ML20216F640
| ML20216F640 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waltz Mill |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1962 |
| From: | Lowenstein R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Morris E WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216F225 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-98-100 NUDOCS 9804170152 | |
| Download: ML20216F640 (5) | |
Text
. .
O e- UNITED STATES 4 E ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
~
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
IRAR.2 198t Docket No. 50-22 Mr. E. T. Morris, General Manager Westinghouse Electric Corporation P. O. Box 1075 Pittsburgh 30, Pennsylvania
Dear Mr. Morris:
By letter dated December 27, 1961, and supplements thereto dated Janu-ary 31, 1962 and February 20, 1962, Westinghouse Electric Corporation requested authorization under License No. TR-2 to transfer spent fuel elements to a pool in the decontamination building for storage prior to shipment off the site for reprocessing.
We have reviewed the proposed changes in operating procedures and have found that the proposed changes do not present any significant hazards considerations not described or implicit in the Final Hazards Summary Report and that there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered. A copy of our analysis of the safety of operation of the Westinghouse Testing Reactor (WTR) with the above changes is attached hereto.
In view of the foregoing, pursuant to paragraph 3.a. of License No.
TR-2, as amended, authorization is hereby granted to Westinghouse Electric Corporation to transfer spent fuel elements to a pool in the '
decontamination building for storage prior to shipment off the site in accordacce with the procedures for transfer and storage described in Westinghouse Electric Corporation's letters dated December 27, 1961, January 31, 1962 and February 20, 1962 The use of storage racks not described in these documents, or work involving special nuclear mate-rial to be carried out in the fuel storage pool shall be submitted for approval by the Atomic Energy Commission.
Sincerely yours, E. kYLT2l - !
Director Division of Licensing and Regulation
Enclosure:
i Hazards Analysis l
J
)
9804170152 980413 }
ROLLER 98-100 PDR
- ^
/ f u 'l / / U / J L
r 'o HAZARD'i ANALYSIS BY THE TEST & POWER REACTOR SAFETY BRANCH Myh
"'" DIVISION OF LICENSING AND REGULATION WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-22 Facility License No. TR-2, as amended, authorizes Westinghouse Electric Corporation to store spent fuel elements from the Westinghouse Testing Reactor (WIR) in the reactor canal for cooling before shipment off site for reprocessing. By letter dated December 27, 1961 with attached Report No. VIR-153, and supplemental information letters dated January 31, 1962 and February 20, 1962, Westinghouse requested authorization to transfer irradiated WIR fuel elements in a cask from the reactor canal to a pool in a newly constructed decontamination building for further storage prior to shipment off the site.
The decontamination building is a high bay, heated and lighted area 100 f eet in length and 60 feet wide serviced by an' overhead twenty-five ton crane whose structural skeleton serves as the support structure for the walls and roof. At the north end of the building is a water pool, 30 feet by 25 feet by 26 feet deep which will be used for storage and load-ing operations of the spent WTR fuel elements. The pool is built on bed rock with a reinforced concrete base three feet thick, and with rein-forced concrete walls of a minimum thickness of 20 inches, which are .
coated on both sides to minimize leakage of water into or out of the pool.
The pool has neither a drain line nor overflow line. If the pool should overflow, a collection system has been provided to transfer overflow to a waste process area. The pool is equipped with fuel storage racks, designed to hold 360 elements in a critically safe geometry of six inch triangular arrays, an underwater work platform designed to f acilitate transfer operations, and a travelling work bridge from which most fuel manipulations will be done.
Design Analysis
- Westinghouse has provided adequate equipment to readily determine acci-dental criticality and background monitoring under normal operating con-ditions. Personnel monitoring badges and dosimeters will be worn by those engaged in handling and transfer operations. Continuous air non-itoring for particulate activity will be provided in the high bay area, filter and impactor air samples will be taken periodically, and gas samples will be collected and read using a vibrating reed electrometer.
Adequate portable survey instrumentation is available for monitoring the fuel handling and transfer operation.
The transfer cask is an unfinned circular cylinder, approximately 28 inches in diameter and six feet in height, specifically designed to transfer three (3) WIR fuel elements which have been irradiated not more than 100 days and cooled for a period of 30 days or more prior to transfer from the reactor annex canal to the fuel storage pool in the decontamination building, taking into consideration the radiation, heat
y' generation, material handling equipment, and safe transfer requirements.
wyg, Two lif ting trunnions are attached to the cask side above the center of gravity rs facilitate handling. The cask shell and fuel basket are con-structed of stainless steel for corrosion resistence and decontamination purposes. Westinghouse states that the lead shielding of 9 3/4 inches on the sides and 9 inches on the top and bottom is designed to give a dose rate when loaded of less than 530 mr at the surface and 50 mr/hr at one meter f rom the cask surface.
By independent analysis, using the effective energy method as described in NAA-SR-1992 and the parameters of 3 WTR fuel elements described which have been irradiated not more than 100 days and cooled not less than 30 days prior to transfer from the reactor canal, we have determined that the maximum radiation level at the surface of the cask will be less than i 60 mr/hr, and at a distance of one meter the radiation level will be less I than 10 mr/hr. The lid of the cask is designed to prevent radiation streaming. Further, the structural integrity of the transfer cask appears l to be adequate in light of the on-site use, short distances of movement (approximately 300 yards), and complete control of the movement by the i applican t. {
1 Westinghouse's heat transfer calculations show that the loaded cask (con-taining three fuel elements and water) can remain out of pool water at least nine hours with the generated heat being dissipated to the surround-ing air before the tempera'ture of the water in the cask would increase to 1900 F. The temperature difference across the wall of the cask under these conditions would be 20 F. 'The normal transit time should be less than one ,
hour. If, for some reason, the elements generate more heat than calcu- )
lated, or if it is necessary to further cool the cask, an emergency cooling system is provided in the cask. This emergency system provides for a flow of water, isolated f rom the water immediately adjacent to the fuel elements, through twenty-two stainless steel tubes imbedded within the lead shielding.
In our opinion, Westinghouse has demonstrated the ability of the fuel ele-ments to withstand a loss of transfer cask cooling water for a sufficient period of time in which to make corrective action before fuel element temperature exceeds the melting point of the aluminum cladding. The appli-cant's calculations show that there is 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> in which to provide addi-tional cooling water or to return the cask to either of the storage pools i before overheating of the three elements to 12000F would occur within the i cask to a point where fission product gases would be released to the atmos- l phere. In view of the conservative assumptions used in this analysis, i.e.,
all decay heat due to both beta and gamma radiation is generated within the fuel element, and none of the heat is carried away by conduction, convection or radiation, we believe that it is reasonable to conclude that more than 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> will be available, and that this time should be sufficient for the initiation of the proposed emergency procedures.
Westinghouse will conduct unloading operations f rom the cask under a mini-mum of six feet of water, which should provide adequate shielding from the radiation from the fuel elements, and proposes to store the coolest elements nearest to the pool wall.
y 3
}g!;tW '
5sve' The criticality of the proposed storage arrangement has been determined as a function of the triangular lattice pitch. Interpolating from Wenda-4 Code computations, the 6" pitch between fuel elements in the storage racks corresponds to a metal to water volume ratio of -0.16 which yields an infinite multiplication factor of 0.66.
Measurements in the WTR critical facility and computation by P3 transport theory approximations give flux distributions which agree well with those determined with the Wanda-4 Code in the case of the WTR fuel elements. An 11 region representation of the single fuel assembly-moderator cell is well within the capability of the Wanda-4 Code which has a 25 region limitation.
In addition, some conservatism is present in the computation in that, the effective multiplication was computed on the basis of a cylindrical model which would have less leakage, hence greater reactivity, than the actual storage array.
The transfer cask which is designed to hold three WIR fuel elements (e-0.9 kg U-235) insures agreement with 10 CFR 72.37 in that this loading amounts I to less than 75% of a minimum critical mass.
Accident Analysis Large losses of pool water which might result in melting of the fuel element cladding could only occur if there is: (1) structural failure of the pool, (2) siphoning action by the pool clean up system, and (3) undetected seepage.
In light of the construction of the pool, it appears that structural failure could result only from a severe earthquake. Seismology reports for the reactor site area indicate only a negligible probability for the occurrence of such an earthquake. Siphoning is not possible since all parts of the clean-up system external to the pool are above the normal water level and there are no direct piping connections to any other piping system. The clean-up system does discharge water into the pool below the level of the fuel stor-age racks; however, provisions have been included so that the direction of flow in the system cannot be reversed. To determine seepage, water samples will be taken periodically from wells surrounding the pool and analyzed for radioactive material content to detect any leakage of the canal water to the ,
surrounding ground water. In the event that the water level should drop by I some unforseen means, provisions have been made to replenish the pool water si a sete of 600 gpm with the backup capability of returning fuel elements to the reactor annex canal should this fail. Continuous air monitoring will be conducted in the decontamination building which will give an early warning of hazardous radiation level.
Damage to fuel elements in storage in the decontamination room pool and a release of fission products would be possible if a heavy item were to be dropped on the top of one or more elements within the fuel storage rack.
Such an event could cause failure of the fuel element cladding and the release of fission product gases to the surrounding water and to the atmosphere above the water. To prevent such an accident, Westinghouse has adopted operating procedures which preclude the handling ~ of heavy pieces of equipment by the crane over fuel elements in storage.
~
f .
26 i
Nevertheless, to provide an estimate of the upper limit of public hazard incident to the proposed operations, it was assumed that the tops of five 30-day cooled elements were damaged by such an accident to the extent that 10% of the fission gases from each element were released. Calcula-tions indicate that under unfavorable weather conditions the maximum ground concentration of released fission products would occur within the -
site boundary. Assuming more conservatively that the maximum concentra-tions occurred at the site boundary, the total integrated thyroid dose due to the released iodine f rom this accident to an individual who remained at this location for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> would be less than 300 rem. The consequences of exposure to the other released gaseous fission products would be much less serious. Because of the remote likelihood of such an occurrence.and in view of Westinghouse's warning and evacu/ation procedures which would reduce the calculated exposures significantly, we believe the operations proposed do not represent an undue risk to public health and safety.
In view of the foregoing analysis, we have concluded that provided that Commission approval is obtained for changes in or additions to the stor-age racks described in Report No. VTR-153, and work involving special nuclear material to be carried out in the fuel storage pool not described in Report No. VTR-153, Westinghouse Electric Corporation can be authorized to transfer spent fuel elements to a pool in the decontamination building for storage prior to shipment off the site, and that the proposed activities would not increase the probability or magnitude of accidents beyond those analyzed and evaluated in the Final Summary Safeguards Report, and that there is reasonable assurance that the activities can be carried out as proposed without endangering the health ~ and safety of the public.
Edson G. Case, Acting Chief Test & Power Reactor Safety Branch Division of Licensing and Regulation Date: gA7 g jggg
2 " i ' h Is-k.
3 4.'. i.
v
\ \
WESTINGH0USE Testing Reactor
- - i I
P. O. Box 158 Madison, Penna. ,
January 25,1%3 Docket 50-22 [
l;h 1ge 0 g / ,.%- -
i Mr. Robert lovenstein I Division of Licensing and Regulhtion U. S. Atomic EnerEy Commission Washington 25, D. C. l
Dear Mr. Lovenstein:
.Please refer to a letter from Mr. E. R. Price (Docket No. 50-22:
~
l DIAR:ERF), to my attention, dated Augxst 17,1%2. This is to notify you that the shutdown and y rmanent retirement of the Westinghouse Testing Reactor, the facility under License TR-2, has been completed including the last shipment of irradiated fuel which was made .on December 14,1%2. l There is enclosed herewith the " Final Shutdown Report for WTR" vhich supplements and amends the Shutdown Report (WTR-170) dated
( April 24,1%2. The,information and data is bein6 supplied to obtain a license amendment authorizing Westinghouse to possess but not to operate the WTR. We would appreciate pro:npt issuance of the requested amendment so that, among other matters, the financial protection requirements for License TR-2 may be re-duced. Perhaps if early overall action is not indicated, action on the financial protection problem could be accomplished on an interim basis.
O Very tru Q ours, fg z D ,
/,
~
S p
f.9
~ h"J- -)
J. . adon, Manager l
i Power Service dc**"S e7
~
JAN2 9196> >l Nuc D.1 AticEnyyCr:-j :.a 71
~ . 2.g -
- ' o.,mn e, ' p- .
- 'll o uctasmo a arcut nas -
/ $
w -
cu y> -. .
QA n -u n :
TJv iv ( .
c .: a, ;. * -
~
.b
, WTR-172 sk
- ~
R$g u/ wf
,ygpo cow C
l i
1 1
i i
a N/
l FINAL SHUTDOWN REPORT FOR WESTINGHOUSE TESTING REACTOR WTR-172
- JAI'UARY 25, 19ff S 9
, R~kto
,t.
w c-e i
y
@# ns ys A 7, ,
s
- emir
~. m u R b a ~? D "? O 5Dtr- 15ff- -
a.4 . o e, -
, CONTENTS 7
1 INTRODUCTION A. Purpose of Report.
B. Description of Site and Retired Facilities.
C. Control of Site.
- 11. DIS.QEIETION OF RETIRED CONDITION OF FACILITY A.
Site and Retired Facilities.
B. Primary Coolant System.
C. Vapor Container.
D. Process Building.
. E. Secondary System Facilities.
F. SNM and By-Produets
- 1. WTR Fuel Elements '
a) Irradiated Fuel Element b) Non-irradiated Fuel. Elements '
- 2. Experiments a) Irradiated Non-Fueled .
b) Irradiated Fueled c) Non-irradiated 3 Cobalt 60 and Radioactive Isotopes 4 Waste Disposal and Contaminated Water Inventory.
l 0. Disposal of Non-Contaminated Equipment.
Ill. HAZARDS QI
. IV .- ADMINISTRATION AND ItEPECTION PROCEDURES Figure 1 - Retired Facilities Waltz Mill Site.
Appendix A Table 1 - Survey Readings Review for Retired Areas. %
Appendix B;- 20,000 Oallon Tank Survey.
e-
g *. . ,* * . e
!. .I, INTRODUCTION Re Westinghouse Testing Reactor has been' shutdown. WTR-170 described the plans and schedule for retirement of this facility under license TR-2 and the condition into which the facility was being placed during the first phase of the shutdown covering a period from reactor shutdown to the end of 1962. This report, which is an amendment to WTR-170, describes the final shutdown condition prevailing as of the date of this report.
Included in Appendix A of this report are results of. radiation surveys which serve as a basis for procedures to insure compliance with 10CFR Part 20 Section 20.105, 20.201, 202.202, 20.203, 20.401 and other sections
-and appendices as applicable.
~
2e property.of the Westinghouse Plant Site near Waltz Mill, Pennsylvania is' owned in " fee simple" by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. He Corporation is operating and plans to continue to operate other facilities at the Site.
Reference (4) Docket 70-698." Post Irradiation Facility" is an application for broad. by-product and special nuclear material licenses for a post-irradiation facility located at the Waltz Mill Site of the Westinghouse Testing Reae. tor.
Certain service facilities at the Site are utilized by this facility.
The Westinghouse Reactor Evaluation Center located at this same Site is being operated under existing separate licenses.
t Y
w he retired facilities as shown in Figure 1 will be independent of the
' operating units at the Site. Security, maintenance, and inspection of these retired facilities will be the responsibility.of the Westinghouse I
Atomic Power Division, Forest Hills, Pennsylvania.
The following referenced documents are relevant to this report:
- 1) WTR-170, May 3,1962, " Shutdown Report" transmitted by letter l
' May 25, 1962 to Mr. Robert Lowenstein by J. M.-Yadon
- 2) Letter, August 17, 1962 to J. M. Yadon by E. IC" Price, Docket 50-22:
- . DIAR
- ERF.
- 3) WTR-171 - Transmitted by letter of September 24 " Retirement of Facilities Open Basins" 4)' Docket No.70-698.
5)- WCAP-369 (Rev.) WTR Final Safety Report l
1 i
l
- c. - .- . e
- . ~~ ,
1 11 7 DESCRIPTION OF RETIRED C WDITION OF FACILITIES
.The areas which have been placed in a retired condition at the WTR Site are shown in Figure 1 in cross hatching. A description of the various
. retired areta as of the date of this report is given below. Radiation surveys of these' Tite areas are given in Appendix A, and steps have been taken to comply with requirements of CFR-10.Part 20 Paragraph 201, 202 and 203.
/ A. Reactor Building The Reactor Building has been cleaned and surveyed and except for certain areas described below is a clean area. Doors will be locked or electric operators deenergized so as to prevent access except to authonized personnel.
- 1. ganal '
All irradiated material has been removed from the canal and it has been carefully cleaned. Fixtures such as r&cks and the thimble loader will remin in the canal. Thecanalhasbeencoveredwith6mid polyethylene sheeting and a heavy wire-mesh screen. A heavy small mesh screen has been placed in the canal at the Reactor Building wall to prevent access to this building from the Annex Building.
- 2. Reactor Vessel e-The head assembly has been replaced and bolted down as per approved
.' WTR. procedures, thus the interior is inaccessib'el except to a skilled crew of riggers. In addition only power for lighting is available in this building so .the crane is inoperable. All other openings have been secured. The core support structure and associated hardware and thimbles remain in the vessel. The vessel has been drained.
/ 3 Subnile Egga The subpile room has been cleaned but still re Q s a low level
" Contaminated Zone" . Radiation levels are within values to classify this as a " Radiation Zone" . The two doors to this particul'ar area have been locked.
er
9 ,
l 2.' .(
4 Rabbit M Eg;gL,
'/
This area remains a "Contaminat5d Zone" and a " Radiation Area".
Therefore the, door to this area has been locked.
5 Primry Coolant U ngs. and Igggs
.This' system has been completely drained and all openings have been secured to prevent escape of any airborne activity which may
-develop as residual drops of primary coolant water evaporate. The system will be allowed to " breathe" through an absolute filter ' located in the Process Building. -
/ 6. Contaminated U p.g, Tunnels Cleanup of gross contamination was accomplished. Access to these Iekst : , . areas is prevented by locked gates, doors, and concrete slabs as appropriate over all openings.
- 7. Lggp, Areas a) WTR-Loop No. 4 - This loop has been removed in its entirety and only the shielding cubicle remains. The top concrete shielding slabs have been replaced on this shielding cubicle thus preventing access.
b) WTR Water Loops No's. 1 to 3 hithintheshieldingcubicles the radiation levels are low but some contamination exists. These specific areas have been posted with appropriate signs and access to l~ the Reactor Building is restricted as described above. If, at some future date, the equipment in these cubicles were to be removed it could only be accomplished by properly trained, equipped, and supervised personnel.
- 8. Truck Lock Room and New Fugl Storage Vault i All new fuel has been returned to the supplier for reprocessing and the'se areas are empty and non-contaminated.
B. Process Building
- -=s The entrances to the retired areas of the Process Buildings have been locked and in addition the ga;os or doors to internal areas which remain as " Contaminated Areas" and " Restricted Areas" have been locked. Appendix A tabulates the results of the latest radiation survey. The general back-ground of most areas is lower than that defined for a "High Radiation Area" however the maxintm reading on contact for certain primary system components is.in this range. Therefore, specific -areas have been posted as restricted areas and are isolated internally by locked barriers.
~
3*.. :. .
~
- 1. Pump Roms All pump rooms have been locked Nd in addition the power for the electrically operated doors vill be cut off. Since lov levels of contamination and radiation exist, access to these areas is prevented except by trained and properly equipped personnel.
- 2. Internal Areas All internal areas which include those for the Heat Exchanger, '
Surge Tank, Primary Coolant Ion Exchanger, and Waste Disposal have
(
been individually locked. All tanks and piping in the various systems j have been drained and openings secured.
C. External Areas 1 All contaminated material other than described in Section E below i resulting from operation of the Westinghouse Testing Reactor has been removed frm external areas. The primary coolant head tank vill remain in place as will the fence surrounding its base. The head tank vent has been flanged off and the vent valve closed. The primary coolant system vill be allowed to breathe through an absolute filter located inside the Process Building. .All openings to the primary coolant tunnels have been secured with concrete slabs or locked gates.
D. Special Nuclear Materials and By-Product Materials Held Under License TR-2 f 1. WTR Fuel E.le ments !
l l
All the irradiated WTR Fuel Elements were transferred to the Decon-tamination Building Water' Pit by mid-July, 1962 and all these elements were returned to the AEC for reprocessing (WTR-153, SNM-576) by December 14, 1962. The Decontamination Building vill remain in operation as described in Docket 70-698.
All non-irradiated WTR fuel elements were transferred to other licensees for cold reprocessing by October 15, 1962y %
- 2. Experiments All experiment material, irradiated or non-irradiated, fueled or non-fueled, has been either returned to the original experimenter or disposed of as radioactive vaste material by standard WTR procedures.
0
~.
. . ~
3 Cobalt 60 and Radioactive Isotopes All of the Cobalt 60 has been transferred to licensed customers or, .in the case of the lov activity cobalt and radioactive isotopes, have been disposed of by normal vaste disposal procedures.
E. WTR - Liquid Waste Retention Basin, Evaporator Plant and Solid Waste Disposal Pad As described in Docket 70-698 the WTR Site Liquid Waste Retention Basin, the Evaporator Plant and certain tanks associated with this facility will be retained as part of the operating facility. However, before transfer of these facilities was made, all contaminated water generated by 9TR operation or shutdown vork was evaporated and all solid vastes so generated vere disposed of by standard vaste disposal procedures.
The three pools in this area have been drained and the water evaporated.
Subject to AEC approval of proposals made in WTR-171, these three pools vill be filled in and the land returned to contour. In addition drainage ditches vill bc constructed around the periphery of the pools to minimize the flow of surface water across tb,e filled-in areas and direct the surface water to Calley's Run, the area drainage stream. There are thirty (30) 20,000 gallon tanks in thirdrea. The majority of these tanks are clean or have been cleaned. As described in Docket 70-698 some of these tanks vill be retained for future use. The remainder of the clean tanks will be disposed of as uncontaminated surplus equipment.
,- , Surveys have been made and all such tanks to be disposed of average less than 1000 dpm per square foot by emear and 0.1 mr open vindow by radiation survey over the internal surfaces of the tank. A typical set of surveys is given in Appendix B.
F. Activated and Contaminated Hardware and Tools '
i 1
'Ihe greater part of this equipment and material have been disposed of through standard vaste disposal procedures. Where practical a '
small amount has been decontaminated and vill be usTon the Site i by the remaining operating facilities. Miscellaneous small pumps and driving motors have been stored in the heat exchanger room. The core support structure and associated hardware. including low pressure
. s .
and high pressure thimbles are stored in the vessel. The thimble loader and certain racks remain in the canal. Access to all of these 4
areas vill be prevented by the measured described.
G. Disposal.of Non-Contaminated Equipment Conventional equipment associated with the facility such as office furniture, machine shop tools and equipment, storeroom inventory, and miscellaneous auxiliary equipment have been disposed of in the past six months and similar equipment may be disposed of from time to time in the future.
III. HAZARDS The hazards associated with the retired VfR facilities are primarily those .of direct radiation and contamination on surfaces. The principle of " Restricted Areas" vill be applied to any area in the retired facility where such hazards are considered to exist based on the radiation survey,of December 31, 1962. In any event, in addition, all retired areas will be locked and access permitted only to authorized personnel after the areas have been determined to be safe for access.
Personnel trained and equipped to handle contaminated equipment or radio-active materials vill be available at the Site. Although it is not in-tended that such personnel as a matter of routine vill enter or be involved in the retired areas, their presence if any emergency arises vould' permit them to assist immediately. In establishing the retirement conditions, particular attention has been given to the possibility of 'the uncontrolled escape of . radioactivity.or contamination. The following analysis of the potential hazards indicates such an escape is not credible.
A. Contaminated Areas and Direct Radiation In previous sections the retired conditions of specific areas of interest have been described and survey results as obtained as of December 31, 1962 are given in Appendix A. Wing the shutdown period, whenever practical, irradiated materials and/or equipment have been removed and decontamination work has been done. Thus the radiation and contamination levels in these areas have decreased over
,. t . .
., . ~_
and above that expected from r.ormal decay. It is expected that further decreases will occur because 7of normal decay.
Although for some of the following areas,100FR-Part 20 Section 20.204 might not require posting, they will be restricted and posted as
" Contamination or Rediation Areas" until annual inspections indicate
-significant changes in contamination or radiation levels. It is noted that the locations of irradiated materials or contamination are steel-and/or concrete enclosures inside the retired areas. The retired areas under any condition will remain locked and restricted. The "Centamination and/or Radiation Areas are:
Process Building
{'j.
.w
- 1. All pump rooms.
- 2. Heat exchanger room.
3 Surge tank room.
4 Ion exchange cubicle.
- 5. Waste disposal basement. -
Reactor Buildine
- 1. Sub Pile Ruttr.
- 2. Rabbit pump room.
3 Loop cubicles.
4 Reactor top and Pressure vessel.
- l 5. Canal.
General
- 1. Base area of P. C. Head Tank.
- 2. All P. C. Piping Tunnels.
B. Fire As stated in WIR 170 the plant is of steel and concrete construction To reduce hazards the following steps have been tak M
- 1. All combustible material has been removed. For example, the cooling tower will be dismantled and the wood removed from the site.
2 There are no sources of explosive gases or dust in the retired areas.
~
- . i- o .
8_
3 Unnecessary electrical circuits have been deenergized.
4 Officials of local fire companies along with security personnel have been briefed on the condition of the plant.
- 5. For an indefinite period other facilities on site will be operated. These facilities have people who have been trained in fire fighting and are equipped to handle emergencies.
C. Natural Forces The natural forces to which the facility structures are exposed are described in WCAP-369 (Rev.)Section II. The ar.alysis contained therein is still applicable. In addition, the plant structures are conservatively designed and relatively new. It is expected they can h., stand for many years without attention. However, it is anticipated that any deterioration will be detected and reported by security personnel or those making periodic inspection of the plant and appropriate action taken at that time, f) . Unlawful Entry This is considered from the point of view of hazard to the person or persons who might enter the plant. All retired areas have been locked. The entire area is surrounded by an AEC security type chain link fence, and the plant is under guard. To obtain access to any radiation or contamination area another strong barrier must be
_ breached. As previously indicated other facilities on the site will be in operation. This in itself will tend to discou age trespassing and unlawful entry and it would be expected that with a number of personnel on site attempted trespass and unlawful entry would be quickly detected and action taken.
IV. ADMINISTRATION AND INSPECTION A. License Administration To preserve continuicy in negotiations concerniglicensing of the WTR shutdown, specific responsibility will be maintained by the Westinghouse Atomic Power Division organization.
B. Security A 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> guard will be c.aintained at the Waltz Mill site.
1
. e- ,
/
Guards win Lake periodic tours of plant buildings but they win 31 ~
have routine access to specific areas which have been isolated as l contamination and radiation areas. .
C. Inanectiop
. Annual inspections of the retired facilities at the WTR Site win be.made by personnel experienced in the detection.of hasards both nuclear and non nuclear. The results of these inspections. win '
be reported to the AEC.
- 1. The inspection team will be drawn from the Westinghouse
.A.tomic Power Division Statt. Represented in this group, win be Engineering, Health Physics, and Flart Services and Facilities. i They will be assisted as required, by Health Physics Technicians ~
and Mechanical Technicians who have been trained in fire protection.
- 2. The steps in the inspecticn win be as fonows:
a) Air samples to determine airbcrne contamination and any necessary initia] surveys r.ade in each of the retired areas to .
determine safety equipment and procedurea necessary to :nako the inspection.
b) A co~plete survey, duplicatizg the survey given f.n Appendix A win be made and the results recorded.
c) An inspection of structural integrity win be made as ven as a ganaral area inspection. Inspection will be made of the fonardrg items but not necessarily lis.ited to these. -
1". Reactor Building a) Security of all locks,, doors, and covers restricting access to the areas:
b) Integrity and condition of walls and columns. ,
' c) Crane and. Supporting structure. '
d) Reactor pressure vessel and its closures both at the reactor top and in the sub pile room.
i e) . Wane,. canal, and structure in the subpile room.
, 2. Process Buildina y, .
a) security of a n locks, decrs, and building closures. -
b
~) Filter assembly for primary coolan s,ystemTenthing (Repia iter as necessary). /
) A --.
l l
l
~
(, . s t . .
. . .e .
I .: .
! - 10 .
l c) . Integrity of Heat Exchanger.
d) Integrity of. Surge Tank. 1 L e) Integrity of #1, #2, #3, shutdown and standby primary coolant
- . Pumps.
f) Integrity of tanks in Waste. Disposal area.
g) , Integrity of primary coolant piping.
- 3. Armaa l a) Read Tank and structural integrity, b) Integrity of all tunne.1 closures.
,C ~
t 4
h t
'~
es
. 1 e s APPENDIX A TABLE I
,, WTR - Radiation and Contamination Areas December 31, 1962 Contamination 1,evels*
S-7/7 Surface Airborne H2O conc Solid cone cr/hr S-7 S-7 p-7 S-7
/d100cm2 ne/cc pe/cc ue/g I. Reactor Complex Fence O Areas - external to buildings
- 1. Waste storage area North of Cooling Tower 2
NOT PART OF RETIRED FACILITIES h: . Pcd at rear of Process Building y l
- 3. Other external areas (1/2 BKGD BKGD NA BKGD (head tank, fence)
II. Retention Basin Area i
- 1. Waste storage pad NOT PART OF RETIRED AREAS
- 2. Pool areas - Basins I l
1, 2, and 3 See WTR-171 for information on open basins *l l
- 3. Retention Basin and Appendix-B of this report for tanks.
Area is not being retired. Retention Basins
- 4. Evaporator Area !
and Evaporator not part of retired areas.
(Insidebuilding)
- 5. Te.nk Area
{,.ProcessBuilding
- 1. Standby Pump Room General Background 0.5/0.3 200 BKGD NA BKGD
'2. Standby Pump Contact 14/14 NA NA NA NA i
- 3. Pump Room No.1 0.3/0.2 200 BKGD NA NA
- 4. Pump Room No.1 Contact with Pump 4/4 NA NA NA NA
- 5. Pump Room No. 2 0 3/0.2 100 BKGD NA NA G:neral Background m ,
- 6. Pump Room No. 2 Contact with pump 2/2 NA NA NA NA
- 7. Pump Room No. 3 0.5/O.3 100 BKGD NA NA General Background
- 8. Pump Room No. 3 2/2 NA NA NA NA Contaet with pump
- 9. H;ad Tank Downcomer Contact 2/2 'NA -
NA NA NA
t-
,, m p .
k,.;, _-
APPENDIX B STORAGE T1NKS '
Tank Capacity - 20,000 gallons Diameter - 10 ft.
Length - 34 ft.
" Volume - 2650 cu. ft.
Internal Surface - 1227 sq. ft.
Weight - 10,800 lbs.
4 9 x 106 gas.
f
)
'=,
EACH END- 'N
, 3 to 5 points j * '^-
gN, ' ,
i s.
\ ,
V- ,' .
Ea-ret
' 24 to 56 I MTFR.A: .TF.!h d'JR' D F0 .Li points FIG. 2 N, 0.15 s ,' a g O.03 ,
O Oc 0.0 ! 0.0/. 0.0/. \ 0 01
/ - .j
_s i
\
D Barrel RADIATION SURVEY MR/HR AE0VE EACKGROUND (OPEN ?!!NDOW)
FIG. 3- "
v ..
' ;,. .. :* m - -
y . . . .; .
_~
~~
i APPENDIX B SMEAR SURVEY OF A JTPICAL TANK *
(DPM/sq.ft.-NetCountsx100)
REFER 'IO FIGURE 2
._SKEAR No. . NET COUNTS SMEAR Ro. NET COUNTS SMEAR NA NET COUNTS 1 lo 23 10 45 0 2 8 24 lo 46 o 3 8 25 15 47 o 4 o 26 11 48 6 5 5 27 6 49 17
@6 4 28 4 50 7 7 o 29 6 51 o l
8 8 30 8 52 7
, 9 o 31 16 53 o
! 10 5 32 21 >
54 4 11 0 33 9 5 o l 12 7 34 4 i
56 5 13 o 35 ~~ ~ 4 '
57 o 14 8 36 4 58 13 15 o 37 o 59 5 16 9 38 7 60 11 Qf- 17 9 39 6 61 7 28 lo 40 8 62 0 19 5 41 o 63 9 ao o h2 o 64 7
- 21. 9 43 o 65 7 2?. 4 44 16 66- 6 B-2 - '
.