationexposuresaremaintainedwithintherequirementsof10CFR100.Additionally,thecontainmentprovidesradiationshieldingfromthefissionproductsthatmaybepresentinthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaccidentconditions.Thecontainmentequipmenthatch,whichispartofthecontainmentpressureboundary,providesameansformovinglargeequipmentandcomponentsintoandoutofcontainment.DuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,theequipmenthatchmustbeboltedinplace.Goodengineeringpracticedictatesthataminimumof4boltsbeusedtoholdtheequipmenthatchinplaceandthattheboltsbeapproximatelyeuallsaced.Asanalternative,theequipmenthatchcaneisolatedbyaclosureplatethatrestrictsairflowfromcontainment.~~4u~~~viva.X~);~(.<,g.~nba,Q.4ec.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-10Revision0 ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)aw0-g<isoX~SC.CC'<cAThecontainmentequipmentandpersonnelairlocks,whicharealsopartofthecontainmentpressureboundary,provideameansforpersonnelaccessduringMODES1,2,3;and4inaccordancewithLCO3.6.2,"ContainmentAirLocks."Eachairlockhasadooratbothends.ThedoorsarenormallyinterlockedtopreventsimultaneousopeningwhencontainmentOPERABILITYisrequired.Duringperiodsofplantshutdownwhencontainmentclosureisnotrequired,thedoorinterlockmechanismmaybedisabled,allowingbothdoorsofanairlocktoremainopenforextendedperiodswhenfrequentcontainmententryisnecessary.DuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,containmentclosureisrequired;therefore,thedoorinterlockmechanismmayremaindisabled,butoneairlockdoormustalwaysremainclosedinthepersonnelandequipmenthatch(unlesstheequipmenthatchisisolatedbyaclosureplate).Therequirementsforcontainmentpenetrationclosureensurethatareleaseoffissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentwillberestrictedfromescapingtotheenvironment.Theclosurerestrictionsaresufficienttorestrictfissionproductradioactivityreleasefromcontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentduringrefueling.TheContainmentPurgeandExhaustSystemincludestwosubsystems.TheShutdownPurgeSystemincludesa36inchpurgepenetrationanda36inchexhaustpenetration.Thesecondsubsystem,aMini-PurgeSystem,includesa6inchpurgepenetrationanda6inchexhaustpenetration.DuringMODES1,2,3,and4,theshutdownpurgeandexhaustpenetrationsareisolatedbyablindflangewithtwo0-ringsthatprovidethenecessaryboundary.Thetwoairoperatedvalvesineachofthetwomini-purgepenetrationscanbeopenedintermittently,butareclosedautomaticallybytheContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationSystem.NeitherofthesubsystemsissubjecttoaSpecificationinMODE5.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-11Revision0 ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASES"BACKGROUND(continued)InNODE6,largeairexchangersareusedtosupportrefuelingoperations.Thenormal36inchShutdownPurgeSystemisusedforthispurpose,andeachairoperatedvalveisclosedbytheContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationinaccordancewithLCO3.3.5,"ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation."TheMini-PurgeSystemalsoremainsoperationalinMODE6,andallfourvalvesarealsoclosedbytheContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation.Theothercontainmentpenetrationsthatprovidedirectaccessfromcontainmentatmospheretooutsideatmospheremustbeisolatedonatleastoneside.IsolationmaybeachievedbyanOPERABLEautomaticisolationvalve,orbyamanualisolationvalve,blindflange,orequivalent.Equivalentisolationmethodsmayincludeuseofamaterialthatcan-provideatemporary,atmosphericpressure,ventilationbarrierfortheothercontainmentpenetrationsduringfuelmovements.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,themostsevereradiologicalconsequencesresultfromafuelhandlingaccident.Thefuelhandlingaccidentisapostulatedeventthatinvolvesdamagetoirradiatedfuel(Ref.1).Fuelhandlingaccidents,analyzedusingthecriteriaofReference2,includedroppingasingleirradiatedfuelassemblyandhandlingtooloraheavyobjectontootherirradiatedfuelassemblies.TherequirementsofLCO3.9.6,"RefuelingCavityWaterLevel,"andtheminimumdecaytimeof.100hourspriortoCOREALTERATIONSensurethatthereleaseoffissionproductradioactivity,subsequenttoafuelhandlingaccident,resultsindosesthatarewithintheguidelinevaluesspecifiedin10CFR100.StandardReviewPlan(SRP),Section15.7.4,Rev.1(Ref.2),requirescontainmentclosureeventhoughthisisnotanassumptionoftheaccidentanalyses.Theacceptancelimitsforoffsiteradiationexposureis96rem(Ref.3).ContainmentpenetrationssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatementsincetheseareassumedintheSRP.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-12(continued)Revision0 ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASES(continued)LCOThisLCOlimitstheconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccidentincontainmentbylimitingthepotentialescapepathsforfissionproductradioactivityreleasedwithincontainment.TheLCOrequiresanypenetrationprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmospheretobeclosedexceptfortheOPERABLEcontainmentpurgeandexhaustpenetrations.FortheOPERABLEcontainmentpurgeandexhaustpenetrations,thisLCOensuresthatatleastonevalveineachofthesepenetrationsisisolablebytheContainmentVentilationIsolationSystem.APPLICABILITYTheco'ntainmentpenetrationrequirementsareapplicableduringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentbecausethisiswhenthereisapotentialforafuelhandlingaccident.InMODESI,2,3,and4,containmentpenetrationrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.6.1.InMODES5and6,whenCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentarenotbeingconducted,thepotentialforafuelhandlingaccidentdoesnotexist.Therefore,undertheseconditions,norequirementsareplacedoncontainmentpenetrationstatus.ACTIONSA.1andA.2~>~goivaK~Ifthecontainmentequipmenthatch(oritsclosureplate,airlockdoors,oranycontainmentpenetrationthatprovidesdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphereisnotintherequiredstatus,includingtheContainmentVentilationIsolationSystemnotcapableofautomaticactuationwhenthepurgeandexhaustvalvesareopen,theplantmustbeplacedinaconditionwheretheisolationfunctionisnotneeded.ThisisaccomplishedbyimmediatelysuspendingCOREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.Performanceoftheseactionsshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.9-13(continued)Revision0 ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.9.3.1ThisSRdemonstratesthateachofthecontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeinitsclosedpositionisinthatposition.TheSurveillanceontheopenpurgeandexhaustvalveswilldemonstratethatthevalvesarenotblockedorotherwisepreventedFromclosing(e.g.,solenoidunabletovent).TheSurveillanceisperformedevery7daysduringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.TheSurveillanceintervalisselectedtobecommensuratewiththenormaldurationoftimetocompletefuelhandlingoperations.Assuch,thisSurveillanceensuresthatapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentthatreleasesfissionproductradioactivitywithinthecontainmentwillnotresultinareleaseoffissionproductradioactivitytotheenvironment.SR3.9.3.2ThisSRdemonstratesthateachcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalveactuatestoitsisolationpositiononmanualinitiationoronanactualorsimulatedhighradiationsignal.The24monthFrequencymaintainsconsistencywithothersimilarinstrumentationandvalvetestingrequirements.InLCO3.3.5,theContainmentVentilationIsolationinstrumentationrequiresaCHANNELCHECKevery12hoursandaCOTevery92daystoensurethechannelOPERABILITYduringrefuelingoperations.Every24monthsanACTUATIONLOGICTESTandCHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformed.TheseSurveillanceswillensurethatthevalvesarecapableofclosingafterapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidenttolimitareleaseoffission,productradioactivityfromthecontainment.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-14(continued)Revision0 ontainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section15.7.2.NUREG-800,Section15.7.4,Rev.1,July1981.3.LetterfromD.N.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.Haier,RGLE,

Subject:

"FuelHandlingAccidentInsideContainment,"datedOctober7,1981.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-15Revision0

AttachmentIIIProposedTechnicalSpecificationsIncludedpages(notethatnotallpagesarechanged):3.9-43.9-5B3.9-10B3.9-11B3.9-12B3.9-13B3.9-14B3.9-15 ontainmentPenetrations3.9.33.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.3ContainmentPenetrationsLCO3.9.3Thecontainmentpenetrationsshallbeinthefollowingstatus:a.Theequipmenthatchshallbeeither:1.boltedinplacewithatleastoneaccessdoorclosed,or2.isolatedbyaclosureplate,orequivalent,thatrestrictsairflowfromcontainment;b.Onedoorinthepersonnelairlockshallbeclosed;andc~Eachpenetrationprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphereshallbeeither:1.closedbyamanualorautomaticisolationvalve,blindflange,orequivalent,or2.'apableofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEContainmentVentilationIsolationSystem.APPLICABILITY:DuringCOREALTERATIONS,Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorecontainmentpenetrationsnotinrequiredstatus.A.lSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDA.2Suspendmovementofi}radiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.ImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantl3.9-1AmendmentNo.g ContainmentPenetrations3.9.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.9.3.1Verifyeachrequiredcontainmentpenetrationisintherequiredstatus.7daysSR3.9.3.2Verifyeachrequiredcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalveactuatestotheisolationpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-5AmendmentNo.61 j4ontainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS83.9.3ContainmentPenetrationsBASESBACKGROUNDDuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,areleaseoffissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentwillberestrictedfromescapingtotheenvironmentwhentheLCOrequirementsaremet.InMODES1,2,3,and4,thisisaccomplishedbymaintainingcontainmentOPERABLEasdescribedinLCO3.6.1,"Containment."InMODE5,therearenoaccidentsofconcernwhichrequirecontainment.InMODE6,thepotentialforcontainmentpressurizationasaresultofanaccidentisnotlikely;therefore,requirementstoisolatethecontainmentfromtheoutsideatmospherecanbelessstringent.TheLCOrequirementsarereferredtoas"containmentclosure"ratherthan"containmentOPERABILITY."Containmentclosuremeansthatallpotentialescapepathsareclosedorcapableofbeingclosed.Sincethereisnopotentialforcontainmentpressurization,theAppendixJleakagecriteriaandtestsarenotrequired.Thecontainmentservestocontainfissionproductradioactivitythatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowinganaccident,suchthatoffsiteradiationexposuresaremaintainedwithintherequirementsof10CFR100.Additionally,thecontainmentprovidesradiationshieldingfromthefissionproductsthatmaybepresentinthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaccidentconditions.Thecontainmentequipmenthatch,whichispartofthecontainmentpressureboundary,providesameansformovinglargeequipmentandcomponentsintoandoutofcontainment.DuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,theequipmenthatchmustbeboltedinplace.Goodengineeringpracticedictatesthataminimumof4boltsbeusedtoholdtheequipmenthatchinplaceandthattheboltsbeapproximatelyequallyspaced.Asanalternative,theequipmenthatchopeningcanbeisolatedbyaclosureplate,orbyanequivalentisolationbarrier(e.g.,overheaddoorassembly),thatrestrictsairflowfromcontainment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-1RevisionP llht ontainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thecontainmentequipmentandpersonnelairlocks,whicharealsopartofthecontainmentpressureboundary,provideameansforpersonnelaccessduringMODESI,2,3,and4inaccordancewithLCO3.6.2,"ContainmentAirLocks."Eachairlockhasadooratbothends.ThedoorsarenormallyinterlockedtopreventsimultaneousopeningwhencontainmentOPERABILITYisrequired.Duringperiodsofplantshutdownwhencontainmentclosureisnotrequired,thedoorinterlockmechanismmaybedisabled,allowingbothdoorsofanairlocktoremainopenforextendedperiodswhenfrequentcontainmententryisnecessary.DuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,containmentclosureisrequired;therefore,thedoorinterlockmechanismmayremaindisabled,butoneairlockdoormustalwaysremainclosedinthepersonnelandequipmenthatch(unlesstheequipmenthatchisisolatedbyaclosureplateorequivalentbarrier).Therequirementsforcontainmentpenetrationclosureensurethatareleaseoffissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentwillberestrictedfromescapingtotheenvironment.Theclosurerestrictionsaresufficienttorestrictfissionproductradioactivityreleasefromcontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentduringrefueling.TheContainmentPurgeandExhaustSystemincludestwosubsystems.TheShutdownPurgeSystemincludesa36inchpurgepenetrationanda36inchexhaustpenetration.Thesecondsubsystem,aMini-PurgeSystem,includesa6inchpurgepenetrationanda6inchexhaustpenetration.DuringMODESI,2,3,and4,theshutdownpurgeandexhaustpenetrationsareisolatedbyablindflangewithtwo0-ringsthatprovidethenecessaryboundary.Thetwoairoperatedvalvesineachofthetwomini-purgepenetrationscanbeopenedintermittently,butareclosedautomaticallybytheContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationSystem.NeitherofthesubsystemsissubjecttoaSpecificationinMODE5.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.9-2RevisionP ontainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)InHODE6,largeairexchangersareusedtosupportrefuelingoperations.Thenormal36inchShutdownPurgeSystemisusedforthispurpose,andeachairoperatedvalveisclosedbytheContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationinaccordancewithLCO3.3.5,"ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation."TheHini-PurgeSystemalsoremainsoperationalinHODE6,andallfourvalvesarealsoclosedbytheContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation.Theothercontainmentpenetrationsthatprovidedirectaccessfromcontainmentatmospheretooutsideatmospheremustbeisolatedonat,leastoneside.IsolationmaybeachievedbyanOPERABLE.automaticisolationvalve,orbyamanualisolationvalve,blindflange,orequivalent.Equivalentisolationmethodsmayincludeuseofamaterialthatcanprovideatemporary,atmosphericpressure,ventilationbarrierfortheothercontainmentpenetrationsduringfuel'movements.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,themostsevereradiologicalconsequencesresultfromafuelhandlingaccident.Thefuelhandlingaccidentisapostulatedeventthatinvolvesdamagetoirradiated,fuel(Ref.1).Fuelhandlingaccidents,analyzedusingthecriteriaofReference2,includedroppingasingleirradiatedfuelassemblyandhandlingtooloraheavyobjectontootherirradiatedfuelassemblies.TherequirementsofLCO3.9.6,"RefuelingCavityWaterLevel,"andtheminimumdecaytimeof100hourspriortoCOREALTERATIONSensurethatthereleaseoffissionproductradioactivity,subsequenttoafuelhandlingaccident,resultsindosesthatarewithintheguidelinevaluesspecifiedin10CFR100.'tandardReviewPlan(SRP),Section15.7.4,Rev.1(Ref.2),requirescontainmentclosureeventhoughthisisnotanassumptionoftheaccidentanalyses.Theacceptancelimitsforoffsiteradiationexposureis96rem(Ref.3).ContainmentpenetrationssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatementsincetheseareassumedintheSRP.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-3(continued)Revision0 ontainmentPenetrations83.9.3BASES(continued)LCOThisLCOlimitstheconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccidentincontainmentbylimitingthepotentialescapepathsforfissionproductradioactivityreleasedwithincontainment.TheLCOrequiresanypenetrationprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmospheretobeclosedexceptfortheOPERABLEcontainmentpurgeandexhaustpenetrations.FortheOPERABLEcontainmentpurgeandexhaustpenetrations,thisLCOensuresthatatleastonevalveineachofthesepenetrationsisisolablebytheContainmentVentilationIsolationSystem.APPLICABILITYThecontainmentpenetrationrequirementsareapplicableduringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentbecausethisiswhenthereisapotentialforafuelhandlingaccident.InNODESI,2,3,and4,containmentpenetrationrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.6.1.InNODES5and6,whenCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentarenotbeingconducted,thepotentialforafuelhandlingaccidentdoesnotexist.Therefore,undertheseconditions,norequirementsareplacedoncontainmentpenetrationstatus.ACTIONSA.landA.2Ifthecontainmentequipmenthatch(oritsclosureplateorequivalent),airlockdoors,oranycontainmentpenetrationthatprovidesdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphereisnotintherequiredstatus,includingtheContainmentVentilationIsolationSystemnotcapableofautomaticactuationwhenthepurgeandexhaustvalvesareopen,theplantmustbeplacedinaconditionwheretheisolationfunctionisnotneeded.ThisisaccomplishedbyimmediatelysuspendingCOREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.Performanceoftheseactionsshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-4(continued)RevisionP 00'(~dhTI 0tContainmentPenetrations83.9.3BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR,3.9.3.1ThisSRdemonstratesthateachofthecontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeinitsclosedpositionisinthatposition.TheSurveillanceontheopenpurgeandexhaustvalveswilldemonstratethatthevalvesarenotblockedorotherwisepreventedfromclosing(e.g.,solenoidunabletovent).TheSurveillanceisperformedevery7daysduringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.TheSurveillanceintervalisselectedtobecommensuratewiththenormaldurationoftimetocompletefuelhandlingoperations.Assuch,thisSurveillanceensures'thatapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentthatreleasesfissionproductradioactivitywithinthecontainmentwillnotresultinareleaseoffissionproductradioactivitytotheenvironment.SR3.9.3.2ThisSRdemonstratesthateachcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalveactuates.toitsisolationposition.onmanualinitiationoronanactualorsimulatedhighradiationsignal.The24monthFrequencymaintainsconsistencywithothersimilarinstrumentationandvalvetestingrequirements.InLCO3.3.5,theContainmentVentilationIsolationinstrumentationrequiresaCHANNELCHECKevery12hoursandaCOTevery92daystoensurethechannelOPERABILITYduringrefuelingoperations.Every24monthsanACTUATIONLOGICTESTandCHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformed.TheseSurveillanceswillensurethatthevalvesarecapableofclosingafterapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidenttolimitareleaseoffissionproductradioactivityfromthecontainment.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-5(continued)Revision0 ontainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section15.7.2.NUREG-800,Section15.7.4,Rev.1,July1981.3.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.Haier,RGLE,

Subject:

"FuelHandlingAccidentInsideContainment,"datedOctober7,1981.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-6'evision0 AttachmentIVI"uelHandlingAccidentInsideContainmentDoseConsequenceAnalysisforGinnaStation FuelHandlingAccidentInsideContainmentDoseConsequenceAnalysisforGinnaStation1.0BACKGROUNDTheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsrequirethatcontainment"closure"beineffectduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentandduringcorealterations.Containment"closure"isdefinedinLCO3.9.3asisolating,orprovidingautomaticisolationcapability,forallpenetrationswhichprovidedirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphere.Specificrequirementsareprovidedforthepersonnelandequipmentairlocksinthatatleastonedoorintheassociatedairlockmustbeclosed.Aclosureplatewhichrestrictsairflowfromcontainmentcanalsobeusedinplaceoftheequipmenthatchanditsassociatedairlockdooi'.Thesetechnicalspecificationrequirementsareprovidedeventhoughcontainmentclosureisnotcreditedinthefuelhandlingaccidentdoseconsequencesasdescribedinthetechnicalspecificationbases.StandardReviewPlan(SRP)15.7.4statesthatifa"fuelhandlingaccidentwilloccuronlywhenthecontainmentisisolated,noradiologicalconsequencesneedbecalculated."TheSRPfurtherstatesthatif"containmentwillbeopenduringfuelhandlingoperations,aswithacontainmentpurgeexhaustsystem"itshouldbeverifiedthattheresultingdosesare"wellwithin"10CFRPart100limits(i.e.,75remforthethyroidand6remforthewhole-body).SinceGinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheSRP,itdoesnot(andisnotrequiredto)meettheselimits.Assuch,thefuelhandlingaccidentwithincontainmentforGinnaStationshowsanoffsitedoseof96remthyroidwhichhasbeenpreviouslyacceptedbytheNRCasbeing"wellwithin"10CFRPart100limits(UFSARSection15.7.3.3.2.2).Insupportoftheupcomingsteamgeneratorreplacementoutage,RG&;Eisrequestingtorevisetheexistingtechnicalspecificationrequirementsrelatedtotheequipmenthatchtoallowuseofaninstalledoverheaddoorassemblytoisolatetheequipmenthatchopening.ThisoverheaddoorassemblyissimilartothoseusedinBWRcontainmentsandintheGinnaStationAuxiliaryBuilding(whichalsohastechnicalspecificationrequirementsassociatedwithitduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithintheAuxiliaryBuilding).Withtheuseoftheoverheaddoorassembly,containment"closure"isessentiallymaintainedsincethebasesforLCO3.9.3specificallystatethat"sincethereisnopotentialforcontainmentpressurization,theAppendixJleakagecriteriaandtestsarenotrequired"fortheisolationdevicesusedtomeetthisLCO.However,itisrecognizedthattheoverheaddoorassemblycouldcreatealargerreleasepathfromcontainmentthanfromotherpenetrationsduetoitssizeandthesmallgapswhichexistbetweenthedoorandequipmenthatchopening.Therefore,thepurposeofthisanalysisistocalculatewholebodyandthyroiddosesinthecontrolroomandfortheexclusionareaboundary(EAB)withtheequipmenthatchopeningisolatedusingtheinstalledoverheaddoorassemblyinplaceofthecurrentoptionsprovidedintechnicalspecifications.

Inperformingthisanalysis,severalissuesmustbeaddressed.Thesearebrieflydiscussedbelow:TheGinnaStationUFSAR(Section2.3.4.2)providesanatmosphericdispersionfactor(i.e.,X/Q)valueof4.8E-4sec/m'ortheEABduringthefirst2hoursofanaccident.TheX/QvalueforthecontrolroomisprovidedinUFSARTable6.4-1as1.9E-4sec/m~.ThisvalueislessthanthatfortheEABeventhoughthecontrolroomisclosertothereleasesource.Therefore,thisanalysismustdetermineanappropriatevaluetouseinordertocalculatecontrolroomdoses.Aleakageratefromcontainmentviatheoverheaddoorassemblymustbedeterminedduringthetwohourreleasefollowingthefuelhandlingaccident.Thisincludesconsiderationofleakagefromotheravailablepathways(e.g.,purgelineswhichmaybeopened).Theanalysismustbeperformedusingthehigherenrichmentfuelwithhigherpeakingfactorsthatisbeingusedfortheupcomingfuelcycle.Theseissuesareevaluatedindetailbelow.2.0DETERMINATIONOFX/QVALUESThebasicequationusedforthespatialdistributionofmaterialsreleasedundertheinfluenceofthebuildingwakeis:X/Q=K/AUwhere:Kisthenondimensionalconcentrationcoefficientwhichisafunctionoftheconfigurationofnearbystructures,thereleaseandintakelocations,andthewindlocation;Aisthereferencebuildingarea;andUisthewindvelocityatthetopofthereferencebuilding.TheplantconfigurationisshowninFigure1.Thecriticalfeaturesasshownonthisfigureisthatthecontrolroomintakesourceisontopofthecontrolroombuilding.TheKvaluesusedintheaboveequationforthepurposeofthisanalysisarefromDr.J.Halitskybasedonfieldandwindtunnelexperiments(seeChapter5ofMeteorologyandAtomicEnergy,1968,TID-24190).Table1providestheKvaluesforeachwinddirectionforthereleaseconfigurationbeingevaluatedatGinna.

TheTable1Kvaluesandthecontrolbuildingareaof2,964m'ereinputintheaboveequationandprocessedthrough3yearsofhourlyaveragedweatherdatafromtheGinnasiteweathertower(1992-1994).TheresultingX/QvaluesatthecontrolroomintakeontopofthecontrolbuildingstructurewerethenplottedinFigure2.Asshownbythisfigure,the5%probablevalueofX/Qis3.0E-4sec/m'.TheabovecalculatedvalueislargerthanthecontrolroomX/QvalueprovidedinUFSARTable6.4-1,butsmallerthantheX/QvalueprovidedintheGinnaStationUFSARfortheEAB.ThevaluecalculatedfortheEABisbasedongeneric(i.e.,conservative)assumptionswhichifweresimilarlyevaluatedusingplantspecificconsiderationswouldbelowered(seeUFSARSection2.3.4.2.2).Therefore,theUFSARX/QvaluefortheEABwillbeconservativelyusedinthisanalysisforboththeEABandthecontrolroom.3.0DETERMINATIONOFCONTAINMENTLEAKAGERATESTheexistingUFSARanalysisforfuelhandlingaccidentsassumesthatcontainmentisnotisolatedatthetimeoftheevent.However,forthepurposeofthisanalysis,containmentwillbeintheconfigurationrequiredbytechnicalspecifications.Therefore,aleakageratefromcontainmentmustbedeterminedasdiscussedbelow:3.1ini-PureandhudownPrePenrinThesepenetrationsmaybeopenedduringfuelmovementprovidedthattheyarecapableofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEContainmentVentilationIsolationSignal.Theisolationvalvesforthesepenetrationsaredesignedtoclosewithin2secondsfromthetimeasignalisgeneratedoratotalof5secondsfollowingtheevent(seeUFSARTable6.2-15).ThistimelimitisconsistentwithBranchTechnicalPositionCSB6-4toensurethattheimpactondoseanalysesisminimized.Therefore,leakagethroughthesepathwaysisconsiderednegligibleandignoredforthepurposeofthisanalysis.3.2EuimenHchninTheinstalledoverheaddoorassemblyhassmallgapsbetweenthedoorandtheequipmenthatchopening.Thesegapscreatethepotentialforareleasepathfromcontainment.Assuch,theleakratethroughthesegapsmustbedetermined.Thefirststepistoestimatethesizeofthegaps.Anestimateofa1/4inchgapfortheentire88feetcircumferenceoftheopeningisused.Thisresultsinaleakageareaof1.83ft~.Itshouldbenotedthatthis1/4"gapisindicativeofthetypeofcontainmentbarrierwhichtheoverheaddoorassemblyisintendedtoprovideandnotanacceptancelimitforitsoperabilityduetotheotherconservatismsusedinthisanalysis.Thenextstepistodeterminetheleakagethroughthisarea.AsdiscussedinthebasesforLCO3.9.3,containmentpressurizationisnotassumedforafuelhandlingaccident.However,somepressuredifferentialmustbeassumedtocreatealeakagepathtotheoutsideenvironment.Forconservatism,twosourcesofpressuredifferentialwereconsideredasshownbelow:

Forthefirstthreeminutesfollowingthefuelhandlingaccident,containmentisassumedtobepressurizedby0.5psigabovetheoutsideatmosphere.This3minutesisthetimeittakesforthecontainmentfreevolumetoequalizewiththeoutsideatmospherethroughthe1.83ft~gap.Thisequatestoaleakagerateof8240cfm.b.Fortheremainingtwohourduration,aleakageratebasedonthemaximumtemperaturedifferencebetweencontainment(120'F)andtheoutsideatmosphere(-2'F)isassumed.Thisequatestoaleakagerate.of320cfm.3.3theroninmenPenerinsTheremainingcontainmentpenetrationswhichprovidedirectaccessfromcontainmenttotheoutsideenvironmentmustbeclosedbyamanualorautomaticisolationvalve,blindflange,orequivalentpertechnicalspecifications.AsdiscussedinthebasesforLCO3.9.3,theseisolationdevicesdonothavetomeet10CFR50,AppendixJleakagerequirementssuchthatleakagethroughthesepenetrationscanexist.AtGinnaStation,mostpenetrationswhichprovidedirectaccesstotheoutsideenvironmentdonothaveisolationcapabilityotherthantheinstalledcontainmentisolationvalves.Therefore,LCO3.9.3istypicallymetthroughtheuseoftheseinstalledcontainmentisolationvalves.Inaddition,duetotheconservativeassumptionsfortheequipmenthatch,leakagethroughthesepathswasignored.4.0DOSECALCULATIONSThesourceoffissionproductsreleasedfromthefuelafter100hoursdecayandtheassumptionsforiodineformandremovalarebasedonRegulatoryGuide1.25.Thisanalysisassumesthatthefissionproductinventoryfromthehighestratedassemblywasreleasedtothereactorcavitywater.Table2showstheassumedsourcetermforeachisotope.ThewholebodydosecalculationsweremadeusingthefollowingrelationsanddosefactorsfromTables3and4.where:fii~istheactivebreathingrate(assumedtobe3.47E-4m'/sec);fistheaveragerelativeconcentrationinthecontrolroombasedonthein-leakage,filtration,andtotalvolumeofthecontrolroom(seeTable3);Q;isthecuriequantityinthecontainmentavailableforleakage;

'wf>>;istheadultthyroidinhalationdosefactorfortheisotope;andnisthenumberofiodineisotopes.Thewholebodydoseconservativelycombinesboththegammaandbetacontributionsinthefollowingrelationshipforasemi-infiniteplume:tlnDb=Xlg[023QgBp'25QgB]llllwhereBandB,aretheaveragebetaandgammaenergiesinunitsofmevperdisintegration.ValuesfortheseparametersaregiveninTable4.5.0RESULTSTheresultsoftheanalysisforthevariouscombinationsareprovidedinTable3.Thethreecaseswhichwererunaredescribedbelowwiththedifferencesbetweenthethreecasesstrictlyduetoassumptionswithrespecttothecontrolroomventilationconfigurations:5.1Qase1Thecontrolroomwasassumedtobeinthenormalconfigurationatthetimeofthefuelhandlingaccident.Thisresultsin2000cfmofunfilteredairbeingtakenintothecontrolroomforthefirst30secondsfollowingthefuelhandlingaccidentuntilthecontrolroomisisolatedandthesystemswitchestoemergencyrecirculationmodewithairbeingforcedthroughacharcoalsystem.5.2Qgse2Thecontrolroomwasassumedtobeisolatedpriortothefuelhandlingaccidentandsubsequentlyplacedintherecirculationmode.5.3~se3Thecontrolroomwasassumedtobeisolatedpriortothefuelhandlingaccidentwiththerecirculationmodeunavailable.TheresultsfromeachofthesecasesdemonstratethattheEABdosesremainfarbelowtheSRPrequirementsof75rematthethyroidandthatthecontrolroomdosesremainfarbelowthelimitsofGeneralDesignCriteria19of30remthyroid.

TABLE1.CONCENTRATIONCOEFFICIENTS(K)VALUESFORGINNACONTROLROOMGIVENARELEASEATTHEEQUIPMENTHATCHWINDDIRECTION,8INDSFRO3.022.54567.590112.5135157.5180202.5225247.5270292.5315337.5ReferenceArea,A=2964m'eferenceHeightforWind=36mAGL4.50.00.00.00.00.00.00.3752.254.52.251.50.750.3750.0 TABLE2.FUELGAPINVENTORYRELEASEDATTIMEOFGINNAFUELHANDLINGACCIDENT(100HoursAfterShutdown)ISOTOPEI-131I-132I-133I-134I-135Kr-85mKr-85Kr-87Kr-88Xe-131mXe-133mXe-133Xe-135mXe-135Xe-138CURIESRELEASEDTOREACTORCAVITYORSPENTFUELPOOLWATER5.16E+04Negligible4.50E+03Negligible3.22E+003.12E-031.72E+03NegligibleNegligible6.35E+021.55E+03,8.33E+045.16E-011.56E+02NegligibleCURIESRELEASEDTOCONTAINMENTATMOSPHERE5.16E+02Negligible4.50E+01Negligible3.22E-023.12E-031.72E+03NegligibleNegligible6.35E+021.55E+038.33E+045.16E-011.56E+02Negligible 4$'.laiCl TABLE3.ASSUMPTIONSFORGINNAFUELHANDLINGACCIDENTINSIDECONTAINMENTCASE1CASE2CASE3ContainmentVolume(ft')ContainmentLeakRateDuringFirst3min(cfm)ContainmentLeakRateDuringLast117min(cfm)ControlRoomIn-Leakage(cfm)ControlRoomVolume(ft)ControlRoomRecirculationRate(cfm)1.0E61.0E61.0E682408240824032032032046464645,78445,78445,784200020000IodineFilterEfficiency-elemental(rem)-organic(rem)0.90.70.90.70.90.7FractionofIodinethatis-elemental(rem)-organic(rem)Initial(30sec)ControlRoomFlow(cfm)BreathingRate(m'/sec)EABX/Q(sec/m')ControlRoomIntakeX/Q(sec/m')WholeBodyDose(P+y)-EAB(rem)-ControlRoom(rem)ThyroidDose-EAB(rem)-'ontrolRoom(rem)0.750.750.750.250.250.25200003.47E-43.47E-43.47E-44.8E-44.8E-44.8E-44.8E-44.8E-44.8E-40.120.120.120.050.0070.0078.18.18.10.790.160.538 TABLE4.ISOTOPICDATAFORFUELHANDLINGACCIDENTISOTOPEI-131I-132I-133I-134I-135Kr-85mKr-85Kr-87Kr-88Xe-131mXe-133mXe-133Xe-135mXe-135Xe-138EpV/DIS1.91E-14.90E-14.09E-16.08E-13.69E-12.70E-12.70E-l1.42EO4.00E-11.50E-12.00E-11.40E-11.00E-l3.40E-16.50E-1EV/DIS3.80E-12.29EO6.07E-12.63EO1.57EO1.56E-12.20E-37.84E-11.93EO1.98E-24.16E-24.48E-24.28E-12.44E-11.17EOTHYROIDDOSEFACTORM/C1.48E65.35E44.05ES2.50E41.24E5

~roe' Ig~~rrmm,T;rQoei~~tg~~mvurreC Figure2-X/QUsing1992-1994MeteorologicalData100.0010.00aA<<9'.A:F>":::(C,.:XCCa:XC'?>?X,!.YFXXX'<<A<<F'!XCCXCC>>2CAX.'>>.::8"X(2>.XXXXX'XXCC>.0c501.00CXj>X"..A":!>2A.nXC>XXXf(F".CQ?";".~:'.XXC!XCfP!X>X>n~a'2!hVAFDXXX>2>>>C!'9:XXXXX:9axjxaxf<<C:22:X:fi>x!3j?A:9,vj>3c>;X3CjX<<R!332$2'XXjj?2'9(:>XCB2C:c.(ac>'aAcF!>>".c'fi!3!PX:29%2C29:229CX:0.10322C'AX'ACX::CCf.F'A'F<<9>2>A">.222>Cf>293>'i2'>MA>,>9!22!A..'N(>>>F>>2XC1.00E-061.00E-051.00E-04X/Qsec/m~1.00E-031.00E-021/15/9625851hours36mrelease