ML24289A235

Supplemental Slides - SNC Presentation - Pre-Submittal Meeting on October 15, 2024 - Proposed Vogtle 3 and 4 PRHR LAR

ML24289A235
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	10/15/2024
From:	John Lamb NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL2-1
To:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
EPID L-2024-LRM-0116
Download: ML24289A235 (16)

Text

Depiction of UFSAR Figure 6.3-1 Sheet 2

Technical Specifications ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 3.3.8 - 7 Amendment No. 190 (Unit 3)

Amendment No. 147 (Unit 4)

Table 3.3.8-1 (page 1 of 32)

Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS CONDITIONS

1.

Containment Pressure

a. - Low 1,2,3,4,5(a),6(a) 4 P

b. - Low 2 1,2,3,4,5(a),6(a) 4 P

2.

Containment Pressure - High 2 1,2,3,4 4

H

3.

Containment Radioactivity - High 1,2,3,4(b) 4 l

4.

Containment Radioactivity - High 2 1,2,3 4

l

5.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low 3 1,2,3(c)(l) 4 E

6.

Pressurizer Water Level - Low 1,2 4

D

7.

Pressurizer Water Level - Low 2 1,2,3,4(b) 4 F

4(d),5(e) 4 J

8.

Pressurizer Water Level - High 1,2,3 4

l

9.

Pressurizer Water Level - High 2 1,2,3,4(f) 4 l

10.

Pressurizer Water Level - High 3 1,2,3,4(f) 4 Q

11.

RCS Cold Leg Temperature (Tcold)

a. - Low 2 1,2,3(c)(l) 4 per loop E

b. - High (o) 1,2,3,4(b) 4 per loop F

12.

Reactor Coolant Average Temperature (Tavg)

- Low 1,2 4

D

13.

Reactor Coolant Average Temperature (Tavg)

- Low 2 1,2 4

D (a) Without an open containment air flow path 6 inches in diameter.

(b) With the RCS not being cooled by the Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS).

(c) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.

(d) With the RCS being cooled by the RNS.

(e) With RCS not VENTED and CMT actuation on Pressurizer Water Level - Low 2 not blocked.

(f) With all four cold leg temperatures > 275°F.

(g) With upper internals in place.

(l) Below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock and RCS boron concentration is less than that necessary to meet the SDM requirements at an RCS temperature of 200°F.

(o) For each Unit only applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High.

DRAFT

Technical Specifications ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 3.3.8 - 8 Amendment No. 190 (Unit 3)

Amendment No. 147 (Unit 4)

Table 3.3.8-1 (page 2 of 2)

Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS CONDITIONS

15. Core Makeup Tank (CMT) Level - Low 3 1,2,3,4(b) 4 per tank F

4(d),5(h) 4 per OPERABLE tank J

16. CMT Level - Low 6 1,2,3,4(b) 4 per tank F

4(d),5(h)(n) 4 per OPERABLE tank J

17. Source Range Neutron Flux Doubling 2(i),3(i),4(j) 4 I

5(j) 4 I

18. IRWST Lower Narrow Range Level - Low 3 1,2,3,4(b) 4 F

4(d),5(n) 4 M

6(g)(n) 4 N

19. Reactor Coolant Pump Bearing Water Temperature - High 2 1,2,3,4 4 per RCP O

20. SG Narrow Range Water Level - Low 2 1,2,3,4(b) 4 per SG F

21. SG Wide Range Water Level - Low 2 1,2,3,4(b) 4 per SG F

22. SG Narrow Range Water Level High 1,2,3,4 4 per SG I

23. SG Narrow Range Water Level - High 3 1,2 4 per SG D

3,4 4 per SG I

24. Steam Line Pressure - Low 2 1,2,3(c)(l)(m) 4 per steam line G

25. Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate - High 3(k) 4 per steam line I

(b) With the RCS not being cooled by the Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS).

(c) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock.

(d) With the RCS being cooled by the RNS.

(g) With upper internals in place.

(h) With RCS not VENTED.

(i) With unborated water source flow paths not isolated except when critical or except during intentional approach to criticality.

(j) With unborated water source flow paths not isolated.

(k) Below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock when Steam Line Pressure - Low 2 is blocked.

(l) Below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock and RCS boron concentration is less than that necessary to meet the SDM requirements at an RCS temperature of 200°F.

(m) Below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock when Steam Line Pressure - Low 2 is not blocked.

(n) For Unit 3 only, not required to be OPERABLE prior to initial criticality.

DRAFT

Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 26 Revision __77 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

A Passive Containment Cooling Actuation signal initiates water flow by gravity by opening the isolation valves. The water flows onto the containment dome, wetting the outer surface. The path for natural circulation of air along the outside walls of the containment structure is always open.

Passive Containment Cooling is actuated on the following signals:

Containment Pressure - High 2; and Passive Containment Cooling Actuation - Manual Initiation.

Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Heat Exchanger Actuation The PRHR Heat Exchanger (HX) provides emergency core decay heat removal when the Startup Feedwater System is not available to provide a heat sink.

PRHR is actuated on the following signals:

{For each Unit not applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High} SG Narrow Range Water Level - Low 2 coincident with Startup Feedwater Flow - Low 2;

{For each Unit only applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High} SG Narrow Range Water Level - Low 2, coincident with Startup Feedwater Flow - Low 2, and coincident with Tcold - High; SG Wide Range Water Level - Low 2; ADS Stages 1, 2, & 3 Actuation; CMT Actuation; Pressurizer Water Level - High 3; and PRHR Heat Exchanger Actuation - Manual Initiation.

Boron Dilution Block The block of boron dilution is accomplished by closing the CVS makeup line isolation valves or closing the demineralized water system isolation valves to the CVS.

DRAFT

Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 37 Revision __77 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and in MODE 4 when all four cold leg temperatures are > 275°F.

This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 with at least one cold leg temperature 275°F or MODES 5 and 6 because it is not required to mitigate a DBA in these MODES.

10. Pressurizer Water Level - High 3 PRHR is actuated and the pressurizer heaters are tripped when the pressurizer water level reaches its High 3 setpoint. This signal provides protection against a pressurizer overfill following an inadvertent core makeup tank actuation with consequential loss of offsite power. This Function is automatically unblocked when RCS pressure is above the P-19 (RCS pressure) setpoint. Each water level signal is compensated using pressurizer reference leg temperature, pressurizer pressure and RCS wide range pressure.

The ESFAS protective functions actuated by Pressurizer Water Level

- High 3 are:

PRHR Heat Exchanger Actuation; and Pressurizer Heater Trip.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, and in MODE 4 when all four cold leg temperatures are > 275°F.

This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 with at least one cold leg temperature 275°F or in MODES 5 and 6 because it is not required to mitigate DBA in these MODES.

11.a RCS Cold Leg Temperature (Tcold) - Low 2 This signal provides protection against the following accidents:

SLB; Feed line break; and Inadvertent opening of an SG relief or an SG safety valve.

DRAFT

Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 38 Revision __77 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The ESFAS protective functions actuated by RCS Cold Leg Temperature (Tcold) - Low 2 are:

Safeguards Actuation; Steam Line Isolation; and Startup Feedwater Isolation.

This Function provides closure of the MSIVs during a SLB or inadvertent opening of a SG relief or a safety valve to maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor and to limit the mass and energy release to containment. This Function also closes the startup feedwater control and isolation valves and trips the startup feedwater pumps if reactor coolant system cold leg temperature is below the Tcold setpoint in any loop.

The LCO requires four channels of Tcold - Low 2 to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2. Additionally, they are required to be OPERABLE in MODE 3 above P-11 or in a condition below P-11 where the RCS boron concentration is below that necessary to meet the SDM requirements at an RCS temperature of 200°F. At these conditions, a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in the rapid cooldown of the primary side. Four channels are provided in each loop to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, this Function is not needed for accident detection and mitigation because the cold leg temperature is reduced below the actuation setpoint.

{For each Unit Function 11.b only applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High}

11.b RCS Cold Leg Temperature (Tcold) - High RCS Cold Leg Temperature (Tcold) - High PRHR is actuated when the Tcold reaches its High setpoint coincident with SG Narrow Range Water Levels indicating Low 2 coincident with Startup Feedwater Flows indicating Low 2 in both SGs. The LCO requires four channels per cold leg to be OPERABLE to satisfy the requirements with a two-out-of-four logic. Four channels are provided to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function. The Setpoint reflects both steady state and adverse environmental instrument uncertainties as the detectors provide protection for an event that results in a harsh environment.

DRAFT

Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 39 Revision __77 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The ESFAS protective functions actuated by Tcold - High are:

PRHR Heat Exchanger Actuation.

The Tcold - High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and in MODE 4 when the RCS is not being cooled by the RNS.

This ensures that the PRHR can be actuated in the event of a loss of the normal heat removal systems. In MODE 4 when the RCS is being cooled by the RNS, and in MODES 5 and 6, the PRHR is not required to provide the normal RCS heat sink.

12. Tavg Low This signal provides protection against excessive feedwater flow by closing the main feedwater control valves. This signal results from a coincidence of two of the four divisions of reactor loop average temperature below the Low setpoint coincident with the P-4 permissive. Four channels are provided to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure that no single random failure will disable this trip Function.

The Main Feedwater Control Valve Isolation ESFAS protective function is actuated by Tavg Low.

Closing the Main Feedwater Control Valves on Tavg Low coincident with Reactor Trip (P-4) is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2. Failure to close the main feedwater control valves following a SLB or FLB can lead to additional mass and energy being delivered to the steam generators, resulting in excessive cooldown and additional mass and energy release in containment.

13. Tavg Low-2 This signal provides protection against excessive feedwater flow by closing the main feedwater isolation and crossover leg valves, and tripping of the main feedwater pumps. This signal results from a coincidence of two out of four divisions of reactor loop average temperature below the Low 2 setpoint coincident with the P-4 permissive.

Four channels are provided to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure that no single random failure will disable this trip Function. This Function may be manually blocked when the pressurizer pressure is below the P-11 setpoint. The block is automatically removed when the pressurizer pressure is above the P-11 setpoint.

DRAFT

Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 43 Revision __77 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

19. Reactor Coolant Pump Bearing Water Temperature - High 2 The CCS containment isolation valves are closed and the RCPs are tripped if two-out-of-four sensors on any RCP indicate High 2 bearing water temperature. This Function is lead-lag compensated.

The ESFAS protective functions actuated by Reactor Coolant Pump Bearing Water Temperature - High 2 are:

Reactor Coolant Pump Trip; and Component Cooling Water System Containment Isolation Valve Closure.

This Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Four channels are provided for each RCP to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function.

20. SG Narrow Range Water Level - Low 2

{For each Unit not applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High} PRHR is actuated when the SG Narrow Range Water Level reaches its Low 2 setpoint coincident with an indication of Low 2 Startup Feedwater Flow. The LCO requires four channels per steam generator to be OPERABLE to satisfy the requirements with a two-out-of-four logic. Four channels are provided to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function.

Each water level signal is compensated using steam line pressure.

The Setpoint reflects both steady state and adverse environmental instrument uncertainties as the detectors provide protection for an event that results in a harsh environment.

{For each Unit only applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High} PRHR is actuated when the SG Narrow Range Water Level reaches their Low 2 setpoint coincident with an indication of Low 2 Startup Feedwater Flows in both SGs, coincident with an indication of Tcold - High in either loop. The LCO requires four channels per steam generator to be OPERABLE to satisfy the requirements with a two-out-of-four logic for each steam generator.

Four channels are provided to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function. Each water level signal is compensated DRAFT

Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.8 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.8 - 44 Revision __77 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and APPLICABILITY (continued) using steam line pressure. The Setpoint reflects both steady state and adverse environmental instrument uncertainties as the detectors provide protection for an event that results in a harsh environment.

The ESFAS protective functions actuated by SG Narrow Range Water Level - Low 2 are:

PRHR Heat Exchanger Actuation; and SG Blowdown Isolation The SG Narrow Range Water Level - Low 2 Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and in MODE 4 when the RCS is not being cooled by the Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS). This ensures that PRHR can be actuated in the event of a loss of the normal heat removal systems. In MODE 4 when the RCS is being cooled by the RNS, and in MODES 5 and 6, the SGs are not required to provide the normal RCS heat sink.

Therefore, startup feedwater flow is not required, and PRHR actuation on Low 2 steam generator narrow range water level is not required. This ESFAS function can be manually blocked by the main control room operator when below the P-9 setpoint (Tavg interlock) and is automatically unblocked when above the P-9 setpoint. This block is necessary to permit routine maintenance without PRHR heat exchanger actuation or SG blowdown isolation.

21. SG Wide Range Water Level - Low 2 PRHR is also actuated when the SG Wide Range Water Level reaches its Low 2 Setpoint. There are four wide range level channels for each steam generator and a two-out-of-four logic is used. Four channels are provided to permit one channel to be in trip or bypass indefinitely and still ensure no single random failure will disable this trip Function. Each water level signal is compensated using steam line pressure.

The PRHR Heat Exchanger Actuation ESFAS protective function is actuated by SG Narrow Range Water Level - Low 2.

DRAFT

Technical Specifications Bases ESFAS Startup Feedwater Flow Instrumentation B 3.3.11 VEGP Units 3 and 4 B 3.3.11 - 1 Revision __71 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.11 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Startup Feedwater Flow Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND A description of the ESFAS Instrumentation is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.3.8, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCOs, and APPLICABILITY The required channels of ESFAS instrumentation provide plant protection in the event of any of the analyzed accidents ESFAS protective functions include PRHR Heat Exchanger Actuation.

{For each Unit not applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High} PRHR is actuated when the Steam Generator Narrow Range Water Level reaches its Low 2 setpoint coincident with an indication of Low 2 Startup Feedwater Flow.

{For each Unit only applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High} PRHR is actuated when Steam Generator Narrow Range Water Levels reach their Low 2 setpoint coincident with indications of Low 2 Startup Feedwater Flow for both SGs, coincident with Tcold - High in either loop.

Startup Feedwater Flow - Low 2 uses a one-out-of-two logic on each of the two startup feedwater lines. These two startup feedwater line Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, and in MODE 4 when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not being cooled by the Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS). This ensures that PRHR can be actuated in the event of a loss of the normal heat removal systems. In MODE 4 when the RCS is being cooled by the RNS, and in MODES 5 and 6, the steam generators (SGs) are not required to provide the normal RCS heat sink. Therefore, startup feedwater flow is not required, and PRHR actuation on Low 2 startup feedwater flow is not required.

ESFAS Instrumentation Startup Feedwater Flow satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this specification may be entered independently for each startup feedwater line Function. The Completion Time(s) of the inoperable equipment of each startup feedwater DRAFT Several UFSAR discussions of PRHR actuation logic would be similarly revised

15.2-24 Revision 6 VEGP 3&4 - UFSAR IIIA.

Loss of normal feedwater flow Feedwater is lost (transient initiation) 10.0 Low-2 steam generator narrow range water level reactor trip reached 61.1 Rods begin to drop 63.1 Minimum DNBR is reached 64.0 Steam generator safety valves first open 94.5 PRHR heat exchanger actuation on Low-2 steam generator narrow range water level (coincident with Low-2 start up feeedwater flow rate) 243.1 Cold leg temperature reaches Low-2 Tcold setpoint 1455.6 Reactor coolant pump trip on Low-2 Tcold S signal 1455.6 Steam line isolation on Low-2 Tcold S signal 1467.6 Core makeup tank actuation on Low-2 Tcold S signal 1587.9 Pressurizer safety valves first open

~2500 PRHR heat exchanger heat removal matches decay heat addition

~15,500 Maximum long term pressurizer water volume reached 16,500 Table 15.2-1 (Sheet 6 of 8)

Time Sequence of Events for Incidents Which Result in a Decrease in Heat Removal By the Secondary System Accident Event Time (seconds)

DRAFT 6a

{For each Unit not applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High}

For UFSAR Tables & Figures "a" and "b" versions provided

15.2-24 Revision 6 VEGP 3&4 - UFSAR IIIA.

Loss of normal feedwater flow Feedwater is lost (transient initiation) 10.0 Low-2 steam generator narrow range water level reactor trip reached 61.1 Rods begin to drop 63.1 Minimum DNBR is reached 64.0 Steam generator safety valves first open 94.5 PRHR heat exchanger actuation on Low-2 steam generator narrow range water level (coincident with Low-2 start up feeedwater flow rate) 243.1 Cold leg temperature reaches Low-2 Tcold setpoint 1455.6 Reactor coolant pump trip on Low-2 Tcold S signal 1455.6 Steam line isolation on Low-2 Tcold S signal 1467.6 Core makeup tank actuation on Low-2 Tcold S signal 1587.9 Pressurizer safety valves first open

~2500 PRHR heat exchanger heat removal matches decay heat addition

~15,500 Maximum long term pressurizer water volume reached 16,500 Table 15.2-1 (Sheet 6 of 8)

Time Sequence of Events for Incidents Which Result in a Decrease in Heat Removal By the Secondary System Accident Event Time (seconds)

DRAFT

{For each Unit only applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High}

6b 259.5 61462.0 61474.0 61462.0 and coincident with Tcold - High For UFSAR Tables & Figures "a" and "b" versions provided Example Figure next pages

15.2-68 Revision 6 VEGP 3&4 - UFSAR Figure 15.2.7-4 Pressurizer Water Volume Transient for Loss of Normal Feedwater DRAFT a

{For each Unit not applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High}

DRAFT Comparison of Change to Figure 15.2.7-4

[draft]

"b" Figure would be Green line only 16.4 sec delay 1 ft3 increase

7.2-32 Revision 10 VEGP 3&4 - UFSAR Figure 7.2-1 (Sheet 8 of 21)

Functional Diagram Loss of Heat Sink Protection MANUAL PRHR ACTUATION (TWO CONTROLS)

(NOTE 1)

LOW-2 STEAM GENERATOR 1 WATER LEVEL (NARROW RANGE)

LOW-2 STEAM GENERATOR 1 STARTUP FEEDWATER FLOW LOW-2 STEAM GENERATOR 1 WATER LEVEL (WIDE RANGE)

FIRST STAGE AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM ACTUATION OPEN PRHR DISCHARGE VALVES FB D

B B

D FB FEEDWATER FLOW STARTUP LOW-2 STEAM GENERATOR 2 (NARROW RANGE)

WATER LEVEL LOW-2 STEAM GENERATOR 2 CMT ACTUATION CLOSE STEAM GENERATOR 1 BLOWDOWN VALVES VALVES BLOWDOWN GENERATOR 2 CLOSE STEAM (NOTE 2)

(WIDE RANGE)

WATER LEVEL LOW-2 STEAM GENERATOR 2 (NOTE 2)

(NOTE 2)

WATER LEVEL PRESSURIZER HIGH-3 GUTTER ISOLATION AND CLOSE IRWST VALVES (APP PMS J1 107)

(APP PMS J1 107)

(APP PMS J1 107)

(APP PMS J1 107)

(APP PMS J1 115)

(APP PMS J1 112)

(APP PMS J1 106)

L R

S R

MOMENTARY RESET (NOTE 3)

PRHR RESET CONTROL

1. TWO MOMENTARY CONTROLS OPERATING EITHER CONTROL WILL ACTUATE ALL APPLICABLE DIVISIONS.

2. COMPONENTS ARE ALL INDIVIDUALLY SEALED IN (LATCHED), SO THAT LOSS OF THE ACTUATION SIGNAL WILL NOT CAUSE THESE COMPONENTS TO RETURN TO THE CONDITION HELD PRIOR TO THE ADVENT OF THE ACTUATION SIGNAL.

3. SEPARATE MOMENTARY CONTROLS, ONE FOR EACH APPLICABLE DIVISION.

CONFIRMATORY OPEN SIGNAL TO PRHR HL ISOLATION VALVE L

R RESET AUTO STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN ISOLATION (NOTE 3)

L R

MANUAL CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL (APP PMS J1 113)

AUTO CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL (APP PMS J1 113)

(NOTE 2)

DRAFT Tcold - High (APP-PMS-J1-109)

{For Unit 4 only applicable after startup from 4R02} {For each Unit only applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High}

b

7.2-33 Revision 10 VEGP 3&4 - UFSAR Figure 7.2-1 (Sheet 9 of 21)

Functional Diagram Steam Line Isolation 2/4 BYP PB A

A PB LOOP 1 LOOP 2 HIGH STEAM PRESSURE NEGATIVE RATE (RATE-LAG COMPENSATED)

BLOCK MOMENTARY RESET MOMENTARY (NOTE 5)

STEAMLINE / FEEDWATER ISOLATION AND SAFEGUARDS BLOCK CONTROL P-11A (LEAD-LAG COMPENSATED)

LOW-2 STEAMLINE PRESSURE LOOP 2 LOOP 1 PB A

PB BYP 2/4 2/4 BYP TO FEEDWATER ISOLATION A

TB LOOP 2 LOW-2 MANUAL STEAMLINE ISOLATION (TWO CONTROLS)

(NOTE 1)

HIGH-2 CONTAINMENT SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION ISOLATION STEAMLINE (NOTE 3)

COLD T

FEEDWATER ISOLATE STARTUP 2/4 BYP CLOSE STEAM GENERATOR "1" PORV AND PORV B

C D

B C

D B

C D

B C

D A

(NOTE 3)

CONTROL ROOM ISOLATION FROM MANUAL STEAMLINE RELIEF ISOLATION FROM CONTROL ROOM (TWO CONTROLS)

RELIEF ISOLATION MANUAL SG MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR (NOTE 1)

BLOCK VALVE GENERATOR "2" BLOCK VALVE PORV AND PORV CLOSE STEAM (NOTE 3)

(APP PMS J1 111)

(APP PMS J1 110)

(APP PMS J1 111)

(APP PMS J1 110)

(APP PMS J1 111)

2. DELETED.

NOTES:

4. DELETED.

5. SEPARATE MOMENTARY CONTROLS, ONE FOR EACH APPLICABLE DIVISION.

S R L R S R L R RESET SG1 RELIEF ISOLATION (NOTE 5)

S R L R PRESSURE RESET STEAMLINE ISOLATION (NOTE 5)

RESET SG2 RELIEF ISOLATION (NOTE 5)

B C

D B

C D

2/4 BYP 2/4 BYP A

TB LOOP 1 LOW-2 COLD T

1.

TWO MOMENTARY CONTROLS OPERATING EITHER CONTROL WILL ACTIVATE ALL APPLICABLE DIVISIONS.

3.

COMPONENTS ARE ALL INDIVIDUALLY SEALED IN (LATCHED), SO THAT LOSS OF THE ACTUATION SIGNAL WILL NOT CAUSE THESE COMPONENTS TO RETURN TO THE CONDITION HELD PRIOR TO THE ADVENT OF THE ACTUATION SIGNAL.

DRAFT b

{For Unit 4 only applicable after startup from 4R02} {For each Unit only applicable after startup from PMS modification to implement Tcold - High}

Tcold -High Tcold -High