ML20216F540

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Submits Table Giving Suitable Operating Conditions Which Will Be Observed During Escalation Program.Wtr Operating Procedures P-107 Detailing Action to Be Taken by Reactor Operating Staff in Event of Reactivity Changes Encl
ML20216F540
Person / Time
Site: Waltz Mill
Issue date: 07/18/1960
From: Morris E
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To: Price H
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML20216F225 List:
References
FOIA-98-100 NUDOCS 9804170116
Download: ML20216F540 (3)
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Text

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Westinghouse ELECTRIC CORPORATlON O

TESTING REACTOR l July 18, 1960 P.O. DOX 107 5 PITTSBURGH 30, PA,

! Mr. H. L. Price, Director Division of Licensing and Regulation U. S. Atomic Energy Commission l Washingto; 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Price:

Subject:

Lice'nse No. TR-2 Docket 60-22 N9d During a meeting with members of your staff on July 12, 1960 certain information was requested to supplement that furnished you with our letter of July 11, 1960.

In paragraph 3, page 3, of our letter we proposed to limit heat flux by limiting the amount of local boiling in the core. A satifac cory alternate method of heat flux control is the establishment of minimum primary coolant flow conditions as a function of power level.

The following table gives suitable operating conditions which will be l obcerved during the escalation program and early 60 MW operation of the WTR, l

Power Level as a Function of

, Minimum Core Flow I

and Inlet Temperature Thermal Inlet Minimum Core (Approximate Total Power Temperature 'F Flow GPM Coolant Flow GPM )

60 140 11 200 16 800 60 115 9 260 13 900 50 140 8 200 12 300 50 115 7 530 11 300 l l

40 140 6 530 9 800 i 40 115 5 930 8 900  ;

In between conditions are to be obtained by linear interpolation.

These values were derived on the basis precented in Section K of Report WTR-49 A 10% hot channel factor has been added to cover small '

defects in fuel elements. The resulting values represent an operational safety factor in burnout heat flux greater than 2 3 under all operating conditions.

9004170116 980413 ' ' '

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oh Mr. H. L. Price July 18, 1960

, _ Attached are forty (40) copies of WTR Operating. Procedures P-107 which detail action to be taken by the reactor operating staff in the event of sudden reactivity changes or fission product release to the

! primary coolant.

As requested, we have conducted a thorough review of both the construction drawings and the installed equipment of the primary loop, the vapor container, and the ventilation system in an effort to determine if there were any possible paths of leakage in the containment system.

No other possible direct leakage from the containment system other than i the known venting system of the primary coolant head and surge tanks was discovered. We have recently applied to the Isotopes Branch of the Division of Licensing and Regulation for a broad Byproduct Materials License. In the course of preparing information required for this license, we are conducting a thorough examination and analysis of any possible abnormal radioactive discharge from secondary radiation sources, such as laboratories and hot cells. The results of this study will be presented to the Isotopes Branch.

We have found the incident of the fuel element failure, although regrettable, to have been a valuable experience from the standpoint of operating standards and procedures, the handling of emergency conditions, and the development of techniques. The folloiring requirements have been particularly emphasized:

a. The need for extreme care in specifying, handling, and inspecting fuel. No step in the process can be taken for granted. In addition to the inspection program outlined in our July 11, 1960 letter, we <

have set up local inspection facilities immediately '

adjacent to the main fuel storage rack for rechecking key mechanical dimensions of fuel elements after receipt from the supplier.

b. The training process for reactor operators and super-visors must be a continuing program. We have emphasized and will continue to emphasize to the reactor operators that a sudden change in negative reactivity can be as symptomatically significant as a positive change in reactivity. We will, as in the past, continually stress safety at our operations staff meetings and make every

! effort to keep our operators constantly on the alert for  :

unusual operating symptoms. '

l As a result of the incident, a number of minor changes have been made or are underway in the plant system. Among the modifications are:

Mr. H. L. Price July 18, 1960

a. Relocation of the fission product monitor to obtain a greater speed of response.

b .. Addition of more drainage points in the primary loop to permit easier removal of radioactive particles at

' pipe bends and other inconvenient locations,

c. Addition of lead shielding on the bottom head of the reactor vessel and rabbit tubes to reduce the radiation hvel in the sub-pile room.
d. Addition of a spray-wach-down system to confine con-tamination to the pressure vecsel when head is being removed.
e. Addition of new waterproof lines for primary loop temperature instrumentation to permit operation should pipe tunnels become flooded.
f. Addition of a canal filter and vacuuming system to c1,ean up radioactive particles on the floor of ther canal. ,

.A number of new techniques for handling radiation and decon-tamination problems are now available. Methods have been developed for clearing the reactor vessel of radioactive particles, decontaminating the vessel head, removing the shroud tubes when they are contaminated, cleaning the primary piping system, decontaminating the heat exchangers and cleaning the surge tank. Improved methods of waste disposal and water handling have been developed. Canal machinery and underwater handling processes have been improved. Health Physics instrumentation has been strengthened, and the procedures and clothing for working under radioactive conditions have all been proven or modified by experience.

Our immediate permanent personnel level has been increased from 110 to 135 of which 8 have been additions to the Health Physics Department. i l

In summary, our personnel has been subjected to a rigorous I experience in the handling and control of high-level radiation problems. l This experience has resulted in increased strength in all areas of operation which will be a major factor in the future successful operation. l of the'wTR. i j Sincerely yours,

?XNO+zAa E. T. Morris General Manager i

I l

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