Text

2021 Point Beach Initial License Exam Proposed Written Exam Key
	ML21264A468
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	08/12/2021
From:	Chuck Zoia; Operations Branch III
To:	; NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
	Zoia C
Shared Package
ML20139A041	List: ML21264A129; ML21264A137; ML21264A143; ML21264A146; ML21264A356; ML21264A407; ML21264A461; ML21264A468;
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	Download: ML21264A468 (342)
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QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 001 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at 7% of Rated Thermal Power Which of the following conditions would DIRECTLY result in a reactor trip signal?

A. Four CLNT FLOW LOOP bistables tripped B. Three PRZR LO PRESS bistables tripped C. Two PRZR HI PRESS bistables tripped D. One SG LO LEVEL bistable tripped RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2017 PBNP RO 1 PREVIOUS 2 NRC EXAMS K/A:

007EK2.03 Reactor Trip Knowledge of the interrelations between a reactor trip and the following:

Reactor trip status panel. (Imp 3.5/3.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine which will cause a change on the reactor trip status panel Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must understand the initial conditions, realize the status of the permissives, and determine which of the choices will cause a reactor trip based on those permissives.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 1

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

883D195 Sh 13, Pressurizer Trip Signals Logic Diagram, Rev 6 883D195 Sh 14, Steam Generator Trip Signals Logic Diagram, Rev 10 883D195 Sh 15, RC Trip Signal Logic Diagram, Rev 9 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Justification:

Given the power level, permissives P-7 (10%), P-8 (35%) are not met, AND the trip logic (2 of 3) is met, therefore PRZR HI PRESS bistables will have caused the reactor trip.

A INCORRECT: Plausible due to 4 bistables are said to be tripped, with no distinction between loops. Given that information, 3 from one loop, or 2 from each loop may be tripped, so both the single loop and two loop low flows conditions can exist simultaneously. Both signals would produce a reactor trip if the correct permissive was met.

B INCORRECT: Plausible as this is in excess of the trip logic, only 2 of 4 needed, and this is blocked until 10% power.

C CORRECT: See above explanation.

D INCORRECT: Plausible because 2 of 3 low-low SG water levels are needed to cause a trip, and only one low level when combined with a steam flow feed flow mismatch is needed, neither of which is dependent on permissives being met.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the Reactor Trips, automatic functions, and interlocks for the Reactor Protection System. Description should include actuation setpoints, actuation logic, logic acceptability, requirements to enable actuation, and protection afforded by each of the signals/processes.

(053.02.LP0361.004)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 2

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 002 Given the following:

A Safety Injection occurred on Unit 2 and the crew is currently in EOP-1.1 Unit 2, SI Termination at step 7, Check If Containment Spray Should Be Stopped Subsequently, 2RC-430, PORV, opens and fails to reclose Attempts to close 2RC-516, PORV Block Valve fail Containment pressure is 6 psig and RISING SLOWLY Which of the following conditions will require the operator to manually start the non-operating ECCS pumps?

A. Pressurizer level drops to 30%

B. RCS subcooling drops to 50°F C. RCS pressure drops to 1700 psig D. Total AFW flow to intact Steam Generators is 180 gpm Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 3

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2007 Seabrook RO 2 K/A:

008AK3.03 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Actions contained in EOP for PZR vapor space accident/LOCA (Imp 4.1/4.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to evaluate plant conditions, indicating a vapor space accident and determine actions to be taken due to this event.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must diagnose the indications and determine the procedural outcome from said indications.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.41 10 55.45 6 55.45 13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 4

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

EOP-1.1, SI Termination Unit 2 Rev 41 BG-EOP-1.1, Background SI Termination Rev 31 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

An inadvertent Safety Injection occurred and the operating crew is currently in ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION at step 7, Check if SI Pumps Should Be Stopped.

Subsequently, one PORV opens and fails to reclose. Attempts to close the PORVs associated block valve fail. Containment pressure is at 5 psig and slowly increasing.

Which of the following conditions will require the operator to manually start the non-operating charging pump?

A. Pressurizer level drops to less than 30%.

B. RCS subcooling drops to less than 40 F.

C. RCS pressure drops to less than 1700 psig.

D. Total EFW flow to intact Steam Generators is less than 500 gpm.

Proposed Answer: B Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 5

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per EOP-1.1, Foldout Page, SI Reinitiation Criteria, manually start ECCS pumps as necessary to restore subcooling and PZR level and go to EOP-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT if either condition below occurs:

RCS subcooling-Less than [62°F] 37°F.

-or-Pressurizer level-Cannot be maintained greater than [26%] 11%

A INCORRECT: Plausible. Pressurizer level is one of the ECCS pump restart criteria, however the level requirement for adverse containment is <26%, the existing pressurizer level does not warrant an ECCS pump restart.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Plausible. RCS pressure stable or increasing is one of the SI termination criteria. However, decreasing RCS pressure is not one of the ECCS reinitiation criteria, and this pressure is below the SI actuation setpoint.

D INCORRECT: Plausible. Adequate heat sink is one of the SI termination criteria in EOP-1.

Learning Objective:

RECOMMEND actions to ensure Core Cooling and Subcooling Margin are maintained.

(031.02.LP0435.011)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 6

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 003 Given the following:

Unit 1 has just been manually tripped from Rated Thermal Power due to a small break LOCA inside Containment The crew is performing EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, step 8 Check RCS temperature The following indications are noted:

Containment pressure is 7 psig and RISING SLOWLY RCS pressure is 1710 psig and LOWERING SLOWLY Pressurizer level is 11% and LOWERING RCS subcooling is 35°F and LOWERING 1P-30A and B Circ Water Pumps have tripped.

1P-15A and B SI Pumps are both running indicating 40 amps 0 gpm flow 1570 psig discharge pressure Which of the following is the next procedural action to be taken and why?

A. Place Steam Dump Mode Selector Switch in MANUAL to minimize the cooldown rate B. Shut both 1MS-2017 and 1MS-2018, MSIVs to prevent damage to the Main Condenser C. Stop both 1P-1A and 1P-1B, Reactor Coolant pumps, to prevent excessive RCS inventory loss D. Adjust 1HC-468 and 1HC-478, Atmospheric Steam Dump controllers to 1050 psig to establish pressure control in the Steam Generators Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 7

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

009EA1.09 Small Break LOCA Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a small break LOCA:

RCP (Imp 3.6/3.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the reason for action in EOP-0 that requires monitoring and operation of the RCPs during a SB LOCA.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must determine the actions to be taken, predicted from indications in an event.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.45 5 55.45 6

Reference:

EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev 70 BG-EOP-0, Background Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev 45 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 8

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per EOP-0 background document, for step 10 and for the Foldout Page, states The reason for purposely tripping the RCPs during accident conditions is to prevent excessive depletion of RCS water inventory through a small break in the RCS which might lead to severe core uncover if the RCPs were tripped for some reason later in the accident.

The criteria for tripping the RCPs, in step 10 and in the foldout page are:

IF both conditions listed below occur, THEN trip both RCPs:

RCS subcooling - LESS THAN [40°F] 31°F

SI pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW The SI Pumps are not injecting, but are capable of delivering flow when RCS pressure lowers to shutoff head of the pumps.

Also per the background document, for the step to monitor the fold-out page, it states that, The foldout page provides a list of important items that should be continuously monitored. If any of the parameters exceed their limits, the appropriate operations should be initiated.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: Plausible. The step being performed is the pressure control step. However, with Circ Water Pumps tripped, the Condenser is not available and the mode selector switch is not shifted to MANUAL.

C INCORRECT: Plausible because of the concern with damaging the Condenser by overpressurization. However, in step 8, the MSIVs are shut to control cooldown.

D INCORRECT: Plausible because the RNO for step 8 has the operators adjust the ADV controllers to 1005 psig. However, due to the issue with subcooling, the next step to be taken should be the fold-out page RCP Trip criteria.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the basis for Reactor Coolant Pump trip criteria and the conditions when Reactor Coolant Pump trip criteria does not apply.

(031.02.LP0405.009)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 9

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 004 Given the following:

The crew has entered CSP-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock due to a RED condition on the Integrity CSF Status Tree Which of the following describes the CSP-P.1 parameter that determines whether the Red condition on integrity was caused by a Large Break LOCA or an actual PTS event?

A. RVLlS level B. SG pressure C. RHR flow rate D. RCS temperature RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2007 McGuire RO 42 K/A:

011EA2.13 Large Break LOCA Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Difference between overcooling and LOCA indications (Imp 3.7/3.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to recall what procedural determined parameters identify the difference between an overcooling and LOCA event.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-F: The operator must recall what parameter identifies the difference between an overcooling or LOCA event.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.43 5 55.45 13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 10

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

CSP-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock, Rev 36 BG-CSP-P.1, Background Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock, Rev 30 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

The crew has entered FR-P.l , Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock due to a RED condition on the Integrity CSF Status Tree.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the parameter that determines whether the Red condition on NC System integrity was caused by a iarge LOCA or an actual PTS event?

A. RVLlS level B. SG pressure C. ND flow rate D. NC temperature Proposed answer: C Justification:

RHR flow indicates that RCS pressure is low and not recovering, indicating a large break LOCA A INCORRECT: Plausible, as RVLIS level could indicate both a large or small break LOCA and a small break LOCA is a PTS concern.

B INCORRECT: Plausible, SG pressure will change and could be an indication of a LOCA or steam break which is a PTS concern.

C CORRECT: See above D INCORRECT: Plausible, RCS temperature will change for a large break LOCA as well as a PTS concern (steam break).

Learning Objective:

DIFFERENTIATE between Reactor Coolant Systems leak and other accidents.

(031.02.LP0435.013)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 11

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 005 Given the following:

Unit 2 was operating at Rated Thermal Power Safety Injection has actuated A transition has been made to EOP-1.1, SI Termination No charging pumps are running Component Cooling (CC) flow to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) thermal barrier HX has been lost since the SI actuation What action IAW EOP-1.1 is initially taken associated with RCP seal cooling and what is the reason for the action?

A. CC flow is established to the RCP thermal barriers to prevent thermal shock to the RCP seals.

B. CC flow is established to the RCP thermal barriers and then a Charging Pump is started, to prevent RCP shaft warping.

C. A Charging Pump is started and then CC flow is established to the RCP thermal barriers, to prevent steam binding of the CC system.

D. RCP seal injection is isolated before starting a Charging Pump to avoid the delay of reestablishing Charging flow since RCP seals are already heated up.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 12

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2012 PBNP RO 3 (Question's original K/A was 026AK3.03)

K/A:

015/017AG2.4.6 Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

(Imp 3.7/4.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to recall the mitigation strategies in the EOP network that deal with reactor coolant pump malfunctions.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-B: The operator must understand the initial conditions, what the purpose and strategy of the procedure is and what the bases is for not reestablishing charging flow to the RCPs.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41.10 55.43.5 55.45.13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 13

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

EOP-1.1, SI Termination Rev 41 BG EOP-1.1, Background Document for SI Termination Rev 31 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

Unit 2 was operating at Rated Thermal Power Safety Injection has actuated A transition has been made to EOP-1.1, SI Termination No charging pumps are running Component Cooling (CC) flow to the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) thermal barrier HX has been lost since the SI actuation What action is initially taken associated with RCP seal cooling and what is the reason for the action?

A. CC flow is established to the RCP thermal barriers to prevent thermal shock to the RCP seals.

B. CC flow is established to the RCP thermal barriers and then a Charging Pump is started, to prevent RCP shaft warping.

C. A Charging Pump is started and then CC flow is established to the RCP thermal barriers, to prevent steam binding of the CC system.

D. RCP seal injection is isolated before starting a Charging Pump to avoid the delay of reestablishing seal cooling since RCP seals are already heated up.

Proposed Answer: D.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 14

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

With the loss of both CCW and Charging, the seal is assumed already heated up, and the seal injection is isolated from the charging system and charging is restored.

A INCORRECT: Plausible. With the loss of both CCW and Charging, the seal is assumed already heated up, and the seal injection is isolated from the charging system and charging is restored.

B INCORRECT: Plausible. With the loss of both CCW and Charging, the seal is assumed already heated up, and the seal injection is isolated from the charging system and charging is restored.

C INCORRECT: Plausible. With the loss of both CCW and Charging, the seal is assumed already heated up, and the seal injection is isolated from the charging system and charging is restored.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

IDENTIFY the bases for the steps in the Emergency Operating Procedures.

(031.02.LP0405.005)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 15

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 006 Given the following:

The crew entered CSP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS Step 4 Initiate Emergency Boration of RCS is being performed Which of the following describes the basis for opening a PORV in CSP-S.1, if Pressurizer pressure is greater than 2335 psig?

A. To prevent passing two phase flow through the safety valves.

B. To ensure PTS limits will not be exceeded when the reactor is tripped and cools down C. To minimize primary-to-secondary leakage in case of a SGTR, until other recovery actions can be taken.

D. To allow sufficient borated injection flow into the RCS to ensure the addition of negative reactivity to the core.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 16

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2011 Diablo Canyon RO 5 K/A:

022AK1.02 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Relationship of charging flow to pressure differential between charging and RCS (Imp 2.7/3.1)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine the reason for control room actions when RCS pressure is high compared to Charging Pump discharge pressure.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-B: The operator must recall the basis for the actions taken in CSP-S.1 for high PZR pressure.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 8 55.41 10 55.45 3 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 17

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

CSP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, Rev 43 BG CSP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, Rev 28 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Which of the following describes the basis for opening a PORV in FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, if pressure is greater than 2335 psig?

A. To prevent passing two phase flow through the safety valves.

B. To ensure PTS limits will not be exceeded when the reactor is tripped and cools down.

C. To minimize primary-to-secondary leakage in case of a SGTR, until other recovery actions can be taken.

D. To allow sufficient borated injection flow into the RCS to ensure the addition of negative reactivity to the core.

Proposed Answer: D Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 18

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

From CSP-S.1

Background:

The check on RCS pressure is intended to alert the operator to a condition which would reduce charging or SI pump injection into the RCS and, therefore, boration. The PRZR PORV pressure setpoint is chosen as that pressure at which flow into the RCS is insufficient. The contingent action is a rapid depressurization to a pressure which would allow increased injection flow. When primary pressure drops 200 psi below the PORV pressure setpoint, the PORVs should be shut. The operator must verify successful closure of the PORVs, closing the isolation valves, if necessary.

A INCORRECT: Plausible. 2 phase flow through safeties is a concern for accidents such as SGTR, but not the bases for this check of pressure in CSP-S.1.

B INCORRECT: Plausible. PTS is a concern for overcooling events, such as a steam break but not the bases for this check of pressure in CSP-S.1.

C INCORRECT: Plausible. SGTR is not a concern in CSP-S.1 at this time. The concern is inserting negative reactivity to shutdown power generation.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the major actions accomplished by the Subcriticality Crtitical Safety Function Procedures.

(043.03.LP1996.012)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 19

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 007 Given the following:

Unit 2 is in MODE 5 2P-10A, RHR Pump is running in decay heat removal mode per OP 7A, Placing Residual heat Removal System in Operation 2P-11A, Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump is running Bus 2B04 is currently deenergized for maintenance 2P-11A has inadvertently tripped The crew is currently in AOP-9B, Component Cooling System Malfunction, and SEP-1, Degraded RHR System Capability The crew is currently at step 25 of SEP-1, second bullet, which checks RHR differential temperature

1) Which of the following describes the RHR components that have lost cooling water flow?

2) What is the purpose of performing a check of the RHR differential temperature in this step?

A. 1) RHR heat exchanger and RHR pump seal cooler only.

2) If temperature differential is higher than expected, it indicates that RHR flow is insufficient to remove decay heat.

B. 1) RHR heat exchanger and RHR pump seal cooler only.

2) If temperature differential is lower than expected, it indicates that CCW flow is insufficient to remove decay heat.

C. 1) RHR heat exchanger, RHR pump seal cooler, and RHR pump motor lube oil cooler.

2) If temperature differential is higher than expected, it indicates that RHR flow is insufficient to remove decay heat.

D. 1) RHR heat exchanger, RHR pump seal cooler, and RHR pump motor lube oil cooler.

2) If temperature differential is lower than expected, it indicates that CCW flow is insufficient to remove decay heat.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 20

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2016 Beaver Valley Unit 1 RO 7 K/A:

025AK2.03 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System Knowledge of the interrelations between Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following: Service water or closed cooling water pumps (Imp 2.7/2.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the interrelationship between RHR System and CCW System, including the implication of a CCW Pump failure on RHR Decay Heat Removal.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must recognize the interaction between RHR and CCW including implications of failures on each other.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 21

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

SEP-1, Degraded RHR System Capability Rev 22 BG SEP-1, Background Degraded RHR System Capability Rev 6 110E029 SH 1, Unit 2 Auxiliary Coolant, Rev 57 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following initial conditions:

Plant is in Mode 5

1RH-P-1A, 'A' RHR pump is running

1CC-P-1A, 'A' CCR pump is running

DF bus is cleared for maintenance Final conditions:

1CC-P-1A, 'A' CCR pump trips on overcurrent

1CC-P-1C, 'C' CCR pump failed to start

Crew is performing AOP 1.15.1, Loss of Primary Component Cooling Water in conjunction with AOP 1.10.1, Loss of Residual Heat Removal Capability

1) Which of the following describes the RHR components that have lost cooling water flow?

2) What is the reason for monitoring RHS inlet temperature at this time?

A. 1) RHR Hx and RHR pump seal cooler only.

2) If temperature exceeds 180°F, the RHR pumps must be tripped to prevent cavitation.

B. 1) RHR Hx and RHR pump seal cooler only.

2) If temperature exceeds 180°F, the RHR pump must be tripped to prevent seal damage.

C. 1) RHR Hx, RHR pump seal cooler, and RHR pump motor lube oil cooler.

2) If temperature exceeds 180°F, the RHR pumps must be tripped to prevent cavitation.

D. 1) RHR Hx, RHR pump seal cooler, and RHR pump motor lube oil cooler.

2) If temperature exceeds 180°F, the RHR pump must be tripped to prevent seal damage.

Proposed Answer: B.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 22

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

At Point Beach, CCW supplies the RHR Heat Exchangers, 1(2)HX-11A/B, and the RHR Pump Seal Coolers, 1(2)HX-114A/B. The motors are air cooled.

Per the background document for SEP-1 for step 25:

This step directs the operator to check RCS and RHR system temperature indications to ensure decay heat is being removed. RCS temperatures are checked to indicate that RHR cooling flow is sufficient to remove decay heat. RHR differential temperatures are checked to ensure the component cooling and service water systems are functional in removing heat from the RHR heat exchangers.

In this step, the term "RHR differential temperature consistent with heat load" refers to indicated difference between the inlet and outlet temperatures on TR-630. The temperature difference should be proportional to the decay heat load on the system. If the differential temperature is lower than expected, it could indicate that component cooling flow through the RHR heat exchanger is not sufficient to remove the decay heat.

A INCORRECT: Plausible because the components are correct. However, per the SEP background, RCS temperature higher than expected is indicative of RHR flow being insufficient for decay heat load.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Plausible since many large motor have water cooled heat exchangers. RHR does not. And per the SEP background, RCS temperature higher than expected is indicative of RHR flow being insufficient for decay heat load.

D INCORRECT: Plausible the reason for checking differential temperature is correct. However, there is no CCW to the RHR motors.

Learning Objective:

PREDICT the effect of a RHR support system malfunction on the RHR and RCS systems during RHR cooldown.

(051.03.LP0069.011)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 23

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 008 Given the following:

Unit 1 is in EOP-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - Low Head Injection 1P-11B, Component Cooling Pump was isolated for a seal leak The crew is establishing Component Cooling Flow to RHR Heat Exchangers What effect will the Component Cooling lineup have on the actions taken in EOP-1.3?

A. Transition to ECA-1.1, Loss of Containment Sump Recirculation to recover the isolated Component Cooling pump B. Only one RHR heat exchanger should be aligned and ONLY that train will be used for sump recirc C. Only one RHR heat exchanger should be aligned and BOTH trains will be used for sump recirc D. Both RHR heat exchangers should be aligned and BOTH trains will be used for sump recirc Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 24

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

026AK3.03 Loss of Component Cooling Water Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: Guidance actions contained in EOP for Loss of CCW (Imp 4.0/4.2)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to understand the initial condition and determine what effect on the overall mitigation and lineup being performed by the procedure in effect.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must understand the initial conditions, the CCW pump being isolated, determine the effect this will have on the RHR line up and how that will affect the sump recirc lineup.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41.5 55.41.10 55.45.6 55.45.13

Reference:

EOP-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - Low Head Injection, Rev 59 BG EOP-1.3, Background Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - Low Head Injection, Rev 39 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 25

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

With one CCW pump isolated, the ability of CCW to cool RHR has been reduced. Only one RHR heat exchanger should be lined up. With the limit of only one RHR heat exchanger, only that train of sump recirc should be available for sump recirc.

A INCORRECT: Plausible because this does affect the recirc capability, but does not stop the use of both trains..

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: .Plausible, if the student thinks only one RHR heat exchanger is required to make both trains of sump recirc available.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if the student thinks only one CCW pump is needed, similar to normal system operations which only requires one pump running.

Learning Objective:

Diagnose and respond to the following conditions:

b. Loss of Component Cooling Water (055.03.LP2444.009)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 26

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 009 Given the following:

Unit 1 is responding to a loss of offsite power Both G01 and G03, Emergency Diesel Generators have started and loaded onto their respective buses Safety Injection did NOT actuate Pressurizer level is 25%

What must be done to energize 1T-1C, Backup Group C Heaters?

A. Turn the 1T-1C control switch to OFF.

Then turn the 1T-1C control switch to ON.

B. Reset the 1B-03 Non Safeguards Equipment lockout.

Leave the 1T-1C control switch in AUTO.

C. Restore power to 1B-01, 480V Non-Safeguards bus.

Then turn the 1T-1C control switch to ON.

D. Place 1HC-431K, Pressurizer Pressure Controller, in MANUAL and raise the controller output.

Leave the 1T-1C control switch in AUTO.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 27

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2019 PBN Question 8 PREVIOUS 2 NRC EXAMS K/A:

027AA1.04 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfunction Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Pressure recovery, using emergency-only heaters.

(Imp 3.9*/3.6*)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to recall the actions necessary to energize an emergency set of pressurizer heaters.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-I: Requires the operator to recall the interlocks and actions necessary to energize the emergency pressurizer heaters.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 5 55.45 6 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 28

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

AOP-18A, Train A Equipment Operation Unit 1 Rev 18 883A195 Sh 9, Safeguards Sequence Logic Drawing Rev 19 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

Unit 1 is responding to a loss of offsite power Both G01 and G03, Emergency Diesel Generators have started and loaded onto their respective buses Safety Injection did NOT actuate Pressurizer level is 25%

What must be done to energize 1T-1C, Backup Group C Heaters?

A. Turn the 1T-1C control switch to OFF.

Then turn the 1T-1C control switch to ON.

B. Reset the 1B-03 Non Safeguards Equipment lockout.

Leave the 1T-1C control switch in AUTO.

C. Restore power to 1B-01, 480V Non-Safeguards bus.

Then turn the 1T-1C control switch to ON.

D. Place 1HC-431K, Pressurizer Pressure Controller, in MANUAL and raise the controller output.

Leave the 1T-1C control switch in AUTO.

Proposed Answer: A.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 29

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Power is available for the C bank of heaters. This breaker is stripped on under voltage and can be reset by taking the associated control switch to off and back to on.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: Plausible if the operator has the misconception that the effect of the under voltage is the same as an SI. The first part is incorrect, 1B-03 has power restored via EDGs. The Equipment lockout does strip loads but is actuated with an SI, which has not occurred. Resetting this lockout is a common task in the EOP network. The second part is incorrect, this action will not reset the heaters, plausible if this operator has the misconception that the heaters ride the bus similar to other equipment which does that.

C INCORRECT: Plausible if the operator incorrectly recalls the power supply to the pressurizer heaters also if the operator has a misconception of breaker operation and does not recall this breaker needs to be reset. The first part is incorrect, power to 1B-01 is not restored via EDGs, this bus is still de-energized with the loss of offsite power. The second part is incorrect, to reset heaters the control switch must be taken to off first.

D INCORRECT: Plausible because in normal no loss of power situation, taking HC-431K to manual is a way to turn on pressurizer heaters and raise or maintain pressure and if this operator has the misconception that the heaters ride the bus similar to other equipment which does that. The first part is incorrect. The second part is incorrect, this action will not reset the heaters.

Learning Objective:

Given access to the Site Specific Simulator or specific plant conditions, RESPOND to the following conditions:

Turbine Generator Voltage Regulator failure Loss of Main Generator Hydrogen pressure Total collapse of 345 KV system frequency Loss of electrical buses (055.03.LP2440.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 30

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 010 Given the following:

Unit 1 was at Rated Thermal Power Supply breaker to 1B-03, 480V Safeguards bus trips Supply breaker to 1B-04, 480V Safeguards bus trips Conditions indicated the need for a manual reactor trip After pushing the Reactor trip pushbuttons on 1C04 and C02 the crew transitioned to CSP-S.1, Respond to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS The following indications are noted:

1-52/RTA and 1-52/RTB, Reactor Trip Breakers, indicate closed NI power, on 1NI-41 through 1NI-44, is still 100% power The Main Turbine has not tripped The OATC is driving Control Rods in MANUAL (1) BEFORE the Reactor Trip Breakers are opened, which indication(s) can be used determine Control Rod position?

AND (2) Reactor trip breakers and ___(2)___ will be used to determine if the reactor has been tripped.

(IRPI, Individual Rod Position Indication)

A. (1) IRPI and Rod bottom lights (2) Rod bottom lights B. (1) Control Rod Group Step Counters ONLY (2) Rod bottom lights C. (1) IRPI and Rod bottom lights (2) Neutron flux lowering D. (1) Control Rod Group Step Counters ONLY (2) Neutron flux lowering Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 31

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

029EA2.08 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to an ATWS: Rod bank step counters and RPI.

(Imp 3.4/3.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify which Control Rod indications are available after a power failure during an ATW.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-I: The operator needs to recall the power supply for the rod control system, and determine rod position at power and what is used after trip.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.43 5 55.45 13

Reference:

CSP-S.1, Respond to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS, Rev 43 MDB 3.2.11 1Y06 Instrument Panels, Rev 18 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 32

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

With the power loss, power to the IRPI and Rod bottoms will be lost. The control rod bank step counters will be the only indication of where the rods are and which direction they are moving, besides the rod speed indicator and rod direction bistable (light). The operator will use the control rod bank step counters until the reactor trip breakers are operated locally. When the trip breakers are open neutron flux will be utilized due to IRPI and rod bottom lights not having power.

A INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible if the operator does not recall the loss of 1B-03 will affect the IRPI indication. The second part is wrong, plausible if the operator does not recall the loss of 1B-03 will affect the rod bottom light indications.

B INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part is wrong, plausible if the operator does not recall the loss of 1B-03 will affect the rod bottom light indications.

C INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible if the operator does not recall the loss of 1B-03 will affect the IRPI indication. The second part is correct, this will be used with the reactor trip breaker indications due to no direct indication of rod height in the control room.

D CORRECT: See above Learning Objective:

IDENTIFY the proper Control Board indications for implementing procedural steps in the EOPs.

(031.02.LP0405.011)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 33

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 011 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at Rated Thermal Power when an event occurred The following indications are present:

1P-1A and 1P-1B, Reactor Coolant Pumps - RUNNING Containment pressure is 0.4 psig and STABLE RCS Subcooling, based on CETs is DEGRADING Pressurizer pressure and level are LOWERING SLOWLY Steam Generator A and B levels are 64% and STABLE Steam Generator A and B steam flows are EQUAL SG A Feedwater Flow, is 3.5X106 pph and LOWERING SLOWLY SG B Feedwater Flow is 4X106 pph and STABLE The RMS Server is alarming Subsequently the crew has manually tripped the reactor and is carrying out EOP actions Which of the following describes the action the crew must take to mitigate the event?

A. Stop the Reactor Coolant Pumps due to a Reactor Coolant Loop A leak B. Stop feeding the B Steam Generator due to a Faulted B Steam Generator C. Cooldown and Depressurize the RCS due to a Ruptured A Steam Generator D. Isolate feed flow into, and steam flow out of, B Steam Generator due to a Ruptured B Steam Generator Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 34

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

NEW Question History:

None K/A:

038EG2.4.21 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.

(Imp 4.0/4.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify, from various indications, the Steam Generator Tube Rupture in progress and determine actions to maintain core cooling and minimize radioactive release.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must determine, from varied indications, the event in progress and determine a course of action.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.43 5 55.45 12

Reference:

EOP-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev 57 BG EOP-3, Background Steam Generator Tube Rupture Rev 39 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 35

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The combination of indications point to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR). Per EOP-3 and its background, cooling down and depressurizing the RCS to at or below ruptured Steam Generator pressure will stop the flow of Reactor Coolant into the Steam Generator.

A INCORRECT: Plausible because RCS and Pressurizer response, as well as subcooling, are similar between an RCS leak into or out of containment and a SGTR. If the leak was from the RCS to atmosphere, stopping the RCPs would aid in slowing down the leak.

B INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee misinterprets the differences in Steam Generator response. Stopping feed into the Steam Generator would cause it to eventually dry out and thus stop the leak.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Plausible due to indications point to a SGTR. However, indications point to A S/G. While isolating feed flow and steam flow will mitigate consequences, such as minimizing rad release, the RCS will still be flowing into the Steam Generator.

Learning Objective:

IDENTIFY plant conditions that distinguish between a faulted and ruptured Steam Generator.

(031.02.LP0441.007)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 36

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 012 Given the following:

Unit 2 has experienced a total loss of Main Feedwater and Auxiliary Feedwater The crew is performing the actions of CSP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Bleed and Feed has been initiated Both steam generators are dry Core Exit Thermocouples are 555°F, LOWERING SLOWLY The capability to feed all steam generators using 2P-53, MDAFW, pump has been restored Per CSP-H.1 and the associated background document:

(1) What action should be taken?

AND (2) What is the reason for the action?

A. (1) Fully open ONE MDAFW flow control MOV to a steam generator (2) To restore a heat sink B. (1) Fully open BOTH MDAFW flow control MOV to the steam generators (2) To restore a heat sink C. (1) Throttle open ONE MDAFW flow control MOV to establish 50 gpm to one steam generator (2) To minimize excessive thermal stresses D. (1) Throttle open both MDAFW flow control MOV to establish AFW flow of 50 gpm to BOTH steam generators (2) To minimize excessive thermal stresses.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 37

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Modified Question History:

2016 Diablo Canyon 50 K/A:

054AK3.03 Loss of Main Feedwater Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): Manual control of AFW flow control valves (Imp 3.8/4.1)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify method and reasoning for feeding Steam Generators, following feed and bleed, based on conditions.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must recall the foldout page criteria for feeding the Steam Generators from AFW, including the implications of not performing the correct steps.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.41 10 55.45 6 55.45 13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 38

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

CSP-H.1 Unit 2, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev 48 BG CSP-H.1, Background Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev 31 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given:

A total loss of Main Feedwater and Auxiliary Feedwater occurs

The crew is performing the actions of FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink

Bleed and Feed has been initiated

All steam generators are dry

Core Exit Thermocouples are 555°F, rising slowly The capability to feed all steam generators using the TDAFW pump has been restored.

Per FR-H.1 and the associated background document, what action should be taken and what is the reason for the action?

A. Fully open one TDAFW LCV to a steam generator to restore a heat sink.

B. Fully open all TDAFW LCVs to the steam generators to restore a heat sink C. Throttle open one TDAFW LCV to establish approximately 100 gpm to one steam generator to minimize excessive thermal stresses.

D. Throttle open all TDAFW LCVs to establish AFW flow of approximately 100 gpm to each steam generator to minimize excessive thermal stresses.

Proposed Answer: A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 39

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The procedural direction with all steam generators dry, AND CET not rising is to feed one steam generator at a rate of 50 gpm. The reason for is minimize thermal stress to the Steam Generator, while restoring the heat sink.

A INCORRECT: Maximum flow to one steam generator is to be used if core exit thermocouples are rising. Plausible because 50 gpm is the flow rate to one dry steam generator if core exit temperatures are lowering. Additionally, the reason for any limit on feed flow is to reduce thermal stress.

B INCORRECT: Only one steam generator is used in order to limit potential faults to only that steam generator. Plausible because the need to re-establish a heat sink is urgent and the MDAFW pump would normally be used to feed all steam generators.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Only one steam generator is used in order to limit potential faults to only that steam generator. Plausible because the MDAFW pump would normally be used to feed all steam generators, and 50 gpm would be used if core exit temperatures were stable or lowering. Additionally, the reason for any Feed flow limit is to reduce thermal stress.

Learning Objective:

Given a set of plant conditions, DESCRIBE the SG feed flow restrictions following RCS Bleed and Feed IAW CSP-H.1 (043.03.LP1998.008)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 40

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 013 Given the following:

Due to an earthquake a loss of all Offsite Power has occurred G01 and G02, Emergency Diesel Generators, will not start NONE of the output breakers for G03 or G04 will CLOSE The crew is responding to the loss of power with ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power Concerning the 125 VDC Battery System:

What is the period of time that the safety-related battery system is credited to maintain terminal voltage above the minimum required for coping with this event at full load?

A. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months B. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months C. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months D. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

055EK1.01 Station Blackout Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout: Effect of battery discharge rates on capacity (Imp 3.3/3.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the operational implications of battery capacity during a Station Blackout.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-F: The operator must recall a design basis fact about the 125 VDC system and relate that to battery capacity during a loss of all AC Power.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41.8 55.41.10 55.45.3 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 41

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

ECA-0.0 Loss of All AC Power Unit 1 Rev 75 BG ECA-0.0, Background Loss of All AC Power Rev 40 FSAR Appendix 1, Version UFSAR 2013 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Justification:

Per UFSAR 8.7.3, Safety related station batteries D-05, D-06, D-105, and D-106 have been sized to carry their expected shutdown loads following a plant trip/LOCA and loss of offsite power or following a station blackout for a period of one hour without battery terminal voltage falling below either:

(1) the design minimum battery terminal voltage (equivalent to 1.75 volts per cell for battery considerations), or (2) the minimum battery terminal voltage required to maintain the most limiting component, and therefore all fed components, operable.

Per UFSAR Appendix 1, the standard coping strategy time requirements were 2, 4, 8, and 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months . Prior to system modifications, PBNPs coping time was 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , then revised to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Per ECA-0.0 background, actions to restore AC power are described for re-energizing the battery chargers within one hour.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: Plausible because a 2-hour coping strategy is one of the industry standard coping times.

C INCORRECT: Plausible because a 4-hour coping strategy was the PBNP standard prior to the incorporation of D-03 and D-04 batteries and G-03 and G-04 Diesel Generators.

D INCORRECT: Plausible because an 8-hour coping strategy is one of the industry standard coping times.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the function and/or purpose, design bases, and operating characteristics of the Direct Current (DC) Electrical System.

(054.03.LP0121.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 42

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 014 Given the following:

Both Units are at Rated Thermal Power Annunciator 2C20 A 3-1, WHITE INVERTER TROUBLE alarms The AO reports that 1DY-03, White 125V DC/ 120V AC Inverter appears to be failing Which of the following components is designed to AUTOMATICALLY assume the loads supplied by 1DY-03 in case of a failed inverter?

A. Y-15, 120V Instrument Bus Alt Source Distribution Panel B. 2DY-03, White 125V DC/ 120V AC Inverter C. DY-0C, White 125V DC/ 120V AC Inverter D. 1Y-06, Vital Instrument Panel RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

057AG2.1.28 - Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus Knowledge of the purpose and function of major components and controls.

(Imp 4.1/4.1)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the function of major components of the system.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-F: The operator must recall a fact about the components of the 120 VAC Instrument AC system.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 43

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

ARP 2C20 A 3-1, White Inverter Trouble, Rev 6 UFSAR 2020, Section 8.6.

Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Justification:

Per UFSAR section 8.6.3, Upon a loss of an inverter, the instrument bus will automatically transfer to a non-safety-related 120 VAC bus (Y-15 or Y-16) if available.

UFSAR Figure 8.6.2 shows that the White and Yellow Inverters receive their backup supply from Y-15. Fig. 8.6.1 shows Y-16 supplying the Blue and Red Inverters.

A INCORRECT: Plausible because 2DY-03 also supplies White Instrument AC power. However, Unit 2 inverters cannot supply Unit 1 and vice versa.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Plausible because Y-16 does supply backup power to inverters.

However it is the Red and Blue inverters.

D INCORRECT: Plausible because DY-0C will be used to assume the loads supplied by 1DY-03 until 1DY-03 can be repaired. However, this is a manual evolution only.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the function and/or purpose, design basis, and operating characteristics of the Instrument Bus Electrical System.

(054.02.LP0123.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 44

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 015 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at Rated Thermal Power Annunciator C01A 1-9, INSTRUMENT AIR HEADER PRESSURE LOW is LIT If a ruptured Instrument Air header is causing a continuous lowering of Instrument Air header pressure, which of the following will require a Reactor Trip due to the loss of Instrument Air?

A. Loss of Feedwater Heater Level control B. Loss of Pressurizer Spray valve control C. Loss of Letdown Orifice Isolation valve control D. Loss of Main Feedwater flow control valves control RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2017 PBNP RO 14 PREVIOUS 2 NRC EXAMS (Questions original K/A was 065AA2.05)

K/A:

065AA1.05 Loss of Instrument Air Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: RPS (Imp 3.3/3.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the loss of Instrument Air condition that would require actuation of RPS (Reactor Trip).

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-B: The operator must understand the initial conditions of the event, and apply the mitigation strategy of the AOP.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.45 5 55.45 6 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 45

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

AOP-5B Loss of Instrument Air Rev 49 BG AOP-5B, Background Loss of Instrument Air Rev 24 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power.

Annunciator C01A 1-9, INSTRUMENT AIR HEADER PRESSURE LOW is LIT If a ruptured Instrument Air header is causing a continuous lowering of Instrument Air header pressure, which of the following will require a Reactor Trip per AOP-5B, Loss of Instrument Air?

A. Loss of Feedwater Heater Level control B. Loss of Pressurizer Spray valve control C. Loss of Letdown Orifice Isolation valve control D. Loss of Main Feedwater flow control valves control Proposed Answer: D Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 46

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Based on system response, the loss of control to the main feedwater flow control valves will cause a lowering of steam generator levels, and manual control of the main feedwater flow control valves will not mitigate the event, so a reactor trip will be required. Also AOP-5B directs the crew to trip the reactor(s) if Main feedwater flow control valves operating as required is not met.

A INCORRECT: Plausible, as this may cause a feedwater system induced transient on the plant, but is does not require a reactor trip.

B INCORRECT: Plausible as a loss of air would cause the spray valves to fail in the closed position, but that would not require the crew to trip the reactor.

C CORRECT: Plausible as a loss if air would cause the orifice isolation valves to fail shut, but that wouldnt require a reactor trip.

D INCORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Given access to the Site Specific Simulator or specific plant conditions, APPLY the appropriate guidance provided in the applicable AOPs for various system/component malfunctions.

(055.03.LP2439.005)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 47

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 016 Given the following:

Both Units were at Rated Thermal Power Unit 1 experienced a small break LOCA The crew has manually tripped and manually initiated Safety Injection and Containment Isolation While performing the immediate actions of EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Offsite Grid voltage lowered to the point that BOTH Units buses A-01 through A-06 are reading 3900 VAC Which of the following describes the condition of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) to the above indications after 20 seconds?

A. NO EDGs are running or loaded on their buses.

B. G-01 and G-03 EDGs are running and loaded on their buses. G-02 and G-04 EDGs are NOT running or loaded on their buses.

C. G-01 and G-03 EDGs are running and loaded on their buses. G-02 and G-04 EDGs are running but NOT loaded on their buses.

D. ALL four EDGs are running and loaded on their respective buses.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 48

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

077AA2.09 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Operational status of the emergency diesel generators.

(Imp 3.9/4.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine the status of the Emergency Diesel Generators during a grid disturbance.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-DR: The operator must recall the EDG interlocks with an SI, then also with degraded voltage to determine the status of the EDGs.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.43 5 55.45 5 55.45.7 55.45.8

Reference:

STPT 21.1 Sheet 74, Protective Relay Setpoints Bus 1A05, Rev 12 883D195 Sheet 4, 4160V Bus Schemes, Rev 23 883D195 Sheet 6, Emergency Generator Starting, Rev 12 883D195 Sheet 6A, Emergency Generator Starting, Rev 5 PBE-7033 Electrical Power Distribution Diagram, Rev 14 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 49

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

STPT 21.1 Sheet 74, for 1A-05 list the setpoints for degraded voltage relays as required to be =3937V. This is true for all four safeguards buses, per Tech Specs. It also lists the time delay for degraded voltage required to be 39.14 seconds.

Per the logic prints above, degraded voltage has 2 paths for each bus/ EDG.

The first is the time delayed version of approximately 3955 VAC for 40 seconds, measure on each bus, will cause a trip of the normal supply to the respective buses 1(2)A-05 and 1(2)A-06. This also sends a signal to start the respective EDG and allow it to load on its bus.

The second path is if an SI signal is generated on either unit along with the degraded voltage condition, the above actions will occur without the 40 second time delay.

A INCORRECT: Plausible if the student does not recall the SI link to degraded voltage which eliminates the 40 second time delay.

B INCORRECT: Plausible because G-01 and G-03 will be running and loaded.

However, G-03 and G-04 will also be running and loaded on their buses. It is plausible if the student does not recall the SI link to degraded voltage which eliminates the 40 second time delay.

C INCORRECT: Plausible because G-01 and G-03 will be running and loaded.

However, G-03 and G-04 will also be running and loaded on their buses.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Assess interlock permissives and automatic functions associated with operation of the AC electrical distribution system.

(055.03.LP2440.009)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 50

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 017 Given the following:

Unit 1 experienced a LOCA ECA-1.1, Loss of Containment Sump Recirculation, is the procedure in effect due to the inability to open either Containment Sump 'B' suction valves which has resulted in a loss of containment sump recirculation The following indications are noted:

Containment Pressure is 15 psig VCT level is 52%

RWST level is 4%

RCS Pressure is 26 psig The crew has just determined that 100 gpm is the required minimum injection flow Based on these indications, which of the following actions will the crew take to maintain core cooling?

(1SI-866A/B, SI Pump Discharge Header MOV)

(1RH-625, RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet FCV)

A. Charging Pumps must be aligned to the VCT and started to establish 100 gpm charging flow.

B. One RHR Pump must be started and 100 gpm established by throttling 1RH-625.

C. One Safety Injection Pump must be started and 100 gpm injection flow established by throttling the respective 1SI-866A/B.

D. Both Safety Injection Pumps must be started and 50 gpm each established by throttling both 1SI-866A and B.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 51

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2003 PBNP RO 17 K/A:

E11EK1.3 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation): Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation)

(Imp 3.6/4.0)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify steps to be taken due to indications provided during a loss of Containment Sump Recirculation to recover injection.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must understand the initial conditions, and determine what actions will be necessary to re-establish injection flow.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41.8 55.41.10 55.45 3 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 52

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

ECA-1.1, Loss of Containment Sump Recirculation Rev 45 STPT 11.1, Safety Injection System General Instrumentation Channels, Rev 20 ARB C01 B 3-9, 1T-13 RWST Level Low-Low, Rev 5 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Following a LOCA, the inability to open either Containment Sump 'B' suction valve has resulted in a loss of containment sump recirculation. All other equipment has functioned normally. ECA-1.1, Loss of Containment Sump Recirculation, is the procedure in effect. The following indications are noted:

- Containment Pressure = 15 psig

- VCT level = 52%

- RWST level = 4%

- RCS Pressure = 26 psig The crew has just determined that 100 gpm is the required minimum injection flow.

Based on these indications, which of the following actions will the crew take to maintain core cooling?

A. Charging Pumps must be aligned to the VCT and started to establish 100 gpm charging flow.

B. One Safety Injection Pump must be started and 100 gpm injection flow established by throttling the respective 1SI-866A/B (SI Pump Discharge Header MOV).

C. Both Safety Injection Pumps must be started and 50 gpm each established by throttling both 1SI-866A and B.

D. One RHR Pump must be started and 100 gpm established by throttling 1RH-625, RHR Hx Outlet Flow Control Valve.

Proposed Answer: A.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 53

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per ECA-1.1 Foldout page, if RWST is less than 10%, then place the effected pumps in pull-out

RWST level - LESS THAN 10% for RHR, SI and charging pumps Once minimum flow has been determined, if less than 140 gpm, it will be established using charging pump with suction lined up to the VCT, with RHR and SOI pumps being stopped.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: Plausible, as this will provide the minimum required injection of 100 gpm, but is not procedurally allowed unless required minimum flow is 525 gpm using a desired RHR pump.

C INCORRECT: Plausible, as this will provide the minimum required injection of 100 gpm, but is not procedurally allowed unless required minimum flow cannot be established using a charging, which there is nothing preventing that in the stem.

D INCORRECT: Plausible, as this will provide the minimum required injection of 100 gpm, but is not procedurally allowed unless required minimum flow cannot be established using a charging, which there is nothing preventing that in the stem Learning Objective:

Given a set of plant conditions, RESPOND to a Loss of Containment Sump Recirculation in accordance with ECA-1.1 and BG-ECA-1.1.

(031.02.LP0465.003)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 54

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 018 While attempting to restore cooling using CSP-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, of the sources listed below, what is the proper order for attempting to restore cooling (by priority)?

(MFW - Main Feedwater)

(AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater including Standby Steam Generator Feed Pumps)

A. MFW, Condensate, AFW, Bleed and Feed B. MFW, Bleed and Feed, AFW, Condensate C. AFW, MFW, Condensate, Bleed and Feed D. AFW, MFW, Bleed and Feed, Condensate RO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2007 PBNP RO 18 K/A:

E05EK2.2 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Knowledge of the interrelations between (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following: Facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal system, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility (Imp 3.9/4.2)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the heat removal systems, and their proper operation for a loss of heat sink.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-P: The operator must recall the order of procedure steps for preference of systems to mitigate a loss of heat sink.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 55

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

CSP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev 47 BG-CSP-H.1, Background Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev 31 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

While attempting to restore cooling using CSP-H.1, "Loss of Secondary Heat Sink", what is the proper order for attempting to restore cooling (by priority)?

A. MFW, Condensate, AFW, Bleed and Feed B. MFW, Bleed and Feed, AFW, Condensate C. AFW, MFW, Condensate, Bleed and Feed D. AFW, MFW, Bleed and Feed, Condensate Proposed Answer: C.

Justification:

AFW is preferred since it is the Safety Related source. CSP-H.1 starts with TDAFW, then MDAFW, then the SSGFPs, then crosstie MDAFW from the opposite Unit. MFW is next, since it may be established with the SGs at a much higher pressure. Condensate requires depressurization of a SG to establish flow. Bleed and Feed is the least desirable due to low efficiency and radiological concerns A INCORRECT: Plausible is the student does not recall the mitigating strategy of CSP-H.1, because it contains all of the sources, but in the wrong order; refer above.

B INCORRECT: See A above.

C CORRECT: See above D INCORRECT: See A above.

Learning Objective:

Given a set of plant conditions, DIAGNOSE and RESPOND to loss of heat sink in accordance with the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function procedures.

(043.03.LP1998.003)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:55:59 AM 56

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 019 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at 75% of Rated Thermal Power A malfunction causes the indication below:

Rods start moving Rod control is placed in manual 15 seconds after the failure occurs (1) What direction were rods moving prior to rod control being placed in manual?

AND (2) How many steps must rods be moved in order to restore them to their ORIGINAL height prior to the malfunction IAW AOP-6C, Uncontrolled Motion of RCCA(s)?

(1) (2)

A. In 8 B. In 10 C. Out 8 D. Out 10 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 57

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

Modified Question History:

2015 Surry RO 1 K/A:

001AA1.02 Continuous Rod Withdrawal Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: Rod in-out-hold switch.

(Imp 3.6/3.4)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine the needed movement using the in-hold -out switch after a continuous rod withdrawal.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must determine what deviation was caused by the malfunction, how it is going to impact rods, determine direction and rod travel and speed.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41.7 55.45.5 55.45.6 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 58

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

STPT 5.1, Primary Control Systems Rod Speed Control, Rev 13 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Initial Conditions:

Reactor at 50% with a ramp to 100% in progress.

Median Tave fails such that Tave is 4.0 °F lower than Tref.

Rod Control is placed in manual 30 seconds after the failure occurs.

Which ONE of the following states:

1) The direction of rod motion before the rods were placed in manual.

2) The number of steps the control rods must be moved to restore the control rods to their ORIGINAL rod height during failure recovery.

A. 1) Out.

2) 16.

B. 1) Out.

2) 20.

C. 1) In.

2) 16.

D. 1) In.

2) 20.

Proposed Answer: B Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 59

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

With Tref > Tave, by greater than 1.5°F, rods will move out.

Rod speed will be dependent on the temperature difference. Rod speed is 8 SPM from 1.5°F to 3°F. From 3°F to 5°F rod speed increases linearly from 32 SPM to 72 SPM, therefore there is an increase of 32 SPM/°F. This temperature deviation is 4°F therefore the rod speed would be 8 SPM + 32 SPM or 40 SPM, and time the rods are able to move is 15 seconds, therefore the amount of steps need to return to the original position is 10.

A INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible is the candidate confuses the direction of rod motion caused by the failure. The second part is wrong, plausible if the candidate does not take into consideration the 8 SPM which happen until greater than a 3°F occurs.

B INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible is the candidate confuses the direction of rod motion caused by the failure. The second part is correct.

C INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part is wrong, plausible if the candidate does not take into consideration the 8 SPM which happen until greater than a 3°F occurs.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Describe system response to the following:

f. Failed Reactor Coolant Bypass loop RTD

g. Malfunctioning Turbine First Stage pressure transmitter (051.01.LP1547.008)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 60

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 020 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at Rated Thermal Power Rod D4, Control Bank C, in the N-43 quadrant, drops to the bottom of the core During recovery of Rod D4, 30 minutes later, it becomes stuck at 10 steps, and will not withdrawal or insert (1) Shutdown Margin must be verified to be within the limits of the COLR within a MAXIMUM of ___(1)___ from the initiating event.

AND (2) Due to the Xenon transient, N-43, Power Range NI (Blue), readings will start to slowly ___(2)___ over the next hour.

(Assume Turbine Load, Reactor Power, and Tave are held constant)

(1) (2)

A. 30 minutes lower B. 30 minutes rise C. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months lower D. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months rise Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 61

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2016 Callaway RO 19 K/A:

005AK1.03 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Inoperable / Stuck Control Rod: Xenon transient (Imp 3.2/3.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine the impacts of the dropped rod on xenon, and then determine what impact on the xenon will have on plant instrumentation.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must understand the initial condition, determine what effect the dropped rod will have on xenon, then what effect that will have on plant instrumentation.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41.8 55.41.10 55.45.3 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 62

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS 3.1.6, Control Bank Insertion Limits, Rev 2 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Reactor Power is 100%.

Shutdown Bank A Rod D-14, drops to the bottom of the core.

15 minutes later and during recovery of Rod D-14, it becomes stuck at position 010 and will not withdrawal or insert.

(1) Shutdown Margin must be verified to be within the limits of the COLR within a MAXIMUM of ?

And (2) Due to the Xenon transient, the Reactor Operator should expect SE NI-42B, Power Range Nuclear Instrument 42B, readings to start to slowly __(2)___ over the next hour. (Assume Turbine Load, Reactor Power, and Tave remain constant.)

A. (1) 30 minutes (2) lower B. (1) 30 minutes (2) rise C. (1) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (2) lower D. (1) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (2) rise Proposed Answer: C Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 63

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per TS 3.1.6, action A.2.1 states Verify SDM is within the limits specified in the COLR, with a completion time of 1 hr. AOP-6A, step 9, also calls out performing SDM for an operating reactor within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Given the dropped rod, and failed recovery, power is being suppressed in the area of N43. This lowers the xenon burnout by absorption but the production from iodine decay is still present and xenon concentration starts to rise which would lower the indication on N43. This is due to less neutrons leaking from the core (more are being absorbed by xenon in this area of the core.

A INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible because 30 minutes is less than a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months TS which has to be known from memory, and applies to AFD, and to reducing power <50%, and AFD is not mentioned in the stem. The second part is correct.

B INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible because 30 minutes is less than a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months TS which has to be known from memory, and applies to AFD, and to reducing power <50%, and AFD is not mentioned in the stem. The second part is wrong, plausible if the examinee does not understand the relationship between xenon production, depletion, and that relationship with neutron leakage.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part is wrong, plausible if the examinee does not understand the relationship between xenon production, depletion, and that relationship with neutron leakage.

Learning Objective:

Diagnose and respond to the following events in accordance with the appropriate procedures B. Dropped Control Rod (055.03.LP2444.006)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 64

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 021 Given the following:

RCS dilution is in progress for reactor startup Reactor trip breakers are closed Shutdown Bank rods have been withdrawn N31, Source Range Counts (RED) is reading 3 x 103 cps N32, Source Range Counts (WHITE) is reading 2 x 103 cps N35, Intermediate Range (RED) current is reading 1.5 x 10-11 amps N36, Intermediate Range (WHITE) current is reading 1.0 x 10-11 amps P-6, Power Above P-6 is not lit Suddenly N32 reading drops to < 1 cps Which of the following is a required action, if any?

A. Immediately suspend the RCS dilution B. Continue the startup and block SR trips C. Immediately open the reactor trip breakers D. Remove N32 from service and continue the startup Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 65

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

057.03.02.LP3341.002 003 K/A:

032AK3.01 Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Startup termination on source-range loss.

(Imp 3.2/3.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine the impacts of the loss of SR nuclear instrumentation on the startup from procedures and licensing documents.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must understand the initial condition, determine where in the startup procedure they are, and the actions that are required for the failure that has happened.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41.5 55.41.10 55.45.6 55.45.13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 66

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, Rev 4 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

- RCS dilution is in progress for reactor startup

- Reactor trip breakers are closed

- Shutdown Bank rods have been withdrawn

- N31, Source Range Counts (RED) is reading 3 x 103 cps

- N32, Source Range Counts (WHITE) is reading 2 x 103 cps

- N35, Intermediate Range (RED) current is reading 1.5 x 10-11 amps

- N36, Intermediate Range (WHITE) current is reading 1.0 x 10-11 amps

- Suddenly N32 reading drops to < 1 cps Which of the following is a required action, if any, based upon the inoperability of N32?

A. Immediately suspend the RCS dilution B. Continue the startup and block SR trips C. Immediately open the reactor trip breakers D. No action required - the LCO is satisfied Proposed Answer: A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 67

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per TS 3.3.1, below the P-6 interlock, the requirement for SR instruments is 2, if not, then immediately stop positive reactivity additions, which in this case is a dilution.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: Plausible because you are approaching the power level for blocking the SR, and if it fails at or near the time it is to be blocked, then blocking would have the same effect at it failing.

C INCORRECT: Plausible because there are several causes/indication where a reactor trip is procedurally directed.

D INCORRECT: Plausible as this is the common action for a failed instrument.

Learning Objective:

Given specific plant conditions, ASSESS and APPLY Technical Specification requirements as appropriate. TS 3.3.1 (057.02.LP3341.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 68

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 022 Which of the following radiation monitors would NOT be a symptom of a fuel handling accident in the spent fuel pool per AOP-8C, Fuel Handling Accident in Primary Auxiliary Building?

A. RE-220, Spent Fuel Pool Service Water Liquid Monitor B. RE-214, Aux. Building Vent Exhaust Gas Monitor C. RE-221, Drumming Area Vent Gas Monitor D. SPING 24, Drumming Area Vent SPING RO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

055.03.LP2442.008.001 K/A:

036AA2.02 Fuel Handling Incidents Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: Occurrence of a fuel handling incident (Imp 3.4/4.1)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to recall the indication of an occurrence of a fuel accident.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-I: The operator must recall the monitors with direct entry into the procedure.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.43.5 55.45.13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 69

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

AOP-8C, Fuel Handling Accident in Primary Auxiliary Building, Rev 2 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Which of the following radiation monitors would NOT be a symptom of a fuel handling accident in the spent fuel pool per AOP-8C, Fuel Handling Accident in Primary Auxiliary Building?

A. RE-220, Spent Fuel Pool Service Water Liquid Monitor B. RE-214, Aux. Building Vent Exhaust Gas Monitor C. RE-221, Drumming Area Vent Gas Monitor D. SPING 24, Drumming Area Vent SPING Proposed answer: A Justification:

AOP-8B symptoms or entry condition is abnormal activity on Containment sample/purge sample monitors of 1RE-211, 1RE-212. AOP-8B direct suspending refueling operation in the containment only.

A INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible as these both may show indications of a fuel handling incident. The second wrong, plausible as it would be the conservative thing to do.

B INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second wrong, plausible as it would be the conservative thing to do.

C INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible as these both may show indications of a fuel handling incident. The second correct.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Describe the Symptoms and Mitigating Actions for the following Abnormal Operating Procedures:

b. AOP-8C (055.03.LP2442.008)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 70

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 023 Given the following:

Both units are at Rated Thermal Power The crew transitions to AOP-40A, Control Room Abandonment Due to Fire Both units have been tripped Prior to leaving the control room, the crew will ___(1)___ for both units. This is performed to ___(2)___

(CV-200A/B/C, LTDN Orifice A/B/C Outlet CV)

(RC-430, PZR PORV)

(RC-431C, PZR PORV)

A. (1) ensure CV-200A/B/C are shut (2) prevent spurious operation B. (1) isolate RC-430 and RC-431C (2) prevent spurious operation C. (1) ensure CV-200A/B/C are shut (2) allow for remote/local operation of these valves D. (1) isolate RC-430 and RC-431C (2) allow for remote/local operation of these valves Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 71

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2013 Robinson RO 23 K/A:

067EK1.02 Plant Fire On Site Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Plant Fire on Site: Fire Fighting (Imp 3.1/3.9)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to recall the operational implications of why the block valves are operated.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-P: The operator must recall the steps and reason for their performance.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 8 55.41.10 55.45.3 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 72

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

AOP-40A, Control Room Abandonment due to Fire, Rev 7 BG AOP-40A, Background Document for Control Room Abandonment due to Fire, Rev 0 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following plant conditions:

-A fire breaks out on the RTGB

-The crew has entered AOP-041, RESPONSE TO FIRE EVENT, and subsequently, DSP-OO1, ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN DIAGNOSTIC

-The crew has tripped the reactor CVC-200 A/B/C, LTDN ORIFICE PCV-455C, PZR PORV PCV-456, PZR PORV Which ONE (1) of the following completes the statements below?

Prior to leaving the control room, the QAC will (1) . This is performed to (2)

A. (1) Verify CVC-200 A/B/C closed (2) prevent spurious operation B. (1) Isolate PCV-456 & PCV-455C (2) prevent spurious operation C. (1) Verify CVC-200 A/B/C closed (2) allow for remote operation of these valves D. (1) Isolate PCV-456 & PCV-455C (2) allow for remote operation of these valves Proposed Answer: B Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 73

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

These components are a spurious depressurization and inventory loss concern due to direct cable damage, which could cause the valve to fail open is a shot smart short occurs.

A INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible because letdown valves are operated using control room abandonment, and could cause a loss of RCS pressure. The second part is correct.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible because letdown valves are operated using control room abandonment, and could cause a loss of RCS pressure. The second part is wrong, plausible as these valves are operated locally.

D INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part is wrong, plausible as valves in this procedure are set up for local/remote operation.

Learning Objective:

Describe the major action of AOP-10 and the AOP-40 series procedures to include:

a. Actions taken prior to abandoning the control room (055.03.LP1275.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 74

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 024 Given the following:

Unit 1 has a Large Break LOCA in progress RCS Cold Leg is 405°F and LOWERING RCS pressure is 260 psig and LOWERING Highest Core Exit Thermocouple is 510°F and RISING SLOWLY Containment pressure is 61 psig and RISING SLOWLY

'A' Steam Generator narrow range level is 40% and STABLE

'B' Steam Generator narrow range level is 55% and STABLE Total Auxiliary Feedwater flow is 200 gpm and STABLE Pressurizer level is 0%

NR RVLIS indicates 12 ft EOP-0, Reactor trip and Safety Injection, Attachment A is complete Which of the following describes the procedural transition upon exit from EOP-0, based upon assessment of the Critical Safety Function Status Trees?

A. CSP-C.2, Respond to Degraded Core Cooling (orange path)

B. CSP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (red path)

C. CSP-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure (red path)

D. CSP-I.2, Response to Low Pressurizer Level (yellow path)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 75

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

E14G2.4.04 High Containment Pressure Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.

(Imp 4.5/4.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to recall the entry conditions for containment high pressure procedure.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator understand the initial conditions, and determine which conditions warrant actions, and which procedure to enter.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.41.10 55.45.6 55.45.13

Reference:

CSP-ST.0 Critical Safety Function Status Trees, Rev 15 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 76

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

This condition is met: Containment pressure > 60 psig A INCORRECT: Plausible, with no RCPs running, narrow range reactor vessel level needs to be greater than 14 feet.

B INCORRECT: Plausible, feed and one steam generator meet entry into H.1, but the other steam generator being above the required level negates this.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Plausible, the conditions met, but not a required entry condition to transition to.

Learning Objective:

Evaluate the red path and orange path entry conditions for CSP-Z.1and Z.2 (043.03.LP2000.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 77

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 025 Given the following:

The crew has entered CSP-H.2, Response to Steam Generator Overpressure Steam Generator pressures are:

Steam Generator 'A'; 1050 psig Steam Generator B': 1150 psig Why does Step 5 of CSP-H.2 direct controlling Steam Generator 'B' pressure to less than 1105 psig?

A. To reduce RCS temperature in order to ensure primary system integrity B. To prevent lifting the Steam Generator code safety valves and causing a radiological release C. To decrease pressure below the highest steamline safety valve setpoint to ensure secondary integrity D. To maintain Steam Generator pressure low enough to ensure adequate total auxiliary feedwater flow Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 78

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2011 Seabrook RO 26 K/A:

E13EK3.2 Steam Generator Overpressure Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure): Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations.

(Imp 3.2/3.4)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to recall knowledge of for the reasons of the control manipulations.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-B: The operator must recall the reason the actions are being carried out.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.41.10 55.45.6 55.45.13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 79

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

BG CSP-H.2 Response to Steam Generator Overpressure, Rev 15 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following plant conditions:

The crew has entered FR-H.2, "Response to Steam Generator Overpressure."

Steam Generator pressures are:

~ Steam Generator 'A'; 1100 psig.

~ Steam Generator

B': 1240 psig.

~ Steam Generator 'C'; 1100 psig.

~ Steam Generator 'D': 1100 psig.

Why does Step 5 ofFR-H.2, "Response to Steam Generator Overpressure" direct reducing Steam Generator 'B' pressure to less than 1225 psig?

A. To reduce RCS temperature in order to ensure primary system integrity.

B. To prevent lifting the Steam Generator code safety valves and causing a radiological release.

C. To decrease pressure below the highest steamline safety valve setpoint to ensure secondary integrity.

D. To maintain Steam Generator pressure low enough to ensure adequate total emergency feedwater flow.

Proposed Answer: C Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 80

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The background document states If pressure is lowering but is not below the highest steamline safety valve setpoint, the operator is direction to return to Step 3 and continue monitoring level and releasing steam. If steam release lowers the affected SG(s) pressure to less than the highest steam line safety valve setpoint, then the steam release is controlled to maintain pressure and the operator is instructed to return to the procedure. In effect.

A INCORRECT: Plausible, part of the overall strategy of CSP-H.2 is to reduce RCS temperature however the purpose of that step is to mitigate any excessive heat transfer that may be causing the overpressure condition in the steam generator.

B INCORRECT: Plausible, reducing steam generator pressure is associated with steam generator safety valve performance however it is to ensure that pressure is within the safety valve relieving capacity versus being below the lowest valve actuation point. The concern regarding radiological release is also plausible as the safety valves offer a direct release path, however this concern is associated with the condition where there is elevated radiation as in the case of a steam generator tube rupture.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Plausible, CSP-H safety function does take into account the need for adequate feed flow to the steam generators however the generator pressure concern addresses the need to isolate feed flow to the effected generator to remove it as a contributing factor to the over pressurization.

Learning Objective:

From memory, state the purpose of each of the Heat Sink Critical Safety Procedures (043.03.LP1998.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 81

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 026 Given the following:

A small break LOCA has occurred on Unit 1 Condenser vacuum is 18" Hg 1P-30A, Circulating Water pump is running Maximum charging has been established RCS pressure is 1200 psig and STABLE Core Exit TCs are 520°F and RISING The crew is performing EOP-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization Which describes the method and rate at which the RCS cooldown will occur in accordance with EOP-1.2?

A. Condenser steam dumps will be used at the maximum achievable rate. RCS cooldown rate limits do not apply for this condition.

B. Condenser steam dumps will be used at less than 100°F per hour cooldown rate.

C. SG ADVs will be used at the maximum achievable rate. RCS cooldown rate limits do not apply for this condition.

D. SG ADVs will be used at less than 100°F per hour cooldown rate.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 82

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2016 Summer RO 25 K/A:

E03EK2.1 LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization) and the following: Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

(Imp 3.6/4.0)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to evaluate the conditions during an event requiring a post-LOCA cooldown and depressurization determining what actions/components operations are needed.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must understand the initial conditions, determine what method of cooldown will be utilized, and to what rate it is required to be performed.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 8 55.41.10 55.45.3 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 83

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

EOP-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, Rev 37 BG EOP-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, Rev 26 STPT 14.2 Condensate and Feedwater, Rev 36 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following plant conditions:

A small break LOCA has occurred.

Condenser pressure is 6" Hg.

All Circulating Water pumps are running.

RCS pressure is 1100 psig and stable.

"A" Charging pump is running with lower than normal amperage.

"B" Charging pump is OFF.

Core Exit TCs are 570°F and rising.

The crew is performing actions contained in EOP-2.1, ES-1.2 POST-LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION.

Which ONE of the following describes the method and rate at which the RCS cooldown will occur in accordance with EOP-2.1?

A. Condenser steam dumps will be used at the maximum achievable rate. RCS cooldown rate limits do not apply for this condition.

B. Condenser steam dumps will be used at less than 100°F per hour cooldown rate.

C. S/G PORVs will be used at the maximum achievable rate. RCS cooldown rate limits do not apply for this condition.

D. S/G PORVs will be used at less than 100°F per hour cooldown rate.

Proposed Answer: D Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 84

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

SG ADVs will be used to cooldown, due to condenser steam dumps not being available because of vacuum level in the condensers. The cooldown is limited in EOP-1.2 to a rate of < 100°F/hr A INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible because the condenser steam dumps are used to cooldown when available. The second part is wrong, plausible because this is the cooldown rate that is utilized in EOP-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

B INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible because the condenser steam dumps are used to cooldown when available. The second part is correct.

C INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part is wrong, plausible because this is the cooldown rate that is utilized in EOP-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Implement the following procedure for the specified condition(s)

b. EOP-1.2, to cooldown and depressurize the reactor coolant system following a small break LOCA.

(031.02.LP0435.010)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 85

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 027 Given the following:

A Main Steam Line Break occurred inside containment Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIVs) are closed The faulted Steam Generator (SG) has been isolated RED PATH conditions exist on the Integrity Status Tree The actions of CSP-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, are being performed RCS Hot leg temperatures are being maintained stable RCS temperature soak is required and has been initiated No RCPs are running Which evolution is allowed during the one hour "soak period"?

A. Place Normal Letdown in service.

B. Lower non-faulted SG Atmospheric Dump Valve setpoint by 25 psig.

C. Raise AFW Flow to the non-faulted SG and establish SG Blowdown.

D. Raise RCS pressure to the middle of the pressure band of CSP-P.1, Figure 1.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 86

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2015 Audit 27 K/A:

E08EA1.2 Pressurized Thermal Shock Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock): Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

(Imp 3.6/3.9)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to use knowledge of operating characteristics and behavior of the plant to determine which evolution will be allowed during the soak period.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-DR: The operator must understand the initial conditions, the soak requirements and precautions of the procedure, then determine which of the listed evolutions can be performed during the soak period based on what effect the evolution will have on the plant 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45.5 55.45.6 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 87

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

CSP-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, Rev 27 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

A Main Steam Line Break occurred inside containment

Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIVs) are closed

The faulted Steam Generator (SG) has been isolated

RED PATH conditions exist on the Integrity Status Tree

The actions of CSP-P.1, Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition, are being performed

RCS Hot leg temperatures are being maintained stable

RCS temperature soak is required and has been initiated

No RCPs are running Which evolution can be performed during the one hour "soak period"?

A. Place Normal Letdown in service.

B. Lower non-faulted SG Atmospheric Dump Valve setpoint by 25 psig.

C. Raise AFW Flow to the non-faulted SG and establish SG Blowdown.

D. Raise RCS pressure to the middle of the pressure band allowed by Figure 1 of CSP-P.1.

Proposed Answer: A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 88

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

CSP-P.1 calls out requirements for the one our soak period. Placing letdown in service will not cause a change in RCS pressure nor a change in RCS temperature.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: Plausible because after the one hour soak, a change of 50°F per hour is allowed, and changing the ADV setpoint will change RCS temperature.

C INCORRECT: Plausible because after the one hour soak, a change of 50°F per hour is allowed raising AFW and establishing blowdown both will cause RCS temperatures to lower.

D INCORRECT: Plausible because after the one hour soak, you are directed to maintain pressure and temperature per Figure 1.

Learning Objective:

APPRAISE each operator-initiated recovery technique in its ability to restore the Integrity Critical Safety Function.

(043.03.LP1999.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 89

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 028 Given the following:

Unit 2 is at 30% Reactor Power Feedwater control is in MANUAL 2P-1B, Reactor Coolant Pump trips Immediately (directly) following the trip of 2P-1B, an automatic Reactor Trip will . . .

(Assume no operator actions)

A. occur, and the 'B' SG water level will swell.

B. occur, and the 'B' SG water level will shrink.

C. NOT occur, but the 'B' SG water level will swell.

D. NOT occur, but the 'B' SG water level will shrink.

RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2013 Comanche Peak 42 (Questions original K/A was 015/017AK1.04)

K/A:

003K3.02 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RCPS will have on the following: S/G (IMP 3.5/3.8)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify how a Reactor Coolant Pump Trip will affect a Steam Generator.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must take the information provided and deduce the event will have on the status of the reactor trip breakers, and the Steam Generator(s) system.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 6 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 90

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

PBN LP2461 FSAR Primary Transient Analysis Rev 12 PBN LP0131 Feedwater Letdown Control, Slide 17 Rev 15 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is at 35% power.

Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 2-02 trips.

In the 30 seconds following the trip of RCP 2-02, and assuming NO operator action, an automatic Reactor Trip will ...

A. ...occur, and the affected SG water level will shrink.

B. ...NOT occur, but the affected SG water level will shrink.

C. ...occur, and the affected SG water level will swell.

D. ...NOT occur, but the affected SG water level will swell.

Proposed answer: B Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 91

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

SG level will shrink due to loss of heat input to SG; and, the Reactor will not automatically trip unless power level is greater than 35%.

A INCORRECT: Plausible if thought that power is above the P-8 setpoint.

Steam Generator water level will initially shrink due to loss of heat input to SG.

B INCORRECT: Plausible if thought that power is above the P-8 setpoint. A Reactor Trip will occur when one Reactor Coolant Pump trips with Reactor power greater than 35%. When the RCP trips, SG shrink due to loss of heat input to SG.

C INCORRECT: Plausible because power is below P-8 permissive blocking the reactor trip. SG level will shrink due to loss of heat input to the steam generator.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Predict the effects of a loss of Reactor Coolant Flow.

(043.02.LP2461.009)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 92

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 029 Given the following:

Unit 1 is cooling down in MODE 5 The Pressurizer is SOLID Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure is 300 psig LTOP is in service Steam Generator secondary side metal temperature is 275°F No Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) are running Both Trains of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) are aligned for cooldown The B RHR Pump, 1P-10B, is running Which of the following actions or failures would cause an RCS overpressure transient?

A. The crew starts A RCP, 1P-1A B. The crew starts A RHR Pump, 1P-10A C. LP Letdown Line Pressure Transmitter, 1PT-135, fails high D. RC Loop A Hot Leg Pressure Transmitter, 1PT-420, fails high Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 93

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2018 Millstone RO 28 K/A:

003A1.07 Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCPS controls including: RCS temperature and pressure.

(Imp 3.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to predict which transient negatively impacts RCS pressure.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must use knowledge of the plant systems and procedures to predict the outcome, or cause, of a plant transient.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41.5 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 94

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

OP 4B, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation, Rev 65 883D195 Sht. 18, Logic Diagram Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control, Rev 13 684J741 Sht. 2, P&ID Chemical and Volume Control, Rev. 84 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

Steam Tables Original Question:

The plant is in MODE 5, with initial conditions as follows:

The Pressurizer is solid

COPPs is blocked

RCS is 280 psia

SG secondary side temperatures are 250 op

No RCPs are running

Both trains of RHR are aligned for cooldown

The "B" RHR pump is running What action/failure would cause an RCS overpressure transient?

a) The crew starts the "A" Residual Heat Removal pump.

b) The crew starts the "A" Reactor Coolant Pump.

c) RCS Wide Range pressure instrument 3RCS*PT405 fails high.

d) Letdown Pressure Instrument 3CHS*PTI31 fails high.

Proposed Answer: B.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 95

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per OP 4B Caution, If SG metal temperature is greater than Reactor metal temperature, upon an initial start of an RCP, then an RCS pressure spike will occur.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: Due to control of flow from RHR system to RCS, RCS pressure is not impacted.

C INCORRECT: In the current plant condition, 1HC-135, Letdown Line Pressure Controller would be in MANUAL, in which case no actual change in RCS pressure is encountered. If the hand controller is in AUTOMATIC, then RCS pressure would drop due to 1CV-135 opening from the failed pressure signal.

D INCORRECT: 1PT-420 failing high will open 1RC-430, PORV, on LTOP signal, causing a pressure drop.

Learning Objective:

ANALYZE the effect of the Pressurizer Pressure Control System caused by temperature variation during solid plant operations.

(055.02.LP0162.013)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 96

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 030 Given the following:

Unit 1 was operating at Rated Thermal Power A failure occurred causing Letdown temperature to rise Which of the following describes:

1) At what temperature will the Letdown Divert Temp Control Valve, 1CV-145, divert to the VCT?

AND

2) What is the reason for this action?

A. 1) 145°F

2) Protect Demineralizer resin from damage due to high Letdown line temp B. 1) 145°F

2) Mitigate positive reactivity caused by boron absorption by Demineralizers C. 1) 130°F

2) Protect Demineralizer resin from damage due to high Letdown line temp D. 1) 130°F

2) Mitigate positive reactivity caused by boron absorption by Demineralizers Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 97

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2015 Surry RO 4 K/A:

004K4.03 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

Knowledge of CVCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Protection of ion exchangers (high letdown temperature will isolate ion exchangers)

(Imp 3.2)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the CVCS system features that prevent damage to ion exchangers.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-B: The operator must the setpoint of the system automatic function and the purpose for that interlock.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41.7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 98

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

ARB 1C04 1C 4-7, 1HX-3A AND B NONREGEN HX LETDOWN OUTLET TEMPERATURE HIGH Rev 5 DBD-04, Chemical and Volume Control Sytem, Rev 12 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Unit 1 was operating at 100% operation when a failure occurred causing Letdown temperature to rise.

Which of the following describes:

1) At what temperature will the Letdown divert valve, 1-CH-TCV-1143 divert to the VCT?

2) What is the reason for this action?

A.1) 145 °F.

2) Protect Ion Exchanger resin from damage due to high Letdown line temp.

B.1) 145 °F.

2) Mitigate positive reactivity caused by boron absorption from Demins.

C.1) 130 °F.

2) Protect Ion Exchanger resin from damage due to high Letdown line temp.

D.1) 130 °F.

2) Mitigate positive reactivity caused by boron absorption from Demins.

Proposed Answer: A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 99

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Letdown Line temperatures and VCT temperatures are rising slowly. Once Letdown line temperature reaches 145 °F, 1CV-145, Letdown Divert Temp Control Valve, will divert to the VCT which bypasses the Demins. The reason for this is to protect the Ion exchangers from high temperatures. 130 °F is the high temperature alarm setpoint for the VCT.

A CORRECT: 1) 145 °F. Correct.

2) Protect Ion Exchanger resin from damage due to high Letdown line temp.

B INCORRECT: 1) 145 °F. Correct.

2) Mitigate positive reactivity caused by boron absorption from Demins. Incorrect, 1CV-145 provides protection to the Demins.

Plausible because letdown temperature changes will cause a change to boron. In this case Letdown temperatures are rising which would tend to release boron adding negative reactivity which is the opposite effect.

C INCORRECT: 1) 130 °F. Incorrect, because the divert valve diverts at 145 °F.

Plausible because this is the setpoint for ARP 1C04 1C 3-7, 1T-4 VOLUME CONTROL TANK TEMPERATURE HIGH, therefore this choice could be selected if candidate confused between VCT hi temp and Letdown Hi temp/divert setpoint.

2) Protect Ion Exchanger resin from damage due to high Letdown line temp. This is correct.

D CORRECT: 1) 130 °F. Incorrect, because the divert valve diverts at 145 °F.

Plausible because this is the setpoint for ARP 1C04 1C 3-7, 1T-4 VOLUME CONTROL TANK TEMPERATURE HIGH, therefore this choice could be selected if candidate confused between VCT hi temp and Letdown Hi temp/divert setpoint

2) Mitigate positive reactivity caused by boron absorption from Demins. Incorrect, 1CV-145 provides protection to the Demins.

Plausible because letdown temperature changes will cause a change to boron. In this case Letdown temperatures are rising which would tend to release boron adding negative reactivity which is the opposite effect.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the interlocks associated with the Chemical and Volume Controls (include administrative limitations).

c. Divert Valve (051.02.LP0079.004)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 100

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 031 Given the following:

Unit 2 reactor tripped Trip and Bypass breakers are open Neutron flux is lowering Control rod K5 indicates 100 steps with the rod bottom light NOT lit Control rod E9 indicates 25 steps with the rod bottom light NOT lit The crew is responding to the event in EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response Is normal/emergency boration required for the current conditions and if so from where?

A. Emergency boration is not required at this time for shutdown margin B. Borate via 2CV-350, Emergency Boration valve, until 2825 gallons per stuck rod is achieved C. Borate via 2CV-112B, RWST to Chg Pump Suction valve, until 2825 gallons per stuck rod is achieved D. Borate via 2CV-112B, RWST to Chg Pump Suction valve, until Intermediate Range Current is <1.0E-10 amps Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 101

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

004A4.18 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Emergency borate valve (Imp 4.3/4.1)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine that emergency boration is required and the flowpath to be used.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must determine the number of stuck rods, recall the requirements of the EOP network and determine the appropriate volume of boric acid to be injected and via which flowpath.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 5 55.45 6 55.45 7 55.45 8

Reference:

EOP-0.1 Response to Reactor Trip Step 3, Rev 47 BG EOP-0.1 Background Document Response to Reactor Trip, Rev 32 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 102

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per EOP-0.1 Unit 2, Step 3, if two or more control rods are not fully inserted the operators are required to emergency borate, via 2CV-350, with one Boric Acid Pump, to a volume of 2825 gallons for each rod that is not fully inserted.

The background document for EOP-0.1, Step 3, states that control rods are considered inserted when IRPI indicates less than 20 steps with Reactor Trip Breakers OPEN and the Rod Bottom Light LIT.

A INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee does not recall that EOP-0.1 requires 2825 gallons for EACH stuck rod and incorrectly determines that one rod does not meet the stuck rod criteria.

B CORRECT: See above C INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee does not recall the flowpath required by procedure is via the emergency boration valve.

D INCORRECT: Plausible, if the student determines the rods are stuck, but does not recall the fowpath or endpoint.

Learning Objective:

Within the CVC Boration and Dilution Control System, IDENTIFY and Discuss flowpaths/flow ratings, major components, and interfaces with other major systems for the following operations:

g. Emergency Boration (051.02.LP0082.003)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 103

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 032 Given the following:

Unit 1 has experienced a Loss of Coolant Accident from Rated Thermal Power The crew is implementing EOP-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization Maximum charging is established 1P-1B, Reactor Coolant Pump is running Both SI pumps are running Both RHR pumps are stopped and in AUTO RCS Hot Leg temperature is 300°F When evaluating conditions to stop the first SI pump, there is less subcooling than required. In accordance with the RNO step in EOP-1.2, the operator starts an RHR pump and then stops the SI pump.

What is accomplished by starting an RHR pump prior to stopping the SI pump?

A. Ensures the RCS will remain subcooled B. Prevents void formation in the reactor vessel head C. Prevents a challenge to the Core Cooling critical safety function D. Ensures conditions are maintained for continued RCP operation Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 104

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2009 Diablo Canyon RO 4 K/A:

005K5.02 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to RHRS: Need for adequate subcooling (Imp 3.4/3.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to know why the RHR system should be restarted for current plant conditions.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-P: The operator must recall a procedure step/ fold-out page step requiring reinitiating of RHR if subcooling requirements are not met.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.45 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 105

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

EOP-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization Rev. 37 BG-EOP-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization Rev 28 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

GIVEN:

The crew is performing the actions of E-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

One RCP is running

Both ECCS CCPs are running

Both SI pumps are running

Both RHR pumps are stopped

RCS temperature is 300°F When evaluating conditions to stop the first SI pump, there is less subcooling than required. In accordance with the RNO step in E-1.2, the operator starts an RHR pump and then stops the SI pump.

What is accomplished by starting an RHR pump prior to stopping the SI pump?

A. Prevents void formation in the reactor vessel head.

B. Ensures the RCS will remain subcooled.

C. Prevents a challenge to the Core Cooling critical safety function.

D. Ensures conditions are maintained for continued RCP operation.

Proposed Answer: B Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 106

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

BG-EOP-1.2 states: If the RCS subcooling criterion is not satisfied, but the RCS hot leg temperatures are less than the saturation temperature corresponding to the low-head (RHR) SI pump head at minimum pump recirculation flow, the charging/SI pump can be stopped if a low-head SI pump is running or can be started. Starting a low-head SI pump for this case ensures that RCS subcooling will be maintained after the charging/SI pump is stopped.

A CORRECT: See above B INCORRECT: Plausible because LOCA size (small or large) was not provided, and subcooling requirements are not met as stated in the question, and without a pressure and temperature, you cannot calculate the value of subcooling, so voiding is the head could be possible, but should not occur with RCP running.

C INCORRECT: Plausible if the student understanding of ECCS flow and subcooling requirements not being met is flawed.

D INCORRECT: RCP operation is not required for current conditions.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the procedures which govern operation of the Residual Heat Removal System. Description should include significant prerequisites, precautions, and notes associated with startup and operation of the Residual Heat Removal system by Licensed or Non-Licensed Operators.

(051.03.LP0069.009)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 107

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 033 Given the following:

Unit 2 has experienced a large break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) from Rated Thermal Power Which of the following would present the greatest challenge to long term core cooling?

A. Only one SI Accumulator injects B. Loss of Safety Injection Pumps C. Loss of Containment Spray Pumps D. Loss of Residual Heat Removal Pumps RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2009 Diablo Canyon RO 5 K/A:

006K6.13 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ECCS: Pumps (IMP 2.8/3.1)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to understand the effect of a loss of the various ECCS pumps on the plant.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must recall the interaction between systems and how a malfunction can impact those systems and the plant.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 108

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

FSAR 2020, Section 6.2 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

A large break LOCA has occurred.

Which of the following would present the greatest challenge to long term core cooling?

A. Loss of ECCS CCPs.

B. Loss of SI pumps.

C. Loss of RHR pumps.

D. Only 2 Accumulators inject.

Proposed Answer: C Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 109

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

After successful initial operation of the ECCS, the reactor core is once again covered with borated water. This water has enough boron concentration to maintain the core in a shutdown condition. Decay heat is removed by a continuous supply of water from the ECCS. This supply initially comes from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). When the RWST level reaches the switchover setpoint the ECCS pumps are transferred into the recirculation mode (using ES 1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION) wherein water is drawn from the containment sump and is cooled in the residual heat removal heat exchangers. Thus, long term cooling of the core is maintained by the ECCS in sump recirculation mode. The core is maintained in a shutdown state by borated water.

A INCORRECT: Without being given the location of the break, the student could assume only one accumulator injects during the blowdown and reflood phase of a LOCA, thus challenging long term due to only half of the borated water from the accumulators reflooding the core. But they do not contribute to the long term cooling requirements of 10CFR 50.46, though their water volume is credited as part of the long term cooling inventory.

B INCORRECT: Without RHR pumps, Safety Injection pumps do not have a suction source during long-term cooling (sump recirculation).

And during a large break LOCA, the SI pumps are not needed to inject into the RCS, since RCS pressure is below the shut-off head of the RHR pumps.

C INCORRECT: Without RHR pumps, Containment Spray pumps do not have a suction source during long-term cooling (sump recirculation).

D CORRECT: There is adequate ECCS flow with Charging pumps and both SI pumps to prevent any challenge to core cooling.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the procedures which govern operation of the Residual Heat Removal System. Description should include significant prerequisites, precautions, and notes associated with startup and operation of the Residual Heat Removal system by Licensed or Non-Licensed Operators.

(051.03.LP0069.009)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 110

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 034 Given the following:

Unit 1 is in MODE 2 SI Accumulator parameters are as follows:

A SI Accumulator Boron concentration - 3050 ppm Level - 43%

Pressure - 810 psig B SI Accumulator Boron concentration - 2690 ppm Level - 9%

Pressure - 730 psig Which of the following describes the impact, if any, on LCO 3.5.1 Accumulators?

A. LCO 3.5.1 is NOT MET due to A SI Accumulator, ONLY B. LCO 3.5.1 is NOT MET due to B SI Accumulator, ONLY C. LCO 3.5.1 is NOT MET due to A and B SI Accumulators D. LCO 3.5.1 is MET Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 111

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2015 PBNP RO 31 K/A:

006G2.2.22 Emergency Core Cooling Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

(IMP 4.0/4.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

This question tests the candidate's knowledge of the Tech Spec ECCS Accumulator concentration, pressure, and level limits.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-F: The operator must recall the requirements concerning tech specs for the SI accumulators, and apply those requirements.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.43 2 55.45 2 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 112

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS 3.5.1, Tech Specs for Accumulators, Rev 4 TLB 17, Tank Level Book Safety Injection Accumulators, Rev 9 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

Unit 1 is in Mode 3 preparing to enter Mode 2 SI Accumulator parameters are as follows:

A SI Accumulator Boron concentration - 3050 ppm Level - 43%

Pressure - 810 psig B SI Accumulator Boron concentration - 2690 ppm Level - 9%

Pressure - 730 psig Which of the following describes the impact, if any, on LCO 3.5.1 Accumulators?

A. Only A SI Accumulator is Inoperable and LCO 3.5.1 is NOT MET.

B. Only B SI Accumulator is Inoperable and LCO 3.5.1 is NOT MET.

C. Both A and B SI Accumulators are Inoperable and LCO 3.5.1 is NOT MET.

D. Both A and B SI Accumulators are OPERABLE and LCO 3.5.1 is MET.

Proposed Answer C Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:00 AM 113

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Tech Specs 3.5.1 requires the following for SI Accumulators:

Boron Concentration = 2700 ppm and = 3100 ppm Level = 1100 ft3 ( 6%) and = 1136 ft3 Pressure =700 psig and = 800 psig A Accumulator pressure is > 800 psig B Accumulator boron concentration is < 2700 ppm Both A and B SI Accumulators are inoperable as listed above. LCO 3.0.3 is required to be entered immediately.

A INCORRECT: True, A SI Accumulator is inoperable due to pressure exceeding technical specification values. Plausible if the student cannot correctly recall the required level or boron concentrations.

B INCORRECT: True, B SI Accumulator is inoperable due to boron concentration lower than technical specification values.

Plausible if the student cannot correctly recall the required level or pressure.

C CORRECT: See above D INCORRECT: A SI Accumulator is inoperable due to pressure exceeding technical specification values and, B SI Accumulator is inoperable due to boron concentration lower than technical specification values. Plausible if the student cannot correctly recall the required pressure or boron concentrations.

Learning Objective:

IDENTIFY and DISCUSS Technical Specifications associated with Emergency Core Cooling System components, parameters, and operation including Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), LCO applicability, Action Conditions and required actions as they pertain to the following requirements:

- Accumulators (057.02.LP3340.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 114

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 035 Which of the following describes the adverse effects of NOT maintaining the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) within its design level band?

A. If the level is too low, there would be insufficient water volume to absorb and condense a design discharge of PZR safety leading to possible over temperature and overpressure of the PRT.

B. If the level is too low the radioactive gases that leak from the top of the PZR would not be adequately scrubbed, thus causing subsequent elevated gaseous activity levels inside containment.

C. If the level is too high, the sparger pipe will be too far underwater rendering the cooling effect of makeup water ineffective.

D. If the level is too high, the tank will overflow to the RCDT causing possible false indications of RCS leakage.

RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2011 PBNP RO 34 K/A:

007A1.01 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRTS controls including:

Maintaining quench tank water level within limits (Imp 2.9/3.1)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to predict the consequences of not maintaining PRT parameters in their established bands.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-B: The operator must recall the bases/function of the system.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.45 5 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 115

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

DBD-09 Reactor Coolant System Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Which of the following describes the adverse effects of NOT maintaining the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) within its design level band?

A. If the level is too low, there would be insufficient water volume to absorb and condense a design discharge of PZR safety leading to possible over temperature and overpressure of the PRT.

B. If the level is too high, the tank will overflow to the RCDT causing possible false indications of RCS leakage.

C. If the level is too low the radioactive gases that leak from the top of the PZR would not be adequately scrubbed, thus causing subsequent elevated gaseous activity levels inside containment.

D. If the level is too high, the sparger pipe will be too far underwater rendering the cooling affect of makeup water ineffective.

Proposed Answer: A.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 116

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per the DBD a minimum volume of water (600 cu. Ft.) below a certain temperature (120°F) is needed to prevent over pressurization leading to rupture disc failure following a design discharge to the PRT.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: The design of the PRT system does not consider scrubbing activity levels. Plausible as this is a similar reason why we maintain S/G level for a tube rupture.

C INCORRECT: Too much water over the sparger is not true; it is based on the volume and temperature of the quench volume. Plausible if the candidate does not understand the principles behind the coolding effect of the makeup water D INCORRECT: There is no overflow. Rupture disc designed to protect against over pressure. Plausible as the PRT can be drained to the RCDT.

Learning Objective:

IDENTIFY and DESCRIBE the Control Room controls, alarms, and indications associated with the Pressurizer, Level Control, Pressure Control, and Relief System, including:

Location and function of components and/or operating controls and control stations Alarming indications and response to major system and component alarms Plant, system, and component conditions or permissives required for Control Room operation Setpoints associated with major system alarms and/or interlocks (051.01.LP0078.006)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 117

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 036 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at Rated Thermal Power 1RE-217, Component Cooling Water Monitor, is in HIGH ALARM Annunciator 1C03 1D 3-6, 1T-12 CC SURGE TANK LEVEL HIGH OR LOW is LIT Which answers the following:

(1) What is the status of 1CC-17, 1T-12 CC Surge Tank Vent?

AND (2) What actions of AOP-9B, Component Cooling Water Malfunction will mitigate this event?

A. (1) Open (2) Seal Return Heat Exchanger is leaking, and will be isolated and bypassed B. (1) Closed (2) Seal Return Heat Exchanger is leaking, and will be isolated and bypassed C. (1) Closed (2) Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger is leaking, and Letdown will be isolated D. (1) Open (2) Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger is leaking, and Letdown will be isolated Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 118

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

008A2.04 Component Cooling Water Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: PRMS alarm (Imp 3.3/3.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to predict the effect of an PRMS alarm, and using procedures, mitigate the event.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must understand the initial conditions, predicts the result of the high alarm, and determine what the source of the leak is.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.43 5 55.45 3 55.45 13

Reference:

AOP-9B, Component Cooling System Malfunction, Rev 26 RMSASRB CI 1RE-217, CC Water Liquid Monitor, Rev 10 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 119

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

With 1RE-217 in high alarm combined with the surge tank level annunciator, means there is a leak into the CCW System.

Per the RMSASRB, a high alarm on 1RE-217, will cause 1CC-17 to shut.

AOP-9B will address leaks though isolation, and since this is a leak into the system, the cause would be NRHX A INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible if the student does not recall the valve closure on high alarm, since the valve is designed to keep the surge tank vented. The second part is wrong, but plausible because if this water leaked into the CCW system, an RMS alarm would be expected.

B INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part is wrong, but plausible because if this water leaked into the CCW system, an RMS alarm would be expected.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible if the student does not recall the valve closure on high alarm, since the valve is designed to keep the surge tank vented The second part is correct.

Learning Objective:

DIAGNOSE and RESPOND to indications of a leak into or out of the system in accordance with AOP-9B.

(055.03.LP2444.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 120

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 037 Given the following:

Unit 2 is at Rated Thermal Power Two banks of Backup Heaters are on to recirc the Pressurizer volume Pressure has stabilized and is not changing 2RC-431A and 2RC-431B PZR Spray Valves, indicate cracked open Pressurizer Pressure indicates 2235 psig 2HC-431K, Pressurizer Pressure controller is in AUTO Which of the following statements is correct concerning the indications on the 2HC-431K, Pressurizer Pressure Controller?

A. The deviation meter indicates approximately +5%. The output meter indicates approximately 50%.

B. The deviation meter is approximately Nulled. The output meter indicates approximately 63%.

C. The deviation meter indicates approximately -5%. The output meter indicates approximately 50%.

D. The deviation meter could be anywhere on scale. The output meter indicates approximately 63%.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 121

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

051.01.LP0457.001 002 K/A:

010A3.02 Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the PZR PCS, including: PZR pressure (Imp 3.6/3.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to controller indications and current conditions to determine proper operation of the Pressurizer Pressure Control System.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-DR: The operator must understand and apply the initial conditions to determine the output of the controller.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 5 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 122

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

STPT 5.3, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control, Rev 11 PBN LP0457, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control, Rev 15 Change 1 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

Unit 2 is operating at Rated Thermal Power

Two banks of Backup Heaters are on in order to recirc the Pressurizer volume

Pressure has stabilized and is not changing

2RC-431A and 2RC-431B PZR Spray Valves, indicate cracked open

Pressurizer Pressure indicates 2235 psig

2HC-431K, Pressurizer Pressure controller is in AUTO Which of the following statements is correct concerning the indications on the 2HC-431K, Pressurizer Pressure Controller?

A. The deviation meter indicates approximately +5%. The output meter indicates approximately 50%.

B. The deviation meter is approximately Nulled. The output meter indicates approximately 63%.

C. The deviation meter indicates approximately -5%. The output meter indicates approximately 50%.

D. The deviation meter could be anywhere on scale. The output meter indicates approximately 63%.

Proposed Answer: B Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 123

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Pressurizer Pressure 1HC-431K controller will initially show a positive deviation

(~+5%) and an output to ~70% as pressure rises until the spray valves open After the Spray Valves open the deviation slowly returns to Null (a stable 2235 psig). The Spray Valve(s) stay 'cracked' open to maintain Controller Stpt of 2235. Cracked Open is ~ 63% deviation on the controller. Normal deviation (not Spray Demand) is ~ 50%

A INCORRECT: The first part is wrong. The second part is wrong. Plausible as a 5% deviation will be an initial condition, but and 50% output could be reasonable.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: The first part is wrong. The second part is wrong. Plausible as a 5% deviation will be an initial condition, but and 50% output could be reasonable.

D INCORRECT: The first part is wrong. The second part is correct. Plausible as a deviation will be an initial condition but not after the system has stabilized.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the automatic functions and interlocks associated with the Pressurizer, Level Control, Pressure Control, and Relief System and its major components:

Pressurizer Pressure Pressurizer Level Low Temperature Over Pressure Protection (051.01.LP0457.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 124

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 038 Which one of the following failures would cause a loop 'A' OPT reactor trip SETPOINT to LOWER?

A. Tavg failing LOW B. Tavg failing HIGH C. I (delta-flux) failing LOW D. I (delta-flux) failing HIGH RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2012 Ginna Retake RO 37 K/A:

012K6.11 Reactor Protection Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: Trip setpoint calculators (Imp 2.9/2.9)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine the effect on RPS trip setpoints due to an impact on OPT.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-I: The operator must recall inputs and the penalty for high temperature.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 125

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

STPT 1.3 Unit 1, Reactor Trip OPT Unit 1, Rev 22 TS B 3.3.1, Basis Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation Rev 9 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Which one of the following failures would cause the LOOP 1A-1 OP Delta-T reactor trip SETPOINT to LOWER?

A. Tavg failing LOW B. Tavg failing HIGH C. Delta-I failing LOW D. Delta-I failing HIGH Proposed Answer: B.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 126

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Overpower T See STPT 1.3 U1 for definitions of terms Tavg failing high will lower the trip setpoint A INCORRECT: Plausible because candidate may not understand the correct OPT calculation and not realize the K5 penalty coefficient is 0/°F for any temperature less than full power resulting in no change of the setpoint.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Plausible because the OTT setpoint calculation has a large penalty for I outside the normal band and failing low would lower the setpoint. For this core, there is no I penalty for OPT.

D INCORRECT: Plausible because the OTT setpoint calculation has a large penalty for I outside the normal band and failing high would lower the setpoint. For this core, there is no I penalty for OPT.

Learning Objective:

State the equation and describe each term in the equation for Overtemperature and Overpower trips in accordance with design basis documents (053.02.LP0361.007)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:01 AM 127

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 039 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at 100% power I&C and Operations are performing 1ICP 02.003A, Reactor Protection System Logic Train A 31 Day Surveillance Test, resulting in the current reactor trip breaker configuration shown below:

Given the above configuration, if 52/BYB, Bypass Breaker B was racked in, which of the choices below shows the status of the Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers after one minute?

A. B.

C. D.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:02 AM 128

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

012A4.06 Reactor Protection Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Reactor trip breakers (Imp 4.3/4.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the indications for the Reactor Trip Breaker after a manipulation by the Operator in the field.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must recall the information that having both Bypass Breakers racked in at the same time will cause a trip, and determine the indications available in the Control Room of that event.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 5 to 8

Reference:

FSAR 7.2.2.3.c.2, page 7.2-14, Version UFSAR 2020 617F354 Sheet 5A, Reactor Trip Breaker Switchgear Train A, Rev 8 617F354 Sheet 5B, Reactor Trip Breaker Switchgear Train B, Rev 9 617F354 Sheet 5C, Reactor Trip Breaker Switchgear Train A & B, Rev 0 6118 E-61 Sheet 2, Turbine Generator Control Turbine Trips, Rev 32 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:02 AM 129

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per FSAR 7.2.2.3.c.2 Bypass breakers are provided to prevent an inadvertent reactor trip when the reactor trip breaker being tested is tripped; however, a valid reactor trip will still occur, if required, by tripping the reactor trip breaker not under test. During normal operation, the bypass breakers are open.

Administrative control is used to minimize the amount of time these breakers are closed, and to prevent the simultaneous closure of both bypass breakers.

Indication of a closed bypass breaker is provided locally, on the test panel, and on the main control board. Also, if both bypass breakers are simultaneously racked in, with one being used for the bypass function, a reactor trip will result.

A INCORRECT: Plausible because this would be correct if there was no interlock between the Bypass Breakers.

B INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee assumes that the interlock which prevents the racking of one Bypass Breaker would not cause a reactor trip.

C INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee assumes the interlock will only cause the other bypass breaker to open, and not cause a reactor trip.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the function and/or purpose, design basis, and operation characteristics for the Reactor Protection System in accordance with design basis documents. Description should include Major components and their physical construction/ location

1. Nuclear Instrumentation

2. Process Protection Instrumentation

3. Protection Logic Relay Racks

4. Reactor Trip Switchgear (053.02.LP0273.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 130

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 040 Given the following:

Unit 1 experienced a small break Loss of Coolant Accident Safety Injection has actuated Containment Pressure rose to the Containment Spray actuation setpoint and has since lowered to 18 psig In accordance with EOP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, the Control Operator has performed the following actions:

Reset Containment Spray signal Ensured both 1SI-870A and B, Containment Spray RWST Suction valves, were, OPEN Stopped both Containment Spray Pumps and placed in AUTO Shut all four 1SI-860A - D, Containment Spray Pump Discharge valves, and placed the handswitches in AUTO-after-SHUT position Subsequently, the size of the LOCA gets bigger, causing Containment Pressure to rise to 29 psig After the pressure rises to 29 psig, what will be the response of the Containment Spray System?

A. Containment Spray valves will open Containment Spray pumps will NOT start B. Containment Spray valves will open Containment Spray pumps will start C. Containment Spray valves will NOT open Containment Spray pumps will NOT start D. Containment Spray valves will NOT open Containment Spray pumps will start Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 131

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2009 Palisades RO 37 K/A:

013K4.05 Engineered Safety Features Actuation Knowledge of ESFAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Core spray actuation signal reset.

(Imp 4.0/4.2)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify Containment Spray actuation and reset criteria/logics.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-DR: The operator must analyze the initial conditions, determine the effects the lowering pressure, and the reset conditions, then apply the rise in pressure to determine the effect on the system.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 132

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

Logic Drawings:

883D195, Sheet 7, Safeguards Actuation Signals, Rev 25 883D195, Sheet 8, Safeguards Sequence Logic, Rev 19 883D195, Sheet 9, Safeguards Sequence Logic, Rev 7 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following conditions:

A small break LOCA has occurred

Safety Injection has actuated

Containment pressure rose to 8.5 psig and has since lowered to 1.0 psig

The CHP signal is RESET

The Reactor Operator has placed the Containment Spray Pump hand switches in TRIP and returned them to mid-position

The Containment Spray valves are closed If the PCS break size gets larger causing Containment Pressure to rise and exceed the Containment High Pressure (CHP) actuation setpoint, how will the Containment Spray System respond?

a. Containment Spray valves will open.

Containment Spray pumps will NOT start.

b. Containment Spray valves will open.

Containment Spray pumps will start.

c. Containment Spray valves will NOT open.

Containment Spray pumps will NOT start.

d. Containment Spray valves will NOT open.

Containment Spray pumps will start.

Proposed answer: A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 133

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per logic drawings 883D195, Sheets 7, 8, and 9, Containment Spray Actuation, and its reset logic, are independent of Safety Injection logic. Containment Spray will actuate off of 2 of 3 twice, Containment high pressure signals, or by 2 of 2 manual pushbuttons. Upon receipt of either of those signals (auto or manual),

assuming power is available, the pump discharge valves will open immediately.

10 seconds later the pumps will start.

Reset of the Containment Spray signal will allow the pumps to be stopped and the discharge valves to be closed.

A subsequent Hi-Hi Containment Pressure signal will cause a complete system actuation.

A INCORRECT: Plausible if trainee fails to recall Containment Spray logic.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Plausible if trainee fails to recall Containment Spray logic.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if trainee fails to recall Containment Spray logic.

Learning Objective:

ASSESS pump and valve lineups to verify proper operation.

(051.03.LP0064.013)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 134

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 041 Given the following:

Unit 1 has experienced a Loss of Coolant Accident The crew has performed the actions of EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and has transitioned to EOP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant The following conditions exist:

Reactor Coolant Pumps are both RUNNING RHR Pumps are both SECURED and in AUTO SI Pumps are both RUNNING RCS pressure is 350 psig and LOWERING Containment pressure is 6 psig and RISING RCS Subcooling is 45 °F and LOWERING SLOWLY Total Aux Feed flow to the Steam Generators is 300 gpm Pressurizer level is 0%

RWST level is 70% and LOWERING SLOWLY Which of the following describes next action that is required by the crew IAW EOP-1?

A. Trip Reactor Coolant Pumps B. Manually start the RHR Pumps C. Transition to EOP-1.1, SI Termination D. Transition to EOP-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - Low Head Injection Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 135

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

013G2.1.20 Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems - ESFAS Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

(Imp 4.6/4.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify plant conditions requiring actions and implement those actions.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must analyze the initial condition to determine the actions which are required next.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 5 55.45.12

Reference:

EOP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Rev 47, foldout page Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 136

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The student must analyze the initial conditions to determine that SI reinitiation criteria is met due to subcooling, and that the RHR pumps need to be manually started, as they will not auto cycle on.

A INCORRECT: Plausible - SI pumps are running delivering flow, but subcooling is not low enough for the criteria.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Plausible if student misinterprets RCS pressure requirement for sump recirc transition.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if student misinterprets RWST level requirement for transition to Sump Recirc.

Learning Objective:

Implement the following procedures for the specified condition(s):

a. EOP-1 to determine the proper recovery procedure for a loss of Primary or Secondary Coolant (031.02.LP0435.010)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 137

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 042 Given the following:

Unit 2 tripped from 100% power RCS pressure is 1825 psig and LOWERING Containment pressure is 6 psig and RISING The crew is performing the actions of EOP-0, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection The fourth license is performing Attachment A of EOP-0 and notes the following conditions:

2SW-2907, Cont Vent Coolers Outlet Emer FCV, is full OPEN 2SW-2908, Cont Vent Coolers Outlet Emer FCV, is full CLOSED and can NOT be opened All four Containment Accident Fans (2W-1A1 through 2W-1D1) are running What is the status of Containment Cooling for Unit 2?

A. The Containment Accident Fans are running without Service Water cooling B. The Containment Accident Fans are running with half the required Service Water cooling flow for the listed conditions C. The Containment Accident Fans are running with the required amount of Service Water cooling flow for the listed conditions D. The Containment Accident Fans and Cooling Fans (2W-1A2 through 2W-1D2) are running with the required amount of Service Water cooling flow for the listed conditions Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 138

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

022K1.01 Containment Cooling Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CCS and the following systems: SWS/cooling system (Imp 3.5/3.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine Containment Cooling and Service Water System status, given plant conditions.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must determine the interaction between Containment Cooling and Service Water, including the consequences or a failure of one or the other.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 2 to 9 55.45 7 & 8

Reference:

M-2207, Sheet 2, Rev 19 UFSAR Section 9.6.2, Updated 2020 MDB 3.2.6 2B31, Rev 18 883D195 Sheets 7 - 9, Safeguards Sequence Logic, Revisions 25, 19 and 19, respectively Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 139

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

2SW-2907 or 2SW-2908, CONT VENT COOLERS OUTLET EMER FCVs, are each 100% capacity, in order to ensure that sufficient containment cooling can be achieved with a single failure.

A INCORRECT: Plausible if the student does not remember that the Service Water emergency lines are in parallel, so full flow can be achieved through either valve.

B INCORRECT: Plausible if the student does not recall that the 2SW-2907 or 2SW-2908, CONT VENT COOLERS OUTLET EMER FCVs, are each 100% capacity, in order to ensure that sufficient containment cooling can be achieved with a single failure.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if student does not remember that the Containment Cooling Fans trip on 2B03 SI lockout.

Learning Objective:

For the Containment Ventilation System, IDENTIFY and DISCUSS flowpaths, major components, and their physical locations, and interfaces with other major systems.

(051.05.LP0057.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 140

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 043 Which of the following lists the power supplies for Containment Spray pumps 1P-14A and 2P-14B?

A. 1P-14A - MCC 1B-32; 2P-14B - MCC 2B-42 B. 1P-14A - Bus 1B03; 2P-14B - Bus 2B04 C. 1P-14A - Bus 2B03; 2P-14B - Bus 1B04 D. 1P-14A - MCC 2B-32; 2P-14B - MCC 1B-42 RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2009 Diablo Canyon RO 16 K/A:

026K2.01 Containment Spray System (CSS)

Knowledge of the bus power supplies to the following: Containment spray pumps (Imp 3.4/3.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify which set of power supplies is correct.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-F: The operator must recall the power supplies for the Containment Spray Pumps.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 141

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

MDB 3.2.3 Panel 1B03, Rev 19 MDB 3.2.4 Panel 2B04, Rev 14 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Which of the following lists the power supplies for Containment Spray pumps 11 and 12?

A. 11 - Bus G 12 - Bus H B. 11 - Bus F 12 - Bus G C. 11 - Bus F 12 - Bus H D. 11 - Bus H 12 - Bus G Proposed Answer: A.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 142

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Containment Spray Pumps are powered from their associated Units Train specific bus A INCORRECT: The Containment Spray Pumps are powered from the safety related 480 VAC busses, not MCCs, plausible if the student incorrectly associates these MCCs with safeguards buses.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Containment Spray Pumps are powered from their associated Units Train specific bus, plausible is the student incorrectly recalls power supply.

D INCORRECT: The Containment Spray Pumps are powered from the safety related 480 VAC busses, not MCCs, plausible if the student incorrectly associates these MCCs with safeguards buses.

Learning Objective:

STATE the power supplies for the Containment Spray System and its major components.

(051.03.LP0064.003)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 143

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 044 Given the following:

A steam line break in Unit 1 Containment caused a Containment Spray actuation What is the status of the Unit 1 Containment Spray System components thirty (30) seconds after the spray actuation signal?

A. Both spray pumps running All four pump discharge valves shut Both spray eductor valves shut B. Both spray pumps running All four pump discharge valves open Both spray eductor valves open C. Both spray pumps running All four pump discharge valves open Both spray eductor valves shut D. Both spray pumps NOT running All four pump discharge valves open Both spray eductor valves shut Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 144

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2009 PBNP RO 41 K/A:

026A3.01 Containment Spray System (CSS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CSS, including: Pump starts and correct MOV positioning (Imp 4.3/4.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine the component status following an actuation signal.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-I: The operator must recall the system response to an actuation signal and timing relays.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 5 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 145

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

883D195, Sheets 8 and 9, Revisions 19 and 19 respectively Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

GIVEN:

A steam line break in Unit 1 Containment caused a Containment Spray actuation. All equipment responded as required.

What is the status of the Unit 1 Containment Spray System components thirty(30) seconds after the spray actuation?

A. Both spray pumps running.

All four pump discharge valves shut.

Both spray eductor valves shut.

B. Both spray pumps running.

All four pump discharge valves open.

Both spray eductor valves open.

C. Both spray pumps running.

All four pump discharge valves open.

Both spray eductor valves shut.

D. Both spray pumps secured.

All four pump discharge valves open.

Both spray eductor valves shut.

Proposed Answer: C.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 146

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Spray Valves open on spray signal. 10 seconds later, Pumps start. 2 minutes after spray signal, Spray Eductor Valves open A INCORRECT: Plausible. Discharge valves get an open signal from the spray signal.

B INCORRECT: Plausible. Spray Eductor valves open 2 minutes after spray signal.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Plausible. Spray pumps start 10 seconds after spray signal.

Learning Objective:

STATE the actuation setpoints and EXPLAIN effects of automatic actuations for the following components:

a. Containment Spray Pumps

b. Spray additive valves

c. Containment Spray Valves (051.03.LP0064.010)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 147

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 045 Given the following:

Unit 1 is performing a startup at middle of life (MOL) per OP 1B, Reactor Startup, following a forced outage SHUTDOWN BANKS have been withdrawn CONTROL BANKS are being withdrawn Atmospheric Dump Valves are being controlled in MANUAL Which of the following would cause the reactor to go critical PRIOR to the value determined in the Estimated Critical Position (ECP)?

(Assume no other operator action)

A. 1MS-2015, SG B Atmos Steam Dump fails closed.

B. Steam Generator operating level is reduced from 60% to 50%.

C. A steam leak develops upsteam of 1MS-228, Main Steam Trap isolation.

D. Fifteen (15) gallons of boric acid is added to the Reactor Coolant System.

RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2019 Audit 43 K/A:

039K3.05 Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MRSS will have on the following: RCS (Imp 3.6/3.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to use predict using knowledge which one MRSS events will have a specific effect on the RCS Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must understand the initial conditions, and then determine how the distractors will effect the plant / core, and determine which one will cause the reactor to go critical prior to the calculated value 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45.6 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 148

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

OP 1B, Reactor Startup, Rev 81 P&L 3.5 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

The unit is performing a startup at middle of life (MOL) per OP 1B, Reactor Startup, following a forced outage

The SHUTDOWN BANKS have been withdrawn

The CONTROL BANKS are being withdrawn

Atmospheric Dump Valves are being controlled in MANUAL Which of the following plant evolutions would cause the reactor to go critical PRIOR to the value determined in the Estimated Critical Position (ECP)?

(Assume no other operator action)

A. One Atmospheric Dump Valve fails closed.

B. The Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass valves are opened.

C. Steam Generator operating level is reduced from 60% to 50%.

D. Fifteen (15) gallons of boric acid is added to the Reactor Coolant System.

Proposed Answer: B Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 149

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

A steam leak developing upstream of the trap isolation will not be isolable, and will cause an increase in steam flow which will cause Tave to lower, and since this is MOL the MTC is negative, so that will insert positive reactivity.

A INCORRECT: Plausible because this will effect steam flow, and cause Tave to rise, which will insert negative reactivity due to MTC.

B INCORRECT: Plausible because a change in steam generator level will cause a change in the RCS, but it will cause a rise in temp which will cause negative reactivity addition due to MTC.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Plausible because the addition of boric acid will cause a change in reactivity, but a negative addition, not positive one.

Learning Objective:

RECOGNIZE factors which have contributed to past premature criticality events and DETERMINE how these problems can be avoided.

(055.01.LP0183.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 150

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 046 What is one of the functions of CS-3124/3125, Steam Generator A/B Feedwater Isolation Valves?

To automatically close . .

A. on Rx Trip to prevent excessive cooldown of the RCS.

B. on high steam generator water level to prevent water carryover into main steam piping.

C. upon receipt of a Safety Injection signal to limit feedwater into containment during a steam line break.

D. upon receipt of a Containment Isolation signal to limit radiological release from containment during a LOCA.

RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

052.02.LP0128.001 005 K/A:

059K4.19 Main Feedwater Knowledge of MFW design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Automatic feedwater isolation of MFW (Imp 3.2/3.4)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify which signal causes a Main Feedwater Isolation.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-I: The operator must recall which signal causes a MFIV isolation.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 151

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

883D195 Sheet 10, Rev 17 FSAR Section 10.1, Rev UFSAR 2020 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

What is the function of CS-3124/3125, Steam Generator A/B Feedwater Isolation Valves?

A. To automatically close on Rx Trip to prevent excessive cooldown of the RCS B. To automatically close on high steam genetrator water level to prevent water carryover into main steam piping C. To automatically close upon receipt of a Safety Injection signal to limit feedwater into containment during a steam line break D. To automatically close upon receipt of a Containment Isolation signal to limit radiological release from containment during a LOCA Proposed Answer: C.

Justification:

According to FSAR section 10.1, The MFIVs are pneumatically operated and each have two redundant solenoid valves which energize to close the associated MFIV on a safety injection signal.

A INCORRECT: MFIVs close on an SI signal. Rx Trip causes Main Feed Reg Valves to close.

B INCORRECT: MFIVs close on an SI signal. High S/G level causes the Main Feed Reg Valves and the Bypass Feed Control Valves to close.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: MFIVs close on an SI signal. Containment Isolation does not impact the Main Feedwater System.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the interlocks, automatic actuations, and permissives associated with major components of the Feedwater System.

(052.05.LP0128.004)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 152

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 047 Given the following:

Unit 2 is in MODE 3 following a loss of Feedwater and Condensate 3 minutes ago 2P-29, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump is running 2P-53, Motor Driven AFW Pump is running Both AFW pumps automatically started on Low Steam Generator level Which one of the below correctly describes the AFW flow response one minute after taking 2AF-4001, 2P-29 AFP DISCH SG A INLET MOV, to FULL CLOSED?

A. 2P-29 Discharge Flow remains the same 2P-53 Discharge Flow remains the same SG A Total AF Flow remains the same SG B Total AF Flow remains the same B. 2P-29 Discharge Flow lowers 2P-53 Discharge Flow remains the same SG A Total AF Flow lowers SG B Total AF Flow rises C. 2P-29 Discharge Flow lowers 2P-53 Discharge Flow rises SG A Total AF Flow remains the same SG B Total AF Flow remains the same D. 2P-29 Discharge Flow remains the same 2P-53 Discharge Flow remains the same SG A Total AF Flow lowers SG B Total AF Flow rises Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 153

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2011 South Texas RO 6 K/A:

061K5.03 Auxiliary Feedwater Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to AFW: Pump head effects when control valve is shut (Imp 2.6/2.9)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to understand the effect of shutting one AFW valve feeding one Steam Generator and the impact that has on the rest of the system.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must predict what will happen when AFW valves are manipulated.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.45 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 154

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

M-217 Sheet 1, Rev 105 M-2217, Rev 7 DBD-01, Rev 22 FSAR Section 10.2, Rev UFSAR 2020 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

GIVEN:

AFW Pump 11 is running with a total flowrate of 540 gpm and a discharge pressure of 1550 psig.

AFW Pump 11 is providing equal amounts of AFW flow to Steam Generators (SG) 1A, 1B, and 1C.

Which one of the below correctly describes the AFW System response as the AFW Regulating Valve for SG 1A is fully closed?

AFW flow to SG 1B and 1C will A. rise because the discharge pressure of AFW Pump 11 has gone up.

B. lower because the Auto Recirc Valve for AFW Pump 11 has opened fully.

C. remain the same because the Auto Recirc Valve for AFW Pump 11 has opened to pass 180 gpm.

D. remain the same because QDPS has opened the AFW Reg. Valves for SG 1B and 1C.

Proposed Answer: A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 155

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Closing 2AF-4001 causes flow to A SG to lower by the amount set by the valves throttle setting. The closing of the valve causes 2P-29 discharge pressure to rise. This, in turn, will force more flow through the still-throttled 2AF-4000.

2P-53 discharge FCVs, 2AF-4074A & B, are in Automatic, set for ~145 gpm. As flow drops in A SG from 2P-29, backpressure from A SG lowers in the discharge line, causing flow from 2P-53 to rise to the A SG. 2AF-4074A will throttle to maintain flow through that line to 145 gpm. This causes the 2P-53 discharge pressure to rise. But here, 2AF-4074B will throttle to maintain flow to B SG at 145 gpm.

A INCORRECT: Plausible if trainee assumes that the flow controls for the remaining AFW lines to the SGs adjust to compensate for the reduction in flow to A SG.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Plausible if trainee assumes 2P-53 flow control will compensate for reduction in flow to A SG.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if trainee assumes all 2P-29 flow, reduced from A SG, is redirected to B SG Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the function and/or purpose, design bases, and operating characteristics of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and major components.

(052.05.LP0169.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 156

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 048 Given the following:

You are the Third License performing TS 81, Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Monthly test G01, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) has just been synchronized to the grid with conditions established for the required 60-minute test run The following G01 conditions are noted:

KW loading is 3050 KW KVAR loading is 475 KVAR out Amps are 380 A Speed is 900 RPM Voltage is 4150 V Based on these indications, what actions are you required to take IAW TS 81?

A. Trip the EDG to prevent exceeding the maximum voltage ratings of the supplied loads.

B. Raise diesel speed by going to raise on the governor control switch.

C. Lower KW load by going to lower on the governor control switch.

D. Continue monitoring G01 until the required test run is satisfied.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 157

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2012 PBNP RO 45 K/A:

062.A1.01 AC Electrical Distribution Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the AC Distribution System controls including: Significance of D/G load limits.

(Imp 3.4/3.8)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify parameters, their limits, and actions to prevent exceeding limits.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-P: The operator must recall a procedure note and steps concerning EDG limits and determine what action to take.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.45 5 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 158

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS-81 Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Monthly test, Rev 95 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

You are the Third License performing TS 81, 'Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Monthly test'. G01 EDG has just been synchronized to the grid with conditions established for the required 60 minute test run. The following G01 conditions are then noted:

KW loading is 2850 KVAR loading is 475 out Amps are 380 Speed is 900 rpm Voltage is 4150 Based on these indications, what actions are you going to take?

A. Reduce VARS by going to lower on the voltage regulator control switch.

B. Trip the EDG to prevent exceeding the maximum voltage ratings of the supplied loads.

C. Lower KW load by going to lower on the governor control switch.

D. Continue monitoring G01 until the required test run is satisfied.

Proposed Answer: C.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 159

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per TS-81 page 31 for the 60 minute run KW loading should be 2600-2700 kW, 300-800 KVARS and amp are not to exceed 450. Going to lower on the governor will lower KW loading.

A INCORRECT: Tripping the diesel can protect it but the given voltage ratings are in the normal band.

B INCORRECT: Plausible The action is correct if speed was not within limits.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: This would be correct if all the EDG parameters were within specifications.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the procedures which govern the operation of the Diesel Generator System. Description should include significant prerequisites, precautions, and notes associated with each operating procedure requiring consideration by Licensed and Auxiliary Operators.

(054.02.LP0133.006)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:03 AM 160

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 049 Given the following:

Both Units are at Rated Thermal Power Multiple DC grounds have occurred, causing one of the two fuses supplying D-11, 125 VDC distribution panel, to blow Which of the following is the expected plant response and what actions will be taken in response to this failure?

(EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

(EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response)

(AOP-0.0, Vital DC System Malfunction)

A. Only Unit 2 will trip. Crew will enter EOP-0 for Unit 2 and perform AOP-0.0 in parallel. When maintenance determines the cause of the blown fuse, direct maintenance to replace ONLY the blown fuse one time.

B. Both Units 1 and 2 trip. Crew will enter EOP-0 for both units and perform AOP-0.0 when EOP-0.1 is completed. When maintenance determines the cause of the blown fuse, direct maintenance to replace BOTH fuses one time.

C. Only Unit 1 will trip. Crew will enter EOP-0 for Unit 1 and perform AOP-0.0 in parallel. When maintenance determines the cause of the blown fuse, direct maintenance to replace BOTH fuses one time.

D. Both Units will remain at power. Supply fuses are in parallel and blowing one fuse will NOT cause D-11 to lose power. Respond to the failure of one fuse using ARB guidance. When maintenance determines the cause of the blown fuse, direct maintenance to replace ONLY the blown fuse one time.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 161

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2005 PBNP RO 49 K/A:

063A2.01 DC Distribution Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the DC distribution system, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Grounds (Imp 2.5/3.2)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine the impact of a DC ground on the DC system, by determing if power will be lost or not, and then based on that response determine the actions needed to mitigate the event.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must predict the outcome of the event by recalling the impacts of the loss of one fuse on the DC system, then the effect of the DC system on the plant, then determine the actions needed to mitigate the event.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.43 5 55.45 3 55.45 13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 162

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

AOP-0.0 Vital DC System Malfunction, Rev 37 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Consider the following plant conditions:

- Multiple DC grounds have occurred, causing one of the two fuses supplying D-11, 125 VDC distribution panel, to fail open.

Which of the following correctly describes the expected plant response and what actions should be taken in response to this failure?

A. Only Unit 2 will trip. Crew will enter EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, for Unit 2 and perform AOP-0.0, Vital DC System Malfunction in parallel. When maintenance determines the cause of the blown fuse, direct maintenance to replace ONLY the blown fuse one time.

B. Both Units 1 and 2 trip. Crew will enter EOP-0 for both units and perform AOP-0.0 when EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, is completed. When maintenance determines the cause of the blown fuse, direct maintenance to replace BOTH fuses one time.

C. Only Unit 1 will trip. Crew will enter EOP-0 for Unit 1 and perform AOP-0.0 in parallel. When maintenance determines the cause of the blown fuse, direct maintenance to replace BOTH fuses one time.

D. Both Units will remain at power. Supply fuses are in parallel and blowing one fuse will NOT cause D-11 to lose power. Respond to the failure of one fuse using ARB guidance. When maintenance determines the cause of the blown fuse, direct maintenance to replace ONLY the blown fuse one time.

Proposed Answer: C Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 163

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The loss of one fuse will cause a loss of power to D-11, as the fuses are not in parallel. This loss will cause only unit 1 to trip. EOP-0 and perform AOP-0.0 in parallel, and this will direct both fuses to be replaced, and this is allowed only once.

A INCORRECT: Plausible as the loss of other 125 VDC distribution panels will only cause the trip of only one unit and both fuses will be replaced, but replacing only the blown fuse would remedy the issue, but is not allowed by procedure.

B INCORRECT: Plausible as the loss of other 125 VDC distribution panels will only cause the trip of both units and both fuses will be replaced by procedure.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if the student thinks the fuses are in parallel, and the loss of one will not cause a loss of power, and both fuses will be replaced, but replacing only the blown fuse would remedy the issue, but is not allowed by procedure Learning Objective:

Diagnose and describe the plant and operator(s) response to the following conditions:

A. Loss of a DC bus (053.03.LP3456.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 164

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 050 Given the following:

G-02, Emergency Diesel Generator is running, supplying 2A-05, 4160 VAC Safeguards Bus T-31B, Diesel Generator Day Tank has just completed auto makeup from T-175A, EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank Upon completion of the Day Tank fill, the breaker for P-207A, Fuel Oil Transfer Pump, tripped and will not reset With no other Operator action, how long can G-02 run at 100% load?

A. less than 30 minutes B. between 30 and 60 minutes C. at least 120 minutes D. greater than 7 days RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

064K6.08 Emergency Diesel Generator Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G system: Fuel oil storage tanks.

(Imp 3.2/3.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the impact of a failure in the fuel oil storage system on EDG operation.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-DR: The operator must recall the sizes of the fuel tank, and the impact of the tripped pumpt to determine the amount of time the diesel can run.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 165

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

FSAR Section 8.8, Rev UFSAR 2017 P&ID M-219 Sheet 1, Rev 51 P&ID M-219 Sheet 2, Rev 16 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Justification:

P-207A feeds T-31B, Day Tank from T-175A. Per FSAR Section 8.8, A 550 gallon day tank is located near each diesel generator. The capacity of each day tank will allow its associated EDG to run continuously at 100% rated load for at least 120 minutes without makeup.: Also, An additional 550 gallon storage tank is located in the base of each of the Train A diesels.

A INCORRECT: Plausible if the student cannot recall the effect on the system, diesel fuel consumption and capacity of the tanks.

B INCORRECT: Plausible if the student cannot recall the effect on the system, diesel fuel consumption and capacity of the tanks.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Plausible as this is the amount of time one EDG can run off of T-175A and T-175B from minimum Tech Spec level.

Learning Objective:

Analyze the effects of component malfunctions on operation of the fuel oil system.

(052.07.LP0374.006)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 166

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 051 Given the following:

G-04, Emergency Diesel Generator is being paralleled to 2A-06, Safeguards 4160V Bus 2A52-93, G-04 Diesel Generator to Bus 2A-06 Breaker, is closed with G-04 voltage (INCOMING) slightly greater than Bus 2A-06 (RUNNING)

The Operating Supervisor has directed that zero (0) KVARs be maintained following paralleling G-04 with 2A-06 Which of the following identifies:

(1) The response of G-04 output voltage after the breaker is closed?

AND (2) What action should be taken?

A. (1) EDG VAR meter will indicate in the positive (+) VAR (OUT) direction.

(2) Place the G-04 Voltage Control Switch in the LOWER position to adjust VAR load.

B. (1) EDG VAR meter will indicate in the positive (+) VAR (OUT) direction.

(2) Place the G-04 Voltage Control Switch in the RAISE position to adjust VAR load.

C. (1) EDG VAR meter will indicate in the negative (-) VAR (IN) direction.

(2) Place the G-04 Voltage Control Switch in the RAISE position to adjust VAR load.

D. (1) EDG VAR meter will indicate in the negative (-) VAR (IN) direction.

(2) Place the G-04 Voltage Control Switch in the LOWER position to adjust VAR load.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 167

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2011 Comanche Peak RO 24 K/A:

064A3.05 Emergency Diesel Generators (ED/G)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ED/G system, including: Operation of the governor control of frequency and voltage control in parallel operation (Imp 4.2/4.2)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify system conditions and determining proper actions to take.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must predict the outcome of the event.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 5 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 168

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS 84, Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 Monthly, Rev 44 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following conditions:

Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-01 is being paralleled to Safeguards Bus 1EA1.

EDG Breaker 1EG1 is closed with EDG voltage (INCOMING) slightly greater than Safeguards Bus 1EA1 voltage (RUNNING).

The Unit Supervisor has directed that zero (0) KVARs OUT be maintained following paralleling the EDG with the Safeguards Bus.

Based on the above conditions, which of the following identifies the response of the Emergency Diesel output voltage and what action should be taken?

A. 1.) EDG VAR meter will move in the positive (+) VAR (LAG-OUT) direction.

2.) Place the EDG Voltage Control Switch in the LOWER position to adjust VAR load.

B. 1.) EDG VAR meter will move in the positive (+) VAR (LAG-OUT) direction.

2.) Place the EDG Voltage Control Switch in the RAISE position to adjust VAR load.

C. 1.) EDG VAR meter will move in the negative (-) VAR (LEAD-IN) direction.

2.) Place the EDG Voltage Control Switch in the RAISE position to adjust VAR load.

D. 1.) EDG VAR meter will move in the negative (-) VAR (LEAD-IN) direction.

2.) Place the EDG Voltage Control Switch in the LOWER position to adjust VAR load.

Proposed Answer: A.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 169

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

With EDG voltage greater than bus voltage when the breaker is closed, a positive VAR load will be supplied by the G-04. The Voltage Control Switch is placed in LOWER to decrease generator terminal voltage and zero out the VAR load.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: Plausible because the VAR response is correct, however, this action would only serve to increase the VAR load.

C INCORRECT: Plausible because this would be the correct action if generator voltage were lower than Bus 2A-06 voltage when the breaker was closed and it was desired to zero out the VAR load.

D INCORRECT: Plausible because the action is correct, however, this VAR response would occur if G-04 voltage were less than Bus 2A-06 voltage.

Learning Objective:

STATE and DESCRIBE the actions necessary for the following conditions/

operations:

c. Establish Diesel Generator Control following a Fast Start (054.02.LP0133.014)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 170

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 052 Given the following:

Both Units are at Rated Thermal Power Service Water Overboard is aligned to Unit 1

'A' Waste Distillate Tank is going to be discharged Discharge permit has been initiated by Chemistry and an extra CO has been assigned to do detector source checks IAW OI 140B, Standard Radioactive Batch Release 1RE-229, Unit 1 SW Overboard Monitor is designated as the release point monitor RE-223, Waste Distillate Tank Overboard Monitor is the "At Tank" Monitor When the CO arrives at the RMS System Server, he notes that 1RE-229 and RE-223 both indicate Fail External Are these indications expected?

A. No, neither radiation monitor should indicate Fail External.

B. No, 1RE-229 should indicate Fail External until the tank discharge commences but RE-223 should NOT indicate Fail External.

C. No, RE-223 should be indicating Fail External until the tank discharge commences but 1RE-229 should NOT indicate Fail External.

D. Yes, both radiation monitors should indicate Fail External until tank discharge commences.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 171

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2005 PBNP RO 51 K/A:

073A4.02 Process Radiation Monitoring Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Radiation monitoring system control panel (Imp 3.7/3.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to indicate expected indications being monitored at the RMS Systems Server.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-DI: The operator must understand the initial condtions, determine what effects the "at tank" position will have on both RE-223 and 229, and determine if that matches the current indications.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 5 - 8 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 172

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

OI-140B, Standard Radioactive Batch Liquid Release - Waste Distillate Tanks RMSASRB CI 1RE-229, Service Water Overboard Monitor RMSASRB CI RE-223, Waste Distillate Tank Overboard Monitor Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Consider the following plant conditions:

- Both Units are at 100% reactor power.

- Service Water Overboard is aligned to Unit 1.

- 'A' Waste Distillate Tank is going to be discharged.

- Discharge permit has been initiated by Chemistry and an extra CO has been assigned to do monitor checks IAW OI-140, Standard Radioactive Batch Release.

- 1RE-229, Unit 1 SW Overboard Monitor is designated as the release point monitor.

- RE-223, Waste Distillate Tank Overboard Monitor is the "At Tank" Monitor.

- When the CO arrives at the RMS System Server, he notes that 1RE-229 and RE-223 both indicate Fail External.

Are these indications expected?

A. Yes, Both radiation monitors should indicate Fail External until tank discharge commences.

B. No, neither radiation monitor should indicate Fail External.

C. No, 1RE-229 should indicate Fail External until the tank discharge commences but RE-223 should NOT indicate Fail External.

D. No, RE-223 should be indicating Fail External until the tank discharge commences but 1RE-229 should NOT indicate Fail External.

Proposed Answer: D.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 173

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

RE-223 should be in Fail Ex with no flow, 1RE-229 should indicate normal.

A INCORRECT: Plausible, tests student RMS knowledge as RE-232 should be in Fail Ex until discharge starts, since Fail Ex indicates no flow.

B INCORRECT: Plausible because it is opposite of the correct answer.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Plausible, as 1RE-229 should not indicate Fail Ex with flow going through it, tests the student knowledge of RMS expected conditions and SW alignments.

Learning Objective:

IDENTIFY and DESCRIBE the controls, alarms, and indications associated with RMS Operation.

(053.05.LP0286.006)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 174

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 053 Given the following:

Both Units are at Rated Thermal Power A large fish intrusion occurs Circ Water Pump Bay levels for BOTH units stabilize at -13 feet Which of the following components are required to be declared inoperable per TLCO 3.7.7, Service Water (SW) System based on Circ Water Pump Bay level?

A. PAB Battery Room Vent Coolers B. 66' EL Containment Accident Fan Coolers C. Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers D. G01 and G02, Emergency Diesel Generators Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 175

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

Bank (Stem was reworded to relate that the Service Water Tech Specs/Operability is affected by the Circ Water Pump Bay level, as that is where the SW pump take a suction. K/A was changed to make the question applicable to the SW system. Question is modified, but not significantly.)

Question History:

2019 PBNP RO 65 PREVIOUS 2 NRC EXAMS (Questions original K/A was 075K3.07)

K/A:

076G2.2.39 Service Water Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical Specification action statements for systems.

(Imp 3.9/4.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the condition that requires a one-hour TS Action.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-F: The operator must recall the facts of the one-hour TS actions for the Service Water System.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.41.10 55.43.2 55.45.13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 176

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TRM 3.7.7, Service Water (SW) System Rev 17 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

Both Units are at Rated Thermal Power

A large fish intrusion occurs

Circ Water Pump Bay levels for BOTH units stabilize at -13 feet Which of the following components will cause TLCO 3.7.7, Service Water (SW)

System to no longer be met with Circ Water Pump Bay level at -13 Feet?

A. PAB Battery Room Vent Coolers B. 66' EL Containment Accident Fan Coolers C. Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers D. G01 and G02, Emergency Diesel Generators Proposed answer:.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 177

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

With Circ Water Pump Bay level being at -13 feet means that 66' EL containment accident fan cooler units need to be declared inoperable immediately (TRMAC 3.7.7.B), which is required to be done at a level of less than -11.5 feet. This is due to loss of suction to the SW pumps A INCORRECT: Plausible, because PAB Battery Room Vent Cooler will be declared inoperable if the forebay temperature is greater than 85°F.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Plausible, because Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanges are declared inoperable if the forebay temperature is greater than 85°F.

D INCORRECT: Plausible, because G01 and G02 will be declared inoperable if the Circ Water Pump Bay level is less -15 feet.

Learning Objective:

Given specific plant conditions, ASSESS and APPLY Technical Specification Technical Requirements Manual requirements as appropriate.

(057.02.LP3410.003)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 178

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 054 Given the following:

Both Units are at Rated Thermal Power K2A, Instrument Air (IA) compressor is in CONSTANT K2B, Instrument Air (IA) compressor is in AUTO An Instrument Air leak develops on the North Air Header in the TDAFW Pump Room The supply breaker for 2B-04, 480 V Bus tripped Instrument Air Pressure lowers to 82 psig With no operator action, which of the following describes the Air System (IA and SA) response to this event?

A. K-2A is RUNNING loaded K-2B is RUNNING loaded Service Air to Instrument Air Backup valves, IA-3014 and IA-3019, are OPEN Instrument Air Dryer Bypass valves, IA-3000S and IA-3094S, are OPEN B. K-2A is RUNNING loaded K-2B is NOT running Service Air to Instrument Air Backup valves, IA-3014 and IA-3019, are OPEN Instrument Air Dryer Bypass valves, IA-3000S and IA-3094S, are CLOSED C. K-2A is NOT running K-2B is RUNNING loaded Service Air to Instrument Air Backup valves, IA-3014 and IA-3019, are CLOSED Instrument Air Dryer Bypass valves, IA-3000S and IA-3094S, are CLOSED D. K-2A is RUNNING loaded K-2B is RUNNING loaded Service Air to Instrument Air Backup valves, IA-3014 and IA-3019, are CLOSED Instrument Air Dryer Bypass valves, IA-3000S and IA-3094S, are OPEN Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 179

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

078K2.01 Instrument Air System (IAS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Instrument air compressor.

(Imp 2.7/2.9)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the components that have lost power.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must interpret the impact of the loss of power on the Air systems and then determine system response to the leak.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 5

Reference:

MDB 3.2.4 PANEL 2B04, 480 V AC Unit 2, Rev 14 MDB 3.2.5 PANEL 1B32, 480 V AC Motor Control Centers Unit 1, Rev 24 MDB 3.2.6 PANEL 2B42, 480 V AC Motor Control Centers Unit 2, Rev 22 STPT 14.7, Secondary Systems Instrument and Service Air, Rev 23 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 180

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

From STPT 14.7 and the listed MDBs, the following are true:

K-2A power supply - 1B32 K-2B power supply - 2B42 At 90 psig (dec) IA pressure - AUTO IA compressor starts At 88 psig (dec) SA pressure - STBY SA compressor starts At 85 psig (dec) IA pressure - STBY SA compressor starts At 85 psig (dec) IA pressure - SA to IA Backup valves OPEN At 80 psig (dec) IA pressure - IA Dryer Bypass valves OPEN 2B04 supplies power to 2B42 K-2B is OFF due to loss of power. IA Dryer Bypass valves have not met their OPEN setpoint.

A INCORRECT: Plausible. K-2B is OFF due to loss of power.However, IA Dryer Bypass valves have not met their OPEN setpoint.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Plausible, however, K-2A will remain running and K-2B will lose power. The SA-IA Backup Valves will be OPEN.

D INCORRECT: Plausible. K-2B is OFF due to loss of power. Also, Service Air Backup valves will be open and Dryer bypass valves will not have met their OPEN setpoint.

Learning Objective:

STATE the power supply for the following Instrument and Service Air components:

a. Instrument and Service Air Compressors

b. Instrument Air Dryers and Dryer Bypass Solenoid valves (052.06.LP0338.003)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 181

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 055 Given the following:

Unit 2 is at Rated Thermal Power Containment Forced Vent is in progress IAW OP-9C, Containment Venting and Purging 2P-707B, Containment Forced Vent pump is running 2RE-212, Unit 2 Containment Noble Gas Monitor fails to the HIGH ALARM condition Which of the following automatic actions will occur and what actions will the Unit 2 operators take?

(CVI - Containment Ventilation Isolation)

(CI - Containment Isolation)

A. No automatic actions will occur.

Operators will compare 2RE-212 readings to other Containment radiation monitors and decide whether forced vent may continue.

B. CVI will automatically occur.

Operators will need to manually secure 2P-707B, Containment Forced Vent pump, to prevent it from running without a discharge path.

C. CVI will automatically occur.

Operators will verify that 2P-707B, Containment Forced Vent pump, is off and that 2RM-3200H, Containment Forced Vent pump discharge valve, is closed.

D. CI and CVI will automatically occur.

Operators will verify 2P-707B, Containment Forced Vent pump, is off, 2RM-3200H, Containment Forced Vent pump discharge valve is closed and that all Containment Isolation Valves repositioned as required.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 182

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2005 PBNP RO 73 (Questions original K/A was G2.3.9)

K/A:

103K1.02 Containment Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the containment system and the following systems: Containment isolation/containment integrity (Imp 3.9/4.1)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify consequences of a Rad Monitor impact on CVI and CI.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must recognize the interaction between RMS and CVI and CI, including consequences.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 2 to 9 55.45 7 55.45 8 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 183

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

RMSASRB CI 2RE-212 Contyainment Noble Gas Monitor Unit 2, Rev 11 ARB C01 C 2-8 Containment Ventilation Isolation, Rev Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Consider the following Unit 2 conditions:

- Unit 2 is at 100% reactor power.

- Containment Forced Vent is in progress IAW OP-9C, Containment Venting and Purging.

- 2P-707B, Containment Forced Vent pump is running.

IF 2RE-212, Unit 2 Containment Noble Gas Monitor fails to the HIGH ALARM condition, which of the following automatic actions will occur and what actions will the Unit 2 operators take?

NOTE: CVI - Containment Ventilation Isolation CI - Containment Isolation A. No automatic actions will occur. Operators will compare 2RE-212 readings to other Containment radiation monitors and decide whether forced vent may continue.

B. CVI will automatically occur. Operators will need to manually secure 2P-707B, Containment Forced Vent pump, to prevent it from running without a discharge path.

C. CVI will automatically occur. Operators will verify that 2P-707B, Containment Forced Vent pump, is off and that 2RM-3200H, Containment Forced Vent pump discharge valve, is closed.

D. CI and CVI will automatically occur. Operators will verify 2P-707B, Containment Forced Vent pump, is off, 2RM-3200H, Containment Forced Vent pump discharge valve is closed and that all Containment Isolation Valves repositioned as required.

Proposed Answer: C.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 184

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

CVI will occur, pump will stop and 3200H will shut.

A INCORRECT: Plausible, CVI will automatically occur when RE-212 reaches the HIGH alarm, additionally, the pump will automatically stop on CVI.

B INCORRECT: Plausible, CVI will occur, pump will automatically stop and RM-3200H will shut.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Plausible, CI does not have an input from RE212.

Learning Objective:

ASSESS the causes of Interlocks, Permissives, and Automatic Functions associated with operation of the Safeguards Actuation System.

(053.06.LP0486.020)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 185

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 056 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at Rated Thermal Power Control Rods are in AUTOMATIC with Bank D at 220 steps The following occurs:

N-42, Power Range NI (White) RAPIDLY fails HIGH Control Bank D rods start to drive in Which answers the following?

Automatic inward rod motion will ___(1)___. Prior to switch operation at the NIS cabinet, rods ___(2)___ be withdrawn manually at 1C04 (Assuming no operator action)

(1) (2)

A. stop as the power mismatch signal decays CANNOT B. stop as the power mismatch signal decays CAN C. continue until rods are fully inserted CANNOT D. continue until rods are fully inserted CAN Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 186

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2018 Millstone RO 64 K/A:

001K1.05 Control Rod Drive Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CRDS and the following systems: NIS and RPS (Imp 4.5/4.4)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the cause and effect on CRDs from NI System malfunction.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must predict the outcome of the failure of an NI channel failure, and consequences on the Control Rod System.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 2 to 9 55.45 7 55.45 8 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 187

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

AOP-6C Unit 1, Uncontrolled Motion of RCCAs, Rev 19 ARB 1C04 1A 4-2, Power Range High Setpoint Channel Alert, Rev 2 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

With power initially at 100% power, the following sequence of events occurs:

1. Power Range NI Channel N44 rapidly fails high.

2. Control Bank "D" rods start to drive in.

Assuming no operator action is taken, complete the following statements about how the Rod Control System responds to this event.

Automatic inward rod motion will (1) . Prior to switch operation at the NIS cabinet, rods (2) be withdrawn manually at MB4.

(1) (2)

A. stop as the power mismatch signal decays CANNOT B. stop as the power mismatch signal decays CAN C. continue until rods are fully inserted CANNOT D. continue until rods are fully inserted CAN Proposed Answer: A.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 188

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The power mismatch signal (difference in the rate of change between reactor and turbine load) will initially cause rods to drive in due to a rapid increase in auctioneered high NIS power. As rods drive in, Tave decreases. Temperature error will start to offset the inward rod motion signal, and the and the power mismatch signal will decay, since it is not a primary to secondary power mismatch signal ("C" and "D" wrong), but a rate of change signal. This would result in inward rod motion stopping. The overpower rod stop coincidence is 1 of 4 channels, so outward rod motion is blocked until the failed channel is defeated at the NIS cabinets ("A" correct and "B" wrong). "C" and "D" are plausible, since this would be true if a temperature instrument failed high, since temperature error is based on difference between Tave and Tref, not a rate of change between the two. "B" is plausible, since most of the RPS coincidences are 2 of 4 channels, not 1 of 4.

A CORRECT: See above B INCORRECT: Plausible since Control Rods will stop moving. However, since coincidence for rod stop is 1 of 4 instead of the normal 2 of 4, the examinee may choose this answer.

C INCORRECT: Plausible, since rods cannot be withdrawn prior to switch operations. However, Control Rods will stop when power mismatch decays.

D INCORRECT: Plausible since the examinee may assume Control Rods will be able to move since the normal coincidenses are 2 out of 4 and rod stops is a 1 out of 4 coincidense.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE system response to the following:

e. Failed NIS Power Range Channel (053.01.LP1547.008)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 189

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 057 Given the following:

Unit 1 is in MODE 3, cooling down to MODE 5 for a forced outage An electrical fault has locked out 345 KV Bus Sections BS1 and BS2 The crew is responding to the loss of offsite power to Unit 1 Which of the following statements describes the Pressurizer Heater Group(s) that will be available to maintain Pressurizer pressure?

A. All Control and Backup Heater Groups B. Backup Heater Groups A and B ONLY C. Control Group E and Backup Heater Group D ONLY D. Control Group E and Backup Heater Groups C and D ONLY RO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2016 South Texas Project RO 9 K/A:

011K2.02 Pressurizer Level Control Knowledge of the bus power supplies to the following: PZR heaters (Imp 3.1/3.2)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine which Pzr Heaters are without power.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must determine the impact on the electric plant from the loss of offsite power and then correlate the impact on the Pressurizer Heaters.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 190

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

MDB 3.2.3 Panel 1B01, Rev 14 MDB 3.2.3 Panel 1B02, Rev 15 MDB 3.2.3 Panel 1B03, Rev 19 MDB 3.2.3 Panel 1B04, Rev 15 PBE-7033, Simplified Electrical Power Distribution System, Rev 14 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Following a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP), which ONE of the following statements describes the Pressurizer heater groups that will be available to maintain Pressurizer pressure?

A. Backup heater groups A and B ONLY B. Backup heater groups D and E ONLY C. All Backup heater groups EXCEPT control heater group C D. All Backup heater groups Proposed Answer: A.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 191

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Heater Control Group E is powered from 1B-04, 480 V Safeguards bus.

Heater Backup Group A is powered from 1B-01, 480 V Non-Safeguards bus.

Heater Backup Group B is powered from 1B-02, 480 V Non-Safeguards bus.

Heater Backup Group C is powered from 1B-03, 480 V Safeguards bus.

Heater Backup Group D is powered from 1B-04, 480 V Safeguards bus.

Fast Bus Transfer of 13.8 KV busses should keep 1B-03 and 1B-04 powered.

If not, EDGs G-01 and G-03 will power 1A05 and 1A06, which in turn power 1B-03 and 1B-04, respectively.

A INCORRECT: Plausible if Busses 1B-01 and 1B-02 remained energized.

B INCORRECT: Plausible but opposite. Heater Groups A & B are non-safeguards power, which is lost on a loss of offsite power.

C INCORRECT: Plausible if examine believes only Bus 1B-04 is energized or does not recall the power supplies to the Pzr Heater groups.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

STATE the power supplies for the Pressurizer, Level Control, Pressure Control, and Relief System components:

Pressurizer Heaters (051.01.LP0078.003)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 192

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 058 Given the following:

Unit 1 Reactor startup is in progress with power holding at 40% RTP for testing Bank D control rods are at 150 steps Control Rod Bank Selector switch is in AUTO N-44, Power Range NI (Yellow) fails off-scale LOW over 30 seconds Which of the following is the expected response of the Rod Control System without Operator action?

Initially rods will step . . .

A. IN until rate input is zero.

B. OUT until rate input is zero.

C. IN until P-7 permissive setpoint is reached.

D. OUT until P-9 permissive setpoint is reached.

RO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2011 Wolf Creek RO 23 K/A:

015K3.02 Nuclear Instrumentation Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the NIS will have on the following: CRDS (Imp 3.3/3.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine the effect on the Control Rods/ Control Rod Drive System from a failure in the Nuclear Instrumentation System.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: Analyze plant conditions and determine system/plant response to the conditions, predicting the outcome.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 6 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 193

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

AOP-6C Uncontrolled Motion of RCCAs Rev 19 BG AOP-6C, Background Uncontrolled Motion of RCCAs Rev 15 STPT 3.1, P6, P7, P8, P9, and P10, Rev 13 Logic 883D195 Sheet 16, Rod Control & Blocks & Turbine Runbacks FSAR Section 7.7.1, Rod Control, version UFSAR 2012 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following plant conditions:

Startup in progress

Reactor power 50%

Control Bank D rods are at 170 steps in Auto

Power range monitor NI44 fails off scale HIGH over 30 seconds Which ONE of the following is the expected INITIAL response of the Rod Control System without Operator action?

A. Rods drive in at max rate until rate input is zero.

B. Rods drive out at max rate until rate input is zero.

C. Rods drive in until C-5 permissive setpoint is reached.

D. Rods drive out until C-11 permissive setpoint is reached.

Proposed Answer: A.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 194

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per UFSAR 7.7.1.1.d, The rod control system maintains a programmed Tavg by providing speed and direction signals to the control banks, based on High Tavg and power mismatch signals.

2. Power Mismatch Signal A power mismatch signal is also employed as a control signal to improve the plant performance. The nuclear power is determined from the signals of the four reactor trip system power range neutron flux instrumentation. The average of the four power range signals is used as the control signal. The power mismatch signal is determined from a comparison of the average nuclear flux signal and the turbine first stage pressure signal, which represents turbine power.

The power mismatch signal is sent to a variable gain unit, which increases the signal based on turbine power. This serves to speed up system response and reduce transient peaks. This signal is sent to the Tavg summing circuitry where it is compared with the HI Tavg signal and the reference average temperature Tref, which is based on turbine power.

The above signals are combined by the summing circuitry and the output signal is used to control the direction and speed of control groups, to maintain Tavg at its programmed setting.

A INCORRECT: Plausible. This would be true if N-44 failed High instead of Low.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Plausible. Rods would drive in if N-44 failed low. However, they would stop when the rate input went to zero.

D INCORRECT: Plausible. The direction of rod movement is correct. However, the rods would not stop at the P-9 permissive. They would stop when the rate input went to zero.

Learning Objective:

Assess the effect a loss of Nuclear Instrumentation would have on the Reactor Protection System.

(053.03.LP2416.010)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 195

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 059 Given the following:

Unit 1 has experienced a small break LOCA EOP-1.1, SI Termination, is in progress The following indications are noted:

1TI-970, Subcooling Monitor 50°F and STABLE 1TI-971, Subcooling Monitor 25°F and STABLE RCS Wide Range Pressure 1210 psig Core Exit Thermocouple avg 545°F Complete the following:

(1) After comparing the subcooling readings with RCS pressure and CETs, the crew will determine that 1TI-970 is reading . . .

AND (2) The range of indication of 1TI-970 is from . . .

A. (1) accurately.

(2) -25°F (Superheat) to 150°F Subcooling.

B. (1) inaccurately.

(2) -25°F (Superheat) to 150°F Subcooling.

C. (1) accurately.

(2) -50°F (Superheat) to 200°F Subcooling.

D. (1) inaccurately.

(2) -50°F (Superheat) to 200°F Subcooling.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 196

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

017K4.03 In-Core Temperature Monitor System (ITM)

Knowledge of ITM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Range of temperature indication (Imp 3.1/3.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the range of subcooling, which receives input from the core exit thermocouples Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The operator must determine the actual subcooling based on current plant conditions, then recall the indication range of subcooling.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 197

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

LP0583, RVLIS/SCM/CET Systems, Rev 8 Slide 87 Steam Tables Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

Steam Tables Original Question:

A small break LOCA has occurred on Unit 1.

- EOP-1.1, SI Termination, is in progress.

- Safety Injection Pump 1P-15A has just been stopped.

- Safety Injection Pump 1P-15B is running.

The following conditions are noted:

- 1TI-970, Subcooling Monitor 200 °F and stable

- 1TI-971, Subcooling Monitor 25 °F and stable

- RCS Wide Range Pressure 1210 psig

- Core Exit Thermocouple avg 545 °F

- Containment pressure 5 psig

- Containment rad levels 4 R/hr After comparing the subcooling readings with RCS pressure and CETs, the crew will determine that:

A. 1TI-970 is reading accurately, Safety Injection Pump 1P-15A will NOT be started, the crew will continue in EOP-1.1.

B. 1TI-970 is reading inaccurately, Safety Injection Pump 1P-15A will be started to restore subcooling.

C. 1TI-971 is reading accurately, Safety Injection Pump 1P-15A will NOT be re-started, the crew will continue in EOP-1.1.

D. 1TI-971 is reading inaccurately, Safety Injection Pump 1P-15B will be stopped since adequate subcooling exists.

Proposed answer: B Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 198

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Saturation temperature for the current plant pressure is 570°F, with CETs at 545°F, that would make subcooling 25°, and therefore the subcooling monitor is indicating inaccurately.

Range of the indication is 50°F superheated to 200°F Subcooled.

A INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible if the student confuses the instrument numbers, or makes an error calculating subcooling.

The second part is wrong, plausible as this range will provide all indications required by the EOP network.

B INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part is wrong, plausible as this range will provide all indications required by the EOP network.

C INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible if the student confuses the instrument numbers, or makes an error calculating subcooling.

The second part is correct.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Describe the function and or purpose, design bases, theory of operation, and operating characteristics of the Reactor Vessel Level Indication, Subcooling Monitor, and Core Exit Thermocouple System and the major components.

(053.07.LP0583.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 199

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 060 What is the reason that the quantity of aluminum metal components in containment must be minimized?

A. Aluminum melts in a high temperature fire.

B. Aluminum reacts with sodium hydroxide to produce hydrogen.

C. Aluminum combines with elemental iodine to form a soluble salt.

D. Aluminum loses structural strength in a high energy line break environment.

RO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2011 PBNP RO 59 K/A:

028K5.03 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to HRPS: Sources of hydrogen within containment (Imp 2.9/3.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine which choice is the basis for the prohibition of aluminum in containment.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-F: The operator must recall the reason for prohibiting aluminum in Containment.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.45 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 200

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

FSAR 5.6 Construction, UFSAR 2018 LP3821 slide 97, Rev 4 change 1 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

What is the reason that the quantity of aluminum metal components in containment must be minimized?

A. Aluminum melts in a high temperature fire.

B. Aluminum reacts with sodium hydroxide to produce hydrogen.

C. Aluminum combines with elemental iodine to form a soluble salt.

D. Aluminum loses structural strength in a high energy line break environment.

Proposed Answer: B.

Justification:

Per FSAR Section 5.6.2, states that Aluminum alloys were found to be incompatible with the alkaline sodium borate solutions. Aluminum was observed to corrode at a significant rate, with the generation of hydrogen gas.

A INCORRECT: Not the FSAR stated reason for minimizing aluminum in Containment.

B CORRECT: See above C INCORRECT: Not the FSAR stated reason for minimizing aluminum in Containment.

D INCORRECT: Not the FSAR stated reason for minimizing aluminum in Containment.

Learning Objective:

EXPLAIN the four mediums of hydrogen production in Containment.

(051.05.LP0058.006)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 201

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 061 Given the following:

Both Units are at Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 has just returned to RTP following a refueling outage that concluded 5 days ago A malfunction resulted in level lowering in the Spent Fuel Pool to the lowest edge of the Spent Fuel Pool Gates Which of the following will go to High Alarm FIRST as a result of the lowering Spent Fuel Pool level?

A. RE-105, Spent Fuel Pool Low Range Monitor B. RE-214, Auxiliary Building Vent Exhaust Gas Monitor C. 1RE-216, Containment Fan Cooler Return Monitor D. RE-220, Spent Fuel Cooling Liquid Monitor Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 202

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

033A1.02 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System controls including: Radiation monitoring systems (Imp 2.8/3.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine the impact on the RMS system for a malfunction in the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-PEO: The operator must recall the location of the radiation monitors, their type and monitored parameter, and the impact of lowering SFP level on those rad monitors.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.45 5

Reference:

STPT 13.1, Area Monitors, Rev 7 STPT 13.4, Effluent Monitors, Rev 17 DBD-13 Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtration Design Basis Document Figure 2-6, Rev 12 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 203

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Normal level in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) is 63 8. This is 25 feet above the active fuel. The bottom of the SFP gates is 40 8. This is a loss of 23 feet of water shielding, and leaves only 2 11 of water shielding above the fuel. The 10th thickness of water is 24. This calculates out to a reduction in shielding, measured at RE-105 and RE-135 of 11.5 10ths, or a factor of 10-11.5.

High alarm for RE-105 is 10 mR/hr and is located next to the SFP. It will alarm due to loss of shielding.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: Plausible because this rad monitor would alarm if contents of the SFP went airborne. (failed fuel or loose surface contamination)

C INCORRECT: Plausible if the student believes that shine will cause the alarm.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if examinee doesnt realize this is a process monitor on the Service Water System coming out of the SFP HXs.

Learning Objective:

Recognize and Analyze the effects on the Spent Fuel Pool and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System in the event of:

Loss of Service Water Fuel Pool liner leakage Interconnecting piping failure (112.01.LP0110.006)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 204

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 062 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at Rated Thermal Power The B Steam Generator (SG) Steam Flow and Feedwater Flow Control Transfer Switches are aligned as follows:

Subsequently:

1FT-476, Feedwater Flow Loop B, fails LOW SLOWLY Annunciator 1C03 1E2 3-5, STEAM GENERATOR B FEED WATER CHANNEL ALERT, is lit Which completes the following?

Immediately after the failure, 1CS-476, Steam Generator B FW Regulator CV, will start to go ___(1)___.

AND In order to restore B SG level control to AUTOMATIC, the Operator will select

___(2)___ in accordance with the ARP 1C03 1E2 3-5?

A. (1) OPEN (2) SG B Feedwater Flow Control Transfer Switch ONLY to 477 (Yellow)

B. (1) OPEN (2) SG B Feedwater Flow Control Transfer Switch to 477 (Yellow), and SG B Steam Flow Control Transfer Switch to 475 (Yellow)

C. (1) CLOSED (2) SG B Feedwater Flow Control Transfer Switch ONLY to 477 (Yellow)

D. (1) CLOSED (2) SG B Feedwater Flow Control Transfer Switch to 477 (Yellow), and SG B Steam Flow Control Transfer Switch to 475 (Yellow)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 205

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2014 Harris RO 59 K/A:

035A2.04 Steam Generator Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the S/G system, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Steam flow/feed mismatch (Imp 3.6/3.8)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator predict the system response to the malfunction and determine actions based on the governing procedure.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must recognize the interaction between the SG level control system and Feed Reg Valves and the implication of this failure on procedural steps to take to correct the plant conditions.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.43 5 55.45 3 55.45 5 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 206

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

ARP 1C03 1E2 3-5, STEAM GENERATOR B FEED WATER CHANNEL ALERT, Rev 0 883D195 Sheet 10, Logic Diagram Feedwater Control and Isolation, Rev 17 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following plant conditions:

- The unit is operating at 100% power

- The 'B' SG Control and Recorder Selectors are as follows:

Subsequently:

- The controlling 'B' SG Feed Flow channel fails high

- Annunciator ALB-014-4-1B, SG B FW > STM Flow Mismatch, alarms Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

Immediately after the failure the 'B' SG FRV will start to go ___(1)___ .

Once 'B' SG level is under operator control, in order to restore 'B' SG automatic water level control the operator will select ___(2)___ in accordance with OWP-RP, Reactor Protection.

A. (1) OPEN (2) STM GEN B FW Flow Chan 486 ONLY B. (1) OPEN (2) STM GEN B FW Flow Chan 486 AND STM GEN B STM Flow Chan 485 C. (1) CLOSED (2) STM GEN B FW Flow Chan 486 ONLY D. (1) CLOSED (2) STM GEN B FW Flow Chan 486 AND STM GEN B STM Flow Chan 485 Proposed Answer: D.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:04 AM 207

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Failure of the BLUE Feed Flow Transmitter will cause a false steam flow greater than feed flow condition. This will cause the feedwater control system to open the Feed Reg Valve more, to make up for the perceived reduction in feed flow for the given steam flow.

Per ARP 1C03 1E2, 3-5, for a failure of 1FT-476, the Operator is to place both the feed flow selector and the steam flow selector to the opposite channel A INCORRECT: Plausible. The Feed Reg Valve will go OPEN. But both selectors, not just the failed transmitters selector, are shifted to the other channel.

B CORRECT: See above C INCORRECT: Plausible if the trainee assumes only the failed channel selector is shifted to the opposite channel. However, the Feed Reg Valve will OPEN, not CLOSE.

D INCORRECT: Plausible. Both selectors are directed to be shifted to the opposite channel. However, the Feed Reg Valve will OPEN, not CLOSE.

Learning Objective:

IDENTIFY and RESPOND to the following failures/transients:

Feedwater Control System Malfunctions Steam Generator Level Control System Malfunctions (052.02.LP0131.006)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 208

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 063 Given the following:

Unit 2 is at 16% power following startup Turbine is latched and rolling at 1800 RPM Main Generator output breaker is open Subsequently, the Reactor trips Both Circ Water pumps are running Condenser Vacuum is 26 Hg Tavg is 530°F and LOWERING Turbine is still operating EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, is in progress and C02 is carrying out Immediate Actions Are plant conditions as expected? Why or why not?

A. Conditions as expected, turbine does not automatically trip if <P-9.

B. Conditions NOT as expected, turbine should have tripped due to low vacuum.

C. Conditions NOT as expected, turbine should have tripped when reactor tripped.

D. Conditions NOT as expected, turbine should have tripped when Tavg lowered to 547ºF.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 209

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2007 PBNP RO 39 (Questions original K/A was 012K1.06)

K/A:

045A3.04 Main Turbine Generator System (MT/G)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MT/G system, including: T/G trip (Imp 3.4/3.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the analyze plant condition, including turbine status and determine if automatic actions should have occurred.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The operator must analyze plant conditions, determining if they are normal for the parameters given, and if not, why they are not expected..

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41.7 55.45.5 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 210

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

Logic Drawing 883D195 Sh. 2, Reactor Trips Rev 9 Logic Drawing 883D195 Sh. 3, Turbine Trips Rev 3 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Consider the following Unit 2 conditions:

- Unit 2 is at 16% power following startup

- Turbine is latched and rolling at 1800 RPM.

- Main Generator output breaker is open.

- Subsequently, Unit 2 Reactor trips.

- Both Circ Water pumps are running.

- Condenser Vacuum is 26 Hg.

- Tavg is 530ºF and lowering.

- Turbine is still operating.

EOP-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection", is in progress and C02 is carrying out Immediate Action steps.

Are plant conditions as expected? Why or why not?

A. Conditions as expected, turbine does not automatically trip if <P-9.

B. Conditions NOT as expected, turbine should have tripped due to low vacuum.

C. Conditions NOT as expected, turbine should have tripped when reactor tripped.

D. Conditions NOT as expected, turbine should have tripped when Tavg lowered to 547ºF.

Proposed answer C Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 211

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The turbine should have tripped with the reactor trip signal, regardless of cause.

A INCORRECT: Plausible if the student misapplies the P-9 permissive from the reactor causing a turbine trip.

B INCORRECT: Plausible if the student applies the vacuum trip not being met causing the turbine not to have been tripped.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if the student misapplies the low Tave trip Learning Objective:

Describe the interlocks, actuation setpoints, and permissives associated with major components and operations associated with the Turbine Protection Trip System.

(052.03.LP0021.003)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 212

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 064 Given the following:

A discharge of the A Monitor Tank is in progress Which of the following would provide the Control Operator indication that WL-18, Waste Condensate Overboard Discharge to SW Header Control Valve, should have automatically closed?

A. The COMMON AREA RADIATION MONITOR HIGH annunciator alarms.

B. RE-218, Waste Disposal System Liquid Monitor, status indication on PPCS changes from green to red.

C. RE-223, Waste Distillate Tank Overboard Monitor, status indication on PPCS server changes from green to blue.

D. The status light for WL-18, Waste Condensate Overboard to SW header control valve is lit on the Containment Isolation Panel.

RO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2015 PBNP RO 63 (Questions original K/A was 068A4.04)

K/A:

068A4.03 Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Stoppage of release if limits exceeded (Imp 3.9/3.8)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to recall what control room indications will cause the stoppage of a release if limits are exceeded.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-I: The operator must recall the control room indications for liquid Radwaste system.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.45 5 - 8 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 213

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

RMSASRB CI RE-218, Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Setpoint &*

Response Book Channel Information Sheet Waste Disposal System Liquid Monitor, Rev 5 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

A discharge of the A Monitor Tank is in progress Which of the following would provide the Control Operator indication that WL-18, Waste Condensate Overboard Discharge to SW Header Control Valve, should have automatically closed?

A. The COMMON PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR HIGH annunciator alarms.

B. RE-218, Waste Disposal System Liquid Monitor, status indication on the RMS server changes from green to red.

C. RE-223, Waste Distillate Tank Overboard Monitor, status indication on the RMS server changes from green to blue.

D. The status light for WL-18, Waste Condensate Overboard to SW header control valve is lit on the Containment Isolation Panel.

Proposed answer: B Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 214

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The control room indication is that RE-218 status on the RMS server will change from green to read. Automatic actions will stop the discharge.

A INCORRECT: This is incorrect due to this alarm can be caused by a number of monitors, but not RE-218. Plausible is the operator asumes this alarm will be caused by RE-218 as it is a process monitor.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT:RE-223 will cause an automatic operation if a high alarm condition exists, the indication on RMS server indicated that the point has gone bad. Plausible if the student expects a bad input to cause a closure signal, and does not understand the system layout.

D INCORRECT: There are Liquid Waste system valve indications on the Containment Isolation panel, but WL-18 is not one of them.

Plausible if the student assumes the isolation panels will indicate for overboard discharges.

Learning Objective:

Identify and describe the controls, alarms, and indications associated with the Liquid Waste Disposal System (WL) including:

a Location and function of components and/or system operating controls and (051.04.LP0063.005)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 215

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 065 Given the following:

Both units are at Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 is aligned for ice melt 1P-30A and 2P-30B, Circulating Water Pumps, are currently in service Subsequently 1P-30A has developed a severe motor bearing failure requiring the pump to be secured immediately Which of the following is negatively impacted, or potentially impacted, directly by the loss of 1P-30A?

A. Supply to the fire system header B. Supply to the Water Treatment system C. Discharge path and dilution water for radioactive releases D. Provides cooling to the Steam Generator Blowdown system RO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

052.01.LP0151.001 003 K/A:

075G2.1.27 Circulating Water Knowledge of system purpose and/or function.

(Imp 3.9/4.0)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to recall the purposes/ functions of the Circulating Water System.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-B: The operator must recall function/purpose of the Circ Water System.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 216

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

FSAR 1.2.4, Summary Plant Description, version UFSAR 2020 FSAR Section 10.1, Steam and Power Conversion System, version UFSAR 2020 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Which of the following functions is normally supported by the Circulating Water System?

A. Supply to the fire system header B. Supply to the Water Treatment system C. Condense steam in the Steam Generator Blowdown system D. Provide a discharge path and dilution water for radioactive releases Proposed Answer: D.

Justification:

Circulating Water provides for dilution of liquid Radwaste discharges.

A INCORRECT: This is a function of both the Fire Protection System and Service Water System.

B INCORRECT: This is a function of the Service Water System.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: This is a function of the Condensate System.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the function and/or purpose, design bases, and operating characteristics of the Circulating Water System.

(052.01.LP0151.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 217

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 066 Given the following:

You are a licensed Reactor Operator that was assigned to the Work Control Center (Staff CO) on 9/1/2020 Both Units have remained at RTP while assigned to the Work Control Center You are current in maintaining qualification in the Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program The date is February 23, 2021 and you are preparing to return to shift duties The times you were on shift since this assignment is as follows:

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on September 18, 2020 as Unit 1 CO

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on September 19, 2020 as Unit 1 CO

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on October 27, 2020 as Unit 2 CO

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on October 28, 2020 as Unit 2 CO

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on November 23, 2020 as Third CO

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on November 22, 2020 as Third CO

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on December 24, 2020 as Third CO Which of the following describes the status of your license in accordance with OM 3.10, Operations Personnel Assignments and Scheduling?

A. Your license is active. You may stand watch with no restrictions.

B. Your license is active. You must regain qualification as RO by standing three (3) additional 8-hour shifts in the Unit 1 or Unit 2 CO position.

C. Your license is inactive. You must reactivate your license by standing two (2) additional 8-hour shifts in any CO position.

D. Your license is inactive. You must reactivate your license by standing forty (40) hours on shift under instruction in any CO position.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 218

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

2009 PBNP RO 66 K/A:

G2.1.1 Conduct of Operations Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.

(Imp 3.8/4.2)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the status of their license, which is part of the conduct of operations.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The operator must determine the number of watches stood in the current quarter, and then recall the requirement and compare the two.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.45 13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 219

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

OM 3.10 operator Personnel Assignments and Scheduling section 4.4 and 4.5, Rev 43 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

You are a licensed Reactor Operator and were assigned to the Work Control Center on 9/1/08. Both Units have remained at RTP while assigned to the Work Control Center.

You are current in maintaining qualification in the Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program.

The date is February 23, 2009 and you are preparing to return to shift duties.

The time you were on shift since this assignment is as follows:

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on September 18, 2008 as Unit 1 CO

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on September 19, 2008 as Unit 1 CO

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on October 27, 2008 as Unit 2 CO

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on October 28, 2008 as Unit 2 CO

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on November 23, 2008 as Third CO

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on November 22, 2008 as Third CO

- 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months on December 24, 2008 as Third CO Which of the following describes the status of your license in accordance with OM 3.10, "Operations Personnel Assignments and Scheduling"?

A. Your license is active. You may stand watch with no restrictions.

B. Your license is active. You must regain qualification as RO by standing three (3) additional 8-hour shifts in the Unit 1 or Unit 2 CO position.

C. Your license is inactive. You must reactivate your license by standing two (2) additional 8-hour shifts in any CO position.

D. Your license is inactive. You must reactivate your license by standing forty (40) hours on shift under instruction in any CO position.

Proposed Answer: D.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 220

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per OM 3.10, section 4.4.1.a, Staff COs maintain their licenses active by standing Operator-At-The-Controls watches only. Seven 8-hour watches or 5 12-hour watches.

Last calendar quarter did not stand 7 OATC watches.

A INCORRECT: License is inactive due to insufficient hours last quarter.

B INCORRECT: Plausible; while the proficiency watches must be either CO1 or CO2, re-activation requires 40 hours4.62963e-4 days 0.0111 hours 6.613757e-5 weeks 1.522e-5 months of activation watches.

C INCORRECT: Re-activation requires 40 hours4.62963e-4 days 0.0111 hours 6.613757e-5 weeks 1.522e-5 months of activation watches in the OATC positions (CO1 or CO2).

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements (SD 86.1.2.1.1)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 221

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 067 Which of the following components would require double isolation while creating a clearance boundary?

A. P-87, Lube Oil Storage Tank Pump B. P-207A, G02 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump C. T-33B, Instrument Air Receiver D. P-313A, Sodium Hypochlorite Pump RO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

2012 PBNP RO 67 K/A:

G2.1 .26 Conduct of Operations Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen).

(Imp 3.4/3.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches K/A by requiring the operator to recall procedure requirement for double valve isolation as it applies to industrial safety.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-P: The operator must recall the requirements of double valve isolation when tagging.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.45 12 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 222

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

OP-AA-101-1000 Fleet Clearance and Tagging, Rev 30 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Which of the following components would require double isolation while creating a clearance boundary?

A. P-87, Lube Oil Storage Tank Pump B. P-207A, G02 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump C. T-33B, Instrument Air Receiver D. P-42A, Water Treatment Acid Pump Proposed Answer: D.

Justification:

Per OP-AA-101-1000 Fleet Clearance and Tagging high energy or hazardous systems require double isolation whenever possible. Sulfuric Acid and Sodium Hypochlorite are mentioned as examples.

A INCORRECT: Plausible as lube Oil is flammable and an environmental hazard but not considered hazardous for double isolation.

B INCORRECT: Plausible as fuel oil is flammable but not considered hazardous requiring double isolation.

C INCORRECT: Plausible as Air pressure is high than other system, but does not get high enough to be considered high energy.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, hi-hi temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen).

(SD 86.1.2.1.26)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 223

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 068 Given the following:

Unit 2 is at Rated Thermal Power The Unit 2 OATC is preparing to perform a normal dilution to the RCS to lower boron concentration, in accordance with OP 5B, Blender Operation/Dilution/Boration, Attachment B, DILUTE Which completes the following?

A second licensed operator will ___(1)___ the performance of Attachment B, DILUTE, which ___(2)___ be waived during abnormal operations.

A. (1) peer check (2) can B. (1) peer check (2) can NOT C. (1) independently verify (2) can D. (1) independently verify (2) can NOT Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 224

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

2019 South Texas Project RO 2 K/A:

G2.1.37 Conduct of Operations Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

(Imp 4.3/4.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the guidelines for reactivity management as concerns peer checks.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-P: The operator must recall procedure steps directing peer checks for reactivity manipulations and when peer checks can be waived.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 1 55.43 6 55.45 6 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 225

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

OP-AA-103-1000, Reactivity Management, Rev 13 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

The Primary RO has just completed a routine dilution and is aligning the Makeup system for automatic operation in accordance with 0POP02-CV-0001, Makeup to the Reactor Coolant System.

A second RO will (1) the performance of Form 4, Modes 1-2 Automatic Operation Checklist, which (2) be waived during abnormal operations.

A. (1) peer check (2) can B. (1) peer check (2) can NOT C. (1) independently verify (2) can D. (1) independently verify (2) can NOT Proposed Answer: A.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 226

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per OP-AA-103-1000, Section 3.7, .14.d and 19, state the following, respectively:

If the manipulation involves rod movement, turbine adjustment, or for PWR, and RCS dilution, boration, or makeup, obtain a peer check.

Each licensed operator shall be responsible for reducing power or initiating a manual reactor scram if a key safety parameter deviates from an expected condition or if it is believed necessary to assure nuclear safety. Due to time considerations, peer checking is desired, but NOT required in these conditions.

A CORRECT: See above B INCORRECT: Plausible because a peer check is required for reactivity manipulations. However, during abnormal conditions, peer checks are not required.

C INCORRECT: Plausible because peer checks can be waived in abnormal conditions. However, peer check is required, not independent verification.

D INCORRECT: Plausible however, peer check is required. Not independent verification. And the peer check can be waived for abnormal conditions.

Learning Objective:

Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management.

(SD 86.1 2.1.37)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 227

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 069 Given the following:

1P-27A, Heater Drain Tank pump, needs to have its internals replaced due to a manufacturer recall notice.

In what order are the components tagged for hanging the Clearance of 1P-27A?

A. Suction Valve, Discharge Valve, Control Switch, Motor Breaker B. Control Switch, Motor Breaker, Suction Valve, Discharge Valve C. Control Switch, Motor Breaker, Discharge Valve, Suction Valve D. Discharge Valve, Suction Valve, Motor Breaker, Control Switch RO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

2012 Byron RO 69 K/A:

G2.2.13 Equipment Control Knowledge of clearance and tagging procedures.

(Imp 4.1/4.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to recall requirements of the Clearance and Tagging procedure.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-P: The operator must recall the procedure step describing isolation sequence while tagging a piece of equipment.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.45 13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 228

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

OP-AA-101-1000, Clearance and Tagging, Attachment 4 Section 8.3.1, Rev 30 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

In what order are the components tagged during a pump Clearance Order placement?

A. Discharge Valve, Suction Valve, Control Switch, Motor Breaker B. Control Switch, Motor Breaker, Suction Valve, Discharge Valve C. Control Switch, Motor Breaker, Discharge Valve, Suction Valve D. Discharge Valve, Suction Valve, Motor Breaker, Control Switch Proposed Answer: C.

Justification:

The control switch is tagged first to prevent operation of the breaker. Breaker next to prevent starting the motor before the valves are closed. Discharge, then suction valve to protect pump and lower pressure-rated equipment.

The distractors are commonly confused variations on the correct answer.

A INCORRECT: Plausible because the order will isolate the pump. However, electrical isolation must come first.

B INCORRECT: Plausible because electrical isolation is first. However, the discharge valve is shut before the suction valve C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Both the valve order and the electrical isolation order are backwards.

Learning Objective:

Knowledge of clearance and tagging procedures.

(PBN SD 86.2 2.2.13)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 229

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 070 In accordance with EN-AA-205-1102, Temporary Configuration Changes, which one of the following situations would require the use of the temporary modification process?

A. Using non-intrusive test instruments to monitor and take amperage readings of a Turbine Building Supply fan.

B. Installation of a ladder to access valves during performance of an Ops service water flushing call up.

C. A temporary hose is connected to a system drain and directed to a floor drain.

D. A temporary power supply is aligned to a non-safeguards component.

RO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

02.02.11.01 003 K/A:

G2.2.14 Equipment Control Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status.

(Imp 3.9/4.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to recall requirement to control temporary configuration changes.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-P: The operator must recall the procedural requirements for temporary configuration changes.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 3 55.45 13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 230

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

EN-AA-205-1102, Temporary Configuration Changes, Attachment 1, Rev 17 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Justification:

EN-AA-205-1102, Attachment 1 specifies what are TCCs. A temporary power supply is considered a TCC per attachment 1 step 18.

A INCORRECT: Plausible because this is an example that is listed in the procedure, but is an example of an activity where a TCC is not required.

B INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee considered this as test equipment.

C INCORRECT: Plausible because this is an example that is listed in the procedure, but is an example of an activity where a TCC is not required.

D CORRECT: See above Learning Objective:

Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status.

(PBN SD 86.2 2.2.14)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 231

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 071 Given the following:

Unit 1 is in MODE 5 Both Trains of RHR are aligned for shutdown cooling An air leak in the PAB results in all Instrument Air to the PAB being isolated Which correctly describes effect of this condition?

RHR Shutdown Cooling is . . .

A. AVAILABLE to provide shutdown cooling because CC-738A and CC-738B, CCW Supply valves to the RHR Heat Exchangers will fail open.

B. AVAILABLE to provide shutdown cooling since 1RH-624 and 1RH-625, RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet HCVs fail open and 1RH-626, RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass HCV fails closed.

C. NOT available to provide shutdown cooling since 1RH-624 and 1RH-625, RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet HCVs fail closed and the 1RH-626, RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass HCV fails open.

D. NOT available to provide shutdown cooling because CC-738A and CC-738B, CCW Supply valves to the RHR Heat Exchangers will fail closed.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 232

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

2013 South Texas Project RO 44 K/A:

G2.2.37 Equipment Control Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

(Imp 3.6/4.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify if the RHR system is available or not for Shutdown Cooling.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 2-RI: The operator must recall the determine what provides motive force for the RHR and CCW valves and determine how the failure of Instrument Air impacts those valves, and from there determine the availability of Shutdown Cooling.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.43 5 55.45 12 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 233

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

110E018 Sheet 1, Auxiliary Coolant (RHR Unit 1), Rev 071 M-209 Sheet 8, Instrument Air Diagram, Rev 33 NP 10.3.6, Shutdown Safety Review and Safety Assessment, Rev 55 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in Mode 5 RHR Train A is in service providing shutdown cooling.

FV-8565, IA OCIV, subsequently fails closed.

Which of the following correctly describes the effect of the valve failure?

RHR Train A is.....

A. AVAILABLE to provide shutdown cooling since instrument air accumulator tanks in containment will continue to supply the necessary air and allow normal operation.

B. AVAILABLE to provide shutdown cooling since the RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet valve fails open and the RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass valve fails closed providing full cooling flow.

C. NOT available to provide shutdown cooling since the RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet valve fails closed and the RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass valve fails open providing no cooling flow.

D. NOT available to provide shutdown cooling since the RHR Pump Recirculation valve fails open which would not allow adequate cooling water flow to reach the RCS.

Proposed Answer: D Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 234

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

110E018 Sheet 1 shows that 1RH-624 and 625 are fail open valves. 1RH-626 fails shut to force maximum flow through the RHR Heat Exchangers.

Per NP 10.3.6:

3.2 Available (Availability) (B-15) 3.2.1 The status of a system, structure, or component (SSC) that is in service or can be placed in service in a functional or operable state by immediate manual or automatic actuation (this includes all required support systems of a SSC) to meet its required shutdown key safety function. The "Shutdown Safety Assessment Checklist Definitions" section of this procedure includes additional clarifications of availability.

And in Attachment B, Shutdown Safety Assessment Checklist Definitions:

Core Cooling:

3.0 SINGLE RHR PUMP/CCW PUMP AVAILABLE (0-1)

NOTE: To have two trains both RHR and CC pumps must be available.

NOTE: Tanks, pipes, and heat exchangers are not considered active components.

The following conditions must be met to consider the first train of RHR available: (B-10) 3.1 The RHR pump and either heat exchanger must be available.

The Heat Exchanger is available to provide its Shutdown Safety function of core cooling since the outlet flow control valves are open and the bypass valve is closed on a loss of instrument air. Even if the RHR pumps must be stopped to control cooldown, that is allowed by the definition of available.

A INCORRECT: Plausible because it is available. However, the CCW valves listed are motor operated valves, powered from MCCs 1B-32 and 1B-42 respectively. They are not impacted by a loss of Instrument Air.

B INCORRECT: See above.

C CORRECT: Plausible if the examinee switches which valves fail open and which valves fail closed.

D INCORRECT: Plausible because if the CCW valves to the RHR Heat Exchangers did go closed, there would be no cooling to the HXs and Shutdown Cooling would be lost.

Learning Objective:

Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

(SD86.2 2.2.37)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 235

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 072 Given the following:

You are required to make one or more entries into the Unit 2 Containment Dose rates at the work site are 150 mrem/hour Your current TEDE dose for the year is 1525 mRem What is the maximum time you can spend in that area without exceeding your NextEraEnergy Administrative dose limits?

A. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months B. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months C. 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months D. 23 hours2.662037e-4 days 0.00639 hours 3.80291e-5 weeks 8.7515e-6 months RO Tier 3 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

G2.3.4 Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

(Imp 3.2/3.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine stay time before exposure limits will be exceeded.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The operator must solve a problem using their knowledge of radiation exposure limits and personal and plant conditions.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 12 55.43 4 55.45 10 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 236

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

NP 4.2.14, Administrative Dose Levels/ Dose Level Extension Procedure, Rev 11 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Justification:

Per NP 4.2.14, the annual TEDE limit is 2 Rem/yr (2000 mRem/yr).

Since the individual already has 1525 mRem dose, they have 475 mRem left for the year.

475 mRem divided by 150 mRem/hr = 3.16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months A INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee miscalculates the available dose left.

B CORRECT: See above C INCORRECT: Plausible if miscalculates using their current TEDE as the dose left.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee uses the Federal TEDE dose limit instead of the admin limit.

Learning Objective:

Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

(SD86.3 2.03.04)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 237

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 073 Given the following:

Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a LOCA occurs Safety Injection automatically initiated but the reactor failed to trip and the operating crew was unable to trip the reactor from the Control Room pushbuttons.

CSP-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, has been entered During performance of CSP-S.1 Step 3, Check AFW status, the following conditions exist:

Containment pressure is 3.0 psig and rising RCS pressure is 1230 psig and dropping Reactor power is 9% and dropping Which completes the following?

The RCPs ___(1)___ be tripped because ___(2)___.

A. (1) are required to (2) of the small break LOCA design basis requirements B. (1) are required to (2) the normal running support systems are not satisfied C. (1) should NOT (2) Immediate Operator Actions have not been completed D. (1) should NOT (2) reduced RCS heat removal could challenge fuel integrity Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 238

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

2017 Sequoyah RO 75 K/A:

G2.4.20 Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

(Imp 3.8/4.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to determine if a Caution in CSP-.1 applies and its implications.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-P: The operator must recall the note contained in CSP-S.1.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 5 55.45 13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 239

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

CSP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Generation/ ATWS, Rev 43 BG-CSP-S.1, Background Response to Nuclear Generation/ ATWS, Rev 28 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

- Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a LOCA occurs.

- Safety Injection automatically initiated but the reactor failed to trip and the operating crew was unable to trip the reactor from the MCR handswitches.

- FR-S.1, "Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS," has been entered.

- During performance of FR-S.1 Step 3, Check AFW status, the following conditions exist:

- Containment pressure is 3.0 psig and rising.

- RCS pressure is 1230 psig and dropping.

- Reactor power is 9% and dropping.

Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?

The RCPs (1) be tripped because (2) .

(1) (2)

A. are required to of the small break LOCA design basis requirements B. are required to the normal running support systems are not satisfied C. should NOT Immediate Operator Actions have not been completed D. should NOT reduced RCS heat removal could challenge fuel integrity Proposed Answer: D.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 240

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per CSP-S.1, Caution prior to step 1, it states, RCPs should NOT be tripped with reactor power greater than 5%.

The background document states the reason for this caution is, If reactor power is greater than 5%, the RCPs should not be tripped even if all normal running conditions are not satisfied. Manually tripping the RCPs during some ATWS events could result in reduced heat removal and a challenge to fuel integrity. An ATWS is not a design basis event; therefore the licensing requirement to trip the RCPs within a timely manner to remain within the small-break LOCA design basis is not applicable.

A INCORRECT: Plausible if an ATWS were not in progress.

B INCORRECT: Plausible if an ATWS were not in progress.

C INCORRECT: Plausible, this is true for the NOTE concerning monitoring of the fold-out page.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

DIAGNOSE and RESPOND to Nuclear Power Generation/ ATWS in accordance with the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function procedures.

(043.03.LP1996.013)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 241

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 074 Concerning OM 3.10, Operations Personnel Assignments and Scheduling, Section 4.19, EP Responder/ Fire Brigade eSOMS Login and Fire Brigade Response Requirements The Fire Brigade shall consist of at least ___(1)___ members.

The Fire Brigade Leader and at least ___(2)___ brigade member(s) shall be either fully qualified AO(s) or PAB qualified AOT(s), as well as being Fire Brigade qualified.

A. (1) 4 (2) 1 B. (1) 4 (2) 2 C. (1) 5 (2) 1 D. (1) 5 (2) 2 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 242

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

2016 North Anna RO 74 K/A:

G2.4.26 Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of facility protection requirements, including fire brigade and portable firefighting equipment usage.

(Imp 3.1/3.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the requirements for Fire Brigade manning.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-F: The operator must recall the requirements for the Fire Brigade manning from administrative documents.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 5 55.45 12 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 243

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

OM 3.10, Operations Personnel Assignments and Scheduling. Rev 43 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Which of the choices below completes the following statements in accordance with TR 7.3, Fire Brigade?

A Fire Brigade of at least (1) members shall be maintained onsite.

The Fire Brigade Scene Leader and at least (2) brigade members shall have sufficient knowledge of safety-related systems to understand the effects of the fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability.

A. (1)4 (2) 1 B. (1)4 (2) 2 C. (1)5 (2) 1 D. (1)5 (2) 2 Proposed Answer: D.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 244

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per OM 3.10, Section 4.19, the following is the Fire Brigade and EP Responder shift compliment:

A INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee discounts the Fire Brigade Leader as part of the Fire Brigade count. Also, plausible if the examinee counts only the Fire Brigade Leader as the only required qualified member.

B INCORRECT: Plausible since the number of qualified members is correct. The first part is plausible if the examinee discounts the Fire Brigade Leader as a member of the Fire Brigade.

C INCORRECT: Plausible because the number of members is correct. Also, plausible if the examinee counts only the Fire Brigade Leader as the only required qualified member.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Knowledge of facility protection requirements, including fire brigade and portable firefighting equipment usage.

(SD 86.4 2.04.26)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 245

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 075 Given the following:

Unit 1 has experienced a LOCA The crew is implementing the Emergency Operating Procedures and has reached EOP-1.4, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - High Head Injection At Step 12, Align SI Test Lines for Recirculation:

The Control Room then directs the PAB AO to locally shut 1SI-897A and B, SI Test Line Return Isolation valves Which answers the following:

(1) Where does the Auxiliary Operator go to operate these valves?

AND (2) What is the reason for shutting the SI Test Line Return Isolation valves?

A. (1) PAB, 8 ft Pipeway #2 (2) To prevent the injection of radioactive recirculation water into the RWST B. (1) PAB, 8 ft Pipeway #2 (2) To prevent loss of SI system pressure/ loss of injection flow rate C. (1) PAB, 8 ft Pipeway #4 (2) To prevent loss of SI system pressure/ loss of injection flow rate D. (1) PAB, 8 ft Pipeway #4 (2) To prevent the injection of radioactive recirculation water into the RWST Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 246

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank RO Tier 3 Source:

New Question History:

None K/A:

G2.4.35 Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

(Imp 3.8/4.0)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to identify the location of where the Auxiliary needs to go to operate the valves, and the resultant operational effect this operation will have.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-B: The operator must recall the location and reason for the actions taken by the field operators.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 5 55.45 13

Reference:

EOP-1.4, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - High Head Injection, Rev 33 BG-EOP-1.4, Background Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - High Head Injection, Rev 20 PBN LP0066, Safety Injection System, Rev 27, Change 3 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 247

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The location of these valves is PAB, 8 ft Pipeway #2 Per EOP-1.4 Background document, The SI pump mini-flow recirc valves must be shut to prevent the pumps from injecting radioactive recirculation water into the RWST. This requires local action.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part is wrong, plausible because this is another interlock for the SI system which requires valve operations.

C INCORRECT: The first half is wrong, plausible as this location also hase valves which may require local operation. The second part is wrong, plausible because this is another interlock for the SI system which requires valve operations.

D INCORRECT: The first half is wrong, plausible as this location also hase valves which may require local operation. The second part is correct.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the procedures which govern operation of the Rod Control System.

Description should include significant prerequisites, precautions, and notes associated with each operating procedure requiring consideration by Licensed or Auxiliary Operators.

(053.01.LP1547.005)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 248

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 076 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at 95% power Pressurizer and VCT levels begin to LOWER SLOWLY The crew enters AOP-1A, Reactor Coolant Leak After entering AOP-1A, the Third License noted the following alarms came in and cleared:

1C03 1D 1-1, 1P-1A or B RCP LABYR SEAL WATER INLET or BEARING TEMP HIGH 1C03 1D 2-1, 1P-1A or B RCP LABYR SEAL P LOW 1C03 1D 1-5, 1P-1B RCP COOLING WATER FLOW LOW annunciator is LIT CCW Surge Tank level rose 4%, and STABILIZED Pressurizer and VCT levels have STABILIZED Which of the following actions should the SRO direct the operators to perform based on the above conditions?

(AOP-1B, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction)

(AOP-9B, Component Cooling System Malfunction)

(EOP-0, Reactor Trip and Safety Injection)

A. Continue in AOP-1A; monitor RCPs seal parameters for degradation.

B. Transition to AOP-1B; trip the Reactor, stabilize per EOP-0, trip 1P-1B RCP then isolate CC flow to the RCP per the AOP-1B foldout page.

C. Transition to AOP-9B; bypass and isolate the Seal Water Heat Exchanger per AOP-9B, Attachment A.

D. Transition to AOP-9B; ensure both RCPs have seal injection supply flow, then verify isolation of 'B' RCP thermal barrier cooling return, per AOP-9B, Attachment B.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 249

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2012 PBNP SRO 76 SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing system knowledge, immediate operator actions, knowing entry condition for AOPs or plant parameters which direct entry into major EOPs, the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions and determine the selection of a procedure to mitigate and knowledge of appendices, including how to coordinate these items with procedure steps.

K/A:

026AG2.2.44 Loss of Component Cooling Water Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

(Imp 4.4)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to use knowledge of the control room indications and annunciators to determine plant status, and then determine what operator actions are necessary based on those conditions.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The examinee must analyze the initial conditions, to determine the status, then apply that to determine which procedure/appendix is needed to mitigate the event.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 50 55.43 5 55.45.12 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 250

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

AOP-1A, Reactor Coolant Leak, Rev 19 AOP-9B, Component Cooling System Malfunction, (Attachment B, B3) Rev 26 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 1 is at 95% power

- Pressurizer and VCT levels begin to SLOWLY LOWER, prompting the crew to enter AOP-1A, 'Reactor Coolant Leak'

- Shortly after entering AOP-1A, the Third license noted the following alarms came in and cleared:

- "1P-1A or B RCP LABYR SEAL WATER INLET or BEARING TEMP HIGH"

- "1P-1A or B RCP LABYR SEAL P LOW"

- "1P-1B RCP COOLING WATER FLOW LOW" annunciator is LIT

- CCW Surge Tank level rose 4 inches, and STABILIZED

- Pressurizer and VCT levels have STABILIZED Which of the following actions should the SRO direct the operators to perform based on the above conditions?

(AOP-1B, 'Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction')

(AOP-9B, 'Component Cooling System Malfunction' )

(EOP-0, 'Reactor Trip and Safety Injection' A. Continue in AOP-1A; monitor RCPs seal parameters for degradation.

B. Transition to AOP-1B; trip the Reactor, stabilize per EOP-0, trip 1P-1B RCP then isolate CC flow to the RCP per the AOP-1B foldout page.

C. Transition to AOP-1B; trip the Reactor, stabilize per EOP-0, trip 1P-1B RCP then isolate CC flow to the RCP per the AOP-1B foldout page.

D. Transition to AOP-9B; ensure both RCPs have seal injection supply flow, then verify isolation of 'B' RCP thermal barrier cooling return, per AOP-9B, Attachment B.

Proposed answer: D Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 251

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Based on the indications, the plant is experiencing an RCS to CCW leak via the RCP thermal barrier. The thermal barrier will automatically isolate on a high flow, which will cause the PZR and VCT levels to stabilize, causing the need to navigate the procedure historically to properly utilize the procedure, and verify the isolation of the leak.

A INCORRECT: This will not address the isolating of the RCS to CCW leak.

Plausible as entry conditions were are met for this procedure, and if the examinee does not recognize a transition is made to AOP-9B, due to level in the CCW surge tank, thus determining the RNO is not needed due to level being stable now.

B INCORRECT: A reactor trip or RCP trip is not warranted at this time given the current plant status. Plausible if the examinee determines a trip of the RCP is necessary based on the loss of thermal barrier cooling.

C INCORRECT: VCT level has risen and stabilized, this action would not be appropriate. Plausible if the examinee misdiagnosis the initiating event, determining that the Seal Water Heat Exchange leak is the cause.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Diagnose and respond to indication of a CCW leak into or out of the system in accordance with AOP-9B.

(055.03.LP2444.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 252

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 077 Given the following:

Unit 1 has the following indications:

A SG pressure is 210 psig and LOWERING B SG pressure is 205 psig and LOWERING CET temperatures are 397°F and LOWERING RCS pressure is 950 psig and LOWERING CTMT sump A level is 72 inches and RISING CTMT pressure 42 psig and LOWERING The following annunciators are lit:

C01B 1-4, UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT SUMP A LEVEL HIGH 1C20 D 1-3, UNIT 1 RCS SUBCOOLING MARGIN ALERT 1C04 1C 1-3, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HIGH OR LOW C01B 1-5, UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CHANNEL ALERT CO1B 2-5, UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Which answers the following:

(1) Are the listed annunciators consistent with the plant event in progress?

AND (2) What are the procedure transitions for the plant event in progress after EOP-0?

(EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection)

(EOP-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant)

(EOP-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation)

(EOP-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - Low Head Injection)

(ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators)

A. (1) No (2) EOP-2 ECA-2.1 B. (1) No (2) EOP-1 EOP-1.3 EOP-1 C. (1) Yes (2) EOP-2 ECA-2.1 D. (1) Yes (2) EOP-1 EOP-1.3 EOP-1 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 253

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2016 Surry SRO 96 (Questions original K/A was G2.4.46)

SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing system knowledge, immediate operator actions, knowing entry condition for AOPs or plant parameters which direct entry into major EOPs, the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions and determine the selection of a procedures to mitigate with knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the EOP s that involve transitions to event-specific sub-procedures or emergency contingency procedures.

K/A:

E12G2.4.45 Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm (Imp 4.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to analyze the annunciators to determine if they are consistent with plant conditions/indications, and then diagnose plant conditions based on indications and annunciators prioritizing the mitigation strategy.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The examinee must analyze the initial conditions, to determine the plant status, determine if the annunciators match conditions, then determine mitigation.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 5 55.45.3 55.45.12 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 254

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev 70 EOP-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Rev 26 ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators, Rev 45 ARB 1C20 D 1-3, UNIT 1 RCS SUBCOOLING MARGIN ALERT, Rev 7 STPT 11.1, Safety Injection System General Instrumentation Channels, Rev 20 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Unit 1 has the following indications: The following annunciators are lit:

A S/G - 200 psig, lowering 1E-B9, CTMT HI PRESS - RED B S/G - 210 psig, lowering 1A-A1, RWST TECH SPEC LO LVL C S/G - 205 psig, lowering 1B-A3, CTMT SUMP HI LVL CETC - 397°F, lowering 1B-C4, CLS HI-HI TR A RCS pressure - 900 psig, lowering 1B-C5, CLS HI-HI TR B CTMT sump level - 1.8 feet, rising 1C-B8, PRZR LO PRESS CTMT pressure - 58 psia, lowering 1G-B1, APPROACH TO SATURATION TEMP ALARM

1) Are the listed annunciators consistent with the plant event in progress?

2) What are the procedure transitions for the plant event in progress?

(REFERENCE PROVIDED)

A. 1) No.

2) E-0 E-2 ECA-2.1.

B. 1) No.

2) E-0 E-1 ES-1.3 E-1.

C. 1) Yes.

2) E-0 E-2 ECA-2.1.

D. 1) Yes.

2) E-0 E-1 ES-1.3 E-1.

Proposed answer: A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 255

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Based on the indications, the 1C20 D 1-3, UNIT 1 RCS SUBCOOLING MARGIN ALERT annunciators would not be expected. With steam break, subcooling should rise significantly. The crew would enter the EOP network at EOP-0, transition to EOP-2 to deal with the steam break, and then transition to ECA-2.1 to mitigate the uncontrolled depressurization of all steam generators.

A CORRECT: See above B INCORRECT: The first part is correct, and the second part is incorrect.

Plausible if the examinee assumes a LOCA is in progress, the subcooling margin alert will happen based on the size, so the examinee may assume it is not expected based on assumed leak size.

C INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, the second part is correct. Plausible if the examinee miscalculates subcooling or becomes distracted by containment sump level reading/rise.

D INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, the second part is wrong. Plausible if the examinee assumes a LOCA is in progress, the subcooling margin alert will happen based on the size, so the examinee may assume it is not expected based on assumed leak size.

Learning Objective:

Given a set of plant conditions diagnose and respond to Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both SGs in accordance with ECA-2.1 and BG-ECA-2.1 (031.02.LP0465.006)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 256

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 078 Given the following:

Both units are at Rated Thermal Power The electric plant is in a normal lineup Subsequently an electrical perturbation causes the indication pictured on the next page Operators have restored D-07, DC Station Battery Charger, to service Considering UNIT 1 ONLY, which of the following:

(1) Lists the required actions for LCO 3.8.1 Electrical Power Systems, AC Sources - Operating?

AND (2) The operability status of 1P-15A, SI pump?

(Assume no additional operator action)

REFERENCE PROVIDED TS 3.8.1 (5 pages)

A. (1) Enter TSAC 3.8.1.B, 3.8.1 E and 3.8.1F only (2) Inoperable, due to the loss of offsite power B. (1) Enter TSACs 3.8.1.B, 3.8.1.C, 3.8.1.D, 3.8.1 E and 3.8.1F (2) Inoperable, due to the loss of offsite power C. (1) Enter TSAC 3.8.1.B, 3.8.1 E and 3.8.1F only (2) Operable, 1P-15A will be declared inoperable after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months D. (1) Enter TSACs 3.8.1.B, 3.8.1.C, 3.8.1.D, 3.8.1 E and 3.8.1F (2) Operable, 1P-15A will be declared inoperable after 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 257

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2019 PBNP SRO 79 PREVIOUS 2 NRC EXAMS SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing < 1-hour TS/TRM Actions, the LCO/TRM information listed above the line, or TS safety limits; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions utilize TS bases for redundant power supplies in the application of required actions (TS Section 3) and apply completion times for equipment, declaring it inoperable.

K/A:

056AA2.44 Loss of Offsite Power Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: Indications of loss of offsite power.

(Imp 4.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring identification of the loss of offsite power given control room indications.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPR: The examinee must understand the plant conditions and final lineup of the cause the by perturbation, and apply tech specs to determine which action(s) are required to be entered and the status (operable or inoperable) for 1P-15A.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.43 5 55.45.13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 258

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS 3.8.1, Electrical Power Systems, AC Sources - Operating Rev 4 TS B 3.8.1 Basis - Electrical Power Systems, AC Sources - Operating Rev 20 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

TS 3.8.1, Electrical Power Systems, AC Sources - Operating Rev 4 PAGES 1-5 Original Question:

Given the following:

Both units are at Rated Thermal Power The electric plant is in a normal lineup An electrical perturbation causes the indication pictured on the next page Operators have restored D-07, DC Station Battery Charger, to service Considering UNIT 1 ONLY, which of the following:

(1) Lists the required actions for LCO 3.8.1 Electrical Power Systems, AC Sources - Operating?

AND (2) The operability status of 1P-15A, SI pump?

(Assume no additional operator action)

REFERENCE PROVIDED TS 3.8.1 (5 pages)

A. (1) Enter TSAC 3.8.1.B, 3.8.1 E and 3.8.1F (2) Inoperable, due to the loss of offsite power B. (1) Enter TSACs 3.8.1.B, 3.8.1.C, 3.8.1.D, 3.8.1 E and 3.8.1F (2) Inoperable, due to the loss of offsite power C. (1) Enter TSAC 3.8.1.B, 3.8.1 E and 3.8.1F (2) Operable, 1P-15A will be declared inoperable after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months D. (1) Enter TSACs 3.8.1.B, 3.8.1.C, 3.8.1.D, 3.8.1 E and 3.8.1F (2) Operable, 1P-15A will be declared inoperable after 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Proposed answer: D Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 259

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The operator must diagnose the loss of offsite power to the safeguard busses, complicated by G03, EDG not starting. Given the assumption that no further actions have occurred after the restoration of D-07, the operator must determine that Unit 1 is the only unit affected by the loss of the G03 and that TSAC-3.8.1.B/C/D need to be entered based on the initial conditions. The operator must also determine that 1P-15A is operable but must complete required action D.1 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months form discovery.

A INCORRECT: The first part is incorrect, plausible as this is one of the TSACs needed to be entered, but not a completed list. The second part is correct based on the loss of offsite power with loss of G03.

B INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part is incorrect, plausible if the operator has the misconception that the loss of offsite power causes the pump to immediately inoperable C INCORRECT: The first part is incorrect, plausible as this is one of the TSACs needed to be entered, but not a completed list. The second part is incorrect, plausible if the operator determine that after the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months that 1P-15A is no longer operable.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Given specific plant conditions, ASSESS and APPLY Technical Specification requirements as appropriate.

(057.02.LP3344.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 260

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 079 Given the following:

The site has experienced a loss of D-03 DC Bus, recovery using D-105 Battery is not possible at this time The crew is recovering D-03 bus using AOP-0.0, Vital DC System Malfunction D-305, Swing Battery, has been disconnected from ALL Battery Chargers for the last 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Considering ONLY Swing Battery D-305, what is the status of D-305 and what action(s) are required for the current conditions?

(0-SOP-DC-003, 125 VDC, Bus D-03 & Components)

A. OPERABLE; align D-305 and D-09 Battery Charger to D-03 using 0-SOP-DC-003 B. OPERABLE; align D-305 and D-109 Swing Battery Charger to D-03 using 0-SOP-DC-003 C. INOPERABLE; LCO 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating remains NOT MET, enter TSAC 3.8.4.A , until D-305 is charged for an hour D. INOPERABLE; LCO 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating remains NOT MET, enter TSAC 3.8.4.A; declare LCO 3.0.3 and commence a dual unit shutdown Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 261

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2012 PBNP SRO 81 (Questions original K/A was 058AG2.1.32)

SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing < 1-hour TS/TRM Actions, the LCO/TRM information listed above the line, or TS safety limits; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions utilize TS bases for redundant power supplies in the application of required actions (TS Section 3) and apply completion times for equipment, declaring it inoperable.

K/A:

058AG2.1.23 Loss of DC Power Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

(Imp 4.4)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring determination of the required system manipulation and determination of plant end state.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The examinee must understand the plant conditions and cause the by perturbation, and apply tech specs to determine which action(s) are required to be entered and the status (operable or inoperable) for D-305 and then determine the end state for the plant.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 5 55.45 2 55.45 6 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 262

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating, Rev 2 TS B 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating, Rev 5 0-SOP-DC-003, 125 VDC System Bus D03 & Components, Rev 22 AOP-0.0, Vital DC Malfunctions, Rev 37 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following conditions:

- The site has experienced a loss of D-03 DC Bus, recovery using D-105 Battery is not possible at this time

- The crew is recovering D-03 bus using AOP-0.0, 'Vital DC System Malfunction'

- D-305, Swing Battery, has been disconnected from ALL Battery Chargers for the last 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Considering ONLY Swing Battery D-305, what is the status of D-305 and what action(s) are required for the current conditions?

(0-SOP-DC-003, '125 VDC, Bus D-03 & Components')

A. OPERABLE; align D-305 and D-109 Swing Battery Charger to D-03 using 0-SOP-DC-003.

B. OPERABLE; align D-305 and D-09 Battery Charger to D-03 using 0-SOP-DC-003.

C. INOPERABLE; declare LCO 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating NOT MET by entering TSAC 3.8.4.A until D-305 is charged for an hour.

D. INOPERABLE; declare LCO 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating NOT MET by entering TSAC 3.8.4.A; declare LCO 3.0.3 and commence a dual unit shutdown.

Proposed Answer: A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 263

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

A battery that is fully charged can be considered operable if it is not connected to a charger; AOP-0.0 Step 21 RNO states that D-305 Battery with the D-109 Charger can be aligned to DC Bus D-03.

A INCORRECT: The first part is right. The second part is wrong, D-09, Charger cannot be aligned with the D-305, Battery, and D-03, DC Bus.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: The battery is operable and meets the requirements of TS 3.8.4, plausible if the examinee does not understand the bases for operability.

D INCORRECT: The battery is operable and meets the requirements of TS 3.8.4, plausible if the examinee does not understand the bases for operability.

Learning Objective:

Given specific plant conditions, ASSESS and APPLY Technical Specification requirements as appropriate.

(057.02.LP3344.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 264

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 080 Given the following:

Both units were operating at Rated Thermal Power An inadvertent Safety Injection occurred on Unit 2 The crew is responding per EOP-0, Unit 2 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Upon completion of EOP-0 Attachment 'A', Automatic Action Verification the 3rd License reports:

P-32B, Service Water pump FAILED TO START SW-2927A, 'A' Spent Fuel Pool HX Inlet FAILED TO SHUT All other equipment operated correctly for the safety injection signal Considering Service Water only; which of the following describes the complete list of Action Conditions requiring entry for this event?

REFERENCE PROVIDED TS 3.7.8 (4 pages)

A. TSAC 3.7.8 A for Unit 2; TSAC 3.7.8 F for Unit 1 B. TSAC 3.7.8 A for Both Units; TSAC 3.7.8 F for Unit 1 C. TSAC 3.7.8 A for Both Units; TSAC 3.7.8 F for Unit 2 D. TSAC 3.7.8 A for Both Units; TSAC 3.7.8 D for Both Units Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 265

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

TS 3.7.8 SW 003 SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing < 1-hour TS/TRM Actions, the LCO/TRM information listed above the line, or TS safety limits; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions determine the effect of a common system for both units, utilize TS in the application of required actions (TS Section 3) and apply completion times for equipment.

K/A:

062AA2.02 Loss of Nuclear Service Water Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: The cause of possible SWS loss (Imp 3.6)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the student to recall what interlocks are utilized in SI and what SW flows will be lost under normal conditions, and also with a malfunction..

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3SPR: The examinee must understand the plant conditions recall the Safety injection interlocks, and then use TS to apply any applicable action conditions, then determine which unit those actions apply to.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.43 5 55.45.13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:05 AM 266

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS 3.7.8, Service Water (SW) Systems, Rev 2 TS B 3.7.8, Basis Service Water (SW) Systems, Rev 2 883D195 SH 8, Safeguards Actuation Signal Logic, Rev 19 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

TS 3.7.8, Service Water (SW) Systems, 4 PAGES (3.7.8-1 thru 3.7.8-4)

Original Question:

Given the following:

Both units were operating in MODE 1 An inadvertent Safety Injection occurred on Unit 2 The crew is responding per EOP-0, Unit 2 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Upon completion of EOP-0 Attachment 'A', Automatic Action Verification the 3rd License reports P-32B, Service Water pump FAILED TO START SW-2927A, 'A' Spent Fuel Pool HX Inlet FAILED TO SHUT All other equipment operated correctly for the safety injection signal Considering Service Water only; which of the following describes the complete list of Action Conditions requiring entry for this event?

A. TSAC 3.7.8 A for Both Units; TSAC 3.7.8 F for Unit 2 B. TSAC 3.7.8 A for Unit 2; TSAC 3.7.8 F for Unit 1 C. TSAC 3.7.8 A for Both Units; TSAC 3.7.8 F for Unit 1 D. TSAC 3.7.8 A for Both Units; TSAC 3.7.8 D for Both Units Proposed Answer: C Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 267

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Both units will be affected by the inoperable SW pump, so both must enter TSAC 3.7.8.A The Safety Injection will cause 2SW-2907 and 2SW-2908, Containment Vent Coolers Outlet Emergency FCV to open. This will put Unit 1 in TSAC 3.7.8 F A INCORRECT: Plausible if the student incorrectly applies 3.7.8A to unit 2, as both units are in the mode of applicability.

B CORRECT: See above C INCORRECT: Plausible if the student incorrectly applies 3.7.8 F, which would only apply to Unit 1.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if the student fails to recall that even though SW-2927A didnt shut, the backup did shut, which makes entering 3.7.8 D inappropriate.

Learning Objective:

Given specific plant conditions, ASSESS and APPLY Technical Specification requirements as appropriate.

(057.02.LP3343.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 268

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 081 Given the following:

Unit 2 was operating at 75%

A plant transient resulted in a reactor trip and safety injection The crew has entered EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection The following plant conditions are noted:

RCS pressure is 1100 psig and LOWERING SLOWLY Pressurizer level is 5% and LOWERING SLOWLY Pressurizer PORVs are closed Spray valves are closed SGs levels are normal SGs pressures are normal Containment pressure is normal Containment radiation is normal Sump 'A' level is normal RE 214, PAB Exhaust Monitor is RISING Several PAB area radiation monitors are RISING After assessing these conditions, the next procedure the OS will implement is:

A. EOP-1.1, SI Termination B. EOP-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization C. ECA-1.1, Loss of Containment Sump Recirculation D. ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 269

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 1 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2011 PBNP SRO 81 SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing system knowledge, immediate operator actions, knowing entry condition for AOPs or plant parameters which direct entry into major EOPs, the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions and determine the selection of a procedures to mitigate with knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the EOP s that involve transitions to event-specific sub-procedures or emergency contingency procedures.

K/A:

E04EA2.1 LOCA Outside Containment Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment): Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

(Imp 4.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring identification of the loss of offsite power given control room indications.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The examinee must analyze the initial conditions, to determine the plant status, then determine mitigation strategy needed.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.43 5 55.45.13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 270

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, Rev 69 EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev 25 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Unit 2 was operating at 75% power when a plant transient resulted in a reactor trip and safety injection. EOP-0, 'Reactor Trip or Safety Injection', has been entered and the crew is carrying out actions of the procedure. The following plant conditions are noted:

RCS pressure 1100 psig and slowly lowering Pressurizer level 5% and slowly lowering Pressurizer PORVs closed Spray valves closed Steam Generator levels normal Steam Generator pressures normal Containment pressure normal Containment radiation normal Sump 'A' level normal RE 214, PAB Exhaust Monitor rising Several PAB area radiation monitors rising After assessing these conditions, the next procedure the OS will implement is:

A. ECA-1.2, 'LOCA Outside Containment' B. EOP-1.1, 'SI Termination' C. ECA-1.1, 'Loss of Containment Sump Recirculation' D. EOP-1.2, 'Small Break LOCA' Proposed Answer: A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 271

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Based on the indications, a LOCA outside containment is occurring, other transition criteria will not apply until ECA-1.2 Step 4 when the break would be analyzed to determine if it is isolated.

A INCORRECT: SI termination criteria is not met. Plausible if the examinee incorrectly determines that ECCS flow should be terminated based on normal secondary conditions.

B INCORRECT: A LOCA is occurring, but outside containment. Plausible because there is a LOCA occurring and if the examinee incorrectly diagnosis it.

C INCORRECT: Do not currently meet this transition criteria. Plausible because this is the required transition is the leak is not isolated during the performance of ECA-1.2 D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Given a set of plant conditions diagnose and respond to a LOCA Outside Containment in accordance with ECA-1.2 and BG-ECA-1.2 (031.02.LP0465.004)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 272

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 082 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at Rated Thermal Power An instrument malfunction causes the following plant response:

Letdown automatically isolated.

Speed is rising on the charging pump selected to AUTO Which of the following:

(1) Identifies the failed channel AND (2) Includes the protection function described by the Technical Specification Bases that is impacted by this failure?

A. (1) 1LT-427, Pressurizer Level (White)

(2) protection from violating the DNBR limit due to low pressure via the low pressure trip B. (1) 1LT-427, Pressurizer Level (White)

(2) protection against water relief through the Pressurizer Safety Valves via the high level trip C. (1) 1LT-428, Pressurizer Level (Blue)

(2) protection from violating the DNBR limit due to low pressure via the low pressure trip D. (1) 1LT-428, Pressurizer Level (Blue)

(2) protection against water relief through the Pressurizer Safety Valves via the high level trip Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 273

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2010 North Anna SRO 85 SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing < 1-hour TS/TRM Actions, the LCO/TRM information listed above the line, or TS safety limits; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions utilize TS bases to determine what protective function will be impacted by the failure, and knowledge of TS bases that is required to analyze TS- required actions and terminology..

K/A:

028AA2.12 Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: Cause for PZR level deviation alarm: controller malfunction or other instrumentation malfunction.

(Imp 3.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring identification of the cause of loss of offsite power given control room indications.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The examinee must analyze the initial conditions, to determine the cause for indications, then recall the the protective feature being impacted by the failure.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.43 5 55.45.13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 274

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS B 3.3.1, Bases - Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, Rev 9 883D195 SH 18, PZR Pressure And Level Control Logic, Rev 13 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Unit 1 is at 100% power with the PRZR Level Channel Defeat Switch selected to position 461/460.

An instrument malfunction causes the following plant response:

Letdown automatically isolated.

Normal charging flow control valve 1-CH-FCV-1122 fully open.

Which ONE of the following identifies the failed channel, AND includes the protection function described by the Technical Specification Bases that is impacted by this failure?

A. 1-RC-LT-1460 is failed ; primary protection against RCS overpressurization.

B. 1-RC-LT-1460 is failed ; protection against water relief through the PRZR Safety Valves.

C. 1-RC-LT-1461 is failed; primary protection against RCS overpressurization.

D. 1-RC-LT-1461 is failed; protection against water relief through the PRZR Safety Valves.

Proposed Answer: D Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 275

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Based on the conditions given, the controlling channel or (1LT-428, Pressurizer Level (Blue)) has fail low. The protection function as explained in Technical Specifications, is provides protection against water relief through the pressurizer safety valves.

A INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, but plausible if the examinee down to have a solid understanding of the failure mode and effects of the instrument failure. The second part is wrong, but plausible since a temperature drop will cause water density to change, PZR level to lower, and PZR level isolates Letdown, this would help protect against a pressure transient due to loss of PZR level.

B INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, but plausible if the examinee down to have a solid understanding of the failure mode and effects of the instrument failure. The second part is right.

C INCORRECT: The first part is right. The second part is wrong, but plausible since a temperature drop will cause water density to change, PZR level to lower, and PZR level isolates Letdown, this would help protect against a pressure transient due to loss of PZR level.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Given specific plant conditions assess and apply Technical Specification requirements as appropriate (057.02.LP3341.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 276

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 083 Given the following:

Unit 1 was at Rated Thermal Power A Tube leak developed on SG A The crew entered AOP-3, Steam Generator Tube Leak During the load reduction, a failure causes an inadvertent reactor trip without an SI Which of the following actions should the SRO direct the operators to perform based on the above conditions?

EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response EOP-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture A. 1) Remain in AOP-3, transition to EOP-0 is not needed B. 1) Enter EOP-0,

2) Transition to EOP-3 C. 1) Enter EOP-0,

2) Transition to EOP-0.1 and perform AOP-3 in parallel D. 1) Enter EOP-0,

2) Transition to AOP-3 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 277

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

New Question History:

None SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing system knowledge, immediate operator actions, knowing entry condition for AOPs or plant parameters which direct entry into major EOPs, the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions and determine the selection of a procedures to mitigate with knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and\or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

K/A:

037AG2.4.08 Steam Generator Tube Leak Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

(Imp 4.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to analyze the plant conditions and determine how to utilize abnormal procedures in conjunction with emergency operating procedures.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPR: The examinee must analyze the initial conditions, to determine the plant status, determine the appropriate procedures to utilize based on plant conditions and administrative requirements.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 5 55.45.13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 278

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

OM 3.7, AOP and EOP Procedure Usage for Response to Plant Transients, Rev 33, Sections 6.10.3, 6.16 AOP-3, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Rev 15 EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev 70 EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Rev 48 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Justification:

Based on the plant conditions of an inadvertent reactor trip, per OM 3.7 EOP-0 shall be entered. Since there is no SI, transition to EOP-0.1 will be required.

Section 6.16 of OM 3.7 will direct parallel performance of AOP-3 and EOP-0.1.

A INCORRECT: Plausible since this is an uncomplicated trip without an SI, if the examinee misapplies the note prior to tripping the reactor in AOP-3, which directs the crew to remain in AOP-3, as EOP-0 is not required.

B INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee uses the EOP network to mitigate the tube leak which based on plant conditions, there is no transition or procedure path to EOP-3 currently present.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee incorrectly wants to exit the EOP network prior to addressing the tube leak.

Learning Objective:

Recognize and predict the use and adherence requirements applicable to Abnormal Operating Procedure sets.

(055.01.LP3959.001)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 279

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 084 Given the following:

Unit 1 has experienced a large break LOCA The crew has transitioned to EOP-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - Low Head Injection The crew is checking train A Ready for recirculation per step 18 RWST level 32%

The STA informs you that an Orange Path on Containment exists due to containment sump level being 90 inches As the Operations Supervisor of Unit 1 what actions are you going to take?

(CSP-Z.2, Response to Containment Flooding)

A. Continue in EOP-1.3, until at least one train of RHR is on sump recirculation, then transition to CSP-Z.2 A. Continue in EOP-1.3, until at least one train of RHR is on sump recirculation, then transition to CSP-Z.2 B. Complete EOP-1.3 in its entirety, when both trains of sump recirc have been established, then transition to CSP-Z.2 C. Transition to CSP-Z.2, locate and isolate the source of water entering containment, then return to EOP-1.3 D. Transition to CSP-Z.2, after verifying sump level is due to the LOCA and RWST water injected into containment then return to EOP-1.3 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 280

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

New Question History:

None SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing system knowledge, immediate operator actions, knowing entry condition for AOPs or plant parameters which direct entry into major EOPs, the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions and use knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the EOPs that involve transitions to event specific sub-procedures or emergency contingency procedures after specific criteria has been met.

K/A:

E15EA2.2 Containment Flooding Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Containment Flooding): Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

(Imp 3.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to assess plant conditions and based on that select the appropriate course of action and implement procedures to accomplish this.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The operator must understand the initial condition, which one of the conditions must be calculated by the operator, and apply those conditions to the critical safety function status Trees, and interpret how the information impacts the EOP Network and determine the course of action to take next.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 55.43 5 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 281

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

EOP-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation - Low Head Injection Unit 1 Rev 59 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Justification:

After transitioning to EOP-1.3, A note prior to step 1 Steps 1 through 31 should be performed without delay. CSPs should not be implemented prior to completion of these steps. This note is modified by step 21 which checks that the RWST is less than or equal to 34%, if level is not, the RNO directs implement critical safety procedures and continue with procedure and step in effect. Given the conditions the crew will be reaching this step, but RWST level is less than 34%, so the OS should continue on without delay to establish sump recirc prior to transition to CSP-Z.2.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee mistakes both trains being required to be on sump recirc prior to transition out of EOP-1.3.

C INCORRECT: Plausible as the status trees indicate the need for an orange path transition, but it is not allowed procedurally by EOP-1.3 at this time.

D INCORRECT: Plausible as the status trees indication is an orange path and several CSPs have notes or checks to ensure indications are within normally allowed amounts, or operator controlled bands.

Learning Objective:

Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

(SD86.4.2.4.9)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 282

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 085 Given the following:

A substation perturbation caused the loss of 1A01 and 1A02, 4160 VAC Non-Safeguards busses on unit 1 The crew is implementing EOP-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel (with RVLIS)

The crew is performing the Continue RCS Cooldown And Initiate Depressurization step, and is cooling down to 350°F and depressurizing the plant to 1200 psig Power has been restored to 1A01, 4160 VAC Non-Safeguards bus The crew starts 1P-1A, Reactor Coolant Pump Annunciator 1C04 1C 1-5, 1P-1A&B RCP VIBRATION ALARM is received The CO reports A RCP vibrations are as follows:

Shaft vibration is 20 mils and SLOWLY RISING Frame vibration is 7 mils and SLOWLY RISING Which of the following describes the procedure flow path the SRO is required to direct?

A. Transition to OP 3C, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, and commence the plant cooldown to cold shutdown B. Remain in EOP-0.3, and perform AOP-1B, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction in parallel and trip the A RCP C. Remain in EOP-0.3 until the cooldown and depressurization is completed then transition to OP 3C, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, and continue the plant cooldown to cold shutdown.

D. Transition to EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, to terminate the cooldown and stabilize the plant with the RCP running, then transition to OP 3D, Post Reactor Trip Stabilization to Hot Standby Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 283

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 1 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2017 PBNP SRO 85 PREVIOUS 2 NRC EXAMS (Questions original K/A was E10G2.4.50)

SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing system knowledge, immediate operator actions, knowing entry condition for AOPs or plant parameters which direct entry into major EOPs, the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions and use knowledge that involves administrative procedure for the hierarchy and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures.

K/A:

E09EG2.4.46 Natural Circulation Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

(Imp 4.2)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to assess plant conditions determine if the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions, then select the appropriate course of action and implement procedures to accomplish this.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The operator must understand the initial conditions, determine if the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions, then select the appropriate course of action and implement procedures to accomplish this 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 .10 55.43 5 55.45.3 55.45.12 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 284

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

ARB 1C04 1C 1-5, 1P-1A&B RCP VIBRATION ALARM, Rev 5 AOP-1B Unit 1, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Rev 30 EOP-0.3 Unit 1, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel (with RVLIS), Rev 33 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

A substation perturbation caused the loss of 1A01 and 1A02, 4160 VAC Non-Safeguards busses The crew is implementing EOP-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel (with RVLIS)

The crew is performing the Continue RCS Cooldown And Initiate Depressurization step, and is cooling down to 350°F and depressurizing the plant to 1200 psig Power has been restored to 1A01, 4160 VAC Non-Safeguards bus The crew starts 1P-1A, Reactor Coolant Pump Annunciator 1C04 1C 1-5, 1P-1A&B RCP VIBRATION ALARM is received The CO reports A RCP vibrations are as follows:

Shaft vibration is 20 mils and SLOWLY RISING Frame vibration is 7 mils and SLOWLY RISING Which of the following describes the procedure flow path the SRO should direct?

A. Transition to OP 3C, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, and commence the plant cooldown to cold shutdown B. Remain in EOP-0.3, and perform AOP-1B, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction in parallel and trip the A RCP C. Remain in EOP-0.3 until the cooldown and depressurization is completed then transition to OP 3C, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, and continue the plant cooldown to cold shutdown.

D. Transition to EOP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, to terminate the cooldown and stabilize the plant with the RCP running, then transition to OP 3D, Post Reactor Trip Stabilization to Hot Standby Proposed answer: B Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 285

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

EOP-0.3, step 1 is a continuous action step to try to restart an RCP, when this is successful, a transition OP 3C is directed for further plant recovery. The annunciator received indicates an off-normal condition with the RCP exists, and directs entry to AOP-1B if necessary which will be performed in parallel while still controlling the cooldown and depressurization. Based on the values for the vibration and given they are also still rising, this meets the foldout page criteria for tripping the RCP. Stating the RCP therefore has not been successful, so transition from EOP-0.3 is not warranted.

A INCORRECT: Plausible if the student does not recall the trip criteria of the RCP, and utilizes the normal procedure transition given a successful RCP start.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Plausible if the student incorrectly applies the procedure usage to complete the plant cooldown/depressurization based on usage of EOP-0.3 is for a cooldown depressurization to cold shutdown, with no accident in progress.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if the student in under the assumption that with restart of an RCP, that the cooldown is no longer required, with no accident in progress, and wants to transition to the post trip procedures.

Learning Objective:

Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

(SD86.4 2.4.46)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 286

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 086 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 is in MODE 5 The following issues happen to the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System 1 February at 0600, HX-12B, CCW Heat Exchanger develops a tube leak and is declared inoperable 2 February at 0200, 1P-11A, CCW Pump is declared inoperable due to vibrations 4 February at 1400, HX-12C, CCW Heat Exchanger is declared inoperable due to a tubesheet leak 4 February at 2200, 1P-11A is repaired, tested and declared OPERABLE 6 February at 2100, 1P-11B, CCW Pump is declared inoperable for a bearing failure 7 February at 1300, HX-12B is repaired, tested and declared OPERABLE Assuming that the current inoperable components cannot be repaired and brought to an OPERABLE status, which describes the latest allowable date and time which Unit 1 must be in MODE 3?

REFERENCE PROVIDED TS 3.7.7 (2 pages)

A. 7 February at 2000 B. 8 February at 0800 C. 10 February at 0300 D. 10 February at 2000 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 287

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2015 PBNP SRO 77 (Questions original K/A was 026G2.2.38)

SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing < 1-hour TS/TRM Actions, the LCO/TRM information listed above the line, or TS safety limits; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions in the application of required actions (TS Section 3) and apply completion times for equipment, declaring it inoperable.

K/A:

008G2.2.40 Component Cooling Water Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.

(Imp 4.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to apply TS for the compoment cooling system.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPR: The operator must use Technical Specifications as a reference and Technical Specification Bases knowledge to determine when plant shutdown is required.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 2 55.43 5 55.45.3 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 288

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water (CC) System Rev 1 TS B 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water (CC) System Bases Rev 4 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

TS 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water (CC) System 2 pages Original Question:

Given the following:

Unit 1 is at Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 is in MODE 5 The following issues happen to the Component Cooling Water (CCW)

System 1 February at 0600, HX-12B, CCW Heat Exchanger develops a tube leak and is declared inoperable 2 February at 0200, 1P-11A, CCW Pump is declared inoperable due to vibrations 4 February at 1400, HX-12C, CCW Heat Exchanger is declared inoperable due to a tubesheet leak 4 February at 2200, 1P-11A is repaired, tested and declared OPERABLE 6 February at 2100, 1P-11B, CCW Pump is declared inoperable for a bearing failure 7 February at 1300, HX-12B is repaired, tested and declared OPERABLE Assuming that the current inoperable components cannot be repaired and brought to an OPERABLE status, which describes the latest allowable date and time which Unit 1 must be in MODE 3?

(See provided reference)

A. 7 February at 2000 B. 8 February at 0800 C. 10 February at 0300 D. 10 February at 2000 Proposed Answer: B Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 289

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

This answer is based on the 144 hours0.00167 days 0.04 hours 2.380952e-4 weeks 5.4792e-5 months (+6) from not meeting the LCO. The LCO is not met with the inoperable declaration of the 1P-11A pump, the LCO is met with the inoperable declaration of the HX-12B, as the system design and bases allows for one heat exchanger to be inoperable, and still met the LCO.

Once the LCO is not met, it must be met within 144 hours0.00167 days 0.04 hours 2.380952e-4 weeks 5.4792e-5 months .

A INCORRECT: This answer is based on the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (+6) for HX-12C. This is incorrect as when HX-12B is declared OPERABLE (at the 71 hour8.217593e-4 days 0.0197 hours 1.173942e-4 weeks 2.70155e-5 months point for HX-12C), that ACTION CONDITION is exited, so HX-12C does not need to be OPERABLE to meet the LCO.

Plausible if the student does not realize the ACTION CONDITION is exited with the repair of HX-12B.

B CORRECT: See Above C INCORRECT: This answer is based on 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (+6) for 1P-11B. This is incorrect, this would be longer than the 144 hour0.00167 days 0.04 hours 2.380952e-4 weeks 5.4792e-5 months requirement to met the LCO. Plausible due to 1P-11B is the only component which is inoperable and does not cause the LCO not to be met.

D INCORRECT: This answer is based on the 144 hours0.00167 days 0.04 hours 2.380952e-4 weeks 5.4792e-5 months (+6) for HX-12C. This is incorrect, as the clock actually started when 1P-11A was declared inoperable. Plausible if the student applies the 144 hour0.00167 days 0.04 hours 2.380952e-4 weeks 5.4792e-5 months requirement to components which are not considered OPERABLE.

Learning Objective:

Given specific plant conditions, assess and apply Technical Specification Requirements, as appropriate (057.02.LP3343.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 290

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 087 Given the following:

Unit 2 is in MODE 3 A significant amount of water is discovered around 2HX-15A1-8, Containment Accident Recirc HX A water sample determines the water is from Service Water The inlet and outlet of the HX have been isolated What is the OPERABILITY status of Containment and 2W-1A1, Containment Accident Recirc Fan?

Containment 2W-1A1 A. OPERABLE OPERABLE B. OPERABLE inoperable C. inoperable OPERABLE D. inoperable inoperable Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 291

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2016 Prairie Island SRO 87 SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing < 1-hour TS/TRM Actions, the LCO/TRM information listed above the line, or TS safety limits; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions in the application of the TS Bases to determine if the component is operable.

K/A:

022A2.05 Containment Cooling System (CCS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Major leak in CCS (Imp 3.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to determine the impact of a major leak in CCS.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPR: The operator must use Technical Specifications Bases knowledge to determine component operability.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 2 55.43 5 55.45.3 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 292

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS B 3.6.1 Bases Containment, Rev 3 TS B 3.6.6, Bases Containment Spray and Cooling Systems, Rev 12 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

- Unit 2 is in Mode 3.

- A significant amount of water is discovered around 22 CFCU.

- A water sample determines the water is from the river.

- All actions of C35 AOP4, Cooling Water Leakage in Containment, are complete.

What is the OPERABILITY status of Containment and 22 CFCU?

Containment 22 CFCU A. OPERABLE OPERABLE B. OPERABLE INOPERABLE C. INOPERABLE OPERABLE D. INOPERABLE INOPERABLE Proposed Answer: B Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 293

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The containment would OPERABLE after leak isolation. The Accident Fan, even though it runs, would remain inoperable until repair and system restoration.

A INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee applies the minimum requirement for LOCA analysis and not a SLB analysis and does not take into consideration the leak on the cooling unit.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: Plausible if the examinee does not take the leak isolation into consideration while also Appling the minimum requirement for LOCA analysis and not a SLB analysis and does not take into consideration the leak on the cooling unit.

D INCORRECT: .Plausible due to both being inoperable if no actions were taken.

Learning Objective:

Given specific plant conditions, ASSESS and APPLY Technical Specification requirements as appropriate.

(057.02.LP3342.002)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 294

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 088 Given the following:

Unit 1 is in MODE 1 Technical Specification surveillance IT 8A, Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve Test (Quarterly) Unit 1 (satisfies SR 3.7.5.2) was recently performed (1) What is the latest date that IT 8A can be performed?

AND (2) What TS Actions Conditions are required to be entered if 1MS-2019, B SG Steam Supply to 1P-29 AFP fails to open per IT 8A?

Reference provided TS 3.7.5 pages 3.7.5-1 to 3.7.5-5 A. 92 days + 25% extension after the last performed date TSAC 3.7.5.A only, based on failure of 1MS-2019 to actuate B. 92 days after the last performed date TSAC 3.7.5.A only, based on failure of 1MS-2019 to actuate C. 92 days + 25% extension after the last performed date TSAC 3.7.5.A and 3.7.5.B, based on failure of 1MS-2019 to actuate and the steam supply loss causing a loss of developed pump head.

D. 92 days after the last performed date TSAC 3.7.5.A and 3.7.5.B, based on failure of 1MS-2019 to actuate and the steam supply loss causing a loss of developed pump head.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 295

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

New Question History:

None SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing < 1-hour TS/TRM Actions, the LCO/TRM information listed above the line, or TS safety limits; AND requires the operator to assess the application of required actions (TS Section 3) and apply completion times for equipment surveillances.

K/A:

061G2.2.12 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(Imp 4.1)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to display knowledge of the surveillance process and what is being tested during surveillances.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The operator must use Technical Specifications as a reference and Technical Specification usage knowledge to determine what condition actions are required to be entered and when the next surveillance is allowed to be performed.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 296

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, Rev 4 TS 3.0, Surveillance Requirement Applicability, Rev 3 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

TS 3.7.5 pages 3.7.5-1 to 3.7.5-5 (5 pages)

Original Question:

N/A Justification:

The answer is based on 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency as measured from the previous performance or as measured from the specified condition of the Frequency is met. The IT is a quarterly performance, and this will satisfy the requirement of SR 3.7.5.2. The action condition required to be entered is 3.7.5.A only. The valve will affect the pump operation and actuation, but will not meet 3.7.5.B.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible if the student does not apply the 25% extension to the SR frequency. The second part is correct.

C INCORRECT: .The first part is correct The second part is wrong, plausible if the examinee assumes a loss of one of the steam supply valves will cause enough of a loss of steam to the TDAFW pump to cause a loss of developed pump head D INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible if the student does not apply the 25% extension to the SR frequency. The second part is wrong, plausible if the examinee assumes a loss of one of the steam supply valves will cause enough of a loss of steam to the TDAFW pump to cause a loss of developed pump head.

Learning Objective:

Knowledge of surveillance procedures (SD 86.2.2.2.12)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 297

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 089 Given the following:

Both units are at Rated Thermal Power 2C20 B 4-8, D-05/D-06 BATTERY ROOM VENT FLOW LOW alarms The AO reports that W-10B, D-05 Battery Room Exhaust Fan is not running and will not start Complete the following:

The operational concern of the exhaust fan malfunction is excessive D-05 Battery Room ____(1)___.

AND D-05, Station Battery ___(2)___ OPERABLE per TS 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating.

A. (1) Hydrogen concentration (2) is B. (1) Temperature (2) is NOT C. (1) Hydrogen concentration (2) is NOT D. (1) Temperature (2) is Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 298

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2017 Farley SRO 88 SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing < 1-hour TS/TRM Actions, the LCO/TRM information listed above the line, or TS safety limits; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions, recall the basis to determine whether or not a component is OPERABLE.

K/A:

063A2.02 D.C. Electrical Distribution Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the DC electrical systems; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of ventilation during battery charging (Imp 3.1)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to recall the operational concern of the loss of ventilation during an equalizing change, and then use procedure knowledge to determine the consequences of the loss on the battery.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The operator must recall the operational concern for the loss of ventilation, and then apply procedural Technical Specifications knowledge to determine the operable status of the station battery given an equalizer charge and loss of ventilation.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 299

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

ARB 2C20 B 4-8, D-05/D-06 BATTERY ROOM VENT FLOW LOW, Rev 3 TS B 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating Basis, Rev 5 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Unit 1 is at 100% Power with the following conditions:

An equalizing battery charge is in progress on the 1A Aux Building Battery.

LG3, 1A BATT RM EXH FAN FAULT, has come into alarm on the BOP.

Upon investigation, maintenance has determined that the 1A BATT RM EXH FAN has a seized bearing and cannot be returned to service.

Which one of the following completes the statements below?

The operational concern of the exhaust fan malfunction is excessive Battery Room ___(1)___

The 1A Aux Building Battery ___(2)___ OPERABLE, per TS 3.8.4, DC Sources -

Operating.

A. (1) hydrogen concentration (2) IS B. (1) hydrogen concentration (2) is NOT C. (1)temperature (2) IS D. (1)temperature (2) is NOT Proposed answer: A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 300

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

One of the initial conditions for an equalizing battery charge is that battery room normal exhaust fan or temporary ventilation is in operation. Hydrogen buildup is the operational concern, and it addressed in the Battery Room low vent flow ARB. Per the TS Basis, each of the 125 VDC batteries are separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distribution centers, but the loss of the battery room ventilation does not cause the battery to be inoperable A CORRECT: See Above B INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible that temperature in the battery room would rise without an exhaust fan but this is not an operational concern. The second part is wrong, plausible if the student assumes that ventilation is needed to an equalizing battery charge.

C INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part is wrong, plausible if the student assumes that ventilation is needed to an equalizing battery charge.

D INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible that temperature in the battery room would rise without an exhaust fan but this is not an operational concern. The second part is correct.

Learning Objective:

Given specific plant conditions, assess and apply technical specification requirement as appropriate (057.02.LP3336.017)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 301

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 090 Given the following:

Both units are at Rated Thermal Power K-3A, Service Air Compressor is tagged out for repair A Service Water (SW) leak occurs in the plant K-2A, Instrument Air Compressor, AND K-2B, InstrumentAir Compressor trip The crew enters AOP-9A, Service Water System Malfunction, and isolates the South SW header to isolate the SW leak SW loads have NOT been shift to alternate supplies Complete the following statement:

K-3B will ___(1)___, an OS will enter AOP-5B, Loss of Instrument Air and ___(2)___.

(1) (2)

A. have tripped on high SW remain in AOP-5B, no transitions discharge temperature from AOP-5B are required B. continue to run, SW remain in AOP-5B, no transitions cooling is not required from AOP-5B are required C. have tripped on high SW trip both reactors and enter discharge temperature EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, while concurrently performing AOP-5B, Loss of Instrument Air D. continue to run, SW trip both reactors and enter cooling is not required EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, while concurrently performing AOP-5B, Loss of Instrument Air Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 302

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 2 Group 1 Source:

Bank Question History:

2015 PBNP SRO 80 (Questions original K/A was 065AA2.04)

SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing system knowledge, immediate operator actions, knowing entry condition for AOPs or plant parameters which direct entry into major EOPs, the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions and determine the selection of a procedures to mitigate with knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and\or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

K/A:

078G2.1.32 Instrument Air Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(Imp 4.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to evaluate plant performance and make an operational decision based on the operating characteristics of the instrument air/service air system and the interface with service water.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The operator must understand the initial condition and the given fault of the loss of the south service water header, take that knowledge and IA system operating characteristics and determine the effect on the plant making an operational decision on how to mitigate the event.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.43 5 55.45.12 55.45.13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 303

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

AOP-5B, Loss of Instrument Air Rev 49 M-207 Sh 1, P&ID Service Water Rev 91 M-207 Sh 1A, P&ID Service Water Rev 45 FSAR, UFSAR 2012 Section 9.7 Instrument Air and Service Air LP0338 Instrument and Service Air Rev 14 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

Unit 1 and Unit 2 are at Rated Thermal Power K-2B, Instrument Air Compressor is out of service for repair A Service Water (SW) leak occurs in the plant K-2A, Instrument Air Compressor, AND K-3A, Service Air Compressor trip The crew enters AOP-9A, Service Water System Malfunction, and isolates the South SW header to isolate the SW leak Complete the following statement:

K-3B will ___(1)___, an OS will enter AOP-5B, Loss of Instrument Air and ___(2)___.

(1) (2)

A. trip on high SW discharge remain in AOP-5B, no transitions temperature from AOP-5B are required B. continue to run, SW remain in AOP-5B, no transitions cooling is not required from AOP-5B are required C. trip on high SW discharge trip both reactors and enter temperature EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, while concurrently performing AOP-5B, Loss of Instrument Air D. continue to run, SW trip both reactors and enter cooling is not required EOP-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, while concurrently performing AOP-5B, Loss of Instrument Air Proposed answer: C Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 304

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The compressor having lost the required SW cooling will trip on high SW discharge temperature this results in a loss of instrument AND service air compressors. OS1 will enter AOP-5B, transition to EOP-0, trip and stabilize the plant and branch back to AOP-5B, with the purpose of performing both in parallel A INCORRECT: The compressor having lost the required SW cooling will trip on high SW discharge temperature. The direction is incorrect, AOP-5B will also have you trip the reactor based on a loss of all compressed air. Plausible because there are actions taken in AOP-5B to mitigate a loss of instrument air and AOP-5B will be performed in parallel with EOP-0.

B INCORRECT: The status is incorrect K-3B is the SW cooled air compressor, and AOP-5B will also have you trip the reactor based on a loss of all compressed air. Plausible because one of the two service air compressors has a SW discharge temperature trip and the other does not, and there are actions taken in AOP-5B to mitigate a loss of instrument air and AOP-5B will be performed in parallel with EOP-0.

C CORRECT: See above.

D INCORRECT: The status is incorrect K-3B is the SW cooled air compressor, OS1 will enter AOP-5B, transition to EOP-0, trip and stabilize the plant and branch back to AOP-5B, with the purpose of performing both in parallel. Plausible because one of the two service air compressors has a SW discharge temperature trip and the other does not.

Learning Objective:

DISCUSS how the following conditions/events could affect overall operation of the plant.

a. Loss of Instrument Air

b. Gland Steam Condenser Tube Leak

c. Loss of Condenser Vacuum

d. Abnormal conditions for Reactor Coolant Pump vibration and/or oil, as indicated by alarms

e. Steam binding or overheating of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps

f. Feedwater Heater and/or Heater Drain Tank malfunction

g. Loss of DC Control Power to Main Generator Exciter Breakers

h. Loss of or malfunction of the CVCS System.

(069.04.LP0352.005)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 305

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 091 Given the following:

Units 1 is starting up after completing a refueling outage Unit 2 is at Rated Thermal Power Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) boron concentration sample results have dropped since last sample and are currently below the Technical Specification Which answers the following:

If SFP boron concentration continues to drop, a Keff <1.0 will be ___(1)___.

AND Action must be initiated immediately to restore the Tech Spec minimum SFP boron concentration of ___(2)___.

A. (1) maintained regardless of SFP boron concentration (2) 2100 ppm B. (1) maintained regardless of SFP boron concentration (2) 2350 ppm C. (1) maintained only as long as SFP boron concentration is > 664 ppm (2) 2100 ppm D. (1) maintained only as long as SFP boron concentration is > 664 ppm (2) 2350 ppm Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 306

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

Modified Question History:

2016 Callaway SRO 93 SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing < 1-hour TS/TRM Actions, the LCO/TRM information listed above the line, or TS safety limits; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions have a detailed knowledge of TS bases and terminology to determine the impact of the boron dilution.

K/A:

033A2.01 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Inadequate SDM (Imp 3.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by placing the examinee in a conditions where recently used fuel is in the SFP with a lowering boron concentration, making a prediction of the impact of a further loss of boron, and the recall the required amount of boron that is needed to maintain Keff and SDM.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-B: The operator must recall the bases information for boron concentration requirement to maintain Keff and required boron concentration fo the SFP.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 5 55.43 5 55.45.3 55.45.13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 307

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

TS B 3.7.11, Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration, Rev 3 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Fuel is being moved in the Spent Fuel Pool.

Spent fuel pool boron concentration is 1950 ppm.

(1) Spent fuel pool Shutdown Margin (keff) is limited to a MAXIMUM of

_____(1)_____? (Assume only one fuel assembly is mispositioned)

And (2) Action must be initiated immediately to restore the MINIMUM boron concentration to .?

A. (1) 0.95 (2) 2000 ppm B. (1) 0.99 (2) 2165 ppm C. (1) 0.95 (2) 2165 ppm D. (1) 0.99 (2) 2000 ppm Proposed answer: C Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 308

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per TS B 3.711, The design of the spent fuel storage rack is based on the use of unborated water, with maintains the spent fuel pool in a subcritical condition during normal operation with the pool fully loaded. So a Keff of less than 1.0 will be maintained in the SPF based on the construction of the storage racks.

Per TS 3.7.11 and its associated bases, the >2100 PPM limit conservatively assures Keff is maintained within the limit (Keff <.95) for dropped fuel assembly etc,. In addition, this limit ensures no credible boron dilution event will reduce boron concentration to <664 ppm required during non-accident conditions to maintain Keff < .95.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part is wrong, plausible as this is the minimum boron concentration during refueling operations.

C INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible as this is the boron concentration that is assumed to in accident analysis to maintain the SFP at a Keff <0.95. The second part is correct.

D INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible as this is the boron concentration that is assumed to in accident analysis to maintain the SFP at a Keff <0.95. The second part is wrong, plausible as this is the minimum boron concentration during refueling operations.

Learning Objective:

DISCUSS Technical Specification Definitions, Rules of Usage, Safety Limits, 1 Hours or Less Actions for Systems, Equipment, and Basis of LCOs and Safety Limits.

(057.01.LP3336.017)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 309

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 092 Given the following:

Unit 1 is at Rated Thermal Power 1MS-2015, Steam Generator B Atmos Steam Dump CV fails open and cannot be closed by the CO What are the required directions per AOP-2A, Secondary Coolant Leak to address the failed atmospheric dump valve (ADV), and can Unit 1 continue to operate?

A. Direct the operator to shut the isolation for the affected ADV.

Unit 1 may continue to operate indefinitely at a power of < 39% of Rated Thermal Power B. Direct the operator to shut the isolation for the affected ADV.

Unit 1 must be shutdown per Technical Specifications if the ADV is not returned to operable in 7 days C. Direct the operator to isolate and then vent the operating air to the affected ADV.

Unit 1 may continue to operate indefinitely at a power of < 39% of Rated Thermal Power D. Direct the operator to isolate and then vent the operating air to the affected ADV.

Unit 1 must be shutdown per Technical Specifications if the ADV is not returned to operable in 7 days Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 310

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2011 Callaway SRO 93 SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing < 1-hour TS/TRM Actions, the LCO/TRM information listed above the line, or TS safety limits; AND requires the operator to assess plant conditions have a detailed knowledge of TS bases to determine the impact of the valve failure on plant operations.

K/A:

041G2.1.31 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup.

(Imp 4.3)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to recall the actions and determine the impact of the loss of ADV.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-B: The operator must recall the actions to isolate and then the bases and apply that knowledge determine the effect on Unit 1 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.45.12 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 311

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

AOP-2A, Secondary Coolant Leak, Rev 17 TS 3.7.4, Atmospheric Dump Avle (ADV) Flowpaths, Rev 2 TS B 3.7.4, Atmospheric Dump Avle (ADV) Flowpaths Basis, Rev 5 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following conditions:

The plant is at 100% power

AB PIC-1A, SG A Atmospheric Steam Dump (ASD) fails open and cannot be closed by the Reactor Operator What are the required directions per OTO-AB-00001, STEAM DUMP MALFUNCTION, to address the failed ASD, and can the plant continue to operate?

A. Direct the Plant Operator to close the Air/N2 Isolation Valve for the affected ASD and then open the Air/N2 drain valve. The plant can continue to operate indefinitely at a reduced power of 85%.

B. Direct the Plant Operator to unlock and close the Manual Isolation Valve for the affected ASD. The plant must be shutdown per Technical Specifications if the ASD is not repaired in 7 days.

C. Direct the Plant Operator to close the Air/N2 Isolation Valve for the affected ASD and then open the Air/N2 drain valve. The plant must be shutdown per Technical Specifications if the ASD is not repaired in 7 days.

D. Direct the Plant Operator to unlock and close the Manual Isolation Valve for the affected ASD. The plant can continue to operate indefinitely at a reduced power of 85%.

Proposed answer: C Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 312

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Per AOP-2A, the RNO states to manually shut the valve from the control room, and if that is unsuccessful, then to manually shut the isolation valve.

The unit may continue to operate for 7 days, since the ADV being manually isolated makes it inoperable.

A INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part it wrong, but plausible as this is the required power limit if one steam generator safety is inoperable.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: The first par is wrong, plausible because this will cause a loss of operating air to the valve, and this is a fail shut valve, but this is not procedurally directed.

D INCORRECT: Plausible if the student assumes this requirement is met by the construction and fuel storage requirements.

Learning Objective:

DISCUSS Technical Specification Definitions, Rules of Usage, Safety Limits, 1 Hours or Less Actions for Systems, Equipment, and Basis of LCOs and Safety Limits.

(057.01.LP3336.017)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 313

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 093 Given the following:

Both units are at Rated Thermal Power While performing welding activities in the Cable Spreading Room, one of the heat detectors associated with the Halon system was inadvertently actuated The Halon actuation was successfully aborted with the use the ABORT palm switch and resetting fireworks prior to actual Halon discharge Which answers the following:

(1) How is the Cable Spreading Room Halon system affected while the ABORT palm switch is held in the depressed position?

AND (2) What actions are required per OM 3.27, Control of Fire Protection and NFPA 805 Equipment, if the Halon system is removed from service to stop further unintended actuations while work continues?

A. (1) Auto actuation ONLY is blocked (2) Backup fire suppression capability is provided and an Hourly fire watch is established within one hour B. (1) BOTH Manual and Auto actuation of the system is blocked (2) Backup fire suppression capability is provided and an Hourly fire watch is established within one hour C. (1) Auto actuation ONLY is blocked (2) Backup fire suppression capability is provided and a Continuous fire watch is established within one hour D. (1) BOTH Manual and Auto actuation of the system is blocked (2) Backup fire suppression capability is provided and a Continuous fire watch is established within one hour Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 314

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 2 Group 2 Source:

Bank Question History:

2009 McGuire SRO 92 SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(1) Conditions and limitations in the facility license Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it is the administration of fire protection program requirements, such as compensatory action associated with inoperable sprinkler systems and fire doors.

K/A:

086A2.03 Fire Protection System (FPS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fire Protection System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Inadvertent actuation of the FPS due to circuit failure or welding (Imp 2.9)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to predict what impact the auto actuation and abort switch operation will have on the fire protection system actuation sequence, and what actions are required to prevent further unintended system actuations.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-I The examinee must recall the interlock for the halon system actuation and what compensatory actions will be needed.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 1 55.43 5 55.45 3 55.45 13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 315

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

LP0003, Fire Protection, Rev 27 OM 3.27, Control of Fire Protection and NFPA 805 Equipment, Rev 77 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

Unit 1 was operating at 100% RTP

While performing welding activities in the 1A D/G Room one of the heat detectors associated with the Halon system was inadvertently actuated

The Halon actuation was successfully aborted by the fire watch depressing the ABORT/OFF pushbutton prior to actual Halon discharge.

How is the 1A D/G Halon system affected and what actions are required per SLC 16.9.3 (Halon Systems)?

A. Auto actuation ONLY is blocked Establish an Hourly fire watch within one hour B. BOTH Manual and Auto actuation of the system is blocked.

Establish a Hourly fire watch within one hour.

C. Auto actuation ONLY is blocked Establish a Continuous Fire Watch within one hour.

D. BOTH Manual and Auto actuation of the system is blocked.

Establish a Continuous Fire Watch within one hour.

Proposed answer: C Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 316

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The halon system is actuated by 2 smoke detectors or one heat activated detector, and will have a 40 second time delay. If the operator uses the abort palm switch, this will stop the delay. During that time an operator can abort the discharge via the fireworks or FACP if the alarm condition is clear.

This button will only block automatic operations of the halon system.

If the system is to be removed from service per OM 3.27, the compensatory actions of a backup fire suppression capability is an hourly fire watch must be established with one hour.

A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible if the examinee does not recall that manual actuation cannot be blocked. The second part is correct.

C INCORRECT: The first part is correct. The second part is wrong, plausible is the examinee apples the requirements of HSS fire barrier and a fire detection system being non-functional to this situation.

D INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible if the examinee does not recall that manual actuation cannot be blocked. The second part is wrong, plausible is the examinee apples the requirements of HSS fire barrier and a fire detection system being non-functional to this situation.

Learning Objective:

Analyze system response to Fire Protection System malfunctions (051.01.LP0003.006)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 317

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 094 Given the following:

Unit 1 is in a refueling outage with a core offload in progress You are the Relief Crew SRO and have two Operators who need to hang a danger tag in containment on the 21' behind the LHRA refueling boundary What must be done prior to sending your Operators into the LHRA to hang the tag?

A. Sign on specific Operations Outage RWP, establish radio communication with the Core Load Supervisor (CLS), and obtain authorization from the CLS prior to entering the area. Fuel may NOT be moved through the transfer tube.

B. Sign on the fuel motion RWP. Entry is allowed with concurrence of the CLS. Fuel may be moved through the transfer tube.

C. No entry into fuel motion LHRA's is allowed unless the fuel transfer tube gate valve is danger tagged shut.

D. The Operations standing RWP allows for a short duration entry into areas posted due to fuel motion for such activities as hanging tags. Outage Manager permission is required as long as fuel is not actively being transferred between the SFP and Containment.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 318

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

2015 PBNP SRO 97 SRO 10CFR55.43(b)(4) Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on SRO (supervisor) responsibility for the determination of what requirements must be met to enter the area, based on radiological and refueling requirements.

K/A:

G2.1.13 Conduct of Operations Knowledge of facility requirements for controlling vital/controlled access.

(Imp 3.2)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to have knowledge of the requirements needed to enter a controlled area during refueling.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-P: The examinee recall the requirements needed to be met to enter the area and perform the task.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 5 55.45 9 55.45 10

Reference:

RP 1C, Refueling, Rev 83 RP-AA-102-1003, High Radiation Area Controls Rev 12 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 319

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

Very High Radiation Areas are defined as an area, accessible to individuals, where radiation levels could result in an individual receiving an absorbed dose in excess of 500 rads in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months at 1 meter from a radiation source or from any surface that the radiation penetrates. Since refueling operations are currently happening, radio contact is needed with the CLS A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: Plausible as the RWP and CLS concurrence are necessary for entry, but fuel is not allowed to be moved while personnel are in that area.

C INCORRECT: Plausible if the student has a misconception of or cannot recall the entry requirements, as this would prevent fuel movement while personnel would be in the area.

D INCORRECT: The operational standing RWP does not allow access into these areas, CLS or SM permission is required, not the Outage Manager. Plausible if the student has a misconception of or cannot recall the standing RWPs used by operations, and access during no fuel movement times makes sense.

Additional non-operations permissions are required for entry into VHRA Learning Objective:

Learning objectives were derived from the tasks contained in NUREG-1122 Rev 2, Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operator:

Pressurized Water Reactors.

(SD 86.1.2.3.13)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 320

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 095 Given the following:

Unit 2 is being refueled following a complete core offload.

IAW RP 1C, Refuleing, any deviation from the specified core refueling approved sequence, while transporting fuel to or from the Spent Fuel Pool or the core, requires the concurrence of the ______ before any changes are made?

A. Reactor Engineering Duty and Call Supervisor B. Core Loading Supervisor and the Shift Manager C. Reactor Engineering representative and the Shift Manager D. Reactor Engineering representative and the Core Load Supervisor Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 321

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

2015 PBNP SRO 95 (Questions original K/A was G2.1.35)

SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(6) Procedures and limitations involved in initial core loading, alterations in core configuration, control rod programming, and determination of various internal and external effects on core reactivity.

10CFR55.43(b)(7) Fuel handling facilities and procedures.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on SRO refueling floor responsibilities and refueling procedure knowledge as well as administrative controls associated with refueling actives.

K/A:

G2.1.42 Conduct of Operations Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures.

(Imp 3.4)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to have knowledge of the fuel movement procedures.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-P: The examinee must recall the administrative requirements, whos permission is required for changes.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 7 55.45 13 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 322

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

RP 1C, Refueling, Rev 83 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

Unit 2 is being refueled following a complete core offload.

Any deviation from the specified core refueling approved sequence, while transporting fuel to or from the Spent Fuel Pool or the core, requires the concurrence of the ______ before any changes are made?

A. Reactor Engineering Duty and Call Supervisor B. Core Loading Supervisor and the Shift Manager C. Assigned Reactor Engineer and the Shift Manager D. Assigned Reactor Engineer and the Core Load Supervisor Proposed answer: D Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 323

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

These are the required approvals per section 3.2.2 of RP 1C A INCORRECT: This position is notified of issues during the fueling sequence, but concurrence is not required, plausible because this person is notified when issues arise.

B INCORRECT: The first person is right, but the Shift Manager is only required to be notified of the change, plausible because the change is required to through the Shift Manager for notification purposes.

C INCORRECT: The first person is right, but the Shift Manager is only required to be notified of the change, plausible because the change is required to through the Shift Manager for notification purposes.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Learning objectives were derived from the tasks contained in NUREG-1122 Rev 2, Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operator:

Pressurized Water Reactors.

(2.1.42)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 324

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 096 Concerning Guarded Equipment areas, what type of permission (if any) is needed and who grants it for the following evolutions:

1) Non-intrusive walkdown of the area?

AND

2) Erection of scaffolding in the area?

(OATC, Operator At The Controls)

(SM, Shift Manger)

A. 1) Permission is not needed

2) Verbal permission from the OATC B. 1) Verbal permission from the OATC

2) Verbal permission from the SM C. 1) Verbal permission from the OATC

2) Written permission from the SM D. 1) Verbal permission from SM or designee

2) Written permission from the SM Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 325

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 3 Source:

New Question History:

None SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on SRO responsibility to maintain equipment control and maintenance control of guarded equipment areas.

K/A:

G2.2.17 Equipment Control Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, and coordination with the transmission system operator.

(Imp 3.8)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to have knowledge of the managing maintenance activities on guarded equipment.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-F: The examinee must recall the requirements for what is and is not allowed around guarded equipment.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 5 55.45 13

Reference:

OP-AA-102-1003, Guarded Equipment, Rev 39, Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

N/A Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 326

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

For guarded equipment areas, written permission is required for physical work to be performed (i.e., scaffold building, maintenance), written permission is not required it no physical work is occurring such as a pre-job walkdown, these only require verbal permission, and there is list of work which requires no level of permission examples of this include, operator and fire rounds, responding to alarms, performing surveys, regulatory inspection.

A INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible as there are similar activities which do not require permission. The second part is wrong, plausible if the examinee differentiates between work on a system, and work in the area of a system, this being work in the area may only require verbal permission.

B INCORRECT: The first part is right. The second part is wrong, plausible if the examinee differentiates between work on a system, and work in the area of a system, this being work in the area may only require verbal permission.

C CORRECT: See Above.

D INCORRECT: The first part is wrong, plausible as there are similar activities which do not require permission. The second part is right.

Learning Objective:

Learning objectives were derived from the tasks contained in NUREG-1122 Rev 2, Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operator:

Pressurized Water Reactors.

(2.2.17)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 327

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 097 Given the following:

Unit 1 is conducting refueling operations during an outage per RP 1C, Refueling Annunciator 1C04 1A 1-3, SOURCE RANGE HIGH FLUX LEVEL AT SHUTDOWN alarms If the alarm is verified to be valid, the OS should . . .

A. ensure Unit 1 Containment is being evacuated B. ensure RCA access is restricted to only essential personnel C. direct CO1 to actuate the Source Range High Flux Level at Shutdown alarm in Unit 1 Containment D. direct CO3 to actuate the Plant Evacuation Alarm, then make an announcement for all personnel to evacuate the Protected Area Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 328

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

112.01.LP0285.001 004 SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(7) Fuel handling facilities and procedures.

10CFR55.43(b)(4) Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on not including items that the RO may be responsible for, such as fuel-handling equipment and refueling-related control room instrumentation operability requirements, and AOP immediate actions., but requires knowledge of refueling procedures, and EPIP procedures.

K/A:

G2.3.12 Radiation Control Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

(Imp 3.7)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to have knowledge of the containment entry/evacuation requirements during refueling.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-F: The examinee must recall the fact and conditions of the containment entry requirements.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 12 55.45 9 55.45 10 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 329

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

EPIP 6.1, Assembly and Accountability, Release and Evacuation of Personnel, Rev 45 Withheld from public disclosure ARB 1C04 1A 1-3, Source Range High Flux Level at Shutdown, Rev 7 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Given the following:

Unit 1 is conducting refueling operations during an outage per RP 1C, Refueling

Annunciator 1C04 1A 1-3, SOURCE RANGE HIGH FLUX LEVEL AT SHUTDOWN alarms If the alarm is verified to be valid, the OS should . . .

A. direct CO3 to actuate the Plant Evacuation Alarm, then make an announcement for all personnel to evacuate the Protected Area B. direct CO1 to actuate the Source Range High Flux Level at Shutdown alarm in Unit 1 Containment C. ensure RCA access is restricted to only essential personnel D. ensure the Unit 1 Containment is being evacuated Proposed answer: D Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 330

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

The ARB will send the OS to EPIP 6.1. EPIP-6.1, is the responsibility of the Shift Manager until assumed by the Emergency Coordinator. An initial condition of valid containment high flux at shutdown alarm requires the consideration of a limited plant evacuation, of the effected containment.

A CORRECT: See Above.

B INCORRECT: Plausible, as this would be a safety practice that would limit the exposure of personnel and limit traffic to the affected containment, but the containment access should be restricted vice the containment, and there is no procedural requirement to perform this action.

C INCORRECT: Plausible, as this is an action taken for a Fuel Handling Accident in Containment, which symptoms and entry conditions have not been met. The High Flux at Shutdown alarm is not used for evacuation.

D INCORRECT: Plausible, as this is what would be required if the accident affected more than the containment, and these have not be met at this time.

Learning Objective:

Learning objectives were derived from the tasks contained in NUREG-1122 Rev 2, Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operator:

Pressurized Water Reactors.

(SD86.3 2.3.12)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 331

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 098 Given the following:

T-104A, Waste Distillate Tank is being discharged overboard via Unit 2 Service Water 2RE-229, Service Water Overboard Unit 2 monitor, momentarily goes into an ALERT status, and then clears RE-223, Waste Distillate Tank Overboard monitor, is normal and is well below setpoint Which of the following describes how the system will respond and what actions are now required?

A. Discharge will need to be manually secured. The discharge path switched to Unit 1 Service Water Overboard, and then discharge may be recommenced. Document change of discharge path on the existing Liquid Waste Discharge Permit.

B. Discharge will need to be manually secured. Discharge may recommence using a new Liquid Waste Discharge Permit, following re-sampling and analysis.

C. BE-LW-15, Waste Distillate Overboard Discharge Flow Control, will automatically close. The alert condition on 2RE-229 will need to be evaluated and a new Liquid Waste Discharge Permit MUST be completed prior to continuing the discharge.

D. BE-LW-15, Waste Distillate Overboard Discharge Flow Control, will automatically close. Discharge may recommence using existing Liquid Waste Discharge Permit following the performance of RAM 3.1.1, Restarting a Liquid Batch Release.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:06 AM 332

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

2012 PBNP SRO 98 (Questions original K/A was G2.3.11)

SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(4) Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by RO knowledge of radiological safety principles (e.g., radiation work permit requirements, stay time, and DAC hours); AND requires the examinee to demonstrate SRO level of knowledge of procedures which controlling the release of radioactive fluids.

K/A:

G2.3.15 Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

(Imp 3.1)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the operator to use knowledge of fixed radiation monitors, alarms and the impact of that on discharge of liquid waste.

Cognitive Level:

Comprehension 3-SPK: The operator must analyze the initial conditions, determine how the discharge will be effected, and what actions are necessary to continue the discharge.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 12 55.43 4 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:07 AM 333

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

RMSASRB CI 2RE-229, Service Water Overboard Monitor Unit 2 Rev 6 RMSASRB CI RE-223, Waste Distillate Tank Overboard Monitor Rev 6 OI 140B, Standard Radioactive Batch Liquid Release - Waste Distillate Tanks Rev 13 AOP-4A, High Effluent Activity Rev 6 RAM 3.1.1 Restarting a Liquid Batch Release Rev 7 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Consider the following plant conditions:

- Waste Distillate Tank A is being discharged overboard via Unit 2 service water.

- 2RE-229, Unit 2 SW Overboard monitor, momentarily goes into an ALERT status, and then clears.

- RE-223, Waste Distillate Tank Overboard monitor, is normal and is well below setpoint.

Which of the following describes how the system will respond and what actions are now required?

A. Waste Distillate Overboard valve, BE-FCV-LW-15, will automatically close.

The alert condition on 2RE-229 will need to be evaluated and a new Liquid Waste Discharge Permit MUST be completed prior to continuing the discharge.

B. Waste Distillate Overboard valve, BE-FCV-LW-15, will automatically close.

Discharge may recommence using existing Liquid Waste Discharge Permit following the performance of RAM 3.1.1, Restarting a Liquid Batch Release.

C. Discharge will need to be manually secured while the discharge path is switched to Unit 1 SW Overboard, then discharge may be recommenced.

Document change of SW alignment on the existing Liquid Waste Discharge Permit.

D. Discharge will need to be manually secured. Discharge may recommence using a new Liquid Waste Discharge Permit, following re-sampling and analysis.

Proposed answer: D Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:07 AM 334

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

With 2RE-229 having an alert alarm condition, the discharge will need to be manually secured per AOP-4A and RAM 3.1.1. 2RE-229 will not cause an automatically operation of BE-LW-15, so the discharge will need to be manually stopped. The tank will need to be resampled and a new permit issued.

A INCORRECT: The first part it correct. The second part is incorrect PBNP prohibits the change of discharge permit from one unit to another without the issuance of a new permit, but plausible since the reading RE-223 was always well below normal, the operator can assume that it is not functioning properly and with the change in discharge paths, the discharge can continue.

B CORRECT: See above.

C INCORRECT: The first part is incorrect, but plausible RE-223 alarmed as this would automatically occur. The second part is a correct statement.

D INCORRECT: The first part is incorrect, but plausible RE-223 alarmed as this would automatically occur. The second part is incorrect, RAM 3.1.1 will require the current permit closed out and a new permit be issued.

Learning Objective:

DESCRIBE the procedures which govern operation of the Liquid Waste Disposal System. Description should include significant prerequisites, precautions, and notes associated with each operating procedure.

(051.04.LP0063.004)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:07 AM 335

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 099 Per the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Background Documents, why is INTEGRITY the fourth priority in the Critical Safety Function hierarchy?

INTEGRITY protects the . . .

A. RCS ONLY.

B. Fuel Cladding ONLY.

C. Containment and the RCS.

D. Fuel Cladding and the RCS.

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:07 AM 336

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 3 Source:

Bank Question History:

2016 South Texas SRO 82 SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing system knowledge, immediate operator actions, knowing entry condition for AOPs or plant parameters which direct entry into major EOPs, the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure; AND requires the operator have knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations.

K/A:

G2.4.22 Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations.

(Imp 3.4)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to recall the bases for one of the safety functions.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-B: The examinee must recall the bases/background of the safety function procedure.

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 7 55.41 10 55.43 3 55.45 12 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:07 AM 337

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

LF04BG, Background Information for WOG Emergency Response Guidelines, F-0 Critical Safety Function Status Trees, page 3, Rev 3 Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Per the WOG Background Documents, why is INTEGRITY the fourth priority in the Critical Safety Function hierarchy?

INTEGRITY protects the A. Fuel Cladding ONLY.

B. RCS ONLY.

C. Fuel Cladding and the RCS.

D. Containment and the RCS.

Proposed answer: B Justification:

Per the WOG background documents, INTEGRETY only protects the RCS barrier A CORRECT: See above.

B INCORRECT: Plausible if the RCS were to fail, a loss of inventory would occur and inventory is tied to the Core Cooling critical safety function which protects Fuel Cladding.

C INCORRECT: Plausible if the RCS were to fail, it is reasonable to think the Containment would also need to be protected due release of energy from the RCS to the containment in a DBA.

D INCORRECT: Plausibe if the RCS were to fail, it is reasonable to think the Fuel Cladding would also need to be protected due to the loss of cooling which can accompany a LOCA Learning Objective:

Relate each CSP series procedure to the barrier that they protect.

(043.03.LP1995.009)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:07 AM 338

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank 2021 NRC 100 In accordance with EPIP 1.1, Course of Actions, which of the following identifies an action that may be delegated by the Shift Manager while they are acting as Emergency Coordinator?

A. Approval of dose extensions B. Authorizing the use of potassium iodide C. Issuing Protective Action Recommendations D. Directing assembly, accountability and evacuation Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:07 AM 339

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank SRO Tier 3 Source:

Modified Question History:

2015 PBNP SRO 100 SRO:

10CFR55.43(b)(5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Justification for SRO-ONLY Question:

This is an SRO-ONLY question based on it cannot be answered solely by knowing system knowledge, immediate operator actions, knowing entry condition for AOPs or plant parameters which direct entry into major EOPs, the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigative strategy of a procedure; AND requires the operator to demonstrate knowledge of administrative procedures that specify implementation during the use of emergency preparedness procedures.

K/A:

G2.4.40 Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.

(Imp 4.5)

Justification for K/A Match:

Matches the K/A by requiring the examinee to recall which responsibilities are non-delegable duties and must be performed by the Emergency Director.

Cognitive Level:

Knowledge 1-P: The examinee must know requirements for which actions/responsibilities can be delegated by the Emergency Director (ED) 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

55.41 10 55.43 5 55.45 11 Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:07 AM 340

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank

Reference:

EPIP 1.1, Course of Action, Section 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 Attachment A, Rev 84 -

Withheld from public disclosure Proposed reference to be provided to the applicants during examination:

None Original Question:

Based on stem change where the SM is the ED, making it a situation specific question where the examinee would perform that function, vice an Emergency Director in the EOF or Emergency Coordinator in the TSC, where duties change and personnel other than SRO perform the duty, and the modification of one distractor.

In accordance with EPIP 1.1, Course of Actions, which of the following identifies an action that may be delegated by Emergency Director (ED)?

A. Approval of dose extensions B. Authorizing the use of potassium iodide C. Issuing Protective Action Recommendations D. Directing assembly, accountability and evacuation Proposed answer: D Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:07 AM 341

QUESTIONS REPORT for 2021 NRC ILT Master Exam Bank Justification:

This is an action/duty that the Emergency Coordinator can delegate, (Attachment A, Command and Control Turnover Sheet)

A INCORRECT: The request for federal assistance is not an activity that can be delegated. Plausible if the student has a misconception of actions/duties which may be delegated by the ED.

B INCORRECT: The authorization of potassium iodide use is not an activity that can be delegated. Plausible if the student has a misconception of actions/duties which may be delegated by the ED.

C INCORRECT: The issuing of protective action recommendations not an activity that can be delegated. Plausible if the student has a misconception of actions/duties which may be delegated by the ED.

D CORRECT: See above.

Learning Objective:

Learning objectives were derived from the tasks contained in NUREG-1122 Rev 2, Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operator:

Pressurized Water Reactors.

(2.4.40)

Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:56:07 AM 342

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