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MONTHYEARML13051A8552013-02-20020 February 2013 Licensee Slides for 3/5/13 Pre-Application Meeting for Proposed Licensing Action to Revise the Fire Protection Program at STP Project stage: Meeting ML13046A0652013-02-22022 February 2013 3/5/13 Notice of Preapplication Meeting Via Conference Call with STP Nuclear Operating Company to Discuss License Amendment Request for Fire Protection Program to Credit Additional Operator Actions for South Texas, Units 1 and 2 Project stage: Meeting ML13070A2132013-03-29029 March 2013 3/5/13 Summary of Preapplication Meeting Via Conference Call with STP Nuclear Operating Company to Discuss License Amendment Request for Fire Protection Program to Credit Additional Operator Actions for South Texas, Units 1 and 2 Project stage: Meeting 2013-02-22
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Category:Meeting Briefing Package/Handouts
MONTHYEARML22243A1312022-08-31031 August 2022 STP Nuclear Operating Company August 31, 2022 Presentation - Pre-Submittal Meeting for Updated Main Steam Line Break and Locked Rotor Dose Consequence Analysis to Address Extended Cooldown Timelines ML22214A0972022-08-0202 August 2022 Presentation by South Texas Project ML22153A2942022-06-17017 June 2022 richardsd-hv-th28 ML21203A2702021-07-26026 July 2021 Presentation - 7-26-21 Meeting with STPNOC Proposed South Texas Project Moderator Temperature Coefficient TS Change ML20125A3362020-05-0404 May 2020 STP Presubmittal Meeting Exigent Accumulator LAR 2020-05-05 Presentation L-2020-LRM-0039 ML19326A0072019-11-22022 November 2019 Pre-Application Public Meeting for Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise the STPEGS Emergency Plan - December 3, 2019 ML16356A0612016-12-21021 December 2016 12/21/2016 South Texas Project Aluminum Bronze Aging Management Request for Additional Information ML16264A3632016-09-20020 September 2016 Pre-Application Public Meeting for Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise the STPEGS Emergency Plan Staff Augmentation Times ML16210A0442016-07-28028 July 2016 STP Nuclear Operating Company Handouts for July 28, 2016 Public Meeting on GSI-191 ML16172A0192016-07-25025 July 2016 STP Aluminum Bronze Selective Leaching Public Meeting - June 21, 2016 ML16202A4872016-07-21021 July 2016 07/21/2016 Talking Points, Supplemental Information for South Texas Project and NRC Public Meeting ML16111A0272016-04-18018 April 2016 STP Nuclear Operating Company Slideshow for Public Meeting on April 21, 2016 for GSI-191 Resolution (CAC No. MF2400-01) ML16062A3042016-03-0202 March 2016 TS 5.3.2 LAR Pre-Submittal Meeting Presentation - March 2, 2016 ML16033A0042016-01-19019 January 2016 Applicant's Slides for STP Meeting on Aluminum Bronze Aging Management ML15274A5992015-10-0101 October 2015 10-01-15 Public Phone Call ML15271A3042015-09-28028 September 2015 Public Phone Call Meeting Description of Supplement 2 to STPNOC Risk-Informed Licensing Application to Address GSI-191 and Respond to GL-2004-02 ML15111A0582015-04-15015 April 2015 Licensee Handouts (2 of 2) for 4/22/2015 Public Meeting Possible Roverd Section on Fixed Filtration (TAC Nos. MF2400-MF2409) ML15111A0562015-04-15015 April 2015 Licensee Handouts (1 of 2) for 4/22/2015 Public Meeting Revised Roverd Section on Large Early Release Frequency Change for Large Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident(Tac Nos. MF2400-MF2409) ML15056A3862015-02-25025 February 2015 NRC Slides for February 25, 2015 Public Meeting with STPNOC Concerning GSI-191 ML15049A4882015-02-18018 February 2015 Slides for February 25, 2015 Public Meeting ML15034A1512015-02-0505 February 2015 Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) from 10 Years to 15 Years. NRC Public Meeting Slides - ILRT License Amendment ML15034A1142015-02-0404 February 2015 STP Risk- Informed Approach to GSI - 191 Roverd 2015 Meeting Blue 1 29 15 ML14192A9842014-08-0404 August 2014 Summary of Pre-Licensing Meeting with STP Nuclear Operating Company to Discuss Future License Amendment Request to Revise TS 6.9.1.6.b.9 to the Leading Edge Flow Meter Technology for Feedwater Flow Measurement ML14120A0112014-04-29029 April 2014 4/29/2014 - South Texas Project Regulatory Approach for Risk-Informed Pilot Submittal Presentation Relating to 10 CFR 50.46c ML13352A1422013-12-16016 December 2013 GSI-191 Licensing Submittal Comparison of Changes Between Rev 1 and Rev 2 ML13352A1242013-12-16016 December 2013 NRC Staff Slides South Texas Project Risk-Informed Generic Safety Issue - 191, December 16, 2013 ML13316B9052013-11-13013 November 2013 Albrz Testing Update for NRR Final ML13150A2162013-05-23023 May 2013 Licensee Slides for 5/23/13 Public Meeting Regarding GSI-191 ML13140A2562013-05-20020 May 2013 Licensee Slides for 5/23/13 Meeting - STP Pilot Submittal for Risk Informed Approach to Resolving GSI-191 ML13023A3342013-02-25025 February 2013 1/15/2013 Summary of Public Meetings Conducted to Discuss Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement Related to Review of South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2, License Renewal Application ML13051A8552013-02-20020 February 2013 Licensee Slides for 3/5/13 Pre-Application Meeting for Proposed Licensing Action to Revise the Fire Protection Program at STP ML13029A4972013-01-15015 January 2013 Slides - Preliminary Site-Specific Results of the Environmental Review for South Texas Project License Renewal ML12297A3312012-11-27027 November 2012 Summary of Prelicensing Meeting with STP Nuclear Operating Company to Discuss Proposed Amendment for Approval of Revised Fire Protection Program Related to Alternate Shutdown Capability for South Texas, Units 1 and 2 ML12264A3202012-10-11011 October 2012 Meeting Handout for 10/11/12 Pre-licensing Meeting License Amendment Request to Revise the Fire Protection Program ML12145A4382012-05-18018 May 2012 Licensee Handout on Calibration and Benchmarking of Single and Two-Phase Jet Cfd Models ML1209004042012-03-30030 March 2012 3-27-2012 - STP Public Meeting Handout from Nuclear Innovation North America, LLC on Fukushima Lessons Learned for South Texas Project Units 3 and 4 ML1205407582012-02-22022 February 2012 STP Summary of January Meeting ML1205405572012-02-22022 February 2012 Licensee Slides for 03/1/12 Meeting with STP Nuclear Operating Company Meeting to Discuss GSI-191 ML1205405702012-02-22022 February 2012 Uncertainty Modeling of LOCA Frequencies and Break Size Distributions for the STP GSI-191 Resolution ML1204400652012-02-0909 February 2012 Licensee Slides for 2/9/12 Meeting Regarding GSI-191 ML1133505632011-12-0101 December 2011 Licensee Presentation from 12/1/11 Meeting Via Conference Call to Discuss Risk-Informed GSI-191,Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized Water Reactor Sump Performance ML1130506322011-10-26026 October 2011 Licensee Handouts from November 1, 2011 Meeting with STP Nuclear Operating Company on GSI-191 ML1127702032011-10-0303 October 2011 Licensee Slides from 10/3/11 Meeting LOCA Frequencies, Final Results ML1127701762011-10-0303 October 2011 Licensee Handouts from 10/3/11 Meeting STP LOCA Frequency ML1123508732011-08-22022 August 2011 Models and Methods Used for Casa Grande ML1123508832011-08-22022 August 2011 LOCA Initiating Event Frequencies and Uncertainties Status Report ML1120707072011-07-26026 July 2011 Meeting Notice with South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 - Licensee Slide Models and Methods Used for Casa Grande ML1120707292011-07-26026 July 2011 Meeting Notice with South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 - Licensee Slides Computational Fluid Dynamics Validation Plan ML1118903802011-07-0707 July 2011 Licensee Slides, LOCA Initiating Event Frequencies and Uncertainties(Draft) ML1118904082011-07-0606 July 2011 Licensee Handout Loca Frequencie Approach and Example Application 2022-08-31
[Table view] Category:Slides and Viewgraphs
MONTHYEARML22243A1312022-08-31031 August 2022 STP Nuclear Operating Company August 31, 2022 Presentation - Pre-Submittal Meeting for Updated Main Steam Line Break and Locked Rotor Dose Consequence Analysis to Address Extended Cooldown Timelines ML22214A0972022-08-0202 August 2022 Presentation by South Texas Project ML22153A2942022-06-17017 June 2022 richardsd-hv-th28 ML21203A2702021-07-26026 July 2021 Presentation - 7-26-21 Meeting with STPNOC Proposed South Texas Project Moderator Temperature Coefficient TS Change ML20248H5322020-09-0404 September 2020 STP Nuclear Operating Company September 14, 2020, Presentation - Pre-Submittal Meeting for Proposed South Texas Project Moderator Temperature Coefficient Surveillance Requirement Technical Specification Change ML20125A3362020-05-0404 May 2020 STP Presubmittal Meeting Exigent Accumulator LAR 2020-05-05 Presentation L-2020-LRM-0039 ML20034E8192020-02-0606 February 2020 Pre-Application Public Meeting for Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise the STPEGS Emergency Plan ML19095A6562019-04-0404 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Handout for 4/10/19 Meeting to Discuss a Proposed Request for South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Regarding Repair of Piping Using Carbon Fiber Repair Methods ML17004A0292017-01-0404 January 2017 Slides for January 4, 2017, Public Meeting on South Texas Project's Resposne to Aluminum Bronze Aging Management Request for Additional Information ML16356A0612016-12-21021 December 2016 12/21/2016 South Texas Project Aluminum Bronze Aging Management Request for Additional Information ML16350A3272016-11-17017 November 2016 Transcript of Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Plant License Renewal Subcommittee Meeting - November 17, 2016 ML16264A3632016-09-20020 September 2016 Pre-Application Public Meeting for Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise the STPEGS Emergency Plan Staff Augmentation Times ML16172A0192016-07-25025 July 2016 STP Aluminum Bronze Selective Leaching Public Meeting - June 21, 2016 ML16188A3682016-07-0606 July 2016 Audit Presentation - Westinghouse Methodology for South Texas Unit 1 LAR: Operation with 56 Control Rods ML16062A3042016-03-0202 March 2016 TS 5.3.2 LAR Pre-Submittal Meeting Presentation - March 2, 2016 ML16033A0042016-01-19019 January 2016 Applicant's Slides for STP Meeting on Aluminum Bronze Aging Management ML15334A3972015-11-30030 November 2015 TS 5 3 2 Emergency LAR Pre-Submittal Meeting Presentation ML15274A5992015-10-0101 October 2015 10-01-15 Public Phone Call ML15034A1512015-02-0505 February 2015 Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) from 10 Years to 15 Years. NRC Public Meeting Slides - ILRT License Amendment ML15034A1142015-02-0404 February 2015 STP Risk- Informed Approach to GSI - 191 Roverd 2015 Meeting Blue 1 29 15 ML14192A9842014-08-0404 August 2014 Summary of Pre-Licensing Meeting with STP Nuclear Operating Company to Discuss Future License Amendment Request to Revise TS 6.9.1.6.b.9 to the Leading Edge Flow Meter Technology for Feedwater Flow Measurement ML14149A0892014-05-21021 May 2014 NRR E-mail Capture - STP-GSI-191 Presentation ML14120A0112014-04-29029 April 2014 4/29/2014 - South Texas Project Regulatory Approach for Risk-Informed Pilot Submittal Presentation Relating to 10 CFR 50.46c ML13352A1242013-12-16016 December 2013 NRC Staff Slides South Texas Project Risk-Informed Generic Safety Issue - 191, December 16, 2013 ML13352A1422013-12-16016 December 2013 GSI-191 Licensing Submittal Comparison of Changes Between Rev 1 and Rev 2 ML13316B9052013-11-13013 November 2013 Albrz Testing Update for NRR Final ML13150A2162013-05-23023 May 2013 Licensee Slides for 5/23/13 Public Meeting Regarding GSI-191 ML13140A2562013-05-20020 May 2013 Licensee Slides for 5/23/13 Meeting - STP Pilot Submittal for Risk Informed Approach to Resolving GSI-191 ML13023A3342013-02-25025 February 2013 1/15/2013 Summary of Public Meetings Conducted to Discuss Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement Related to Review of South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2, License Renewal Application ML13051A8552013-02-20020 February 2013 Licensee Slides for 3/5/13 Pre-Application Meeting for Proposed Licensing Action to Revise the Fire Protection Program at STP ML13029A4972013-01-15015 January 2013 Slides - Preliminary Site-Specific Results of the Environmental Review for South Texas Project License Renewal ML12297A3312012-11-27027 November 2012 Summary of Prelicensing Meeting with STP Nuclear Operating Company to Discuss Proposed Amendment for Approval of Revised Fire Protection Program Related to Alternate Shutdown Capability for South Texas, Units 1 and 2 ML12264A3202012-10-11011 October 2012 Meeting Handout for 10/11/12 Pre-licensing Meeting License Amendment Request to Revise the Fire Protection Program ML1209004042012-03-30030 March 2012 3-27-2012 - STP Public Meeting Handout from Nuclear Innovation North America, LLC on Fukushima Lessons Learned for South Texas Project Units 3 and 4 ML1204400652012-02-0909 February 2012 Licensee Slides for 2/9/12 Meeting Regarding GSI-191 ML1133505632011-12-0101 December 2011 Licensee Presentation from 12/1/11 Meeting Via Conference Call to Discuss Risk-Informed GSI-191,Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized Water Reactor Sump Performance ML1130506322011-10-26026 October 2011 Licensee Handouts from November 1, 2011 Meeting with STP Nuclear Operating Company on GSI-191 ML1127701762011-10-0303 October 2011 Licensee Handouts from 10/3/11 Meeting STP LOCA Frequency ML1127702032011-10-0303 October 2011 Licensee Slides from 10/3/11 Meeting LOCA Frequencies, Final Results ML1123508832011-08-22022 August 2011 LOCA Initiating Event Frequencies and Uncertainties Status Report ML1123508732011-08-22022 August 2011 Models and Methods Used for Casa Grande ML1120707292011-07-26026 July 2011 Meeting Notice with South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 - Licensee Slides Computational Fluid Dynamics Validation Plan ML1120707072011-07-26026 July 2011 Meeting Notice with South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 - Licensee Slide Models and Methods Used for Casa Grande ML1118903802011-07-0707 July 2011 Licensee Slides, LOCA Initiating Event Frequencies and Uncertainties(Draft) ML1118904202011-07-0606 July 2011 Licensee Slide from 7/7/11 Meeting with STP Nuclear ML11157A0102011-06-0202 June 2011 STP Nuclear Operating Company, Licensee Handouts, 6/2/2011 Meeting Risk-Informed GSI-191 Closure Plan for GSI-191 Resolution ML1114501952011-05-24024 May 2011 Summary of Meeting with South Texas Project Electric Generating Station 2010 Performance ML1105503952011-02-22022 February 2011 Licensee Slides from 2/22/11 Public Meeting with STP Nuclear Operating Company ML1103206432011-01-27027 January 2011 1/27/11 Presentation on Risk-Informed GSI-191 Project Overview ML1021803392010-08-0505 August 2010 Ltr to E. Halpin Re Participation in Commission Meeting on the Resolution of Generic Safety Issue (GSI) - 191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Performance on 09/29/10 2022-08-31
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1Pre-Application Meeting for Proposed Licensing Action to Revise the Fire Protection Program at the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2March 5, 2013 2Agenda* Introductions* Proposed Licensing Action* Basis for Proposed Licensing Action (Technical)* Basis for Proposed Licensing Action (Analytical)* Safety/Security Interface* Preliminary No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination* Environmental Considerations* Conclusion* Questions 3INTRODUCTIONS 4PurposeTo reach a common understanding on the regulatory criteria and standards to be applied in the NRC's review of the proposed change to the South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2 Fire Protection Program (FPP)
Licensing Basis regarding the Alternative Shutdown Capability.
5Submittal Type* License Amendment Request - Result in amendment to the STP Fire Hazards Analysis Report.
6Proposed Licensing Action* To credit one automatic operation and the performance of operator actions in the control room, in addition to a single action currently credited in STP FPP Licensing Basis, in the event a fire requires evacuation of the control room.
- To regain compliance with the STP Licensing Basis for ensuring that the requirements of Section III.L of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R are met.
- STP is required by their licensing basis to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.L, Alternative and dedicated shutdown capability.
7Proposed Operator Actions1. Initiate main steam isolation2. Close the pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) block valves3. Secure all reactor coolant pumps4. Close feedwater isolation valves5. Secure the startup feedwater pump6. Isolate reactor coolant system letdown7. Secure the centrifugal charging pumpsCredited FeatureCredit the automatic trip of the main turbine upon initiation of a manual reactor trip.
8Impacted Regulatory RequirementsGoverning regulation is 10 CFR 50.48 (a) and (e)(a) Each operating nuclear power plant must have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of Appendix A of this part.(e) Nuclear power plants licensed to operate after January 1, 1979, shall...satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part in accordance with the provisions of their licenses."
9Impacted Regulatory Requirements (continued)Criterion 3 - Fire protection.Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions. Noncombustible and heat resistant materials shall be used wherever practical throughout the unit, particularly in locations such as the containment and control room. Fire detection and fighting systems of appropriate capacity and capability shall be provided and designed to minimize the adverse effects of fires on structures, systems, and components important to safety. Firefighting systems shall be designed to assure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of these structures, systems, and components.
10Impacted Regulatory Requirements (continued)Appendix R,Section III.L.1 RequirementAlternative or dedicated shutdown capability provided for a specific fire area shall be able to (a) achieve and maintain subcritical reactivity conditions in the reactor; (b) maintain reactor coolant inventory; (c) achieve and maintain hot standby conditions for a PWR (hot shutdown 3 for a BWR); (d) achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; and (e) maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter. During the postfire shutdown, the reactor coolant system process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal a.c. power, and the fission product boundary integrity shall not be affected; i.e., there shall be no fuel clad damage, rupture of any primary coolant boundary, or rupture of the containment boundary.
11Impacted Regulatory Requirements (continued)Appendix R,Section III.L.2 RequirementThe performance goals for the shutdown functions shall be: a. The reactivity control function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions. b. The reactor coolant makeup function shall be capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level above the top of the core for BWRs and be within the level indication in the pressurizer for PWRs.c. The reactor heat removal function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal. d. The process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control the above functions. e. The supporting functions shall be capable of providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc., necessary to permit the operation of the equipment used for safe shutdown functions.
12Impact on Operating License (OL)Condition 2.E for STP Units 1 and 2 OL* STPNOC is required to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report and the Fire Hazards Analysis Report through the amendments cited in the OL
- If changes to the FPP are considered to adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire, prior NRC approval is required of the change.- Although 10CFR50.48 does not define "adverse", STPNOC considers the proposed action meets the threshold for an amendment because of the reliance on the number of operator actions required to meet Section III.L of Appendix R.
13Planned Submittal Date/Requested Approval Date* Plan to submit on March 28, 2013* Expedited review requested- Required to restore compliance with the STP Licensing Basis.- Issue of over 7 years old.- Amendment is the corrective action path STPNOC is pursuing to resolve a Notice of Violation for untimely corrective action.
14Technical Basis for Proposed Operator Actions 15Technical Basis for Proposed Licensing ActionProposed operator actions are actions performed by a single operator in the control room prior to evacuation- Operator is designated to perform the actions and has no Fire Brigade duties.- Control panel switches to perform the actions are readily accessible and familiar to the operator.- Actions have been trained on and demonstrated to be feasible and reliable.- Operator will be pre-alerted because actions are not initiated until a fire occurs and the decision is made to trip the reactor.
16Technical Basis for Proposed Licensing Action (Continued)Automatic turbine trip upon initiation of a reactor trip.* Part of the plant design since initial operation.* Robust separation scheme between redundant reactor protection system circuitry.* Strong reliability record, tested by a Technical Specification surveillance.
17Technical Basis for Proposed Licensing Action (Continued)Design features- Relay room physically separated from main control room. - Robust safety train circuit separation.- Once control is transferred to the alternate shutdown stations, fire-induced circuit failures in the control room will not negate the proposed operator actions.
18Analytical Basis for Proposed Operator Actions 19Analytical Basis for Proposed Licensing Action* When assuming plant is at nominal full power conditions, analysis demonstrates that the proposed operator actions satisfy Appendix R,Section III.L requirements for a fire-induced spurious actuation.* When including instrument uncertainties from nominal conditions, analysis demonstrates safety margin is maintained and the plant can achieve safe shutdown.* When crediting no proposed operator actions, analysis demonstrates safety margin is maintained and plant can achieve safe shutdown conditions (defense in depth).
20Analytical Basis for Proposed Licensing Action (Continued)Assuming nominal full power conditionsKey Appendix R Section III.L parameters include:- Process variables are maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal AC power.*- No fuel damage or rupture of primary or containment boundaries.- Reactor coolant makeup function capable of maintaining reactor coolant level within the level indication of the pressurizer.* The STP analysis of a loss of normal AC power shows a safety injection signal may occur.
21Analytical Basis for Proposed Licensing Action (Continued)Assuming instrument uncertainties in the plant initial conditions* Preliminary results indicate pressurizer water level goes off-scale low for a brief period of time as a result of a fire-induced spurious actuation.* Significant voiding of the reactor coolant system does not occur and the plant satisfies the other Appendix R,Section III.L requirements.* Plant can achieve safe shutdown conditions.
22Analytical Basis for Proposed Licensing Action (Continued)When crediting no proposed operator actionsThe limiting case is a stuck open pressurizer PORV with the following assumptions:- Pressurizer PORV spuriously opens at the initiation of reactor trip. Automatic turbine trip occurs with 3.5 seconds.- None of the proposed operator actions are successful.- Operator secures the pressurizer PORV valve in 10 minutes at the alternate control station, terminating the event.
23Analytical Basis for Proposed Licensing Action (Continued)Limiting case assumptions continued:- Safety injection (SI) does not actuate.- Except for SI, automatic controls in the control room are assumed to function because of control/relay room and safety train separation scheme provides reasonable assurance that at least one safety train should not be damaged by fire.- Operators restore charging and letdown within two hours of event initiation.
24Analytical Basis for Proposed Licensing Action (Continued)Limiting case analysis results:- Pressurizer level restored to >20% and <100%.- Steam generator level restored to 22% and 100%.- The loss of subcooling margin does not impact the ability of the plant to establish and maintain natural circulation.- The core remains sub-critical and covered ensuring fuel integrity.
25Limiting Case Analysis Results (continued)0.00.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.01.20100020003000400050006000Transient Time (Sec)Nuclear Power (Fraction of Nominal 26Limiting Case Analysis Results50010001500200025000100020003000400050006000Transient Time (Sec)Pressurizer Pressure (psia) 27Limiting Case Analysis Results (continued)02040 60 801001200100020003000400050006000Transient Time (Sec)Indicated Pressurizer Level (% Span) 28Limiting Case Analysis Results (continued)0102030405060700100020003000400050006000Transient Time (Sec)Loop 1 Indicated SG Level (% NRS) 29Limiting Case Analysis Results (continued)020004000 6000 800010000120000100020003000400050006000Transient Time (Sec)Loop 1 Cold Leg Flow (lbm/s) 30Limiting Case Analysis Results (continued)4004505005506006500100020003000400050006000Transient Time (Sec)Loop 1 Hot Leg Temperature (F) 31Limiting Case Analysis Results (continued)-2002040 6080100 1200100020003000400050006000Transient Time (Sec)Subcool Margin (F) 32Limiting Case Analysis Results (continued)4004505005506006500100020003000400050006000Transient Time (Sec)Peak Core Exit Temperature (F) 33Limiting Case Analysis Results (continued)0.00.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.53.00100020003000400050006000Transient Time (Sec)Hot leg 1 Level (ft) 34Limiting Case Analysis Results (continued)25.025.5 26.0 26.5 27.0 27.528.00100020003000400050006000Transient Time (Sec)RV DC 1 Level (ft) 35Analytical Basis for Proposed Licensing Action (Continued)Fire Modeling of the Limiting EventDemonstrates that a fire leading to the limiting event is not credible.* Model used was Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (CFAST).* Key features are barriers separating panels and distance between panels.* Limiting panel is CP001 - Safety Injection (SI) control circuits.* Limiting because panel is smaller and physically isolated from other control room panels such that ambient heat flux and upper layer temperature is greater than a fire initiating in other investigated panels.* Result is impact of fire in CP001 will only result in CP004 (PORV control circuits) and CP010 (offsite power control circuits) experiencing marginally above ambient conditions.
36Fire Modeling of Limited Event Control Room Layout 37Fire Modeling of Limited Event Results 38Safety/Security Interface* The performance of the operator actions in the control room prior to evacuation does not change security response to a fire in the control room.* The site physical security plan is not impacted by the proposed change.
39Preliminary No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination* Proposed action will not initiate an event. The proposed actions do not increase the probability of occurrence of a fire or any other accident previously evaluated.* Proposed action does not involve new failure mechanisms or malfunctions that can initiate a new accident.
- Margin of safety is not significantly reduced by the propose action.- Completion of operator actions ensure that the requirements of Appendix R,Section III.L are met and there is no impact on fission product integrity.- When considering instrument uncertainties, safe shutdown capability is maintained with no impact on fission product integrity.- In limiting case where no operator actions in the control room are successful, fission product integrity is maintained.
40Environmental ConsiderationsThe proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
41Conclusion* Thermal-hydraulic analysis demonstrate that the proposed operator actions meet regulatory requirements.* Proposed operator actions will not be negated by subsequent spurious actuations.* Automatic turbine trip is ensured by reliability and redundancy.* Proposed operator actions have been validated to be feasible and reliable.* Fire Protection Program objectives are met.* Defense-in-depth limiting event analysis demonstrate that fuel integrity is not challenged.* Fire modeling demonstrates fire leading to limiting event is not credible.
42Questions?