ML19330A324

Forwards IE Circular 80-14, Radioactive Contamination of Plant Demineralized Water Sys & Resultant Internal Contamination of Personnel. No Written Response Required

ML19330A324
Person / Time
Site:	Barnwell File:Allied-General Nuclear Services icon.png
Issue date:	06/24/1980
From:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Baxter R ALLIED GENERAL NUCLEAR SERVICES
References
NUDOCS 8007170126
Download: ML19330A324 (1)

Text

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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.. SulTE 31C0 ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30303 n

JUti 2 41980 In Reply Refer To:

Allied-General Nuclear Services Attn:

R. C. Baxter, President P. O. Box 847 Barnwell, SC 29812 Centlemen:

The enclosed IE Circular No. 80-14 is forwarded to you for information.

If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested actions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

u. ;3 xV(.g,.

James P. O'Reilly Director

Enclosures:

1.

IE Circular No. 80-14 2.

List of IE Circulars Recently Issued 4

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UNITED STATES Accession No.:

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8005050074 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

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June 24, 1980 l

IE Circular No. 80-14 RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION OF PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER SYSTEM AND RESULTANT INTERNAL CONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL This circular describes an event which occurred at a nuclear power facility; however, the generic implications may be applicable to research reactors, and fuel cycle facilities.

On March 17, 1980, a licensee informed the NRC resident inspector that portions of the plant demineralized water (DW) system were found to be radioactively contaminated. A temporary hose used to add demineralized water to the spent fuel pool was the pathway for the cross-contamination. After this fuel pool makeup was completed on March 14, the temporary DW line (still connected to the DW header) was inadvertently left submerged in the fuel pool. Since the DW header pressure at the point of supply was relatively low (a DW booster pump had been secured), a siphoning action occurred, resulting in radioactive contamination of portions of the DW header.

On March 17, 1980, while performing routine secondary system chemical analyses, the licensee discovered that the demineralized water tap in,ghe chemistry lab contained high levels of boron and had activity of 1.5 x 10 uCi/ml (mainly Cs-13', Cs-137, Co-58, Co-60 and Mn-54).

It was subsequently discovered that demineralized water from the chemistry laboratory supply tap had been used to make five (5) pots of coffee. The remaining coffee was confiscated and the twenty-three (23) individuals who had consumed this coffee were whole-body counted. All involved individuals showed no intake greater than an equivalent 0.01 MPC-HRS. Analysis performed by the licensee's radiation consultant, based on the maximum concentration of radioactivity found in the coffee, indicated that the resultant 50-year dose commitment to an individual drinking eight ounces of this coffee would be less than 1 millirem.

Further licensee investigation revealed that the non-radiological chemistry DW supply tap was the only DW supply point outside the Auxiliary Building controlled area. This DW supply tap was tagged prohibiting human consumption to prevent a similar event in the future.

It is recommended that you review your facilities use of demineralized water (LW) via temporary connections and give attention to the following:

1.

Provisions should be made to assure that radioactive materials are not inadvertently introduced into your facility's DW system via the improper use of temporary connections. A temporary cross connection between contaminated systems and the DW system without adequate physical controls to prevent cross-contamination should be prohibited.

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IE Circular No. 80-14 June 24, 1980 i

Page 2 of 2 2.

In addition to some physical means of preventing backflow into the DW system, appropriate administrative controls should be established to ensure that the DW supply valve is secured and temporary hosing is disconnected from the DW supply header after use.

3.

Use of plant-supplied DW for human consumption should be prohibited.

.The potable water system should be the only authorized source of water for human consumption.

4.

Examine potable and deminera!. ced water systems to determine if pathways exist allowing or having the potential to allow contamination of these systems including temporary connections whereby siphons could cause situations described above.

No written response to this Circular is required. Your review of this matter to determine its applicability to your facility and any corrective and preven-tive actions taken or planned, as appropriate, will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.

If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

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f IE Circular No. 80-14 Enclosure sd June 24, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Subject Date of Issued to No.

Issue 80-14 Radioactive Contamination 6/24/80 All holders of Power &

of Plant Demineralized Water Research Reactor licenses System & Resultant Internal (OLs & cps) & Fuel Cycle Contamination of Personnel Licenses 80-13 Grid Strap Damage in 5/18/80 All holders of Reactor Westinghouse Fuel Assemblies OLs and cps 80-12 Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator Key 5/14/80 All holders of Reactor May Fall Out of Place When OLs and cps Mounted Below Horizontal Axis 80-11 Emergency Diesel Generator 5/13/80 A'l holders of a power Lube Oil Cooler Failures reactor OL or CP 80-10 Failure to Maintain 4/29/80 All holders of Reactor Environmental Qualification OLs and cps of Equipment 80-09 Problems With Plant Internal 4/28/80 All holders of a power Communications Systems reactor OL or CP 80-08 BWR Technical Specification 4/18/80 All General Electric Inconsistency - RPS Response BWR's holding a power Time reactor OL 80-07 Problems with HPCI Turbine 4/3/80 All holders of a power Oil System reactor OL or CP 80-06 Control and Accountability 4/14/80 Medical licensees in Systems for Implant Therapy Categories G and G1 Sources 80-05 Emergency Diesel-Generator 4/1/80 All holders of a power Lubricating Oil Addition and reactor OL or CP Onsite Supply 80-04 Securing of Threaded Locking 3/14/80 All holders of a power Devices on Safety-Related reactor OL or CP Equipment 80-03 Protection from Toxic Gas 3/6/80 All holders of a Hazards power reactor OL 80-02 Nuclear Power Plant Staff 2/1/80 All holders of Reactor Work Hours OLs, including research and test reactors, and Cfp

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