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1998 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted W/O Prior Approval for Aug 1996 Through Dec 1997 Under Provisions of 10CFR50.59.
	ML17265A298
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Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/31/1997
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1998REPORTOFFACILITYCHANGES,TESTS,ANDEXPERIMENTSCONDUCTEDWITHOUTPRIORAPPROVALFORAUGUST1996THROUGHDECEMBER1997UNDERTHEPROVISIONSOF10CFR50.59R.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTDOCKET-NO.50-244ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONDATEDMAY21,1998'P8052802i39'80521PDRADQCK05000244RPDR SEV-105718MONTHFUELCYCLEForeconomicaloperationofan18MonthFuelCyclecorepeakingfactorsneededtobeincreased.ThisrequiresreanalysisofseveraloftheUFSARChapter15transients.Sincethetransientswerebeingreanalyzedandthesteamgeneiatorsarebeingreplaceditisappropriatetoincludethecharacteristicsofthenewsteamgeneratorsintheanalysis.Sincethenewsteamgenerators(RSGs)producehighersteampressureoperationatareducedTavgwouldbeeconomicallybeneficial.Therefore,thechangesbeingincorporatedintothe18MonthFuelCycleare:~increasedcorepeakingfactors~incorporationoftheRSGs~TavgwindowThisevaluationwaspreviouslysubmittedwiththe199610CFR50.59(b)submittalandisbeingrevisedtoincludethefollowing:AnalysisandStandardReviewPlansupportanupperlimitof10.5pHoncontainmentsprayvs.theWestinghouseguidelineof10.0pH.Thehigherlimitwouldallowwideningtherangeonsodiumhydroxideconcentration.Increasedpeakingfactors,Tavgwindow,andcharacteristicsoftheBWISGdonotaffecttheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentormalfunction.Theyareassumptionsusedincalculatingtheconsequencesofanaccident.TheTavgwindowwouldallowoperationataTavgofupto15'FlowerthanthecurrentTavg.ThissmallreductioninTavgdoesnotaffecttheprobabilityofanaccident.Thechangesassociatedwiththisevaluationhavebeenincorporatedintothecalculationofaccidentormalfunctionconsequences.Theconsequencesmeettherequiredacceptancecriteria,thustheconsequencesareacceptable.TheStandardReviewPlanupperpHlimitof10.5resultsinanacceptableprobabilityofequipmentmalfunctionorfailure.Therefore,replacingtheWestinghouseguidelineof10.0withtheStandardReviewPlanvalueof10.5isconsistentwiththeprobabilityofmalfunctionorfailuretoacceptableStandardReviewPlanvalues.Anincreaseintheprobabilityofmalfunctionorfailureonlyresultswhenthe10.5pHvalueisexceeded.Thenatureofthechangesaddressedbythissafetyevaluationcannotcauseanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangesonlyeffecttheconsequences.Thechangesaddressedbythissafetyevaluationdonotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationbecausetheanalysisoftheaccidentconsequencesmeettherequiredacceptancecriteria.Sinceallacceptancecriterionaremetthereisnoreductioninthemarginofsafety.

SEV-1065USEOFMAINFEEDWATERPUMPBREAKERTESTPOSITIONFORIMPROVEDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONTABLE3.3.2-1FUNCTION6.FImprovedTechnicalSpecification(ITS)Table3.3.2-1,Function6.frequiresthatthemotor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwater(MDAFW)pumpsbecapableofbeingstartedduringMODES1and2uponopeningofbothmainfeedwater(MFW)pumpbreakers.However,duringMODE2,neitherMFWpumpistypicallyinserviceuntilapproximately4%,RTP.Therefore,thepurposeofthissafetyevaluation(SEV)istoevaluatetheuseoftheMFWpumpbreakertestpositionasasufficientmeanstomeettherequirementsofITSTable3.3.2-1,Function6.funderconditionswhenMFWisnotinservice.ThisSEVwillalsoserveasthebasisforanITSbaseschangetoreflecttheuseoftheMFWpumpbreakertestposition.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveanincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.TheMFWpumpbreakerpositiononlyimpactstheactuationoftheMDAFWpumpsandthemainfeedwaterpumpdischargevalves(MFPDVs).Thisequipmentisonlyusedforaccidentmitigationpurposes;therefore,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Also,'forbothsetsofequipment,ithasbeendemonstratedthattheaccidentanalyses(i.e.,SGTRandMFWandmainsteamlinebreaks)arenotadverselyimpacted.Assuch,thereisnoincreaseintheconsequencesofanaccident.TheuseoftheMFWpumpbreakerinthetestpositiondoesnotinvolveachangetotheparameterswithinwhichtheplantisnormallyoperatedorinthesetpointswhichinitiateprotectiveormitigativeactions.Thereisalsononewequipmentbeingpermanentlyinstalledasthebreakertestpositioncurrentlyexistsandhasbeenpreviouslyutilized.Theuseofthetemporaryjumpersdoesnothaveadetrimentalimpactonthemannerinwhichplantequipmentoperatesorrespondstoananalyzedevent.Assuch,nonewfailuremodesarebeingintroduced.Inaddition,thechangedoesnotalterassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisandlicensingbasis.Therefore,thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Themarginofsafetyisdefinedbythedifferencebetweenthelimitsbasedontruedesignandqualificationofplantequipment(i.e.,pointofequipmentfailurewithoutanyconservatismapplied)andthelimitsimposedbyanalysisorNRCregulations.ThepointatwhichprotectiveormitigativeactionsareinitiatedmustensurethattheanalyticalorNRCimposedlimitisnotexceededandthusreducethespecifiedmarginofsafety.TheproposeduseoftheMFWpumpbreakerinthetestpositioninordertomeetITSTable3.3.2-1,Function6.frequirementsdoesnotimpactthesefactors.Therearenoequipmentperformanceparameterchangesassociatedwiththischange.Nosetpointsareaffected,andnochangeisbeingproposedintheplantoperationallimitsasaresultofthischange.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveareductioninthemarginofsafety.

SEV-1072REPLACEMENTOFMOTORVALVEOPERATORSFORVALVES852AAND852BThisevaluationaddressesupgradeofthemotorsforthecoredelugemotoroperatedvalves852Aand852B.Specifically:1)Replacementofbreaker52/852AatMCCCposition7J.2)Replacementofbreaker52/852BatMCCDposition7J..3)Replacementofthecurrentenvironmentallyqualifiedmotorsforvalves852Aand852B(460V,60ft-lbs,1800rpm)withnewenvironmentallyqualifiedmotorsratedfor460V,60ft-lbs,3600rpm.4)Replacementofallexistinginterconnecting10gaugecablefromtheMCCtothevalvemotorwithnew2gaugecable.Allnewcableandsplicesincontainmentareenvironmentallyqualified.5)TherevisedcableroutingwillutilizecontainmentpenetrationsAE-6andCE-20inlieuofthecurrentpenetrationsAE-3andCE-23.6)Changingoftheexistinggearsonthevalveoperatorstoincreasethegearratiofromthecurrent27.2:1to60.15:1.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanyaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Thechangesevaluatedheredonotincreasetheprobabilityoffailureofanyequipmentimportanttosafety.Bymaintainingthedesignbasisofallsystemsthepotentialconsequences'faccidentsevaluatedintheUFSARareunchanged.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?Theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobabilityofanysystemfailurethatcouldinitiateanaccident,andthereforethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARcannotbecreatedasaresultofthischange.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?TheproposedchangesdonotaffectthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecification.Thereforethemarginofsafetyisnotreduced.

00 SEV-1073MDAFWDISCHARGEVALVESThepurposeofthissafetyevaluation(SEV)isasfollows:Determineifmanualactionsareadequatetomeetmotor-drivenAuxiliaryFeedwater(MDAFW)requirementswithreactorpower~5%(i.e.,inMODES2and3).Specifically,thisSEVdocumentstheacceptabilityofmanuallyopeningandthrottlingMOVs4007and4008duringMODEs2and3.b.Determineifsettingtheflowcontrollogicfor4007and4008priortoMODE1isacceptablesincesteamgenerator(SG)pressuresaredifferentbetweenlowpowerandfullpowerconditions.DetermineifdelayingAFWflowinjectionintotheSGsfor10minutesduringadesignbasisaccidentortransientinMODE1isacceptable.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveanincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.TheAFWSystemisonlyusedtomitigatetheconsequencesofanaccident,andassuch,theproposeduseof4007and4008doesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccident.AllaccidentsandtransientswhichcredittheuseofAFWhavebeenreviewedtodeterminethattheexistingUFSARanalysesremainbounding.Therefore,thereisnoincreaseintheconsequencesofanyanalyzedaccident.Theproposeduseof4007and4008willnotaddanynewequipmenttoGinnaStationanddoesnotresultinanychangestoinstalledcontrolcircuitry.Thereisnoalterationtotheparameters'ithinwhichtheplantisnormallyoperatedorinthesetpointswhichinitiateprotectiveormitigativeactions.Thechangesdonothaveadetrimentalimpactonthemannerinwhichplantequipmentoperatesorrespondstoananalyzedevent.Assuch,nonewfailuremodesarebeingintroduced.Inaddition,thechangedoesnotalterassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisandlicensingbasis.Therefore,thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Themarginofsafetyisdefinedbythedifferencebetweenlimitsbasedontruedesignandqualificationofplantequipment(i.e.,pointofequipmentfailurewithoutanyconservatismapplied)andthelimitsimposedbyanalysisorNRCregulations.ThepointatwhichprotectiveormitigativeactionsareinitiatedmustensurethattheanalyticalorNRCimposedlimitisnotexceededandthusreducethespecifiedmarginofsafety.TheproposeduseoftheAFWdischargevalvesdoesnotimpactthesefactors.TherearenoequipmentperformanceparameterchangesassociatedwiththisSEV.Nosetpointsareaffected,andnochangeisbeingproposedintheplantoperationallimitsasaresultofthischange.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveareductioninthemarginofsafety.

0 SEV-1074THROTTLINGOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMVALVES4011AND4012Thisevaluationaddressespositioningoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemvalves4011and4012inathrottled(lessthanfullopen)position.Thepurposeofthischangeistoprovideadditionalhydraulicresistanceinthemotordrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpdeliverylinestolowerthepressuredropacrosstheflowcontrolvalves4007,4008whichwillimprovetheflowcontrolcharacteristicsofthesevalves.Thethrottlepositionwillbedeterminedasfollows:Athotzeropowerconditions(Sgpressure=1005psig)amotordrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpwillbestarted.2)Bymanualoperationoftheassociatedmotoroperatedflowcontrolvalve(4007or4008)andthemanualglobevalve(4011or4012)aflowof240gpmwillbeestablishedwiththeassociatedMOV(4007or4008)inthefullopenposition.3)Theassociatedmanualvalvewillbesecuredinthisposition.WilltheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanyaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbeincreased?Thechangesevaluatedheredonotincreasetheprobabilityoffailureofanyequipmentimportanttosafety.BymaintainingthedesignbasisofallsystemsthepotentialconsequencesofaccidentsevaluatedintheUFSARareunchanged.WillthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecreated?TheproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobabilityofanysystemfailurethatcouldinitiateanaccidentinthatthedesignrequirementscontinuetobemetandthereforethepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARcannotbecreatedasaresultofthischange.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationbereduced?TheproposedchangesdonotaffectthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecification.Thereforethemarginofsafetyisnotreduced.

SEV-1075REPOSITIONINGVALVES880BAND880CTheSafetyInjectionAccumulatorsarelosinglevelthroughreliefvalve887tothePressurizerReliefTankatarateof.07GPM.Thisrequirestheaccumulatorstobefilled.twotimesadaytomaintaintherequiredTechnicalSpecificationminimumlevel.Nonintrusivemethodstoseatthereliefvalveand/orAOV's839A,839B,840Aand840Bhavebeenunsuccessful.Replacementofthereliefvalvewouldrequiretheplanttobeincoldshutdow'nsincethevalveislocatedinsidethemissilewalladjacenttothepressurizerandisunisolatablefromtheSafetyInjectionsystem.Thisproposedchangewouldclosethenormallylockedopen880Band880Cvalvestoisolatethereliefvalvefromtheaccumulators,thusremovingtheoverpressureprotectioncapacityfortheclass1501pipingbetweenthetestlineAOV'sandthe880valves.ThischangeisbeingimplementedtoreduceunnecessarystartsandruntimeoftheSafetyInjectionPumpswhicharerequiredtofilltheaccumulators.ThischangewastemporaryinnatureuntilanappropriatetimewhenRV887couldberepairedorreplaced.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthe'UFSARarenotincreasedbythischangebecauseoperationanddesignoftheSafetyInjectionsystemhasnotchanged.Thetestlineisnormallyisolatedduringoperationandisnotcreditedduringsafetyinjection.Thevalvesaremanualandhavenoautomaticactionsandarenotmanipulatedorrelieduponbyoperationsforanyevents.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARwillnotbecreatedbythischangebecausethischangedoesnotchangedesignoroperationoftheSafetyInjectionsystem.ThedesignpressurecapabilityoftheportionofpipingwhichcouldbeexposedtoRCSpressurehasbeenshowntobeadequate.ThereliefcapabilityoftheSafetyInjectiondischargepipingandtestlinedownstreamofvalves880Band880CisstillpreservedbyRV887and,hence,noneweventiscreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotchangedbytherepositioningofthesevalvesbecausealltechnicalspecificationsrequirementsarestillsatisfied.

SEV-1076SAFETYINJECTIONPUMPTESTINGWITHSITESTLINEOPENThepurposeofthissafetyevaluationistodeterminetheeffectonhighheadsafetyinjectionflowduringtheperiodictestingphaseduringwhichthe3/4-inchSItestlinesareintheopenposition.Duringnormalplantoperation,thetestlinesareclosed,i.e.valves879,879C,and884areclosed.TheSItestlinesaredepictedonPAID33013-1262,Sheets1and2.TSR96-122wasinitiatedtodeterminetheeffectonflowdeliverytotheRCSbythehighheadsafetyinjectionsystemduringaccidentconditions.EachSItraincontainsa3/4-inchtestlineinsidethecontainmentboundarythatbranchesfromthemain4-inchSIinjectionline,arethenheaderedtogether,passthroughthreemanualvalves,andultimatelytiebacktothenormalpumpmini-flowrecirculationsystem's2-inchlinethatleadstotheRWST.Thenormalsystemconfigurationisnotbeingchanged,sinceSItestlineswillcontinuetobeclosedduringoperationotherthanperiodictesting.DuringperiodictestingoftheSIpumps,thetestlinemanualvalvesareopenedinordertoincreasetheflowoftheSIpumpto150gpm.ThatvaluewaschosenbyRGEcEinordertoattempttominimizethepotentialforagerelateddegradationofthepumpsduringtheirtesting.Thepumpvendorrecommendedaflowof1/3ofBEP(bestefficiencypoint)flowforcontinuousoperation,whichwouldcorrespondto150gpm.Althoughthetestingcertainlydoesnotconstitutecontinuousoperation,itwaschosenasaconservativevalue,andthesystemcouldaccommodatethatflowbyopeningthetestline.Thenormalrecirculationsystemwasdesignedtoprovidearecirculationflownearbutnottoexceed100gpm,andcurrentlyprovidesintheorderof90gpm,usingafixedorifice.(ThemaximumvaluewasestablishedinordertoensuretherequiredSIdeliverytotheRCSduringdesignbasisaccidents).Openingthetestlineandthrottlingtheflowthroughthetestlineusingvalve884enablesarecirculatedflowrateof150gpmtobeachievedduringtesting.OpeningtheSItestlineduringperiodictestingprovidesanadditionalbypassfortheotherSItrainsshouldtheyreceiveastartsignal,sincethetestlineforeachofthetwoSIinjectionlinesareheaderedtogetherandarenotindependent.Therefore,adesignbasisaccidentoccurringduringtheperiodictestingofanSIpump,effectivelycausesaplantconfigurationthatallowsmorebypassflowfromeachoftheotherSIpumps,toberecirculatedthanwaspreviouslyassumed,andnotbeavailableforsafetyinjectionduringtheevent.Thecurrentaccidentanalyses,however,allowedadditionalmarginon-SIdelivery,andthisevaluationwilldemonstratethatthedeliveryrequirementsarestillacceptablewiththeSItestlineopen.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceorconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreasedbytheoperationoftheSItestlineopenduringtestingoftheSIpumpsorsystem.Consequencesarenotincreased,becausetwoSIpumpsarestillavailableandoperableduringapostulatedeventiftheeventweretooccurduringatestingevolution.Thisisconsistentwiththenumberofpumpsassumedavailableintheaccidentanalysis.DuringtestingwithasinglepumpoutofserviceandtheSItestlineopentotheredundanttrain,anothersinglefailureisnotrequiredtobeassumed.The e

openSItestlinewouldprovideaflowpath'fortheothertwoSIpumpsinthatsituation.TheeffectsoftheopenSItestlineontheflowdeliveredtotheRCSduringsuchaconfigurationhasbeendeterminedtobestillboundedbythevaluestabulatedintheCOLRforMSLB.ForSBLOCAeventsithasbeendeterminedthatthetotaldeliveredflowtotheRCSisonly3.3gallonsoutof842.2gallonslessthanthevolumesassumedtobedeliveredintheaccidentanalysis.Thisamount(0.4%)wouldresultinanindistinquisablechangeinthepeakcladtemperaturefortheworstcaseSBLOCA.Sincetheanalyzed'PCTwasdeterminedtobe1308.Fascomparedto.the10CFR50.46criteriaof2200'F,consequencesarenotincreased.Thesecaseswerebaseduponaassumed5%SIpumpdegradationand,therefore,a5%degradationmaybeutilizedasthepumptestlimitduringPTtestingwiththeSItestlineopen.Probabilityisnotincreased,becausetheSItestlineisassociatedwithsystemwhichperforms'anaccidentmitigationfunction.Thepressureboundarycapabilityofthetestlineisnotbeingaltered,therefore,thesafetyfunctionofthetestlineisnotaffected.ItshouldbenotedthattheprobabilityofoccurrenceoftheTypeIeventssuchasSBLOCAandMSLBisintheorderof7x10'/year.Operationwiththetestlineopenoccursduringquarterlypumptestsoneachofthreepumpsforaconservativelyestimateddurationof2hourspertest.Othersystemtestingthroughouttheyearconservativelymayaccountforadditionalruntimewiththetestlineopen.'Alltogether,theplantoperatesconservativelyintheorderof50hoursoutofan8000houryearwiththetestlineopen,thusreducingtheprobabilityofoccurrencebyafactorof0.006.ThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARisnotcreatedbytheperformanceofSIpumporsystemtestingwiththeSItestlineopen.Thetestlineisdesignedtoperformitsfunctionduringtestingwiththeplantatpower.Thepressureimposedonthetestlinesystemisnotchanged.TheadditionalrecirculatedflowrateasaresultofthetestlinebeingopenhasbeenevaluatedonthecapabilityoftheSIsystemtodelivertherequiredvolumeofwaterduringthetimefollowingapostulatedtransienttoprovidecorecooling,maintainpeakcladtemperaturewithinlimits,maintaincoreresponsewithinlimits,andmaintaincontainmentpressurewithinlimits.ThepositionofthevalvesinthetestlinearenotbeingalteredduringplantoperationwhentheSIpumpsarenotbeingtested,i.e.theywillremainintheclosedposition.Therefore,thereisnonewtypeofaccidentcreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedwhileinaconfigurationwiththeSItestlineopenduringSIpumporsystemtests.TheTechnicalSpecificationbasisdoesnotincludethespecificflowdeliveryrequiredbythesafetyinjectionsystem,however,theflowrateisanassumptioninthetransientanalyses.Thetransientanalysesassumea5%degradedpumpperformance,andtheresultingdeliveredvolumeperunittime(aftersubtractingthenormalrecirculationflow)isutilizedintheanalyses.TheflowratesassumedaretabulatedintheCOLR.ThesevalueswerederivedutilizingtheKypipecomputermodelfortheECCS,therefore,theeffectsonsystemflowrateprovidedinthissafetyevaluationareconsistentwiththeCOLRandaccidentanalysismethodology.TheUFSARsection6.3.5.2identifiesavalueof1356psigtotaldevelopedpressure(differentialbetweendischargeandsuctionpressure)astheacceptablelimitofperformanceoftheSIpumpsat150gpm.ThatvaluewasbasedonthecalculationsreferencedinanearlierTechnicalSpecificationAmendment(No.33),andwasbaseduponapumpperformancethatwasassumedtobedegraded3%.The 0e existingaccidentanalysesassume5%degradationplusadditionalmargin.Ithasbeenshownthatanassumed5%degradation,includingtheeffectsofanopenSItestline,canstillmeetthedeliveryrequirementsforMSLBandwouldproduceaninsignificantchangeintheanalysesforSBLOCA.Therefore,section6.3.5.2oftheUFSARmaybeupdatedthroughthenormalUFSARupdateprocesstoreflecttheresultsofthisevaluationonthepumpperformancelimit.Sincetheeffectoftheincreasedbypassflowisstillboundedbytheexistinganalyses,thereisnoreductioninthemarginofsafety.

SEV-1077USEOFHYDROPUMPONSAFETYINJECTIONPUMPDISCHARGELINEINMODES1-4DuetovalveleakagewithintheSafetyInjection(SI)System,theaccumulatorsareexperiencingleakageproblemsrequiringthemtobefrequentlyfilledinordertomeettechnicalspecificationlimitsforvolumeandlevel.TheaccumulatorsarenormallyfilledviaSIPumpB.orC.However,topreventthepotentialfordegradationoftheSIpumpsandmotorsfromfrequentstartsandstops,andtoallowforanalternativemeanstofilltheaccumulators,a10gpmhydropumpwillbetemporarilyinstalledonthedischargelinefromSIPumpBinordertofilltheleakingaccumulators.Theaccumulatorrangeoflevelis'between50%and82%perLCO3.5.1ofTechnicalSpecifications.Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluation(SEV)istodocumenttheacceptanceofinstallingandusingthishydropumpinMODES1,2,3,and4.Specifically,thefollowingwillbetemporarilyperformed:a.Apositivedisplacementhydropumppoweredfromanon-safetyrelatedsourcewithasafetyclass2checkvalvelocateddownstreamofthepumpwillbeinstalledontheSIPumpBdischargeline;andb.,AredundantmanualisolationvalvewithtubingwillbeinstalledontheSIpumpssuctionlinefromtheRWSTtoprovideasuctionsourceforthepump.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveanincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theaffectedsystemsareonlyusedforaccidentmitigationpurposes;therefore,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Also,bothContainmentandSafetyInjectionSystemshavebeendemonstratedtoremainoperableandcapableofperformingtheirrequiredsafetyfunction.Assuch,thereisnoincreaseintheconsequencesofanaccident.Theuseofthehydropumpdoesnotinvolveachangetotheparameterswithinwhichtheplantisnormallyoperatedorinthesetpointswhichinitiateprotectiveormitigativeactions.ThereisalsononewequipmentbeingpermanentlyinstalledsincethehydropumpwillnormallyremainisolatedfromtheSISystemwhennotinuseandisbeinginstalledasatemporarymodification.Theuseofthehydropumponatemporarybasisdoesnothaveadetrimentalimpactonthemannerinwhichplantequipmentoperatesorrespondstoananalyzedevent.Assuch,nonewfailuremodesarebeingintroduced.Inaddition,thechangedoesnotalterassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisandlicensingbasis.Therefore,thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Themarginofsafetyisdefinedbythedifferencebetweenthelimitsbasedontruedesignandqualificationofplantequipment(i.e.,pointofequipmentfailurewithoutanyconservatismapplied)andthelimitsimposedbyanalysisorNRCregulations.ThepointatwhichprotectiveormitigativeactionsareinitiatedmustensurethattheanalyticalorNRCimposedlimitisnotexceededandthusreducethespecifiedmarginofsafety.Theproposeduseofthehydropump10 doesnotimpactthesefactors.Therearenoequipmentperformanceparameterchangesassociatedwiththischange.Nosetpointsareaffected,andnochangeisbeingproposedintheplantoperationallimitsasaresultofthischange.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveareductioninthemarginofsafety.11

SEV-1080SURFACEMOUNTEDPUSHBUTTONSONDBBREAKERCUBICLESThissafetyevaluationreviewsthemodificationofinstallingsurfacemountedpush-buttonswitchesonDBbreakercubicledoorsfor480Vbuses13,15,14,16,17and18.Theexistingpush-buttonswitchesprotrudeintothebreakercubiclecausingmechanicalinterferencewiththeamptectorsmountedontheDBbreakers.Themodificationistoinstallasurfacemountedenclosurewithpush-buttonswitches(switchassembly).Thepush-buttonswitchesprovidelocalcloseandtripcapabilitiesfortheDBbreaker.Installingsurfacemountedswitchassemblieswillmaintainthisoperationalfeature.ThismodificationhasbeenpreviouslyanalyzedbyEWR4225SafetyAnalysis,butonlyfor'uses17and18.Thisanalysiswillcoverbuses13,15,14,16,17and18.Thismodificationdoesnotintroduceanynewcomponentinteractionsorfailuremodes.Aftercompletionofthischangethebreakerswillfunctionexactlyasbeforethemodification.ItcanthereforebeconcludedtheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.ThepossibilityforintroducinganaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotcreatedbecause:aftercompletionoftheproposedmodificationtheDBbreakerswillfunctioninthesamemannerasbeforethechange,nonewcomponent/functions/interactionsarebeingaddedorexistinginterfacesremovedthefunctions,andmethodsofaccomplishingthosefunctionsofthestandbyauxiliaryfeedwatersystemremainunchangedThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforthestandbyauxiliaryfeedwatersystemisnotreducedbecausetherearenospecific.technicalspecificationsassociatedwiththeDBbreakerlocalcloseandtrippush-buttons.TheStandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpshavetechnicalspecificationoperability,requirements.Thoserequirementsareunchangedbythismodification.12 0

SEV-1081REPLACEMENTOFGINNAMAINTRANSFORMERThechangeassessedbythissafetyevaluationinvolvesreplacingtheexistingMainTransformerwiththespare,currentlystoredatstation13A.Thischangeinvolvesmodificationofnon-nuclearsafetyequipmentthathasinteractionwithequipmentimportanttosafety.Thereplacementtransformeristhefunctionalequivalentoftheold.ThedetailsofthetechnicaldifferencesarebeyondthelevelofdetaildescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Thetransformerchangeoutissignificant,inthattheactivitiesassociatedwithperformingthechangecouldaffectequipmentimportanttosafety.Thepurposeofthissafetyanalysisistoexaminetheintegratedeffectsassociatedwith'hemodification.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARarenotincreasedbythisproposedchange.Thischangeinvolvescomponentsinthepowergenerationportionoftheoffsitepowersystem.Themaintransformerisnotcreditedasanemergencypowersupplytoequipmentimportanttosafety.Safetyrelatedcomponentsnecessarytomaintainsafeshutdown(aconditionalreadyachieved)willremainoperablewithpoweravailablefromtheEDGsorindependentoffsitesources.ThisisnodifferentthentheconditionsestablishedduringanormaloutageandiswithintheparametersestablishedbytheSAR.Managementoftheloadtransferpathsandpreservationofalternativeshutdownfeatureswillensurethatadroppedloadwillnotcausethelossofasafeshutdownfunction.ThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.'Becausetheplantisinshutdownwhenthechangesoccuritisnotpossibletocreateanewtypeofaccident.PMalfunctionsaffectingshutdowncoolingorlossofcoolantaccidentsarethedominatecontributorstofueldamagewhenshutdown.TheeffectedequipmentusedtomanagetheseissueswillhavepositivecontrolandpoweravailablethroughtheEDGsorthefunctionwillbepreservedbyapreviouslyevaluatedalternativemethods.Theequipmentassociatedwiththischangeisnotutilizedasthebasisforanymarginsofsafetydefinedintechnicalspecifications.13 I0e SEV-1082SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMLOWERSUCTIONThepurposeofthisevaluationistoallowuseofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystem(SFPCS)lowersuctiontapwhennecessarywhileoperatingonthe"A"SFPCtrain.Forexample,whenmaintenanceneedstobeperformedontheskimmerSFPlevelmustbelowered.Whenthisoccurs,theuppersuctionwillbeabovethewaterlevel.However,thePAIDstatesthatthelowersuctionvalve(Valve782)shallbelockedclosedperprocedureif"A"SFPCHxisinservice.Areviewofoldoperatingproceduresindicatedthatthepreferredoperatingline-upwasusingtheuppersuctionwiththelowersuctionclosed.Thelowersuctioncouldbeusedifnecessarybutwasnotpreferred.In1985thelowersuction(Valve782)wasgivenlockedstatus.LaterduringtheP&IDupgradeprojectthenotewasplacedonthePAID:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveanincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theuseofthelowersuctionwiththerestrictionontheamount-ofleveldecreaseallowsforgreatermargintosuctionuncoveryandensuresthatheatuptimeonlossofcoolingismaintainedwithincurrentbasislimit.Theproposeduseofthelowersuctiondoesnotaddanynewequipmentanddoesnotresultinanychangestoinstalledcontrolcircuitry.Therearenoalterationtoparameterswithinwhichtheplantisnormallyoperating(poolleveldiscussedabove)orinthesetpointswhichinitiateprotectiveormitigativeactions.Therefore,usingthelowersuctiondoesnotcreatethe'ossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedbecausewiththelimitationonSFPleveldecreaseassuresthattheSFPheatuptimeisgreaterthanthecurrentdesignbasisvalue.Alsothebulkpooltemperaturelimitof150'Fisstillmet.14 SEV-1084REVERSALOFPOWERANDCONTROLCIRCUITSFORPRESSURIZERPORVBLOCKVALVESMOV515AND516Actionreport96-1009identifiedaconditionwherebythepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)andtheirassociatedblockvalvescouldbealignedsuchthatasingledirectcurrent(DC)powersystemfailurewoulddegradetheabilitytomitigateasteamgeneratortuberupture.TheproposedchangereviewedbythissafetyanalysisconsistsofswappingthepowerandcontrolcablingforMOVs515and516.CompletionofthischangewillestablishaPORV/BlockvalvecontrolconfigurationwhichcannotberenderedinoperabletocompleteitsrequiredopenfunctionfromasingleDCpowerfailure.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARarenotincreasedbythisproposedchange.Thischangebringstheplantintoconformancewiththeaccidentanalysis(singlefailureresistantwithrespecttoPORVoperationandmalfunction).BecausethechangeaddressedbytheproposedmodificationdoesnotinfluencethefrequencyofSGtuberupturesitcannotchangetheprobabilityofoccurrenceoftheevent.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotaffecttheactuationcircuitryofthePORVshenceitwillnotchangetheprobabilityofaspuriousvalveactuation.TheproposedchangecreatesnonewequipmentinteractionsnordoesitremovetheabilitytoaccomplishanyoftheequipmentfunctionsdetailedorassumedintheSAR.AftercompletionofthechangethePORV/Blockvalveswillfunctionasassumedinthesafetyanalysisreport.Theproposedchangedoesnotaddanynewequipmentnordoesitchangetheexistingequipmentfunctions.ThischangeresultsinconformancewiththeassumptionsdetailedintheSARandcannotcauseanincreaseintheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunction.ThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.Theequipmentaffectedbytheproposedchangeisinvolvedinaccidentandtransientmitigation.Therearenofailuremodeswhichcanbeconsideredprecursorstoanaccidentnorarethereanymalfunctionswhicharedifferentthanthosepreviouslyevaluated.Aftercompletionoftheproposedmodificationtheaffectedequipmentwillfunctionasdescribedinthetechnicalspecificationbasis.Becausetheequipmentassociatedwiththischangewillfunctionexactlyasrequiredinthetechnicalspecificationsnomarginsforsafetywillbereduced.15 SEV-1086REMOVALOFSERVICEWATERREMOTECONTROLSWITCHESFROMCONTROLCIRCUITSActionReport96-1125identifiesthepotentialforahighenergylinebreak(HELB)intheIntermediateBuilding(includingthosebreaksintheTurbineBuildingneartheIntermediateBuildingblockwall)tofailallDCcontrolpowertotheServiceWater(SW)pumps.Specifically,localcontrolswitchesandpushbuttonsforallfourSWpumpsarelocatedontheturbine-drivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpshieldwallneartheIntermediateBuildingnorthblockwall.Theconduitssupplyingthesedevicesarerunthroughcabletrayslocatednearthesameblockwall.IfamainsteamormainfeedwaterlinebreakweretooccurintheIntermediateorTurbineBuildings,thesubjectblockwallisexpectedtocollapseasadirectresultofthe,HELBpotentiallyimpactingtheswitches,pushbuttons,andassociatedwiring.ThisinturncouldfailallDCcontrolpowertotheSWpumpssuchthatfollowingacoincidentlossofoffsitepower(LOOP),noSWflowwouldbeautomaticallystartedtoprovidenecessarycoolingwatertothedieselgenerators(DGs).PCR96-121proposestoresolvethisconcernbyremovinguseofthecontrolswitchesandpushbuttonslocatedintheIntermediateBuildingbyperformingsplicesinthecabletunnelthatwillbypasstheswitchcircuitry.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveanincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThischangeremovesthepotentialneedforoperatoractiontolocallystarttheSWpumpsintheScreenhousefollowingaHELBintheIntermediateorTurbineBuildings.TheuseofthecontrolswitchesandpushbuttonsintheIntermediateBuildingisnotassumedinanyaccidentanalysis.Therefore,thereisnoincreaseintheconsequencesofanevent.TheSWpumpsareonlyusedforaccidentmitigationpurposes;therefore,thereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangewillnotaddanynewequipmenttoGinnaStation;however,currentlyin'stalledswitchesandpushbuttonswillberemovedfromtheSWpumpDCcontrolpowerlogic.Thechangesdonothaveadetrimentalimpactonthemannerinwhichplantequipmentoperatesorrespondstoananalyzedevent.Assuch,nonewfailuremodesarebeingintroduced.Thereisnoalterationtotheparameterswithinwhichtheplantisnormallyoperatedorinthesetpointswhichinitiateprotectiveormitigativeactions.CurrentproceduralguidancetostarttheSWpumpsbyoperatoractionintheScreenhouseasaresultofafireinthecontrolroomisunchanged.Inaddition,thechangedoesnotalterassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisandlicensingbasis.Therefore,thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Themarginofsafetyis'define'dbythedifferencebetweenlimitsbasedontruedesignandqualificationofplantequipment(i.e.,pointofequipmentfailurewithoutanyconservatism16

applied)andthelimitsimposedbyanalysisorNRCregulations.ThepointatwhichprotectiveormitigativeactionsareinitiatedmustensurethattheanalyticalorNRCimposedlimitisnotexceededand,thusreducethespecifiedmarginofsafety.TheproposedremovaloftheIntermediateBuildingSWcontrolswitchesandpushbuttonsfromthepumpDCcontrollogicdoesnotimpactthesefactors.TherearenoequipmentperformanceparameterchangesassociatedwiththisSEV.Nosetpointsareaffected,andnochangeisbeingproposedintheplantoperationallimitsasaresultofthischange.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveareductioninthemarginofsafety.17 00 SEV-1087ISOLATIONOFCONTAINMENTCHARCOALFILTERDOUSINGSYSTEMReviewofNRCGenericletter96-06hasshownthepossibilitythatasectionoftheContainmentCharcoalFilterDousingSystemcouldexperienceathermallyinducedoverpressuretransient.Atemporarychangeconsistingofclosingmanualvalves2860and2865,andpartiallyorfullyopeningoneofthedousingMOVs(i.e.875Aor875Bor876Aor876B)willisolateandventtheContainmentCharcoalFilterDousingsystem.TheContainmentSpraysystemflowpathremainsthesame.ThecurrentconfigurationoftheContainmentCharcoalFilterDousingsystemhasallfourMOV'sclosedwiththeirbreakerslockedopen.ThemotorsfortheseMOV'sarenotEQqualifiedandarethereforenotexpected,norcredited,tobeoperableinapostaccidentscenario.ThisreconfigurationisconsistentwiththeUFSAR,whichspecifiesmanualactionstoinitiatecharcoalfilterdousingintheeventofafire.Thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisinthatthefunctionorconditionofthecontainmentspraysystemisnotbeingaffected.TheContainmentCharcoalfilterDousingsystemisnotcreditedinanyGinnaaccidentanalysis.Thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportinthatthefunctionortheconditionofthesubsystemisnotaffected.ThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationinthattheTechnicalSpecificationsdonotaddresstheContainmentCharcoalFilterDousingsubsystemandthefunctionoftheContainmentSpraysystemisnotaffected.18

SEV-1088CONTAINMENTSPRAYCHARCOALFILTERDELUGELINETHERMALRELIEFVALVEDuringthereviewofNRCGenericLetter96-06,itwasdiscoveredthattheContainmentSpray(CS)CharcoalFilterDelugelinebetweencheckvalves866A&,866B(2"line)waspotentiallysusceptibletoanoverstressconditionduetothethermalexpansionoftrappedfluidduringaccidentconditions.Thethermaloverpressurizationtransientispostulatedtooccurduringtheinjectionphaseofadesignbasisaccident(LOCAorMSLB)whencontainmenttemperaturemomentarilyincreasestoapproximately286'F.Theimmediatecorrectiveactionwastoisolateandventthissectionoftheline(ReferenceSEV-1087).ThisSEVevaluatesthelongtermflix,whichistoinstallapressurereliefvalveonthisline,allowingtheheadertobeunisolated.Thisreliefvalveissizedfortherelativelylowflowrateassociatedwiththegradualheat-upofthisline(maximumflowcapacityis10gpmat500psig).Thetotalvolumerequiredtoberelievedduringthetransientislessthan1.5gallons.ThereliefvalvewillrelievetotheContainment,whichisconsistentwiththenormaldischargelocationoftheCSsystem.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARarenotincreasedbytheproposedmodificationsincetheCSsystemdoesnotinitiateanaccidentortransient,andtheCSsystemwillstilldelivertherequiredflowtotheringheaderwiththenewreliefvalveinstalled.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodificationsincethefailureofthereliefvalvetore-closeisboundedbytheexistingassumptionsintheaccidentanalyses(i.e.lossofacontainmentspraypump).ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedbytheproposedmodification,sincetheproposedmodificationdoesnotadverselyaffecttheassumedcapabilitiesofanyaccidentmitigatingsystems.19 SEV-1089INSTALLATIONOFTHERMALRELIEFVALVESONVARIOUSCONTAINMENTPENETRATIONLINESINRESPONSETONRCLETTERGL96-06TheNRChasissuedGenericLetterGL96-06concerningapossibilityforathermallyinducedoverpressurizationduetoLOCAorMSLBconditions.Thethermaloverpressurizationtransientispostulatedtooccurduringthedesignbasisaccidentswhencontainmentpressureandtemperaturemomentarilyincreasestoapproximately60psigand286'F.Areviewofthepipingpenetratingandinsidecontainmentidentifiedthefollowinglinesaslineswhichmaybesubjectedtooverpressurization:Penetration324.PrimaryWaterTreatment,Line2"-125-.1(betweenvalves8418&,8422)Penetration307.FireProtection,Line4"-FS-125-11(betweenvalves9227&9232,9233,9234,9235,9236,9237)Penetration121.ReactorCoolantPressurizer(PRTfillline),Line2"-CH-151(betweenvalves508&548)Inordertoprotecttheabovelistedpipes,itisproposedtoinstallreliefvalvesontheselinesinsidethecontainment.Thereliefvalveswillbeinstalledutilizingexistingtestconnectionsdownstreamoftherootvalves8421,9230and568.Therootvalveswillbenormallylockedopen.Eachthermalreliefassemblywillbelocateddownstreamofthecontainmentisolationvalves(checkvalves)oneachpenetrationlineandwillbesizedfortherelativelylowflowrateassociatedwithheat-upoftheselines.ThelineswherethereliefassembliesareattachedarenotrequiredtomitigatethepostulatedLOCAorMSLBevents.TheinstalledreliefvalveswillmaintainpipestresseswithintheEWR2512,revision5,"GinnaSeismicUpgradeProgram"stressallowablelimits.Thevalve'scrackingpressureissetequaltothedesignpressure.ThereliefvalvesareinstalledpertheoriginalconstructioncodeforGinna(ASAB31.1-1955).tTheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARwillbenotincreasedbytheproposedmodificationsincethemodificationsareonnormallyisolatedlinesandthereforecannotinitiateaaccidentortransient.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodificationsincethismodificationisdesignedtolimitlocalpipingsystemsstresses.Thereforetheonlyeffectisadecreasedprobabilityofpiperupture.ThemarginofsafetydefinedasthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreduced,sincenoTechnicalSpecificationsareaffectedbytheproposedmodification.20 SEV-1090TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONBASESCHANGEFORSCREENHOUSEBAYLOWERTEMPERATURELIMITThepurposeofthissafetyevaluationistoaddresschangingtheTechnicalSpecificationBasesforLCO3.7.8;specifically,theminimumscreenhouse'bayoperabilityrequirementswillbechangedfrom"Temperature)35'F..."to"Temperature)32'F..."inaccordancewiththesensitivityanalysisthathasbeenperformed.Thischangeisbeingmadetobettercorrelatethelake(i.e.,ultimateheatsink)environmentalconditionswithplantoperations.Implementationofthischangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentorthemalfunctionofequipmentaspreviouslyevaluatedinthatthechangedoesnotimpactthecapabilitytomeettheaccidentanalysisnordoesitintroduceanyeffectsthatcouldincreasetheprobabilityofanaccident.Inaddition,thereductioninthetemperaturedoesnotadverselyimpacttheabilityofanyequipmenttoperformtheirintendedsafetyfunction.Theconsequencesmeettherequiredacceptancecriteria,thustheconsequencesareacceptable.Thischangedoesnotintroducethepossibilityofanaccidentorequipmentmalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedinthatthechangeaffectsonlytheparametricvalueusedbycurrentanalyses.ThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisfortheTechnicalSpecificationsinthattheslightimpactuponPCTdoesnotresultinaPCTabovethecriteriabasis.Sinceallacceptancecriteriaaremetthereisnoreductioninthemarginofsafety.21 SEV-1091SAFETYINJECTIONTORCSCOLDLEGSDURINGPROCEDUREAP-RHR.2AsaresultofGenericLetter88-17,theWestinghouseOwnersgroupissuedaguidelinetoprovidetheactionsnecessaryformaintainingcorecoolingandprotectingthereactorcoreintheeventthatRHRcoolingislostduringlowloopconditions.RG&EprocedureAP-RHR.2isbasedonthisguidelinewithappropriateallowancesmadeforGinna'sspecificplantdesign.ArevisiontotheWOGguidelinewasissuedon06/06/96whichcontainedminorchangesinrecoverymethodologyandincorporatedpreviouslytransmittedchangestotheguidelinetoaddresssurgelinefloodingissues.4ThemajorchangeassociatedwiththisprocedurerevisionincorporatestheuseofcoldleginjectionasanalternativefortheoperatortorestorelooplevelpriortorestartingtheRHRpumps.Previouslytherewerethreesequentialoptionsfortheoperatortofollow:GravityfillfromtheRWSTtotheRHRhotlegsuctionconnection,chargingtothecoldlegs,andsafetyinjectiontotheRCShotlegs.TheproposedchangewouldinsertanoptionofsafetyinjectiontotheRCScoldlegs.Thisoptionwouldbeemployedifthegravityfillandchargingmethodsarenotsuccessful(aslongascoreboilingisnotoccurring)andwouldbecomethethirdinaseriesoffourmethodsofeventmitigation.ThesequenceofRCSlevelrestorationisexplicitlydescribedintheGinnaUFSARandhencerequiresawrittensafetyevaluationtoaddressthepertinentsafetyissues.AsecondchangeistheupdatingofthespecifiedRHRflowratewhensweepingairoutoftheRHRlinesafterflowrestoration.Previouslythiswasspecifiedasgreaterthan1200GPM.Thiswillbechangedtobetween1200and1400GPM.ThiswaspreviouslyevaluatedbythesafetyreviewforPCN97-3547(procedure0-2.3.1).Thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisinthatappropriatemethodsofrestoringcoolantlevelaremaintained.Theuseofacontinuousactionsteptoproceeddirectlytohotleginjectionifcoreboilingisimminentorinprogressensuresthattheadditionofanextrasteptothemitigationsequencedoesnotdelayhotleginjectionwhenitiswarranted.Theproposedchangeisassociatedwithmitigationofaneventandcanneithercreatenorincreasetheprobabilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety.ThischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportbecausetheadditionofanotherpossibleflowpathtotheRCSprovidestheoperatorwithmoreoptionstorestorelevel.Appropriateproceduralguidancehasbeenemployedtoisolatethisflowpathshouldhotleginjectionbedeterminedtobenecessary.ThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical22 00 SpecificationsinceitmaintainsthefunctionofrestoringRHRcoolingasquicklyaspossibleshoulditbelostatlowlooplevelconditions.23 0e SEV-1092THERMALOVERPRESSURIZATIONOFCONTAINMENTPENETRATIONS205206A207AThepurposeofthisevaluationistoprovideprotectionforcontainmentpenetrationsP205,P206a,andP207afromapotentialforthermallyinducedoverpressurization.ThischangeisbeingmadeinresponsetoissuesraisedinresponsetoNRCGenericLetterGL96-06wherebycertaincontainmentpenetrationsmaybesubjecttoisolatedwatersolidconditionswithnoreliefpathavailableintheeventofdesignbasisaccidentcontainmentenvironment.Aspartofthisresponse,thefollowinglineswerefoundtobesubjecttothepossibilityofwatersolidconditionsduringpossibledesignbasisaccidentscenarios:~PenetrationP205:RCSloopBhotlegsamplingthroughvalve955PenetrationP206a:RCSloopAhotlegsamplingthroughvalve953~PenetrationP207a:Pressurizersteamspacesamplingthroughvalve951Inordertoprotectthepenetrationpipingfromoverpressurization,abypasslinewillbeinstalledaroundvalves955,953,and951withacheckvalvetopreventflowinthedirectionofthesamplesink.Thecheckvalvewillallowforbackflowtotheprimarysystemfromthesampleside(penetrationportionside)oftheabovevalvesshouldpressureonthesamplesideexceedprimarysystempressure.Duringnormaloperation,thecheckvalvewillbeseatedbyprimarysystempressure.Thecheckvalveswillhaverequisiteisolationcapabilityinstalledtoprovideforinservicetesting.Toensureproperseatingofthecheckvalves,samplingproceduresmustallowfordepressurizingthesamplesidepipinguponcompletionofsamplingactivities.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinsafetyanalysisreportwillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedmodificationinthatthechangeprovidesadditionalassuranceoffunctionalresponseduringaccidentconditions.Thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodificationinthatthechangeprovidesadditionalassuranceorfunctionalcapability.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedinthatnoTechnicalSpecificationsareaffectedbytheproposedchange.24

SEV-1093REMOVALOFTHEPRESSURIZERLOWPRESSURELEAD/LAGMODULETheGinnaplantwasoriginallydesignedtobeabletowithstanda50%loadreductionwithoutareactortripprovidedautomaticsteamdumpandrodcontrolarefunctioning.Recenttestingontheplantsimulatorindicatesthatalargeloadchangemayresultinalowpressurizerpressurereactortrip,duetoalead/lagcircuitinthepressureinputtothisfunction.Thislead/lagfunctionisnotmodeledintheoriginaldesign.Therefore,itisproposedtoremovethelead/lagmodulefromthelowpressurereactortripcircuit.ThelowpressurizerpressuretripfunctionasstatedintheUSFARandTechnicalSpecificationswouldremainunaffected.Removalofthelead/lagcircuitwouldbeperformedbyremovingthepowersupplywiringforthelead/lagmodule,removingthemodule,andremovingthetestpointconnections.Theinputcableforthelead/lagunitcouldthenbeconnectedtotheinputofthelowpressuretripsetpointmodule.Thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisinthatthefunctionorconditionofthepressurizerlowpressurereactortripsetpointisnotbeingaffected.Thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportinthattherequiredfunctionortheconditionoftheotherchannelsubsystemsarenotaffected.JThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationinthatthelead/lagcompensationforthepressureinputtothelowpressurizerpressurereactortripchannelisnotcreditedinanyaccidentortransientanalysis.Thefunctionsofthepressurizerpressurechannelssetpoint,controlorotherprotectivelogicremainunaffected.25

,/

SEV-1094REPLACEMENTOFRTDINPUTMODULESINTHEREACTORPROTECTIONRACKSTheelectroniccomponentsusedtogeneratetheT,,and~TsignalsintheReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)aregoingtobechangedtoreplacetheagingloopmoduleswhichhavenoavailablereplacements.ThiswillrequiretheremovaloffiveFoxboroH-linemoduleswhichwillbereplacedwithsixmodulesmanufacturedby'NUS.ThenewmodulearrangementwillconsistoffourResistance-to-Current(R/I)converters,andtwoTimeDomainModules(allsafetygradeanalogdevices).ThefourR/IconvertorswillbeusedfortheconversionofHotlegandColdlegtemperaturesintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),andtheTimeDomainModuleswillbeusedtoconditiontheRCStemperatureinputsintoT;and~Tsignals.OneadditionalfunctionoftheTimeDomainModuleswillbetoprovidetherequiredlagtimeassociatedwith,thetemperaturesignal;TheinsertionofinstrumentlooplagtimeprovidesacompensatingfactorfortheextremelyfastrespondingloopRTDswithrespecttotherestoftheinstrumentloop.ThelagtimefactorwaspartoftheoriginalinstrumentloopresponsecalculationforboththeT,,and~Tsignals.ThesignaloutputsoftheTimeDomainModuleswillbeidenticaltotheoutputsoftheexistingmodulesbeingremoved,includinglagtime,andthereforewillhaveno'mpactonthefunctionoftheloopdownstreamofthenewmodules.Aftercompletionofthisproposedchangetheinstrumentloopwillbecapableofbeingre-configuredtofunctionaccountingfortheeffectsofafailedRTD.ThissafetyevaluationdoesnotanalyzetheuseofanyconfigurationotherthantheuseoftwoT-hotand.twoT-coldRTDinputs.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequenceofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreasedbythisproposedmodification.Thechangedoesnotintroduceanynewfailuremodesoreffectsintotheaffectedinstrumentloopnordoesitfunctionallymodifytheloop(includingdelaytimes,setpointsanduncertainties)orassociatedRPSandcontrolsystemsinanyway.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotcreateanynewequipmentinteractions.Becausetherearenochangesinloopfailuremodesandeffects(notethatthereplacementequipmentisalsoanalog)andnonewequipmentinteractionsareadded,thechangecannotleadtoanewtypeofmalfunction.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedbythisproposedmodification.TheOverpowerandOvertemperaturesetpoints,theprocessbywhichtheyaregenerated,andthetotalRPSdelaytimeareallunaffectedbythechange.26 e

SEV-1095BLOWDOWNJETSHIELDREMOVALINTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGTheprimarypurposeofthissafetyevaluationistodocumenttheanalysisoftheeffectsofremovingtheSteamGeneratorBlowdownsystemvalves5737and5738stemmissilerestraintsandassociatedsteamjetimpingementshieldsintheintermediatebuilding.TheworkassociatedwiththisevaluationwasperformedunderTechnicalStaffRequest(TSR)94-058"BlowdownJetShieldRemoval"whichprovidedsupporttoEngineeringWorkRequest4324C,"SteamGeneratorBlowdownSystem,Phase3".TheremovalofthedevicesreceivedatechnicalevaluationfortheTSRbuttheevaluationwasnotincorporatedintotheEWRsafetyevaluationnordidtheTSRinvokeanindependentsafetyevaluation.ThisdeficiencywasidentifiedinActionReport97-0756.Thesecondarypurposeofthisevaluationistoprovidedocumentationofthebasisfordeterminingwhythechangeunderevaluationdidnotaffecttheoperabilityofthesystemswhichwereaffordedprotectionbytheshieldsandrestraints.Theremovalofthejetshieldsandvalvestemrestraintsdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofablowdownlinefailure.Theshieldsprotectequipmentagainsttheeffectsofabreaktheydonotpreventabreakfromoccurring.Thestemrestraintspreventthevalvestemsfrombecomingmissileswhichcouldaffectotherequipmentshouldafailureoccur,againtheydonotpreventablowdownfailure.Theconsequencesofablowdownfailureareboundby.theconsequencesofsteamandfeedwaterlinebreaksintheintermediatebuilding.Thechangesassociatedwiththisreviewdonotimpacttheequipmentusedtoachievesafeshutdownfollowingtheoccurrenceoftheboundinglinebreaks.ItisconcludedthattheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.Safeshutdownfollowinghigh-energylinebreaks(HELB)intheintermediatebuildingisevaluatedintheSAR.NoequipmentutilizedtomitigateanintermediatebuildingHELBisaffectedbytheremovalofthemissileshield.RemovalofthemissileshielddoesnotexposeanyequipmentnotpreviouslyevaluatedtowithstandtheeffectsofaHELBtoanewhazard.Thenuclearandradiologicaleffectsofbreaksinintermediatebuildinghighenergylinesareindependentofthejetshields,providingsafeshutdowncanbeachieved.Becausesafeshutdowncanbeachievedwithouttheequipmenttheshieldsprotect,itisdeterminedthatthepossibilityofaaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethatanyevaluatedintheSARisnotcreated.EquipmentutilizedasjetforceandmissileprotectionagainsttheeffectsofHELBsisnotdescribedintechnicalspecification.Theequipmentassociatedwiththischangeisnotutilizedasthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.Accordingly,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedbythischange.

SEV-1096AANDBBATTERYROOMAIRCONDITIONINGUNITREPLACEMENTThescopeofthismodificationistoreplacetheexisting"A"&"B"BatteryRoomACunitwithalargerACunit.Thechangesrequiredwhengoingfromtheexisting5tonunittoa7.5tonunitrequireaSafetyEvaluationduetothechangesinairflowandthechangesinthepowersupplyconfiguration.Thisupgradewillrequireductworkchanges,servicewaterpipingchangesandelectricalpowerandcontrolchangestosupportthenewequipment.ThedesignoftheproposedmodificationsisaddressedinPCR96-084.TheplantconfigurationdescriptionintheUFSARSection9.4.9.3specificallyliststheairflowfancapacityoftheexistingACunitat2000cfm.ThenewACunithasaminimumairflowcapacityof2400cfmandamaximumof3600cfm.TheexistingBatteryRoomcoolingunitelectricalsupplyisfromtheEmergencyFloodingDistributionPanelA,ACPDPCB07,whichissuppliedbymotorcontrolcenter(MCC)K,position1D.ThereplacementcoolingunitwillbefeddirectlyfromMCCK,position1K.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,previouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport(SAR),isnotincreasedasaresultofthismodification.Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisunrelatedtothechangesproposedinthismodification.'heequipmentthismodificationaffectshasnofailuremodesthancanleadtotheinitiation,orpreventthemitigationof,anaccident.Theconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyarenotchangedasaresultofthismodification.Becausethismodificationdoesnotmakeanyfunctionalchanges,orintroduceanynewpreviouslyunanalyzedhazards,theconsequencesassociatedwithanyaccidentormalfunctionareaspreviouslyanalyzed.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Thechangesmadeforthismodificationarenotfunctionalchanges.Becausethismodificationdoesnotintroduceanynewfailuremodestoexistingplantsafetyequipment,itisnotpossibleforittocreateanewtypeofaccidentormalfunction.Theequipmentassociatedwiththisproposedchangeisnotdetailedintechnicalspecificationsorbases.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedasaresultofthisproposedchange.28 e

SEV-1097VALVE866BREPLACEMENTThepurposeofthissafetyevaluationistoevaluatethechangesmadeunderGinnaEmergencyMaintenanceProcedureEM-503,Revision0inMarch1985duringthe1985annualrefuelingoutage.ThechangeswillbeevaluatedwithrespecttotheoriginalsafetyconsiderationsoftheplantdesignbasisandwilldetermineifNRCapprovalisrequired(i.e.,ifthemodificationinvolvesanunreviewedsafetyquestionoraffectstheplantTechnicalSpecifications).EWR4121"866BReplacement"wasapprovedon3-8-85andwasintendedtobeanengineeringmodificationprojectgoverningthischange.ThevalvewasactuallyreplacedunderaplantEmergencyMaintenanceProcedure(EM-503)beforeanyformalengineeringprojectdesigninputdocuments(DesignCriteriaorSafetyAnalysis)werepreparedtocontrolthedesignprocess.Subsequently,EWR4121wasusedtoanalyzethepipingandsupportchangesassociatedwiththereplacementcheckvalve866B.ThisEWRprojectanalyzedthoseitemsandfoundthemacceptable.Themodificationconsistedofremovaloftheoriginal866Bvalve,a'2"Rockwellcheckvalve,anditsreplacementwithanew2"Kerotestcheckvalve.Thevalvesweresimilar(stainlesssteelmaterials,y-typedesign,1500-lb.pressureclass,socketweldends).TheonlysignificantdifferenceswerethatthenewKerotestvalvewasalmost20%heavierandusedasoft-seat(EPT)material.ThefactthatthenewKerotestvalveusedasoft-seat(EPT)material,whichhasafiniteradiationresistance,preventsitfrombeingautomaticallyjudgedasequivalenttotheRockwellvalveitreplaced.Theincreaseinvalveweightrequiredpipingandsupportreanalysis.ThismodificationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Themodificationinvolvesreplacementofpipingpressure-boundaryitemswithqualified,functionally-equivalentitems.ThismodificationdoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Themodificationinvolvesreplacementofpipingpressure-boundaryitemswithqualified,functionally-equivalentitems,andisindependentofaccidentmitigationfeatures.Thismodificationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,previouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Themodificationinvolvesreplacementofpipingpressure-boundaryitemswithqualified,functionally-equivalentitems.Thismodificationdoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,previouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Themodificationinvolvesreplacementofpipingpressure-boundaryitemswithqualified,functionally-equivalentitems.29

'e ThismodificationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanaccidentofatypedifferentfromanypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Themodificationinvolvesreplacementofpipingpressure-boundaryitemswithqualified,functionally-equivalentitems,andisindependentofaccidentmitigationfeatures.ThismodificationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofatypedifferentfromanypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Themodificationinvolvesreplacementofpipingpressure-boundaryitemswithqualified,functionally-equivalentitems.Thismodificationswillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecifications.Themodificationdoesnotaffectanyautomaticactuationsignalsortheoperabilityofanyofthecomponentsinvolved,norwillthefunctionsthatthosecomponentscurrentlyperformbealtered.30 SEV-1099PRESSURIZERSAFETYVALVELVDTPOWERSUPPLYUFSARCORRECTIONThepurposeofthisreviewistoexaminetheconsequencesofmodifyingtheReg.Guide1.97"PostAccidentMonitoringVariable",tablecontainedintheUFSAR.Includedinthetablearedetailsofthepowersuppliesofthemonitoringdevices.Onevariable,itemnumber59,pressurizersafetyvalveposition,liststhepowersupplyasbeingfrominstrumentbuslA.Thisisincorrect,theirsupplyisfromanon-vitalsource,Bus13viaACPDPCB01.TheproposedchangeisnotacorrectionofatypographicalerrorbecausetheR.G.-1.97safety.evaluationissuedbytheNuclearRegulatoryCommissionwasbasedonanRGB'ransmittal.whichdetailedthepowersupplyincorrectly.Thedocumentationerrorwasintroducedbylistingthepowersupply.totheterminaldecksofthecabinetthedevicesare,locatedin(containmentisolationresetpanel)asthevalvepositionpowersupply.Infact,thepanelcontainstwoseparatepowersources,onefortheCNMTisolationmonitoringandresetandoneforthepanel"convenience"outlets.Thepositionindicatorsaresuppliedfromthelattersource.Itisimportanttonotethattheoriginaldesignoftheindicatorsspecifiedthembeingpoweredfromthenon-safetysource.Thechangereflectstheasdesignedandinstalledconfiguration.Theuseofreliablepowerversessafetygradepowerreflectsthedevicesroleasoneofseveralindicationsavailabletomonitorthestatusofthereactorcoolantpressure.boundary.Themomentarylossofthesafetyvalvepositionindicationcanbetolerated,thereforethedevicesdonotneedbatterybackup.Itshouldbenotedthatthe,Reg.Guidedoesnotrequireasafetyrelatedpowersourceforavariableofthistype.Thechangeunderreviewdoesnoteffectthefunctionofanyequipmentdirectlyusedinthemitigationofaccidentsortransients.Becausethechangeisnotafunctionalchangeandbecausetheequipmentassociatedwiththechangecontinuestooperateasdesigned,theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.ThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.Thepressurizersafetyvalvepositionindicationpowersupplyhasnofunctionalinteractionwiththesafetyvalves.Anypowersupplyofthecorrectvoltage,regardlessofitssource,isconditionedbytheLVDTinstrumentloop.Theinstrumentloopanditsindependencefromthesafetyvalvesarenotaffectedbythechange.Thepressurizersafetyvalveindicationsarenotpartofthebasisforanytechnicalspecification.Consequently,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreduced.31 SEV-1101ALIGNMENTOFMOV857A857B857CDURINGSUMPRECIRCULATIONINES-1.3ThepurposeofthissafetyevaluationistosupportaprocedurechangePCN97-4341toES-1.3,TransfertoColdLegRecirculation.Thischangeisproposedasanimprovementtotheprocedure.RHRflowischeckedandthrottledasnecessarytolessthan1500gpmduringtheinjectionphasealignment(RWST>>28%level),whereastheNPSHanalysisestablishedtheflowlimitbasedonthesumprecirculationsystemalignment.BasedontheresultsoftheKypipeHydraulicModelfortheECCS,thesystemflowratewhencomparingthesetwoalignments'variesenoughsothatadditionalsystemthrottlingmaybenecessaryfollowingtherealignmentforhighheadsafetyinjectionfollowingthecompletionofStep11ofES-1.3.Given1),theflowinstrumentuncertaintiesforFI-626,FI-931A,andFI-931Bthatmustbeaccountedfor,2)thecurrentES-1.3requirementtoopenallthree857valves,and3)acalculatedlevelof0.34feetlesswaterabovethefloorofcontainmentascomparedtothatassumedinthepreviousanalysis,anenhancementtotheprocedureisrecommendedthatwillprovideadditionalNPSHmarginsuchthatadditionalthrottlingintherecirculationphasewouldbeunnecessary.TheprocedureshouldbechangedsothatifonlyoneRHRpumpisoperating,onlytheassociatedvalve(s)inthattrain,MOV-857AandMOV-857C(TrainA)orMOV-857B(TrainB),shouldbeopened.UseofthecurrentES-1.3procedurewithonesuctionpathisolated,onepumprunning,andbothinjectionlinesopenresultsinthesystemperformancebeinglessthanoptimalbutstilloperable.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased,becausethechangeinvolvesequipmentusedinthemitigationofanaccident,namelytheabilitytoprovidelongtermsumprecirculationusinghighheadpumps,andtheuseofcontainmentsprayforcontainmentpressurecontrolintheunlikelyconditionwherecontainmentpressureexceeded37psigduringrecirculation.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSARarenotincreased,becausetheproposedchangestillrequirestheopeningofonetrainofhighheadflowpaththrougheither857Bor857Aand857C.Openingeitheroftheselinesexposesthoselinesandportionoftheauxiliarybuildingbasementtoradioactivityassumingfueldamageaspostulated.Therefore,thereisnochangeintheconsequences.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased,becausetheSARassumesonlyonetrainisavailablepostLOCA,duringthesumprecirculationphase(Table6.3-9ofUFSAR).Theprocedureisbeingmodifiedtoinstructoperatorstoopenonlyonetrainthroughthe857valves,intheeventonlyoneRHRtrainisoperating.Sincecreditisonlytakenforasingletrainofhighheadflowpath'erRHRpump,thereisnoeffectonanymalfunctionspreviouslyevaluated.The857valvesleftclosedprocedurallywouldstillbeavailableforlateruseintheeventthiswasdesired.AfailureofoneoftheflowpathscombinedwithafailureoftheoppositeRHRpumpwouldnotbeconsistentwiththeplantdesignbasis.32 0

TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased,becausetheintegrityofthevalvesagainstexternalleakageisnotbeingchanged.Failureofbothpathsisnotconsistentwiththeplantdesignbasis.IfpumpAisoperatingandtheflowpaththrough857AandCwereblocked,flowcouldstillbedeliveredtotheSIsystemthrough857B.Conversely,ifpumpBwereoperatingandthe857Bvalvefailedtoopen,flowwouldbepreventedfrompassingthrough857AandCtotheSIsystemduetotheplacementofcheckvalve697A.InthiscasetheflowpathwouldbeprovidedfrompumpAthrough857Aand857C.Thesesetofcircumstancesarealsonotconsistentwiththeplantdesignbasis.IThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated,becausenonewequipmentorcontrolsarebeingaddedormodified.Thechangeisaproceduralonethatdoesnotaffectthecapabilityofthesystemtodeliverflowforhighheadsafetyinjection.Thereisnochangetoanyeventsormalfunctionsintheinjectionphasesincethevalvesremainclosedduringthatduration.Therearenopredetermineddeliveryflowratesestablishedforrecirculationphaselongtermcooling.Thechange,ineffect,hasazeroneteffectontheflowratedelivered,becausekeepingonetrainthroughthe857valvesclosedwithoneRHRpumpoperatingresultsinthesameamountofflowdeliveredaspreviouslyanalyzed,sincethrottlingwasdictatedineithercase.ThechangeprovidesasubstantialimprovementintheNPSHmarginfortheApumpoperation,becausetheflowwillbereducedduetoeliminationofthe"looparound"effectwhenall857valvesareopened.TheBRHRhadmoreNPSHmarginthantheARHRpump,whenallthree857valveswereopened,sinceminimumflowrecirculationflowwouldexistthroughbothtrainswhentheBRHRpumpwasoperating.Followingthisproposedchange,thiseffectwillnolongerexist,andtheNPSHmarginofbothRHRpumpswillbeessentiallythesame.ThepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethenevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated,becauseonlyproceduralstepsarebeingchangedandthevalveswillbeoperatedasbefore.Therearenochangestocontrols,andnochangesinexternalorinternalconditionsplacedonthevalvesexists.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreduced,becausenochangesarebeingmadetothefunctionsofthevalves,andeachflowpathisstillbeingcalledupontoserveitsassociatedtrainofRHR.33

SEV-1102PCN97-4346SAFETYEVALUATIONThisSafetyEvaluationdescribesproposedchangestotestprocedurePT-60.4.ThisprocedureisusedtotesttheperformanceoftheADieselGeneratorLubeOilandJacketWaterCoolerscoincidentwiththemonthlyADieselGeneratorrundoneunderPT-12.1.ThefoulingintheDieselGeneratorAheatexchangersisdeterminedanalyticallyfromPT-60.4'estmeasurementsusingawelldevelopedmethodology.Theuncertaintyinthedeterminationoffoulingisstronglydependentontheservicewatertemperaturedifferenceacrossthecoolers.Inordertoreducetheuncertaintyinthefouling,theservicewaterwillbethrottledtoapproximately250gpm.PCN¹97-4346addsstepstoPT-60.4tounlockandthrottleglobevalve4671duringtestingoftheDieselGeneratorAcoolers.DieselGeneratorAwillbedeclaredINOPERABLEforthedurationoftimethatvalve4671isunlockedandthrottled.PCN¹97-4346addsaprecautiontoPT-60.4tohaveanobservercontinuallymonitorthelubricatingoilandjacketwateroutlettemperaturesfromDieselGeneratorA,andrecordthevaluesonaten-minutefrequency,whenevertheengineisrunningandtheservicewateristhrottled.Intheeventthatthejacketwatertemperaturerisesabovethealarmsetpointof182'Forthelubricatingoiltemperaturerisesabovethealarmsetpointof195'F,theHCOisinformedandtestpersonnelimmediatelyopenvalve4671.Testpersonnelalsoimmediatelyopenvalve4671iftheHCOreceivesahigh-temperaturealarmontheMCB.AllotherproposedchangestoPT-60.4areinconsequential.Theyinvolveinstallationofadditionalnon-intrusiveinstrumentation(surface-mountedRTDs)andchangestothefrequencyanddurationatwhichdataistaken.Thesechangesareintendedtofurtherimprovetheaccuracyofthetests.TheproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.TheproposedchangesdonotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.DieselGeneratorA,althoughINOPERABLE,isexpectedtofunctionnormally,andcanbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusbyopeningandlockingvalve4671.InadditiontothenormalMCBalarm,DieselGeneratorAwillbecontinuallymonitoredlocallytoverifythatthelubeoilandjacketwatertemperaturesdonotexceedthealarmsetpointvalues.Intheeventthattemperaturesreachalarmsetpoints,testpersonnelwilltakeimmediateactiontoopenvalve4671.Therefore,theprobabilityoffailureofDieselGeneratorA'isnohigherthanitisduringtheregularmonthlyPT-12.1SurveillanceTest.TheproposedchangesdonotincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Accidentanalysesalreadyassumethelossofadiesel34 generator.TheproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSAR.Theproposedchangesinvolveminormodificationstoatestthatisroutinelycarriedout.ThemostsevereoccurrencewouldbethetrippingofDieselGeneratorAtopreventitfromoverheating.Contingentactionsstemmingfromadieselgeneratortriparealreadycovered.TheproposedchangesdonotincreasethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethenevaluatedpreviouslyintheSAR.TheDieselGeneratorAlubeoilandjacketwatertemperatureswillnotbeallowedtoriseabovethecurrentlyestablishedalarmsetpoints.Ithasbeenestablishedbythevendorthattheseareacceptableoperatingtemperaturesforthedieselengines.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreduced,sincenoTechnicalSpecificationsareviolated.35 e

SEV-1103VACUUMFILLOFTHEREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMIndustrywideuseofthevacuumfillmethodofincreasingthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)levelfrommidlooptothenarrowrangeonthepressurizeristobeevaluated.Thisprocedureistobeusedduringmode5priortoandduringthefinalRCSloopfillprocess.ItwillbeinstalledonlyduringthisprocessandwillberemovedwhenRCSrefilliscomplete.Thedurationoftheequipmentbeingincontainmentshouldbelessthan48hours.Thevacuumfillprocesswillbeincorporatedintoprocedures0-2.3.1and0-1B.ThepresentmethodofRCSsystemfillrequiresalongandcomplicatedventprocedure.ThismodificationwillallowavacuumtodrawnontheRCSwhenatmidloopinordertoallowtheRCStobefilledwithouttheneedforventing.Thevacuumoperationwillconsistofavacuumpumpconnectedvia2inchdiametervacuumratedhosestotwomanifolds.Themanifoldswillbelocatedonthepressurizerrelieftank(PRT)levelcolumnareaandthereactorheadventarea.ThePRTwillbedrainedandthepressurizerPORVandBlockvalveswillbeopentoallowthePRTtobeconnectedtotheRCS.ThepressurizerventmanifoldwillsupplythevacuumtapsforreactorvessellevelsightglassandRCSlooplevelinstrumentation.Oncevacuumisattained(approx24to25inchesofHg),theRCSwillbefilled.AstheRCSisfilled,levelindicatorsareisolatedandremovedfromservice.WhentheRCSlevelis)64inchesbut(84inchesthefillwillbestopped.TheRCSwillnolongerbeinareducedinventorycondition.0-2.3.1cannowbeclosedoutandalllowlooplevelrestrictionsarelifted.Procedure0-1BwillnowcontinuethefillandpressurizetheRCS.Oncethepressurizerlevelisat80%thefillprocesswillbestoppedandvacuumwillbebroken.Alltemporarymodificationequipment,hosesandcomponentswillberemovedfromcontainmentpriortoleavingmode5()200f).ThischangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocedurewillmaintainpositivecontrolovertheRCSventsandthelowtemperatureoverpressuresystem(LTOP)alignment.TheproceduremaintainscontroloverallequipmentthatcaninjectintotheRCSandincreaseitspressure.ThisassuresRCSboundaryprotectionatlowtemperatures,thereforetheinitialconditionsandprobabilityofoccurrenceforanyaccidentanalysispreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARisnotincreased.TheRCSvacuumventandfillproceduremaintainscontrolofreactorcoolantboron,density,oroperatingtemperature.TheproceduremonitorsthedilutionandborationpathstotheRCS.Thevacuumprocesswillnotinfluencecoolantboronconcentration,thereforetheinitialconditionsandprobabilityofoccurrenceforanyaccidentanalysisforreactivityinsertionin II~e chapters15.4.4.2.2or'15.4.4.2.6havenotchangedandarevalid.TheRCSvacuumventandfillevolutiondoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslydescribedintheUFSAR.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocedurewillmaintainpositivecontrolovertheRCSventsandthelowtemperatureoverpressuresystem(LTOP)alignment.TheproceduremaintainscontroloverallequipmentthatcaninjectintotheRCSandincreaseitspressure.ThisassuresRCSboundaryprotectionatlowtemperaturesperchapter5.2.2.ThereforetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslydescribedintheUFSARhavenotchangedandarevalid.TheRCSvacuumventandfillproceduremaintainscontrolofreactorcoolantboron,density,oroperatingtemperature.TheproceduremonitorsthedilutionandborationpathstotheRCS.Thevacuumprocesswillnotinfluencecoolantboronconcentration,thereforetheinitialconditionsandconsequencesofanaccidentpreviously.describedintheUFSARforreactivityinsertioninchapters15.4.4.2.2or15.4.4.2.6havenotchangedandarevalid.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARisnotincreased.Thewallthicknessofthepressurizer,steamgeneratorsandU-tubes,reactorcoolantpumpsandassociatedcomponentsexposedtothevacuumissufficienttomaintaintheintegrityofthesystemsduringvacuumventing,andafterthefillprocessiscomplete.Theintegrityofthereactorcoolantpumpsealsisassuredbymaintainingapositivepressureatthenumber1sealinletarea.Thepressurizerrelieftankisdesignedtowithstandafullvacuum.Thetankisequippedwithaninternalsupportfortherupturedisktopreventthedamagetothedisk.ThereforetheintegrityoftheRCSremainsunchangedandtheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreased.Thecontainmentisolationsystemwillremainunaffectedbythischange.Thesystemwillstillbeabletoachievecontainmentclosurewithintheallowed2hourtimeperiodofgenericletter88-17,andbecapableofpreventingaradiationreleasewithin10CFR100limits.ThereforetheabilitytoisolatecontainmentduringreducedRCSinventoryoperationsremainsunchangedandtheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreased.TheRHR,charging,andsafetyinjectionsystemswillallbelinedupandcontrolledperOperationsprocedure0-2.3.1"DrainingandOp'cratingatReducedInventoryintheReactorCoolantSystem".ThereforetheabilitytorecoverfromalossofRHRcoolingduringreducedRCSinventoryoperationsremainsunchangedandtheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreased.TheabilityoftheResidualHeatRemovalsystemtoprovideforcorecoolingwhentheRCSisin'areducedinventoryconditionwillnotchange.TheNPSHavailablefortheRHRpumpsisgreaterthanrequired,thereforethecapabilityofRHRsystemtoprovidecorecoolingwillnot37 beadverselyaffected.TheWCAP-11916wasreviewedtoverifythatoperatinginmidloopwiththeRCSatavacuumdidnotinvalidateitsanalysis.Theanalysesforvortexformationweremostsensitivetofluidvelocitywiththedensityandviscosityofthefluidassecondaryaffects.NoneoftheseparametersareaffectedbytheRCSbeingunderavacuum.Theanalysisthereforeremainsvalid.ThereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanmalfunctionpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARhasnotincreased.Thewallthicknessofthepressurizer,steamgeneratorsandU-tubes,reactorcoolantpumpsandassociatedcomponentsexposedtothevacuumissufficienttomaintaintheintegrityofthesystemsduringvacuumventing,andafterthefillprocessiscomplete.Theintegrityofthereactorcoolantpumpsealsisassuredbymaintainingapositivepressureatthenumber1sealinletarea.Thepressurizerrelieftankisdesignedtowithstandafullvacuum.Thetankisequippedwithaninternalsupportfortherupturedisktopreventthedamagetothedisk.ThereforetheintegrityoftheRCSremainsunchangedandtheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreased.Thecontainmentisolationsystemwillremainunaffectedbythischange.Thesystemwillstillbeabletoachievecontainmentclosurewithintheallowed2hourtimeperiodofgenericletter88-17,andbecapableofpreventingaradiationreleasewithin10CFR100limits.ThereforetheabilitytoisolatecontainmentduringreducedRCSinventoryoperationsremainsunchangedandtheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreased.TheRHR,charging,andsafetyinjectionsystemswillallbelinedupandcontrolledperOperationsprocedure0-2.3.1"DrainingandOperatingatReducedInventoryintheReactorCoolantSystem".ThereforetheabilitytorecoverfromalossofRHRcoolingduringreducedRCSinventoryoperationsremainsunchangedandtheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreased.TheabilityoftheResidualHeatRemovalsystemtoprovideforcorecoolingwhentheRCSisinareducedinventoryconditionwillnotchange.TheNPSHavailablefortheRHRpumpsisgreaterthanrequired,thereforethecapabilityofRHRsystemtoprovidecorecoolingwillnotbeadverselyaffected.TheWCAP-11916(section2.5)wasreviewedtoverifythatoperatinginmidloop'withtheRCSatavacuumdidnotinvalidateitsanalysis.Theanalysesforvortexformationweremostsensitivetofluidvelocitywiththedensityandviscosityofthefluidassecondaryaffects.NoneoftheseparametersareaffectedbytheRCSbeingundera'vacuum.Theanalysisthereforeremainsvalid.ThereisnoincreaseintheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.ThischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSAR.38 TheRHR,charging,andsafetyinjectionsystemswillallbelinedupandcontrolledperOperationsprocedure0-2.3.1"DrainingandOperatingatReducedInventoryintheReactorCoolantSystem".ThisprocedureimplementsRGEcE'sresponsetogenericletter88-17concerns.TheRCSismaintainedinananalyzedconditionperWCAP11916.TheRCSandmitigatingsystemsarelinedupandoperatingperestablishedprocedures.Thereforethissystem'onfigurationand-proceduredoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSAR.TheabilityoftheResidualHeatRemovalsystemtoprovideforcorecoolingwhentheRCSisinareducedinventoryconditionwillnotchange.TheNPSHavailablefortheRHRpumpsisgreaterthanrequired,.thereforethecapabilityofRHRsystemtoprovidecorecoolingwillnotbeadverselyaffected.TheWCAP-11916wasreviewedtoverifythatoperatinginmidloopwiththeRCSatavacuumdidnotinvalidateitsanalysis.Theanalysesforvortexformationweremostsensitivetofluidvelocitywiththedensityandviscosityofthefluidassecondaryaffects.NoneoftheseparametersareaffectedbytheRCSbeingunderavacuum.Theanalysisremainsvalid.ThereforeRHRpumpoperationwhentheRCSisundervacuumconditionsdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSAR.ThepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARisnotcreated.Withthesteamgeneratorintactandthepressurizermanwayinstalled,thecriteriaismetfortheRCSintactconfiguration.ThisconfigurationwasanalyzedandisoneoftheconfigurationsthatWCAP-11916andGenericLetter88-17reviews.Therefore,thepossibilityofamalfunctionoftheRCSboundaryofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARisnotcreated.RCSpressureandtemperaturelimitsasstatedinthePressureTemperatureLimitsReport(PTLR)arenotexceeded.TheshutdownrequirementsandPORVoperabilitylimitsfortheRCSaremaintained.Therefore,thepossibilityofamalfunctionoftheRCSboundaryofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARisnotcreated.ThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.Withthesteamgeneratorintactandthepressurizermanwayinstalled,thecriteriaismetfortheRCSintactconfiguration.ThisconfigurationwasanalyzedandisoneoftheconfigurationsthatWCAP11916andGenericLetter88-17reviews.Thisevolutionoccurswellbeyondthe120hoursaftershutdownanalysisandtemperatureisfarbelowthe140'fstartingtemperatureasevaluatedintheWCAP11916analysis.ThisconfigurationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedTechnicalSpecification3.4.8and3.4.12.AKYPIPEanalysis(notedon"ExpeditiousActions"responsetotheNRC,datedJanuary4,1997)oftheRHRsystemverifiedthatthegravityfeedmethodwouldplaceapproximately700039 gallonsofwaterintheRCSifinitiatedwithin16minutesoftheeventandassuminganintact,unventedRCS,thatwouldpressurizeaccordingtotheWCAP11916fig.3.3.1-1.Thiswasbasedonthedecayheatloadat48hoursaftershutdown.Thevacuumfillevolutionistakingplaceatgreaterthan300hoursaftershutdown,theestimatedtimetosaturationisapproximately27minutesandthereisadditionaltimeneededtobuilduppressureintheRCS.TheopenPORV'sandhavingonesteamgeneratorfilledwillfurtherdelaytheincreaseinRCSpressure.ThereforeadditionaltimeisavailablefortheoperatorstoincreaseRCSlevelusinggravityfeed.Apressureofapproximately42psiawasfoundtostopgravityfeedflowfromtheRWST.ThefinalrecoveryactionofrestartingRHRwouldoccurafterlevelisincreased.PerformingtheRCSvacuumventandfillundertheseconditionsdoes.notreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecification.Inaddition,SIflowpathstothehotandcoldlegsandchargingflowpathstothecoldlegwillbeavailablebyprocedureintheeventgravityfeedcapabilityislost.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocessdoesnot"requireachangetoGinnaTechnicalSpecifications.RCSpressureandtemperaturelimitsasstatedinthePressureTemperatureLimitsReport(PTLR)arenotexceeded.TheshutdownrequirementsandPORVoperabilitylimitsfortheRCSaremaintained.ThemarginofsafetyforthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryasdefinedbytheASMEcodeforwallthickness,stresslimits,integrityofsystemsandcomponentsismaintained.40 00 SEV-1104PCN97-4347SAFETYEVALUATIONThisSafetyEvaluationdescribesproposedchangestotestprocedurePT-60.5.ThisprocedureisusedtotesttheperformanceoftheDieselGeneratorBLubeOilandJacketWatercoolerscoincidentwiththemonthlyDieselGeneratorBrundoneunderPT-12.2.ThefoulingintheDieselGeneratorBheatexchangersisdeterminedanalyticallyfromPT-60.5testmeasurementsusingawelldevelopedmethodology.'Theuncertaintyinthedeterminationoffoulingisstronglydependentontheservicewatertemperaturedifferenceacrossthecoolers.Inordertoreducetheuncertaintyinthefouling,theservicewaterwillbe.throttledtoapproximately250gpm.PCN¹97-4347addsstepstoPT-60.5tounlockandthrottleglobevalve4672duringtestingoftheDieselGeneratorBcoolers.DieselGeneratorBwillbedeclaredINOPERABLEforthedurationoftimethatvalve4672isunlockedandthrottled.PCN¹97-4347addsaprecautiontoPT-60.5tohaveanobservercontinuallymonitorthelubricatingoilandjacketwateroutlettemperaturesfromDieselGeneratorB,andrecordthevaluesonaten-minutefrequency,whenevertheengineisrunningandtheservicewateristhrottled.Intheeventthatthejacketwatertemperaturerisesabovethealarmsetpointof182'Forthelubricatingoiltemperaturerisesabovethealarmsetpointof195'F,theHCOisinformedandtestpersonnelimmediatelyopenvalve4672.Testpersonnelalsoimmediatelyopenvalve4672iftheHCOreceivesahigh-temperaturealarmontheMCB.Allother,proposedchangestoPT-60.5areinconsequential.Theyinvolveinstallationofadditionalnon-intrusiveinstrumentation(surface-mountedRTDs)andchangestothefrequencyanddurationatwhichdataistaken.Thesechangesareintendedtofurtherimprovetheaccuracyofthetests.TheproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.TheproposedchangesdonotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.DieselGeneratorB,althoughINOPERABLE,isexpectedtofunctionnormally,andcanbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusbyopeningandlockingvalve4672.InadditiontothenormalMCBalarm,DieselGeneratorBwillbecontinuallymonitoredlocallytoverifythatthelubeoilandjacketwatertemperaturesdonotexceedthealarmsetpointvalues.Intheeventthattemperaturesreachalarmsetpoints,testpersonnelwilltakeimmediateactiontoopenvalve4672.Therefore,theprobabilityoffailureofDieselGeneratorBisnohigherthanitisduringtheregularmonthlyPT-12.2SurveillanceTest.TheproposedchangesdonotincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.Accidentanalysesalreadyassumethelossofadiesel41 0

generator.TheproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSAR.Jheproposedchangesinvolveminormodificationstoatestthatisroutinelycarriedout.ThemostsevereoccurrencewouldbethetrippingofDieselGeneratorBtopreventitfromoverheating.Contingentactionsstemmingfromadieselgeneratortriparealreadycovered.TheproposedchangesdonotincreasethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethenevaluatedpreviouslyintheSAR.TheDieselGeneratorBlubeoilandjacketwatertemperatureswillnotbeallowedtoriseabovethecurrentlyestablishedalarmsetpoints.Ithasbeenestablishedbythevendorthattheseareacceptableoperatingtemperaturesforthedieselengines.Themarginof'safetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreduced,sincenoTechnicalSpecificationsareviolated.42 0

SEV-1105VACUUMAFFECTSONRCSINSTRUMENTATIONDURINGVACUUMVENTANDFILLTheeffectsofhavingavacuumontheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)instrumentationduringtheRCSvacuumventandfillevolutionaretobeevaluated.TheinstrumentationwillbeexposedtoRCStemperaturesof90-100'F.Thepressurewillrangefromatmosphericto25inchesofHgvacuumor2.42psia.TheRCSloopwillbeinitiallyatthemidlooplevel.Thislevelis10inchesusinglocallevelindicationandisatthe246'0"elevation.Thetimedurationoftheexposuretovacuumislessthan6hours.OncetheRCSlevelisinthe50%-80%narrow'angeinthepressurizerthevacuumwillberemovedandthesystemwillbereturnedtonormaloperationalpressures.ImpactoftheRCSVacuumVentandFillprocedureonsystemperformanceisevaluatedinSEV-1103.ThischangedoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocedurewillmaintainpositivecontrolovertheRCSventsandthelowtemperatureoverpressuresystem(LTOP)alignment.TheproceduremaintainscontroloverallequipmentthatcaninjectintotheRCSandincreaseitspressure.ThisassuresRCSboundaryprotectionandRCSinstrumentoperabilityatlowtemperaturesperUFSARchapter5.2.2.TheRCSinstrumentsystemwillcontinuetoaccuratelymonitoranddisplaytheprocessvariablesneededtoverifyRCSparameters.ThereforetheinitialconditionsandprobabilityofoccurrenceforanyaccidentanalysispreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARhavenotchanged.TheRCSvacuumventandfillproceduremaintainscontrolofreactorcoolantboron,density,andoperatingtemperature.TheproceduremonitorsthedilutionandborationpathstotheRCS.TheRCSinstrumentsystemwillcontinuetoaccuratelymonitoranddisplaytheprocessvariablesneededtoverifyRCSparameters.Thevacuumprocesswillnotinfluencecoolantboronconcentration,thereforetheinitialconditionsandprobabilityofoccurrenceforanyaccidentforreactivityinsertioninUFSARchapters15.4.4.2.2or15.4.4.2.6havenotchangedandarevalid.TheRCSvacuumventandfillevolutiondoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslydescribedintheUFSAR.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocedurewillmaintainpositivecontrolovertheRCSventsandthelowtemperatureoverpressuresystem(LTOP)alignment.TheproceduremaintainscontroloverallequipmentthatcaninjectintotheRCSandincreaseitspressure.ThisassuresRCSboundaryprotectionatlowtemperaturesperUFSARchapter5.2.2.TheRCSinstrumentsystemwillcontinuetoaccuratelymonitoranddisplaytheprocessvariablesneededtoverifyRCSparameters.ThereforetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslydescribedintheUFSARhavenotchangedandarevalid.TheRCSvacuumventandfillproceduremaintainscontrolofreactorcoolantboron,density,43 0

andoperatingtemperature.TheproceduremonitorsthedilutionandborationpathstotheRCS.TheRCSinstrumentsystemwillcontinuetoaccuratelymonitoranddisplaytheprocessvariablesneededtoverifyRCSparameters.Thevacuumprocesswillnotinfluencecoolantboronconcentration,thereforetheinitialconditionsandconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslydescribedintheUFSARforreactivityinsertioninchapters15.4.4.2.2or15.4.4.2.6haveno'tchangedandarevalid.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARisnotincreased.ThewallthicknessoftheRCSprocessinstrumentationandsensinglinesandassociatedcomponentsexposedtothevacuumissufficienttomaintaintheintegrityofthesystemsduringvacuumventing,andafterthefillprocessiscomplete.Theintegrityofthereactorcoolantpumpsealinstrumentationisassuredbymaintainingapositivepressureatthenumberonesealinletarea.Thepressurizerrelieftankinstrumentationisdesignedtowithstandafullvacuum.Thetankisequippedwithaninternalsupportfortherupturedisktopreventthedamagetothedisk.ThereforetheintegrityoftheRCSinstrumentationremainsunchangedandtheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreased.Thecontainmentisolationsystemanditsassociatedinstrumentationwillremainunaffectedbythischange.Thesystemwillstillbeabletoachievecontainmentclosurewithintheallowed2hourtimeperiodofgenericletter88-17,andbecapableofpreventingaradiationreleasewithin10CFR100limits.Therefore,theabilitytoisolatecontainmentduringreducedRCSinventoryoperationsremainsunchangedandtheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreased.TheRHR,charging,andsafetyinjectionsystemswillallbelinedupandcontrolledperOperationsprocedure0-2.3.1"DrainingandOperatingatReducedInventoryintheReactorCoolantSystem".TheRCSandRHRinstrumentsystemswillcontinuetoaccuratelymonitoranddisplaytheprocessvariablesneededtoverifytheirparameters.ThereforetheabilitytorecoverfromalossofRHRcoolingduringreducedRCSinventoryoperationsremainsunchangedandtheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreased.TheabilityoftheResidualHeatRemovalsystemtoprovideforcorecoolingwhentheRCSisinareducedinventoryconditionwillnotchange.TheNPSHavailablefortheRHRpumpsisgreaterthanrequired,thereforethecapabilityofRHRsystemtoprovidecorecoolingwillnotbeadverselyaffected.WCAP-11916wasreviewedtoverifythatoperatinginmidloopwiththeRCSatavacuumdidnotinvalidateitsanalysis.Theanalysesforvortexformation:weremostsensitivetofluidvelocitywiththedensityandviscosityofthefluidassecondaryaffects.TheRCSandRHRinstrumentsystemswillcontinuetoaccuratelymonitoranddisplaytheprocessvariablesneededtoverifytheirparameters.NoneoftheseparametersareaffectedbytheRCSbeingunderavacuum.Theanalysisthereforeremainsvalid.ThereisnoincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanmalfunctionpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.44 e

TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARhasnotincreased.ThewallthicknessoftheRCSprocessinstrumentationandsensinglinesandassociatedcomponentsexposedtothevacuumissufficienttomaintaintheintegrityofthesystemsduringvacuumventing,andafterthefillprocessiscomplete.Theintegrityofthereactorcoolantpumpsealinstrumentationisa'ssuredbymaintainingapositivepressureatthenumberonesealinletarea.Thepressurizerrelieftankinstrumentationisdesignedtowithstandafullvacuum.The'ankisequippedwithaninternalsupportfortherupturedisktopreventthedamagetothedisk.ThereforetheintegrityoftheRCSremainsunchangedandtheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreased.Thecontainmentisolationsystemanditsassociatedinstrumentationwillremainunaffectedbythischange.Thesystemwillstillbeabletoachievecontainmentclosurewithintheallowed2hourtimeperiodofgenericletter88-17,andbecapableofpreventingaradiationreleasewithin10CFR100limits.Therefore,theabilitytoisolatecontainmentduringreducedRCSinventoryoperationsremainsunchangedandtheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreased.TheRHR,charging,andsafetyinjectionsystemswillallbelinedupandcontrolledperOperationsprocedure0-2.3.1"DrainingandOperatingatReducedInventoryintheReactorCoolantSystem".TheRCSandRHRinstrumentsystemswillcontinuetoaccuratelymonitoranddisplaytheprocessvariablesneededtoverifytheirparameters.ThereforetheabilitytorecoverfromalossofRHRcoolingduringreducedRCSinventoryoperationsremainsunchangedandtheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreased.TheabilityoftheResidualHeatRemovalsystemtoprovideforcorecoolingwhentheRCSisinareducedinventoryconditionwillnotchange.TheNPSHavailablefortheRHRpumpsisgreaterthanrequired,thereforethecapability.ofRHRsystemtoprovidecorecoolingwillnotbeadverselyaffected.TheWCAP-11916(section2.5)wasreviewedtoverifythatoperatinginmidloopwiththeRCSatavacuumdidnotinvalidateitsanalysis.Theanalysesforvortexformationweremostsensitivetofluidvelocitywiththedensityandviscosityofthefluidassecondaryaffects.TheRCSandRHRinstrumentsystemswillcontinuetoaccuratelymonitoranddisplaytheprocessvariablesneededtoverifytheirparameters.NoneoftheseparametersareaffectedbytheRCSbeingunderavacuum.Theanalysisthereforeremainsvalid.ThereisnoincreaseintheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.Thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluated,previouslyintheUFSAR.TheRHR,charging,andsafetyinjectionsystemswillallbelinedupandcontrolledperOperationsprocedure0-2.3.1"DrainingandOperatingatReducedInventoryintheReactor45 CoolantSystem".ThisprocedureimplementsRGAE'sresponsetogenericletter88-17concerns.TheRCSismaintainedinananalyzedconditionperWCAP11916.TheRCSandmitigatingsystemsarelinedupandoperatingperestablishedprocedures.ThereforethissystemconfigurationandproceduredoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSAR.Thepossibility.ofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARisnotcreated.Withthesteamgeneratorintactandthepressurizermanwayinstalled,thecriteriaismetfortheRCSintactconfiguration.ThisconfigurationwasanalyzedandfoundacceptableinWCAP-11916.Therefore,thepossibilityofamalfunctionoftheRCSboundaryofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARisnotcreated.RCSpressureandtemperaturelimitsasstatedinthePressureTemperatureLimitsReport(PTLR)arenotexceeded.TheshutdownrequirementsandPORVoperabilitylimitsfortheRCSaremaintained.Therefore,thepossibilityofamalfunctionoftheRCSboundaryofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARisnotcreated.ThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalSpecification,Withthesteamgeneratorintactandthepressurizermanwayinstalled,thecriteriaismetfortheRCSintactconfiguration.TheRCSandRHRinstrumentsystemswillcontinuetoaccuratelymonitoranddisplaytheprocessvariablesneededtoverifytheirparameters.ThisconfigurationwasanalyzedandfoundacceptableinWCAP11916.ThisconfigurationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinTechnicalSpecifications.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocessdoesnotrequireachangetoGinnaTechnicalSpecifications.RCSpressureandtemperaturelimitsasstatedinthePressureTemperatureLimitsReport(PTLR)arenotexceeded.TheRCSandRHRinstrumentsystemswillcontinuetoaccuratelymonitoranddisplaytheprocessvariablesneededtoverifytheirparameters.TheshutdownrequirementsandPORVoperabilitylimitsfortheRCSaremaintained.ThemarginofsafetyforthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryasdefinedbytheASMEcodeforwallthickness,stresslimits,integrityofsystemsandcomponentsismaintained.46

SEV-1106COREEXITTHERMOCOUPLESDISPLAYREPLACEMENTTheCoreExitThermocouple(CETM)Monitorsareobsoleteandrequirereplacement.ThemonitorsareanintegralpartofthesafetyrelatedCETsystem.Requiredasapostaccidentmonitoringsystem,theunitsfunctiontocalculateanddisplaycoreexittemperatures,deviations.ofindividualpointsfromaverage,andprovidedeviationandtemperaturealarms..Thereplacementunitscontainprogrammablemicroprocessors.TheCETMunit'sdesignandconfigurationisdifferentthantheexistingdisplaymodules.Accordingly,theymustbeevaluatedtoensurethattheyarenotsusceptibletofailuremodesoreffectswhichcouldleadtoanunreviewedsafetyquestion.Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluationistoprovidearecorddemonstratingwhereallthecriticalattributesassociatedwiththedigitalupgradeareanalyzed,anddocumentingtheresultsofthoseanalysiswithrespecttodeterminingifthemodificationcanbeimplementedwithoutpriorNRCapproval.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.Theproposedchangehasnofunctionalinter-relationswithequipmentdirectlyutilizedinaccidentmitigation.Themodificationwillnotchangetheabilityoftheplantoperatorstomonitorcoreexittemperaturesoranyoftherelatedpostaccidentandsafetyparameterdisplays.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSARwillnotbeincreasedbythisproposedmodification.Aspreviouslystated,theCETMsdonothaveanydirectinteractionwithplantprocessorcontrolequipmentnorcantheyintroduceafailurewhichwouldprecludethefunctioningofanyprocessorcontrolequipment.AftercompletionofthechangetheCETsystemwillprovideplantstaffwiththeidenticalinformationsetastheexistingunits.Becausetheplantoperatorswillhavethesameinformationavailabilitytherewillbenoreductionintheirabilitytomanagetheconsequencesofanaccident.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotestablishanynewfunctionalrelationshipswithplantequipment.Becausenonewequipmentinter-actionsarecreated(norexistingonesremoved)theproposedchangecannotincreasetheprobabilityofamalfunction.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.Theproposedchangecreatesnonewfunctionalinter-actionsandnonewequipmentfailuremodesormechanisms.Becausetheproposedchangeisfunctionallylike-for-like,thechangehasnoeffectontheconsequencesofanyequipmentmalfunction.ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangecreatesnonewfunctionalinter-actionswithexistingplantequipmentnordoesitintroduceanynewfailuremodesormechanismswhichcouldleadto47 reactorcoredamageorfissionproductreleaseThepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofa.differenttypethenevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanynewequipmentinter-actionsorfailuremodesormechanisms.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedbythisproposedmodification.TheproposedchangewillnotaltertheCETsystemresponseordegradesystemaccuracy.Otherthanprovidingfortheaforementioneddisplayfunctions,theCET'sarenotutilizedinthebasesforanytechnicalspecifications.48 SEV-1107EVALUATIONOFMODE4ECCSCONFIGURATIONSDuringnormalplantcooldownstheRHRsystemcanbealignedtotheRCSwhentemperatureis350degreesorlower.ShouldashutdownlossofcoolantaccidentoccurduringtheRCStemperaturespanbetween350andapproximately280degrees,(theactuallowertemperatureisafunctionofRWSTtemperatureandlevel),thedepressurizationcouldcauseflashingintheRHRsuctionpipingduetolossofRCSpressureandthussubcooling.ThiscouldcausethepumpstomalfunctionwhenthesuctionistransferredtotheRWST.ThisconditioncanresultinwaterhammerandthepotentialdegradationofRHRdeliveryuntilsuchtimeastheRHRsuctionpipingtemperature/pressureprofilereturnstosub-saturatedconditions.ProceduresAP-RHR.1,"LossofRHR"andAP-RCS.4,"ShutdownLOCA",provideplantoperatorswithguidancetomitigatetheeventwhenaleakisindicated.However,thecurrentshutdownLOCAproceduredoesnotutilizeallthepossibleplantconfigurationsthatcouldbemadeavailabletomitigatethisevent.ThepurposeoftheevaluationistoexaminethesafetyimpactofmodifyingplantproceduresandtheECCStechnicalspecificationbasestoallowre-alignmentoftheECCSsystemwhenenteringmode4suchthattheoptimumECCSequipmentsetisavailableforuse.TheneedforthisstemsfromthepotentialforRHRsuctionpipingflashingiftheRHRsuctionistransferredtotheRWSTwhenthetemperatureoftheliquidisabove280degreesF.ThisistemperatureassociatedwithsaturatedconditionsoftheRWSTtemperatureandpressure.,lessinstrumentuncertaintyoftheRHRsuctiontemperatureindication.TheproposedchangeconsistsofmakingtheAandBhotlegSIinjectionpathsavailableforusebelowanRCStemperatureof350degreesF-Mode4.HavinghotleginjectionavailablegiveseachSIpumptwoinjectionspaths,thusensuringadeliverypathevenifthebreaklocationis.inanRCSloopSIinjectionnozzle.SafetyinjectionfromtheRWSTtothehotlegsisonemethodalreadyanalyzedforlossofRHRduringRCSreducedinventoryoperations.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofaaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreasedbythisproposedchange.Theproposedchangehasnoaffectonprobabilityofaccidentspreviouslyevaluatedat-power,becauseitdoesnotmodifytheat-powerSIvalveconfiguration.TheproposedchangedoesnotalteranysystemconfigurationsorequipmentfunctionsasdescribedintheSARorcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.Additionally,thechangeunderreviewhasnofailuremodesoreffectswhichcanleadtoashutdownLOCAoralossofshutdowncooling.Theconsequence'sofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSARarenotincreasedbythisproposedchange.ThechangeunderreviewdoesnotalteranysystemconfigurationsorequipmentlineupsduringplantmodeswhenSIiscreditedintheaccidentanalysis.Becausetheproposedchangedoesnotalterequipmentfunctionoravailabilityitcannothaveanegativeeffectontheconsequencesofanaccident.49

TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.Thechangeunderreviewdoesnotaffectanyat-powersystemconfigurationsandthuscannotincreasetheprobabilityofat-powerequipmentmalfunctions.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportantofsafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreasedbytheproposedchange.Thechangeunderreviewdoesnotaffectanyat-powersystemconfigurationsandisunrelatedtoanypotentialequipmentmalfunction.Becausethechangedoesnotaffecttheconfigurationoftheequipmentwhenitiscreditedforaccidentmitigationtheproposedchangecannotincreasetheconsequencesofat-powerequipmentmalfunctions.Thepossibilityofaaccidentofadiffer'enttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.ThechangeunderreviewdoesnotaltertheplantconfigurationduringplantmodeswhenSIiscreditedforaccidentmitigation.Additionally,theproposedchangehasnofailuremodeswhichactasprecursorstoanaccident.Becausethechangehasnoaffectonplantequipmentavailabilityandnofailuremodeswhichpreventcorecooling,thechangecannotcreateanewtypeofaccident.ThepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotaddanynewfunctionalinter-actionsnordoesitremoveanyexistingones'.Becausetheproposedchangedoesnotalterequipmentdesignorfunctionitcannotintroducethepossibilityofanewtypeofmalfunction.CThebasisforthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedbythisproposedchange.ThischangewillnotresultinanydegradationintheabilityoftheECCStoperformitsintendedsafetyfunctionsandthuscannotreducethemarginsofsafetyassociatedwiththecorecoolingsystems.OnetrainofECCSasdefinedintheproposedbasisfortheTechnicalSpecificationsB3.5.3consistsofonetrainofSIanditssubsystem,includinghotandcoldleginjectionpaths.TheneedforECCSutilizingtheRHRanditssubsystemcanbedelayeduntilswitchovertosumpBrecirculation.Atthetimesumprecirculationwouldcommence,theRHRsuctionpipingwillhavecooledsufficientlybelowthesaturationtemperaturesuchthatthepotentialforawaterhammernolongerexists.ThechangeunderreviewdoesnotaffecttheECCSat-powerconfiguration.Accordingly,theproposedchangehasnoaffectontheabilityoftheECCStomitigationthedesignbasisaccidentset.MakingtheSIhotleginjectionpathavailableforuseduringMODE4operationswhiledelayingtheinitiationofECCSusingtheRHRsubsystemuntilsumprecirculationenhancestheabilitytocopewithaMode4LOCA.Thisproposedchangedoesnotresultinanunreviewedsafetyquestion.50 SEV-1108CYCLE27RELOADCycle27consistsof41newfuelassembliesfromfeedregions29A,29B,29C,and29D.Thissafetyevaluationisvalidforanend-of-cycle26burnupof15,200to16,200MWD/MTUandCycle27burnupnottoexceed16,517MWD/MTUwithoutadditionalanalysis.ThefuelassembliesforCycle27aremechanicallythesameasthecycle26fuelassembliesexceptforthefollowing.1.Theuseofannularpelletsintheaxialblankets,2.AreductioninbackfillpressureinIFBArodsto100psig,3.Groovedtopandbottomfuelrodendplugs,4.3-tabinconelgrids,5.Newtopnozzlespringpackdesign.TheCycle27reloadwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentbecausethereloadcoredoesnoteffectaccidentinitiatorsorequipmentoperation.Thereloadcoredoesnotcauseapipetobreakorequipmenttomalfunction.Therefore,thereloadcorecannotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccidentofmalfunction..Thefueldesignchangesatisfyexistingdesigncriteria;therefore,theprobabilityoffailuredoesnotincrease.TheCycle27reloaddoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionbecausethecorecharacteristicsareboundedbyparametersassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Whendeviationsoccurredreanalysiswasperformedtoshowtheacceptancecriteriawasstillsatisfied.Thefuelassemblychangesdonotdegradefuelperformances.Theresultingchangesarestillwithinacceptableranges.TheCycle27reloadandfuelassemblychangesdonotcauseanewtypemalfunctionoraccidentbecausethecoreparametersareboundedbythoseassumedinaccidentanalysisanddesignparametersarestillwithintheassumedranges.SincetheassumptionsinthesafetyandaccidentanalysisincludingthoserelatedtothecoredesignareboundingfortheCycle27reloadtheconclusionsintheGinnaUFSARremainappropriateandtheregulatedacceptancecriteriafortheaccidentanalysishasnotbeenviolatedthereisnoreductioninthemarginofsafety.Thegapreopeningcriteriaandthe17%metalwastageLOCAcriteriaaremetforCycle27throughmid-cycle.Therefore,thereisnoreductioninthemarginofsafetyduringthisperiod.Operationbeyondmid-cyclewillrequirearevisedevaluation.51 SEV-1109NEWPROCEDUREPT-60.3A"CONTAINMENTRECIRCULATIONFANCOOLERPERFORMANCETEST"SAFETYEVALUATIONThisSafetyEvaluationdescribesnewprocedurePT-60.3A.ThisprocedurewasdevelopedtoprovideasimplifiedalternativetoprocedurePT-60.3.Simplificationwasdesiredtoreducethenumberofpeopleandamountofequipmentthatwouldberequiredincontainmenttofacilitateat-powertesting.ThenewprocedureonlyprovidesinformationnecessarytodeterminethefoulingoftheContainmentRecirculationFanCoolers(CRFC).ItDOESNOTtesttheCRFCmotorcoolers.Theactionsintheprocedurethathavepotentialsafety-significanceinclude:1.ThrottlingtheservicewaterflowtoeachCRFCdownto-300gpmfromtheusualvalueof-1200gpm.ThisisonlydonetooneCRFCatatime,andtheCRFCisdeclaredinoperable.2.IsolationofservicewaterflowtothefanmotorcooleroftheCRFCbeingtested.Again,theCRFCisdeclaredinoperablewhenthemotorcoolerflowisisolated.3,Installationandremoval'ofintrusivetestinstrumentation(differentialpressurecells).ThiswillperiodicallycausethecontrolroomoperatorstogetlowflowalarmsonFIA-2033,FIA-2034,FIA-2035,andFIA-2036.Theoperatorsareinformedbeforethesemanipulationsaredone.4.PositioningandrepositioningofA-3.3ContainmentIsolationBoundaries.PT-60.3AdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR.PT-60.3Adoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofanaccident'reviouslyevaluatedintheSARsincetheinoperabledurationofanyCRFCismuchlessthantheLCO3.6.6allowedtimeof7days.PT-60.3AdoesnotincreasetheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARsincetheinoperabledurationofanyCRFCismuchlessthantheLCO3.6.6allowedtimeof7days.PT-60.3AdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSAR.TheprocedureinvolvesmanipulationofservicewatersystemvalvesinthesupplytoaninoperableCRFC,entryintotheenclosureoftheinoperableCRFC,andinstallationoftestequipmentonly.PT-60.3Adoesnotincreasethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyof52 adifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheSAR.TheprocedureinvolvesmanipulationofservicewatersystemvalvesinthesupplytoaninoperableCRFC,entryintotheenclosureoftheinoperableCRFC,andinstallationoftestequipmentonly.Nootherequipmentismanipulatedorexpectedtomalfunctionasaresultofthisprocedure.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreduced,sincenoTechnicalSpecificationsareviolated.53 SEV-1110TSCBATTERYCHARGERASANACCEPTABLEDCELECTRICALSOURCEWHILEINMODE5AND6ThisevaluationaddressesaproposedrevisiontotheBasesforTechnicalSpecificationssection3.8.5,"DCSources-MODES5and6",toincludetheuseoftheTechnicalSupportCenter's(TSC)DCbatterychargerasanacceptablesourceofDCpower.Thenon-Class1ETSCDCsystemisdesignedtotieintoeitherClass1EDCtrainusingmanualswitches.BytyingtheTSCbatterychargertooneofthevitalDCtrains,theassociatedClass1Ebatteryandchargersmayberemovedfromservice.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.TheTSCbatterychargerasasecondDCsourcewillbeusedduringMODES5and6.TherearethreetypesofevaluatedeventsintheseMODES;borondilutionandfuelhandlingaccidentsandlossofshutdowncooling.TheuseoftheTSCbatterychargerwillnotchangetheabilityoftheplantoperatorstomonitorborondilutionorfuelmovementactivitiesandhasnofailuremodeswhichactasaprecursortoanyeventortransient.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreasedbythisproposedchange.TheTSCbatterychargerexceedsthecapabilityofeitherClass1Ebatterycharger.AfailureintheTSCbatterysystemwhenconnectedtoaClass1EDCsystemwillnotcauseafailureintheredundantClass1EDCsystemandhasnoimpactontheabilitytomanagetheassociatedshutdownevents.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.FailureoftheTSCbatterychargerorothercomponentsintheTSCDCsystemresultsonlyinthelossoffunctionoftheequipmentsuppliedfromtheconnectedClass1EDCwhichisaddressedintheSAR.ATSCfailurewillnotcausetheClasslEDCsystemequipmenttomalfunction.-TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.Theproposedchangeutilizesexistingequipmentanddoesnotcreateadditionalfunctionalinteractionsornewequipmentfailuremodesormechanisms.ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangecreatesnonewfunctionalinteractionswithexistingplantequipmentnordoesitintroducenewfailuremodesormechanismswhichcouldleadtoreactorcoredamageorfissionproductrelease.ThepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethenevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduceanynewequipmentinteractionsorfailuremodesormechanisms.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedbythis54 proposedmodification.TheproposedchangeaffectsonlythesecondDCsourceduringMODES5and6.AfaultintheTSCbatterysystemwhenusingtheTSCchargerasasecondDCsourcewillnotpropagateintotheredundantClass1BDCsystem.55 SEV-1111FUELASSEMBLYREPAIRPROCEDURERF-73Inordertorepair(reconstitute)selectedfuelassembliesthepreferredtechniqueistoremovethetopnozzlewhichallowsaccesstothefuelpins.Thisdiffersfrompastmethodsofreconstitutionwhichinvolvedturningthefuelassemblyupsidedownandremovingthebottomnozzle.TheremovabletopnozzlehasbeenincorporatedintoGinnafueldesignsanditisdesirabletoutilizethismethodofreconstitution.Fuelreconstitutionisaccomplishedbyremovingdefectiverodsandreplacingthemwith"dummy"stainlesssteelrods.Theacceptabilityofusingareconstitutedfuelassemblyinthereactorisnotcoveredbythissafetyevaluationasthatwillbecoveredbyarevisiontothereloadsafetyevaluation.Thisevaluationcoverstheprocessofreconstitutiononly.Thegeneralprocessforreconstitutionisasfollows:Onceafuelassemblyhasbeenidentifiedasaleakerandthedefectivepin(s)identifiedbyaUTinspectionthefuelassemblyistransportedtothenewfuelelevator.Thenewfuelelevatorwillbeoutfittedwithaspecialreconstitutionbasketthatiscompatiblewiththereconstitutiontooling.Oncethefuelassemblyhasbeenplacedintheelevatortheelevatorwillberaisedtoaheightwherethetopnozzlelocktubescanberemoved.Thiselevationisapproximately9feetbelowthewatersurface.Thelocktubesandtopnozzlearethenremovedandthefuelassemblyloweredtotherackelevation.Nextthedefectivefuelpinsareremovedandplacedintheexistingfailedfuelstoragecontainer.Dummyrod(s)areinsertedinthelocation(s)previouslyoccupiedbythedefectivepinsandthefuelassemblyraisedagaintothe9footelevationandthetopnozzleandlocktubesarereinstalled.Theassemblyisthenloweredandtransferredtoitsdesiredlocation.TheGinnaUFSARstatesthatthenewfuelelevatorisusedfornewfuelonly.Sincethisprocedurewilldeviatefromthatdescriptionthissafetyevaluationisbeingpreparedtodescribetheadditionaluseoftheelevatorforfuelrepairactivities.SincetheassemblytobereconstitutediscontainedinsystemsdesignedtohandleitsassociatedgeometryandweighttheprobabilityofafuelhandlingaccidentoranyotheraccidentinSARisnotincreased.Sincethefuelassemblywillbetheonlyassemblyintransitorbeingworkedonduringreconstitutionactivitiestheconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccidentremainboundedbytheevaluatedaccident.Theprobabilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreasedbecausemultiplelayersofadministrativeandphysicalcontrolsareinplacetomaintainsufficientwaterlevelabovethefuelassemblyatalltimes.Theconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyarenotincreasedbecausesufficientcontrolshavebeenputinplacetoprecludeoverexposureofplantpersonnelaswell56 asthepublicfromreconstitutionactivities.ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARhasnotbeencreatedbecausethenewfuelelevatorhassufficientcontrolsinplacetopreventtheinadvertentwithdrawalofaspentfuelassemblyfromthewater.Anypossiblebreakageofasinglefuelrodduringthereconstitutionprocessisboundedbythefuelhandlingaccidentanalysiswhichassumesallrodsinasingleassemblyarefailed.Theuseofthenewfuelelevatorwillnotcreatethepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetybecausetheadjustedelevatorstopwillbetestedpriortoplacingaspentfuelassemblyintoit.Sincetheelevatorisdesignedfortheweightandgeometryofthecomponentthatisbeinginsertedintoitthischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofitsmalfunction.Sincefuelhandling,waterlevel,boronconcentrationspecificationsareallmaintainedwithintheirTechnicalSpecificationlimitsthisproceduredoesnotdecreasethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforspentfuelpooltechnicalspecifications.57 0

SEV-1112ACTIONREPORT97-1846DISPOSITIONOFMAINSTEAMLINEAANDBCRACKREPAIRATPENETRATION401AND402AsaresultofnewISIinspectionmethodsforintegralattachmentstopiping/components,crackswerediscoveredinthegussetweldsofMainSteam(MS)penetrations401and402insidecontainment.Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluationistoreviewtherootcauseandcorrectiveactiontakenasaresultofthecracksanddetermineiftheaffectedsystemsareoperable.Therootcauseofthecrackswasfoundtobeduetopoorweldjointdesign,referredtoasateejoint,whichcausedhighresidualstressesintheheataffectedzoneoftheweld.Heavypresenceofoxidesisevidencethatthecrackshaveexistedforalongtime,possiblyfromoriginalconstructioninitiation.Crackinginteejointsisawellknowphenomena(Lamellartearing)whichwasidentifiedinthelate1960sforlargesectionstructuralmembers.Theliteraturereviewedshowscracksstartingfromtheweldtoeandpropagatingdownintothebasemetalalongtheheataffectedzone.Basedonthereport,furthercracksshouldnotdevelopsincetheinitiatingcausewastheweldingstresses,notserviceinducedstresses(fatigue).Allcrackswerefoundattheoutertoeoftheweld.Therepairprocessremovedgussetswhichwerelocatedadjacent-tothecrackedweldtoallowaccesstothepipewallfordefectremoval.Crackswerenotfoundinanyoftheareabetweentheoutertoesofthetwofilletweldsoneithersideofthethreegussetwhichwereremoved.Thecrackswereexcavateddownto"defectfree"basemetalandthenreweldedtorestoretherequiredpipewall.Allrepairsweredoneinaccordancewiththeoriginalplantconstructioncode.Themaximumcrackdepthwasfoundtobelessthan5/8"inallcasesandstartedattheweldtoeonthepipe.Theremovedgussetswerenotre-installedovertherepairedpipeareaperPCR97-089,.sincetheywerenotrequiredtomeetthedesignbasisloads.TheFeedwater(FW)systemwasfoundtohavethesamepenetrationdesignastheMSexceptwiththinnermembersandsmallerfilletwelds.Theinspectionsdidnotrevealanycracks.AreviewwasalsodoneoftheremainderoftheMSandFWsystemforotherpotentialteejointconfigurationswhichhavethepotentialforcracks.Nootherattachmentswerefoundwhichwerehighlyrestrainedandhadweldsizeslargeenoughtogeneratehighresidualstresses.Athirdreviewwasdoneoftheremainderoftheplantpipingsystemsandtheresultsshowedthatthesystemsdidnothavealargeenoughpipewallthicknessorattachmentweldstocreatethehighresidualstresses.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARarenotincreasedbytheproposedrepairsincethecapabilityoftheMSlinepenetrationstoresistdesignloadshasnotbeenreducedbeyondwhatwasoriginallyassumed.ThepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanevaluatedpreviouslyintheUFSARwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedrepair.Sincetherepairmeetstheoriginalcode58 requirementsanddesignbasis,andwillnotchangethefunctionofthepenetrations,nonewtypesofaccidentsormalfunctionswouldbeintroduced.Themarginofsafety,asdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecification,isnotreducedbytheproposedrepairsinceitmeetstheoriginaldesignbasisandcodes.59 0

SEV-1113TAVGDEFEATSWITCHINDEFEATPOSITIONTOPREVENTUNWANTEDRODMOTIONINAUTOInordertopreventthedownwardswingsfromchannel2'sTavgsignalfromcausingunwantedrodmotionwhentheRodControlSystemisinAuto(whichisbeingcausedbythecurrentcoreconfiguration/temperaturestreaming),theTavgDefeatswitchT/401AwillbeplacedintheDefeatpositionsothatChannel2'sTavgsignalwillbepreventedfromgoingtoTM-4010(AverageTavg).WhentheTavgdefeatswitchisplacedinthedefeatposition,itpreventstheselectedTavgsignalfrombeingusedinthedevelopmentofAverageTavg.TheAverageTavgsignalisstillproducedusingTavgsignalsfrombothloops,withtheonlyexceptionbeingthatchannel1'sTavgsignalisdoubledsothattheaverageisstillaresultoffourinputvalues.TheAverageTavgsignalisusedinnonSafetyRelatedcontrolsystemssuchasRodControl,SteamDump,PressurizerLevelControlandFeedWaterIsolation.TheRodControlandPressurizerLevelcontrolshouldbeinmanualwhentheTavgdefeatswitchisplacedinoroutofDefeat,thiswillpreventanyperturbationsduetominorchangesinAverageTavg.TheTavgdefeatswitcheswillbecontrolledbyOperationswiththeuseofOperatorAidtagsbeingplacedonbothswitches.ThiswillensurethatT/401AisplacedintheNormalpositionpriortoperformingtestingthatrequirestheuseoftheTavgDefeatforthe"A"and"B"loops.ThetagwillalsoensurethatT/401ATavgDefeatswitchisreturnedtodefeatpositionforchannel2aftermaintenance.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.ThechangedoesnotintroduceanynewfailuremodesoreffectsintotheaffectedTavginstrumentloopnordoesitfunctionallymodifythelooporassociatedRPSandcontrolsystemsinanywaynotoriginallydesignedfor.TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreasedbythisproposedchange.ThechangedoesnotintroduceanynewfailuremodesoreffectsintotheaffectedTavginstrumentloopnordoesitfunctionallymodifythelooporassociatedRPSandcontrolsystemsinanywaynotoriginallydesignedfor.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.ThechangedoesnotintroduceanynewfailuremodesoreffectsintotheaffectedTavginstrumentloopnordoesitfunctionallymodifythelooporassociatedRPSandcontrolsystemsinanywaynotoriginallydesignedfor.TheconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSARisnotincreased.ThechangedoesnotintroduceanynewfailuremodesoreffectsintotheaffectedTavginstrumentloopnordoesitfunctionallymodifythelooporassociatedRPSandcontrolsystemsinanywaynotoriginallydesignedfor.60 ThepossibilityforanaccidentofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotcreateanynewequipmentinteractions.ThepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethenevaluatedpreviouslyintheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotcreateanynewequipmentinteractions.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnicalspecificationisnotreducedbythisproposedswitchposition.TheOverpowerandOvertemperaturesetpoints,theprocessbywhichtheyaregenerated,andthetotalRPSdelaytimeareallunaffectedbythechange.

10CFR50.59SAFETYREVIEWFORACTIONREPORT96-1200NOLONGERREUIRINGSPARECHARGINGPUMPBREAKERFORPIPEBREAKOUTSIDE'CONTAINMENTIPSARSECTION4.14NRCcorrespondencetoRG8'cEdated4/21/83,INTEGRATEDPLANTSAFETYASSESSMENTREPORT(IPSAR)SECTION4.14PIPEBREAKOUTSIDECONTAINMENT,requiredtheimplementationofadministrativecontrolsfortheinstallationofasparechargingpumpbreakerandcableforpostulatedsteamheatinglinebreaksintheAuxiliarybuilding.RG&Ehassinceperformedanenvironmentalevaluationoftheinstalledchargingpumpbreakersanddeterminedthattheyareenvironmentallyqualified(EQPackage49),thereforethereisnorequirementtomaintainasparebreakerandadministrativecontrolsforitsinstallation.Administrativecontrolswillremaininplaceforthecablereplacement.62

10CFR50.59SAFETYREVIEWFORCHANGETOFREUENCYOFPERIODICVENDORCONTACTSFORVENDORMANUALPROGRAMRG&E'scorrespondencetotheNRCdated2/2/93,ResponsetoGenericLetter90-03,statedourcommitmenttoperformperiodicvendorcontactsonafrequencyofbiennially(everytwoyears).AstheresultofprocessimprovementsintheVendorManualProgram,RG8cEwillberevisingourcommitmentandutilizingathreeyearvendorrecontactcycle.Industryexperiencehasshownthatthroughtheimplementationofavigorousrecontactprocess,athreeyearrecontactcycleistheoptimumperiodforperformancefrombothatechnicalandeconomicperspective,andinmanyinstancesismoretechnicallyeffectivethanrecontactsattighterintervals.GenericLetter90-03providedclarificationofthevendorinterfaceforsafety-relatedcomponentsanddidnotspecificallystipulatearecontactfrequency.f63

ML17265A298

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