ML20216F268
| ML20216F268 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waltz Mill |
| Issue date: | 07/18/1960 |
| From: | Anamosa H US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216F225 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-98-100 AEC-R-5-11, NUDOCS 9804170010 | |
| Download: ML20216F268 (4) | |
Text
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UNCLASSIFIED AEC-R 5/11 ,
l July 18, 1960 COPY No, d '
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ATOMIC ENEROY COMMISSION l
l INVgSTIGATION OF RADIATION INCIDE C AT 7 5 WESTINGHOUSE ,
T&TrAJs0 HEAv4vm WALTZ LLL, ramnA. .
Note by the Acting Secretary l
- 1. The General Manager has requested that the attached i
tununtry of the report of the sub,1ect incident sutsnitted by the Director of Inspection, be circulated for the infbrmation of the -
Commission.
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- 2. The General Manager has approved the reconsnendations of the investigating coenittee. Copics of the full consnittee report ,
may be obtained from the Director of Inspection.
Harold D. Anamosa Acting Secretary * 'l' i
'DISTitIWfION
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COPY NO.
Secretary 1
- Consnissioners - 2-6 0:neral Manager 7 Deputy Gen. Mgr. 8 A:st. Gen. Ngr. 9 - 10 '
Asst. Gen. Mgr. R&S 11 A*st. Gen. Mgr. R&ID 12
, A:st. Gen. Mgr. Adm. 13 Asst to the Gen. Mgr. 14 General Counsel 15 - 18 l Biology & Medicine 19 i Compliance 20 - 29 :
Congr. Relations 30 Health & Safety 31 ,
Public Information 32 i Inspection 33 '
Licensing & Regulation 34 - 35 Operations Analysis 36 Production 37 - 8 Reactor Development 39 - 5 D. C. Office 46 - 48 Secretariat 49 - 53
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9804170010 990413 *- '
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UNCLASSIFIED 4'
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d ,4; ITNITED STATES ATOMIC ENEROY COMMISSION 4 WASHINGTON, D. C. * ,!
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May 27, 1960 l MEMONANIXIM TO : Curtis A. Nelson, Director Division of Inspection FROM Marvin M. Mann, Chairman Investigating Committee .
SUBJECT:
INVESTIGATION OF RADIATION INCIDENT AT THE WESTINGHOUSE TESTIN0 REACTOR, LICENSE TR-2, WALTZ MILL, PENNSYLVANIA SYMBOL : INST)MM Transmitted herewith is the report of investigation of the subject incident.
l This incident resulted in partial destruction of one reactor i fuel element through overheating and subsequent melting. The technical origin of the incident is not yet known, but it is
- likely that either or both of two factors played a major roles (1?inadequatecoolantflowunderconditionsexistingatthetime, (2J defective metallurgical bonding in the fuel element.
No personnel overexposures occurred and no offsite contamina-tion was found.
However, this incident, but for a fortunate circumstance, -
could have been rather more serious. The element which failed was now, and having been irradiated for only two days at high power, ,,
l its fission product content was relatively low, i
! The WTR organization functioned effectively in coping with the .
! after effects of the incident. Evacuation of the facility, necessitated by the garena radiation emanating from the process water head tank, was effected expeditiously, and radiation surveys of the surrounding territory were instituted promptly.
Persons.in the small settlements a few miles away were alerted on the chance that detectable airborne radiation might obtain temporarily in these areas. It appears that the public i relations factor worked out favorably. !
Removal of the reactor core, including the damaged fuel, and decontamination of the reactor has proceeded without incident.
In addition to the technical factors mentioned above in connection with the incident, certain features of the WTR organi-zation appear to have played important roles.
It is a matter of record that the WTR Safeguards Cormnittee 4 had reviewed the series of experiments being conducted to study i the onset of boiling in the WTR, and as a consequence, to set i certain technical standards for normal operation. It was during i one of these experiments that the incident occurred. i
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. .I UNCLASSIFTED (N
The WTR Safeguards Committee had written technical specifi-cations and operational limits for the tests, but no, detailed written operating procedures had been provided.
For the test run on the date of the incident a specification l had been prepared b the Chaiman of the Safeguards Committee.
The full committee da ' not review this test, although flow, temperature, and power limits differed from those specified for previous tests. Furthemore, possible abnormal situations had not been fully considered, and no written operating procedures for handling thereof had been provided. ,
While a number of individuals in the WTR organization are knowledgeable and experienced in reactor technology and operation, the reactor supervisor on duty during the incident had had only three monthet experience. The committee interviewed this man, and found that his understanding of reactor operation was severe 2y
- limited. This, coupled with the lack of detailed operating procedurg for the test, constituted a substandard situation, leaving the operation, in our opinion, effectively unsupervised.
While WTR management was present during the test, no special _
measures were taken to offset the deficiency in supervision, ,
j The results of this situation were that the rapid and spontaneous decrease in power
- was not recognized as abnormal,
- cod the supervisor apparently instructed the operator to recover cpecified power, a move inconsistent with safety of operation.
While Westinghouse personnel are studying the possible causes l' cf the incident, the company has not formally convened a groun to -
investigate all aspects of the incident, nor does it appear that r the roles of management, organization and procedure have been cbjectively considered by the company.
Since the committee's visit to the WTR facility, experts in heat transfer phenomena at ORNL and at Westinghouse have made calculations on the basis of reactor conditions presumed to have cxisted at the time of the incident. Metallurgical studies of the damaged element are under way.
The connittee believes that the heat transfer studies do not cxclude the possibility that the phenomenon of " flow disease" caused the incident. It appears that until metallurgical studies cf the damaged element are completed, it will not be possible to casess the probable cause of the incident.
The Division of Inspection continues to follow the studies I centioned and will report results as they become available. 'I
! Finally, this incident has raised an interesting question l I in regard to the philosophy of the design of the WTR. This reactor I has been provided with a containment building, ostensibly for the j l purpose of retaining therein such radioactivity as might be 4 l released from the reactor as the result of incidents such as, but not restricted to, the subject incident. As a matter of fact, the l
- It is our tentative opinion that the power cecrease signalleo l the beginning of the incident, and that the following increase in '
power, caused by the directed withdrawal of control rod, merely aggravated the situation.
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provision of a venting system - for the process water head tank " ^
and for the process water surge tank, in the view of the consnittee, ;
k substantially nest.tes the purpose and efficacy of the containment '!"
building. While the committee recognizes that this feature of .3.*
the design was duly approved via the licensing process, it is believed that such features deserve further consideration.
It is reconenended that the licensee be required to report to the Commissions ,
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- 1. A detailed account of the incident, p ; .,.
- 2. Results of technical and managerial studies of the incident and its implications.
- 3. Steps taken or planned in regard to equipment, L organization, and procedure to prevent recurrence of the .'.-
- [' incident. l.
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