ML20214R375

Response to Applicant 860822 Motion for Authorization to Issue OL to Load Fuel & Conduct Precriticality Testing. Motion Conditionally Supported for Reasons Listed

ML20214R375
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	09/08/1986
From:	Perlis R NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20214R157	List: ML20214R154 ML20214R375 ML20214R390 ML20214R393
References
OL-1, NUDOCS 8609290158
Download: ML20214R375 (10)

Text

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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAR k Sh55$ ~" "

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i Pl!BLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL-1

!!EW HAMPSilIRE, et ~~

al. ) 50-444 OL-1

) On-site Emergency Planning i

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) and Safety Issues I '

l NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR AUTHORIZATION TO ISSUE AN OPERATING LICENSE TO LOAD FUEL AND CONDUCT PRECRITICALITY TESTING On August 22, 1986, the Applicants filed a motion, pursuant to 10 CFR I 50.57(c), for Licensing Board authorization of issuance of a license i to load fuel and conduct precriticality testing at the Seabrook facility. ,

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, The Staff responds herein to Applic_nts' motion; for the reasons 1

j presented below, the Staff conditionally supports the motion. l I 1. INTRODUCTIO!!

. The admitted contentions that must be resolved before issuance of a full-power operating license for Seabrook may be authorized by the Licensing Board have been divided into two distinct groups. All issues i

j relating to offsite emergency planning are before the Licensing Board l chaired by Judge Hoyt; according to 10 CFR I 50.47(d), such issues 1

need not be resolved prior to issuance of an operating license restricted

{ to power levels not greater than 5% of rated power. Three other i

j contested issues remain before this Licensing Board; these issues consist i

) of the adequacy of the detailed control room design review (Contention i

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i,e SAPL Supp. 6), the environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment (NECNP Contention I.B.2), and the acceptability of Applicants' emergency classification scheme (New Hampshire Contention 20 and NECNP Contention III.1). Unlike offsite emergency planning contentions, in the absence of the instant motion , these contentions would have to be resolved favorably to the Applicants before any operating license could be 7

icsued for Seabrook.

In their motion Applicants have invoked the provisions of 10 CFR I I 50.57(c). That Section provides:

An applicant may, in a case where a hearing is held in connection with a pending proceeding under this section make a

! motion in writing, pursuant to this paragraph (c), for an operating '

license authorizing low-power testing (operation at not more than 1

! percent of full power for the purpose of testing the facility), and j further operations short of full power operation. Action on such a j motion by the presiding officer shall be taken with due regard to the i rights of the parties to the proceedings, including the right of any party to be heard to the extent that his contentions are relevant to the activity to be authorized. Prior to taking any action on such a motion which any party opposes, the presiding officer shall make findings on the matters specified in paragraph (a) of this section as

to which there is a controversy, in the form of an initial decision with respect to the contested activity sought to be authorized. The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation will make findings on all other matters specified in Paragraph (a) of this section. If no party

' opposes the motion , the presiding officer will issue an order pursuant to I 2.730(e) of this chapter, authorizing the Director of i Nuclear Reactor Regulation to make appropriate findings on the matters specified in paragraph (a) of this section and to issue a license for the requested operation.

> The effect of Section 50.57(c) is to permit authorization of a license '

j prior to resolution of contentions, if the contentions at issue are not l relevant to the activities permitted under the requested license.

I Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Plant, Units 1 and 2),

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LD P-81-5 , 13 NRC 226, 232-33 (1981). O In their motion, Applicants

! have requested authorization of a license to load fuel and conduct ,

precriticality testing. -

According to their motion, and the accompanying Affidavits of Vincent Esposito, George Thomas, Joseph l

Salvo , and James MacDonald, Applicants will assure that the reactor not

achieve criticality during operation under the requested license by maintaining at all times a concentration of greater than two thousand i parts per million (2000 ppm) boron in the reactor coolant system. If the i

J reactor can not go critical, the argument continues, the public health and l safety can not be adversely affected by the activities conducted under the license, and resolution of the contested issues before this Board

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1/ In this regard, the Licensing Board in Diablo Canyon wrote:

3 For purpose of the 550.57(c) motion, the contentions were those previously allowed in the proceeding. Contentions were considered " relevant" to the motion [in Diablo Canyon] to the ,

extent that they needed to be resolved prior to criticality.

i Thus, for example, a contention which asserted that the control rod drives were defective would have to be heard and decided prior to the grant of a testing license. To the extent that

! matters not raised by contentions were " relevant" to the motion, j' $50.57(c) contemplates that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation would make the necessary findings. The filing of a the motion was not deemed to provide an opportunity to file new l contentions. Acceptance of new contentions remained governed

! by the provisions of 12.714.

j 13 NRC at 233.

I 2/ A similarly limited license was authorized by the Commission for the t Diablo Canyon facility. In its decision, the Commission found that l "the risk to public health and safey from fuel loading and j precriticality testing is extremely low since no self-sustaining unclear

chalp reaction will take place under the terms of the license and i therefore no radioactive fission will be produced." In that case, the t

Commission found that issues concerned with the hazards of nuclear i fission were not material to the issuance of the limited license l because no fission products would be produced.

4 Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Plant, Units 1 and j

2), CLI-83-27,18 NRC 1146,1140 (1983).

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would not be relevant to such activities. Specifically, Applicants assert that SAPL Supp. 6 would be irrelevant because no operator actions would

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be necessary from the control room in order to prevent criticality (Motion at 5); NECNP I.B.2 would be irrelevant because no safety-related electrical equipment would be called upon to protect the public health and i

safety (Id. at 5-6); and New Hampshire 20 and NECNP III.1 would be irrelevant because, without criticality , there is no potential for a radiocctive release and hence there can be no need to implement the i emergency classification scheme.

As is explained below, the Staff agrees with Applicants that if the boron concentration in the reactor coolant is maintained above 2000 ppm, l

j criticality can not occur and the public health and safety could not be adversely affected by activies under the requested license. The Staff further agrees that. if criticality can not occur, the remaining contentions

! before this Board need not be resolved before issuance of the requested 1

license could be authorized pursuant to Section 50.57(c). The Staff is i continuing its review of Applicants' proposed methods of assuring that the f

l boron concentration remain above 2000 ppm, and will attach appropriate

! conditions to a precriticality license to assure that the necessary measures are in fact implemented by Applicants. EI With the implementation of

such conditions, the Staff would support Applicants' motion.  ;

I 3/ The Staff hopes to complete its review within a week, and will

provide the Board and parties with the results of its review as soon j as possible.

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• II. APPLICANTS' MOTION As noted above, Applicants' motion is premised upon a commitment to l

i keep the boron concentration in the reactor coolant above 2000 ppm. In order to assure that this commitment is met, Applicants have indicated d

that they will take and analyze samples from the reactor coolant and makeup water system once per shift, that they will analyze makeup water 1

each time water is added to the system to assure that the system 1

concentration remains above 2000 ppm, and that all valves, the opening of i

- which could permit the entry of nonborated water into the reactor coolant

! system , will be locked shut using chains and padlocks. Motion at 5.

The Staff has reviewed Applicants' motion and the associated affidavits and is in agreement with the technical conclusion that, if boron concentration is maintained above 2000 ppm, the public health and safety can not be adversely affected by operation under the terms of the requested license. As detailed in the attached Affidavit of Walter L.

i Brooks, the only possible threat to public health and safety in the performance of the proposed testing arises from an inadvertent criticality

, in the core. The unirradiated fuel does not contain any fission products and is not sufficiently radioactive to pose a threat otherwise even if the l fuel cladding is breached Uor example, in a fuel handling event).

j Brooks Affidavit, f 2.

Criticality in the core can be avoided by maintaining a sufficiently high boron concentration in the coolant water. The Staff has reviewed calculations for the Seabrook facility and agrees that the critical boron

! concentration over the range of test conditions is less than 1300 ppm, even with all control rods withdrawn. Thus if the concentration is 4

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' maintained at or above 2000 ppm, inadvertent criticality will not occur.

Brooks Affidavit, T 5.

Criticality would not occur under the test conditions even if all coolant were lost from the core. The core without any coolant would be less reactive than the core with coolant containing 2000 ppm boron, and the margin to criticality would actually be increased. Brooks Affidavit,1

6. Thus the Staff agrees that if the boron concentration in the reactor coolant is maintained at or above 2000 ppm, criticality will not occur and the public health and safety can not be adversely affected by the proposed license. Brooks Affidavit, f 7.

The Applicants have proposed to maintain this boron level through I

sampling, manually locking shut certain valves , and through various administrative cont rols . O They do not propose to rely upon any l

safety-related electrical equipment or upon actions from the control room I in order to maintain the boron concentration. The Staff review similarly is taking no credit for safety-related electrical equipment or control room actions . Under the circumstances, Contentions SAPL Supp. 6 and NECNP I.B.2 are not relevant to the activities permitted under the requested license, and (pursuant to Section 50.57(c)) need not be resolved prior to issuance of the requested license. Similarly, since there can be no threat l

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-4/ In discussions with the Staff, the Applicants have revealed that l certain valves that would otherwise be locked would be unlocked j when additions to the makeup water are made. The Applicants gave j the Staff a tentative list of those valves that will be locked shut at j all times and those valves that will be unlocked at various times on September 4, 1986. Administrative procedures were developed to control the locking and unlocking of the valves; these procedures were not provided to the Staff until September 8,1986.

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to the public-health and safety if boron concentration is maintained over 2000 ppm (Brooks Affidavit 5 4), no emergency classification levels will be needed and the contentions raising that issue need not be resolved prior to issuance of the requested license.

The Staff is continuing its review of the measures proposed by Applicants to assure that the boron concentration remain over 2000 ppm.

This review involves assuring that appropriate procedures for sampling are in place, that the appropriate valves from nonborated water sources have been identified and have been locked closed with chains and padlocks , and that appropriate administrative controls are in place for assuring that additions to the makeup water are accomplished without affecting the boron concentration in the reactor coolant. The Staff will condition a precriticality license to assure that the appropriate valves are locked and the appropriate procedures are kept in place and followed.

On August 29, 1980, SAPL and NECNP filed a joint response objecting to Applicants' motion. All the objections raised by those parties lack merit; the Staff addresses the objections seriatim.

First, Intervenors assert that Section 50.57(c) can not be read as 1

authorizing issuance of a license before all contentions are resolved.

Objection at 1-2. This argument is directly contradicted by the Section itself; the purpose of the Section is to permit issuance of a license before all contentions are resolved, if the contentions are not relevant to the activities to be authorized under the requested license. If SAPL and NECNP wish to challenge Section 50.57(c), that challenge is not properly before this Board. See 10 CFR 55 2.758; 2.802.

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Second, Intervenors appeart to assert that the Board is required to make all the findings set forth in Section 50.57(a). Objection at 2-3.

Section 50.51(c) requires that the Board make only those findings delineated in Section 50.57(a) "as to which there is a controversy."

Items in controversy, however, are determined by the admitted contentions. Diablo Canyon, supra, LBP-81-5, 13 NRC at 233. While Intervenors have attempted to demonstrate that there are two issues in controversy (which the Staff discusses below) , none of the admitted contentions in the proceeding are relevant to the license sought and hence the Board is not required to make any of the Section 50.57(a) findings .

Intervenors attempt to place two new issues in controversy. First, Intervenors assert that the draft license for Seabrook contains an exemption given pursuant to 10 CFR $ 70.24 which would allow the Applicants to avoid monitoring criticality of the core in the reactor.

Objection at 4. That exemption was granted as T 16 of the Part 70 license for Seabrook (SNM-1963) issued on December 19, 1985. The exemption was designed to pertain only to fresh fuel either in the fresh fuel storage vault or in the spent fuel pool (if the pool is dry). The exemption, along with a number of other conditions contained in the Part 70 license, was included in the Part 50 license to cover the introduction of fresh fuel on site during. the life of the Part 50 license. See Conditions 4-8 of the Draft Seabrook Operating License. The exemption does not pertain to fuel in the reactor; it will be rewritten to reflect that fact . 1 I

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' Second, Intervenors assert that leakage in the reactor vessel could pose a problem. Objection at 4. This argument ignores the fact that it is the concentration of boron, not the amount of water in the system, '

that is the important factor in preventing criticality. See Brooks i

Affidavit at if 5-7.

Intervenors also argue that there is "no compelling reason" for Applicants to load fuel at this time because findings on offsite emergency planning are " months away." Objection at 5. The " compelling reason" standard is not found in Section 50.57(c); that Section merely indicates that if issues in contention are not relevant to activities to be conducted under a license, the license may be issued before the contentions are resolved. C,f. Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Station, Unit 1),

CLI-53-17, 17 NRC 1032, 1034 (1983) (applicant for a low power license is entitled to such license if it meets the applicable requirements, notwithstanding any doubts about the resolution of emergency planning

issues) .

Finally , Intervenors contend that SAPL Supp. 6 is relevant to the activities to be conducted because the control room will be manned and various controls may be activated. Objection at 5-6. This argument ignores both the thrust of SAPL Supp. 6. The contention is based upon the alleged failure to comply with two items identified in NUREG-0737; both items relate to the ability to recognize and respond to accident conditions. Because of this contention, no credit was taken for the control room in the Staff's review; in the absence of any reliance upon the control room to preclude criticality of the reactor, SAPL Supp. 6 is simply not relevant to the requested license.

III. CONCLUSION For the reasons presented above, the Staff agrees that if the boron concentration in the reactor coolant is kept above 2000 ppm, no criticality can occur in the reactor and issuance of the requested license to load fuel and conduct precriticality testing will not adversely affect the public health and safety . The Staff therefore agrees that the remaining contentions before this Board need not be resolved (pursuant to Section 50.57(c)) before the requested license can issue. Because there are no issues in controversy with respect to the requested license, the findings required to be made pursuant to Section 50.57(a) may therefore be made by the Director of Nuclesr Reactor Regulation. The Staff has only recently acquired the complete details of Applicants' proposal, and therefore has not had the opportunity to complete its review of the proposed means to maintain the boron concentration above 2000 ppm; the results of this review will determine the appropriate license conditions the Staff will impose upon the license to assure that the boron concentration remain over 2000 ppm. For these reasons, the Staff conditionally supports Applicants' motion that the Board issue an order pursuant to 10 CFR

$2.730(e) permitting the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to make the necessary findings to issue a license authorizing the fuel loading and the conduct of precriticality testing.

I Respectfully submitted, e' h Robert G. Perlis Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 8th day of September,1986