ML20215K161
| ML20215K161 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1987 |
| From: | Buchanan D, Loohahill J, Marshall W GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215K159 | List: |
| References | |
| TER-3525-015, TER-3525-015-R10, TER-3525-15, TER-3525-15-R10, NUDOCS 8705110099 | |
| Download: ML20215K161 (83) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- Nuclear TER 3s2s-ois aEv to April 29,1987 ISSUE DATE D irs E nsn O nits DIVISION TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT FOR Defueling Efater Cleanup System i i i l l COG E G 00 DATE NI3\"I RTR b DATE A/6 /M ! COG ENG MGR. hv .__ DATE 4 8,!B 1 ? 1 2 ; 2 l 5 5 $ l DOCUMENT PAGE I OF 23 8705110099 870429 PDR ADOCK 05000320 P PDR l
, m _
No. ENuclear 3525-015 Title Page 2 of 23 Technical Evaluation Report for Defueling Water Cleanup System
SUMMARY
OF CHANGE Approval Date Rev. 0 Initial issue. .
# 12/84 1 Revised to incorporate system design changes and comments 1/85 on Revision 0.
Ar 2 Revised to incorporate comments on Revision 1. 1/85i W/Ad I 3 Revised to incorporate comments on Revision 2. 1/85 4 Revised to reflect addition of relief valves at the 4/85 outlets of the defueling filter canisters, delbtion of fuel pool ~ cleanup system boronmeter and correction of l minor typographical errors. 5 Revised to correct and clarify description of low level #" 5/85 alarm setpoints for fuel transfer canal. 6 Revised to reflect the potential for operation of gf 6/85 portions of the DWC system prior to system being fully operational and to incorporate minor editorial changes. 7 Revised to incorporate Dewatering System inputs to DHCS 9/85 and provide a general update of the DWCS TER. 8 Revised to refibct capability to bypass the filter ### 12/85 canisters. 9 Revised to clarify site dose assessment for fuel transfer canal / spent fuel pool cleanup system. 8#M 1/86 10 Revised to incorporate system design changes per ECAs 3525-86-0313, 0328, 0356, 0377, 0388; 3255-86-0393; Mc*r/ 4/87 3525-86-0395; 3255-86-0406; 3525-86-0416; 3255-86-0422; 3525-86-0429, 0438; 3525-87-0444, 0450, 0451, 0454, and 0455. In addition, the following modifications were incorporated: 1) " deep suction," 2) variable post-filter micron ratings, 3) use of organic loaded ion g exchanger, and 4) the use of deep bed filters (modified 3 knockout canisters). O 3 o. P= t
m - __ . . - __. . _ __ _ - . 3525-015 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
5 1.1 General 5 l 1.2. Scope 5 i i 2.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 5 I 2.1 General 5 ) 2.2 Quality Classification 6 i
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
6
, 3.1 General 6 3.2 Postulated System Failures 7 3.3 Decay Heat Removal 12 l
3.4 Criticality 12 3.5 Boron Dilution 12 ! 3.6 Heavy Load Drops 12 3.7 Radioactive Releases 13 3.8 Operational Improvements 13 3.9 Interface with Defueling Tools 17 t ! 4.0 RADIOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 17 1 4 4.1 Off-site Dose Assessment 17 f 4.2 On-site Dose Assessment 18
- j. 4.3 Occupational Exposures 20 i
l 5.0 SAFETY EVALUATION 21 5.1 Technical Specifications / Recovery Operations Plan 21 i 5.2 Safety Questions (10 CFR 50.59) 21 i
6.0 REFERENCES
22 I i i t 1, l Rev. 10/0136P. i i
3525-015 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) ATTACHMENTS
- 1. Division II System Design Description of the Defueling Water Cleanup Reactor Vessel Cleanup System.
- 2. Division II System Design Description of the Defueling Water Cleanup Fuel Transfer Canal / Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup System.
- 3. Reactor Vessel Cleanup System, Piping and Instrument Diagram, Bechtel Drawing 2-M74-DHC01.
- 4. Fuel Transfer Canal / Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup System, Piping and Instrument Diagram, Bechtel Drawing 2-M74-DHC02.
- 5. Auxiliary Systems, Piping and Instrument Diagram, Bechtel Drawing 2-M74-DWC03.
- 6. Fuel Handling Building, General Arrangement, Bechtel Drawing 2-P0A-6401.
- 7. Reactor Building, General Arrangement, Bechtel Drawing 2-P0A-1303.
- 8. DHCS, Filter-Ald Feed Piping, Schematic Diagram, Bechtel Drawing 2-P70-DHC07.
1 Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 General The Defueling Hater Cleanup (DHC) system is designed to remove organic carbon, radioactive ions and particulate matter from the Fuel Transfer l Canal (FTC), Spent Fuel Pool (SPC) "A" and the Reactor Vessel (RV). The majority of the particulate matter is removed by processing the water through nominal 0.5 micron rated filter canisters. The low micron rating of the filter canisters assures very low turbidity as well as reduction of the particulate activity in the water. Cartridge type filters with different particle size ratings may be used in place of the filter canisters. In general, therefore, discussions concerning the filter canisters are also applicable to cartridge filters when used as replacements for filter canisters. Removal of the radioactive ions (i.e., soluble fission products) and/or organic carbon is performed by processing a portion of the filter output through 4 x 4 liners (similar to those in use for EPICOR II) containing zeolite or organic material, or the Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS). I The installation and operation of the DHC system will occur sequentially such that portions of the system may be operated prior to completion of the entire system. In addition, partial system operation may require temporary interconnection (s) with other plant systems which are not specifically described in this Technical Evaluation Report (TER). Any such temporary modes of DHC system operation will be implemented in accordance with the safety criterie for the complete DHC system and will be bounded by the safety analyses described herein. 1.2 Scope The scope of this document includes the operation of the DHC system, the components of the DHC system and its interfaces to existing systems and components. This TER also includes special modes of operation of the DHC system used to improve flitration operations. This TER is applic-able only during the recovery mode as the DHC system is a temporary system required to support recovery operations and will be removed or reevaluated prior to plant restart. Evaluation of safety concerns related to theinfilter is addressed canisters Reference 8. is not within the Licensing scope of the ionofexchangers this TER andfor l off-site shipments is outside the scope of this TER. 2.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 General The DHC system is designed to process water from the RV, FTC, SFP, and I Dewatering System (DS) holdup tank DS-T-1. The system's major functions are given below,
- a. The DHC system filters the water to remove suspended solids down to a nominal 0.5 micron rating. This is done to maintain the clarity of the water.
Rev. 10/0136P
_=. . . . .- - .. _ -- ! 3525-015
- b. The DWC system removes soluble fission products by demineralization of the water using inorganic zeolites. This is done to reduce the l dose contribution from the water.
, c. The DWC system _ removes organic carbon using specific resins or
- activated charcoal.
1 [ The DWC system is composed of two major subsystems which allow greater
- processing flexibility during post plenum removal operations. These two i
subsystems are the RV cleanup system and the FTC/SFP clehnup system. On-line sampling of both subsystems for pH is provided by the system i design. On-line sampling for boron concentration and turbidity is i provided for the RV cleanup system. Boron sampling for the FTC/SFP cleanup system will be done according to approved procedures. The detailed system description for the DWC RV cleanup system is provided in Attachment 1. Attachment 2 provides the detailed system description for the DWC FTC/SFP cleanup system. Also included as Attachments 3 through 8 are the following figures: Attachment 3 Reactor Vessel Cleanup System, Piping and Instrument Diagram j Attachment 4 Fuel Transfer Canal / Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup System,
. Piping and Instrument Diagram ,
, Attachment 5 Auxillary Systems, Piping and Instrument Diagram 'i Attachment 6 Fuel Handling Building, General Arrangement Attachment 7 Reactor Building, General Arrangement , s Attachment 8 DHC System Filter-Ald Feed Piping, Schematic Diagram i ] 2.2 Quality Classification The quality classification of the DWC system with exception of the
- filter canister units, which are not within the scope of this TER, is i Important to Safety. Important to Safety as used here is defined in the THI-2 Recovery Quality Classification List.
l
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
S
! 3.1 General 4 The DWC system is totally contained within areas that have controlled i ventilation and area isolation ' capability. This limits the environ-mental impact of the system during normal system operations, shutdown or postulated accident conditions. The impact of postulated DHC system i failures is provided below on a case-by-case basis.
The system failures evaluated were loss of power, loss of instrumenta-
, tion / instrument alt, filter media rupture, and line breaks. The design of the system is such that none of the events results in unacceptable , consequences. Other safety concerns evaluated with respect to operation of the DHC system were decay heat removal, criticality, boron concentra- .
tion control, heavy load drops, and radioactive releases. Severall l
, Rev. 10/0136P t
3525-015 system modifications may be used to ensure efficient flitration opera-tions. These system improvements were evaluated for safety concerns, and the evaluations are summarized in Section 3.8. The interface of the 4 DWC system with defueling tools such as the abrasive water jet is addressed in Section 3.9. No unacceptable consequences were found to result from operation of the DHC system provided that proper administrative control is maintained. l 3.2 Postulated System Failures 3.2.1 Reactor Vessel Cleanup System 3.2.1.1 Loss of Power A loss of power to the entire system would simply shut the system down. A loss of power' to the well pumps with an additional failure which results in simultaneous loss of level control in the ion exchangers would result in a flow mismatch. In this case, the system would be automatically shut down until power is restored. Loss of power to indivi-dual components would place that component in its safe mode. An air operated valve, for example, would fall to a position i that ensures no damage to other components. Loss of power to the control panel would cause the loss of all information and fall all control and solenoid operated valves. The system would be shutdown until power is restored. 3.2.1.2 Loss of Instrumentation / Instrument Air j Loss of a single instrument channel will result in the loss of indication for that channel and, for those channels that have control features, a flow mismatch. This flow mismatch will result in an automatic shutdown of the affected portion of the system. Loss of the internals indexing fixture (IIF) level indication system (bubbler) will result in an erroneous level indication which will be noted when compared with a redundant level indication system. Since this system has no control features, ! no adverse system conditions will result. Loss of instrument air will take the individual components to their fall safe position. Flow mismatches induced by loss of air will result in automatic trips. Loss of air to the IIF , level monitoring system will initiate a low air supply
- pressure alarm.
3.2.1.3 Filter Media Rupture A failure of the filter media in the filter canister could
- potentially release fuel fines to the ton exchange portion of the system. The post filter, located downstream of both i filter trains in the line to the ton exchangers, will trap any j fuel fines which would be transported past the filter Rev. 10/0136P l i
3525-015 !. canisters in the event of filter failure. The post filter is sized to be critically safe. A gross rupture in a filter canister may be detected by an increase in the post filter
- differential pressure. Turbidity meters will aid in the detection of gross filter media rupture by detecting changes '
j in water clarity. i Upon detection of a filter canister filter media rupture the ! filter trains will be isolated, including isolation of water i supply lines to ex-vessel defueling (i.e., valves DHC-V-357, ! 358, 363, and 501) involved with the pressurizer defueling j system. The ruptured filter will be identified by observing 1 the differential pressure versus flow for each Individual I canister with flow being recirculated to the RV. A lower i differential pressure for a given flow will. Indicate which i filter is ruptured. The ruptured canister or canisters and the post-filter cartridge would then be replaced as required and the system restarted. The DWC system may be operated in a mode that bypasses the 1 filter canisters. During this mode of operation the post filters will be providing the required system filtration ! upstream of the demineralizers. In order to preclude the ! rupture of the post filter's filter media when it is providing i system filtration, jf. the post filter differential pressure ( reaches 18 psi, further system operation will be prohibited, i The post filters are designed for a maximum differential i pressure of 45 psi. Even if a rupture of the post filter ] media occurred, it is not expected that significant quantitles
- of fuel would accumulate downstream of the filter. This i conclusion is based on the following
! o The bypass flitration mode will be used only when the turbidity is low or during ex-vessel operations as t required; therefore, it is not expected that significant j
fuel fines will be suspended in solution during the
- bypass operation. Consequently, it is not expected that i large amounts of fuel will normally be found in the post
! filter. o The holding capacity of the post filter, prior to j reaching the maximum pressure differential, is small
- (approximately 5 lbs.).
l o The differential pressure, measured across the post l filter, can be used to detect a ruptured post filter ] media, which would inttlate operator action to prevent further accumulation downstream. j o If it is necessary to process the post filter effluent through the DWC ion exchangers, it will be done under the control of a process control plan with adequate provi-sions to accurately assess the quantity of fuel material deposited on the ion exchange media. j! Rev. 10/0136P
_ _ _ _ . ~ _ _ _ _ ___ _ ._ _ _. _ - _- 3525-015 3.2.1.4 Line Break 1 The principal. consequence of any line, or hose break in the RV i cleanup system is a loss of RV inventory. The system is designed to mitigate the consequences of such an incident to i' the extent possible. I In case of a hose rupture or line rupture downstream of the RV
; pumps, the system will trip these pumps on IIF low level and t alarm at control panels in the control room and Fuel Handling i Building (FHB). This could deliver approximately 500 to 1000
- gallons of RV water to the area of the break. .The potential I
areas affected would be the Reactor Building (RB), the annulus, and the FHB, each of which has sumps to contain the spill. l Siphoning of RV water could take place if any of the lines connected to the well pump suction or return hoses, or if the ' hoses themselves, are damaged or ruptured. The two, 4 inch ,
! suction connections provided in the Westinghouse work platform !
will be provided with two, 3/4 inch holes, or in the case of i the 2 inch deep suction one 3/4 inch hole, drilled 18 inches below the water level which will act as siphon breakers. The i three 2 inch return lines will be equipped with spargers, i which are holes drilled into.the pipes. The first holes are drilled 18 inches below the water level which will act as
! siphon breakers. The sample return line will terminate 18 inches below the water level. Also, Isolation valves will be provided in the Westinghouse supplied piping which could be ; used to manually terminate the siphoning. Therefore,- a maximum of approximately 3000 gallons of RV water would spill-into the FTC following a hose rupture. Approximatelyhalfofl 1 this water would be contained in the New fuel Pit.
f The recovery from these events would be accomplished by j isolating the ruptured section and replacing the ruptured hose / pipe. 3.2.2 Fuel Transfer Canal / Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup System i 1 3.2.2.1 Loss of Power A loss of power to any portion of the system would shut that , portion of the system down. Loss of power to Individual components would place that component in its safe mode. An air operated valve, for example, would fall to a position that
- ensures no damage to other components.
l 3.2.2.2 Loss of Instrumentation / Instrument Air , l! j Loss of a single instrument channel will result in the loss of I indication for that channel and, for those channels that have !
- l. control features a flow mismatch. This flow mismatch will
- result in an automatic shutdown of the affected portion of the
j system, i i Rev. 10/0136P . 1
--. - .-. - - - ,_ - - ~-.- - - ,_ - ... - - . - . . - - - - - _ - ._ , - - . ,, _ ._-.-
3525-015 Loss of either the SFP or FTC level monitoring system will be l < noted when compared with the other. The readings should normally be the same since both water bodies are in communica-tion via the fuel transfer tubes. Neither system has control features. Loss of instrument air will take the individual components to l their fall safe position. Flow mismatches induced by loss of I air will result in automatic trips. Loss of air to the IIF level monitoring system (bubbler) will initiate a . Iow air supply pressure alarm. 3.2.2.3 Filter Media Rupture A failure of the filter media in the filter canister could potentially release fuel fines to the ion exchange portion of the system. Flow may be routed to DNC lon exchanger K-2 or to the SOS both of which have filters upstream to trap migrating fuel fines. , Ion exchanger K-2 has a cartridge type post filter (F-8) upstream of it which is in a critically safe canister and SDS l 1s equipped with two filters in series, both of which have i borosilicate glass to control reactivity (see Ref 2). Olffe-rential pressure is measured across the filters to indicate , ruptured filter media. The SDS filter bypass is administratively controlled to prevent inadvertent operation. Upon detection of a filter media rupture in a filter canister the filter trains will be isolated and the ruptured filter ' will be identifled by observing the differential pressure versus flow for each Individual canister with flow being recirculated to the fuel pool. A lower differential pressure for a given flow will indicate which filter is ruptured. The affected canister or canisters and the SOS pre-filter vessel or filter canister post filter cartridge would then be ! replaced as required and the system restarted. The DHC system may be operated in a mode that bypasses the filter canisters. During this mode of operation the post filters will be providing the required system filtration. In order to preclude the rupture of the post filter's filter media when it is providing system filtration, if the post filter differential pressure reaches 18 pst , further system operation will be prohibited. The post filters are designed for a maximum differential pressure of 45 psl. Even if a rupture of the post filter media occurred, it is not' expected that significant quantitles of fuel would accumulate down-stream of the filter. This conclusion is based on the following: o Significant quantitles of fuel are not expected to be found in either the FTC or the SFP, therefore it Is not expected that large amounts of fuel will normally be l found in the post filter. Rev. 10/0136P I
3525-015 o The holdirg capacity of the filter, prior to reaching the maximum pressure differential, is small (approximately 5 lbs.) o The differential pressure, measured across the post filter, can be used to detect a ruptured post filter media, which would initiate operator action to prevent further accumulation downstream. o If effluent is to be processed through DHC lon exchangers, it will be done under a process control plan which adequately assesses the quantity of fuel material deposited on the ton exchange media. 3.2.2.4 Line Break If a rupture occurred in the FTC/SFP cleanup system, the DHC system SFP pumps could deliver FTC and/or SFP water to the RB, the annulus, or the FHB. This action would lower the level in the canal and the pool. A drop of one inch in canal / pool level is approximately equivalent to 1250 gal. A level loss would be detected by redundant level indicating systems, one each for the FTC and SFP, which are provided with low level l alarms in the main control room. The low level alarm will actuate at El. 327'-1". Upon receipt of either low level alarm, the system will be manually shut down. Process water hoses are employed in three services in this system; filter canister inlet / outlet, skimmers to well pumps, and downstream of penetration R-539. If a filter inlet / outlet hose ruptures, that filter will be isolated and the hose replaced. Hoses connected to the filter canisters are submerged in the SFP, this results in no net water loss. If a hose connecting the skimmer to the well pumps breaks, then the ability to surface skim will be hampered or lost, but i pump capacity will not be diminished as the hose is routed l underwater to the pumps and a pump suction supply will continue to be available. t If the hose on the FTC return line downstream of penetration R-539 breaks, then process water will be lost to the RB sump. l + The resulting loss in level would be detected and alarmed by the canal / pool monitors. Check valves are provided to prevent i siphoning the FTC if the hose (or connecting line) breaks. Furthermore, the normal return path is to the SFP; thus this hose is not normally used. When not in use this hose should be Isolated by closing valves to minimize the effect of a hose break. A break of the FTC pump discharge line which uses penetration l R-524 would cause process water to be lost to either the RD or the FHB. The water loss would be detected both by a decrease l In tne monitored flowrate returned to the fuel pool or FTC and also by the drop in fuel pool and/or transfer canal level. Rev. 10/0136P 1
3525-015 i When the FTC pumps are not in use, the discharge valves t)lli ;
- be closed. This will prevent a siphoning of the FTC when the pumps are not in use.
3.3 Decay Heat Removal Decay heat removal is currently performed by heat loss to ambient. No change in this mode of operation is required to operate the DHC system. The large exposed surface of the open RV and the FTC will significantly enhance the removal of decay heat. 3.4 Criticality Subcriticality of the core is maintained by a high concentration of boron in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Subcriticality of the fuel within the filter canister will be assured by design and is addressed in > Reference 8. The design of the FTC/SFP pumps and the RV cleanup pumps do not allow an accumulation of a significant quantity of fuel. The system piping and the post filter have been designed to prevent a possible critical configuration of fuel debris. This is accomplished by restricting the size and configuration of components. Furthermore, the l post filter will not accumulate significant quantitles of fuel unless
- filter canister filter media rupture occurs (see Sections 3.2.1.3 and 3.2.2.3). Other system components preclude fuel accumulation by the filtration of the water, or the components will have critically safe dimensions.
3.5 Boron Dilution The only credible means of attaining criticality of the fuel contained in the vessel is through deboration of the RCS water. The approach described in References 6 and 7 for prevention of deboration will be followed for operation of the OHC system. Specific system evaluations with respect to deboration control were performed prior to DHC system l operation. Boron dilution during defueling has been addressed in the
" Hazards Analysis: Potential for Boron Ollution of Reactor Coolant System" (Reference 9).
3.6 Heavy Load Drops In-containment load handling will consist of the transfer of the OHC filter canisters from the deep end of the FTC to the FHB via the fuel transfer system. Load handling within the FHB will consist of the movement of SOS lon exchange liners, the DHC system liners, the OHC filter canisters and transfer casks. The heavy load drop analysis for the SOS casks is given in reference 3. The DHC system liners will be moved using the existing casks for the EPICOR II system. The handling of heavy loads in containment and in the FHB is addressed in Reference 11. The radiological concerns associated with a load drop of the 50S ton exchange liners and the DHC system liners are bounded by the analysis in Reference 4. The radiological concerns associated with a load drop of a filter canister are bounded by the accident analysts in Reference 12. These analyses show that the health and safety of public is not
- endangered as a result of these hypotM tical accidents.
Rev. 10/0136P '
1 3525-015 ! 3.7 Radioactive Releases ) The operation and design of the ONC system was reviewed with respect to i radioactive releases. No direct radioactive release paths to the , environment exists for the system. Local spillage of contaminated water i from the OWC system will result in a local contamination problem. Since j the specific activity of the water is essentially that of the FTC and i SFP, no significant radioactive releases above those from the open pools j can occur when processing pool water. Defueling activities have the i potential of significantly increasing the specific activity of the RV l ! water. To preclude any significant releases during these periods the a operating procedures associated with processing RV water shall include ! requirements to ensure isolation of the system should a line break or
! massive system leakage occur.
l During shutdown of the ONC system filter trains, radiolytic decompo- { sition of the water in the post filters and filter canisters will cause
! the production of hydrogen and oxygen. In order to prevent the over- , pressurization of the filter canisters, an ASME Section VIII pressure ;
I relief valve is installed in the outlet pipe from each of the four DWC i system filter canisters. The valves provide pressure relief in the ! event that the isolation valves in the OHC system filter inlet and j outlet pipes are closed and pressure bullds up within the filter canister as a result of radiolytic decom30sition. Radlolytic decompo- 4 sition of water in the post filters will be minimized by the limited holding capacity of the filters.
- /
j The filter canisters should not normally be isolated for extended i periods; however, if they were, the maximum rate of hydrogen and oxygen
! generation within the canister based on conservative assumptions is ! estimated to be 0.029 scf/ day. (Note: later analyses have resulted in
. a maximum hydrogen generation rate that is approximately a factor of 10 i { lower). At the higher calculated rate of gas generation, the pressure l I inside the canister would not reach the canister design pressure (150
- pstg) for at least 90 days. The relief valve will release the pressure j bulldup before this pressure is exceeded with approximately 0.3 scf of ,
j hydrogen and oxygen released from each canister. The relief valves will l i continue to relieve pressure at about 15 day intervals, releasing a ; maximum of about 0.3 scf hydrogen and oxygen per canister per relief. The relief valves discharge to the open volume of the containment above
; the FTC or to the operating level of the FHB, Since both of these areas
- are continuously or regularly vented and since the maximum volume of hydrogen released is small, a bulldup of hydrogen to a combustible concentration is not credible. Any particulate releases during the i operation of the relief valves would be bounded by the line breaks .
discussed in sections 3.2.1.4 and 3.2.2.4. ! 3.8 Operational Improvements l 3 l The DWC system is Intended to maintain RV water clarity using the ' j filter canisters. During operation of the OHC system, unexpected ) l concentrations of suspended sollds have blinded the filters and reduced '
; their performance. To alleviate this problem various modifications may )
- be made to the system. Modifications to the original DWC system j installed or planned include
- use of filter-alds, use of coagulants, l
use of cartridge filters, use of series filters and/or demineralizers, I l Rev. 10/0136P l
3525-015 cross-connecting RV cleanup pemps and RV filter train inlets, the use of modified knockout canisters as deep bed filters, and the installation of suction tubes taking suction much deeper than originally designed. These modifications will be discussed in further detail in Attachment 1. 3.8.1 Filter Aid Modifications to the DHC system may employ the use of a filter aid material, which is added to the filter media in the filter canister. The filter aid is intended to prolong the life of the filter canisters by preventing small suspended solids from reaching and plugging the filter media in the canisters. The filter aid material is introduced as a low solids slurry i into the filter by two methods: Body feed method, which is a continuous, low flow rate injection of the slurry into the process water upstream of the filter canisters, or precoat method, which consists of an initial batch of high flow rate (accelerated) body feed delivered to the filter also by way of the process stream. Continuous body feed may be used af ter the initial precoat, or the two methods may be used indepen-dently. The material currently considered for use as a filter aid is diatomaccous earth. The use of diatomaceous earth as the filter aid material in 4 the DHC system has been evaluated and the following safety concerns were identified and are addressed below: o criticality control o catalyst operation Filter aid systems use water to form a slurry of the filter aid material. The water used will have a minimum boron concentration of 4350 ppm to prevent unacceptable dilution of i boron in the RV, and will come from SPC-T-4 or from the effluent of DHC-F-5. To determine the criticality safety consequences of using diatomaceous earth as a filter aid material, an evaluation was performed to assess the moderating ability of diatomaceous i earth. Olatomaceous earth is primarily S102 (approximately 901.), and its moderating ability was found to be significantly less than that of water. Based on this result, it was concluded that the addition of diatomaceous earth to a defueling canister does not present a criticality concern during use, storage or shipment of the canister. The results of the above evaluation are also applicable to the situation where diatomaccous earth becomes intermixed with the fuel within the RCS. That is, since diatomaceous earth is a poor moderator, when compared to water, the addition of diatomaccous earth to the RCS will not cause unacceptable increases to the RCS neutron multiplication. Olatomaceous earth has shown no propensity to remove or absorb boron during previous reactor coolant filtration operations and will not, therefore, cause a decrease in the reactor coolant boron concentration. I Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 In the event of a filter canister rupture, the DHC system post filter will collect filtered material, diatomaceous earth, or filter media that is carried through the failed canister. The post filter is inherently critically safe by design, thus no criticality safety concern exists within the post filter. The use of diatomaceous earth as a filter aid material will not inhibit the performance of the catalyst in the defueling canisters. 01atomaceous earth is inert and thus would not chemically react with the catalyst. Additionally, the very characteristics and consistency of diatomaceous earth which make it an ideal filter aid material, that is, its porosity under wet and dry conditions, prevent it from isolating the
- catalyst from generated hydrogen and oxygen, even if the diatomaceous earth were to settle on the catalyst rettiner screens or on the catalyst material.
Other materials may also be used as a filter aid. However, prior to their use the materials will be reviewed to ensure that there are no unacceptable effects on the defueling canisters or the RCS.
< 3.8.2 Coagulants The use of coagulants in the reactor coolant is intended to prolong the operating Ilfe of the filter canisters by coagu-lating the colloidal suspension in the water into larger particles. The formation of these larger particles will allow the material to be collected in the filter canister without plugging the filter media, thereby prolonging the operating l life of the filter canisters. Coagulants may be added in the process path upstream of the filters.
The specific chemicals to be used for this option have criteria which must be met in order to be introduced to the RCS and defueling canisters. The safety issues which must be addressed before a coagulant can be used include as a minimum: o effect on neutron multiplication, o precipitation of soluble boron, o effect on boron detection capability, o adherence to technical specification requirements for RCS water, and o effect on operability of the canister catalyst material. For the coagulants used to date, References 13, 14, and 15 address the safety issues identifled above to show that their use would not adversely impact previous evaluations or RCS water specifications. 3.8.3 Cartridge filters If cartridge filters are used in the DHC system they will i serve as either a replacement for or an enhancement to the , filter canisters, i i \ ! I Rev. 10/0136P I
3525-015 The cartridge filter to be used will have critically safe
- dimensions (diameter <8 inches). A single cartridge filter cannot contain a mass of fissile material in a critical-
; arrangement, hence neutron poison is not required in the cartridge filters. Disposal of the cartridge filters will be
] in accordance with approved procedures. Schematically, the cartridge filter would replace or be in series with the filter canisters. Cartridge filters may be used in the RV cleanup system and the FTC/SFP cleanup system.
. Thus if the cartridge filter media falls, a filter located
- downstream of the cartridge filter will trap fuel material before it reaches the OHC system or SOS lon exchangers.
Cartridge filter failure w111 be detected and mitigated in the same manner as a filter canister failure. The OHC system can be configured to bypass the ton exchangers. This would eliminate the safety concern assocl-i; ated with the transport of fuel to the post filter or the ton 1 exchangers, since the process water would be returned directly to the RV or the FTC/SFP. However, filter media could in this case be transported to the RV af ter a postulated gross filter
- failure. An earlier study (Reference 10) has demonstrated that foreign material (e.g., cartridge filter media) which cannot Intermix with the fuel in such a manner as to become Interstitially dispersed within the fuel, can be added to RV
- without causing a criticality concern.
4
! 3.8.4 Series Filters t OHC RV manifold piping may be modified to allow the two l' filters in the train to be used in-series with the required instrumentation to monitor the Individual filters. This modification would allow use of two different filters in j series (i.e., one as a " roughing" filter and the second as a , polishing filter).
I j 3.8.5 Series Ion Exchangers ] Piping in the FHB has been modified to allow series operation 3 of the two OHC RV cleanup lon exchangers. This modification i allows the water being processed to be demineralized by the first ton exchanger to remove gross activity before passing through the second organic carbon removing "lon exchanger." 1 The non-zeollte media will be tested prior to use, to' ensure I It does not alter RCS grade specifications for water
- chemistry. In the case of activated carbon, the media is
! borated before placing in service to prevent its removing boron from the flowstream.
l 3.8.6 RV filter Train Cross-Connects l ! This modification will allow use of either pump with either or l both filters trains, to increase system flexibility. 1 l i i i 1 1 Rev. 10/0136P l
3525-015 3.8.7 Deep Suction . The suction tubes for both A and B pumps can be extended to reach elevation 297' in the RV annulus, allowing better circulation and filtration during RCS processing. Excessive vessel drain-down is prevented by siphon breakers located 18" below the water level (327'-6") as noted in 3.2.1.4. Boron dilution concerns have been controlled administratively. Fuel pickup has been Ilmited by the installation of an 850 micron screen and appropriate administrative controls. 3.8.8 Other Modifications Other system modifications may be made to the OHC system without revising this TER provided that the safety concerns associated with the changes are bounded by approved Itcensing documents. 3.9 Interface with Defueling Tools
; The known chemistry and intended high quality (e.g., low turbidity and isotopic concentrations) makes DHC system water ideal for use as process i
water for some of the defueling tools. Additionally an operational advantage for using the OHC system as a source of process water is that no new water will be introduced to the RV, thus additional makeup and letdown monitoring of the RV will not be required. Since the defueling tools that will be connected to ONC system will not Interface with other sources of water, the potential for a boron dilution event to occur in the RCS is not increased by the modifications. Additionally the ability to detect a deboration event is not perturbed by the subject modifications. Presently, a number of tools have been identifled which will use the OHC system as a source of process water. The tools identifled are the abrasive water jet ( ADMAC pump), the cavitating pulsating water jet i system, and the multiple jet / vacuum retractor flushing pump. The OHC system will also be used to supply water to various ex-vessel defueling operations, such as pressurtzer defueling, and to filter the same water as it returns to the RV. Other tools or uses may be Identified in the future which will use the OHC system as a process water source without revising this TER, provided safety concerns are bounded by approved licensing documents. 4.0 RA010 LOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 4.1 Off-Site Dose Assessment Operation of the OHC system could reduce the off-site doses which would result if the system were not available. Without operation of the OHC system specific activity of the water in the pools would slowly increase. This could lead to an increase in the local airborne concen-tration available for release via the plant ventilation system. However, operation of the OHC system will maintain the reactor and fuel pool water at very low specific activity, thereby mlnlmizing this as a potential release source. Since the source available for release from the SDS during processing of accident water from the RB basement greatly Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 exceeds that available from the DHC system, the off-site dose analysis provided in the SOS TER (Ref. 4) bounds those of the OHC system. 4.2 On-Site Dose Assessment 4.2.1 Reactor Vessel Cleanup System The potential exists that defueling may significantly increase the specific activity in the RV water. This could possibly occur during defueling through disturbance of the core debris. Material greater than nominal 0.5 microns would be captured in the system filters. The soluble fission products, particularly ceslum-137 and strontium-90, would be removed by processing through the associated lon exchange media. The filter canisters are located underwater at a depth greater than four feet in the RB and, therefore, do not represent a radiological problem. As indicated earlier (see Section 3.2.1.3 and 3.2.2.3) it is not expected that significant quantitles of fuel will accumulate in the post filters. Consequently, the post filters are not expected to be a radiological hazard. However, if the dose rates from these filters begin to increase, appropriate measures (e.g. shleiding, personnel relocation) will be taken to ensure acceptable dose rates to personnel. The water to be processed is piped through a RB penetration to the ton exchange media at 20 to 60 gpm (max. 30 gpm/lon exchanger) depending on the specific activity of the RV water. These process lines and l the liners for the lor exchange media represent potential radiological hazards. To assess the radiological hazards, the dose rates from OHC system piping and components during operation were evaluated. Sources in the water were assumed to be fuel particles and dissolved radioactive materials. The design basis concentra-tions of these sources are I ppm suspended sollds and a concentration of soluble materials equivalent in dose rate to 0.02 uCl/ml of ceslum-137. During operation at the design basis concentrations, the dose rate from a long 3" diameter unshielded hose is 0.2 milltrem/ hour at a distance of 2 feet. During defueling operations both the solubles and suspended solids concentrations in the water may increase. To assess increases in dose rates during upset water conditions, a combination of a 20 curle ceslum-137 spike and an Instanta-neous release of approximately 35 lb of suspendable fine debris to the RV volume is postulated. A long 3" diameter hose carrying water at the resulting concentrations would result in a dose rate of 9 milllrem/ hour 2 feet from the hose. Process lines which are downstream of the filters do not contain the suspended solids concentrations postulated for the upset water conditions. A 3" diameter hose downstream of the filters would produce a dose rate of 2 millirem / hour at a distance of 2 feet, due to the soluble radioactive materials remaining in the water. Rev, 10/0136P
3525-015 Shielding of lines upstream of the filters may be used to reduce dose rates in areas of personnel occupancy. i Dose rates from solubles are based on the specific activity of
- ceslum-137. Other isotopes which may contribute significantly to gamma dose rates are cesium-134 and antimony-125. 1.ie !
ceslum-134 concentration is normally an order of magnitude ' 4 less than that of ceslum-137. Antimony-125 is not removed by i the DNC system lon exchangers with a reliable decontamination , i factor. However, the dose rate for antimony-125 15 less than ' i that of ceslum-137 for a given concentration. If antimony-125 in the DHC system becomes a significant dose contributor to )j workers, the reactor coolant may be processed through the ! EPICOR II system in a batch processing mode. Batch processing I will be used because chemical adjustment of the coolant is f required. EPICOR II will remove the antimony-125 with a satisfactory decontamination factor. I Three zoollte ton exchangers are needed to handle the flow i from the ONC system. Two are needed for the RV cleanup system
- to provide a 60 gpm flowrate through the ton exchangers. One is used for FTC/SFP cleanup. SDS is also to be used for j FTC/SFP cleanup.
) The shleiding requirements for the OWC system liners were i based on a homogenized 500 curle source in a 4 x 4 liner, ,
- similar in construction to those used for EPICOR II. Since [
- change-out of liners will be based on radiation level, and '
j since the 500 curie loading is conservatively high (actual
- loading should be approximately 100 curles, see Section 4.3), i i the calculated shielding requirement is considered acceptable. ;
i I The contact dose rate on the side of the liner for a homo- l
! gentzed 500 curle source is approximately 185 rem /hr. The
- liners are shleided to limit the shleid contact dose rate at
- the side and on top of the liner to a maximum of 5 milltrem/hr. The concrete floor reduces the dose rates on lower elevations to less than 5 miillrem/hr. Shielded dose l rates represent an upper bound, and would not pose any undue !
operational constraints if actually attained. l I Other OHC system components not specifically discussed above will be shielded as necessary. ; i If hoses or piping in the DHC system break, water will be released in the R8 or the FHB. This water may contain !
; suspended fuel particles and dissolved radioactive materials.
The specific activity of the OWC system water will be main-tained low enough that personnel access to the spill area will j not be precluded. After the removal of the spilled water, the ! area may require decontamination to reduce loose surface contamination to acceptable levels. Thus there are no safety , i concerns associated with the breakage of ONC system hoses or i pipes. i ! Rev. 10/0136P - I i I i
3525-015 4.2.2 Fuel Transfer Canal / Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup System , The FTC/SFP cleanup system processes water through the DWC lon ' exchanger K-2 or SDS. The water in the pools will be main-tained by this system at .01 to .02 uCl/mi of equivalent cesium-137, excluding antimony. A flowpath to EPICOR II via the RCBT's is provided to remove antimony-125 in the event that high antimony-125 levels are encountered. These are significantly lower concentrations than water processed by SDS. The analysis provided in Section 4.2.1 for normal dose rates from the RV cleanup system bounds the dose rates from the FTC/SFP cleanup system during normal operation. The accident analysis provided in the SOS TER. Reference 4, 1 bounds the dosas possible from the FTC/SFP cleanup system in the event of an accident. 4.3 Occupational Exposures Operation of the OHC system will reduce the occupational exposure during defueling operations by maintaining low specific activities in the FTC, SFP and RV. The OHC system is designed to maintain the maximum cesium-137 concentration in the water to between .01 and .02 uCl/ml . This will result in a contribution to general area dose rates of 10 to 20 milltrem/hr from the water. It is estimated that approximately 42, 4x4 liners each loaded with 52 curies of ceslum-137 will be required for the RV cleanup system. The occupational dose to workers during each change-out is estimated to be less 0.1 man-rem. Therefore the total accumulated dose for change out of the estimated 42, 4x4 liners is 4.2 man-rem. The following table provides an estimate of the man-hours and man-rem associated with the installation, operation, maintenance, modiflation, l and removal of the in-containment and FHO portions of the OHC system. These estimates are based upon current man-hour projections. IN-CONTAINMENT Activity Man-Hours Dose Rate (mR/hr) Man-Rem Installation 2200 30 66 Operation 1200 30 36 Halntenance 85 30 2.5 Modifications 1600 20 48 Removal 1000 30 30 FUEL. HANDLING BUILDINQ Activity Han-Hours Dose Rate (mR/hr) Man-Rom Installation 34,400 0.3 10.3 !' Operation 26,280 0.3 7.9 Halntenance 8,600 0.3 2.6 Removal 17,200 0.3 5.2 Rev. 10/0136P
i 3525-015 l The current total man-rem attributable to the operation, maintenance, , ! and modification of the DHC system, as a whole, is approximately 208 ' ! man-rem. This figure does not include man-hour or man-rem values for ! interface with defueling tooling discussed in Sections 3.8 and 3.9.
- r j 5.0 SAFETY EVALUATION 5.1 Technical Specifications / Recovery Operations Plan l
}
l No additional Technical Specifications / Recovery Operations Plan changes ! are required to install and operate the DWC system.
- i
! 5.2 Safety Questions (10 CFR 50.59) , 1 l 10 CFR 50, Paragraph 50.59, permits the holder of an operating Ilcense l to make changes to the facility or perform a test or experiment, provided the change, test, or experiment is determined not to be an t unreviewed safety question and does not involve a modification of the ! plant technical specifications.
- A proposed change involves an unreviewed safety question if
- !
i i a. The possibility of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or [ ] malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated { in the safety analysis report may be increased; or i j b. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type ! 1 than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or ] c. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any technical i
- specification, is reduced. l i
! The DHC system does not increase the probability of occurrence or the , 2 consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to j safety previously evaluated in a safety analysis report. The system ; i failures evaluated are presented in section 3.2 of this report. No . { failures of the DWC system were found which would increase the proba- i
- bility of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction !
! of equipment important to safety. In addition, operation of the DWC ] system will be performed under strict administrative procedural control ! to further ensure safe operation. The procedures used for operation of j the DHC system will be reviewed and approved prior to use in accordance , 3 with Technical Specification 6.8.1. l 1 The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report is not created by the j Installation and operation of the DHC system. The DWC system is essen-tlally a liquid radwaste system utilized to maintain clarity and low . specific activity in the RV, FTC, and SFP water, As such, the possi- ! bility of an accident or malfunction is of the same type as previously evaluated for other liquid radwaste systems. 4 Rev. 10/013f;P l
3525-015 Operation of the ONC system does not result in a reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the bases for the Technical Specifications. Liquid effluents will not be released to the environment directly from DHC system operations. The effluents from operation of the DHC system will be returned to the sources in order to maintain proper water levels. Any gaseous effluents resulting from DHC system operations will traverse existing gaseous effluent flow paths. The gaseous effluents will be less than those generated during processing of the water from i the RB basement by 50S. The results of the radioactive release analysis l presented in the 50S TER therefore bound the releases from the DHC system. Since no change in the maximum permissible concentrations or the instrument configuration or setpoints specified in Appendix B of the Technical Specifications was required for SDS operation, and since the ONC system operation is bounded by the SDS operation, no changes are required for OHC system operation. I Based on the above, the installation and operation of the OWC system does not present an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59. 1
6.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Recovery Program System Description, Aux 111ary Building Emergency Liquid Clean-up System (EPICOR II), GPU Nuclear Letter 4410-86-L-0069 dated j April 29, 1986.
j 2. Technical Evaluation Report (TER) for the Submerged Demineralizer System, Revision 3, GPU Nuclear Letter 4410-86-L-0125 dated August 29,
- i 1986, i
- 3. Letter from G. K. Hovey, GPU, to B. J. Snyder NRC, dated September 30, 1981, " Control of Heavy Loads". GPU Nuclear Letter LL2-81-0227. ,
- 4. Same as Reference 2.
- 5. Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the Refurbishment of Fuel Pool "A",
Revision I, June 1983, GPU Nuclear Letter 4410-83-L-0156 dated July 29, 1983.
- 6. SER for Removal of the THI-2 Reactor Vessel Head, Revision 5, GPU Nuclear Letter 4410-84-L-0014 dated March 9, 1984.
- 7. SER for the Operation of the IIF Processing System, Revision 3, GPU j Nuclear Letter 4410-85-L-Oll2 dated May 17, 1985.
- 8. TER for Oefueling Canisters, Revision 2, GPU Nuclear letter l 4410-86-L-0037 dated March 6, 1986. '
- 9. Hazards Analysis: Potential for Doron Ollution of Reactor Coolant System, Revision 2, September 1985.
- 10. Report on Limits of Foreign Materials Allowed in the THI-2 Reactor Coolant System During Defueling Activities, 15737-2-N09-002, Revision 1, September, 1985.
- Rev. 10/0136P I e
3525-015
- 11. SER for Heavy Load Handling Inside Containment, Revision 3, GPU Nuclear Letter 4410-86-L-0084 dated June 2, 1986. I
- 12. SER for Defueling of the THI-2 Reactor Vessel, Revision 10, GPU Nuclear Letter 4410-86-L-0049 dated May 15, 1986. I
- 13. SER for the Addition of Coagulants to the Reactor Coolant System, GPU Nuclear Letter 4410-86-L-0213 dated December 15, 1986.
- 14. Use of Coagulants, GPU Nuclear Letter 4410-86-L-0216 dated December 31, 1986.
- 15. Criticality Safety Evaluation for Coagulants, GPU Nuclear Letter 4410-87-L-0021 dated February 20, 1987.
i l l l l l Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 l l SYSTEM DESCRIPTION DEFUELING WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM REACTOR VESSEL CLEANUP SYSTEM l
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 1.0 DESIGN DESCRIPTION 1.1 Summary 1.2 References 1.3 Detailed System Description 1.4 System Performance Characteristics
- 1.5 System Arrangement 1.6 Instrumentation and Control 1.7 System Interfaces 1.8 Quality Assurances 2.0 SYSTEM LIMITATION, SETPOINTS, AND PRECAUTIONS 2.1 Limitations 2.2 Setpoints 2.3 Precautions 3.0 OPERATIONS 3.1 Initial Fill 3.2 Startup 3.3 Normal Operations 3.4 Shutdown 3.5 Draining 3.6 Refilling 3.7 Infrequent Operations 3.8 Transient Operations 4.0 CASUALTY EVENTS AND RECOVERY PROCEDURES 4.1 Loss of Power 4.2 Loss of Instrumentation / Instrument Air 4.3 Filter and Hose Break l 4.4 Line and Hose Break 5.0 SYSTEM MAINTENANCE i
Rev. 10/0116P l l
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) SECTION 6.0 TESTING 6.1 Hydrostatic Testing 6.2 Leak Testing 6.3 Instrument Testing 7.0 HUMAN FACTORS 8.0 MAXIMUM ALLOHABLE AP AT GIVEN FLOHRATES Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 1.0 DESIGN DESCRIPTION 1.1 Summary The Reactor Vessel (RV) cleanup system is a temporary 11guld processing system which is designed to process water contained in the RV. The , system's major functions are:
- a. To filter the water contained in the RV to remove suspended solids above a nominal .5 micron rating. This is done to maintain the clarify of the water,
- b. To remove soluble fission products and organic carbon from the RV l by demineralization of the water. This is done to keep the equiva-lent Cs-137 concentration less than .02 uC1/ml, excluding antimony and, thus, reduce the dose rate controlled by batch processing of RV water at the Reactor Coolant Bleed Tanks (RBCTs).
1.2 References
- 1. Planning Study, Defueling Water Cleanup System, Document No.
TP0/THI-046.
- 2. Technical Plan, Defueling Water Cleanup System, Document No.
TP0/TMI-047.
- 3. Division I, System Design Description, Defueling Water Cleanup System, Document No. 2-R72-DWC01.
- 4. Bechtel Drawing 2-M74-DHC01, Defueling Water Cleanup (DHC) Reactor Vessel Cleanup System.
- 5. Bechtel Drawing 2-M74-DHCO2, Defueling Water Cleanup (DHC) Fuel Transfer Canal / Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup System.
- 6. Bechtel Drawing 2-M74-DWC03, Defueling Water Cleanup (DHC)
Auxiliary Systems.
- 7. Bechtel Drawing 2-P0A-6401, General Arrangement Fuel Handling Building Plan El. 347'-6".
- 8. Bechtel Drawing 2-P0A-1303, General Arrangement Plenum Removal Reactor Building.
- 9. Drawing Change Notice Nos. 2026-30-3 and 4, Flow Diagram Spent Fuel l Cooling and Decay Heat Removal.
- 10. Burns and Roe Drawing No. 2026, Flow Diagram Spent Fuel Cooling and Decay Heat Removal.
- 11. Division System Design Description for Spent Fuel Pool / Fuel l Transfer Canal Cleanup System, Document No. SD DHC02.
I
- 12. Instrument Index, Document No. 15737-2-J16-001.
- 13. Design Engineering Valve List, Document No. 15737-2-P16-001. l l
Rev. 10/0135P
3525-015' ATTACHMENT-l
- 14. Standard for Piping Line Specifications for GPU Nuclear Corporation I TMI Unit 2 Standard 15737-2-P-001. ;
- 15. Mechanical Equipment' List, Document No. 15737-2-M16-001. ,
- 16. Bechtel Piping Isometrics
- a. 2-P60-DHC-01-DHCS - Pumps P-2A&B, P-3A&B, P-4A&B, and Miscellaneous Details. !
i
- b. 2-P60-DHCO2-DHCS - Reactor Vessel Filter Trains A & B - Inlet Manifold Piping.
- c. 2-P60-DHC03-DHCS - Reactor Vessel Filter Trains A & B Outlet Manifold Piping.
- d. 2-P60-DHC05-DHCS - Reactor Vessel Filter Train Sample Lines I
- e. 2-P60-DHC06-DHCS - Discharge Piping from Sample Boxes No. 1 and No. 2 to Penetration R-537.
- f. 2-P60-DHC07-DHCS - Samples Lines Upstream and Downstream of Ion Exchangers.
- g. 2-P60-DHC08-DHCS - Forwarding Pumps P-6 and P-7, Suction and 8 Discharge Piping.
h, 2-P60-DHC09-DHCS - Forwarding Pumps P-6 and P-7, Discharge l Piping. 2-P60-DHC10-DHCS - Supply Piping to Ion Exchangers K-1 and 1. K-2, Supply and Discharge Piping for Post Filter F-8.
- j. 2-P60-DHC11-DHCS - Supply Piping to Ion Exchangers K-1, K-2 and K-3.
- k. 2-P60-DHC12-DHCS - Borated Water Flush Piping from SPC-T-4.
- 1. 2-P60-DHC15-DHCS - Nitrogen Supply . Piping to SPC-T ,4 and Drying Station.
I
- m. 2-P60-DHC17-DHCS - Miscellaneous Piping Details.
- n. 2-P60-DHC18-DHCS - Miscellaneous Piping. Details.
- o. 2-P60-DHC19-DHCS - Sample Panel No. 1. Fuel Handling Building.
- p. 2-P60-DHC20-DHCS - Sample Box No. 2, Fuel Handling Building.
- q. 2-P60-DHC21-DHCS - Sample . Panel No. 2, Drain 'and Return to l !
Spent Fuel Pool A. 'l
)
- r. 2-P60-DHC22-DHCS - Air Supply Piping Details. l l 1
- 19. ECA No. 3525-84-0041, Definition of the Defueling Water Cleanup System.
Rev. 10/0135P j 4 i
.-., ,.-- , -_ .r , ,,. -
-y..- , , , . . . . . . - , , , . ,- - , . ,
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1
- 20. ECA No. 3245-84-0034, Defueling Water Cleanup System Penetration Modification.
- 21. ECA No. 3527-84-0042, SDS Tle-in to DHCS.
- 22. Bechtel Area Piping Drawings
- a. 2-P70-DHC02 - Instrument Air Manifolds and Hose Routings for DHCS - Reactor and Fuel Handling Building.
- b. 2-P70-DHCO3 -
DHCS Hose Network Reactor _ Building Plan-El. 347'-6".
- c. 2-P70-DHC04 - DWCS Hose Network Fuel Handling Building Plan El. 347'-6".
- d. 2-P70-DHC05 - DWC System Hose Network Sections and Details,
- e. 2-P70-DHC06 - Process Hose Schedule - Reactor and Fuel Handling Building.
- f. 2-P70-DHC07 - DHCS - Filter-Aid Feed Piping.
- g. 2-P70-DHC08 - DHCS - Filter Precoat Piping.
- h. 2-P70-CLD01 - Canister Loading and Decontamination System, Fuel Handling Building.
- 23. TER 3527-016 - THI-2 Division Technical Evaluation Report for Defueling Canisters.
- 24. ECA No. 3525-85-0304, DHCS RV Filtration Manifold Modification.
l
- 25. ECA No. 3525-86-0313, Abrasive Water Jet System Design.
- 26. ECA No. 3525-86-0328, DHCS Body Feed Tie-in Modification.
- 27. ECA No. 3525-86-0356, DHCS Filter-Aid Feed System.
- 28. ECA No. 3525-86-0377, DHCS Filter-Aid Feed System Electrical Additions in the Fuel Handling Building.
- 29. ECA No. 3525-86-0388, DHCS Filter-Ald Feed Precoat System.
- t l 30. ECA No. 3255-86-0393, Pressurizer Spray Line Defueling Connections.
- 31. ECA No. 3525-86-0395, Tie-in of Cavitating/ Pulsating Water Jet i
System Pump Suction DHCS.
- 32. ECA No. 3255-86-0406, Pressurizer Defueling System Tle-in l Connections.
- 33. ECA No. 3525-86-0416, DHCS - DHC-K-1/DHC-K-3 Piping Modifications.
l 34. ECA No. 3255-86-0422, Pressurizer Defueling System Tie-in Connections. Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1
- 35. ECA No. 3525-86-0429, DHC RV Filter Train 'A' Modifications.
- 36. ECA No. 3525-87-0444, Reactor Building and Fuel Handling Building DHCS Armored Hose Replacement.
- 37. ECA No. 3525-87-0450, DHC Filter-Aid Modifications.
- 38. ECA No. 3525-87-0451, DHC RV Cleanup System Modifications.
- 39. ECA No. 3525-87-0454, Coagulant Addition to DWCS.
- 40. ECA No. 3525-87-0455, Use of DHCS Effluent Water for the Coagulant /
Filter-Aid Systems.
- 41. Design Criteria, DC-3525-86-004, Processing Through DHCS Using Coagulants.
1.3 Detailed System Description 1.3.1 Description The RV cleanup system is a liquid processing system which will process water from the RV. The system is shown schematically on Drawing 2-M74-DHC01 and its associated Drawings 2-M-74-DHC02 and 2-M74-DHCO3. (NOTE: Some valves identified herein have been given an instrument designator as well as a valve number. When this occurs, the instrument designator is shown in parentheses after the valve number.) The system has two submersible type pumps (deep well pumps), P-2A and 28, which are housed in wells and located in the fuel storage pit in the shallow end of the Fuel Transfer Canal (FTC) in the Reactor Building (RB). Each pump has a 220 gpm capacity and will process 200 gpm from the RV and recirculate 20 1pm. The suction from the RV is through the Westinghouse work platform via pipes which connect the nozzles provided on the work platform to the wells. The system has four particulate fil ters , F-1, 2, 3, and 4, each capable of filtering a flow of 100 gpm. The filters are composed of sintered metal filter media which is contained in modified fuel canisters. These filters are capable of removing debris, mainly fuel fines (UO2 ) and core debris (Zr0 2), down to a 0.5 micron rating. Since the canisters contain fuel fines, they are designed to prevent a criticality condition from existing when they have been loaded. Also, the filters are submersed in the transfer canal to provide the appropriate radition shielding. The two pumps and four filters (two trains of two filters 1 each) are cross-connected so that either pump discharges to either or both filter trains. The filtration portion of the system is divided into two trains; each train contains two I filter canisters. This allows the system to filter 200 or 400 gpm from the RV. The two pump cross-connect allows for l greater flexibility in system operations and provides redun-Rev. 10/0136P i r--r.
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 i dancy to allow system operation during maintenance. A coagu-lant may be injected into the . process flow by the STRANCO unit /Moyno Pump (DHC-P-12/13) at either pump. discharge. The pumps are connected to the filters trains by a length of 4" hose which will allow the required contact time between coaqalant and the waste stream. Filter-aid may be injected at the inlet to each individual filter canister. A #11ter is used until the differential pressures reached a prcdetermined setpoint. At this point, the system is shutdown and then, after a waiting period (approximately 5 minutes),_ lt is restarted. The differential pressure is noted and if it returns to a low value, the system will be run again to the pressure setpoint. This process is repeated until the diffe-reptial pressure at restart reaches a value near the shutdown setpoint. When this occurs within one hour, the train is l shutdown and the filter (s) are replaced. Loaded canisters are expected to generate small quantities of oxygen and hydrogen gas due to radiolysis of water. Pressure relief valves R-4, R-5, R-6, and R-7 are provided on the filter canister outlet lines upstream of their isolation valves. Their purpose is to prevent overpressuring the filter canisters when isolated due to the small quantitles of H2 and 02 produced (approximately 0.029 ft3/ day). Once the water has been filtered, all, or a portion of, the flow can be returned to the RV. The amount of water returned is controlled by remotely adjusted valves V015A and B (HV30A and B). Each of these lines will connect, via flexible hoses, to the separate inlet nozzles on the work platform. A sparger has been placed on each return line to maintain a positive pressure in the attached hoses. That portion of the flow not returned to the vessel can be further processed to remove soluble fission products or organic carbon. The flow from the pumps, which passes through a single line to the ion exchangers, is automatically controlled by remotely adjusted flow control valve V084 (FV-10). There is a post filter, F-5, located in that line to ensure that, in case of a failure of a filter canister, significant quantity of fuel fines cannot reach the ion exchangers. The loading on the post filter is expected to be minimal and, as such, they will be standard disposable cartridge type filters. Bypass lines are installed -on both filter trains. The bypass line will allow the filter canisters in a train to be bypassed, and allow direct routing of water to the post filter and ion exchangers or recirculation of the RV without l filtration. Two lon exchangers, K-1 and K-3, are dedicated for use in this system. Each of these ton exchangers can handle the normal 30 gpm flow. The ion exchange media is a bed of zeolite resin which will remove the Cs-137 and Sr-90, or a media (possibly organic) to remove organic carbon. Any media used will be Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 i tested to ensure it does not alter Reactor Coolant System (RCS) chemistry adversely. In the case of activated charcoal, the media is boron saturated prior to placing the exchanger in-service. The two ion exchangers provide flexibility in operation so that one can be taken out of service without interrupting normal flow. The ion exchange media is contained in a 4 x 4 High Integrity Container (HIC). The ion exchangers may be operated independently singly or in parallel, or dependently in series. The level in each ion exchanger is maintained by regulating the flow out of the ion exchanger to match the inflow. The outflow is regulated by a throttling control valve V029 or V266 (LV 45 or 72), which is located downstream of an air driven reciprocating diaphragm pump P-6 or 8. This valve automatically throttles in response to changing level in the ion exchanger. The maximum system flow rate is 30 gpm per 4 x 4 liner. The pumps head-flow characteristics can be changed by adjusting the air pressure to the pumps. Post filter F-6 is located downstream of these pumps to prevent the migration of any resin fines. The water is returned from here to the RV via flexible hoses. Sample points are provided upstream and downstream of each filter train. These samples are routed to sample box 1, a glove box located in the FHB. The glove box has a self contained blower and HEPA filter which discharge to the FHB ventilation system. Sample points are also provided down-stream of ion exchangers K-1 and K-3 (upstream sample is filter effluent sample point). These outlet samples are routed to sample box 2, a laboratory hood located in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB). The hood is connected to combination blower /prefilter, HEPA filter package S-2 and discharges to the FHB atmosphere. The S-2 inlet dampers should be adjusted to maintain a 100 to 140 feet / minute face velocity at the sample box 2 hood. This system provides the operator with the capability to periodically monitor the effectiveness of the system. Also, the turbidity of the effluent from the filters is constantly monitored by nephelometers and displayed at the local control panel. The radiation levels of the ion exchange influent and the boron concentration and pH of the ion exchange effluent are also constantly monitored and displayed at the local control panel. Several inlets have been provided on the Defueling Water System (OHC) system through which borated water can be gravity fed from the standby reactor pressure control system storage tank to operate the filter-aid and coagulant systems, in l addition to filling and backflushing the system. The CLD I booster pump (CLD-P-1) may also be used as an aid in filling i and backflushing the system. The system will be backflushed when radiation levels in the piping are determined to be excessive and prior to maintenance. Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 A path to allow flow to the reactor coolant bleed tanks is provided to allow for system inventory reduction. Also, batch processing to remove Sb-125 will be performed by EPICOR-II from a RCBT as required. This flow path uses a portion of the submerged demineralizer system. This path is located down-stream of the DWC lon exchangers, and, as such, this flow does not pass through the Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS) lon exchange vessels. 1.3.2 System Components P-2 A/B Reactor Vessel Cleanup Pumps Type: Vertical Submersible Deep Well Pump Model: Goulds VIS 9AHC/2 Material: Stainless Steel Bowl and shaft with a bronze impeller Motor: Franklin Electric 25 hp, 460 Volt, 3 phase Rating: 264 FT TDH at 220 gpm Minimum Flow: 20 gpm F-1/2/3/4 Reactor Vessel Filters Type: Pleated Sintered metal media Model: Pall Trinity special product contained in a critically safe canister Rating: 0.5 micron Nominal Removal Rating Flow: 100 gpm F-5/6 Filter Canister Post Filter and DWC Post Filter Type: Disposable Cartridge Model: Filterite No. 921273 Type 18M503C-304-2-FADB-C150 Rating: 0.45 micron to 30 micron nominal removal rating Flow: 20 to 60 gpm K-1/3 Ion Exchangers Type: Zeolite resin or other approved media contained in a 4'x4' HIC Model: Nuclear Packaging 50 ft 3 Enviralloy Demineralizer/ HIC Flow: 30 gpm P-6/8 Forwarding Pumps Type: Air driven double diaphragm pump Model: B.A. Bromley Heavey Metal Pump Model No. H25 Material: Stainless Steel with Viton diaphragms Rating: 60 feet TDH at 60 gpm PSV R-4, R-5, R-6, and R-7 Relief Valves Model: Anderson Greenwood No. 83MS46-4L Orifice Area: 0.049 in2 Set Pressure: 130 psig Rev. 10/0135P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 Sample Box 1 ! Type: Glove Box !' Mfgr: -Labconco Model: No. 50002, Radioisotope Glove Box. Material: Fiberglass-reinforced polyester Built-in Blower: 115 volt, 1/15 HP, variable speed Filters: Inlet Prefilter, outlet HEPA filter Dimensions: 50" x 30" x 37" i Sample Box 2 i j Type: Laboratory Hood Mfgr: Labconco. Model: No. 47810, Radioisotope-47 Laboratory Hood Material: 316 stainless steel Dimensions: 47" x 29" x 59" Recommended Face Velocity: 100-140 ft/ min. 1 S-2 Sample Box 2 Filtration Module ! Mfgr: General Dynamics Reactor Plant Services Model: PFB(H)-1000 Filters: Pref 11ter and HEPA filter ' Blower: 230 VAC, 5 HP, 20 AMP, 3450 rpm -I Rated Capacity: 1000 CFM 1 DHC-P-12 Coagulant Unit Mfgr: STRANCO d Model: Polyblend LO PB12-0.2 Capacity: 4 to 40 gph (diluted, activater polyner)- DHC-P-10A/B and DHC-P-13 Filter-Aid and Coauglant Booster Pumps i Type: Progressing Cavity Pump Model: Hoyno 6M2CDQAAA-4 Motor: 3/4 HP, 115/230 VAC Capacity: 4 to 30 gph ! DHC-U-32A/B, 33A/B, and 34A/B Static Mixers Mfgr: Chemineer, Inc. i Model: Kenics 2.5KMS3 or 3KMS3 i Material: 304 or 304L Stainless with 150# Flanged Connections For instrumentation, valves, piping, and equipment details, see References 12, 13, 14 and 15 respectively. i i 1.4 System Performance Characteristics i t The system is designed to function in any of the modes of operation
- shown in Table 1.
z
?.
i i Rev. 10/0135P 1
- _ - _ . , . _ . - . - - _.,,_m.,..,,-. ~. . . _ . . _ - - - . . . . . , , , _ . - - - - - , _ , - _ , - . . - - _ _ - , , -__ . . _ , , _ . _ _ - . m__ .
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 TABLE 1 REACTOR VESSEL CLEANUP SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS FILTER FLOW (GPM) ION EXCHANGER FLOW (GPM) (Return to (Return to Reactor Vessel) Reactor Vessel) 400 (200) 0 400 (200) 30 400 (200) 60 (0) 30 (0) 60 NOTE: When using coagulant and filter-aid, flowrate is generally limited to a maximum of 100 gpm per filter canister in service and the above filter flows should be adjusted accordingly. (Numbers in brackets indicate flow if only one train is in operation.) i 1 Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 The operational mode is determined by the particulate and radioactive concentrations in the RV. If the visibility in the RV is sufficient to allow defueling operations _ to continue, and the NTU level is below 5 (see Section 2.3), a train with a bypass line may be run at a reduced flow to allow processing of the water through the ion exchangers (30 gpm ! each) without using the filter canisters. The choice of one or both lon exchangers is based on the equivalent C-137 concentration in the RV. If the visibility deteriorates, such that defueling operations cannot continue, or if the NTU level exceeds 5, processing through the ion exchangers should be discontinued, and filtration through the filter canisters should be initiated and continued until defueling operations can resume and the NTU level is below 5. Filtration would be done by either adjusting the valve line-up in the bypassed train or by starting 3 the other train, or by performing both of the above. As the filters load up, the pressure differential across the filter train increases. As the differential pressure increases, the flow rate may be maintained constant by manually adjusting remote valves V015A and l V0158 (HV-30A and 308). i 1.5 System Arrangement Hell pumps P-2A and 28 are located in the fuel storage pit of the Unit 2 Reactor Bldg. These pumps are housed in wells which are located in this i pit. The wells are connected by pipe to the Westinghouse work plat- , form. The pump discharge is routed through a 4" hose to the filter l' canisters via a skid mounted manifold which is located above the water level of the canal. The filter isolation valves are also located on the skid. The filter canisters are in racks which are submerged in the fuel transfer canal. The manifold is connected to the inlet and outlet of the filters via coded hoses. The filter canister inlet hoses are substantially longer than the outlet hoses to allow contact time between the filter-aid and waste / coagulant stream, if used. The inlet and outlet connections are coded to prevent mis-connection of the hoses. The outlets from the filters return to the manifold from where the water is routed back to the vessel or to the ion exchange system for further processing. The coagulant addition system, P-12 and P-13, are located on elevation 347'-6" of the RB, south of the fuel transfer canal. It is connected to the system via hose attached to DHC-V-288A or B, the injection point on ! the P-2A or B discharge. The filter-aid system is located on elevation 347'-6" of the RB near the incore instrument service area, and may be connected to the individual injection points at the manifold outlet l piping to each of the filter canisters via hoses. l The ton exchangers are located behind appropriate shleiding in the FHB. , The water that has been demineralized is pumped back to its source or to ' one of the RBCTs by air driven pumps which are located near the ion i exchangers. l Sample box 1 is at the southeast end of the spent fuel pool A. Sample box 2 is on the DHC system platform near the OHC lon exchangers. Rev. 10/0136P ) 2
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 The system uses the following existing penetrations which have been modified for their temporary function. Modified Penetration No. System Function R-542 Decay Heat Backflush/ Borated Water Supply R-546 Radwaste Disposal Flow to Ion Gas Exchangers i R-553 Radwaste Disposal Return from Reactor Coolant Ion Exchangers Liquid R-537 'R.B. Emergency Spray Sampling and Core Flooding Return R-545B&C Spares Sampling R-554D Instrument Air Instrument Air to LOCA Dampers Supply to DWC For further location and arrangement information see References 7, 8 and 16. 1.6 Instrumentation and Control 1.6.1 Controls The majority of system control is handled remotely from. two (2) control panels which are located in the FHB. This is due to the fact that much of the system is located in the RB which
- has limited access. The RV cleanup pumps do have local- hand switches to shut the pumps down.
4 Filtered water flow back to the RV is monitored by the oper-ator and adjusted by remotely controlled valves V015A and V015B (HV30A and B). The flow to the ton exchangers is controlled automatically by flow control valve V084 (FV-10), which seeks to maintain flow to the ton exchangers at the selected setpoint. Return flow to the RV from the ton exchangers is controlled I automatically by control valves V029 and V266 (LV 45 and 72). Each valve responds to a changing level in its associated ion exchanger, which is sensed by a " bubbler" type of level i measuring device. This level is maintained between a high and low setpoint in the ion exchanger. The forwarding pumps' head-flow characteristics can be changed as needed by manually adjusting the air pressure to the pumps. This control scheme maintains the inflow equal to the outflow :n the ton exchanger. For further information on the instrument & tion, refer to the Instrument Index (Reference 12). Rev. 10/0136P
. 3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 1.6.2 Power The pump motors are supplied .with 480V power through a motor control center which is energized by an existing unit substation located in the Aux 111ary Building. 120 VAC power will be supplied from the control panel or local sources. 1.6.3 Monitoring Monitoring equipment is provided to evaluate the performance 4 of the system and to aid in proper operation of the system. The discharge pressure of the submersible well pumps is monitored (PI-4A and 48) to determine if the pump is operating correctly and also to provide another indication that the pump is operating. In order to determine the degree of filter loading, the primary filter canisters and the secondary post filters are equipped with remote indication of differential pressure across the filters (DPI-5A, 5B and 33). The differential pressure across the canisters will be used to determine when the filters are loaded to capacity. i Flow in the filter train and the ion exchanger loop is mont-tored (FI-7A, 78 and 10) to ensure that inflow to the RV equals the outflow. This is important to insure that the . level in the RV remains constant. Also, the flow to each ion exchanger is integrated by a local device (FQI76 and 77) to determine the loading on each lon exchanger.
- The process fluid conditions are monitored to determine the effectiveness of the system.
The turbidity level in the fluid is monitored (AI 43A and 438) prior to its return to the source. Also, the capability to obtain grab samples of process fluid has been provided for at several locations in the system. The radiation levels in the process fluid are continuously monitored upstream of the ion exchangers (RE-9). , A high radiation alarm (RAH-9) is also provided. This will alert the operator to the need of processing at a higher rate. The pH and boron concentration are monitored downstream of the ton exchangers (AE 11 and 17). This assures the operator that the proper boron concentration is maintained in the return flow. The high and low level trip conditions in the ion exchangers alarm to the local control panel located in the FHB. This is done to ensure that the operator is aware of this condition so that the proper evaluation of the system condition that caused the level mismatch can be made. The operator will isolate the ion exchanger portion of the system during this event.
- In line flow indicators are provided in the return line from the Sample Boxes to the RV. Their purpose is to confirm that
. flow exists through the sample box piping and, therefore, provide a means of assuring that a representative sample has Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 , ATTACHMENT 1 been taken by showing that there has been flow long enough to flush out the stagroant water. 1.6.4 Trips and Interlocks The RV cleanup well pumps, P-2A/B, are provided with low level setpoint trips, and alarm LAL-2A, to ensure that the pumps do not operate under potential cavitation conditions. Also, a low level in an ion exchanger will trip its forwarding pump and terminate flow from that ion exchanger. Additionally, a high level in the ion exchanger would terminate flow to that . ion exchanger by closing its inlet valve, and also would stop its forwarding pump. These trips are taken from a conduc-1 tivity level probe in the ion exchangers. A low level in the Internals Indexing Fixture (IIF) will trip pumps P-2A and P-28. l Locally mounted toggle switches are provided near the ion 4 exchanger to disable the level switches to allow for filling and draining of the ton exchangers. An alarm at the local 3 control panel alerts the operator when the level switches are i disabled. The RV cleanup well pumps, P-2A/B are equipped with interlocks i to prevent them from being started during a low level condi-
- tion. Additionally, either a high or a low level in the ion i exchangers prevents the valve upstream of the ion exchangers from being opened and prevents the restart of the air driven forwarding pumps. This will ensure that the exchangers are not overfilled and also that any flow mismatch condition is properly evaluated by the operator prior to restart of the system.
For trip setpoints, see section 2.2. t. 1.7 System Interfaces 4 Those systems interfacing with the DHC are as follows:
, a. Standby Reactor Pressure Control System Use: Provide a source of borated water for backflushing, filling and the filter-ald/ coagulant systems
! Tle-in: A single connection from SPC-T-4 downstream of SPC-V-1 to several points in system l
- b. Submerged Demineralizer System Use: Provide a path to the reactor coolant bleed tanks Tle-in: Downstream of CN-V-IX-32 near 1 1/2" jumper from downstream of lon exchanger post filters.
- c. Instrument Air System Use: Provide source of instrument air to equipment in the RB and l FHB.
Tle-in: From existing Instrument Air supply to LOCA dampers or l Spent Fuel Pool Gate Seals. Rev. 10/0136P
. .-. . _ - - - . = .- --
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1
- d. Service Air System l Use: Provide a source of service air to the Forwarding Pumps P-6 and P-8. '
Tie-in: Service Station 87 plus another station if needed
- e. FHB Ventilation System !
Use: Receive sample box 1 ventilation Tie-in: 4 inch diameter hose station at southeast end of FHB
- f. Canister Loading and Decontamination System Use: Provide borated water for surface decontamination of canisters and pressure to deliver borated water for a. above. I Tie-in: At Valves DHC-V321, V322, and V323 r 1.8 Quality Assurance The defueling water cleanup system is classified according to the safety functions of its parts. There are three classifications in this system:
Portions of the system associated with lon exchange processing are
~
a. , considered to be a radioactive waste processing system; therefore, , these portions of the system shall be subject to the quality l assurance guidelines contained in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.143. j b. The filter canisters are classified as nuclear -safety related and i are designed to prevent a condition that could result in a return to nuclear criticality of the fuel retained in the filters.
- c. The remaining portions of the system are subject to the BNAPC non-safety-related quality assurance program.
The TMI-2 Recovery QA Plan will be applicable for work performed on site. 1 2.0 SYSTEM LIMITATIONS, SETPOINTS AND PRECAUTIONS i 2.1 Limitations The system is flow limited to 200 gpm through each filter train, 400 gpm total, and 30 gpm through each ion exchanger, 60 gpm through the ton exchanger loop. The main filter canisters are limited to a maximum allowable psid which is flowrate dependent as read on DPI-5A/B (see graph, Section 8.0). This allows a maximum of 60 pst differential across the filter media including friction losses in the piping and hoses at design flows. At 55 psid, an alarm on the local control panel will alert the operator l to monitor filter pressure differential closely. The filter canister post filter (F-5) is limited to 18 psid. At this . point, an alarm on the control panel will inform the operator to stop the flow through the post filter and investigate. The ion exchanger post filter (F-6) is limited to 45 psid. i 1 Rev. 10/0136P
._ . ___ __ __ __ , _ _ . - . . ~ _ _
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 The ion exchanger post filter is considered full and ready for change out when either the maximum pressure differential is reached or when the performance (flow) drops 20'/. below design flow. 2.2 Setpoints DPSH 5 A/B trips the alarm at 55 psid across the filter canisters. ASL 17 trips the alarm at a low Boron concentration of 4850 ppm. DPSH 33 trips the alarm at 18 psid across the filter canister post filter. RC-LIS 103 trips alarms and pumps at high IIF level of 327'-9" and a low IIF level of 327'-3". RIS-9 trips the alarm at a high radiation reading of 0.9 mR/hr. LSL 37/71 and LSH 37/11 trip the ion exchange loops at i 3" from the normal operating level. (NOTE: Low level is 10" from top of IX, High level is 4" from top of IX.) LIS 2A/B trips alarm LAL-2A when a decreasing level of 320'-6 1/2" is reached in the well, and trips pumps 2A/B when a decreasing level of 317'-6 1/2" is reached in the well. (The pumps are tripped when the water is approximately l'-0" above the pump suction). For additional setpoint information, refer to Reference 12. l 2.3 Precautions Due to the number of quick disconnect couplings, extra care should be taken to ensure that the coupilngs are properly connected and that they are connected in the proper locations. This precaution will help prevent a loss of RV inventory. The portion of the startup procedures concerning the well pumps should be strictly adhered to to prevent the rapid filling of an empty mant-fold. This situation could cause a harmful pressure wave to develop which has the potential to damage the filter media. Also, during initial startup, a siphon must be established in the suction of the well pumps. This will be done by filling and venting the piping and by slowly starting the system. The filter canisters operate by a surface filtration method, and their efficiency increases as a cake is built up on the surface of the media. Therefore, the build up of this cake is an important part of the filtra-tion process. The canister life expectancy may be increased by the injection of a coagulant and/or filter-ald into the waste stream upstream of the filters. To prevent the migration of fines to the post filter, the ion exchange portion of the system should not be started until a cake has begun to be formed on the media. This can be verified l by observing the turbidity of the filter effluent. When the filter j train is started up, there will be an initial turbidity spike caused by smaller particles passing through the media. As the cake is built, these particles are stopped and the turbidity decreases. Once the l l Rev. 10/0136P i
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 turbidity reaches a level of 5 NTU or less, the ton exchange portion of the system can be started. To prevent the breakdown of the cake, the system should not be started or stopped unnecessarily. Due to the radioactivity in the water, the system should be carefully drained and flushed prior to any maintenance work. Double isolation has been provided for in the system design to separate borated and nonborated water supplies. 4 Periodically the face velocity across the sample box 2 hood should be checked to verify it is within the range of 100 to 140 feet / minute. If the face velocity is too low the S-2 inlet dampers should be readjusted accordingly. 3.0 OPERATIONS 3.1 Initial Fill The system is filled initially by borated water from the standby reactor coolant pressure system through the backflushing system provided (see section 3.7). The filters are filled to the inlet and outlet manifolds arad the ion exchangers are filled until they reach their normal operating level. The suction piping from the IIF to well pumps 2A/B should be filled as much as possible. l To initially fill the ONC lon exchangers K-1 and K-3 the level switches must be blocked out. This is accomplished by placing the block-out toggle switch, for the ton exchanger to be filled, in the proper post-tion. This will allow isolation valve V025 or V260 to be opened. Once the ton exchanger is filled to the operating level, the level switches are returned to operation by returning the block out toggle switch to I its original position. As a reminder to the operator, an alarm is activated at the control panel when the level switches are blocked out. 3.2 Startup Prior to startup, valve alignment must be checked to verify that the process water for each filter train and the ton exchanger loop is taken from and returned to the RV. If coagulant and filter-ald are to be used, the appropriate filter canister inlet and bypass valves are to be opened and the respective filter canister outlet valves are to be closed. The well pumps P-2A/B are isolated by the remote isolation valves V004A/B (HV27A/B) and manual isolation valves V370A/B, while the manifold inlets are isolated by manual isolation valves V372A/B. Therefore, the appropriate manual isolations must be opened. The ion exchanger loop is isolated by the remote isolation valves V025 and V260, and the control valves V029 and V266 (LV45 and LV72) in the ton exchanger loop. The return lines to the source are isolated by the remote control valves V015A/B (HV 30 A/B). For initial startup, valves V016 A/B should be closed. The well pumps are started and placed on '
- , minimum recirculation flow. The pump isolation valve V004A or B (HV27A
! or B) for one filter train is slowly opened to allow any trapped air to escape through the automatic vent valves. Once the isolation valve is i fully opened, the return valve V015 A/B (HV30A/B) is opened l
- approximately 857.. During initial startup, the globe valve V016 A/B is l l
, Rev. 10/0136P l 'l
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 opened slowly until 200 gpm through the train is obtained. Following initial startup, valves V016A/B will remain in these positions, and startup will be initiated by slowly opening valve V004A/B (HV27A/B) with , valve V015A/B (HV 30A/B) approximately 857. open. Flow is then adjusted to desired flowrate by adjusting valve V015A/B (HV 30A/B). If coagulant and filter-aid are being used, their injection is initiated followed by the opening of the appropriate filter canister outlet valves and the closing of the bypass valves. The ion exchange system is brought into service only when the turbidity, as monitored by the in line nephelometer, AE-43 A/B or by sample results, reaches an acceptably low level (i.e. 5 NTU). The ion exchanger (s) should always be brought to normal operating level prior to operation of this portion of the system. If the ion exchanger is at low level, it should be filled with borated water from the back flush system (see Section 3.7). At this time, the inlet isolation valve V025 or V260 is opened The air pressure to the ion exchanger forwarding pump is manually adjusted to the pressure required to maintain the flow rate chosen. The air supply solenoid valve V154 or V262 is then opened which will start the pump and lower the level in the ion exchanger to the point where the level control valve will close. This level is above the isolation low level. Flow is slowly started to the ion exchanger by opening the flow control valve until the desired lon exchanger flow rate is obtained. The proper flow of water will be returned to the source automatically as the level control for the ton exchanger adjusts the downstream control valve to regulate the outflow. The sample box 2 filtration module inlet dampers should be adjusted to create a 140 feet per minute face velocity across sample box 2. 3.3 Normal Operation Normal operation of the system is in one of the modes shown in Table 1 of Section 1.4. The mode of operation chosen is based on the particu-late and radioactivity concentrations in the Reactor Vessel. 3.4 Shutdown The steps to bring the system to a shutdown condition are basically the reverse of the startup procedure. The ton exchanger (s) fivw would be I brought to zero slowly by remote operation of the upstream flow control valve (s). As the level in the ion exchanger (s) drops, flow from the I forwarding pumps is terminated by the closure of the control valve downstream of the pump. Either (depending on system operation) of the isolation valves from the filtration trains to the ion exchanger is then closed, and the solenoid valve for the air supply to the forwarding pump is closed. The filtration trains are shut down one at a time by l stopping coagulant / filter-aid injection, if applicable, and closing the flow return control valve (s) and then shutting down the pump (s) and l closing the pump isolation valves. Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015-ATTACHMENT 1 3.5 Draining There is a low point drain which can drain both flitration train mant-folds and part of the ion exchange loops to the fuel transfer canal. A manual block-out switch is provided which will deactivate the ion exchanger level switches. This allows the ion exchangers to be pumped out to the reactor coolant bleed tanks via the connection provided. 3.6 Refilling The fully drained system can be refilled in the same manner that the system was initially filled. A partially drained system can be refilled by using either the back flush system (see section 3.7) or the well pumps (see section 3.2). 1 3.7 Infrequent Operations 4 Flushing of the system may be performed when the internal contamination level gets high or prior to internal maintenance work. The system is shutdown (see Section 3.4) prior to flushing. One flushing option allows a gravity flush from SPC-T-4. Borated water is stored in the charging water storage tank, SPC-T-4, located at the 347 f t. elevation in the FHB. This tank is connected to the DHC system. If desired, the CLD booster pump (CLD-P-1) may be used to j assist in backflushing. Either filter train may be flushed without
! stopping flow through the other.
Flushing may be accomplished by opening one of the inlet valves from the flushing system (depending on whicn portion of the system is to be flushed) and then opening the drain valve to the fuel transfer canal. After sufficient time has been allowed to flush the system, the drain valve is closed and then the inlet valve is closed. The system is then restarted following the procedures in Section 3.2. The ton exchangers may be operated in series, with the first containing the normal zeolite media for removal of cesium and strontium, while the second is loaded with activated charcoal to remove organic carbon, or some other unspecified media. In the case of activated charcoal, the media is borated prior to use to prevent deboration of processed fluids. In the case of any other medias which may be used, testing will be performed prior to use, to ensure these media have no adverse impact on RCS chemistry or specifications. System inventory can be decreased as needed by diverting the return flow from the ion exchangers through the lines provided to the Reactor Coolant Bleed Tanks. Also, the water can be routed to the RCBT as , required for processing through EPICOR to remove Sb-125 or other ; contaminants not removed by DWC lon exchangers, j 3.8 Transient Operations The only effects of anticipated transients (e.g., loss of pumps, valve misoperation, or loss of controls) are a mismatch of flows from and to the RV. Mc e water can be removed from the source than is replaced by a l failure to control level in the ion exchangers. In the worst case where l , l Rev. 10/0135P j i
. . . _ - . .. - = -
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 level control in the ton exchangers, while operating in parallel, is I lost, the source outflow will exceed the inflow by a maximum of 60 gpm. This situation can be detected by flow instrumentation in the return line and by a decreasing level in the RV. g 4.0 CASUALTY EVENTS AND RECOVERY PROCEDURES 4.1 Loss of Power
- t A loss of powar to the entire system would simply shut the system down.
A loss of power to the well pumps with an additional failure which results in simultaneous loss of level control in the ton exchangers would result in a flow mismatch. In this case, the system would be automatically shut down until power is restored. Loss of power to individual components would place the component in its safe mode. An air operated valve, for example, would fall to a position that ensures no damage to other components. t I Loss of power to the control panel would cause the loss of all informa-tion and fall all control and solenoid operated valves. The system would be shutdown until power is restored.
! 4.2 Loss of Instrumentation / Instrument Air Loss of instrumentation would hamper operations but .no adverse condi-a tions would result and the system could be safely shut down untti the problem is resolved. , Loss of a single instrument channel will result in the loss of indica-tion for that channel and, for those channels that have control features, a flow mismatch. This flow mismatch will result in an automatic shutdown of the affected portion of the system. ! Loss of the IIF level indication system (bubbler) will result in an erroneous level indication which will be noted when compared with a redundant level indication system. Since this system has no control features, no adverse system conditions will result.
Loss of instrument air will take the individual components to their fall safe position. Flow mismatches induced by loss of air will result in automatic trips. Loss of air to the IIF level monitoring system will initiate a low air supply pressure alarm. On the loss of instrument air, level control in the ton exchangers would be lost; however, the ion exchanger inlet isolation valve (V025 and V260) would fall to the closed position. Also, the level control valves, V029 and V266 (LV45 and LV72), will fall to the closed position to prevent siphoning of the ion exchanger. J 4.3 Filter Media Rupture l A failure of the filter media in the canister could potentially release fuel fines to the ton exchange portion of the system. A post filter is located downstream of both filter trains in the line to the ton exchangers. This filter will trap any fuel fines which would be trans-Rev. 10/0135P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 ported past the filter canisters in the event of filter failure. The post filter is designed to be critically safe and is sized so that a small accumulation of debris will increase the differential pressure to the alarm setpoint. Also, the nephelometers in the return line would alert the operator to a possible media rupture since the turbidity would increase rapidly. The recov:ry procedure is to isolate the filter trains and find the ruptured filter by observing the differential pressure versus flow for each individual canister. Lower differential pressure for a given flow will indicate that this filter is ruptured. That canister or canisters
- and the post filter cartridge would be replaced and the system restarted.
The system may be operated in a mode that bypasses the filter canisters. During this mode of operation, the filter canister post filter will be providing the required system filtration. In order to preclude the rupture of the post filter's filter media during operation, the maximum differential pressure that will be permitted across the post i filter will be 18 psid. The post filters are designed for a maximum l differential pressure of 45 psid. ] 4.4 Line and Hose Break ]
! The consequences of any line and hose break is a loss of RV inventory, i The system has been designed to mitigate the consequences of such an I incident to the extent possible.
! In case of a hose rupture or line rupture, downstream of the RV pumps, 1 P-2A and 28, the system is equipped to trip these pumps on the IIF low level and alarm to the control panel. This event could deliver approxi-mately 500 to 1000 gallons of RV water to the area of the break. The potential areas affected would be the RB and the FHB, each of which has sumps or drains to the Auxiliary Building sumps to contain the spill. If a suction pipe to the well pumps or a return hose to the RV should rupture, a siphoning of RV water would take place. The two 4 inch suction connections provided in the Westinghouse work platform are l provided with two 3/4 inch holes, or in the case of the 2 inch deep suction, one 3/4 inch hole, drilled 18 inches below the water level which will act as a siphon breaker (s). The three 2 inch return lines , are equipped with spargers, which are simply holes drilled into the pipes. The first holes are drilled 18 inches below the water level l , which will act as a siphon breaker. The sample return line is terminated 18 inches below the water level. Therefore, a maximum of approximately 3000 gallons of RV water would spill into the fuel . transfer canal following a hose rupture. Approximately half of this water would be contained in the New Fuel Pit. The recovery from these events would be accomplished by isolating the I ruptured section and replacing the ruptured hose / pipe. l 5.0 SYSTEM MAINTENANCE , The maintenance procedures are the recommended practices and intervals as j described by the equipment vendors. Rev. 10/0136P j
3525-015 ATTACHMENT I 6.0 TESTING 6.1 Hydrostatic Testing Piping and hose will be hydrostatically pressure tested. Testing of hose will be done after couplings have been attached. Pipe will be tested outside the buildings. 6.2 Leak Testing All accessible connections will be initial service leak tested after the piping is assembled. 6.3 Instrument Testing All instruments will be calibrated by vendors. Complete electric /- pneumatic loop verification will be done during start-up. 7.0 HUMAN FACTORS Filter canister hoses are coded for quick identification of inlet versus outlet. Extensive use of hoses is made, especially in the RB, allowing quick installa-tion and use of existing radiation shielding. Hoses which are expected to be frequently disconnected are equipped with quick disconnect coupilngs for ease of removal and replacement, and positive identification to preclude incorrect connections. The following human factors guidelines have been incorporated into the design of the DHC system control panel: o The panel includes all controls and displays required for normal operation. o Displays provide immediate feedback that the system has responded appropriately to an operator's action, o Controls and displays are laid-out for a left to right flow path, o Mimic lines are used to clarify flow paths. o Control devices are mounted 3 to 6 feet above the floor. o Each control device has a name plate. o Light bulbs are replaceable from the front of the panel, o Recorders are grouped on the right side of the panel away from the flow path, o Adjustments to recorders and controllers can be performed from the front of the panel. Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 1 8.0 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE P AT GIVEN FLOWRATES Maximum Allowable AP at Given Flowrates
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3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION DEFUELING WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM FUEL TRANSFER CANAL / SPENT FUEL POOL CLEANUP SYSTEM 1
--.. .m__--__ __m.m.____._ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
. 3525-015 ATTACHMENT-2 i TABLE OF CONTENTS , SECTION 1.0 DESIGN DESCRIPTION ,
- 1.1 Summary
{ 1.2 References ! 1.3 Detailed System Description i 1.4 System Performance Characteristics ! 1.5 System Arrangement 1.6 Instrumentation and Control ] 1.7 System Interfaces
- 1.8 Quality Assurances i
2.0 SYSTEM LIMITATION, SETPOINTS, AND PRECAUTIONS i 2.1 Limitations
)
2.2 Setpoints 2.3 Precautions ' i ! 3.0 OPERATIONS . 3.1 Initial Fill l j 3.2 Startup j 3.3 Normal Operations t 3.4 Shutdown ] 3.5' Draining ) 3.6 Refilling ; j 3.7 Infrequent Operations i { 3.8 Transient Operations i 4.0 CASUALTY EVENTS AND REC 0VERY PROCEDURES 4.1 Loss of Power 4.2 Loss of Instrumentation / Instrument Air
! 4.3 Filter and Hose Break l f 4.4 Line and Hose Break [
) 5.0 SYSTEM MAINTENANCE J j Rev. 10/0136P i i ;
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) SECTION 6.0 TESTING 6.1 Hydrostatic Testing 6.2 Leak Testing 6.3 Instrument Testing 7.0 HUMAN FACTORS 1 Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2- i 1.0 DESIGN DESCRIPTION 1.1 Summary The Fuel Transfer Canal (FTC)/ Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cleanup system is a 4 temporary 11guld processing system which is designed to process water contained in the SFP and/or the FTC. The system's major functions are:
- a. To filter the water contained in the SFP and/or the FTC to remove
- suspended solids above a nominal .5 micron rating. This is done to maintain the clarity of the water.
] ! b. To remove soluble fission products from the SFP or the FTC by ] demineralization of the water. This is done to keep the equivalent Cs-137 concentration less than .02 uC1/ml, excluding antimony, and
} Also, a
- thus reduce the dose rate contribution of the water.
i flowpath to EPICOR II via the. Reactor Coolant Bleed Tanks (RCBTs) is provided to remove Sb-125 in the event that high Sb-125 levels are encountered. 1.2 References
- 1. Planning Study, Defueling Hater Cleanup System Document No. l TP0/TMI-046.
- 2. Technical Plan, Defueling Hater Cleanup System Document No. l TP0/THI-047.
- 3. Division I, System Design Description, Defueling Water Cleanup
. System Document No. 2-R72-DHC01.
- 4. Bechtel Drawing 2-M74-DHC01, Defueling Hater Cleanup (DHC) Reactor Vessel Cleanup System P&ID.
- 5. Bechtel Drawing 2-M74-DHC02, Defueling Water Cleanup (DHC) Fuel Transfer Canal / Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup System P&ID.
- 6. Bechtel Drawing 2-M74-DHCO3, Defueling Water Cleanup (DHC)
! Auxiliary Systems P&ID. i ! 7. Bechtel Drawing 2-POA-6401, General Arrangement Fuel Handling Building Plan El. 347'-6". $ 8. Bechtel Drawing 2-P0A-1303, General Arrangement Plenum Removal Reactor Building. l i l 9. DCN No. 2026-30-2, Flow Diagram Spent Fuel Cooling and Decay Heat Removal.
- 10. Burns and Roe Drawing No. 2026, Flow Diagram Spent Fuel Cooling and Decay Heat Removal.
i
- 11. GPU Nuclear Drawing No.< 2R-950-21-001 P&ID Composite Submerged Demineralizer System.
1 Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2
- 12. THI-2 Recovery Division System Design Description for Submerged Demineralizer System, Document No. SD 3527-005.
- 13. Division System Design Description for Reactor Vessel Cleanup System, Document No. 15737-2-M72-DHC01.
- 14. Instrument Index, Document No. 15737-2-J16-001.
- 15. Design Engineering Valve List, Document No. 15737-2-P16-001.
- 16. Mechanical Equipment List, Document No. 15737-2-M16-001.
- 17. Standard For Piping Line Specifications, Document No. 15737-2-P-001.
- 18. Bechtel Piping Isometrics
- a. 2-P60-DHC01-DHCS-Pumps P-2A&B, P-3A&B, P-4A&B, and Miscellaneous Details, I
- b. 2-P60-DHC04-DHCS - Transfer Canal / Fuel Pool Filter Trains A &
B - Inlet Manifold Piping.
- c. 2-P60-DHC06-DHCS - Discharge Piping from Sample Boxes No.1 l and No. 2 to Penetration R-537.
I
- d. 2-P60-DHC07-DHCS - Samples Lines Upstream and Downstream of Ion Exchangers, I
- e. 2-P60-DHC08-DHCS - Forwarding Pumps P-6 and P-7, Suction and Discharge Piping.
- f. 2-P60-DHC09-DHCS - Forwarding Pumps P-6 and P-7 Discharge Piping.
I
- g. 2-P60-DHC10-DHCS - Supply Piping to Ion Exchangers K-1 and K-2, Supply and Discharge Piping from Post Filter F-8.
h, 2-P60-DHC11-DHCS - Supply Piping to Ion Exchangers K-1, K-2, and K-3. I
- 1. 2-P60-DHCl2-DHCS - Borated Hater Flush Piping from SPC-T-4.
- j. 2-P60-DHCl3-DHCS - Transfer Canal / Fuel Pool Filter Trains "A" and "B" Outlet Manifold Piping.
I
- k. 2-P60-DHC14-DHCS - Transfer Canal / Fuel Pool Filter Trains "A" and "B" Outlet Manifold Discharge Piping, Supply and Discharge I I
to Booster Pump P-5. I
- 1. 2-P60-DHC15-DHCS - Nitrogen Supply Piping to SPC-T-4 and Drying Station.
I
- m. 2-P60-DHC16-DHCS - Discharge Piping from DHC Booster Pump P-5.
- n. 2-P60-DHC17 DHC Miscellaneous Piping Detalls.
Rev. 10/0136P _-__ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2
- o. 2-P60-DHC18 - DHCS - Miscellaneous Piping Details.
I
- p. 2-P60-DHC19 - DHCS - Sample Panel No. 1, Fuel Handling Building.
I
- q. 2-P60-DHC20 - DHCS - Sample Box No. 2, Fuel Handling Building.
I
- r. 2-P60-DHC21 - DHCS - Sample Panel No. 2 Drain and Return to Spent Fuel Pool A.
- s. 2-P60-DHC22 - DHCS - Air Supply Piping Details.
- 19. ECA No. 3245-84-0034 - Defueling Water Cleanup System Penetration Modifications.
- 20. ECA No. 3525-84-0041 - Definition of the Defueling Hater Cleanup System (DHCS).
- 21. ECA No. 3527-84-0042 - SDS Tie-in to DHCS.
- 22. Bechtel Area Piping Drawings
- a. 2-P70-DHC02 - Instrument Air Manifolds and Hose Routings for DHCS - Reactor and Fuel Handling Building,
- b. 2-P70-DHC03 DHCS Hose Net'sork Reactor Building Plan El. 347'-6".
- c. 2-P70-DWC04 DHCS Hose Network Fuel Handling Building Plan El. 347'-6".
- d. 2-P70-DHC05 - DHC System Hose Network Sections and Details.
- e. 2-P70-DHC06 - DHCS - Process Hose Schedule - Reactor and Fuel Handling Building.
- f. 2-P70-CLD01 - Canister Loading and Decontamination System, Fuel Handling Building.
- 23. TER 3527-016, TMI-2 Division Technical Evaluation Report for l Defueling Canisters.
1.3 Detailed System Description 1.3.1 Description The FTC/SFP cleanup system is a 11guld processing system which can process water from the SFP and/or the FTC. For the corresponding P&ID's see references 4, 5, and 6. Some valves identified herein have been given an instrumentation desig-nator as well as a valve number. When this occurs, the instrument designator is shown in parentheses after the valve number. The SFP and the deep end of the FTC will be filled with water ; to a level of 327'-3" + 8. A dam with top elevation 328'-2" , separates the shallow and deep ends of the FTC. ! Rev. 10/0136P
_ .___ _ _ _ -~ -_ _ __ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ 5 3525-015' , ATTACHMENT 2 y Two - vertical submersible well pumps, P-3A/B, are located . in the FTC. Each is capable of pumping a net l200 gpm. A 20 gpm 3 L continuous- recycle protects the. pump- motor. P-3A/B take suction: from trough-type skimmer U-7. via a 6 inch . flexible j' hose. A secondary,~ 4 inch,. subsurface inlet below the= skimmer will prevent pump starvation due to skimmer congestion. - 1 Pumps P-3A/B discharge to the FTC/SFP filter canisters via Reactor Building (RB) . penetration R-524. The internals of check valve SF-Vl90 are removed to make use of existing piping connected to R-524.
-Two vertical submersible we'll pumps, P-4A/B, identical to P-3 i A/B in the FTC, are located in the SFP. P-4A/B take suction from trough-type skimmer, U-8, similar.to U-7. ! The system has four particulate . filters, each capable of l
filtering a' flow of .100 gpm. The filters are contained in modified fuel canisters submersed in the SFP to provide the
; appropriate radiation shielding. These filters .are capable of removing debris, mainly fuel -fines (UO2) and . core debris 4 (Zr02 ), . down to a 0.5 micron rating. Since the canisters contain fuel fines, they are designed to prevent a criticality condition from existing when they have been loaded.
4
- The four pumps and four filters are normally manifolded so one pump from each source discharges to one pair of - filters.
i Therefore, the filtration ' portion of .the system is divided i into two trains. Train A contains pumps P-3A and P-4A and i i- filter canisters F-9 and F-10. Train B contains pumps P-38 and. P-4B and filter canisters F-ll and F-12. In the normal mode the system filters 400 gpm from the FTC and returns the
! filtrate to the SFP. The. system can be manifolded to filter 200 gpm from the FTC and 200 gpm .from the SFP or 400 gpm from l , either source. This pump arrangement provides both flexi-
{ bility in operations and the redundancy to permit continued
; operation during pump maintenance.
i The system may also be configured to bypass- a set of filter i canisters and to route water directly to the post filter and ion exchanger. This may be done by disconnecting the inlet- . i and outlet hoses to one canister, from-the manifold, inserting '
, a hose bypass piece between the inlet and outlet flanges on-the manifold for that canister- position, and closing the isolation valves for the other canister in that train. '
A filter canister is used until the differential pressure
; reaches a set point (See section 2.2). At this point the
- system is. shutdown and then, after a waiting period of approx- '
imately 5 minutes, it is restarted. The differential pressure is noted and if it returns to a low value the system will be 4 run again to the pressure setpoint. This process is repeated i until the differential pressure. at restart reaches a value j near the shutdown setpoint. When this occurs within one hour-of restart, the train is shutdown and the filters are replaced. l i l Rev. 10/0136P i
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 Loaded canisters are expected to generate small quantitles of oxygen and hydrogen gas due to radiolysis of water. Pressure relief valves R-8, R-9, R-10 and R-11 are provided on the filter canister outlet lines upstream of their isolation valves. Their purpose is to prevent overpressuring the filter canisters when isolated due to the small quantities of H2 and 02 produced (approximately 0.029 ft3/ day). The filter canisters are connected to inlet and outlet mani-folds via 2-1/2 inch flexible hoses with cam and groove couplings. Once the water has been filtered, all, or a portion of the flow can be returned to its source (eithen ue SFP or the FTC). The amount of water pumped from its source is controlled by manually adjusting globe valves V097 A/B. The return path to the FTC uses RB penetration R-539. At each source the return path splits into two 2-inch returns to provide back pressure to valves V097 A/B. One two inch return is used for 200 gpm operation; both are used for 400 gpm operation. A portion of the flow not returned directly to source can be further processed through either the DHC ion exchanger K-2 or the submerged demineralizer system (SDS). Routing to the SDS is provided as a backup to K-2 and to augment total processing capability during times of high cesium concentration in either source. The DHC lon exchanger K-2 can process 30 gpm. The ton exchange media is a bed of zeolite resin which will remove Cs-137. The resin is contained in a 4 x 4 liner, similar to those used in EPICOR II. K-2 influent is regulated by flow control valve V085 (FV-15) while K-2 effluent is regulated by level control valve V070 (LV-46). If either high or low levels occur in K-2, LSH-40 or LSL-40 will trip both isolation valve V069, halting influent, and solenoid valve V156, shutting off air supply to DHC forwarding pump P-7, thus halting effluent. Two post filters are provided. Filter canister post filter F-8 protects K-2 from suspended solids in the event of a canister filter media rupture. DHC post filter F-7 is located downstream of the forwarding pump to prevent the migration of resin fines. DHC forwarding pump P-7, an air driven recipro- 1 cating diaphram pump, provides the head to return flow to ) either source. The SDS can process 15 gpm. The DHC Booster Pump, P-5, is provided to increase the pressure to 140 psig to overcome the high SDS differential pressure. P-5 suction pressure will vary inversely with pressure differential across the filter i canisters. When the filter canisters are clean or bypassed, l P-5 will experience maximum suction pressure. Since P-5 I outlet pressure is controlled, _ pump flowrate varies. Pressure regulator V122 (PCV-26) controls SDS inlet pressure at 140 psig, bypassing excess flow past SDS. PSV R-1 is provided downstream of the DHC Booster Pump to prevent overpressuring Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 the SDS due to V122 (PCV-26) failure. From the SDS, flow is routed to either the FTC or SFP. In the event of high Sb-125 levels, the return flow from K-'. can be routed to the reactor coolant bleed tanks for batch processing through EPICOR II. Sample points are provided upstream and downstream of each filter train. These samples are routed to sample box 1, a glove box located in the FHB. The glove box has a self contained blower and HEPA filter which discharge to the FHB ventilation system. Sample points are also provided upstream and downstream of ion exchanger K-2. These samples are routed to sample box 2, a laboratory hood located in the FHB. The hood is connected to combination blower /prefilter, HEPA filter package S-2 and discharges to the FHB atmospnere. The S-2 inlet dampers should be adjusted to maintain a 100 to 140 feet / minute face velocity at the sample box 2 hood. 1.3.2 System Components F-7/8 Filter Canister Post Filter and DHCS Post Filter Type: Disposable Cartridge Model: Filterite No. 921273 Type 18M503C-304-2-FADB-C150 Rating: 0.45 to 30 micron nominal removal rating I Flow: 20 to 30 gpm F-9. F-10. F-ll. F-12 Fuel Transfer Canal / Spent Fuel Pool Filters Type: Pleated sintered metal media Model: Pall Trinity special product contained in a criticality safe canister Rating: 0.5 micron Nominal Removal Rating Flow: 100 gpm K-2 Ion Exchanger Type: Zeolite resin contained in a 4' x 4' HIC Model: Nuclear Packaging 50 ft3 , Envirailoy, Demineralizer/ HIC Flow: 30 gpm P-3 A/B Fuel Transfer Canal Pumps Type: Vertical, 2 stage, submersible pump; Goulds model VIS, size 9AHC, 5.56 in impeller Metalurgy: Stainless steel bowl, bronze impeller, 416SS shaf t Motor: Franklin Electric 25 HP, 3550 rpm, 460V, 3 phase Rating: 220 gpm at 264 ft , Shutoff head: 289 ft. ) Min Flow: 20 gpm (recirculation) P-4A/B Spent Fuel Pool Pumps Identical to P-3A/B Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 P-5 DWC Booster Pump Type: Regenerative turbine, 2 stage, SIHI model AEHY 3102 BN 112.42.4 Metalurgy: 316SS casing with 316SS shaft, impeller, and internals Motor: 5 HP, 1750 rpm Rating: 15 gpm at 250 ft Shutoff head: 390 ft (at min flow) Min Flow: 5 gpm Seals: Mechanical, John Crane type 1 with tungsten carbide seal faces P-7 Forwarding Pump Type: Air driven double diaphragm pump Model: B.A. Bromley Heavy Metal Pump Model No. H25 Material: Stainless Steel with Viton diaphragms Rating: 60 feet TDH at 60 gpm PCV-26 Pressure regulator, SDS bypass Capacity: 25 gpm Model: Fischer Controls No. 98H PSV R-1 Relief Valve Model: Anderson Greenwood No. 81PS88-8 Capacity: 30 gpm Orifice: Size E, 0.196 in2 Set Pressure: 150 psig PSV R-8, R-9, R-10, R-11 Relief Valves Model: Anderson Greenwood No. 83MS46-4L Orifice: Area: 0.049 in2 Set Pressure: 130 psig Sample Box 1 Type: Glove Box Mfgr: Labconco Model: No. 50002, Radioisotope Glove Box Material: Fiberglass-reinforced polyester ' Built-in Blower: 115 volt, 1/15 HP, variable speed Filters: Prefilter, HEPA filter Dimensions: 50" x 30" x 37" Sample Box 2 Type: Laboratory Hood Mfgr: Labconco l Model: No. 47810, Radioisotope-47 Laboratory Hood l Material: 316SS i Dimensions: 47" x 29" x 59" Recommended Face Velocity: 100-140 ft/ min S-2 Sample Box 2 Filtration Module Mfgr: General Dynamics, Reactor Plant Services Model: PFB(H)-1000 Filters: Pref 11ter and HEPA Filter Blower: 230 VAC, 5 HP, 20 AMP, 3450 rpm Rated Capacity: 1000 CFM > Rev. 10/0136P
w 3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 ; 4 For further information on valves and instrumentation, refer to the Valve List (Reference 15) and the Instrument Index (Reference '14). For a listing of all equipment see the Mechanical Equipment List (Reference 16). For piping information see the - Standard for Piping. Line Specifications (Reference 17). 1.4 System Performance Characteristics The system is designed to function in any of the modes of operation , shown in Table 1. f i 4 i i Rev. 10/0136P i
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 TABLE 1 FUEL TRANSFER CANAL / SPENT FUEL POOL CLEANUP SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS Filter Flow (GPM) SDS Flow (GPM) K-2 Flow (GPM) From FTC From SFP From FTC From SFP From FTC From SFP 400 <200> 0 0 0 0 0 400 <200> 0 15 0 0 0 400 <200> 0 0 0 30 0 400 <200> 0 15 0 30 0 0 400 (200) 0 0 0 0 0 400 (200) 0 15 0 0 0 400 (200) 0 0 0 30 0 400 (200) 0 15 0 30 200 200 0 0 0 0 200 200 15 0 0 0 200 200 0 15 0 0 200 200 0 0 30 0 200 200 0 0 0 30 200 200 15 0 0 30 200 200 0 15 30 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 15 0 30 0 0 0 0 15 0 30 (numbers in brackets indicate 1 pump operation) Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 The operational mode is determined based upon which source needs to be processed. Normally, 30 gpm from the FTC will be processed through the ion exchanger and returned to the SFP (no filtration). During periods of high Cs-137 loading, an additional 15 gpm could be processed through the SDS, which would reduce the recovery time of the system. If the visibility in either source becomes too poor for defueling operations or exceeds an NTU valve of 5, processing should be discontinued until visibility is restored and the NTU valve is below 5. This would be done by filtering from the proper source, through the train without the bypass hose piece. 1.5 System Arrangement References 7 and 8 present the positioning of equipment. Well pumps P-3 A/B, are submersed in 10 inch diameter wells in the north end of the FTC in the RB. The wells are connected by a 6" flexible hose to skimmer U-7 located at the dam separating the deep and shallow ends of the FTC. Well pumps P-4A/B are submersed in the northeast end of SFP "A" in the Fuel Handling Building (FHB). These wells are connected by a 6" flex-Ible hose to skimmer U-8 located at the south end of the SFP. The discharge of pumps P-3A/B and P-4A/B is routed to the filter canisters inlet manifold near the northeast end of the SFP. The filter isolation valves, vent valves, and manual control valves V090A/B (HV-64A/B) are also located there. The filter outlet manifold is adjacent to the inlet manifold. Filter canisters F-9, F-10, F-11, and F-12 are submersed in the SFP in the north end of the dense pack fuel rack. They are connected to the inlet and outlet manifolds by 2-1/2 inch flexible, coded hoses equipped l with cam and groove couplings. The coupling at the fuel canister is modified for long handled tool operation. From the filter outlet manifold the water is routed either directly back to source or to the DHC ion exchanger K-2 or SDS for further processing. The DHC ion exchangers are located behind appropriate shleiding in the northwest end of the FHB. The forwarding pump P-7 is located near K-2. Sample box 1 is located at the southeast end of the SFP A and sample box 2 is on the DHCS platform near the DHC lon exchangers. The system uses the following existing penetrations which have been modified for their temporary function. Armored hose is used downstream of penetration R-539 to the FTC. Modified Penetration No. System Function R-524 Spent Fuel Discharge from Cooling Fuel Transfer Canal Pumps R-539 Decay Heat Closed Return to Fuel Cooling Water Transfer Canal Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015
-ATTACHMENT 2 1.6 Instrumentation and Control 1.6.1 Controls The components of this system are located in accessible areas of the FHB and the RB. With the exception of the DHC lon exchanger loop, valve alignment and adjustment is performed manually to achieve the proper flows to and from the various sources.
The flow to DHC lon exchanger K-2 is regulated automatically by flow control valve V085 (FV-15). K-2 effluent is regulated automatically by level control valve V070 (LV-46). 1.6.2 Power The pump motors are supplied with 480V power through a motor control center which is energized by an existing unit substa-tion located in the Aux 111ary Building. A stepdown trans-
; former will provide 120 VAC for valve operation and the control panel.
1.6.3 Monitoring Monitoring equipment is provided to evaluate the performance of the system and to aid in proper operation of the system. PI-25 monitors the Booster Pump discharge pressure to verify the correct operation of both the pump and the bypass pressure
' regulator, V122 (PCV-26)
- i FI-15 and FQI-15 monitor the flowrate and total flow of filtered water routed to DWC lon exchanger K-2 AE-16 monitors the pH in the water leaving K-2 and SDS to verify this parameter was not altered during ion exchange FI-23A and FQI-23A monitor the flowrate and total flow of filtered water returned directly to the FTC l FI-238 and FQI-238 monitor the flowrate and total flow of filtered water returned directly to the SFP
] FI-60 and FQI-60 monitor flowrate and total flow to the SDS to measure system performance and to record water processed DPI-22A/B monitor the differential pressure across the filter ' canisters to determine degree of loading and therefore time of replacement LI-46 monitors the liquid level in DHC lon exchanger K-2 FCC-LI-102 and SF-LI-102 monitor the water level in the FTC and SFP. They are panel mounted in the control room. The level indication system is a bubbler type system. A high or low level in the FTC will alarm FCC-LAHL-102 and a high or low Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 level in the SFP will alarm SF-LAHL-102 at the panel in the control room. Additionally, there is a joint FTC/SFP high-low level alarm (FCC-LAHL-103) that is locally mounted and alarms on a high or low level in the FTC or SFP. PI-81 and PI-82 monitor the pressure in the two instrument air manifolds in the FHB. The process fluid conditions can be sampled to determine the effectiveness of the system. The capability to obtain grab samples of process fluid has been provided at the inlet and outlet piping of the FTC/SFP Filter Trains A and B. Grao samples may also be taken on the inlet / outlet lines to the DHC lon exchanger as well as several points in the SDS. I In line flow Indicators are provided In the return lines from the Sample Boxes to SFP A. Their purpose is to confirm that flow exists through the sample box piping, and therefore, provide a means of assuring that a representative sample has been taken by showing that there has been flow long enough to flush out the stagnant water. 1.6.4 Trips Low or high liquid levels in DHC lon exchanger K-2 will terminate flow to and from K-2. Both LSL-40 and LSH-40 trip closed the inlet isolation valve V069 and P-7 air supply isolation valve V156. A locally mounted switch is provided at K-2 to override the level trips to fill and drain the ion exchanger. A signal alarm at the DHC control panel will notify the operator that the override is engaged. l.7 System Interfaces Those systems interfacing with the DHC are as follows: ! a. Standby Reactor Pressure Control System l Use: Provide a source of borated water for backflushing and I filling system Tle-in: A single connection from SPC-T-4 downstream of SPC-VI to the inlet manifold piping for the FTC/SFP Filters, Trains A and B I
- b. Submerged Demineralizer System Use: Provide a system for soluble fission product processing.
Tle-in. To downstream of pump HG-P-1 of SDS from downstream of FTC/SFP Filters. From downstream of the SDS polishing filter to downstream of the DHCS manual control valves V097A/B.
- c. Instrument Air System l Use: Provide source of instrument air to equipment.
Tle-in: At existing valves AH-V220 and IA-V171 Rev. 10/0136P
- ----,,,-c-, - - , .--,c e- ,- n -
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2
- d. Service Air System l Use: Provide a source of service air to the forwarding pump P-7.
Tle-in: Service Station 87 plus another station if needed
- e. Dewatering System
- Use
- Allow periodic use of DHC lon exchanger K-2 for the Dewatering System.
Tle-in: Upstream of filter canister post filter F-8.
- f. Canister Loading and Decontamination System Use: Provide borated water for surface decontamination of l canisters and provide pressure boost for (a) previous.
Tle-in: At Valves DHC-V321, V322, and V323. 1.8 Quality Assurance The defueling water cleanup system is classified according to the safety functions of its parts. There are three classifications in this system:
- a. Portions of the system associated with ion exchange processing are considered to be a radioactive waste processing system; therefore, these portions of the system shall be subject to the quality i assurance guidelines contained in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.143.
- b. The filter canisters are classified as nuclear safety related and are designed to prevent a condition that could result in a return to nuclear criticality of the fuel retained in the filters.
4
- c. The remaining portions of the system are subject to the BNAPC non-safety-related quality assurance program.
The TMI-2 Recovery QA Plan will be applicable for work performed on site. 2.0 SYSTEM LIMITATIONS, SETPOINTS, AND PRECAUTIONS i 2.1 Limitations The system is flow limited to 200 gpm through each filter train,15 gpm through SDS and 30 gpm through the DHC lon exchanger K-2. 4 The main filter canisters are limited to 55 psid as read on DPI-22A/B. This allows a 45 pst differential across the filter media, with 10 psi of drop due to friction losses in the piping and hoses at design flow. At this point an alarm on a local panel will inform the operator of the
- need to stop and restart the system or to remove and replace the filter.
i The filter canister post filter (F-8) is limited to 18 psid. The ton exchanger post filter (F-7) is limited to 45 psid. Filters are considered full and ready for change out when either the maximum
- pressure differential is reached or when the performance (flow) drops 4
201 below the design flow. The system should not be started and stopped frequently since the j canister filter precoat is lost during a shutdown; thus it will be
- necessary to reestablish a precoat on starting up before processing j through SDS or K 2.
Rev. 10/0136P l
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 2.2 Setpoints OPSH-22A or OPSH-22B Trips alarm at 55 psi pressure differential across either FTC/SFP filter train A or B. LSL-40 and LSH-40 Trip alarm, trip closed inlet isolation valve V069 and trip closed P-7 air supply valve V156, shutting down P-7. Low level set point is 10 inches below top of lon exchanger. High level set point is 4 inches below top of ion exchanger (i.e.,1 3" from normal liquid level). PSV-R-1 Set to relieve at 150 psig with 10% overpressure to protect SDS. PSV-R-8, R-9, R-10, and R-ll Set to relieve at 130 psig with 10% overpressure to protect the filter canisters from hydrogen / oxygen build up. PCV-26 Regulates upstream pressure (SDS inlet pressure) at 140 psig. Level indicators FCC-LI-102 and SF-LI-102 for FTC and SFP "A" levels, respectively, are located on control panel SPC-PNL-3 on the main control panel. In addition, high-low alarms FCC-LAHL-102 and SF-LAHL-102 are provided on SPC-PNL-3 for the FTC and SFP. High level setpoint is 327'-11" and low level set point is 327'-1". Level Indication switches SF-LIS-103 and FCC-LIS-103 actuate a common alarm FCC-LAHL-103 located on panel OHC-LCPI on high or low levels in the SFP or FTC. High level set point is 328'-1" and low level set point is 326'-11". 2.3 Precautions Due to the use of quick disconnect coupilngs, extra care should be taken to ensure that the couplings are properly connected and that they are connected in the proper locations. The filter canisters operate by a surface filtration method, and their efficiency increases as a cake is built up on the surface of the media. Therefore, the build up of this cake is an traportant part of the filtra-tion process. To prevent the migration of fines to the post filter, the ton exchange portion of the system should not be started until a cake has begun to be formed on the media. This can be verified by observing the turbidity of the filter effluent. When the filter train is started up, there will be an initial turbidity spike caused by smaller particles passing through the media. As the cake is built, these particles are stopped and the turbidity decreases. Once the turbidity reaches a level of 5 NTU or le:s, the ion exchange portion of the system can be started. Also, to prevent the breakdown of the cake, the system should not be started or stopped unnecessarily. Caution should be taken during a change of pump feeding a filter train. The new pump should be started and put on lir.a before shutting down the existing pump to protect the filter cake. Note that outside of this brief exception no more than one pump should feed one filter train. Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 The portion of the startup procedures concerning the well pumps should be strictly adhered in order to prevent the rapid filling of an empty manifold. This situation could cause a harmful pressure wave to develop which might damage the canister filter media. The RB penetrations R-524 at elevation 293 f t-6 in and R-539 at eleva-tion 320 ft are both below the water level of 327'-3" +8 -2. When in use the connecting piping / hose should be periodically checked since a line break will cause water to be lost from the system. When not in use, the hose should be isolated by closing valves Vil7A/B and V-099 (see discussion in section 4.5). Periodically the face velocity across the sample box 2 hood shoulo be checked to verify it is within the range of 100 to 140 feet / min. If the face velocity is too low the S-2 inlet dampers should be readjusted accordingly. 3.0 OPERATIONS 3.1 Initial Fill To initially fill the SFP and FTC borated water from the Spent Fuel Cooling System may be pumped from the borated water storage tank, DH-T-1, by the spent fuel cooling pumps, SF-P-1A/B. To fill the FTC the water may be routed through penetration R-524 and into the FTC through the 3 inch fill line downstream of the P-3A discharge check valve. To fill the SFP, V087A/B and V097B are opened and the borated water may be routed through the filter canisters and through the normal return process path to the SFP. The system is filled initially by borated water from the standby reactor coolant pressure system through the backflushing system provided (see section 3.7). The filters are filled to the inlet and outlet manifolds. To initially fill the DHC lon exchanger K-2, the level switch LSL-40 must be overrode (see section 1.6.4) until low level is attained. At this time the override switch should be returned to normal operation for further filling. 3.2 Startup Prior to starting the system, the suction valve alignment is vertfled for the mode of operation selected. The valves to the ton exchange portions of the system are also verifled to be closed. The pump discharge isolation valves are closed and the cross-tle valves are closed. The pump for one train is started and allowed to operate on minimum recirculation flow. The isolation valve for this pump is slowly opened. Then the hand control valve V090 A or B (HV-64 A or B) is opened 101. and any trapped air vented through manual vent valves located on the inlet and outlet manifolds. After venting, V090 (HV-64) is opened fully. Once this has been accomplished, the appropriate outlet cross-tle valve (s) (V096 A/B and V095) are opened. Flow is started by slowly opening the appropriate hand operated control valve (V097 A or B) until the desired flow is obtained. Note that V097 A/B are provided for flow control of the system. Once one train has been started, the other train, if desired, may be brought into service in the same manner. Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 Filter performance will initially increase with time as a cake forms on the filter surface. Therefore, the filtered water should be returned directly to source without further processing until this cake forms, as evidenced by a decrease in turbidity. A turbidity below 5 NTU is sufficient to route to K-2 or SDS. The DHC lon exchanger K-2 should always be brought to normal operating liquid level prior to operation of this portion of the system. Elther borated flush water or filtered water of less than 5 NTU can be used. If the liquid level is below the low level trip, the level switch trip override must be engaged until low level is established (see section 3.1). Once normal level is established, the air supply solenold valve V156 is opened. Pressure regulator V157 (PICV-58) is then manually adjusted to the pressure required to maintain the desired flowrate. Flow is slowly started to K-2 by opening flow control valve V085 (FV-15) until the desired flowrate to K-2 is obtained. K-2 effluent is automa-tically controlled by level control valve V070 (LV-46). Processing water through the SDS requires opening the isolation valves for that portion of the system and starting the DHC Booster pump. These actions will allow 15 gpm to be processed through the SDS. For a detailed description of the SDS see reference 12. The sample box 2 flitration module inlet dampers should be adjusted to create a 140 feet per minute face velocity across sample box 2. 3.3 Normal Operation Normal operation of the system is in one of the modes shown in Table 1 of Section 1.4. The mode of operation is chosen based on what source is to be processed and what the particulate and radioactivity concentrations of the sources are. 3.4 Shutdown The steps to bring the system to a shutdown condition are basically the reverse of the startup procedure. The ion exchanger flow is brought to zero gradually by remote operation of upstream control valve V085 (FV-15). Correspondingly, level control valve V070 (LV-46) will gradually terminate ficw from K-2. Af ter termination of flow the inlet isolation valve V069 is closed and the P-7 air supply isolation valve is closed. If the SDS is in use, the booster pump is switched off and Isolation valves Vill, V139, and V102 are closed. Following this, the well pumps are switched off and the pump Isolation valves and the cross-tle valves are closed. 3.5 Draining The majority of the system can be drained to the SFP. The filter canisters can not be drained, since they are submerged in the SFP. The piping to/from penetrations R-524 and R-539 must be drained to the Auxillary Building sump since the penetration elevation is below the SFP water level. The DHC lon exchanger K-2 can be pumped out to either source, FTC or SFP, or to the reactor coolant bleed tanks via a portion of the SDS. A switch is provided to override the low level switch for pumping out K-2. Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 3.6 Refilling The fully drained system may be refilled in the same manner that the system was initially filled. A partially drained system may be refilled by using either the back flush system (see section 3.7) or the well pumps (see section 3.2). 3.7 Infrequent Operations Flushing of the system may be performed when the internal contamination level gets high or prior to internal maintenance work. The system is shutdown (see Section 3.4) prior to flushing. One flushing option is gravity flush from SPC-T-4. Borated water is stored in the charging water storage tank, SPC-T-4, located at the 347 ft. elevation in the FHB. This tank is connected to the DHCS. If desired, the CLD booster pump (CLD-P-1) may be used to assist in backflushing. Elther filter train may be flushed without stopping flow
- through the other.
Flushing may be accomplished by opening one of the inlet valves from the flushing system (depending on which portion of the system is to be flushed) and then routing the flow to the FTC or the SFP. After sufft-cient time has been allowed to flush the system, the inlet valve from the flushing system is closed, and the system is then restarted j following the procedures in Section 3.2. 3.8 Transient Operations The results of loss of pumps or filter train misalignment are flows not returning to the proper source. However, since this is the normal operational mode of the system and since the sources are connected by the fuel transfer tubes, the results of these transients are negligible. Vent or drain valve misoperation would have the same effect as a line break (see section 4.5) but could be more readily rectified. 4.0 CASUALTY EVENTS AND RECOVERY PROCEDURES i 4.1 Loss of Power A loss of power to any portion of the system mld shut that portion of the system down. No adverse conditions would result. 4.2 Loss of Instrumentation / Instrument Air ] Loss of instrumentation would hamper operations due to loss of j monitoring capability but no adverse conditions would result and the system could be safely shut down until the problem is resolved. Loss of a single instrument channel will result in the loss of Indica-tion for that channel and, for those channels that have control features ! a flow mismatch. This flow mismatch will result in an automatic shut- ! down of the affected portion of the system. Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 i ATTACHMENT 2 l Loss of either the SFP or FTC level monitoring system will be noted when ! compared with the other. The readings should normally be the same since both water bodies are in communication via the fuel transfer tubes. Neither system has control features. Loss of instrument air will take the individual components to their fall safe position. Flow mismatches induced by loss of air will result in automatic trips. On loss of instrument air, level control to the ion exchanger would be lost. But both the inlet isolation valve V069 and the outlet level control valve V070 (LV-46) would fall closed isolating the inn exchanger. 4.3 Deleted 4.4 Filter Media Rupture A failure of the filter media in the canister could potentially release fuel fines to the ion exchange portion of the system. The SDS is equipped with a sand prefilter which has borosilicate glass to control reactivity (see ref. 12) and the DHC filter canister post filter precedes DHC im exchanger K-2. There are differential pressure gauges supplied on the filters to determine if they are loading. Loading of the SDS prefilter or the filter canister post filter could indicate ruptured filter media. The recovery procedure is to isolate the filter trains and find the ruptured filter by observing the differential pressure versus flow for each individual canister. Lower differential pressure for a given flow will indicate that this filter is ruptured. That canister or canisters and the post filter cartridge and/or SDS sand filter would be replaced and the system restarted. The system may be operated in a mode that bypasses the filter canisters. During this mode of operation, the filter canister post filter will be providing the required system filtration. In order to preclude the rupture of the post filter's filter media during operation, the maximum differential pressure that will be permitted across the post filter will be 18 psid. The post filters are designed for a maximum differential pressure of 45 psid. 4.5 Line and Hose Break If a rupture occurred in the system, the pumps could deliver FTC and/or SFP water to the FHB or the RB. This action would lower the level in the canal and the pool . A drop of one inch in canal / pool level is approximately equivalent to 1250 gal. A level loss would be detected and alarmed (see setpoints section 2.2) by at least one of the two redundant level monitors provided for the canal / pool. The operator would then shut the system down. Process water hoses are employed in three services in this system; filter canister inlet / outlet, skimmers to well pumps, and downstream of penetration R-539. Rev. 10/0136P
3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 If a filter canister inlet / outlet hose ruptures, that canister will be isolated and the hose replaced. Since these hoses are submerged in the SFP, this results in no net water loss. If a hose connecting the skimmer (U-7 or U-8) to the well pumps breaks, then the ability to surface skim will be hampered or lost, but pump capacity will not be deminished nor will there be a loss of water. If the hose on the FTC return line downstream of penetration R-539 breaks, then process water will be lost to the RB sump. The resulting loss in level would be detected and alarmed by the canal / pool monitors. l Check valves V-235A/B are provided to prevent siphoning the FTC if the hose (or connecting line) breaks. Furthermore, the normal return path is to the SFP; thus this hose is not normally used. When not in use this hose will be isolated by closing valves V117A/B and V099 to minimize the effect of a hose break. A break on the P-3A/B discharge line which uses penetration R-524 would cause process water to be lost to either the RB or the FHB. The water loss would be detected both by a decrease in the monitored flowrate returned to the fuel pool or FTC and also by the drop in fuel pool and/or transfer canal level. When the FTC pumps, P-3A/B, are not in use, the discharge valves V002A/B and valve SF-V103 should be closed. This would prevent a syphoning of the FTC when the pumps are not in use. 5.0 SYSTEM MAINTENANCE The maintenance procedures are the recommended practices and intervals as described by the equipment vendors. 6.0 TESTING 6.1 Hydrostatic Testing All piping and hose will be hydrostatically pressure tested. Testing of hose will be done af ter couplings have been attached. Pipe will be tested outside the buildings. 6.2 Leak Testing All accessible connections will be initial service leak tested af ter the piping is assembled. 6.3 Instrument Testing All instruments will be calibrated by vendors. Complete electric /- pneumatic loop verification will be done during start-up. 7.0 HUMAN FACTORS filter canister hoses are coded for quick identification of inlet versus outlet. Rev. 10/0136P
)
-. 3525-015 ATTACHMENT 2 Extensive use of hoses is made, especially in the RB, allowing quick installa-tion and use of existing radiation shielding. Hoses expected to be frequently disconnected are equipped with quick disconnect couplings for ease of .renoval and replacement.
The following human factors guidelines have been incorporated into the design of the DHCS control panel: , includes all controls and displays required for normal 4 o The panel operation. t o Displays provide immediate feedback that the system has responded appropriately to an operator's action. o Controls and displays are laid-out for a left to right flow path, o Mimic lines are used to clarify flow paths. t o Control devices are mounted to 3 to 6 feet above the floor, i o Each control device has a nameplate. o Light bulbs are replaceable from the front of the panel.
! o Recorders are grouped on the right side of the panel away from the flow path.
- f o Adjustments to recorders and controllers can be performed from the front of the panel.
i V l l I i Rev. 10/0136P
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