ML20244D416

Reply Brief on Behalf of Seacoast Anti-Pollution League.* Best Efforts Std Considered Insufficient & Emergency Plan Must Achieve Qualitatively Significant Level of Dose Saving. W/Supporting Documentation & Svc List

ML20244D416
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	06/08/1989
From:	Backus R BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE
To:	NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
Shared Package
ML20244D406	List: ML20244D404 ML20244D416
References
OL, NUDOCS 8906190047
Download: ML20244D416 (21)

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89 JJN 12 P4:39 June 8,1989 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEARREGULAhgCOMMISSION nn e BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD

)

~

In the Matter of. )' Docket No. 50-443-OL 1

)  !

l l PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ) FO'YYf.- j OF.NEW HAMPSBIRE, et al. ) (Offsite Emergency-

.)- Planning Issues)

(Seabrook Station, Unit 1 )

)

REPLY BRIEP ON BEHALP OF SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE  !

a I. CONTRARY TO APPLICANTS' POSITION,_THE. COMMISSION! ~

HAS SPECIFICALLY REJECTED A "BEST EFFORTS" STANDARD l OF " ADEQUACY" FOR EMERGENCY PLANS.

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Applicants'-Brief unequivocally sets forth its position that i

the " reasonable assurance" of " adequate protective measures"  !

l standard is both not a primary safety requirement and can be  ;

i satisfied by a "best efforts" response. ("The Commission made L clear that emergency planning was not to be viewed as on a par l

with the safety and siting regulations-. . . . " .and "what the Applicants urge as a_ standard was basically the best-plan which 4 the hand of man could devise that would achieve maximum dose-savings reasonably achievable in a given event, withouti taking extraordinary measures such as major construction of roads, l

shelters, or other structures." -(Applicants' Brief, pp. 7, 8)).

1 8906190047 890600 PDR ADOCK 05000443:

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f The "best efforts" standard, as urged by the Applicants, however hcs been specifically and categorically rejected by the Commission. This was pointed out clearly in the Commission's "Brief of Respondents in Regard to the Challenge to the 1987 Emergency Planning Rule Change." Pertinent pages from the NRC brief are attached hereto as Attachment A.

In the Statement of Considerations that accompany the finsi emergency planning rule, 52 Ped. Esg. 42078, Nov. 3, 1987, the Commission stated:

"It should be emphasized that the rule is not intended to diminish public prctection

, from the levels previously established by the Congress or the Commission's rules."

Idz, 42084 (Column 2).

In so stating, the Commission unequivocally rejected the "best efforts" approach to emergency planning, as a brief review of the history of the emergency planning rule clearly l establishes.

l l The final rule change, as published in the November 3, 1987 l

l Federal Reaister, followed an original proposed rule change, which l

was published on March 6, 1987. 52 Egd. Egg. 6980. The original rule change specifically suggested the Commission was considering two options to amending its emergency planning rules. The first retained the traditional requirement that an operating license be conditioned on there being an " adequate" level of protection as a result of emergency planning. The second option was to focus on "whether the utility has done all within its power to make

emergency planning satisfactory, rather than whether the outcome was a plan that provided adequate protection." (NRC Brief, p.

15). The NRC rejected the second option, which is the "best efforts" approach, in its final rule. Thus, contrary to the l Applicants' assertion, the NRC has very recently specifically rejected the best efforts standard for emergency planning, and so informed the Court of Appeals in its brief in defense of the rule change.

The final rule change, as noted, states that the new rule "is not intended to diminish public protection from the levels previously established by the Congress or the commission's rules."

Those "previously established" requirements included

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statements that the Commission made when it adopted those emergency planning rules in 1980, and which it has never disavowed. At that time, the Commission described emergency planning as an " essential" safety feature on a par with the Commission's siting requirement and regulations governing engineered safety features. (45 Fed. Egg. 55404, August 19, 1980). In describing the emergency planning rules, the Commission had stated that, as a result of the TMI accident, the Commission concluded that its siting and engineering safeguard requirements "must be bolstered" by requiring an adequate level of safety be achieved through emergency planning. (Idx, 55403). No one ever contended, at the time the 1980 rule was being adopted, that it contained only a "best efforts" standard. To now hold that this is the standard would thus " diminish public protection from the levels previously established . . . " contrary to the Commission's recent pronouncement accompanying the recent rule change.

In short, the Applicants' assertion that the Commission has adopted a "best efforts" standard for adequacy of emergency plans is absolutely without support, and contrary to a long-established, and recently reaffirmed, Commission pronouncement as to the centrally important role of emergency planning in reascnably assuring nuclear safety. (See also Town of Hampton Brief, quoting NRC Chairman Zech, at p. 23 stating the NRC's rejection of the "best efforts" standard.)

II. THE COMMISSION HAS NEVER REJECTED THE NEED TO -

UNDERTAKE PHYSICAL CONSTRUCTION EFFORTS, IN CERTAIN CASES, TO ACHIEVE AN " ADEQUATE" LEVEL

[-

OF EMERGENCY PLANNING.

Applicants have consistently asserted that no emergency plan can be rejected, regardless of site limitations, whether extremely long evacuation time estimates or lack of adequate sheltering, because an applicant can never be required to arrange for " major l

construction" of such things as shelters with good dose reduction factors or roads or access ramps. (Applicants' Brief, p. 8).

(This is another aspect of the Applicants position that a "best efforts" emergency planning standard is that all that is required.) This is not correct, and at problem sites, such as Seabrook, " prudent risk reduction" may indeed require construction to improve site environs.

_4_

l Certainly " prudent" risk reduction measures can include these types of actions, just as they clearly do require erection of warning sirens (or some other system) and production of public l informationalimaterial. As set forth in Attachment B in July 1980, at the time when-the Commission was' finalizing its emergency planning requirements, it sought evacuation time estimates from licensees and construction permit holders, including the.Seabrook Applicants. In doing so, the NRC's former Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation specifically noted: "In some cases of extreme difficulty where a large population is at risk, special facility-modifications may also be appropriate." Again, contrary to Applicants' assertion that emergency planning efforts, not their results, are what count, the Staff requested information on page 3 of Attachment B, as to:

Where special evacuation problems are identified (e.g., in high population density areas), specify alternative protective actions, such'as sheltering, which will reduce exposures and the effectiveness of these measures (emphasis added)." (This staff request is attachment B hereto.)

This makes it very clear that at the very time the emergency planning regulations were being finalized, the Commission clearly intended that these regulations.have substantive content, and did not merely require a "best efforts" approach to emergency planning. Attachment B makes it clear that the evacuation time estimates, and the sheltering that might be required if there was

an extreme situation, needed to be determined not merely to exist, but had to be assessed for their effectiveness.

l l Applicants' sole support for their proposition that no construction ever need be undertaken in order to achieve a level of adequate emergency planning is the San Onofre case, CLI 83-10, 1 17 NRC 528. That case is not on point.

In that case, the Commission was only concerned'with requirements to deal with contaminated injured individuals and held that for this narrow category of individuals, izet, those both with radiation contamination and injuries, there was no requirement for " construction of additional hospitals or recruitment of additional medical personnel." (Id. , p. 533) .

This case cennot be properly read as establishing a broad proposition that no applicant need ever make any physical improvements to the site environment in order to achieve the level of adequate emergency planning. Indeed, in that case, the Appeal Board had estimated the number of contaminated and injured persons to be only 1 to 25 individuals.

Therefore, it is not suprising that when Applicants' counsel first raised this theory, the NRC's director and chief hearing counsel, Edward Christenbury, rejected it. (See Hampton Brief, p.

32, note 24, which quotes the Christenbury Memorandum).

III. CONCLUSION The Applicants / Staff have now unequivocally committed themselves to the proposition that a "best efforts" emergency L _ _______ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - .

i planning standard is all that the NRC's emergency planning i regulations require.

SAPL believes that even such a standard has not been met, as argued in its original brief. However, even more fundamentally, SAPL contends that such a "best efforts" standard is not sufficient, and that an emergency plan must achieve some qualitatively significant level of dose savings, although under NRC requirements, no pre-set numerical dose saving standard exists.

Respectfully submitted, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League .

By its Attorneys, j

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BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON r

By I#

R'obe'r t A. Backus, Esquire 116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516 Manchester, NH 03105 (603) 668-7272 DATED: June 8, 1989 I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing reply brief have been telefaxed to the NRC Staff, the Applicants and the Appeal Board and copies have also been forwarded this day by first-class mail, postage prepaid to all persons on the attached service list.

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1. ( *r B Ec._ lEREBBBBE _ _ _ _ _ _R ,

Stato and local. governments, refusing to cooperate'in emergency planning.. . . i 52 Fed. Reg. at 6983 (col. 1) , J. A. 32. , 1 The proposed rule was published on March 6, 1987, with  ; o 60-day period for public comment. 52 Fed. Reg. 6980, J.A. 29. (The comment period was later extended by 30 days, finally expiring on June 4, 1987.) The proposed rule requested comments d from the public on two possible approaches to emergency planning. 52 Fed. Reg. at-6981 (col. 2), J.A. 30. The first was to keep the existing regulatory approach, under which a license can be j issued only when there is " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will.be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." (Emphasis in original.) The notice  ! 4 observed that although under existing regulations, as interpreted in Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear- Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22 (1986), it was legally possible for the NRC to evaluate a utility-prepared plan, it would be difficult for a utility plan to meet the " reasonable assurance" standard in cases where states and localities declined to. participate in emergency planning. 52 Fed. Reg. at 6981 (col. 2), J.A. 30. The notice therefore asked for public comment on i a second possible approach to emergency planning. Under this alternative the NRC proposed to examine whether the utility had done all within its power to make emergency planning satisfactory, rather than whether the outcome was a plan that provided adequate protection. The notice suggested that if a plant were licensed under this approach, even states and localities which had previously opposed licensing the plant would. l' 15 f I l 2 C l joinintheemergencyplanningprocessinordertoassurethe best possible protection of the public. 52 Fed. Reg. at 6983 (col. 1), J.A. 32. In support of this second possible approach to emergency planning the Commission noted that, "[a] forced abandonment of a completed nuclear plant for which billions for [ sic] dollars have been invested also poses obvious serious financial consequences to the utility, ratepayers and taxpayers." 52 Fed. Reg. 6981 (col. 3), J.A. 30. It thus requested comment on the "important and difficult question [of] whether or to what extent these non-safety consequences should be a matter of concern to the Commission in setting pre-licensing emergency planning requirements." 52 Fed. Reg. 6982 (col. 1), J.A. 31. Importantly, for purposes of this litigation, the notice made clear that under both approaches the Commission intended to rely on the " realism" assumption: that states and localities would do their best to protect the public in an actual accident, and that those best efforts would reasonably mean following a comprehensive utility plan. As noted above, the first alternative on which comments were requested would simply have left in place the LILCO adjudicatory decision that first articulated the realism approach. Moreover, the proposed second approach would specifically have required utilities to submit an emergency plan which took "into account a likely State or local response to an actual emergency." 52 Fed. Reg, at 6984 (col. 2), J.A. 33. In explaining the underlying assumptions which led the Commission to propose the second approach, the notice specifically stated: 16 t k -) [T]he Commission believes that State and local governments which have not cooperated in planning'will-carry out their traditional public health and safety ~ roles and would therefore respond to an accident. It { is reasonable to expect that this response would follow a comprehensive utility plan. 52 Fed. Reg. at 6983 (col . 2) . 5 J.A. 32. Finally, the Commission specifically.noted, even with regard to its proposed.second alternative: Any consideration of possible changes ~in the Commission's emergency planning _ requirements.must recognize one central and salient fact: That such a change would not alter the Commission's paramount obligation to assure public health and safety. For each license application, the commission would remain obligated to determine that there is reasonable assur-ance that the public health and safety will be adequately protected. If the Commission, for whatever reason, cannot find that the statutory standard has been met, then the license cannot be issued. 52 Fed. Reg. 6981 (col. 2), J.A. 30. E. The NRC's Final Emergency-Planning Rule On November 3, 1987, the Commission published its final emergency planning rule in the Federal Register. 52 Fed. Reg. 42078, J.A. 644. Relying heavily on Congressional intent, as expressed in the 1980, 1982-83, and 1984-85 NRC Authorization Acts, the Commission declared that it is obligated to evaluate 5 That the Commission's realism doctrine was central to its alternative proposals is underscored by the dissenting views of' ' then-Commissioner Asselstine, who emphasized his disagreement with the realism assumptions. 52 Fed. Reg. at 6986 (col. 1), J.A. 35. 6 The Commission also noted that on August 5, 1987, the House of Representatives defeated, 261-160, an amendment which would ' have barred application of the NRC's proposed rule to two specific plants. 52 Fed. Reg. 42083 (col. i 1),-J.A. 649. 17 ) i {,J _ _ _ _ h utility plan in cases of state or local non-participation, notwithstanding that it might.be difficult for a utility plan to pass muster. The Commission emphasized that it.was amending its emergency planning rules "to provide criteria for the evaluation at the operating license review stage of utility-prepared l emergency plans in situations in which' state and/or local governments decline to participate further in emergency planning." Id. at 42078 (col. 3), J.A. 644. In.this regard the Commission observed that [T]he new rule provides for the first time that where a utility plan.is submitted, in a situation of state and/or local non-participation in [an] emergency planning, it will be evaluated for adequacy against the same standards used to evaluate a state or local plan. However, due allowance will be made both for the non participation of the state and/or local governmental authorities and for the compensatory measures proposed by the utility in reaching a determination whether there is " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken." Id,. at 42080 (col. 3) - 42081 (col. 1), J.A. 646-47. Moreover, the Commission also observed that [A] utility plan, to pass muster, is required to provide- ) reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures ' can and will be taken in [an] emergency. The rule recognizes -- as did Congress when it enacted and re-enacted the provisions of Section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980 -- that no utility plan is  ; likely to be able to provide the same degree of public  ; protection that would obtain under ideal conditions, 1.e., a state or local plan with full state and local i i participation, but that it may nevertheless be adequate. I Id. at 42084 (col. 1), J.A. 650. The Commission explained that the rule does not " diminish public protection from the levels l previously established by the Congress or the Commission's ~ ]' rules," inasmuch as both the Authorization Acts and the NRC's 18 au emergency planning rules had provided for a two-tier approach to Id. at 42084 emergency planning since their duception in 1980. (col. 2), J.A. 650. 3 ' Thus, in its final rule the Commission rejected the proposed alternative which would have shifted the NRC's focuc from evaluating the adcouacy of the utility's emergency plan to evaluating whether the utility had done all it could to provide effective emergency planning. Rather, the Commission adhered to the basic approach to emergency planning established by its 1980 / regulations. As finally promulgated the rule does not alter the { there must principle that before any nuclear plant can operate, be an emergency plan that provides " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken" in the event of an emergency. Id. at 42084 (col. 1), J.A. 650. To those who advocated licensing a power plant based on a utility "best efforts" emergency plan, the Commission frankly acknowledged that the approach it was adopting did not solve the " state veto" problem, and indeed made a " state veto" a de facto 7 The Commission did, however, clarify language in LILCO, which could have been interpreted to require NRC not only to estimate the reduction in radiological dose to the public that a utility plan could achieve in an accident, but also to estimate the dose that might be achieved if there were a state or local plan, to compare the two figurcs, and to permit operation The final only rule if the dose reductions were " generally comparable." points out that evaluations of emergency plans have always been made on a case-by-case basis, without reference to the specific dose reductions that a plan might accomplishreal or toorthe level of protection provided by other emergency plans, local, hypothetical. The rule explains that any plan -- state, or utility -- found to be adequate should be considered " generally comparable" to any other plan 650. found to be adequate. 52 Fed. Reg. at 42084 (col. 2), J.A. 19 [,; (though not a de jure) possibility. The Commission explained, however, that it did not view this result as frustrating Congress's will: The Congress was concerned that utilities not be " penalized," but not to the extent that it was willing ' to countenance operation of a nuclear power plant in a situation where the public was not adequately protected. 52 Fed. Reg. at 42083 (col. 2), J.A. 649. On the other hand, in response to charges that its new rule was motivated by a desire to improve the financial status of certain utilities, the Commission responded directly: The NRC rule.is an effort to bring the NRC's regulations more clearly into line with a policy decision made by the Congress in 1980. The NRC's rule is thus based on economic considerations only to the extent that the Congress's policy decision of 1980 was In the Conference p based on economic considerations. the Report on the NRC Authorization Act of 1980 ... L 4 conferees stated that they did not wish utilities to be " penalized" in situations in which there was no acceptable state or local plan. That could be taken as a reference to economic costs or simply to considerations of fairness, in that the issue was whether a utility was to be barred from operating a plant by the actions of third parties over which it had no control. The NRC's motivation in promulgating this rule is s not economics. Its motivation is to assure that the NRC is in a position to make the decisions that l Congress intended that it make, and that the Commission has declared that it would make. Id. at 42083 (cols. 2 and 3) , J. A. 649. In one important respect, for purposes of this case, the rule codifies existing NRC practice as set forth in the 1986 LILCO decision; it adheres to the two-pronged " realism doctrine" first enunciated in that case. 20 di ~ ATTACHMENT'B

ps *s c g oq(o, Uf!!TED STATES y g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 aj

y WAsmNGTON, D. C. 20S$5  ;

4"*** July '2,1980' l 4 a S ALL APPLICANTS FOR CONSTRUCTION PERMITS AND OPERATING LICENSES . Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR .INFORMATION REGARDING EVACUATION TIMES This letter is being sent to all' applicants for construction permits and licensees of plants under construction. The purpose of the letter is a request for'informa-tion regarding estimates for evacuation of various areas around proposed nuclear power plants. . The information. sought is described in our letter of December 26, 1979 (copy enclosed). The requested submittal. date .for this information was suspended by our letter of March 11, 1980.

We are requesting that you submit evacuation time estimates on an accelerated basis to enable the NRC staff to identify, in a timely manner, those sites where evacuation constraints exist and special planning measures should be considered. In some cases of extreme difficulty where a large population is g at risk, special facility modifications may also be appr.opriate. The i information requested in the enclosure should be submitted by August 1, ,

1980. This time is shorter than provided in the December 26, 1979 letter i because of the need for timely information and because the content of the -

i information desired has been available to you for some months. Units  !

sharing the same site need not, of course, submit separate time estimates. j This special request for information has been submitted to the General I Accounting Office and cleared by GAO as'noted in the clearance block below: - i Approved by GAO {

B-180225 (S80010)

Expires 80-09-30 i incerely,  !

ts f 7

. sienut,  !

Division of _icensing ,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  !

Enclosure:

December 26, 1979 Letter w/ Request for Evacuation Time Estimates cc: Service Lists

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -. - _ _ _ _ u

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' UNIT ED STATES E

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( ;e NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 sN

%, v . . . + y/

December 26, 1979

' APPLICANTS FOR CONSTRUCTION PERMITS AND.

-LICENSEES OF PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING EVACUATION TIMESD This letter is being sent to all' applicants for construction pennits .and licensees of plants under construction. The purpose of the letter.is a request for information regarding estimates for evacuation of various areas -

around future nuclear power plants. The requested information is in addition to that requested by the November 21,1979, . letter to all applicants 'for .

an operating license and licensees of plants under construction from Domenic B. Vassallo, Acting Director, Division of Project Management.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Although evacuation time estimates are expected to be prepared in the course' of the upgrading of the state of emergency preparedness as previously specified submission of these estimates to the NRC is being requested on an accelerated time scale so that the NRC can identify those instances in which unusual evacuation constraints exist and special' planning measures should be considered. In some cases of extreme difficulty where a larg.e population l

is at risk, special facility modifications may also be' appropriate. The information requested in the enclo:;ure should be submitted no later than March 31,1980.

Previous correspondence indicated that efforts to develop a model plan were continuing. It now appears that the model plan will not be completed on a schedule which will be of use in developing upgraded plans in the near term.

The upgraded plan development should therefore proceed on a site-specific basis.

t Sincerely,

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Brian K. Grimes, Director-Emergency Preparedness Task Group Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

Request for Evacuation Time Estimates cc w/ enclosure:

Service Lists J

'i Enclosure '. ]

I REQUEST FOR_ i l

EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES ( AFTER NOTIFICATION) ]

1 FOR AREAS NEAR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Backo_ round .

Prior to recent NRC requests that means for prompt notification to the public be installed around each nuclear power plant site, a significant component .)

of evacuation time estimates was the time required to notify the public of a j need for evacuation. Studies of actual evacuations that have taken place.  :

generally do not' distinguish between the time required for notification, the )

time required to implement the evacgtion, Theand the time required estimates-for to confim time required for that an evacuation has taken place.-

evacuations now requested relate primarily to the time to implement an.

evacuation as opposed to the time required for notification. These ~ estimates may be based on previous local experiences (e.g., enemical spills or floods) or may be based on studies related to population density, local geography and road capacities. No standard method for making such estimates is identified l for use at this time. The basis for the method chosen should be described in the response. As a check'on the evacuation time estimates, conments on the .q time estimates made should be obtained from the principal local officials l responsible for carrying out such evacuations. Such coments should be included in the submittal. .

5 The fonnat given below is appropriate for reporting t6 the kRC estimates of the time required to implement evacuation of areas near nuclear power plants.

These estimates, are to be made for the primary purpose of making available, j to those officials who would make evacuation decisions in an emergency {

situation, knowledge of the time required to complete one of the protective action options (evacuation) available for a particular potentially affected segment of the population. A second purpose of these estimates is to identify -

to all concerned those instances in which unusual' evacuation constraints-exist ano that special planning measures should oe consicered. In some cases of extreme difficulty where a large population is at risk, special facility modifications may also be considered.

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- Given a decision to evacuate rather than shelter in an actual event, fewer or more sector.s or different distances than given in the reporting format  !

might be evacuated should this be the chosen protective action. For example, three 22-1/2' sectors might be initially evacuateo in a downwind 4 direction (the sector containing the plume and an adjacent sector on-each side), followed oy the evacuation of other sectors as a precautionary measure. j

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Hans, J. M., Jr., and T. C. Sell,1974 Evacuation Risks - An Evaluation, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Environmental Research Center, Las Vegas, EPA-520/6-74-Uu2.

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. . Format for Reporting Information The areas for which evacuation estimates are required must encom; ass the entire area within a circle of about 10 miles radius, and have outer i boundaries corresponding to the plume exposure EPZ. These areas are i i

as follows:

Distance Area j 1

2 miles two 180* sectors j i

5 miles four 90* sectors i about 10 miles four 90* sectors l l

l Estimates for the outer sectors should assume that the inner adjacent sectors l are being evacuated simultaneously. To the exent practical, tne sector )

l boundaries should not civide densely populated areas. Knere a direction corresponding to the edges of areas for which estimates have been mace is thcught not to be adequately represented by the time estimates fcr acjacent j areas, an additional area should be defined and a separate estimite made {

for this case. The format for submittal should include Doth a table and a figure (overlaid on a map) which each give the information requested in items 1 and 2 below. Aoditional material may be provided in associatea text.  ;

J Required Information 1,. Two estimates are requested in each of the areas defined in item 1 for ]

a general evacuation of the population (not including special facilities). 1 A best estimate is required and an aaverse weather estimate is required for movement of the population.

2. . The total time required to evacuate special f acilities (e.g., hospitals) ,

within each area must be specified (best estimate ard aoverse weather).

3. The time required for confirmation of evacuation shculd oe ir.dicated.

Confirmation times may consider special instructions to the public -(e.g. ,

tying a handkerchief to a door or gate to indicate the occupant has left the premises).

4. Where plans and prompt notification systems have not been put in place for areas out to about 10 miles, estimates of tne times requireo to evacuate until such measures are in place for the plume exposure erer;ency planning zone (EPZ) should also be given. Notification times creater than 15 minutes should be includeo in the evacuation times and footr.oteo to inoicate the notification time.

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5. Where special evacuation problems are identified (e.g.. in high population density areas) specify alternative protective actions, such as sheltering, which would reduce exposures and;the - effectiveness s p.

of these measures.

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6.- A short background document should be-subm v ng t e.h methods:

-used to make the estimates.and the assumptions made including the e

routes and methods of transportation used. This-document ~should also note the coments of. principal 'lodal officials -regarding these astimates.

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Alan S. Rosenthal, Chrman. Richard A. Hampe, Esquire At'emic ' Safety and Licensing John Traficonte, Esquire

' H Civil Defense Agency 4 Assistant' Atty. General Appeal Panel Hampe & McNicholas US NRC .L'i.: One Ashburton Place 35 Pleasant Street '3"

19th Floor Washington, DC 20555 Concord, NH 03301 Boston, MA- 02108 19 JUN 12 P4 OM)

Howard A. Wilber cro Gary W. &Holmes, f. dudith H. Mizner, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Holmes Ellis . EsqufkEri!_","N" 79 State Street Appeal Board 47 Winnacunnet Road US NRC Newburyport, MA 01950 Hampton, NH 03842 Washington, DC- 20555 Thomas S. Moore Diane Curran, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Paul McEachern, Esquire Harmon, Curran & Tousley Shaines & McEachern Appeal Panel 20001 S Street NW US NRC 25 Maplewood Avenue Suite 430 P.O. Box 360 Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20009 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Kenneth A. McCollom Suzanne Breiseth Atomic Safety and Office of Selectmen l Licensing Board Town of Hampton Falls US NRC

' One Drinkwater Road Washington,'DC 20555 Hampton Falls, NH 03844 I

Richard F. Cole Docketing & Serv. Sec.

Atomic Safety and LicensinB Thomas Dignan, Esquire Office of the Secretary Ropes & Gray Board US NRC US NRC One International Place Washington, DC 20555 Boston, MA 02110 Washington, DC 20555 Ivan W. Smith, Chrman. Joseph Flynn, Asst. Cn. Cnsl.

Atomic Safety and Jane Doughty Fed. Emerg. Mgmt. Agey. SAPL Licensing Board 500 C Street SW US NRC 5 Market Street Washington, DC 20472 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, DC 20555 Phillip Ahrens, Esquire Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire Asst. Atty. General George Dana Bisbee, Esquire Office of Exec. Legal Dir. Attorney General's Office State House, Sta. #6 US NRC Augusta, ME 04333 State of New Hampshire Washington, DC 20555 Concord, NH 03301

Sandra.Gavutis J. P. Nadeau, Esquire Town of Kensington Town of Rye Box 1154 155 Washington Road East Kingston, NH 03827 Rye, NH 03870 Charles P. Graham, Esquire Mr. Angie Machiros, Chrman.

McKay, Murphy and Graham Town of Newbury 100 Main Street Town Hall Amesbury, MA 01913 25 High Road Newbury, MA 01951 William S. Lord, Selectman Town Hall Friend Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey US Senate Washington, DC 20510 Attn: Janet Coit Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel US NRC Washington, DC 20555 Mr. John Duf.fet Pres, & Chief Exec. Officer PSCO P.O. Box 330 Manchester, NH 03105 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel US NRC Washington, DC 20555 x

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