ML20214V647

Forwards Feeder Insp rept-assessment at Exxon Nuclear Co on 861102-08

ML20214V647
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	12/04/1986
From:	Bidinger G NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:	Brock B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
NUDOCS 8612090772
Download: ML20214V647 (8)

Text

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DEC 4 1986 FCUF: GHB 70-1257.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Buddy L. Brock Project Inspector, RV THRU: William T. Crow, Acting Chief Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety FROM: George H. Bidinger Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety

SUBJECT:

FEEDER INSPECTION REPORT, EXXON NUCLEAR COMPANY, NOVEMBER 2-8, 1986 i

Enclosed is the subject feeder report. .This report is a joint effort by J. Ayer and myself.

.Crisinal&taned by:

George H. Bidinger Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enc 1: _ J. Ayer, FCAF 4

Distribution w/ encl:

Occhet7J051257c)'

VLTharpe GBidinger(2)

GSJoblom, IE

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NAME:GBidinger:pg:  :  :  :  :  :

DATE: 12/V /86 :  :  :  :  :  :

0FFICIAL RECORD COPY 4

8612090772 861204 PDR ADOCK 07001257)

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SUBJECT:

FEEDER REPORT - ASSESSMENT AT EXXON NUCLEAR CO., RICHLAND, WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 3-7, 1986, DOCKET 70-1257

References:

1. TI-2600/1, Inspection of Plant Operations at Uranium Fuel Fabrication and Conversion Facilities

2. Region V Inspection Plan, Dated October 3, 1986 This report has been submitted jointly to cover assignments for the Criticality Safety Specialist and the Chemical Engineer. The assignments were made in the Region V Inspection Plan (Ref.2) to complete the inspection in Ref. 1.

I. Lessons Learned Assignments The following findings were made jointly by J. Ayer, G. Bidinger, and (in part)

D. Sly. The numbers refer to the recommendations in Ref. 2.

2.1.2 (1) ENC does not measure pressure on cylinders during vaporization. This is under development. Pressure transduction development has been unsatisfactory to date due to the short instrument lifetime in the UF 6environment.

2.1.2 (2) ENC has no plans to implement overpressure relief. Control of overpressure is through temperature control during vaporization and supplier weight control. Verification of supplier weights is carried out. Deviations beyond specific limits result in review of shipper / reviewer differences as a part of accountability requirements. Maximum cylinder weights are also specified in DOT regulations.

2.1.2 (3) ENC feels that vaporization chests are as safe as autoclaves. ENC has applied infra red temperature sensing as a maximum temperature shutdown system. Thermocouples both control and interlock low and high temperature functions. Thus, the infra-red system is a redundant high temperature shutdown mechanism.

2.2.2 (1) At 11:20 PST on November 5,1986, J. Burdoin, D. Sly, G. Bidinger, J.Ayer,T.Luzzo,andW.Stavigwitnessedasuccessfultgstofgheinfrared UF v rohm,aporfzationtemperaturepowertripsystemat 252-256 F (252 F in control 256 F at work station readout).

2.2.2 (2) See 2.1.2 (2) and (3) above and 2.4.2(1) below.

2.3.2 (2) ENC has Engineering Change Notice procedures in place. As an example, enclosed is the documentation associated with the infra red high-temperature cut-off system.

2.4.2 (1) ENC has no such procedure. Overweight (>5020#) cylinders would be left in outside storage red tagged for disposition by supplier. ENC cannot reship in view of present 00T regulations. ENC can, and has procedures in place to, change defective valves.

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EXXON - Feeder Report 2 2.4.2 (2) ENC has testing procedures and equipment to recertify cylinders according to ANSI N 14.1-1982. The procedures include observation by a certified state inspector who has the ultimate authority to certify compliance with ANSI N.14.1 requirements.

2.5.2 (1) ENC has no steam heated cylinders containing UF6 '

2.5.2 (2) Smoke detectors are installed in each room containing vaporization equipment. Smoke detector activation causet, the following to occur: local and control room alarms are activated; the UFc scrubber is automatically turned on; building exhaust for that room is valved Off but exhaust through the process off gas system is maintained.

3.1.1.2 (1) Sly (2) Sly 3.1.2.2 (1) Sly 3.2.1.2 We (GB, DS, and JA) have seen no evidence of conditions in the ENC facility that would lead to accidents whose severity would exceed the spectrum of emergency classifications contained in ENC's Emergency and Radiological Contingency Plan (XN-NF-32A, Rev.13, Table 4.2.1).

3.2.2.2.2 (3) no action 3.3.1.2 Sly 3.3.2.1.2 (2) no action 3.3.3.2 Sly 7.2 (2)

II. Nuclear Criticality Safety Areas assigned by Ref. 2 to the Criticality Safety Specialist for review included all uranium process areas except rod loading, fuel assembly, and certain warehouses. Rod loading and fuel assembly areas were observed during the initial orientation tour by the team.

The primary nuclear criticality control in the plant is favorable geometry.

Other controls observed were moderation control, concentration control, and fixed neutron absorber poisons.

Favorable geometry is used extensively in the UF conversion area. Moderadon control is used in the vaporization area, powder6blending areas, and final assembly. Fixed poisons are used in the powder storage area and in waste treat-ment. Concentrations control is used for product containers in some scrap recovery and liquid waste treatment areas.

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EXXON - Feeder Report 3 During the plant tour, the following observations were made and provided to ENC management:

1. Empty UF6 cylinders are left in the small vaporization rooms while new cylinders are loaded into the electric chests. Operations on loaded cylinders, e.g., change of valves and pigtail testing, are done with the empty cylinder in the room. This could inhibit prompt egress if a UF 6 release occurred during the time that one to three people are in the room. ENC should assure that prompt egress is possible at all times when heated cylinders are in the vaporization chests.

2. Moderation control signs should be located in the designated area. An ENC sign was improperly posted on a door to a room which contained both a moderation control area and a liquid process.

During the closeout meeting, the Criticality Safety Specialist urged ENC to be diligent in the administration of the criticality safety program whenever moderation control or concentration control are used. It was recommended that ENC reevaluate the use of moderation control for product containers from uranium recovery operations. Favorable geometry controls would provide greater assurance of safety with fewer administrative controls.

III. Written Procedures Written criticality safety and radiation protection procedures are located in all areas of the plant. Written process procedures are available in

" mini-libraries" throughout the process area. Review of a selected number of procedures indicates that the process procedures are updated, but the frequency of changes to safety procedures did not appear to be as high as for process procedures. All procedures were signed by six to eight process, plant and safety managers. No unsatisfactory observations were made.

IV. Operator Training Because ENC has had a very stable workforce, only operator retraining was reviewed. The retraining program consists of refresher programs in radiation protection and criticality safety and on-the-job operator training.

Each year, the program for radiation protection and criticality safety refresher training is changed. Lecture material resources include films, Regulatory Guides, and ENC prepared material. Tests are given to evaluate the effectiveness of the training program. It was observed that not all radiation protection lesson plans were written. This deficiency was called to the attention of ENC personnel.

The training of operators in processing functions is essentially on-the-job.

Training sessions are conducted by the shift supervisor at meetings before shif t changes or on a casual overtime basis. The training subjects are determined by management and include revisions in operating procedures.

EXXON - Feeder Report 4 Before being formalized, changes in operating procedures are reviewed by the shift supervisor. They are also " walked through" by the operators, and their feedback is considered. Thus, the operating personnel are familiar with procedural changes before they become effective. The shift supervisor reports in writing the date, subjects', and attendance of training sessions.

The reported results are input to a computerized system that ccmpares them with an ENC " standard". At established intervals, management is provided with a status report of the comparison. In this way, training is audited by an unbiased system and management is informed of the result. Adherence to training norms is a part of the shift supervisors performance evaluation.

V. Chemical Engineering Areas assigned by Ref; 2 to the Chemical Engineer for review included UF vaporization; precipitation; calcination;pelletprocessingfrompowder$nd pellet pressing through degassing; dry conversion; clad etching and etch neutralization; scrap recovery including uranium extraction, dodecane/T8P use and storage, and UNH measurement; recovery of chemicals from lagoons including uranium precipitation and centrifugation, as well as ammonia recovery and dissociation. The review covered control of processes, process upsets, and operator training.

The operations reviewed are adequately controlled, generally within quite narrow limits of process parameters. These narrow limits appear to be a function of quality control of product. Controls that are exercised during process upset are both active and passive. An example of passive controls are the rupture disc on ion exchange columns that release to a plastic pipe manifold discharging to a brimmed sump. Active controls, as indicated above, shutdown or modulate operations long before the thresholds of safety are reached.

From a chemical engineering point of view, no conditions were noted in which increased inspection effort or improvements to the fuel facility inspection program would materially affect piant safety.

Enclosure:

Engineering Change Notice 1

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v :e n:- = " : R Xl1-flF-C53 PROCESS t, EQUIPMENT ENGINEERING Section 1.13 ENGINEERING CHANGE NOTICE Page 2 cf 2 WORK SCOPE - Install infrared temperature controllers on each vanorization chest Install independent overtemperature controllers for each vaporization chest Connect infrared temperature controller to the overtemperature controller and connect the output of the overtemperature controller'to a shunt trip breaker 1 -

Install a shunt trip breaker in panel NAG Circuit #1 for the Dry Conversion Vaporization Chest.

JUSTIFICATION This rnodification will orovide an indenendent overtemperature control for the UFg cylinder heating systen. This reduces the risk of cylinder overheating due to the T/C's not being attached, T/C failure or T/C's falling off of the Cvlinders.

• i TEST REOUIRED Maintenance FUNCTIONAL CHECK Full T/C and Instrument

-0perations/E&ME Calibration - IRM Red Lable ATP MATERIALS: a. ENGINEERING PROCURED SPARE PARTS REQUIRED X

Uest Model 80lM Infrared Temperature Tes tio Controllersb Shg g g g ed fuRED ON HAND West Model 80lM T/E's ORDERED Infrared Temperature Controller

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