ML20214P541

Contentions on Rev 2 of State of Nh State & Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20214P541
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	11/26/1986
From:	Curran D HARMON & WEISS, NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20214P369	List: ML20214P367 ML20214P541
References
OL, NUDOCS 8612040262
Download: ML20214P541 (26)

Text

. .. . --. .. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

i November- 26, 1986 00LKETEL USNPC UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD DFTICb L. . .a n , a v 1 00CXEiiNa 4 < , avict~

} BRAhu4 In the Ma tter of )

)

Public Service Company of )

New Hampshire, et al. ) Docket Nos. 5 0-443 OL

) 50-444 OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2) ) OFFSITE EMERGENCY

) PLANNING -

)

NECNP CCNTENTIONS ON REVISION 2 OF THE THE NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS -

Introduction d

. (

The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP")

submits the following contentions on Revision 2 to the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan ("RERP"), Re vision

2. These contentions include amendments to previously admitted contentions 1 , as well as new contentions.

The Board has ordered the parties to limit the scope of con-tentions on Revision 2 to matters that are newly raised in Revi-sion 2. In its Motion for Reconsideration and Response to Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order of November 4,1986, NECNP asked the Board to reconsider that order and take contentions on matters that were raised for the first time in Revision 1 and are 1 See Licensing Board Memorandum and Order of April 29,1986 at 47, et seg.

9 8612040262 861126 PDR ADOCK 05000443 G PDR {

perpetuated in Revision 2. NECNP hereby reiterates that request.

We note that while we have endeavored to restrict these conten-

-tions to matters raised for the first time in Revision 2, there is necessarily some slight overlap between Revision 2 and other revisions, if only for the reason that problems raised by Revi-sion 2 have implications for previously prepared portions of the plans.

I. Satisfaction of Late-Filed Contention Standard The Licensing Board has stated that contentions on Revision 2 will be treated as late-filed. Although NECNP objects' to the imposition of the late-filed contention standard, [See NECNP's Motion for Reconsideration and Response to Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order of November 4,1986], NECNP will address its compliance with 10 CFR 2.714(a) below.

A. 10 CFR 2.714 (a ) (1 ) (i ) , Good cause , if any, to file on time. This factor is "a crucial element in the analysis of whether a late-filed contention should be admitted." (Common-wealth Edison Company (Draidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI- 8 6-8, 2 3 NRC 2 41, 244 (1986). NECNP satisfies this standard because "no adequately based contention could have been filed earlier." Philadelphia Electric Company, (Limerick Genera-ting Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-806, 21 NRC 1183,1190 (1985) .

See also Duke Power Company (Ca tawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041,1045 (1983) (previous unavailability

~

of institutional licensing document, coupled with lack of public access to information by other means, constitutes good cause for a

9

~

late-filing). NECNP did. not receive Revision 2 to the New Hampshire RERP until September of 1986. From September through November, NECNP was intensively engaged in the litigation of technical. issues and submission of proposed findings. Moreover, these contentions are not " late-filed" in relation to the sched-ule established by the Licensing Board for contentions on matters raised for the first time in Revision 2.

HECNP received Revision 1 in June of 1986. However, as dis-cussed in NECNP's Mo tion for Reconsideration and Response to Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order of November 4,1986, at 4-5, NECNP did not submit contentions on Revision 1 at that time because both the State and FEMA stated that another revision of the plan was forthcoming. NECNP acted reasonably in waiting to see what portions of Revision 1 would remain viable in Revision

2. During the brief time between the publication of Revision 1 and Revision 2, NECNP's resources and the resourcer of the . Board and other parties were conserved as a result of NECNP's prudent decision.

B. 10 CFR 2.71 t (a ) (1 ) , Availability of Other Means to Pro-tect Petitioner's Interest. No other proceeding exists in which NECNP could protect its interest in obtaining reasonable as-surance that the Seabrook plant will not operate unless it can be operated in conformance with NRC regulations and with a rea- .

s,onable assurance of safety.

C. 10 CFR 2.714 (a ) (1 ) , Extent to Which Petitioner Can -

Contribute to the Development of a Sound Record. The Commission

has held that "[w] hen a petitioner addresses this criterion it should set out with as much particularity as possible the precise issues it plans to cover, identity its prospective witnesses, and smnmarize their proposed testimony." (commonwealth Edison Compa-ny (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI- 86-8, 2 3 NRC at 246. As required by this standard, NECNP has set forth with particularity and detail the nature of its concerns and the bases for its assertions. Given the extremely short time frame for filing these contentions, NECNP has not identified witnesses that it will call in the hearing. However, for some tim'e NECNP has been in the process of interviewing individuals who are responsible for various aspects of the Seabrook emergency response for the purpose of developing testimony on its conten-tions. Because the changing nature of the plans af fects the roles that these individuals may be asked to take in a radiologi-cal emergency, NECNP has considered it prematur e to make arrange-ments for their testimony, until it becomes clear that hearings will actually go forward on a particular set of plans.

Moreover, it is well-established that an intervenor can make a substantial contribution to a record through cross-examination alone. "Our cases clearly recognize that cross-examination can be an especially valuable tool in the development of a full record and that an intervenor may even establish its entire case

~

through its use." Washington Public Power Supply System (WP PSS

~

Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747,18 NRC llc 7,1182 (1983) (.au- .

curring opinion of Mr. Edles, citing Louisiana Power & Light Co.

4

(Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 10 7 6, 10 96 n. 30 (19 83) ) . See also Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units lA, 2A, 1B, an'd 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 3 41, 356 (1978); Kisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2) , ALAB-137, 6 AEC 4 91, 504-05 (1973). As it has. done successfully and competently in the past in the Seabrook case, NECNP intends to use cross-examination as a major tool in the litigation of emergency planning for Seabrook.2 Finally, NECNP's contentions raises critical safety ques-tions that must be addressed before this Licensing Board' can reach a sound decision as to whether the New Hampshire plans pro-

. vide a reasonable assurance of safety. The important safety sig-nificance of these contentions weighs in NECNP's favor. Common-wealth Ediscn , CLI-86-8, 2 3 NRC at 248.

D. 10 CFR 2.714 (a )(1 ), The Extent to Which Other Parties Will Represent Petitioner's Interest. NECNP's interests cannot be adequately represented by any other party to this case. The 2 NECNP has already demonstrated its ability to contribute to the record of this case through cross-examination. In 1983, NECNP conducted its entire case on the duration of environmental qualification of safety equipment and emergency action levels through cross-examination of Applicants' and Staff's witnesses, who took the position in direct testimony that Applicants' l i-c'ense application was complete and adequate with respect to these ,

issues. The ef fectiveness of NECNP's cross-examination was demonstrated later, when the Licensing Board ordered the reopen-ing of the record to allow Applicants and the NRC staff to submit additional information. NECNP also conducted extensive cross-examination on Applicunts' environmental qualification program in September of 1986. Prtoosed findings on that issue are now pend-ing.

interested municipalities, while sharing many of NECNP's concerns in this case, do not necessar.ily share NECNP's broad interests in the adequacy of emergency planning in the entire EPZ and in New l

England in general. Those towns may focus chiefly on the effect of the emergency planning pro ~ cess on themselves, rather than on the entire emergency planning zone. They are more likely to devote their resources on issues pertaining to themselves, and may later settle or withdraw contentions that do not pertain to them.

The Seacoast Anti-Pollution League is another public inter-est organization intervening in the case. However, SAPL does not necessarily share the same priorities or goals as NECNP. It should be noted that all of the intervenors in the case posses; limited resources. When it comes to identifying and pursuing most vigorously those issues that are most important to an inter-venor or town, no group can reasonably be asked to assume that another group will share its perspective on the case or its priorities.

E. 10 CPR 2.714 (a ) (1 ) , Broadening and Delay of the Pro-ceedings. There is no doubt that the litigation of NECNP's con-tentions will broaden and delay the proceeding. However, the new issues that are raised in this set of contentions relate substan-tially to issues that are already admitted for litigation in this case. Thus, admission of these contentions will not lead the Board into an entirely new area that was not previously anticipated.

{

e

• - - ~ - - - - - , , , , _ . . , _ - _ .,. ,_,

horeover, NECNP is in no way responsible for this delay.

The responsibility for the delay rests entirely with Applicants and New Hampshire. Applicants have had three years since the emergency planning proceeding was suspended to submit an emer-gency plan that the Federal Emergency Management Agency would be willing to support. To reject these contentions on the ground that they would broaden and delay the Seabrook license proceeding would penalize NECNP f or Applicants' tardiness and encourage Ap-plicants to continue to postpone the introduction of relevant in-formation until late in the licensing process.

CONTENTIONS

-II. Admendments to Contention RERP-8.

A. Basis (a) is changed as follows: The RERP includes virtually.no assessment of the capacity to protect the public with sheltering facilities, whether during peak use periods or at other times. Only the adequacy of special facilities is de-scribed to any degree. Thus, there is no basis for a finding of reasonable assurance that sheltering constitutes an adequate pro-tective measure for all people who may need it.

B. The following bases are added to this contention:

d. The RERP provides sets of " criteria" for early evacua-tion of the beach population, protective actions for the general public, and protective actions for special facilities. RERP, ,

V.olume 4, Appendix F; Vol. 4A, Appendix U.3 The plan includes 3 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the RERP or to local emergency plans or host plans are citations to Revision 2, ,

dated August, 1986.

L

a

_ g_

worksheets for protective action decisions. There are also " Pro-tective Action Recommendation Guidance Charts" for special facilities and the general public which decisionmakers are to follow in making protective action choices.

~

There are a nunber of significant problems with this form of decisionmaking. First, the plan does not specify the matter in which each criterion will affect and be integrated into a deci-sion whether to order evacuation or protective action. For in-stance, it is unclear how the decisionmakers are to integrate such diverse factors as time of release, wind speed and direc-tion, pl'ume travel time, and weather, to name just a few. See figure 1A, Protective Action Recommendation Worksheet for General Population. . ,

Second, the process of amassing the information required for each worksheet, processing it without any specific criteria, and utilizing all of the information in an ultimate decision will be a cumbersome and time-consuming one. Much time may be consumed by the process of interpreting the data and exercising judgments as to hoa the data should be interpreted. These judgments will also be T.ade under the intense pressures of an emergency situa-tion, when it will be important for decisionmakers to focus quickly on key decisionmaking factors rather than to spend a great deal of time determining how numerous pieces of information should be pieced together in the decisionmaking process. In or-der to make the decisionmaking process more efficient and leave less to the last-minute judgment of decisionmakers, the plans --

-m wy.- .,r,-- -----w,-,---% ,,. -- m - ,y _,~g- - -

especially the procedures to be consulted by decisionmakers --

should include a matrix of possible accident. scenarios.and the types of response that would be warranted in each case.

The advance determination of what protective actions are likely to be appropriate for a given set of accident conditions is not only . required by 10. CFR 50.47(b) (10),_ which requires the State to establish guidelines for choices between protective ac-tions; but it is also required by 10 CFR 50.4 7(b) (4 ) , which re-

. quires the State to establish emergency action levels, using plant conditions, effluent characteristics, and onsite a'nd offsite monitoring, in order to determine what types of pro-

-tective actions are appropriate in an accident. The matrix of emergency action levels that is required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (4) i s intended to' prevent the sort of last-minute confusion and delay that can result from failure to anticipate and plan.for a range of accident scenarios.

Third, the plans contain no basis for utilizing the " Pro-tective Action Recommendation Guidance ChartIs" because they do not provide estimates of sheltering factors for any specific buildings other than special facilities.

Finally, the generalized estimates made in the plan are too vague to be useful in an emergency. The plan cites two different estimates of sheltering effectiveness, without stating which 1t ,

w111'use to make protective action decisions.

Vol. 1 a t 2. 6-7.

Where, as in this case, the State relies on numerical estimates -

of sheltering effectiveness to guide choices between evacuation

...w,r, y - - . ---,ee..-.--.yw--.-- y,-w,%.,-,y,..- . , ,yr,,, .,,.,--.ge=wp-. ,-,

and sheltering, those estimates should be clearly established and supported in advance, and not left open to debate during an emer-gency.

E! . The RERP contains no consistent criteria for making judgments as to how best to p'rotect the public, and instead is based on the expediency of evacuating various groups of people.

For instance:

4

1. The RERP s tates that it uses the same dose criteria for choosing protective actions for both the general public and people in special facilities. Vol. 1 a t 2. 6-7. In reality, the decisionmaking process for special facilities is weighted with other considerations that will mitigate against evacuation, even where evacuation would be deemed appropriate gn-der the dose calculations specified in the " Protective Action Recommendation Guidance Chart" for special facilities (Vol. 4, Appendix F, Figure 4A]. First, the State unreasonably assumes that "[u]nder no circumstances are projected doses to persons lo-cated within the f acilities expected to exceed EPA guidelines."

See, e.g., Portsmouth plan, Vol. 21 at II 28. This reasoning flies in the face of the fundamental principle of emergency plan-ning, that the State must plan for a range of accidents, includ-ing those with severe consequences.

Second, the RERP s tates vaguely that sheltering is the

" preferred protective action" for institutional facilities, "the nature of which require that the implementation of protective ac-tions, particularly evacuation, be considered very carefully with 4

,- r-- . ,.,->w -.n - ,=-_ , -, .-. - , _ _ _ . _ -, _ _ . , , , _ ,_ _ . , . , _

respect to associated risks and derived benefits." Vol. 1 at 2.6-7. Nowhere, however, does the plan identify these "associa-ted risks and derived benefits" or explain the exact manner in' which they are to be taken into consideration. Nor does the plan explain how these considerations may differ for distinct types.of facilities, such as nursing homes and jails. Of course, the "as-sociated risks" of evacuation may be higher for individuals as a result of illness or fragile health. However, the increased risks associated with a failure-to commit adequate resources to the evacuation of an institution should not be allowed to play a part in a decision, as it is under these vaguely worded criteria.

2. While the RERP claims to apply the same pro-tective action decisionmaking criteria to the general public as it does to special facility populations, it does not provide the information necessary to apply the criteria evenly. The plan provides computations of " sheltering factors" for each special facility [Vol. 4, Appendix F, Figure 5) that are to be used fol-lowing the " Protective Ac tion Recommendation Guidance Ch art" for special facilities. Vol. 4, Appendix F , Figure 4A. The plan also contains a " Protective Action Recommendation Guidance Chart" for the general public which is identical to the guidance chart for special facilities. Figure 4. However, the State provides no specific information on sheltering factors for homes, schools, ,

or any of the buildings where the public is expected to shelter.

Moreover, the State's general assumptions about sheltering effectiveness contradict its assumption that the dose received by

sheltered institutionalized individuals would be "much" lower than the dose received by the. sheltered public. Vol. 1 a t 2. 6-8.

The RERP states that New Hampshire takes credit for sheltering protection factors of 0.9 for whole body external exposure and 0.5 (release duration less th'an 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) or 1 - 0.5/t (release duration greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) for exposure periods lasting as long as 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />. Vol. 1 a t 2. 6-7. The table of "Special Facil-ity Sheltering Factors shows that residents of 12 out of 19 of the institutions in the EPZ will receive at least 50% of the whole body dose that unsheltered individuals will receiv'e. Of those facilities, six will receive 75% or more of the dose that unsheltered individuals will receive. Appendix F, Figure 5. Nor does the estimated thyroid protection f actor (0.65) provide sig-nificant dose savings in comparison with the dose to the general public. Thus, the State cannot legitimately use the sheltering factor to treat institutionalized individuals differently than the general public.

3. Protective action choices for transients in the EPZ are based on expediency rather than any judgment about the benefits of sheltering versus evacuation. This can be seen by comparing Revision 1 with Revision 2. Revision 1 stated that

" Transients located in buildings which may serve as suitable shelters will be asked to shelter at the locations they are visiting if this is feasible. Transients without access to suitable shelters will be advised to evacuate as quickly as pos-sible in their own vehicles." RERP, Re v . 1, at 2.6-8 (emphasis

added). Revision 2 deletes any reference to consideration of the suitability of shelters, but states only that transients should remain indoors or evacuate if they have no access to an ,

" indoor location." Volume 1 at 2.6-6. Thus, the State has aban-doned any attempt to assess the adequacy of sheltering for transicents. -

f. The RERP does not appear to anticipate, and con-tains no criteria for, combining the strategies of sheltering and evacuation. In order to avoid excessive radiation exposure resulting f rom remaining in the contaminated EPZ , sheltering must be followed by evacuation at some point. The plan should contain l criteria for judging such factors as plant conditions, effluent l

characteristics, and meteorological conditions to determine at l

I what point evacuation should be ordered after sheltering has taken place.

III. Amendments to Contention NHLP-6 A. The following basis is substituted entirely for the basis supplied in NECNP's contention NHLP-6, dated February 2 4, 19864 :

a. In many cases there is a telephone number to call for those without private transportation who need relocation as-sistance. Such a provision is inadequate not only because of the vulnerability of telephone systems in the event of an emergency, 4 Basis (a) is taken verbatim from NECNP's February 24th filing.

The other bases modify or supplement the basis supplied in the February 24th filing.

1

14 -

but because even if the telephone works, there is no assurance that the' assistance will be available to all who need it. More-over, the telephone system in the EOC may be overloaded. Fo r ex-ample, there are 1,798 people in Exeter who have no transporta-tion.5

.b. . Residents requiring transportation will.have to ,

report to the nearest bus route location for pick-up. During a radiological emergency, making an estimate of the arrival- time of these buses at any given point will be.nearly impossible. Thus, people without transportation may find themselves standing out-side during an emergency for an undetermined amount of time, waiting for a bus to,come along the route. Evacuees may be ex-posed to unacceptable levels of radiation while waiting outsidg .

for a bus. Discouraged evacuees might also further risk exposure by returning to their homes and giving up on evacuating.

' " Latchkey" . children who are at. home while their parents are at work may also fail to call for help or to understand directions regarding bus pick-up.

c. The RERP does not provide a ~ reasonable assurance of ssfety for school children who may be evacuated in a radiological emergency. For example, the Hampton plan notes - that "

[i]n the event of an evacuation, the State Resource Coordinator will

' direct the dispatch of buses from the State Staging Area to the 5 'Other communities also have significant populations without automobiles. _ According to Rye's emergency plan, for example, ap-proximately 6% of the households are non-auto owning.

~-

_.g-sw .-- - - - m-+ r,.c m- ,e w ,w -n- no- awmm-nymm-g n.,--p-4--mm.a-m m- , ma.---,-+

Local Staging Area (EOC) where they will be provided maps and directions to the schools." Vol.18 at II-29. The State RERP .

instructs the Director of Pupil Transportation Safety to "have the available drivers and buses (which normally service the schools) report to their appropriate schools with adequate fuel in the buses." Vol. 4B, Pupil Transportation Safety Procedures at 2. Thus, it is not clear where buses will go and from whom they will receive directions,

d. According to Revision 2, the State of New Hampshire now intends to coordinate the dispatch of buses to schools in the EPZ. However, the State has not demonstrated that this can be done in an efficient and timely manner. The cumbersome process of dispatching school buses invites confusion and delay. Th e bus companies.will need to contact their buses and drivers, and be in continuous contact with the State staging area to update resource availability. If the regular drivers are not available, the Teamsters union or other drivers who may act as substitutes will have to be contacted, get to where their designated bus is stored, and acquaint themselves with tasks such as learning a route and familiarizing themselves with an unfamiliar bus. The State staging area will need to determine how many buses have gone directly to schools, and therefore how many are needed to go to local staging areas. The local staging areas will have to ,

make their needs known to the State agency, and will therefore need to be continuously updated on the number of buses headed directly to the schools. The schools and the local staging area

will need to be in constant contact as well, so that the school can inform the local staging area of the arrival of normal buses and make'its needs known to the local staging area, which will transfer that information to the State staging area, who will be in direct contact with the ne'eded resources. The amount of time involved in gathering all of the necessary information and coor-dinating a response from the State Stag'ing area will be enormous:

'the task is far too cumbersome to assure adequate protection to the evacuees who rely on buses,

e. The RERP indicates that the normal drivers'and buses will be counted on substantially, regardless of the time of day, schedule of drivers, and availability of buses, to perform the functions that they perform at the beginning and end of a ,

school day. Vol. 4B, Pupil Transportation Safety Procedures at

2. This assumes that the regular drivers are the same drivers that have been guaranteed in the letters of agreement. Nothing in the letters of agreement with the bus companies demonstrates that the same drivers, familiar with the route, will be avail-able. For example, a driver with Timberlane in Portsmouth told us that many drivers have second jobs, live far from the bus company, or are unreachable in between runs. She also told us that'the regular school buses were not sitting in the lot all day in between the start and the end of the school day, but are on the road for special runs and field trips as much of the time as

~

! possible. In addition, many of these buses do not have radios, so even if they were close to the EPZ, they may not be reachable.

i

Thus, there may be a large number of the normal school buses and drivers who will not be available during a radiological emer-gency.

B. Contention HP-1: The host plans for Manchaster, Dover, Salem, and Rochester, do not meet the requirements of 10 CFR Sec-tions 50.47(a), 50.4 7( b) (8 ) , (10), (11), and (13) , or NUREG-0695, Sections J.12 and K.5.b.

Basis:

a. NUREG-0695 requires that the personnel and equip-ment at relocation centers should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers. Section J.12.

MANCHESTER:

t

1. The Manchester relocation center does not contain enough equipment to assure that all individuals can be administered the quick one minute check for contamination before entering the reception facility for registration (the check would take over 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> if all of the available monitoring equipment were used only for this checkpoint), nor enough to do a more thorough check on those evacuees who are contaminated to find out where the contamination is. Only 3,060 of the 20,000 expected evacuees could be scanned in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in the decontamination fa-cility if all of the available monitoring equipment were used only at this checkpoint. This is only for the first scan in each

case. However the plans call for several scans in the decontamination facility per person. 6 Moreover, it is absurd to assume that evacuees would stand in line for this long before being able to register and begin the rendezvous process. It is ve'ry likely that the host facility will be abandoned by most evacuees when the inefficiency becomes 6

There will be 17 survey -instruments (CDV-700) stored at the Fire Department for use in the Manchester relocation center.

Volume 36 at II-11. Monitoring will apparently occur in 5 places: ,

1. Vehicles will be monitored before entering the parking lots. No time estimate per vehicle is provided, but since the, shortest scan possible for a person is one minute, it seems un-likely that a whole car could be scanned in less time. Volume 36 at B-3.

2. The plan calls for a quick (one minute) scanning of each individual evacuee before one can enter the reception area. Vol.

'36 at B-3, B4-3. This is both for the safety of the evacuee, whose decontamination needs should be made first priority, and for the " clean" people in the reception area who need to be pro-tected from contamination by evacuees who would be contaminated and wandering around the reception area. All 20,000 people who come to Manchester will require this one minute scan. That will require 333 CDV-700 hours, with the monitor running constantly and no space between evacuees. In Ma nchester, all seventeen monitors in use at once could do this in 41 hours4.74537e-4 days <br />0.0114 hours <br />6.779101e-5 weeks <br />1.56005e-5 months <br />.

3. Co ntaminated individuals will then go to the Control Point manager just outside the decontamination center. Vol. 3 6 at B3-4. There they will get a thorough scan that will take be-tween 3 and 5 minutes each. Vol. 3 6 at B4-5. At 4 minutes a survey, each CDV-700 can read 180 people in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

4. Contaminated people will then remove potentially con-taminated clothing, and be rescanned. Vol. 3 6 at B4-6. The same time factors will apply.

5. If they are still contaminated, the evacuees will go in- .

side the decontamination center and be remonitored. Vol. 36 at

-B4-7. They will then be scrubbed or bathed. Then they will be monitored another time for a final reading. People who come up clean will-be released and people who are still contaminated will undergo scrubbing and remonitoring again. Those who are still contaminated after two scrubbings will be referred to the DPHS Supervisor. Vol. 3 6 a t B4 -7.

19 -

apparent, leaving people without access to the organized method of finding one another within the reception area. Those dis-couraged individuals may seek shelter in other parts of the State or outside the State, thus spreading radioactive contamination as they travel.

2. After twelve hours, the Manchester facility is scheduled to become the only facility that will handle the decontamination of emergency workers. Vol. 3 6 at B-2. Obvious-ly, monitoring and decontamination of the general public will still be underway at that time. Th us , there is no reasonable as-surance that the Manchester relocation center can meet the needs of emergency workers.

ROCHESTER:

3. There will not be enough equipment in the Rochester relocation center to assure that everyone can be ad-ministered even the quick one minute check for contamination be-fore entering the reception facility for registration. The plans do not clearly state how many CDV-700 surveying instruments will be available for use in Rochester. However, there will be four radiological monitoring kits, and therefore no more than four CDV-700's can be counted on. Vol. 3 5 a t I I-11.

It is possible that 35,000 evacuees will go to the Rochester host facility for decontamination. Vol. 3 5 at I-10. If there are l

four CDV-700's for the initial scanning, it will take the last evacuee 143 hours0.00166 days <br />0.0397 hours <br />2.364418e-4 weeks <br />5.44115e-5 months <br /> to get inside the reception facility. This .

l clearly will not provide adequate protection to the evacuees.

l 1

~

DOVER:

'4. There will not be enough equipment at the, Dover host facility to assure that everyone can be administered even the' quick one minute check for-contamination before entering the' reception facility for registration.. There will be 43 CDV-700's available for use in Dover during a radiological emergency.

Vol. 3 3 a t II-ll. There could be 57,000 evacuees coming to Dover for decontamination. Vol. 3 3 a t I-10. Just to get everyone into the reception facility after one scan will take 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />.

SALEM:

^

5. There wil1 not be enough equipment in the Dover host f acility., to assure that everyone can be administered even the quick one minute check for contamination before entergng the reception' facility for registration. There will be 3 CDV-700's available for use in Salem during a radiological emergency.

Vol 3 8 at II-ll . There could be as many as 29,000 evacuees com-ing to Salem for decontamination. Vol 38 at I-8 . Just to get everyone into the reception area after one scan will take 161 houru.

b. The human resources available according to the plans are inadequate to protect the public health and safety.

All of the host plans - regardless of the size of the populations they are expected to serve - provide for 94 staff members to per-form the many diverse tasks associated with the facility. Vols.

~

33, 3 5, 3 6, 3 8 a t B3-1, -2. Not only are these numbers inade- .

quate on their face, but the State clearly has applied a general-4 O

o

\

ized' formula without making any attempt.to' determine what are the staf fing needs of each separate f acility._

c. The plan does not assure that everyone evacuated' from the EPZ will go to a reception area. Vols. 3 3, 35, 3 6, 3 8 a t I-11. Without an assurance that every evacuated person and-every evacuation vehicle is. scanned for radiological contamina-tion and decontaminated if necessary, a publi'cEhazard in the form of radiologically contaminated people and vehicles will go un-checked throughout the state, into other states and to Canada.

In addition, there is no assurance that people who miss decontamination services at the host commun'ity will be able to obtain them anywhere else inareasonableamountoftime, since few hospitals have extensive decontamination capabilities. Vol.

1 at 2.8-5.

d. The plan does not adequately accommodate the decontamination needs of evacuated hospital patients and nursing home residents. Since the decontamination of these individuals will occur at their host health care facilities, they will need to wait for the arrival of a CDV-700 which will already be in great demand at the reception center. Likewise, the monitoring team trained to perform decontaminations to be dispatched to these facilities will have more than enough to do at the recep-tion center. In addition, there are no procedures for how to decontaminate these individuals in the plans. Further, the host medical facilities may risk exposing regular residents to radiologically contaminated materials, vols. 3 3, 3 5, 3 6, 3 8 a t B-3.

22 -

e. It is not clear that injured contaminated evacuees or internally contaminated evacuees will be accommodated by the plans. Both sets of people are to be referred to the DPHS Super-visor. Vol 3 3, 3 5, 3 6, 3 8 a t B-4. However, there is no indica-

~

tion of what s/he will do with them beyond the vague activity of referring them to medical authorities, how s/he will base deci-sions, and what facilities will be available'for these people.

Fo r example, the two Manchester hospitals that are listed in Volume 1 of the RERP are Catholic Medical Center, which has no decontamination capability, and Elliot Hospital, which c'an handle one contaminated patient per hour. There is no reasonable as-surance from this that medical care will be available for injured and contaminated or internally contaminated individuals. .

f. The host facilities coordinator is charged with the task of identifying personnel who may provide emergency medical treatment on-site. No explanation of how this will be done or where the host coordinator will find these people is demonstrated in the plans. Vols . 3 5, 3 6 at III-7, Vols. 3 3, 3 8 at III-8.

g. Although there is a letter of unders'tanding with the Red Cross that it will take responsibility for feeding, clothing, and sheltering all evacuees who have those needs, there is no demonstration of a Red Cross capability to provide these services to the huge number of people who may need them. Vol. 5, Statement of Understanding between the State of New Hampshire and the American Red Cross.

h. Although the plans report that there is a day's food regularly on hand at local schools, it is not clear whether

that is a day's food for the 1,000 regular students at the school, or a day's food to serve 20,000. In addition, the State claims that within that one day period, Red Cross will be able to gather its resources to provide for further food needs. However, no evidence is given to support that projection. Vols. 3 3, 3 5, 3 6, 3 8 a t II-10. The Red Cross will also be responsible for .

providing any clothing that is needed. Vols. 3 3, 3 5, 3 6, 3 8 at I I- 10. Since fresh clothing is an integral part of the decontamination facility, it is not adequate to rely on receiving clothes on an ad hoc basis,

i. The host plans contain no system to communicate lists of registered evacuees with cther host facilities. Vols.

3 3, 3 5, 3 6, 3 8 a t II-12. If the host facility does not keep 1

track of the location of evacuees, order among evacuees will not be kept. For families who are split up because children go to

. school in a different area than their parents live or work, or spouses who work in different areas, a more comprehensive system of logging the whereabouts of evacuees will be necessary to maintain order.

I V. Adoption of Hampton Contentions NECNP incorporates by reference and adopts the contentions on Revision 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan filed by the Town of Hampton on October 31, 1986.

NECNP shares the concerns voiced in Hampton's contentions. More-

! over, those contentions raise issues that affect not only the Town of Hampton, but the entire EPZ. NECNP believes that it will

make a substantial contribution to the record by participating in the litigation of Hampton's contentions. While Hampton may un-derstandably focus on the litigation of those aspects of the con-tentions that are particularly relevant to the Town, NECNP has a broad interest in litigating 'the contentions as they relate to the entire energency planning zone. In addition, Hampton's goals and priorities in the litigation of these contentions may differ substantially f rom NECNP's interests. See discussion in Section I.D., above. Thus, NECNP's participation will contribute to the development of a sounder and fuller evidentiary record in this proceeding.

NECNP intends tg coordinate its ef forts with the Town of Hampton in order to avoid duplication. Thus, NECNP's participg-tion with respect to these contentions should not significantly broaden or delay the litigation of the contentions.

Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Licensing Board should admit the contentions submitted by NECNP regarding Revision 2 to the New Hampshire Emergency Respon'se Plans.

Respectfully submitted, lane Curran HARMON & WEISS 2 0 01 "S" St reet N .W. Suite 4 30 Washington, D.C. 20009 .

(202) 328-3500 -

November 26, 1986 a

e

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE C0f.PEIL?

I certify that on November 26, 1986, copies of NECNP CONTEN-TIONS ON REVISION 2 OF THE THE NEW HAMPHIRE STATE .AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS were served on tgg fg{lsy A10:47 ing by first< class mail:

Helen F. Hoyt, Ch airnan Re p . Roberta C. Pgyeara n . Ar t Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Drinkwater Road 00CKETmG A HVICf.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hamp ton, Falls , NH 055dE4 Washington, D. C . 20555 .

Phillip Ah rens, Esq.

Dr. Jerry Harbour Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board State House, Station # 6 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Augusta, ME 04333 Wachington, D.C. 20555 Thomas G. Dignan, Esq.

Dr. Emmeth A. Lu ebke R.K. Gad II, Es q . '

Atomic Sa fety and Licensing Board Popes & Gray U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 225 Franklin Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Boston, MA 02110

. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Ro be r t A . Ba ck u s , Es q .

. Panel Backus, Meyer & Solomon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 111 Lowell Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Manchester, NH 03105 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Ro be r t G . Pe rlis , Esq.

Board Panel Sherwin E . Tu r k , Es q .

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Of fice of the Executive Legal Washington, D.C. 20555 Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docketing and Service Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C . 20555 Mr. Angie Machiros, Chairman Board of Selectmen Mrs. Anne E . Goodman Newbury, MA 01950 Board of Selectmen 13-15 New Ma rket Road H. Joseph Flynn, Es q .

Durham, NH 03842 Of fice of General Counsel Federal Emergency Management Agency William S. Lo r d, Se lectman 500 C Street S.W.

Town Hall -- Friend Street Washington, D. C . 20472 Amesbury, MA 01913 George Dana Bisbee, Es q .

Jane Doughty Stephen E . Me r rill, Esq.

SAPL Of fice of the Attorney General 5' Ma rket Street State House Annex ~

Portsmouth, NH 03801 Concord, NH 03301

Ca rol S . Sneider, Esquire' Allen Lampert Assistant Attorney General Civil Defense Director Department of the Attorney General Town of Br entowood 1 Ashburton Place,19th Floor Exeter, NH 03833 Boston, MA -02108 Richard A. Ha mp e , Es q .'

Stanley W. Knowles Hampe and McNicholas Board of Selectmen 35 Pleasant Street

< P.O. Bo x 710 Concord, NH 03301 North Hampton, NH 03826 Gary W. -Holmes, Esq.

J.P. Nadeau, Selectman Holmes & Ellis Town'of Rye _

47 Winnacunnent Road 155 Washington Road Hampton, NH 03842 Rye, New Hampshire 03870 William Armstrong Richard E. Sullivan,-Mayor Civil Defense Director City Hall 10 Front Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Exeter, NH 03833 Alfred V. Sargent, Ch airman Calvin A. Ca nney Board of Selectmen

• City Manager Town of Salisbury, MA 01950 City Hall 126 Daniel Street -

Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Portsmouth, NH 03801 U.S. Se nate Washington, D.C. 20510 Ma tthew T. Br ock , Esq.

(Attn. Tom Burack) Shaines & McEachern P.O. Bo x 3 60

. Selectmen of Northampton Maplewood ' Ave.

Northampton, New Hampshire 03826 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Edward A. Th oma s 1 Pillsbury Street Federal Emergency Management Concord, NH 03301 -

Agency 442 J.W. McCormack (POCH)

Michael Santosuosso, Ch airman Boston, MA 02109 Board of Selectmen Jewell Street, RFD # 2 Sandra Gavutis Sou th Hamp ton,_ NH 03842 Town of Kensington RFD 1 Box 1154 Judith H. Mizner, Esq. East Kensington, NH 03827 Silverglate, Gertner, et al.

88 Broad Street -

Boston, MA 02110 Diane Curran ,

e

.