ML20245E002

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Summary of 890406 Meeting W/Util at Plant Re Dcrdr Human Engineering Discrepancy Closure Status
ML20245E002
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 04/21/1989
From: Moran D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-56104, NUDOCS 8905010262
Download: ML20245E002 (11)


Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

UNITED STATES 7,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j WASMNGTON, D. C. 20655 April 21, 1989 n

Docket Nos. 50-259/260/296 LICENSEE: Tennessee Valley Authority FACILITY: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF APRIL 6, 1989 MEETING WITH TVA CONCERNING DCRDR HED CLOSURE STATUS HELD AT THE BROWNS FERRY SITE The staff met with TVA at the Browns Ferry site in the Site Licensing Conference Room. The purpose of the meeting was to determine the status of closure action on Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) and to identify the HEDs required for closure in time for restart of Unit 2.

The attendance roster is Enclosure 1; the HEDs discussed are listed in Enclosu're 2; and the TVA restart requirement criteria excerpted from the Browns Ferry Nuclear Performance Plan are listed in Enclosure 3.

Each of the HEDs listed on Enclosure 2 was reviewed as to correctness of the TVA assessment with respect to the restart criteria (Enclosure 3). TVA had screened HEDs prior to the meeting to ensure that restart criteria were properly considered. TVA determined that two HEDs met the restart criteria (i.e., were determined to require completion and closure. prior to restart);

these were HEDs 299 and 300. The staff agreed with TVA's determinations as listed in Enclosure 2.

~However, HED 283 dealing with common reactor water level reference which may not meet the restart criteria of Enclosura 3, is a THI Action Plan item and should be considered for completion prior to restart. HED 283 is identified as Item II.K.3.27 in TVA's April 9,1981 letter to H. R. Denton from L. M.

Mills dealing with post-TMI requirements, which stated that TVA agreed to provide a common reference level point for water level instrumentation. TVA further stated in this letter they would use the same reference level for all three units and that they expected to complete this modification by July 1, 1981.

At the close of the meeting the staff requested TVA to provide a letter to the staff documenting all their efforts to resolve HEDs, specifically:

the restart review of original batch of HEDs (documented in an August 13, 1987 memo from P. K. Guha to D. F. Faulkner).

identify the six HEDs resulting from the August 13, 1987 review which met the restart criteria, and were "comitted to" for repair bef6re restart.

o 8905010262 890471 gDR ADOCK 05000259 PDC

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  • the reassessment of all HEDs identified in our March 17, 1989 letter, and the results of that assessment (including commitments).

" the documentation of all actions taken to date which provide interim, or final, HED corrective action.

The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this request affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P. L.96-511.

1 David H. Moran, Project Manager TV'. Projects Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Attendance List
2. Restart Requirement Criteria ,
3. Evaluation of HED's cc w/ enclosure:

See next page Distribution Docket File NRC PDR Local PDR Those on attached list i

sf 0FC :NRR:TVA/LA :NRR:T A/PM :TVA: AD/ P  :  :  :  :

.....:__ ...._____:_. ....:....f'_g ..:..._________:..___.......:..____...:......_____

NAME :MSimms /_p6M ___.....:...... as :SBlack  :  :  :  :

.____:........ _W:___ ____.:_ __..______:_.....______:.__________:__________.

DATE :4/2//89 :4/s.\/89 :4/a//89  :  :  :  :

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

.i cc: i Regional Administrator, Region II General Counser -

Tennessee Valley Authority U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 400 West Summit Hill' Drive. -101 Marietta Street, N.W.

E11 B33 At1anta Georgia 30323-Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Resident Inspector / Browns Ferry NP Mr. R. L. Gridley U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Tennessee Valley Authority Route 12, Box 637 SN 1578 Lookout P1 ace Athens, Alabama '35611 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Mr. O. J. Zeringue Dr. Henry Myers. Science Advisor.

Tennessee Valley Authority Committee on Interior Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant and Insular Affairs

.P.O. Box 2000 U. S. House of Representatives Decatur Alabama 35602 Washington, D.C. 20515 Tennessee Valley Authority Mr.'P. Carier Rockville Office Tennessee Valley Authority 11921 Rockville Pike Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Suite 402  :.

P.O. Box 2000- Rockville, Maryland 20852

'Decatur, Alabama 35602 Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.

Mr. D. L. Williams Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power Tennessee Valley Authority Tennessee Valley Authority 400 West Sunnit Hill Drive. 6N 38A Lookout Place W10 885 1101 Market Street Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Chairman, Limestone County Commission P.O. Box 188 Athens, Alabama 35611 Claude Earl. Fox, M.D.

State Health Officer State Department of Public Health State Office Building Montgomery, Alabama 36130 I

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nevision 2 Table IV-1 h;. ,

RESTART REQUIREMENT CRITERIA

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The following critaria shall be used in evaluating whether a particular item aust be resolved prior to startup.

1 1.- The ites identifies a specific deficiency which has significant

, __ probability of leading to the inoperability of a system required for startup or operation by the BFN Technical Specifications.

2. The item identifies a programmatic deficiency which has a high

. probabi.11ty .of caustog. or has caused a specific deficiency which i meets.No. I above. .

NOTE:

To assist in the determination of required-for-restart relative to Technical Specifications as in criterla No. I and No. 2 above, an affirmative answer to any of the following questions requires consideration of the ites for restart based on Technical Specification requirements.

a. Does the ites directly and adversely affect safety related .

equipment function, performance, reliability, or response time?

% b. Does the item indirectly and adverse <1y affect safety relat2d y- equipment power supply, air ' supply, cooling, lubrication, or ventilation?  !

c. Does the item adversely affect primary containment integrity?
d. Does the item adversely affect secondary containment integrity? j
e. Does the item adversely affect control , room habitability?

I

f. Does the item adversely affect systems used to process radioactive waste?
g. Does the item adversely affect fire protection or fire loads?
h. Does the ites adversely affect the ability of a system or component to meet its safety function during a design basis event by impacting the seismic analysis, single failure separation criteria, high energy line break criteria, assumptions, or equipment qualification?

i IV-8 0648s/COC4 ,

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,- Revision 2

- Table IV-1 (Continued)

RESTART REQUIREMENT CRITERIA

1. Are the programs such as Radiological Health, Security, Radiological Emergency Preparedness, or Quality Assurance which are necessary for safe conduct of operation of the plant adversely affected?
j. If not corrected prior to restart, could it lea'd to an uncontrolled release or spread of radioactive contamination beyond the regulated area. ,

.,_ 3 .. The item identifies a specific deficiency that results in a failure

- to comply with NRC regulations and no variance has been approved by NRC.

4. TVA has committed to NRC to complete the ites prior to restart.
5. The item identifies a specific deficiency which has a significant probability of leading to a personal injury during plant operation.
6. The item identifies a specific condittor, which has a forced outage risk (probability X outage length) during the next cycle in excess of the critical path time to correct the condition prior to restart. .

3 i

IV-9 0648s/COC4 _

Enclosure 3 EVALUATION OF HEDS NOTED BY THE NRC WHICH MAY. MEET TVA NPP RESTART CRITERIA. (ITEMS DENOTED BY AN ASTERISK "*" HAVE BEEN OR WILL BE CORRECTED PRIOR TO UNIT 2 RESTART)

HEDS FROM CRDR SUPPLEMENTAL

SUMMARY

REPORT

1. HEDS 299 AND 300 (EVALUATED TOGETHER SINCE THEY ADDRESS OPERATOR ACTION AND INDICATION OF RX BLDG TO OUTSIDE AIR DIFF PRESS.)

HED 299 EDI-3 PROCEDURE AMBIGUITY / DEFICIENCY

~~

CORRECTION: PROCEDURE WILL BE REVISED TO PROVIDE OPERATOR ACTION TO THIS ABNORMAL CONDITION HED 300 EDI-3 ENTRY CONDITION CORRECTION: THE EDI ENTRY CONDITION WILL BE EVALUATED IF VALID, INDICATION AND ALARM WILL BE.

ADDED TO MCR. IF NOT THE PROCEDURE WILL BE CHANGED.

RESTART - YES

-JUSTIFICATION:

Rx BLDG TO OUTSIDE AIR DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE IS AN EDI-3 ENTRY CONDITION. ASSUMING SECONDARY CONTAINMENT IS A SYSTEM,. THIS HED MEETS RESTART CRITEPION 1 SINCE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CAN BE IMPACTED WITHOUT THE OPERATOR'S KNOWLEDGE. ALSO ACTION TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT.IS. DELAYED DUE..TO LACK OF MCR INDICATION.

DURING THE EVALUATION IT WAS FELT THAT SOME ACTION MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED TO ADDRESS THE DEFICIENCIES. (I.E.. FROCEDUFE AND/OR DESIGN CHANGE. OPERATIONAL PREFERENCE IS TO HAVE THE INDICATION IN THE MCR.*)

OTHER CONSIDERED CONDITIONS:

-SURVEILLANCE OF THIS PARAMETER (LOCAL INDICATOR) IS DONE TWICE PER SHIFT

-RX BLDG ABNORMAL VENTILATION ALARM LOCATED MCR (PANEL 9-3)

(MULTI-INPUT ALARM WHICH INCLUDES DIFF PRESS)

-ACTION TO' ADDRESS CONDITION GIVEN IN EDI-3 (HED 299 CORRECTI.VE ACTION)

2. HED 302 - EDI-3 PROCEDURE ENTRY CONDITION CORRECTION: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SETPOINTS AND PROCEDURE VALUES WILL BE ANALYZED. SETPOINTS OR PROCEDURE WILL BE REVISED TO CORRECT PROBLEM.

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RESTART - NO JUSTIFICATION:

THE ISSUED EDI-3(RO) CORRECTED THIS PROBLEM. NO ATTEMPT TO ,

EVALUATE THIS HED FOR RESTART WAS MADE. ,

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  • " 3. HED.305 - EDI-3 TABULATION OF AREA RADIATION LEVELS ,

l CORRECTION: EVALUATE-SETPOINT VALUES.FOR MAX NORMAL.AND MAX L

' SAFE CONDITIONS. DEVELOP. SETTING FOR CONDITIONS I

WHERE TIP=IS IN OPERATION AND NOT IN OPERATION i

AND SPECIFY.IN PROCEDURE.

RESTART - NO l

JUSTIFICATION: ,.

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THE ISSUED EDI-3(RO) CORRECTED THIS PROBLEM. NO ATTEMPT TO W EVALUATE THIS HED FOR RESTART WAS MADE.

  • <4 . HED 306 - EDI-3.. TABULATION OF MAXIMUM SAFE OPERATING WATER LEVELS CORRECTION: PERMANENT _ MARKINGS WILL BE PROVIDED LOCALLY TO INDICATE MAXIMUM SAFE OPERATING WATER LEVEL.

RESTART - NO JUSTIFICATION:

NUMEROUS INDICATIONS (ALARMS / VISUAL SIGHTING) DF AREA FLOODING WILL BE RECEIVED BEFORE MAXIMUM OPERATING WATER LEVEL IS OBTAINED.

, NOTE: MR A875752 WAS ISSUED TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION BEFORE RESTART.

  • 5. HED 308 - TI-75-69B SCALE- RANGE DOES NOT SUPPORT EDI-3 PARAME~'ER CORRECTION: TH,E_D,IFFERENCE BETWEEN SET, POINT AND PROCEDURE VALUE WILL BE EVALUATED. DEFICIENCY WILL BE CORRECTED BY INSTRUMENT MODIFICATION AND/OR PROCEDURE REVISION.

RESTART - NO .

JUSTIFICATION:

THE ISSUED EDI-3(RO) CORRECTED THIS PROBLEM. ALSO MULTIPLE INDICATIONS OF A PROBLEMS WOULD HAVE TO BE AVAILABLE BEFORE EDI-3 WOULD BE ENTERED.

6. HED 311 - EDI-1 APPENDIX 12 PROCEDURE CLARIFICATION I

' CORRECTION: THE EDI SETPOINT WILL BE EVALUATED. IF VALID,

, INDICATION WILL BE ADDED TO THE MCR, IF NOT S THE PROCEDURE WILL BE REVISED.

- RESTART - NO JUSTIFICATION: ,

RBCCW IS NOT A SAFETY SYSTEM, DOES NOT AFFECT EQUIPMENT, NOR NEEDED FOR SAFETY (NOT TECH SPEC REQUIRED). THERE IS NO IMPACT ON COOLING OF EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR PLANT SAFETY. .

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HEDS FORM ORIGINAL CRDR

SUMMARY

REPORT

7. HED 12 - ACCOUSTIC MONITOR (PX-1-4) AND MAIN STEAM TEMP RECORDER (TR-1-1) NOT LOCATED IN MAIN OPERATING AREA CORRECTION: MOVE.TR-1-1 AND PX-1-4 TO MAIN OPERATING AREA (PANEL 9-4)

RESTART - NO JUSTIFICATION:

ALARM IN MCR "DOWNCOMER TEMP.HIGH" ALERTS OPERATOR OF THE ALARM CONDITIO"A. THE ACOUSTIC MONITOR IS USE TO IDENTIFY WHICH MSRV HAS A PROBLEM. IMPACT ON RESPONSE TIME IS MINIMAL AS THE ACOUSTIC MONITOR AND TEMPERATURE RECORDER ARE IN THE MCR. ALSO THERE ARE 2 ROs AND 1 SRO AVAILABLE IN THE MCR TO ADDRESS CONDITION.

  • 8. HED 72 - POSITION OF CONTROLS MAY CAUSE INADVERTENT ACTUATION CORRECTION: ADD GUARDRAILS TO PANELS

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RESTART - NO JUSTIF7 CATION:

NO SAFETY RELATED CONTROLS IDENTIFIED E'XCEPT FOR THE SLC PUMP SWITCH. THIS SWITCH IS KEY LOCKED AND INADVERTENT MOVEMENT OF SWITCH WILL PUT SYSTEM IN SAFE CONDITION.

9. HED 189 - EOI PCIS STATUS CORRECTION: ' ADD EDI APPENDIX / ADD GROUP STATUS LIGHTS /

ADD CONTAINMENT GROUP LABEL / REVISE CONTAINMENT

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MIMIC TO INCLUDE GROUP / IDENTIFY PCIS VALVES RESTART - NO AN' APPENDIX OF PCIS GROUP VALVES HAD BEEN ADDED TO EOI. OTHER IMPROVEMENTS ARE CONSIDERED AIDS TO THE OPERATOR AND DO NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERABILITY..

10. HED 190 - EDI.PCIS STATUS (H2 AND 02 SAMPLING VALVES DO NOT HAVE DIRECT INDICATION OF POSITION)

CQRRECTION: EVALUATE THE NEED TO HAVE DIRECT INDICATION OF VALVE POSITION. ADD DIRECT, INDICATION IF REQUIRED.

RESTART - NO JUSTIFICATION: .

THESE VALVES WERE EVALUATED PER TVA'S NRC RG 1.97 AS NOT NEEDING DIRECT INDICATION. THIS POSITION IS NOTED IN NRC'S SER RESPONSE (DATED JUNE 23,1988) TO TVA.

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11.' HED 'd75 - PCIS RESET STATUS +

[ CORRECTION: PROVIDE CAUTION STEP TO SI 4.1.A-10 TO WARN OPERATOR TO CHECK MSIV POWER AVAILABLE LIGHTS DURING SURVEILLANCE TEST. '

RESTART - NO l JUSTIFICATION:

CONSEQUENCE OF NOT INCLUDING THIS CAUTION STATEMENT DOES NOT ,

INOP SYSTEMS OR PLACE THE SYSTEM OR EQUIPMENT IN AN UNSAFE j CONDITION.

12. HED 283 - DIFFERENT ZERO REFERENCES FOR REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL I 1

, CORRECTION: REACTOR LEVEL INSTRUMENTS WILL BE RESCALED OR MODIFIED T.O HAVE A CONSISTENT ZERO REFERENCE. I e RESTART - NO JUSTIFICATION: ,

THIS CONDITION DOES NOT INPO ANY SYSTEM NOR DOES IT HAVE AN IMPACT ON SAFETY EQUIPMENT.

13. HED 284 - UNIT SPECIFIC ALARM (CONT BAY EMERG VENT) l 9 i CORRECTION: INSTALL ALARM ON UNIT 2 AND 3.

RESTART - NO JUSTIFICATION:

ALARM IS IN COMMON UNI.T.1/2 CONTROL ROOM. COMMUNICATIONS AVAIL TO CONTACT UNIT 3. ALSO DEFINITE PHYSICAL EFFECTS (E.G..

NOISE AND PRESSURE) OF THIS CONDITION CAN BE FELT.

  • 14. HED 157 - PERSONNEL MOVEMENT AND INSTRUMENT. LOCATION MAY CAUSE INADVERTENT ACTUATION.

CORRECTION: ROUTE TRAFFIC AWAY FROM PANEL 3-9-20.

RESTART - NO JUSTIFICATION:.

NO ITEMS IN THE PANEL AREA IN OUESTION CAN INPO THE GENERATOR OR OCCUR WITHOUT OPERATOR KNOWLEDGE (ALARMS).

  • 15. HED 280 - LER 259-80052 RELATED TO HUMAN ENGINEERING F4ESIGN.

. (D/G TRIP DUE TO MISALIGNMENT 0F MODE SWITCH.)

CORRECTION: CAUTIONARY LABEL WILL BE ADDED

- RESTART - NO JUSTIFICATION: .

CONDITION ONLY OCCURS DURING UNDER SI. MULTIPLE FAILURES MUST OCCUR I.E.. OPERATOR ERROR IN FOLLOWING SI AND FAILURE OF DIESEL GENERATOR PROTECTIVE DEVICES BEFORE CONDIT, ION WOULD ,

L,EAD TO INOP OF DIESEL.

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Meeting Summary, Memoranda for Trip Reports or Site Visits *'

Docket File::-

NRC PDR Local PDR OPl Projects Reading , g ADSP Reading J. Sniezek D. Crutchfield B. D. Liaw S. Black R. Pierson D. H. Moran G. Gears T. Daniels N. Markisohn M. Sinas L. Watson, Region II OGC P. Castleman ACRS(10)

GPA/CA (M. Callahan) (5)

E. Jordan B. Grimes P. Gwynn-J. Scarborough G. Marcus L. Norrholm C. Ader J. Gray .

R. Borchardt BFN Rdg. File

  • cc: Licensee / Applicant & Service List e

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