ML21160A270
| ML21160A270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/2021 |
| From: | Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Nextera Energy |
| References | |
| 50-250/21-301, 50-251/21-301 50-250/OL-21, 50-251/OL-21 | |
| Download: ML21160A270 (80) | |
Text
ML21160A270 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 3/29/2021 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 2021-301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*
Calculate a Manual Makeup to the VCT Conduct of Operations D, R 2.1.25: Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (RO 3.9)
Perform a Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Calculation - Manual Method Conduct of Operations D, R 2.1.23: Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation. (RO 4.3)
Equipment Control N, R Perform an Intake Cooling Water IST 2.2.12: Knowledge of surveillance procedures. (RO 3.7)
Determine RWP Requirements Radiation Control N, R 2.3.7: Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions. (RO 3.5)
Emergency Plan NOT SELECTED FOR RO EXAM NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
- Type Codes and Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)
ES-301-1 RO pg 1 of 2 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS Calculate a Manual Makeup to the VCT: The examinee is given initial plant conditions including current and desired VCT levels, RCS and Boric Acid Storage Tank boron concentrations and a desired boric acid flow rate. The examinee is informed that a manual makeup to the VCT is to be performed and is directed to A.1.a perform a specific step of 0-OP-046, section 5.4, Manual Makeup. The examinee will locate and use applicable equations in the Plant Curve Book to calculate the minimum required primary water flow rate, the volumes of primary water and boric acid to be added, as well as the potentiometer setting to obtain the desired boric acid flowrate.
Perform Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Calculation - Manual Method: The examinee is given plant conditions at the start and completion of a leak rate window as well as the combined Charging Pump primary A.1.b seal leakage value. The examinee is directed to perform a manual RCS leak rate calculation using a specific attachment. The examinee will have to fill out the attachment to determine the Gross Leak Rate, Identified Leakage, and Unidentified Leakage. Then examinee will then determine that acceptance criteria is unsatisfactory.
Perform an Intake Cooling Water IST: The examinee is given an Intake Cooling Water IST procedure with all field steps completed. The examinee is directed to complete specific steps in the procedure. The examinee will find intake level and pump discharge pressure data in the surveillance procedure and use an enclosure to translate intake level to a psid value. The examinee will then use this information to calculate total pump A.2 head for the 3A ICW pump. The examinee will then determine that the pump head places the 3A ICW pump in the Required Action Range. The examinee will then use equations in the surveillance procedure to calculate Total ICW Flow for the 3A ICW Pump discharge check valve test and determine that the check valve test was satisfactory. The examinee will then determine that the overall surveillance test was unsatisfactory due to the 3A ICW Pump head results.
Determine RWP Requirements: The examinee is given the conditions of an RCS leak inside Unit 4 containment, including expected local area radiation levels and wet conditions, and informed that they will be going into the containment to isolate the leak using a specific isolation valve. The examinee will use given A.3 information to determine the physical location of the valve. The examinee will then use this valve location to determine the applicable Radiation Work Permit from a package of all Unit 4 Containment Power Entry RWPs (7 in total). The examinee will then use the correct RWP to answer questions including maximum exposure, minimum dosimetry, and protective clothing requirements.
A.4 NOT SELECTED FOR RO EXAM ES-301-1 RO pg 2 of 2 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 3/29/2021 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 2021-301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*
Calculate a Manual Makeup to the VCT Conduct of Operations D, R 2.1.25: Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (SRO 4.2)
Perform a Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Calculation - Manual Method Conduct of Operations D, R 2.1.23: Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation. (SRO 4.4)
Equipment Control N, R Review an Intake Cooling Water IST 2.2.12: Knowledge of surveillance requirements. (SRO 4.1)
Determine RWP Requirements Radiation Control N, R 2.3.7: Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions. (SRO 3.6)
Determine PARs From Offsite Dose Emergency Plan N, R 2.4.44: Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations.
(SRO 4.4)
NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).
- Type Codes and Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)
(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)
ES-301-1 SRO pg 1 of 2 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS Calculate a Manual Makeup to the VCT: The examinee is given initial plant conditions including current and desired VCT levels, RCS and Boric Acid Storage Tank boron concentrations and a desired boric acid flow rate. The examinee is informed that a manual makeup to the VCT is to be performed and is directed to A.1.a perform a specific step of 0-OP-046, section 5.4, Manual Makeup. The examinee will locate and use applicable equations in the Plant Curve Book to calculate the minimum required primary water flow rate, and the volumes of primary water and boric acid to be added. The examinee is then informed that neither the 3A nor 3B Boric Acid Transfer Pumps will start during the manual makeup and is directed to determine any applicable Tech Spec actions.
Perform Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Calculation - Manual Method: The examinee is given plant conditions at the start and completion of a leak rate window as well as the combined Charging Pump primary A.1.b seal leakage value. The examinee is directed to perform a manual RCS leak rate calculation using a specific attachment. The examinee will have to fill out the attachment to determine the Gross Leak Rate, Identified Leakage, and Unidentified Leakage. The examinee will then determine that acceptance criteria is unsatisfactory and identify the required Tech Spec actions.
Review an Intake Cooling Water IST: The examinee is given a completed 3-OSP-019.1, section 7.1, ICW Pump 3A and Discharge Check Valve IST, and informed that all plant alignments have been returned to normal. The examinee is directed to review the surveillance procedure and identify and correct all errors.
The examinee is also directed to determine any applicable Tech Specs and Tech Spec actions based on their A.2 corrections and current plant conditions. The examinee will determine that the conversion from Pump Well Level to Grating to psid was done incorrectly. This error also led to an incorrect calculated Total Pump Head.
The examinee will determine that the corrected pump head places the 3A ICW pump in the Required Action Range. The examinee will determine from the test acceptance criteria that the 3A ICW pump is inoperable.
The examinee will determine that in the current plant alignment, the remaining operable ICW pumps are not powered from independent power supplies and will identify a required 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Tech Spec Action Statement.
Determine RWP Requirements: The examinee is given the conditions of an RCS leak inside Unit 4 containment, including expected local area radiation levels and wet conditions, and informed that they are briefing a team to go into the containment to isolate the leak using a specific isolation valve. The examinee will use given information to determine the physical location of the valve. The examinee will then use this A.3 valve location to determine the applicable Radiation Work Permit from a package of all Unit 4 Containment Power Entry RWPs (7 in total). The examinee will then use the correct RWP to answer questions including maximum exposure, minimum dosimetry, and protective clothing requirements. The examinee is then given conditions of a non-life-threatening injury during an emergency that would require dose in excess of regulatory limits for a rescue. The examinee will be required to determine the maximum amount of exposure allowed for the given conditions.
Determine PARs From Offsite Dose: The examinee is given various plant conditions which describe a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident with fuel damage and a breach of containment. The examinee is informed that a General Emergency has been declared. The examinee is given F444, Guidance for Determining Protective Action Recommendations. The examinee is directed to determine which boxes in the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form will be checked for the Protective Actions Recommendations.
A.4 The examinee will have to determine from a note in F444 that a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident is in progress and determine that Papa 3 PAR applies. The examinee is then informed of dose rates at various distances from the site. The examinee will have to use another note in F444 to determine what dose rates are considered EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs) and then determine that these PAGs are exceeded at the two and five mile distances from the plant, but not exceeded at the 10 mile distance from the plant. From this information, the examinee will determine that Delta 2 PARs applies. Note: This JPM tests recent changes to the PARs classifications and Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form.
ES-301-1 SRO pg 2 of 2 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 3/29/2021 Examination Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: 2021-301 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. 001 Control Rod Drive System (A1.06, 4.1) L, N, S 1 Reactor Startup - De-energize Source Range NIs
- b. 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (A4.02, 4.0) A, EN, N, S 2 Align for Alternate Hot Leg Recirculation - Alt Path
- c. EPE 038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (EA1.04, 4.3) A, D, S 3 Establish Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray
- d. 005 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) (A4.02, 3.4) A, D, L, S 4P Respond to Loss of RHR
- e. 041 Steam Dump System (SDS) and Turbine Bypass Control (A4.08, 3.0) N, S 4S Dump Steam to Condenser
- f. 026 Containment Spray System (CSS) (A3.01, 4.3) A, D, EN, S 5 Manually Initiate Containment Spray
- h. 073 Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System (A4.02, 3.7) N, S 7 R-3-11/12 Startup After Filter Paper Replacement In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U
- j. 064 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System (A2.01, 3.1) A, D, E 6 Manually Fill Unit 3 EDG Skid Tank
- k. 008 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) (A2.02, 3.2) D, E, R 8 Align Unit 3 HHSI Pumps to Unit 4 CCW
- All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6/4-6 /2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8/ 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/ 1 (EN)gineered safety feature 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power/Shutdown 1/ 1/ 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/ 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1/ 1/ 1 (S)imulator ES-301-2 RO pg 1 of 3 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS Reactor Startup - De-energize Source Range NIs: The examinee is given a reactor that has been declared critical with power stable below the P-6 setpoint. The examinee is directed to continue with the startup in accordance with 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operation. The examinee will withdraw control rods to increase reactor power while maintaining a less than 1 DPM steady state startup rate. When the examinee
- a. establishes the conditions to block the Source Range High Flux trip, the examinee will de-energize both Source Range Nuclear Instruments in accordance with 3-GOP-301. The examinee will then continue increasing reactor power, while maintaining a less than 1 DPM steady state startup rate, and stabilize reactor power at approximately 1 x 10-8 amps for critical rod height data. Note: This JPM is based on a recent PTN human performance error that resulted in a reactor trip.
Align for Alternate Hot Leg Recirculation - Alt Path: The examinee is given conditions of a large break loss of coolant accident and informed that the plant was aligned for Cold Leg Recirculation. The examinee is also informed that the crew attempted to establish Hot Leg Recirculation but both hot leg safety injection valves failed and cannot be opened. The examinee is directed to establish Alternate Hot Leg Injection starting with a specific b.
step in 3-EOP-ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation. The examinee will manipulate valves and pumps to establish Hot Leg Recirculation. However, after the Alternate RHR Discharge valves are closed, they will fail, preventing a suction source to the HHSI pumps from the RHR pump discharge. The examinee will then establish an injection path from the RHR pump discharge to the RCS.
Establish Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray: The examinee is informed that a steam generator tube rupture with a loss of offsite power has occurred. The ruptured steam generator has been isolated, the RCS has been cooled down, and the examinee is directed to depressurize the RCS to minimize break flow per a specific step of 3-c.
EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. The examinee will attempt to depressurize the RCS with a PORV only to discover that neither PORV will open. The examinee will then transition to a separate attachment in 3-EOP-E-3 and align valves to establish Auxiliary Spray.
Respond to Loss of RHR: The examinee enters the simulator in Mode 4 with RCS pressure and temperature stable. The examinee is directed to monitor the unit and respond to plant conditions. The running RHR pump will trip and the examinee will enter 3-ONOP-050, Loss of RHR. The examinee will close the RHR Heat
- d. Exchanger Outlet Flow valve and the Bypass Flow valve and will start the remaining RHR pump. When the examinee attempts to restore automatic control of FCV-3-605, RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass Flow valve, automatic control will fail. In accordance with 3-ONOP-050, the examinee will use manual control of FCV-3-605 to establish the required amount of RHR flow.
Dump Steam to Condenser: The examinee is given conditions of a tube rupture and informed that all actions of 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, are complete and the first five steps of 3-EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, are complete. The examinee is directed to continue with the steam generator tube
- e. rupture response starting with the next step of 3-EOP-E-3. The examinee will use a chart to determine the required Core Exit Thermocouple value. The examinee will then determine that Steam Dumps to Condenser are available and will use an attachment in 3-EOP-E-3 to control these steam dumps in manual control to commence the required cooldown.
Manually Initiate Containment Spray: The examinee is informed that the unit has experienced a reactor trip and safety injection and is directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0, Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications, starting at a specific step. The examinee will determine that containment pressure has not remained less than twenty psig.
The examinee will recognize that Containment Spray has not been initiated and will start containment spray f.
pumps and open their associated discharge valves. The examinee will then recognize that Containment Isolation Phase B has not initiated and will manually initiate Phase B with the pushbuttons. The examinee will recognize that the Phase B valves are still open and will close the Phase B valves using their individual control switches. The examinee will then stop all Reactor Coolant Pumps.
ES-301-2 RO pg 2 of 3 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Align 3B 4KV Bus to the 3C 4KV Bus: The examinee will find the unit is tripped and the 3B 4KV Bus is not energized. The examinee is informed that the unit was at 100% power and that an error in the switchyard resulted in a loss of the Unit 3 Main and Startup Transformers. The 3A 4KV Bus is energized from the 3A EDG, the 3B EDG experienced a failure, and the plant has been stabilized using the applicable Emergency Operating
- g. Procedures. The examinee is informed that offsite power is stable and available and is directed to restore power to the 3B 4KV Bus starting with a specific step of 3-ONOP-004.3, Loss of 3B 4KV Bus. The examinee will attempt to energize the 3B 4KV Bus from the Unit 3 Startup Transformer but the supply breaker will fail.
The examinee will then direct specific breakers to be racked in and restore power to the 3B 4KV Bus from the 3C 4KV Bus.
R-3-11/12 Startup After Filter Paper Replacement: The examinee is given the conditions that a filter paper replacement has just been completed on R-3-11, Containment Air Particulate Monitor. The examinee is
- h. directed to place R-3-11 and R-3-12 in service in accordance with 3-NOP-067, section 5.4, R-3-11 and R-3-12 Startup After Filter Paper Replacement. The examinee will ensure the inlet and outlet isolation valves to the PRMS monitors are open and then place the bypass keylock switches for R-3-11 and R-3-12 to normal.
Locally Trip the Reactor: The examinee is informed that EOP-FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation
/ ATWS, is in progress. The examinee is directed to proceed to the applicable B MCC room and open specific
- i. breakers. The examinee will go to the applicable B MCC room and trip the Reactor Trip Breakers, determine the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers are racked out, trip the MG Set Output Breakers, and trip the MG Set input Breakers.
Manually Fill Unit 3 EDG Skid Tank: The examinee is informed that Unit 3 tripped from 100% power due to a loss of offsite power. One of the EDGs is operating normally. The other EDG failed to start and its associated bus is deenergized. The examinee is directed to perform 3-ONOP-023.2, Emergency Diesel Generator Failure, for the failed EDG. The examinee will proceed to the failed EDG room and place the EDGs Master Control j.
Switch in Local. The examinee will then check various status lights and determine the EDG has a low skid tank level. The examinee will proceed to the EDG Day Tank room and determine that valves are in their correct alignment. The examinee will then return to the EDG room and take the appropriate local actions to fill the EDG skid tank.
Align Unit 3 HHSI Pumps to Unit 4 CCW: The examinee is informed that Unit 3 was at 100% power when the unit experienced a Component Cooling Water System rupture on the B header. The examinee is informed of the status of the 3B CCW header and the 3A and 3B HHSI pumps. The examinee is then directed to align the Unit 3 HHSI pump component cooling water supply to Unit 4 in accordance with a specific section of 3-NOP-k.
030, Component Cooling Water System. The examinee will obtain the correct keys to align these valves and proceed to the HHSI pump room. The examinee will isolate the Unit 3 CCW system from the HHSI Pumps and then open the Unit 4 CCW supply to the HHSI pumps. The examinee will then throttle the Unit 4 CCW return from the HHSI pumps to establish a specific range of CCW flow.
ES-301-2 RO pg 3 of 3 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 3/29/2021 Examination Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: 2021-301 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. 001 Control Rod Drive System (A1.06, 4.4) L, N, S 1 Reactor Startup - De-energize Source Range NIs
- b. 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (A4.02, 3.8) A, EN, N, S 2 Align for Alternate Hot Leg Recirculation - Alt Path
- c. EPE 038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (EA1.04, 4.1) A, D, S 3 Establish Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray
- d. 005 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) (A4.02, 3.1) A, D, L, S 4P Respond to Loss of RHR
- e. 041 Steam Dump System (SDS) and Turbine Bypass Control (A4.08, 3.1) N, S 4S Dump Steam to Condenser
- f. 026 Containment Spray System (CSS) (A3.01, 4.5) A, D, EN, S 5 Manually Initiate Containment Spray
- j. 064 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System (A2.01, 3.3) A, D, E 6 Manually Fill Unit 3 EDG Skid Tank
- k. 008 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) (A2.02, 3.5) D, E, R 8 Align Unit 3 HHSI Pumps to Unit 4 CCW
- All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6/4-6 /2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8/ 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/ 1 (EN)gineered safety feature 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power/Shutdown 1/ 1/ 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/ 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1/ 1/ 1 (S)imulator ES-301-2 SRO-I pg 1 of 3 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS Reactor Startup - De-energize Source Range NIs: The examinee is given a reactor that has been declared critical with power stable below the P-6 setpoint. The examinee is directed to continue with the startup in accordance with 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operation. The examinee will withdraw control rods to increase reactor power while maintaining a less than 1 DPM steady state startup rate. When the examinee
- a. establishes the conditions to block the Source Range High Flux trip, the examinee will de-energize both Source Range Nuclear Instruments in accordance with 3-GOP-301. The examinee will then continue increasing reactor power, while maintaining a less than 1 DPM steady state startup rate, and stabilize reactor power at approximately 1 x 10-8 amps for critical rod height data. Note: This JPM is based on a recent PTN human performance error that resulted in a reactor trip.
Align for Alternate Hot Leg Recirculation - Alt Path: The examinee is given conditions of a large break loss of coolant accident and informed that the plant was aligned for Cold Leg Recirculation. The examinee is also informed that the crew attempted to establish Hot Leg Recirculation but both hot leg safety injection valves failed and cannot be opened. The examinee is directed to establish Alternate Hot Leg Injection starting with a specific b.
step in 3-EOP-ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation. The examinee will manipulate valves and pumps to establish Hot Leg Recirculation. However, after the Alternate RHR Discharge valves are closed, they will fail, preventing a suction source to the HHSI pumps from the RHR pump discharge. The examinee will then establish an injection path from the RHR pump discharge to the RCS.
Establish Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray: The examinee is informed that a steam generator tube rupture with a loss of offsite power has occurred. The ruptured steam generator has been isolated, the RCS has been cooled down, and the examinee is directed to depressurize the RCS to minimize break flow per a specific step of 3-c.
EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. The examinee will attempt to depressurize the RCS with a PORV only to discover that neither PORV will open. The examinee will then transition to a separate attachment in 3-EOP-E-3 and align valves to establish Auxiliary Spray.
Respond to Loss of RHR: The examinee enters the simulator in Mode 4 with RCS pressure and temperature stable. The examinee is directed to monitor the unit and respond to plant conditions. The running RHR pump will trip and the examinee will enter 3-ONOP-050, Loss of RHR. The examinee will close the RHR Heat
- d. Exchanger Outlet Flow valve and the Bypass Flow valve and will start the remaining RHR pump. When the examinee attempts to restore automatic control of FCV-3-605, RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass Flow valve, automatic control will fail. In accordance with 3-ONOP-050, the examinee will use manual control of FCV-3-605 to establish the required amount of RHR flow.
Dump Steam to Condenser: The examinee is given conditions of a tube rupture and informed that all actions of 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, are complete and the first five steps of 3-EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, are complete. The examinee is directed to continue with the steam generator tube
- e. rupture response starting with the next step of 3-EOP-E-3. The examinee will use a chart to determine the required Core Exit Thermocouple value. The examinee will then determine that Steam Dumps to Condenser are available and will use an attachment in 3-EOP-E-3 to control these steam dumps in manual control to commence the required cooldown.
Manually Initiate Containment Spray: The examinee is informed that the unit has experienced a reactor trip and safety injection and is directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0, Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications, starting at a specific step. The examinee will determine that containment pressure has not remained less than twenty psig.
The examinee will recognize that Containment Spray has not been initiated and will start containment spray f.
pumps and open their associated discharge valves. The examinee will then recognize that Containment Isolation Phase B has not initiated and will manually initiate Phase B with the pushbuttons. The examinee will recognize that the Phase B valves are still open and will close the Phase B valves using their individual control switches. The examinee will then stop all Reactor Coolant Pumps.
ES-301-2 SRO-I pg 2 of 3 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Align 3B 4KV Bus to the 3C 4KV Bus: The examinee will find the unit is tripped and the 3B 4KV Bus is not energized. The examinee is informed that the unit was at 100% power and that an error in the switchyard resulted in a loss of the Unit 3 Main and Startup Transformers. The 3A 4KV Bus is energized from the 3A EDG, the 3B EDG experienced a failure, and the plant has been stabilized using the applicable Emergency Operating
- g. Procedures. The examinee is informed that offsite power is stable and available and is directed to restore power to the 3B 4KV Bus starting with a specific step of 3-ONOP-004.3, Loss of 3B 4KV Bus. The examinee will attempt to energize the 3B 4KV Bus from the Unit 3 Startup Transformer but the supply breaker will fail.
The examinee will then direct specific breakers to be racked in and restore power to the 3B 4KV Bus from the 3C 4KV Bus.
- h. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO EXAM Locally Trip the Reactor: The examinee is informed that EOP-FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation
/ ATWS, is in progress. The examinee is directed to proceed to the applicable B MCC room and open specific
- i. breakers. The examinee will go to the applicable B MCC room and trip the Reactor Trip Breakers, determine the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers are racked out, trip the MG Set Output Breakers, and trip the MG Set input Breakers.
Manually Fill Unit 3 EDG Skid Tank: The examinee is informed that Unit 3 tripped from 100% power due to a loss of offsite power. One of the EDGs is operating normally. The other EDG failed to start and its associated bus is deenergized. The examinee is directed to perform 3-ONOP-023.2, Emergency Diesel Generator Failure, for the failed EDG. The examinee will proceed to the failed EDG room and place the EDGs Master Control j.
Switch in Local. The examinee will then check various status lights and determine the EDG has a low skid tank level. The examinee will proceed to the EDG Day Tank room and determine that valves are in their correct alignment. The examinee will then return to the EDG room and take the appropriate local actions to fill the EDG skid tank.
Align Unit 3 HHSI Pumps to Unit 4 CCW: The examinee is informed that Unit 3 was at 100% power when the unit experienced a Component Cooling Water System rupture on the B header. The examinee is informed of the status of the 3B CCW header and the 3A and 3B HHSI pumps. The examinee is then directed to align the Unit 3 HHSI pump component cooling water supply to Unit 4 in accordance with a specific section of 3-NOP-k.
030, Component Cooling Water System. The examinee will obtain the correct keys to align these valves and proceed to the HHSI pump room. The examinee will isolate the Unit 3 CCW system from the HHSI Pumps and then open the Unit 4 CCW supply to the HHSI pumps. The examinee will then throttle the Unit 4 CCW return from the HHSI pumps to establish a specific range of CCW flow.
ES-301-2 SRO-I pg 3 of 3 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Date of Examination: 3/29/2021 Examination Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: 2021-301 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function
- a. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM N/A N/A
- b. 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (A4.02, 3.8) A, EN, N, S 2 Align for Alternate Hot Leg Recirculation - Alt Path
- c. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM N/A N/A
- d. 005 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) (A4.02, 3.1) A, D, L, S 4P Respond to Loss of RHR
- e. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM N/A N/A
- f. 026 Containment Spray System (CSS) (A3.01, 4.5) A, D, EN, S 5 Manually Initiate Containment Spray
- g. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM N/A N/A
- j. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM N/A N/A
- k. 008 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) (A2.02, 3.5) D, E, R 8 Align Unit 3 HHSI Pumps to Unit 4 CCW
- All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6/4-6 /2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/ 8/ 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/ 1 (EN)gineered safety feature 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power/Shutdown 1/ 1/ 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/ 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA 1/ 1/ 1 (S)imulator ES-301-2 SRO-U pg 1 of 3 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 JPM
SUMMARY
STATEMENTS
- a. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM Align for Alternate Hot Leg Recirculation - Alt Path: The examinee is given conditions of a large break loss of coolant accident and informed that the plant was aligned for Cold Leg Recirculation. The examinee is also informed that the crew attempted to establish Hot Leg Recirculation but both hot leg safety injection valves failed and cannot be opened. The examinee is directed to establish Alternate Hot Leg Injection starting with a specific b.
step in 3-EOP-ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation. The examinee will manipulate valves and pumps to establish Hot Leg Recirculation. However, after the Alternate RHR Discharge valves are closed, they will fail, preventing a suction source to the HHSI pumps from the RHR pump discharge. The examinee will then establish an injection path from the RHR pump discharge to the RCS.
- c. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM Respond to Loss of RHR: The examinee enters the simulator in Mode 4 with RCS pressure and temperature stable. The examinee is directed to monitor the unit and respond to plant conditions. The running RHR pump will trip and the examinee will enter 3-ONOP-050, Loss of RHR. The examinee will close the RHR Heat
- d. Exchanger Outlet Flow valve and the Bypass Flow valve and will start the remaining RHR pump. When the examinee attempts to restore automatic control of FCV-3-605, RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass Flow valve, automatic control will fail. In accordance with 3-ONOP-050, the examinee will use manual control of FCV-3-605 to establish the required amount of RHR flow.
- e. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM Manually Initiate Containment Spray: The examinee is informed that the unit has experienced a reactor trip and safety injection and is directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0, Attachment 3, Prompt Action Verifications, starting at a specific step. The examinee will determine that containment pressure has not remained less than twenty psig.
The examinee will recognize that Containment Spray has not been initiated and will start containment spray f.
pumps and open their associated discharge valves. The examinee will then recognize that Containment Isolation Phase B has not initiated and will manually initiate Phase B with the pushbuttons. The examinee will recognize that the Phase B valves are still open and will close the Phase B valves using their individual control switches. The examinee will then stop all Reactor Coolant Pumps.
- g. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM
- h. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO EXAM Locally Trip the Reactor: The examinee is informed that EOP-FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation
/ ATWS, is in progress. The examinee is directed to proceed to the applicable B MCC room and open specific
- i. breakers. The examinee will go to the applicable B MCC room and trip the Reactor Trip Breakers, determine the Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers are racked out, trip the MG Set Output Breakers, and trip the MG Set input Breakers.
ES-301-2 SRO-U pg 2 of 3 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2
- j. NOT SELECTED FOR SRO-U EXAM Align Unit 3 HHSI Pumps to Unit 4 CCW: The examinee is informed that Unit 3 was at 100% power when the unit experienced a Component Cooling Water System rupture on the B header. The examinee is informed of the status of the 3B CCW header and the 3A and 3B HHSI pumps. The examinee is then directed to align the Unit 3 HHSI pump component cooling water supply to Unit 4 in accordance with a specific section of 3-NOP-k.
030, Component Cooling Water System. The examinee will obtain the correct keys to align these valves and proceed to the HHSI pump room. The examinee will isolate the Unit 3 CCW system from the HHSI Pumps and then open the Unit 4 CCW supply to the HHSI pumps. The examinee will then throttle the Unit 4 CCW return from the HHSI pumps to establish a specific range of CCW flow.
ES-301-2 SRO-U pg 3 of 3 L-21-1 NRC EXAM SECURE INFORMATION
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 nFacility: Turkey Point Exam Date: 03-29-2021 1 2 3 4 5 6 Attributes Job Content Explanation ADMIN Prep Week comments in Green highlight LOD Admin JPMs Topic and U/E/S Simulator changes based on comments were (1-5) I/C Critical Scope Perf.
K/A Job incorporated during prep week Will need final Cues Overlap Key Minutia electronic copy to review. Done - DD Link Focus Steps (N/B) Std.
0-OP-046, Curve Book - Really nice use of spreadsheet for rounding bounding numbers.
A.1.a RO COO - 2.1.25 3 S Good validation time at 15 minutes. RO did not use OP-46, did it from memory on shift. Recommended 25 minute validation time SAT NOW SEQ-7 should explain how 13 % change in RCDT level results in 41.6 gallons. i.e.
A.1.b RO COO 2.1.23 3 x S what is gal / %?
IS it also available in Curve book??? If so, Is that allowed to be used? SAT NOW Need to have pre-filled out handout for Equipment -
A2-RO 2.2.12 3 S each applicant. Will you have multiple copies of this? SAT NOW Rad Cntrl- Large package for applicant NO Issues, A3-RO 2.3.7 3 S SAT Please Implement any RO changes needed also in SRO Admin JPMs COO -2.1.25 Similar to RO item. With TS call SAT A.1.a SRO 2 S NOW COO Similar to RO item. With TS call .
Same queston: Is the RCDT conversion A.1.b SRO 2 S only by Attachment 2 table or also by curve book figure? SAT NOW Equipment - Similar to RO item with errors and TS Call 2.2.12 . Please change Initiating cue -1 on the applicants handout to be: Ensure the completed items in the surveillance are A2 SRO 3 E correct.
Modify data statement to say something along the lines of: All initial field data was independently / concurrently identified as correct.. SAT NOW
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Rad Cntrl - Similar to RO with added EPIP max 2.3.7 exposure . SAT NOW A3 SRO 2 S Last task typo: The following question not questions are / isindependent .
We modified this to become a 2-part , time critical JPM. We also changed the cue for the dose at the site boundary. We A4SRO EP 2 S validated it again with 2 new SROs. I will need to review this again in detail once the electronic version sent to me. I do have the initial revised JPM in hard copy
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Simulator/In-Plant Safety Function JPMs and K/A 4
2 3 Job Content Attributes LOD (1-5)
Job I/C Cues Critical Scope Overlap Perf. Key Minutia Link Focus Steps (N/B) Std. U/E/S New JPM - GOP-301,step 5.18 About where does IC set establish initial power?
SEQ4-Step 3 just says below IR 1- E-10.
Why is SEQ 6 Standard 2 SR-IR overlap not a critical step? Should it also be in the overall Standard?
SEQ 7 - What is the SUR Trip Setpoint?,
Just Hi flux SEQ 9 - If the examinee increases Rx a 1 3 x X E power to greater than 1% Power Range Power on any Power Range NI (POAH) without stabilizing power at 1x10-8 amps, then this critical SEQ is considered unsatisfactory - This is not listed in the upfront overall Standard. Please add upfront.
No major issues, Validation time 20 minutes Now SAT Sim Setup typo? Fail MOV 3-86BA?;
SEQ 10 standard 1 & 2- Are we sure these are critical since we are not letting them change state? Standard 3 seems to be b 2 3 x E critical! Please comment SEQ 5 CS pumps were already in PTL.
Need to expect that in Seq 5. SAT Now -
DD SEQ 5 - Please highlight Evaluator cue c 3 3 S with different color to ensure he sees that it is for him.
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Can the applicant really determine Aux Spray temp if the CV-3-311 isolation is closed? See SEQ 6.
SEQ 8 - Should this be Controls Aux Spray vs Initiates Aux Spray?
Last step - EOP-3, step 17BUsing max spray , Applicants probably will not use max JPM allows controlling of plant parameters SAT - DD SEQ-1 Does ARP-097 have any additional actions besides identifying which pump and transitioning to the ONOP? If d 4P 2 S so, please provide a snapshot of the ARP for the Evaluator to see.
SEQ-8, Std 4 typo - in manual not manually SAT - DD e 4S 2 S This JPM should be a quick brief outside the MCR with the filled out attachment and then start as soon as applicant in horseshoe.
Applicant will note many things wrong f 5 2 S right away. Have a discussion during Prep week.
Check for scenario overlap Probably not 15 minutes unless applicant errors SAT - DD Initial Conditions typo bus is (3rd bullet) ;
SEQ 6 - Please highlight Evaluator cue and NOTE in different color.
The step should match the standard so make it (Evaluator NOTE and SEQ-6) a critical step and enhance the standard upfront of JPM. This basically puts it in g 6 3 X E/S synch with SEQs-9 and 11 During prep week have validator verify bus stripping attachment 1 Done During exam provide the ONOP to applicant for review prior to entering simulator SAT NOW-DD 3
Simulator/In Safety 2 5 Attributes Plant Function LOD 4 JPMs and K/A U/E/S (1-5) Job Content
ES-301 Operating Test Review Worksheet Form ES-301-7 Job I/C Cues Critical Scope Overlap Perf. Key Minutia Link Focus Steps (N/B) Std.
Yes, do give NOP-067 to applicant prior to entering Sim.
(10 minutes) ;
h 7 2 x x S/E Why not put the SEQ-3 Evaluator Cue in the Applicant Handout.? Please add booth cue to be looking after JPM for keys if removed. OK now SEQ-3 Are we going to have problems seeing and identifying the open flag as green?
I 1 S Change High level Task Standard to Locally trips RTBs, and MG set input and output breakers . i.e. remove words about tripping reactor. Reactor will / would trip SAT - DD So the Skid Tank is not the EDG Day tank?
j 6 S Task Standard - Combine bullets issue?
SAT Now k 8 S
ES-301 6 Form ES-301-7 Instructions for Completing This Table:
Check or mark any item(s) requiring a comment and explain the issue in the space provided using the guide below.
- 1. Check each JPM for appropriate administrative topic requirements (COO, EC, Rad, and EP) or safety function requirements and corresponding K/A. Mark in column 1.
(ES-301, D.3 and D.4)
- 2. Determine the level of difficulty (LOD) using an established 1-5 rating scale. Levels 1 and 5 represent an inappropriate (low or high) discriminatory level for the license that is being tested. Mark in column 2 (Appendix D, C.1.f)
- 3. In column 3, Attributes, check the appropriate box when an attribute is not met:
The initial conditions and/or initiating cue is clear to ensure the operator understands the task and how to begin. (Appendix C, B.4)
The JPM contains appropriate cues that clearly indicate when they should be provided to the examinee. Cues are objective and not leading. (Appendix C, D.1)
All critical steps (elements) are properly identified.
The scope of the task is not too narrow (N) or too broad (B).
Excessive overlap does not occur with other parts of the operating test or written examination. (ES-301, D.1.a, and ES-301, D.2.a)
The task performance standard clearly describes the expected outcome (i.e., end state). Each performance step identifies a standard for successful completion of the step.
A valid marked up key was provided (e.g., graph interpretation, initialed steps for handouts).
- 4. For column 4, Job Content, check the appropriate box if the job content flaw does not meet the following elements:
Topics are linked to the job content (e.g., not a disguised task, task required in real job).
The JPM has meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the applicant's understanding and ability to safely operate the plant. (ES-301, D.2.c)
- 5. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the JPM as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 5.
- 6. In column 6, provide a brief description of any (U)nacceptable or (E)nhancement rating from column 5.
Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.
ES-301 7 Form ES-301-7 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: 1 Exam Date:03-29-2021 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.
Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap 1 2 S Power change start at 50%
Confident applicants will not allow a trip? If not maybe swap events 1 and 3.
Procedure notes indicate crew requesting SM to review TS. We obviously will verify the SRO US identifies the correct TS and associated actions / functions What about also identifying TS 3.4.4.b? Is it applicable as a result of 3 x x E the instrument failure and switch in Closed ? Will crew be required to close the block valve? Feedback during Prep week is that PORV stays operable so no associated TS Expected student action says to review ARPA4/1 - This is a spare tile?
Did it mean ARP A2/1? Please list tile names with ARP tiles listed 2 Validator went to ONOP 49.1 vs 41.5. Have note saying this is ok Done 3 2 x S Please add tile name for affected ARPs C4/3, C6/3, C9/3 4 2 S Booth should have a cause statement ready as to why drain valve 2 S 5 became partially open, Workers in are a or something recent Done Major. Do the Mid & East GCBs have switch #s,, If so, please add #s 3 S 6 to D-2 In D-2 Evt 7 details embedded in the middle of EVT -6. Assume it is in Chronological order.
3 x S Was there an issue with being able to reset the Lock out relay for 3A 4kv 7 bus Good job on highlighting CTs for Examiners
ES-301 8 Form ES-301-7 ES-301 9 Form ES-301-7 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: 2 Exam Date:03-29-2021 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.
Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap Are there any applicable TS related to Unit 4 that the applicant should identify?
1 3 X Had a discussion that an applicant or crew losing control of PZR level would be a post exam Critical Task if it resulted in a reactor scram Validators had TS call incorrect. Believe we confirmed the D-2 had the 3 X S 2 TS call correctly documented 3 2 X X S Affects containment cooling TS 4 3 S Tied to event 5 5 2 S 6 3 X S EVT 7 Scenario Summary references the wrong SG? i.e. different from 2 E D-1 and body of D-2 Fixed DD 7
8 2 S
ES-301 10 Form ES-301-7 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: 3 Exam Date:03-29-2021 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.
Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap Is there and ODCM or TS for the failure?
Please add a note to expect a small power change associated with the 1 2 S failure Please add NOP applicable steps to D-2 for examiner reference OK -
DD S Is there an associated TS with failure to auto actuate CR vent in recirc 2
2 ability per TS 3.7.5? No 3 3 X S 4 3 S S Page 104 Booth Operator notes: Can we speed up Chemistry and RP 3 X 5 results a bit (5-7 minutes)
E Looks like EVT 6 has MSIVs with FTC to force a transition to ECA-3.1.
Do not see this in D-1?? See Pages 96 and 116 of D-2. Please 3 X, X highlight for Examiners the Lead Evaluator Note also on page 116 6 Done , now p 119 or 32 of 44 7 2 S
ES-301 11 Form ES-301-7 Facility: Turkey Point Scenario: 4 Exam Date:03-29-2021 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Required Verifiable Scen.
Event Realism/Cred. LOD TS CTs U/E/S Explanation Actions actions Overlap Validating crew attempted to use a local control pushbutton which is /
1 3 S was unsuccessful OK -DD S Similar to Scenario 1 failure of pressure but ok. Please list tile names 2 X X 2 for ARP windows, page 140. (13 of 46)
S Please list tile names for ARP windows, page 144. (17 of 46) 2 X Takes a lot of time for Flange temperature to decrease to < 150 degrees 3 27 minutes!
S Procedure directs actions that are located in containment. Have booth note to prevent going into containment Done - DD 3
Will need a follow up question for TS 3.4.6.2.D ? Please confirm if this is applicable See p24 of 46 4 Alarm X 4/1 came in. Add to D-2 if appropriate E/S Page 26 of 46 Activities side blurred. Is this intentional? How big is leak? Please note leak size in Evaluator Note side. I may have missed it. Fixed Would crew isolate Excess LD if leak big enough? Would crew be outside of procedures to just trip reactor vs rapid shutdown with only excess LD available???? If they trip based on perceived conservatism we would lose Event 6.
3 Would need to be ready for ATWS to begin on applicants decision to trip early Recommend moving EVT 6 / rod drops up to just after hitting Go on Turbine Load reduction. Already Evaluator Note there on Page 27 of 46 Crew opted to raise Makeup flow by manipulating the pot setting. If 5 expected Add to the D-2 Done - DD S Key item here. Need the Safety basis for the 10 minute time limit to 3
6 establish the Emergency Boration as a Critical Task. Is it in the FSAR
ES-301 12 Form ES-301-7 or some other Basis document???? Licensee also provided PW protected email file OK now - DD 7 2 S S/ E Not clear, Does Booth operator reflect 3-356 as indicating open. Will it if it is manually opened? (MOV)
Due to a timing situation a Safety Injection signal came in before 3 X boration initiatiated and necessitated resetting SI to get the charging pumps back. Add this as a note in the D-2 as a possibility that will require additional action Done - DD Ensure that operators dispatched to trip the reactor do not open the trip 8 breakers prior to the CT task (Boration w/I 10 min) initiated.
ES-301 13 Form ES-301-7 Instructions for Completing This Table:
Use this table for each scenario for evaluation.
2 Check this box if the events are not related (e.g., seismic event followed by a pipe rupture) OR if the events do not obey the laws of physics and thermodynamics.
3, 4 In columns 3 and 4, check the box if there is no verifiable or required action, as applicable. Examples of required actions are as follows: (ES-301, D.5f)
- opening, closing, and throttling valves
- starting and stopping equipment
- raising and lowering level, flow, and pressure
- making decisions and giving directions
- acknowledging or verifying key alarms and automatic actions (Uncomplicated events that require no operator action beyond this should not be included on the operating test unless they are necessary to set the stage for subsequent events. (Appendix D, B.3).)
5 Check this box if the level of difficulty is not appropriate.
6 Check this box if the event has a TS.
7 Check this box if the event has a critical task (CT). If the same CT covers more than one event, check the event where the CT started only.
8 Check this box if the event overlaps with another event on any of the last two NRC examinations. (Appendix D, C.1.f) 9 Based on the reviewers judgment, is the event as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 9.
10 Record any explanations of the events here.
In the shaded boxes, sum the number of check marks in each column.
- In column 1, sum the number of events.
- In columns 2-4, record the total number of check marks for each column.
- In column 5, based on the reviewer's judgement, place a checkmark only if the scenario's LOD is not appropriate.
- In column 6, TS are required to be 2 for each scenario. (ES-301, D.5.d)
- In column 8, record the number of events not used on the two previous NRC initial licensing exams. A scenario is considered unsatisfactory if there is < 2 new events. (ES-301, D.5.b; Appendix D, C.1.f)
- In column 9, record whether the scenario as written (U)nacceptable, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory from column 11 of the simulator scenario table.
ES-301 14 Form ES-301-7 Facility: Exam Date:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 Scenario % Unsat. Explanation Event Events TS TS CT CT Scenario U/E/S Totals Unsat. Total Unsat. Total Unsat.
Elements Instructions for Completing This Table:
Check or mark any item(s) requiring comment and explain the issue in the space provided.
1, 3, 5 For each simulator scenario, enter the total number of events (column 1), TS entries/actions (column 3), and CTs (column 5).
This number should match the respective scenario from the event-based scenario tables (the sum from columns 1, 6, and 7, respectively).
2, 4, 6 For each simulator scenario, evaluate each event, TS, and CT as (S)atisfactory, (E)nhance, or (U)nsatisfactory based on the following criteria:
- a. Events. Each event is described on a Form ES-D-2, including all switch manipulations, pertinent alarms, and verifiable actions. Event actions are balanced between at-the-controls and balance-of-plant applicants during the scenario. All event-related attributes on Form ES-301-4 are met. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory events in column 2.
- b. TS. A scenario includes at least two TS entries/actions across at least two different events. TS entries and actions are detailed on Form ES-D-2. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory TS entries/actions in column 4. (ES-301, D.5d)
- c. CT. Check that a scenario includes at least two preidentified CTs. This criterion is a target quantitative attribute, not an absolute minimum requirement. Check that each CT is explicitly bounded on Form ES-D-2 with measurable performance standards (see Appendix D). Enter the total number of unsatisfactory CTs in column 6.
2+4+6 7 In column 7, calculate the percentage of unsatisfactory scenario elements: 100%
1+3+5 8 If the value in column 7 is > 20%, mark the scenario as (U)nsatisfactory in column 8. If column 7 is 20%, annotate with (E)nhancement or (S)atisfactory.
9 In column 9, explain each unsatisfactory event, TS, and CT. Editorial comments can also be added here.
Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.
ES-301 15 Form ES-301-7 Site name: Exam Date:
OPERATING TEST TOTALS Total Total Total %
Total Explanation Unsat. Edits Sat. Unsat.
Admin. A4 SRO was changed to Time critical during 9 0 1 9 JPMs prep week. Good thing we had a prep week Sim./In-Plant 11 0 5 11 Editorials and Enhancement requests only JPMs Scenarios 4 0 5 4 Editorials and Enhancement requests only Op. Test 24 0 10 24 Totals:
Instructions for Completing This Table:
Update data for this table from quality reviews and totals in the previous tables and then calculate the percentage of total items that are unsatisfactory and give an explanation in the space provided.
- 1. Enter the total number of items submitted for the operating test in the Total column. For example, if nine administrative JPMs were submitted, enter 9 in the Total items column for administrative JPMs.
For scenarios, enter the total number of simulator scenarios.
Enter the total number of (U)nsatisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the two JPMs column 5 and 2.
simulator scenarios column 8 in the previous tables. Provide an explanation in the space provided.
Enter totals for (E)nhancements needed and (S)atisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the previous 3.
tables. This task is for tracking only.
- 4. Total each column and enter the amounts in the Op. Test Totals row.
Calculate the percentage of the operating test that is (U)nsatisfactory (Op. Test Total Unsat.)/(Op. Test 5.
Total) and place this value in the bolded % Unsat. cell.
Refer to ES-501, E.3.a, to rate the overall operating test as follows:
- satisfactory, if the Op. Test Total % Unsat. is 20%
- unsatisfactory, if Op. Test Total % Unsat. is > 20%
Update this table and the tables above with post-exam changes if the as-administered operating test 6.
required content changes, including the following:
- The JPM performance standards were incorrect.
- The administrative JPM tasks/keys were incorrect.
- CTs were incorrect in the scenarios (not including postscenario critical tasks defined in Appendix D).
- The EOP strategy was incorrect in a scenario(s).
- TS entries/actions were determined to be incorrect in a scenario(s).
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Turkey Point 2021-301 Date of Exam: February 22, 2021 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* Total A2 G* Total
- 1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6 Emergency and Abnormal Plant 2 2 2 1 N/A 1 2 N/A 1 9 2 2 4 Evolutions Tier Totals 5 5 4 4 5 4 27 5 5 10 1 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 28 3 2 5 2.
Plant 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 10 1 2 3 Systems Tier Totals 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 2 3 4 38 4 4 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outline sections (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only section, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 radiation control K/A is allowed if it is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 category.)
- 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points, and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the outline. Systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification. Operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
- 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible. Sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
- 7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics IRs for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. If fuel-handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2. (Note 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
G* Generic K/As
- These systems/evolutions must be included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan. They are not required to be included when using earlier revisions of the K/A catalog.
- These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 3 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.
ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
000007 (EPE 7; BW E02&E10; CE E02) x EK2.03: Reactor trip status panel 3.5 1 Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery / 1 000008 (APE 8) Pressurizer Vapor Space x AK2.02: Sensors and detectors 2.7 2 Accident / 3 000009 (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA / 3 x EK1.02: Use of steam tables 3.5 3 000011 (EPE 11) Large Break LOCA / 3 x EA1.11: Long-term cooling of core 4.2 4 AK1.04: Basic steady state thermodynamic 000015 (APE 15) Reactor Coolant Pump x relationship between RCS loops and S/Gs resulting 2.9 5 Malfunctions / 4 from unbalanced RCS flow 000022 (APE 22) Loss of Reactor Coolant x AK3.06: RCP thermal barrier cooling 3.2 6 Makeup / 2 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration x AK2.01: Knowledge of the interrelations between 2.7 7 Emergency Boration and: Valves 000026 (APE 26) Loss of Component x AA1.06: Control of flow rates to components cooled 2.9 8 Cooling Water / 8 by the CCWS AG2.4.21: Knowledge of the parameters and logic 000027 (APE 27) Pressurizer Pressure x used to assess the status of safety functions 4.0 9 Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 (EPE 29) Anticipated Transient x EA1.09: Manual rod control 4.0 10 Without Scram / 1 000038 (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube X 038EA2.15: Pressure at which to maintain RCS 4.4 76 Rupture / 3 during S/G cooldown AG2.4.47: Ability to diagnose and recognize 000040 (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12) x trends in an accurate and timely manner 4.2 11 Steam Line RuptureExcessive Heat l utilizing the appropriate control room Transfer / 4 reference material 000054 (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main x AA2.08: Steam flow-feed trend recorder 2.9 12 Feedwater /4 000055 (EPE 55) Station Blackout / 6 x EK3.01: Length of time for which battery capacity is 2.7 13 designed 000056 (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power / 6 x AK3.02: Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite 4.4 14 power 000057 (APE 57) Loss of Vital AC x AA2.05: S/G pressure and level meters 3.5 15 Instrument Bus / 6 000058 (APE 58) Loss of DC Power / 6 X 058AA2.03: DC loads lost; impact on ability to 3.9 77 operate and monitor plant systems 000062 (APE 62) Loss of Nuclear Service x AA2.02: The cause of possible SWS loss 2.9 16 Water / 4 AG2.2.3: Knowledge of the design, procedural, and 000065 (APE 65) Loss of Instrument Air / 8 x operational l differences between units. 3.8 17 000077 (APE 77) Generator Voltage and X 077AG2.4.4: Ability to recognize abnormal 4.7 78 Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment / 3 X WE04EA2.2: Adherence to appropriate procedures 4.2 79 and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments
ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant X WE11EG2.4.2: Knowledge of system set points, 4.6 80 Recirculation / 4 interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.
WE05EK1.3: Annunciators and conditions indicating (BW E04; W E05) Inadequate Heat x signals, and remedial actions associated with the 3.9 18 TransferLoss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink).
X WE05EG2.4.45: Ability to prioritize and interpret the 4.3 81 significance of each annunciator or alarm K/A Category Totals: 3 3 3 3 3/3 3/3 Group Point Total: 18/6
ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
000001 (APE 1) Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 (APE 3) Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 (APE 5) Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 x AK2.01: Controllers and 2.5 19 positioners X 005AG2.4.11: Knowledge of 4.2 82 abnormal condition procedures 000024 (APE 24) Emergency Boration / 1 X 024AG2.2.44: Ability to interpret 4.4 83 control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions 000028 (APE 28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control x AK2.03: Controllers and 2.6 20 Malfunction / 2 positioners 000032 (APE 32) Loss of Source Range Nuclear x AA2.04: Satisfactory source- 3.1 21 Instrumentation / 7 range/intermediate-range overlap 000033 (APE 33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear X AG2.4.49: Ability to perform 4.6 22 Instrumentation / 7 without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls.
X AA2.02: Ability to determine and 3.6 84 interpret ;
Indications of unreliable intermediate-range channel operation 000036 (APE 36; BW/A08) Fuel-Handling Incidents / 8 000037 (APE 37) Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 (APE 59) Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9 000060 (APE 60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9 x AA2.06: Valve lineup for release 3.6 23 of radioactive gases 000061 (APE 61) Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms x AK1.01: Detector limitations 2.5 24
/7 000067 (APE 67) Plant Fire On Site / 8 x AA1.09: Plant fire zone panel 3.0 25 (including detector location) 000068 (APE 68; BW A06) Control Room Evacuation / 8 000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 X 069AA2.02: Verification of 4.4 85 automatic and manual means of restoring integrity 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07) Inadequate Core Cooling /
4 WE08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 x WE08EK1.2 : Normal, abnormal 3.4 26 and emergency operating procedures associated with (Natural Circulation Operations)
W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 x WE10EK3.1: Facility operating 3.4 27 characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.
000076 (APE 76) High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 000078 (APE 78*) RCS Leak / 3
ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 (W E01 & E02) Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 (W E15) Containment Flooding / 5 (W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 K/A Category Point Totals: 2 2 1 1 2/2 1/2 Group Point Total: 9/4
ES-401 6 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
003G2.1.7: Ability to evaluate plant 003 (SF4P RCP) Reactor Coolant x performance and make operational 4.4 28 Pump judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation.
004G2.4.46: Ability to verify that the alarms are 004 (SF1; SF2 CVCS) Chemical and x consistent with the plant conditions. 4.2 29 Volume Control x 004K2.06: Control instrumentation 2.6 30 005 (SF4P RHR) Residual Heat x 005K6.03: RHR heat exchanger 2.5 31 Removal X 005G2.4.9: Knowledge of low power /
shutdown implications in accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies 4.2 86 006 (SF2; SF3 ECCS) Emergency x 006K3.03: Containment 4.2 32 Core Cooling X 006A2.04: Improper discharge pressure 3.4 33 007 (SF5 PRTS) Pressurizer x 007G2.4.6: Knowledge symptom based EOP 3.7 34 Relief/Quench Tank mitigation strategies 007K5.02: Method of forming a steam bubble x in the PZR 3.1 35 008 (SF8 CCW) Component Cooling x 008K2.02:Power supply CCW pump, including 3.0 36 Water emergency backup X 3.2 87 008A2.03: High/low CCW temperature 010 (SF3 PZR PCS) Pressurizer x 010K6.01: Pressure detection systems 2.7 37 Pressure Control 012 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection x 012K1.03: CRDS 3.7 38 013 (SF2 ESFAS) Engineered x 013K5.02: Safety system logic and reliability 2.9 39 Safety Features Actuation 022K3.01: Containment equipment subject to 022 (SF5 CCS) Containment Cooling x damage by high or low temperature, humidity 2.9 40 and pressure x 022K4.05: Containment cooling after LOCA 2.6 41 destroys ventilation ducts 026 (SF5 CSS) Containment Spray x 026K2.01: Containment spray pumps 3.4 42 X 026A2.08: Safe securing of containment spray 3.7 88 when it can be done) 039 (SF4S MSS) Main and Reheat x 039K3.03: AFW pumps 3.2 43 Steam 059 (SF4S MFW) Main Feedwater X 059A2.11: Ability to use procedures to 3.0 44 correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of : Failure of feedwater x control system 059K1.02: Knowledge of the physical 3.4 45 connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MFW and AFW system 061 (SF4S AFW) x 061A1.05: AFW flow/motor amps 3.6 46 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater
ES-401 7 Form ES-401-2 062A1.03: Effect on instrumentation and 062 (SF6 ED AC) AC Electrical x controls of switching power Supplies 2.5 47 Distribution 062G2.1.28: Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and X controls. 4.1 89 063 (SF6 ED DC) DC Electrical x 063A4.01: Major breakers and control power 2.8 48 Distribution fuses 063K1.03: Battery charger and battery x 2.9 49 064 (SF6 EDG) Emergency Diesel x 064A4 01: Local and remote operation of the 4.0 50 Generator EDG X 064A2.02 : Load, VARS, pressure on air 90 compressor, speed droop, frequency, voltage, fuel oil level, temperatures 073 (SF7 PRM) Process Radiation x 073A2.02: Detector failure 2.7 51 Monitoring 076 (SF4S SW) Service Water x 076A3.02: Emergency heat loads 3.7 52 078 (SF8 IAS) Instrument Air x 078K4.02: Cross-over to other air systems 3.2 53 103 (SF5 CNT) Containment x 103A3.01: Containment isolation 3.9 54 x 103K4.04: Personnel access hatch and 2.5 55 emergency access hatch 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*) Integrated Control K/A Category Point Totals: 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3/ 2 2 3/ Group Point Total: 28/5 3 2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant SystemsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)
System # / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR #
001 (SF1 CRDS) Control Rod Drive x 001K3.02: Knowledge of the effect that a loss 3.4 56 or malfunction of the CRDS will have on the following: RCS 002 (SF2; SF4P RCS) Reactor x 002G2.4.3: Ability to identify post-accident 3.7 59 Coolant instrumentation Note # change Swapped this from A4 to G and # 60 became A4 011 (SF2 PZR LCS) Pressurizer X 011A2:03: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 3.9 91 Level Control the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations 014 (SF1 RPI) Rod Position Indication 015 (SF7 NI) Nuclear x 015K2.01: NIS channels, components and 3.3 57 Instrumentation interconnections 016 (SF7 NNI) Nonnuclear x 016K5.01: Separation of control and protection 2.7 58 Instrumentation circuits
ES-401 8 Form ES-401-2 017 (SF7 ITM) In-Core Temperature Monitor 027 (SF5 CIRS) Containment Iodine Removal 028 (SF5 HRPS) Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 (SF8 CPS) Containment Purge 033 (SF8 SFPCS) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 (SF8 FHS) Fuel-Handling x 034A4.01: Ability to monitor in the control 3.3 60 Equipment room: Radiation levels 035 (SF 4P SG) Steam Generator x 035A1.02: Ability to predict and/or monitor 3.5 61 changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the S/GS controls including: S/G pressure 041 (SF4S SDS) Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 (SF 4S MTG) Main Turbine Generator 055 (SF4S CARS) Condenser Air Removal 056 (SF4S CDS) Condensate 068 (SF9 LRS) Liquid Radwaste x 068K6.10: Radiation monitors 2.5 62 X 068A2.04: Failure of automatic isolation 3.3 92 071 (SF9 WGS) Waste Gas x 071K4.05: Point of release 2.7 63 Disposal X 071G2.4.20: Knowledge of the operational 4.3 93 implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.
072 (SF7 ARM) Area Radiation x 072K1.04: Control room ventilation 3.3 64 Monitoring 075 (SF8 CW) Circulating Water 079 (SF8 SAS**) Station Air 086 Fire Protection x 086A2.02: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 3.0 65 the following malfunctions or operations on the Fire Protection System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations Low FPS header pressure 050 (SF 9 CRV*) Control Room Ventilation K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/ 0 1 1/2 Group Point Total: 10/3 1
ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Date of Exam:
Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-only IR # IR #
Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary G2.1.15 management directives such as standing orders, night orders, 2.7 66 Operations memos, etc.
Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant G2.1.2 operation. 4.1 67 G2.1.20 Ability to execute procedure steps. 4.6 68
- 1. Conduct of .
Operations Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant-wide G2.1.14 announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trip, mode 3.1 94 changes, etc.
Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities G2.1.4 related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, 3.8 95 "no-solo" operation, maintenance of active license stature, 10CFR55 etc Subtotal Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures G2.2.6 3.0 69 Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent G2.2.7 tests 2.9 70 2.2.
- 2. Equipment Control G2.2.19 Knowledge of maintenance work order requirements. 3.4 96 G2.2.43 Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms 3.3 97 2.2.
Subtotal G2.3.15 Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems 2.9 71 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal and G2.3.4 emergency conditions 3.2 72 2.3.
- 3. Radiation Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that G2.3.14 may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or 3.8 98 Control activities G2.3.6 Ability to aprove release permits 3.8 99 2.3.
Subtotal Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic G2.4.2 actions associated with EOP entry conditions 4.5 73 G2.4.25 Knowledge of fire protection procedures 3.3 74 2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures 4.0 75
- 4. Emergency Procedures/Plan .
Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency G2.4.3 plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator 4.4 100 Subtotal Tier 3 Point Total 10 7
ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 1/1 RO 025AK2.02 Changed to 024AK2.01 Emergency Boration. Driven by changed to create another K2 1/1 RO 040AG2.2.36 Stm Line Rupture: Changed to G2.4.47 as Maintenance activities do not related to a SL Rupture combined with degraded power LCOs. Now Recognizing plant trends using MCR information 1/1 RO 065AG2.2.22 Instrument Air does not have LCOs or Safety Limits. Changed to G2.2.3 ,
Differences between Units 2/1 RO 026A2.08 Had 2 RO questions in this KA without completing rest of T2 G1.
Changed this to an SRO question to accommodate SRO question related to BWST. A2 added to ECC 006 system T2 G2 001K3.01 Loss of CRDS will not affect the CVCS system. Changed to K3.02 - RCS system 2/2 028G2.4.2 Recombiners are not entry conditions for EOPs Changed to G2.4.3 post accident instrumentation 1/1 SRO 077AG2.4.3 Was Knowledge of EAL thresholds related to post accident instrumentation which is not applicable Changed to:
077AG2.4.4: Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures
Digitally signed by David E. Dumbacher David E. Dumbacher Date: 2021.02.24 10:37:01 -05'00' Digitally signed by Gerald J. McCoy Date: 2021.03.15 16:17:35 -04'00'
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status HQ K LOD Source 8. Explanation m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
- Generically, plausibility could be a bit more credible with less margin to
- The SRO questions need to be solidly SRO-only and not questions that can be answered with just systems knowledge.
- Also the procedure selection aspect for SRO needs to be associated with AOIs or Emergency related procedures.
- Higher Cog or Lower - sometimes the question could not support Higher.;
- KA match. Be careful with the Generics in Tier 3. They also have to match the category like conduct of ops or Equipment Control (see #
- 70) .
Careful with interplay between Part 1 and Part 2 of answers. Cannot have part one answer CUE part 2 of the answer Answer part 2 needs enhancement to say
___(2)__ be required to enter 3-. What 1 H 3 x B E the crew will do is subjective.
PTN: Change incorporated. Now SAT-DD Answer part 1 - Not clear what answer options are. 2 obvious wrong answers Are the choices supposed to be? RCS wide 2 H 3 X X N U range pressure or PZR wide range pressure or PZR narrow range pressure or just narrow range pressure channels?
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 PTN: PZR pressure channels VS RCS wide range pressure channels. At PTN RCS wide range pressure is only present in RCS loops not in the PZR.
IDEA 1: I recommend to remove the word RCS, before the first blank in the stem. In order to clarify IDEA 2: provide full instrument number and noun name. PZR vs RCS wide range Doesnt stem need to characterize RCS pressure as Stable or Increasing to be plausible? Smart applicant would ask about it on exam PTN: Added and stable to the stem.
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
P 8. Explanation 3 H 3 MB S Would generally prefer modified bank to have different answer but OK.
Submitted a replacement new question (now 2010 Bank question) different from pre-submittal) Same KA/ system 4 F 3 x MB E Please swap answers A and B so that correct answer is now B Need to ensure TP will stand behind opening 860A and 861A as NOT being the
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 correct answer for the Minimum required action because those actions will work.
Stem: typo Each 860 and 861a does NOT open. 860/861 B opens Need to include noun names with EPNs 860/861 A/B PTN: Typos and grammar fixed. Take a look at the student version of exam that you have.
This is now a Bank question, so leave as is of shuffle distractors?
Moved A distractor to D, in order to have all the manipulation answers together and the non manipulation answer separate.
DAVE: how to justify B distractor when stem states that they wont open.
PTN: Added the word local since these valves are outside containment.
DAVE: ok Now SAT, Now a Bank Q.
Is there lesson plan that discusses this result? If so, please add to the support analysis 6910916??
5 H 2 MB S/E PTN: Added a missing objective and enhanced the discussion for distractor A as suggested. SAT now - DD For part (2) of question change the will / will not statement to will / will not or BE 6 F 3 MB E DESIRED IAW.
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 i.e. supporting DA says GOP-100 is NOT DESIRED vs not allowed.
PTN: Change incorporated.
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
- 8. Explanation Support Analysis does not indicate a year this Bank question was used last PTN: This question was drafted from the 7 F 2 B S/E Continuing Training Bank and it has not been identified as appearing in an ILC Exam previously. Now Sat DD 8 F 2 N S Does apply to CSF of Integrity but is not related to the KA system (PZR Pressure control). Recommend describing in the stem a cooldown event where the PZR Porv setting is part of the question answer Or use one of the precautions of GOP-305 9 F 2 X N E For example: 4.1.4 The pressurizer cooldown rate should not exceed 190ºF in any one hour. This limit is 10ºF below the Technical Specification limit of 200ºF in any one hour PTN: Included information in stem to match K/A Dave ok SAT Now i.e. specific to KA -DD RO or RCO?;
Answers (1) of Options C and D are not 10 F 2 X MB U credible to have the Turbine Bldg operator locally trip the reactor. Suggest change to:
Direct the BOP operator to REMOTELY trip
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 the Reactor or maybe TB operator locally tripping off 480 volt bus.
Are turbine trip header pressures displayed in TCS? Assume they are but if not then Options C/D, part 2 answer are also not plausible PTN: Yes trip header pressures are displayed on TCS.
The logic on part 1 of the question was that the incorrect action is also part of the procedure. Also in the past there was an expectation to send out the direction to trip the reactor locally. I believe all distractors are plausible.
Dave: ok , I did not realize RTBs and MG sets In TB at TP. SAT Now -DD Not sure why this question was completely altered from the pre-submittal version. DA answer B - The reference to use to evaluate whether to enter E-2 is E-0, not E-2. (stem is ok)
All 4 possible selections are possibly correct in this new version. Would need to specify answers as high or low or Alone The previous version (pre-submittal) was an H-acceptable question. This version is NOT.
11 co 3 X B U The crew will evaluate all the supplied g
parameters and use integrated knowledge to confirm a faulted SG. The pre-submitted question took advantage of the word Alone Please explain what was wrong with the original version, maybe I am missing something.
PTN: This question was adjusted in an attempt to incorporate a procedural tie required by group 1 questions.
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 The argument that the A,C and D distractors could be correct is true thats why they are plausible but only B is correct IAW the required procedure. I believe only one answer is correct.
Dave: ok SAT now DD- Distractors only wrong because not IAW procedure E-0
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
Like the question but: Please add to stem a Part 1 or part 2 piece that is Tier 1 i.e.
related to an ONOP, etc.
X Please add that answer options C and D are Ti plausible if applicant cannot read direction of 12 H 3 B E er recorder correctly 1 PTN: Added Stem conditions. Added justification enhancement.
Dave: ok SAT Now -DD Please add in stem phrase: In accordance with UFSAR and procedure X, the vital batteries are Provide highlighted procedure that T1 documents this (not UFSAR) 13 F 3 B E PTN: It is difficult to add a procedure tie to X
the battery capacity design time since flex has been incorporated into our procedures.
Created 13B.
Dave: 13B sounds ok SAT Now - DD
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 So, do both breakers feed 4kv bus 3D? Do they have the same noun name in procedures? If not modify the noun names.
Worried about incorrect or two correct answers. Not clear using just the drawing that the answer is correct. Question may be ok but not clear from supporting material.
Maybe a better word description of the interlock 3c RNO says to verify CCW and ICW pumps 3c open and Operate supply breakers. Are 14 H 3 N E the interlock details spelled out in an OP or NOP? If so provide a snapshot of that in question.
PTN: Yes, procedure component names match the question. See below a snapshot of 3-NOP-005. This is from section 5.4 Transfer of 3D 4KV Bus from 3B 4KV Bus to 3A 4KV Bus Dave: ok SAT Now - DD
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
Why is the picture needed? Says 15 F 2 N E/ S Subsequently , so again why is picture needed? Is it because there are other SG
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 level and pressure instruments not in the picture? Little white vertical placard to the right of meters, can it be removed or whited out? Why High cog?
Pre-submittal question SAT now but F (low) cog PTN: My logic for Hi cog is that the applicant must recall what color is associated with the lost bus and then analyze the picture to figure out what has been lost. I feel is borderline H/F. We can swap to F.
Dave: swap to F SAT Now - DD Part 2 answers B and D are not very credible. Need to discuss this question.
Will loss of one (of 3) ICW pump combined with check valve failure reduce pressure down to 10 psig. Is stem realistic?
PTN: Confirmed on simulator with 2 pumps running and a check valve failure on the stopped pump, ICW discharge pressure lowers below 10 psig and I4/4 alarm is received.
Also confirmed on simulator that with 2 16 H 2 X N E running pumps if one of them experiences a sheared shaft the same symptoms of ICW discharge pressure lowering below 10 psig and I4/4 alarming will be displayed.
ARP does NOT list sheared shaft as possible cause.
PTN: The ARP will not list sheared shaft as a possible cause but will treat the symptoms by starting an additional pump. I feel this is all distractors are credible.
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Please provide lesson plan explanation of expected parameter values on a sheared shaft PTN: Added lesson plan explanation of expected parameter values on sheared shaft.
Suggest changing the part 2 of question to something like : The low pressure alarm setpoint is 35 psig or 10 psig ? The ONOP, step 6, has operators take action to look for blockage at 35 psig which would make this plausible.
6 Verify Intake Cooling Water Header Pressure
- LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 35 PSIG Dave: work on p2.
PTN: Confirmed with EPOS that there is plausibility for looking at the flow, this would be incorrect due to the lack of indicator in the control room.
Dave: work on p2. Sat Now - DD
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
17 F 3 MB S Note: Question is a Unit 3 question, but the 18 H 3 B S support material highlighted is from 4-eop-fr-H.1. They have the same Caution
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 PTN: Comment applied. SAT Now- DD Suggest/ Request changing part 2 of question to be something like: Once IOA completed the maximum control rod speed will be ? 72 spm or 48 steps per minute.
Please spell out Immediate Operator Action vs IOA in the stem 19 F 3 X X MB E FIX typo in part 1 of Answer Options: Ratio vs Ration PTN: Typo fixed. Please explain why the change to part 2 is suggested.
Dave: ok SAT now Do Not see Answer Options B & D as plausible for part 2 because failure is not related to the charging pump but rather the LT-461.
Suggest changing question part 2 to ask whether Letdown is expected to isolate?
YES or NO?
20 H 3 X N E Is it obvious that position 1 is Ch 1& 2? I think so, just confirming.
PTN: Yes, position one is Ch 1 and 2. Lets discuss part 2. Will apply the change to P2.
Dave: change next for FIRST on the original.
PTN: EPOs believes that the change to P2 sugested by Dave is more operationally oriented. Changed P2. Sat Now - DD
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Question is SAT but Suggest modifying Part 1 answer for options C and D to be: and thus can NOT be .
21 H 2 N S/E i.e. add the words thus can to boost plausibility Can vs will - discuss PTN: Comment applied SAT Now - DD
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
Good question. Please swap answers A and C options to make C the correct answer.
22 H 3 N S?
Prefer new questions not always be answer A
PTN: Comment applied SAT-DD 23 F 3 MB S 24 F 2 B S 2019 Audit exam. Please confirm this was not available to the class / applicants PTN: This is a bank question; it is available to the ILC instructors. Students do not have 25 F 2 B S access to the bank.
Dave: ok SAT - DD 26 F 3 N S Typo on my part - good catch Sat as is. A good other possible question /
27 H 2 N S answer would be whether it is desired to start 1 CRDM or more than one.
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Met the KA but typed out the KA incorrectly right above the question #. Should be worded as:
Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation PTN: Comment applied 28 x x MB S/E The words to trip the reactor should just be trip the reactor to be consistent with the correct answer . i.e. no to PTN: Comment applied Answer D, change raise to increase PTN: Comment applied Dave: ok SAT - DD In an appeal situation, why would answer option D be incorrect? IF TP is willing to support it is not mentioned in the ARP then Im ok with this as is.
29 H 3 B ?/S PTN: Question is asked IAW the ARP, this invalidates D.
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
30 H 3 N S 31 H 2 B S Please add pdf page that shows the requirement in ECA-1.1 to start the Normal 32 H 3 MB S/E Containment coolers PTN: Comment applied SAT - DD
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 33 H 3 N S 34 F 2 N S Please add pdf page that shows the 3-NOP-35 H 3 N S/E 041.02 guidance for the controller PTN: Comment applied SAT - DD 36 H 3 MB S 37 H 2 B S 38 F 2 N S The stem , last sentence before the answers, needs to eliminate the words or 39 H 3 X MB S/E actuate Adds confusion and is not needed PTN: Comment applied SAT Now - DD Understand gammametrics may be more reliable. Is there some source document that says the NI 43 is not designed to operate in adverse containment temperature environment?
Trying to ensure there are not two correct answers.
40 F 2 MB S?
PTN: Yes, ADM-209 Att 2 lists the equipment that is rated for adverse containment conditions, gammametrics is listed and the PRNIs are not.
Dave: ok, include in master exam SAT Now
- DD 41 H 2 N S Sat as is: Good question - Balance of coverage issue 42 H 3 N S? Could we swap answers A and D to make correct answer D. Prefer new questions not be always Answer A.
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 PTN: Comment applied SAT Now- DD
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
43 H 3 MB S 44 H 2 B S Low level of difficulty but acceptable 45 F 2 N S Please add unit numbers on 3rd and 4th bullets in stem to avoid confusion.
PTN: AFW pumps are shared between the units.
For distractor answer D, Is that the expected AFW flow available for one AFW pump running or all running? One pump 46 F 2 N E running flow number would be better distractor.
PTN: 810 gpm is the expected flow with 2 trains of AFW running. Which could be just 2 out of 3 pumps since Train 2 has 2 pumps.
Dave: ok Sat Now - DD
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
I assume 3Y01A is a 480v transformer.
47 H 3 B S Please add its noun name in stem
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 PTN: Add noun name SAT Now - DD 48 H 2 B S 49 F 2 B S Do not see either set of distractors as plausible. OFF means unavailable, Unavailable means a TS LCO will apply Pick a feature other than OFF on the switches and try to write a new question.
If still too challenging we could try a new KA PTN: Created 50B.
50 F 1 x X N U Dave: Use 50B but change part 1 to ask local operation when master switch is not in remote. Stay away from OFF position.
PTN: Use the LOCAL position in the 50B version.
Dave: ok SAT Now- DD 51 H 2 MB S Show me the procedural words that have RO verify ICW/TPCW as open after a reactor trip w/o SI. Does not seem very plausible that RO would verify some normally open TPCW component as still 52 H 2 X X B E/U open after an SI.
PTN: 3-EOP-ES-0.1 ATT 8 Step 2 performs this verification for a non-SI rx trip.
Maybe remove part in question stem: The RO will verify (leading) and replace with
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 POVs will/will not automatically close on the Phase A.
Need a better set of documentation to understand why the Anwer 2 Options are correct A minimum of .
PTN: 3-EOP-E-0 Att 3 checks that only 2 ECCs are started. This is also shown on sequencer drawing (will include train B).
NCCs are isolated on phase A. (will include logic sheet 11 to show this).
Remaining load is RHR HX, normally has CCW flow isolated as shown in the CCW drawing (will include CCW print for RHR HX)
Dave : change p1 pov will/not automatically close.
PTN: Comment applied. SAT Now - DD
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
53 H 2 MB S The question is basically : Should Phase A and Phase B have actuated Yes or No?
PTN: yes this is part 1. Part 2 is identifying if the listed valves receive a closure signal 54 H 1 X X B U from either PH A or PH B.
Not really a 2 x 2 question based on stem Distractors are not credible
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 The stem informs the applicant that the bulleted valves are containment isolation valves (leading cue) that did not isolate :
PTN: This is not stated, candidate must interpret and understand the dimly lit indication. Also there are 3 different containment isolation signals. Cont ventilation isolation, PH A and PH B.
Idea: Simply state that the valves are Open without making reference to the isolation panel.
What is meant by achieve cont Isolation This is a leading question since it implies the valves did not close. If valve isolation did not occur then clearly the attachment will require it to be closed. Closing only one valve for each will not close all Phase A or Phase B valves so only the valves that were dimly lit were a problem PTN: State if the the valves need to be closed or not. Replaced MOV-4-1418 avoid overlap with scenario N-2.
Suggest modifying question Possible ideas;
- It __(1) IS/IS NOT allowed to leave these CCW valves open due to the high system pressure
- Change stem containment pressure to 10 or 15 psig and ask whether one or both valves is required to be closed
- If one or both valves are AOVs suggest that they stay open on loss
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 of IA Dave: use 54B lower pressure to 15 psig to not have to close the PH B valve.
PTN: Comment applied. SAT Now- DD
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
55 F 2 B S 56 H 2 MB S 57 H 3 MB S Answer option C has grammatical issue which would make this not a choice to pick, should be: preventing channel(s) from tripping PTN: Grammar fixed.
58 F 2 MB E Modified to Answer A - change sequence to make answer other than A PTN: Made C correct. Swapped A and C SAT Now - DD This is basically a 2 x 2 question but not formatted like the others. Please modify stem format to be like other 2 x 2 questions 59 F 2 B S/E :
Suggest part (1) Which instrument PI-444 or TI-410a is a Control Board Instrument that can be relied upon in a post-accident
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 condition ; Part (2) What color must the label for Post Accident monitoring instrumentation be labeled?
PTN: Comment applied.
Sat Now - DD Reword slightly the wording for the stem part (2) to be: the control room HVAC (2) be 60 F 2 x N S automatically placed in the recirculation mode (in the vs on)
PTN: Comment applied. SAT - DD
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
On further review, if the applicant expects containment pressure to rise then why would part (2) allow local isolating?
Suggest: Remove the word :LOCALLY from the stem. Plausible because PZR PORVs 61 F 2 X N E can be isolated. Still operating controls per ka. This makes answer options A/B plausible PTN: Comment applied. Good catch!
SAT Now-DD 62 F 2 MB S Surprised that you can use a Unit 4 purge 63 H 2 B S exhaust for a unit 3 purge MB 64 F 3 S Distractor analysis says the deluge is 65 F 2 X MB E operated / actuated by flow vs pressure. Per
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 the ARP referenced it is actuated by TEMPERATURE which causes flow (once actuated) and then the low pressure in the header Suggest re-word part 1 of question to be:
Fire pumps receive an AUTOMATIC start signal from a (1)
(1) options: a/b - Hi Temperature at transformer or c/d - low FM header pressure PTN: Seems ok. Lets talk.
Dave: Fix C distractor analysis.. flow is not correct for deluge.
PTN: Changed P 2 distractor to temperature as suggested. Plausible since Deluge system actuates on temperature.
Dave: ok. Sat Now - DD 66 F 2 B S
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
67 F 2 MB S 68 F 2 B S Could answer C be considered a temporary 69 F 2 B S/ ? change and perhaps also correct if supervisor is an SRO??
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 PTN: IAW AD-AA-100-1005 TC are approved by two members of plant staff and requires other actions like PCR and screenings for change or intent as well as 10 CFR 50.59 screening. I believe this would not be considered Dave: provide reference to discredit C.
PTN: Added stem information to discredit C.
Dave: ok. Sat Now - DD 70 F 2 N S 71 F 3 MB S 72 F 2 MB S Dont see answer option C as credible distractor with power low on PR meters and also gammametrics. Also stem indicates event was a LOCA not ATWS.
Suggest: Maybe add that RWST is < 10%
and have FR-I.1 as a distractor PTN: Seems ok. Lets talk 73 H 2 X B E Dave: ok Gammametrics and IR SUR makes ATWS plausible SAT Now - DD
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 74 F 2 B S 75 F 2 B S Need to change answer PORVs to just ONE PORV per 2) Note.
76 H 2 MB E PTN: Comment applied. Good catch!
SAT Now - DD For bank questions from the 2018 exam (Jan 2019) please rearrange the answers. -
PTN: Comment applied. Distractors were shuffled B is now correct.
Please explain how question affects the ability to operate and monitor (KA question)
It does not directly focus on what loads are lost or the plant impact. Suggest modifying Part (1) answer. Lets discuss.
PTN: There are 3 parts to this k/a
- First part, ability to determine and interpret DC Load lost: It is required to analyze the given information to 77 H 3 X B E determine what bus was lost and what procedure must be entered.
- Last 2 parts, Ability to determine and interpret impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems: The candidate must determine that the impact on operation of plant systems is that a reactor trip has taken placed. This determination is then taken to an SRO level by having the candidate determine what notification requirement is required for this event.
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 How much of LI-AA-102-1001 ATT 1 is going to be provided? Just p. 3 of 8 thats in the exam package, or all 8 pages?
PTN: All of attachment 1 will be provided.
Dave: Ok with K/a if we remove the last stem bullet.
PTN: Comment applied.
Just provide applicable pages for attachment 1.
PTN: Dave, you should look at the attachment. It might be ok to let them have all pages.
Dave: Ok.
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
Typo in stem Units MVAR loads, not load PTN: Comment applied.
Do not see Part (2) of answers B,D as plausible, credible. The stem does not provide SwitchYard voltage. Applicants would rule those answer options out.
78 H 2 x X B E/U Low to high ranges from 233 kv to 241 or 244 kv. per the 0- ONOP 004.6 Enhance the stem to make the distractors credible PTN: Added to stem: Switchyard voltage is 235.0 KV.
Bank questions: Please rearrange answer
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 PTN: Comment applied.
Dave: Ok SAT Now - DD Pressure rising infers that leak is isolated but it may just be leak is smaller than CCP and SI pump flow. Stem should add bullet saying HHSI pumps secured and SI reset (PTN: ECA-1.2 does not contain steps to secure HHSI Pumps.) since there is no statement saying leak is isolated. Or simply add that ONLY 4A CCP is running.
PTN:
ECA-1.2 BASIS:
This step instructs the operator to check RCS pressure to determine if the break has been isolated by previous actions. If the break is isolated in the previous step, a 79 H 2 x B E significant RCS pressure increase will occur due to the SI flow filling up the RCS with break flow stopped. The operator transfers to E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, if the break has been isolated, for further recovery actions.
Given the wording for the basis and the way our ECA-1.2 is written we feel that the given information is sufficient to arrive to the only correct answer B.the provided information procedure For the distractor analysis only: Answer A ,
say is necessary Answer C termination criteria (add)
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Dave: OK after discussion with EPOS. fix A distractor analysis.
PTN: A and C distractor analysis fixed.
SAT Now - DED
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
Do not see how the KA is met. (Knowledge of set points, interlocks and automatic actions)
Missed this on pre-submittal review -
Part 2) plausibility logic is flawed in that HHSI availability just determines whether operator can or cannot perform ECA-1.1 successfully, not whether they should enter.
80 H 3 X x N E Not enough stem info to determine whether they should Enter 1.1.
Suggest strongly to change part 2) to address KA SPs, or interlocks with plausible distractors
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Stem focus 3rd bullet - Make more concise -
SM declares 3A and 3B HHSI pumps inoperable due to installation of incorrect bearing materials Too many words in current version of stem.
PTN: Comment applied.
The provided information is that 2 HHSI Pumps are INOPERABLE, and this by itself is not a cause to lose recirculation flowpath.
Plausible because the loss of 2 RHR Pumps would required implementation of ECA-1.1 .
K/A match: knowledge of system setpoint associated with ECA-1.1 entry condition.
(number and type of ECCS pumps that requires entry into ECA-1.1)
Idea: add to p2: due to the loss of the 3A and 3B HHSI Pumps.
Dave: Ok after discussion with EPOS.
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
Do not see part (1) answers A or B as credible / plausible. FR-H.1 is a Red path so commencing bleed and feed is an immediate
,without delay, action to get cold water in to 81 H 2 X MB U/E cool the RCS. PRT is going to rupture anyway.
PTN: These statements are accurate. I believe that required plant knowledge is being used to arrived to these conclusions.
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 My thought process is that by reducing bleed flow the operator will delay the pressurization of the PRT while still maintain core cooling. Similar limitations are in other portions of the same procedure when feedwater is re initiated into a dry sg.
Suggest changing part 1 of question to address annunciator for Low PZR pressure SI : For example; In Stem- Feed and Bleed, bleed path, not established yet. ARP C 3/6 Low Pressure SI is not lit, LOW PRZ PRESS. S.I. BLOCKED status light - OFF -
New Stem: To establish the bleed path, Operators are required to block the low pressure SI AFTER - (1) ONE PRZ PORV is opened or (2) BOTH PORVs are opened? Plausible because Open Both PORVs is step 15f but Open one PORV is step 15h
- c. Check BLOCK LOW PRZ PRESS.
S.I. status light - ON
- c. RNO Go to Step 15.h.
- d. Momentarily place both Safety Injection Block switches to BLOCK and return to NEUTRAL
- e. Verify LOW PRZ PRESS. S.I.
BLOCKED status light - ON
- f. Open both PRZ PORVs
- g. Go to Step 16
- h. Open one PRZ PORV Part 2 of stem - the US will NEXT direct .
Change this to be more simple: (1)
Remain in FRH.1 or (2) Transition to Procedure that was in effect prior to entering FRH.1
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 PTN: Simplified Part 2. Editorial change Dave: OK if we change P1 wording. DONE PTN: All requested comments applied.
Sat Now - DD
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
Original review missed that part (1) stem has a leading cue. (1) rod(s) are positioned This eliminates answers A/B from being credible Change stem of part 1 question to be A/B (1) One rod is positioned or C/D (2) Two rods are PTN: Added is(are)
Careful using ONOP entry conditions as 82 H- 3 MB E basis for SRO only. This one is ok because it requires Comprehensive analysis (H) of various rod positions to get to right procedure. From NUREG 1021, ES-401: SRO-only knowledge should not be claimed for questions that can be answered solely using fundamental knowledge of the following:
- the basic purpose ..
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 OK with answers and distractors Stem has several issues: See yellow highlight for suggested simplification.
Part (1) stem question has redundancy issue, 45 gpm on ____ gpm. Remove 2nd reference to gpm 45 gpm is also a cue, use minimum instead.
Get rid of from the RWST in the question stem as it is a cue PTN: Removed the word RWST. Removed 45 gpm.
83 H 2 x x MB E Have part (1) of question in the stem to be more clear. i.e. IAW the crew is required to establish a minimum emergency boration flow and monitor it on instrument
___(1)_____
PTN: Comment applied.
Dave: OK .
Sat Now - DD Missed a few items on original review For Tier 1, change Stem question to be:
IAW TS and ONOP 059.7 done 84 H- 2 X MB E Since power is less than 10% should not ONOP 059.7 step 6 redirect the operator to step 7 since plant is actually in Mode 2? And then ONOP limits power to 5%
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Suggest change part 2 to be 10% vs 100%.
TS may allow up to 10 % but the ONOP will not allow past 5%
Or could have part 2 ask whether a mode change to Mode 1 is allowed by TS? (Mode 1 to Mode 2 per LCO 3.0.4. This would be tricky though as Mode 2 to Mode 1 < 10 %
would be allowed since TS allows up to 10%.
Are you ok with testing knowledge of ONOP 59.7 being more restrictive than the TS?
PTN: I agree, ONOP-59.7 step 7 required to be implemented. I believe the part 2 of the question works. Since it is asking if it is allowed to raise power to 100%
Dave: change power level to 15% OK.
PTN: Comment applied.
Sat Now - DD
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
Add small drawing showing two valves are in same line, otherwise minutia with just valve numbers. Or state they affect same penetration.
85 C 2 x x- N E/U?? Are 3-2826 and 2819, Air operated valves in minutia series , i.e. the same line? I assume they are and that B is not correct because it is not being deactivated.
PTN: Added penetration diagram.
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Change the distractor analysis to say B is incorrect because it does not fully meet TS requirements for the penetration.
If not in same line then Answer B is not a credible distractor.
PTN: Both Valves are associated with Pen 63.
Is Turkey point allowed to use an inoperable valve to meet the TS. Most plants do not do this because it makes post maintenance testing to be on a 4-hour LCO clock. I.e the valve that wont stroke in time? Cannot have NO CORRECT answers. Per the provided TS snapshot must have one OPERABLE valve OPEN and IF allowed to use inoperable valve, then probably just fix distractor B wording in DA PTN: Yes this is allowed at Turkey Point and the normal practice.
Could have answers with fuses removed on both valves if not allowed to meet TS with an inoperable valve.
Dave: OK.
Sat Now- DD DA says CU4 is one reason an Unusual Event will be declared. Could RCS temperature go > 200 degrees?
86 H 3 x B E If CU4 is credible then why isnt CA4 a possibility as CA4 says dont wait for 20 minutes > 200 degrees if it is inevitable?
Suggest adding to the stem a short time to boil time. And possibly the estimated time
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 to get the decay heat removal capability back being ~ 15 minutes???. O/W applicant could argue CA4 based on > 20 minutes to get RHR cooling established. For ensuring CA4 is not possible correct answer.
Change part 2 answer in the stem to say Operators will reinitiate cooling since I doubt the Emergency Coordinator will do it PTN: Added the word crew to part 2.
PTN: Created 86B: Changed stem conditions to full refueling cavity with >30 min time to boil to avoid CA4 conflict.
Dave: OK with q86B Sat Now - DD
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
Part 1 is barely plausible for A/B PTN: CCW system has features that actuate on temperature. I believe part 1 is plausible 87 H 2 X N E/U because of this and the fact that more cooling flow equals to more cooling.
6902140.
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Suggest part 1 be options that question the cause of hi CCW temp; Clogged CCW HX tube sheet vs Clogged RHR HX tube sheet.
This last item makes ONOP-050 credible Also not sure for all hi temp causes that the US will perform actions ONOP-019.
Maybe just review for applicability PTN: should we use the words refer to instead of review and perform?
Dave: work more on this one. Focus on P1 PTN: Created 87B Dave: Ok.
Sat Now - DD
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
A 2 x 2 question in 1x4 format with 2 x 4 answer options. Fix - Question as a whole is very difficult to follow. Start over??
Recommend changing question to focus on what conditions required to secure the CS pp after LOCA.
- KA asks when it is safe to secure CS pp A. Not sure operator has conditions yet to secure the CS A that was just started with Containment pressure at 25 psig.
- Not clear from stem what the status of the plant is or how operator got into ES1.3. ie. Is RWST < 60k gallons low? What steps have been 88 H 3 X X N U completed in ES-1.3?
- Are we at step 23 based on step 22 meeting stable or decreasing CETCs?
- Is the status of 3B CS pump even relevant since step 24.a).4 bypasses the B CS pump start and goes to step 25. If not remove from stem.
- Step 23 of ES-1.3 checks status of CS. With < 30 days since LOCA FRPs would be implemented as necessary in step 24 So FRZ.1 would not be considered incorrect?.
- Step 2k of ES-1.3 does direct returning to procedure and step in
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 effect AFTER 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />. BUT BEFORE starting a CS Pp A.
PTN: Created 88B. Idea to use E-2 transition to E-1 to secure CSP if 88B doesnt work.
Dave: 88B Sounds ok to me, let me see it next week.
Sat Now - DD
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
Suggest changing part 2 to be just:
per Tech Specs, the basis of this requirement is/is NOT to supply safety related equipment required for safe shutdown of the facility ONLY.
89 F 2 X B S It then has Part 2 become a IS / IS NOT answer.
This is to get rid of RCP part SAT now Original Bank question only had referenced A and B receivers in stem at < 160 psig and answer was EDG 4A was INOPERABLE??
Are we sure answer is correct? I think so but want to confirm.
90 H 2 x MB E PTN: Validators agree that the 4A EDG would be OPERABLE under the given conditions. The bank question is missing information on the C and D air receivers.
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Meets SRO only because of TS basis part.
Please provide applicable TS as supporting material after distractor analysis.
PTN: Tech Spec added as a technical reference.
Modify the question stem for part 1 to read:
IAW UFSAR and TSs the 4A EDG , the US
__Will/Will Not_1___be considered it as OPERABLE by the US.
PTN: comment applied.
Sat Now - Still needs formatting correction -
DD Suggest Change stem to have plant at 11 %
and shutting down Per part 2 of question we are telling applicants there is a failed channel PTN: Pls explain basis for this change request. I dont see the flaw on original.
Suggest: Change part 2 stem to be IAW TS A failed PZR level transmitter in MODE 2 IS/IS NOT required to be placed in a trip condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 91 H 3 X MB E This tests whether applicant realizes it is not applicable in MODE 2 PTN: Pls explain basis for this change request. I dont see the flaw on original.
Dave: work on p2 some more with Jose PTN: Created 91B.
Dave: ok.
Sat Now - DD
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9
- 1. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other LO 2. 6.
Ste 7. Status Q K LOD Source m Cred. Job- #/Unit Q- SRO (U/E/S)
(F/ (1-5) Cues T/F Partial Minutia Backward (B/M/N)
H) Focu Dist Link s K/A Only s
The stem says it is a liquid radwaste release. There is no supporting stem info saying something is wrong with Circ Wtr to make answers A and B credible.
PTN: Design idea was there are multiple valves that have an automatic feature to isolate this flowpath for different reasons.
The question is which one of them is the one that actuates on a hi radiation. Dave you are using the knowledge that the solenoids are actuated on lack of CWP flow to disqualify the A and B distractors.
Suggest asking instead for Part 1, whether there are one or two auto isolation valves in the Liquid Radwaste path. Plausible 92 3 2 x x X MB E ??
because Circ Water has two valves SV-1413 and 1414 in isolation path. Part 1 answer would then become two or one?
What is the reading on R-18 supposed to be? 5.5 0M??? Is it > 2.4E+5??? Is red light a trip light?
PTN: 55E+6 cpm. Red is the warning light, the trip light is white.Updated picture to higher definition.
Dave: Add bullet about CWP being OOS.
PTN: Added Sat Now - DD
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Can a component have both TS actions and ODCM Actions?
Please remove the IAW ODCM, to just be With R-14 OOS to avoid cueing ___
93 F 3 x N S/ E Distractor analysis for A says both incorrect Part 2 and Correct Part 2. Please correct Distractor Analysis Question is SAT now Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts:
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question a 1 (easy) to 5 (difficult); questions with a difficulty between 2 and 4 are acceptable.
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
- Stem Focus: The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).
- Cues: The stem or distractors contain cues (e.g., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length).
- T/F: The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.
- Cred. Dist.: The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, and more than one is unacceptable.
- Partial: One or more distractors are partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by the stem).
- 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content flaw is identified:
- Job Link: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).
- Minutia: The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed-reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).
- #/Units: The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).
- Backward: The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.
- 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved K/A and those K/As that are designated SRO-only. (K/A and license-level mismatches are unacceptable.)
- 6. Enter questions source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Verify that (M)odified questions meet the criteria of Form ES-401, Section D.2.f.
- 7. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question, as written, (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?
- 8. At a minimum, explain any U status ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).
LO 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q K LOD Source Status 8. Explanation (F/ (1-5) Stem Cred. Job- Q- SRO (B/M/N) (U/E/S)
Cues T/F Partial Minutia #/Units Backward H) Focus Dist Link K/A Only Basically a 1 x 4 question as both part 1 and part 2 in stem ask if required to make a page, basically a page boost is a subset of a page.
In Part 1 question stem, instead of saying: of the emergency could we say when making an emergency EAL declaration to be more clear?
Suggest coming up with a new part 2 that does not have to do with the plant page Keep part 1 to meet KA Would prefer this new question not to be x-94 F 1.5 subse X X x N U/E answer A t
PTN: Logic behind this question P1 is asking the proper way for an EC to do a plant announcement. P2 is asking if an announcement is required for a specific condition, UE declaration.
Dave: work on p2 some more.
PTN: Question modified per request.
Dave: Ok.
Sat Now - DD 95 F 2 B S 96 F 2 x N E Do not see answer D as credible. Suggest making answer D to be: if approval from
LO 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q K LOD Source Status 8. Explanation (F/ (1-5) Stem Cred. Job- Q- SRO (B/M/N) (U/E/S)
Cues T/F Partial Minutia #/Units Backward H) Focus Dist Link K/A Only BOTH the Ops Director and the Maintenance Director is obtained. Then modify answers B, C to be: ONLY ..
PTN: Comment applied.
The DA supporting material does not show that SM has approval authority just says deviation must be reported to the SM. ???
Add more clear supporting material PTN: The paragraph below the highlighted one contains the supporting information. I will update these markups. Fix highlighted portion.
Dave: ok. SAT Now - DD 97 F 2 B S 98 H 2 MB S Really did not modify Bank question sufficiently to call it a modified Bank question.
99 F 2 MB B S/E No real difference between US (Bank) and SMs designee. (MB)
PTN: Comment applied Now a Bank question SAT Now - DD 1st add a stem bullet indicating the activated staff is fully manned to make the off-shift selections more credible PTN: This might not work since once the TCS is manned the Control Room EC turns over to 100 F 2 X x N E the TCS EC.
Do not see the OSC Supervisor as credible.
Suggest maybe instead the Security Manager Add bullet to say all possible selections are qualified as EC, otherwise not credible.
LO 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q K LOD Source Status 8. Explanation (F/ (1-5) Stem Cred. Job- Q- SRO (B/M/N) (U/E/S)
Cues T/F Partial Minutia #/Units Backward H) Focus Dist Link K/A Only PTN: Lets talk about this. Is it really required?
The US that will assume the EC position is not required to be qualified EC.
Dave: work on this one, RM is not plausible.
PTN: Question modified per request.
Changed Security Manager for OPS AOM in the D distractor.
Dave: ok Sat Now - DD