ML20216F618

Ack Receipt of from AR Luedecke Re Wtr.Committee Believes That Modified Design,Method of Operation & Experimental Program Should Be Reviewed

ML20216F618
Person / Time
Site:	Waltz Mill
Issue date:	03/04/1961
From:	Thompson T US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	Seaborg G US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML20216F225	List: IA-98-100, Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Forwards Documents Listed in App B in Entirety ML20216F223 ML20216F241 ML20216F268 ML20216F271 ML20216F312 ML20216F332 ML20216F356 ML20216F389 ML20216F409 ML20216F504 ML20216F519 ML20216F540 ML20216F618 ML20216F640 ML20216F718 ML20216F724 ML20216F729 ML20216F735 ML20216F743 ML20216F749 ML20216F758
References
FOIA-98-100 NUDOCS 9804170138
Download: ML20216F618 (11)

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{{#Wiki_filter:a .( e ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS r) UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Washington 25, D. C. March 4, 1961 Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg Chairman U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C.

Subject:

WESTINGHOUSE TESTING REACTOR (VIR)

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

J The Committee is in receipt of the letter from A. R. Luedecke, General Manager, on this subject, dated March 1,1961. This reactor is a testing reactor whkh experienced rather serious dif ficulties subsequent to the last review by the Advisory Commit-tee on Reactor Safeguards. The Committee believes that it should review the modified design and method of operation of this reactor. and the experimental program which it will carry out. The desira-bility of this review is further emphasized since it is understood that there have been changes in design and method of operation of this reactor since its last review by the Committee. l The Committee would like to schedule a review of the design and method of operation of this reactor, together with the experiments currently being performed and those proposed. In particular, the Committee desires to obtain information on the design and testing of the control system and the verification of the margin of safety with regard to burnout of fuel elements or their melting due to failure of the coolant system. A proposed time for the review would be during the May 1961 meeting. The Committee would appre-l ciate receiving this information prior to its meeting. The AEC staff and the owners and operators of the renetor should be l present to enable the Committee to obtain all pertinent facts. ~ 9804170138 980413 PDR FOIA ROLLER 98-100 PDR [ -v

-( a Honorab;e Glenn T, Seaborg March 4, 1961 a ' 3 The Committee is not aware of any reason for suspending the operatim of this reactor pending its study and review. Sincerely yours. l /s/ T. J. THOMPSON T. J. Thompson Chairman f

Reference:

l Letter - A. R. Luedec)te to T. J. Thompson, dated March 1,1961 l l 3 4

T{ ' V '. 4' 5*~. ', :. A L e. # :i ~ }4, W f,j5"r:~$ [ I SEP 7~ 1980 Docket No. 50-22 ~ $.? ~ l'. E. T. Morris, Gcneral Manager L 0-s Westinghouse Testing Recetor Westinchouse Electric Corporation P. O. Box 1075 3 Pittsbur6h 30, Pennsylvania Dear Mr. Morris Enclosed herewith is an authorization to start-up and operate \\ theUcstinghouseTestingReactor(Wil3)inaccordancewiththe provisions of License No. TR.-2 and certain additional condi-tions. The first of the conditions sets forth a table of I uini.su: coolant flow rates to the core which must be observed iby' Westinghouse during operation of the WT3. The purpose of the mininun coolant flow rates designated in the enclosed authorization is to preclude any sicnificant ar.ount of boiling in the MTR core. It is our understanding that in accordance vith your letter of July 11, 1960, you vill not permit the l boiling pattern set forth on the boiling detector noise level to be more severe than the pattern set forth in Figure 13, jl M -49, vith a coolant flow of 8,000 EP:. d I cn clso enclosing an cuthorization to fuel and operate the .:c nodified h16h-pressure experinental tube in accordance with x. C M -40. ' p.. f. ' ; $f (_i;; Sincerely yours, t ,.t y'. i J n. 2." . y: -. Harold Price, Director !j Division of Licensing and Regulation L k

Enclosures:

As stated abovo Distribution: Formal Docket f cc: Arvin E. Upton Suppl. Docket !J LeBoeuf, Lamb & Leiby Public Document Room l] 15 Broad St. Compliance Div. (2) w/ene. N Y New York, 5, /,A.[. d. lib C. K. Beck w/ene. 8 R. Lovensteinker/e tion w/ enc, s w ne. ^ M TottehnPd. Tn mn o M l h} - \\ jf. a2 ..< n.a2 wuvou \\ mv r

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^) 1 n C U: ITE.D STATL OF id'.Eh1CA 3 ATLMIC E'CRJY C C MI;3ILN h li ].. In the Matter of ly Facility Licence No. TR-2 'i.ECTING E USE TE.;TI!!G TCACTOR j i / 1 o Following an invectication of the incident which occurred at the V.estinchouce Tecting Reactor (..TR) on April 3,1960 involving the partial destruction of a fuel element through .s overheating and cubcequent melting, an Order saa incued on { June 30, 1960, to the Jicstinghouce Electric Corporation i ( (hereinaf ter referred to ao "sicatinchouse") requiring ricat-inchouce to file certain inforcation '..ith the Atomic Energy } l Commiccion and prohibiting further operation of the J.TR with-out the prior written c,, proval of the Commission. J { y .entinghouco, has filed LTR-49, " Report on..Ta ruel Element t Failure, April 3,1960," dated July 7,1960, and letters l dated July 8, 11, 18 and 25, 1960, and August 15 19.60 in compliance with the aforementioned Order. The report and j letters describe the incident and recultc of a metallurgical f I examination of the colted fuel elo:r.cnt, corrective measures taken to prevent recurrence of the incident, inspection of i fuel eloconta proposed to be loaded into the reactor, and { l'fT chances made in the venting system for the process water head j tank and the process vcater surce tank to protect againot re- 'b loaces of fission ;.roducts to the atmosphere. yfi Baced upon a review an6 analycis of the aforomentioned sub-mittalc, as reflocted by the attached hazarda analysis, i prepared by the Hazards Evaluation Brr.nch of the Division of Licensing and Reculation, thero is reasonable assurance that ' the operation of the oTR in accordance with Licence No. TR-2, and the additional conditionc Oct forth below, will not en- ) danger the public health and cafety and will not be inimical ~ to the common defence and security. In view of the foregoing, and in ac,:ordance with the afore- ~ centioned Order of June 30, 1960, approval of the modification of the venting system for the prococo water head tank.and the process water curce tank proposed in the '.ectinghouse letter i l

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{ ~% h _.8.1T. o I o $ WTR-49,'" Report on WTR Pual Element Failure April 3,1960," dated July 7,1960 r .Y and Iceters dsted July.11 and.18', and August 15, 1960'which discuss the incident- ' :., ~* - h. .. t v ^' z y.. e p.-., \\ ,. : ;;;, :;'l- ~ ~ p g a ;,, ~ ~ ; ' 'P"'- .v-vv ,--iwa- ,.-y

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2 -- '.. I i A and certain corrective measurcs c.2 ken, and letters dated July 8 and 25,1960 y h which discuss the proposed eMagos in the venting system. ,-c tle hva revieued the foregoing docu=cnts, the report of the incident by { . m. ) p the AEC investigating cocnittee, hva visited the facility and held several tF... ' - h ' _ discussions with WTR personnel on revised plans for operation. Following is a.;. ~, b i .. ; discussion of items of significance to the safety of the WT1 operation which 7' l < { ~" were disclosed by the incident of April 3,.1960 J .J' 1 Cause of the Incident ~ ~,- t,.: ~ . ' '.,.)$ The incident was ' initiated by the partisi destruction of ona reactor' fuel . ole =ent through overhosting and subsequent melting. Thetechnicaloriginofthe'['.- 4. . incident is not known with certainty, but it is likely that either or bot'n of. o; .. ',, 'two factors pisyed a major role: 1) defective acts 11urgical bonding of the fuely U- ' elcment; and, 2) inadequate coolant flow to the fuel element. At the time of the incident an caperiment was in progress in which tha i-coolant flow through the reactor core had been reduced to promote substantial l'-

i.. boiling in the core.. Subsequent analysis of the thornst ' conditions which prohbly t

existed at the time of the incident indicate that a burnout of a sound fuel element' due to excessive heat flux probably would not have occurred. The calculated' {.., a j , ja##- burnout ratio using Hirshak's correlstion (DP-355) is' approximately 2 in,.. '. .: :f .e. r./'. sceord with the WTR license requirement for minimum burnout ratio. - .A W.;. . m,$7 - There is Cood resson to believe that the element which did fail was defective. [j' "* N '? Subsequent ultrasonic examination of clean WTR fuel claments of the same batch as ~ 'A Y Jthe failed element revealed that in 133 out of 235 fuel tubes there were araas

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.g. [of poor bonding larger than % inch in diameter, with several,arass larger thsa f[ ,1 inch in diameter.. If the failed fuel elenent contained' a defective metallurt cal i 4 bood as large as 1 inch in. diameter, calculations indicata that it.coutil have f ~- ".e; '. " ./ 3 .y.'h. l,3.; ,* l ' ',,. i. ; ).' N ~,'1 ),. ' '. i,7. _,. ": f. g ..e i-u, 1 5 ' '., r, , -( s,, ~

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3 Burnout in this local [ burned out at that local spot due to execcaive heat flux. I w/ g spot could have caused mechanical dictortion of the element, leakage of coolant j flow, further overheating and molting of a substantial part of the element such ~ a 0 as did occur. h y ', l:.' It is not certain, however, that the incident was initiated by local boiling. 2 burnout due to a local bonding defect. Ono would suspect frca the nsasive failura 1 + f, of the ele =ent an.d the conditions in UTR at the time of failure (lov flow in the. \\ ,. downward direction through the core and subotantial'1ocal boiling) that.che entire':. 3 elcnent could hsva progressively voided due to a hydraulic instability cocmonly j 1 knoun as " boiling disease" even in the absence of a local defect. A satisfactory analysis of the hydraulic conditions existing in the core at l the time of the incident cannot be cada due to the lack of relevant. experimental data in the range of UIR conditicas. Calculations using Eeynolds' data for local 1 boilins pressure drop (ANL-5178) indicate th:t a paralici chanac1 flov instability I did not occur in the UTR at the ti=a of the burnout. Hovover, the conditions of - Ecynolds' c:cperiments did not include conditions of coolant channe1~ dimensions, coolant flow rates, flow direction, heat flux, or probably' void fractica which' j[i 8 - existed in the WTR at the timo. It has not been established either that Reynolds i;,. correlation doca or does not apply, but the differences betveca Raynolds' r - czperbents and WTR conditione probably causes substantial limitations in the ~ applicability of the cathod to the VTR. In a recent paper'(L. Bernath, A Theory. ? Cf Local Boiling Burnout and Its Application To Existing Data, presented at the ' Third National Heat Transfer Conference, August 1959) Bernath points out that, .( ct 1o.4 prescures and subcoolings the lifetino of bubbles both on the surface and l [ in the stream bocame appreciabic, and under these conditions, an appreciable' '~. is.. bubble void fraction can be attained in narrow coolant passages at high boac - r. p s ur.. ) l ', %:f [ 9 A I- ',.W

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"1. " likely,. therefore,' that although local subcooled boiling existed in WIR at ,.i - l ~ 7,3 ' the time.of the incident, the void fraction of the coolant in the element was. - larger than might have been suspected and this together with.the unstabling-b.,. - effect of low flow velocities in downflow could have resulted 'in 'a flow. e. ",,- i ~ instability, progressive voiding of the coolant channels, and overheating of,,. 1 J.

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the element even in the absence of a local defect. ~'I + q I /~ U-Operating Modifications Proposed If, as now appears possible, a parallel channel flow instability initiated f the' fuel element failure at WTR.,we believe it prudent to restrict the future * ' operation of WIR to substantial coolant flows through' and insignificant amountsf _ of boiling in the core until. more information is available on. flow instability - ~ i.r in local subcooled boiling in narrow channels. v..' 7.n their letter to the Commission dated July 18, 1960, Westinghouse has' ,3 a. t proposed in tabular form, 'a set of minimum coolant flow rates to the core T for various reactor power levels and inlet. coolant temperatures. These values (. ~~ L ~ . l were calculated on the basis that the surface temperature of the hotest fuel f,, ' '. ele =ent in the core would not exceed the surface temperature ' required to z,.. 3 ~ ^ initiate local boiling. The surface temperature in' local boiling was cal-y ,. i 5 [.... culated using the Jens and Lottes correlation (ANL 4627). We believe that 3 c.. [;.. the specified ratios between coolant flow and power level.'are conservative, . ?' ' 'and if followed during reactor operatio'n'should n't' result in"any significant' ". ~ o

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amount of boiling in the m core. This table of minima: ' coolant' flow rates, for various reactor, power icvels and inlet coolant temperature should be. '4 incorporated in the UTa license, with the 'notati.2n that the values given for. ~ ..,/..,, ' 40 Hw apply' for power levels of 40 Hw and below. l /l' - Since there is good reason to believe that a defective metallurgical bond. ..,u. i.e 'l may have initiated the incident or contributed to the severity of.the overheating c l ; ;.- of the element, Westinghouse has initiated more stringent fue1~ ' element inspection- ~ f

• _ procedures for elements to bs reloaded intothe reactor. Details are'contaihed 3 - -l,

in Report WIK-49 dated July 7,1960 filed by Westinghouse.. The Report indicates. that the presence of any defects in the bonding between cladding and fuel to be reloaded in the reactor will be determined by ultrasonic means or by any better ,-.[.,. menas which may become' available, and fuel with defects larger than an equivalent diameter of approximately 1/8 inch will be rejected. The effect of defects! '..~ smaller then 1/8" h'as been taken into account by a 10'4 hot channel factor which'. was used in the calculations to determine acceptable reactor power and coolant ' ~ w-< flow ratios discussed above. I Frota a safety standpoint, we'believe that these new.. procedures are ' adequate to assure that the fuel proposed to be reloaded in the. m m.. ~ will. be' suitable 'for the modified ' operating conditions and procedures proposed. r. VM* i.

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~ a 3, ; 6-4 - \\ L4; Ucstinghouse has indicated in choir Iceter dated August 15, 1960 that they t I intend to modify the m adsinistrative procedures to provide for reviou of all reactc: werating and experimental procedures by either the WTR Technical Support i Group or the m Safeguards Coccittee. We believe that this change will serve to strengthen the administrativo procedures for the facility in that it will. } i i.? provide.tn independent technical review of all m procedures significant to safe, t operation of the reactor and its experimental facilities.. Head Tank Venc P. . The fuci cicment failure of April 3,1960 dicciosed a design deficiency of' f.4 the facility in that gaseous activity was releaced to the atmosphere 'from the process meer head tank vent which was not provided with an isolation valve. Weatin0 house has propoced, in their Iceters to the Cccinisolon dated July 8 and i .25, 1960, to install a motor operated valve in the head tank vent lino. Closure'. of this v21ve vill be actuated autcr.atically by signal from the head tank ., radiosceivity caonitor or manually by the reactor operator. The alarm setting. cn the head tank monitor vill be 1.33 x 10-2x c/ce, set on tN basis of standard calculations for ' atmospheric diffusion and measured diversity of wind direction,. ', _ such that the concentration of airborne activity at the point of taximum ground concentration would not be expected to exceed 1 x 10"9 c/mi averaged over one ~ ye tr, as permitted by 10 CFR Part 20 Operating procedures for the m will ' i require that if the head tank monitor should alarm, the operator, vill actuate closure of the head tank vent valvo and shutdown the reactor..- Automatic closure.- of tha vent valve vill be actuated at a measured concentration Icvel 'approximately . two orders of essnitude higher than the alarm sceting. 'Thus, the valve would be 1 a. closed autectatically in the event of a sudden large increase in affluent activity - ,f.. level. 3 . n : y- - ~ g.4,.'.n; s ^ g. j., - -).' r;- e. .f. g y r, a ? v r .ya .9 -a ,,m' h n u.~..

I o v .'y, e 7- ~ Q Since the nom 21 activity IcVel, pri: 2rily Argon 41, expceted at 'the head j j ~~ tank vent during operation is approxim2tely one order of cugnitudo below the specified alsm point, and the veut valve will be closed manually if the activity level chould reach the monitor alarm point, with backup automatic closure to \\ 1 4 \\ cccur for higher Icycis, va conclude that the design and operating procedures proposed for the head c4nk vent syste:s are satisfactory and that it is highly ~ "unlikely that persons in surrounding art c will be expocad to concentrations of i t ~cirborne radiation in excess of permissib.e icvelo, ~ Conclusions Bssed on our anslysis of the course and consequences of the April' 3,1960 - incident of the IER, and the corrective mcscurcs in design, inspect.cn and proE cedures taken or proposed to be taken by Ucstinghouse to prevent its recurrence,- ' v3 have concluded thst operation of the UIR under the proposed modified operating. conditions vill not result in unduc hasard to the hesith and safety of the public, J r t. s ,y. 6-g. .~ 3 ( 9 4 s ~.,.~L e g b M

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. *g. U stinghouse [1 Atomic Power Division ~~ P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh 30, S,eptember 2h,1962 I Mr. Richard Cunningham Division of Licensing and Regulation U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington 25, D. C.

Subject:

Docket 50-22

Dear Mr. Cunningham:

In conjunction with Phase I of the retirement of the Westinghouse Testing Reactor as described in letter of May 8,1962 (TR-2; Docket 50-22) to Mr. Robert Lowenstein froci !!r. J. W. Simpson and letter of August 17, 1962 to Mr. J. M. Yadon from Mr. E. R. Price (Docket No. 50-22: DL&R: ERF), i ve are retiring the three basins which were used to contain water after l the incident ~ of April 3,1960. ~ l The attached Proposal presents our recor.nended plan. ~~ Very truly yours, A l 'j M. ar on, Ihnager / Nucl ar Power Service / mms I attachment 8 +

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',io WTR-171 ~ I f WESTINGHOUSE TESTING REACTOR RETIRDEhT OF FACILITIES - OPEN BASINS t ' WTR-171 September 24, 1962 4 -annqn,n,qa l f-

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PROPOSAL, RETIRDIEhT OF OPDi BASINS AT WTR Subsequent to the fuel rod meltdown at the Westinghouse Testing Reactor on April 3, 1960,' it suddenly became necessary to store large quantities of contaminated water to prevent its release into the stream adjacent to the plant site. Since it was impossible to obtain tanks having sufficient capacity within a short time, several excavations were made on the site. prnperty to create vaste holding basins where this water could be retained.

Subsequently, tanks were installed and used for retention of the contaminated water. Then, a liquid vaste disposal facility, consisting of a 2,000 gal /hr evaporation plant was built and since then, all of the stored vater lias been removed from the basins and processed. Three basins designated as No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 vere used for storage of this contaminated water. They verc located on the site as shown on Drawing No. 1. Drawing Nos. 2, 3'and 4 show their approximate dimensions. The size, nature and characteristics of this site are -described in documents previously submitted (the most recent one is WCAP-2031 " Post Irradiation a cility"). The property is owned in Fee Simple by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. The elevation of the. basins is a minimum ol 10 feet above Calleys Run .-and there is no evidence of ground water at the elevation of the pitsw The clay bed under these basins has very low permeability with no evidence of any subsurface leakage from the basins. There are no useable vells within one-half mile of the basins and the Westinghouse property 1-ine is approximately one-third mile from them. Surface drainage is into Calleys Run which in turn empties into Sevickley Creek. . Basins No,'1 and No'.12' were constructed first'g Pits ve3Ec[v'a't'ed,k -with the excavated clay being piled around the edge to serve as a bank. The bottoms of these pits. vere. leveled, covered with a layer of sand (6"-12," -{ deep) to* provide a flat,' level' surface'and"ihi's'Euffa'ci vai c' overed with ' polyethylene sheeting. \\The basins were then fill'ed'vith the contaminated 5 vaterI Basin No. 3 was the last one constructed. Its-clay-base-was'

covered with_a koroseal coverb. This cover has withstood weathering muchy better than-the polyethylene sheeting used in the first two basins.

The- . polyethylene in Basins Ho.1 and No. 2 has-disintegrated to a considerab1k tent but s %,,:... the c.ov.er_ of Bacin No. 3...i.s...still,in good condition. These basins have all been drained and are of no further use to us. There is a small amount of residual radioactivity in the bottom of them. .In our judgement, it would be preferable to back-fill these with the earth which was originally excavated rather than leaving them open. t I I ~

e 6 s A study of each basin was made during June, July and August 1952 by detennining the amoant of radioactivity and the type of radioactive material in soil samples taken from various locations in their bottecs. Radiation surveys were also made during this period to determine the beta-gamma radiation intensity above the surface of each one. Soil sacples vere collected in the general vicinity of these bnsins and vere analyzed by the same techniques to establish the natural background. The data for the basins is presented on Draving Nos. 2, 3 and 4. From these data and calculations as shown in Appendix A, the following information is cummarized: Avg. pico Total me, mr/hr curies per (above one foot gran (above background) above background) in basins surface Basin No. 1 740 132 .05 - 7 Basin No. 2 30 4 .05 - 1 Basin No. 3 1400 400 .05 - 20 As shown in Appendix B, an analysis of several combined soil samples indicates that the radioactivity is primarily mixed fission products with' 9% to 15% of the radioactivity from Sr90 The mixed " fission products are approximately 2-1/2 years old and theoretically 7% of the radioactivity in them would be from Sr90, . In 10CFR20, certain limits are specified for burial of radioactive materials in soil. Assuming that the materials are mixed fission products containing not over 10% Sr9U, the permissible yea.rly burial vould be 600,f'c(1000x0.1/2x10x12). The aren required for burial vould be 432 sq.ft. and the permissible average radioactivity at the four foot depth would be 14-T/c/ft, 2 In these three basins, the average radioactivity, as shown in Appendix B, 2 isabout154c/ft. Thus, the average amount of radioactivity per unit area in these basins vould be about the same as that permitted by 10CFR20, although the total area involved would be greater. The backfilling would be done in a manner such that the earth codei 3.. of Basin No. 3 vould be roar feet deep,and. the others vould be covered to' I aepth of'at least three feet.' pe soil surface of the area vould have a d graduni slope from~ North to South which would provide good surface drainage from this area.

The soil cover resulting from backfdlling these basins vould provide sufficient attenuation of the existing beta-gant.a radiation $ntensi',ien so that at the ground surface there vould be no significant increase in the nor:nal background. For Eacin No. 3 the radiation intensity frc:a the buried residue would be about.002 mr/hr co.T. pared to natural backgrcund of about.02 mr/hr. In Basin. No. 'l this intensity would be about.004 mr/hr andinBacinNo.2,lessthan.001mr/hr. .It is our conclusion that back-filling these basins vould leave this area 'in the most desirable state. / 't e e f o + q 4 + 4 9 g e 1 4 e 9 4 "=eg 1

O Q o g 8, t M S 3 y-l a m m i s ed ~ ON l: WMM h 1 4 jo s &. Q o 41.. ~1 l r 2,_ 3 ~$ r 4 g Qw q p v [, l es S!! r g rus= y J ODf / fj .M o.... A n y 7 [V) = p = c } -s. 'jl b '. t r, 'f / ' ' ni j f h HE 1 g ,a i L_* ll ._N = '; l.

e WTR-171 APPENDIX A

===1. Background=== Soil saraples were collected at six points on the Waltz Mill Site l nearby the banins. The average beta-gamma radioactivity in these samples was 25 picoeuries per gram of soil. N '.,h ** *,;.. t.*.?.. J N : '?Jn. ~1 Because of the change in radioactivity levels at different depths i in ihe' soil, we have treated the top two, inches and the next ten inches separately, t Estimated surface area = 5462 ft.2 Volume of top 2 in. = 910 ft.3 Since, 1'ft.3 = 28 32 1 910 ft.3 x28321/ft.3=257x100 1 ='2 57 x 107 ml Assuming soil density of 1.2, 2 57 x 107 ml x 1.2 g/ml = 3 08 x 107 g. Averageaegivityabovebackgroundintop2in.iscalculatedas 1.22 x lo-c/g. s Thus, 3 08 x 107 g. x 1.22 x 10-9 c/g. =.037 e (top 2 in.) Volume of remaining 10 in. = 4541 ft.3. h5hl ft.3 x28321/ft.3 1.28 x 105 1 a 1.28 x 108,1 1.28 x 100 ml x 1.2 g/ml = 153 x 108 g, Average activity above background at this depth is calculated as 6.20 x 10-10 c/g. 8 Thus, 1 53 x 10 g. x.6.20 x lo'-10 e/s.=.095c.(remaining 10in.) TOTAL .132 curies '(in Basin 'No.1) 4 0 9 e 6

2, ..o e, WTR-171 APPEHDIX A (Continued) 3 Basin No. 2 Eatinated surface area = 4320 ft.2 Estimate volume to depth of 12 in. - h320 ft.3 4320 ft.3 x 28 321/ft.3 = 1.22 x 105 1 = 1.22 x 108,1 1.22 x 100 ml x 1.2 g/ml = 1.h6 x 100 g. soil Average activity of. top 12 in. above background = 3 0 x 10-11 c/s. 8 Thus, 3 0 x 10-11 c/g.x1.46x10

g. soil = 4.38 x 10-3 c. =

.0043 curies (in Basin No. 2) 4. Basin No. 3 Estimated sediment (primarily soil vashed into basin) on koroseal cover = 621 ft.3 621ft.3.x20321/rt.3=17sx104 7 1 = 1 75 x 10 m1 1 7s x 107 ml x 1.2 g/ml. = 2.11 x 107 g. coil Average ac ,171 x 10jivity of sediment on koroseal cover above background n - c/g. Thus, activity in sediment on koroseal cover:

g. soil x 171 x 10-0 /g. = 0 360 c. (above koroseal cover) 2.11 x 107 c

Estimated quantity of soil t i above background = 1.18 x 10g a depth of 12 in, which is contaminated j ft.3 h ft.3 x28321/ft.3=33hx105 1 = 3 34 x 108,1 1.18 x ic 8 8 3 34 x 10 mlx1.2g./ml=h.cox10 g, 3011 ] Average egimated activi.ty above background to a depth of 12. in = l 1.0 x 10-c/g. Thus, 4.00 x 100 g. soil x 1 x 10-10 c/g. =.0h curies (in 12 in. of soil beneath cover) TOTAL O h00 curies (in Basin No. 3) 4 .__..m_

L ~ e* o-O p* WTR-171 APPENDIX B l. Gamma Spectrum Determinations A composite soil sample was analyzed and a gamma spectrum made indicating the presence of the following nuclides. l E Nuclide 0.14 Mev lkh Ce 0.66 Mev 1 Cs 37 o.76 Mev~ Zn95-n95 1 Cs 34 0.80 Mev 1 o.69Mev] 1.48 Mev h l lh4 ' Ce -Pr 2.18 Mev s 1.1 Mey 6o Co 13 Mev This represents a typical gam =a spectrum for low levels of mixed fission products. 2. S [ Determinations 90 Tota 18 -[ activity Sr Area pc/gmsoil pc/gmsoil Sr90 Basin No. 1 - Depth composite 9 98 9 Basin No. 1 - Surface composite lh 93 15 Basin No. 2 - Depth and surface-13 .127 lo ~ composite Basin No. 3 - Composite ~ 2600

• Sample spoiled during analysis 6

. 'O ,. / .d WTR-171 AITDIDIX B (Continued) 3 Average Radioactivity Total aren of Basins Basin No. Dimensions ft Area ft2 1 48 x 114 5,500 2 45 x 96 4,300 3 212 x 120 25,400 Total 35,200 5 Total radioactivity = 536 me or 5 36 x 10 g e Average radioactivity = 5 36 x 105 2 = 15 4c/ft 35,200 1 Ne W e e* e

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