ML20197C935

Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law & Proposed Form of Order Re Onsite Emergency Planning & Safety Issues & Issuance of Full Power Ol.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20197C935
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	10/30/1986
From:	Dignan T PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ROPES & GRAY
To:
References
CON-#486-1373 OL-1, NUDOCS 8611070134
Download: ML20197C935 (42)

Text

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Dated: October 30, 1986

'86 NOV -3 P5 :10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (FF:

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CCC-before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD I

) -

In the Matter of )

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL-1 NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) 50-444-OL-1

) On-site Emergency Planning (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) and Safety Issues

)

)

APPLICANTS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND PROPOSED FORM OF ORDER Procedural History

1. This proceeding was initiated following the-submission to the NRC of an application for Operating Licenses for Seabrook Station (Seabrook), a two-unit nuclear power facility utilizing pressurized water reactors (the

" Application"). The Application was submitted on behalf of the following electric utilities:

Public Service Company of New Hampshire Bangor Hydro-Electric Company Central Maine Power Company Central Vermont Public Service Corporation Commonwealth Energy Systems Connecticut Light & Power Company 8611070134 861030 PDR ADOCK 05000443 MCA G PDR Ido U

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Fitchburg Gas & Electric Light Company Hudson Light & Power Department

! Maine Public Service Company Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale j Electric Company j -Montaup Electric Company New England Power Company l Taunton Municipal Light Plant

! United Illuminating Company and

! Vermont Electric Cooperative, Inc.

l Since that time various amendments to the Seabrook s

Construction Permit have been allowed and it is anticipated l

that any operating license will issue, or eventually be held -

by:

Public Service Company of New Hampshire Canal Electric Company i

Connecticut Light & Power. Company

} EUA Power Corporation l

Hudson Light and Power Department d

Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company Montaup Electric Company New England Power Company New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, Inc.

l Taunton Municipal Lighting Plant

! United Illuminating Company I Vermont Electric Generation and Transmission i

Cooperative, Inc.~

f The term " Applicants" shall hereafter refer to those of the above-listed companies as are holders of the construction

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permit as of the'date of this decision or any of those companies as shall become owners of Seabrook pursuant to

! Amendment No. 9 of Construction Permit CPPR-135.

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, 2. An application for construction permits was filed by the Applicants on July 9, 1973. The construction permits.  !

were i ssued on July 7, 1976. The Final Safety Analysis  !

Report was filed with the Regulatory Staff of'the United

4 States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the " Staff") on June 29,'1981, and the Application was docketed on October 5, 1981. See Staff Exh. 1.(SER), at p. 1-1. Notice of the opportunity for requesting a public hearing was published in the Federal Register on October 19, 1981.

46 Fed. Reg. 51331.

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3. This Board was convened by order of the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel on November 30, 1981, was reconstituted in membership by order of the same ,

authority issued August 25, 1982, and again reconstituted in its present membership by order of the same authority issued September 13, 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. 37608 (Sept. 16, 1985).

4. Petitions for leave to intervene were received-from the following persons and organizations:

Name Abbreviation New England Coalition on Nuclear NECNP Pollution Seacoast Anti-Pollution League SAPL The Attorney General of the NHAG State of New Hampshire The Attorney General of the MassAG Commonwealth of Massachusetts Robert F. Preston Preston Sun Valley Association SUN Arnie Wight Wight Society for the Protection Society of the Environment of Southeastern New Hampshire

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Patty Jacobson, et al. Jacobson Coastal Chamber of Commerce of CCCNH New Hampshire j Public Advocate of the Advocate

} State of Maine i

Nicholas'J. Costello Costello 1

i Town of South Hampton, New Hampshire SENH

.i Donald L. Herzberg, M.D., et al. Herzberg i Co-op Members for Responsible Co-op Investment T o A petition for leave to participate as an " interested state" was'also received from the Attorney General of the State of Maine ("MeAG") prior to May 6, 1982.

5. After pre-hearing conferences held on May 6 and 7, 4

i 1982 and July 15 and 16, 1982, the Board issued a Memorandum and Order on September 13, 1982, admitting NHAG, NECNP, SAPL and CCCNH.as parties and granting interested state status to MassAG, SHNH, and MeAG, and admitting the following contentions:

NH-9: "The Seabreech design does not provide an adequate program for monitoring the release of radioactivity to the plant and its environs either under normal operating conditions or in pre- and post-accident circumstances. Thus, the application is not in compliance with general design criteria

, 63, 64 of Appendix A, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, and the requirements of NUREG-0737 and NUREG-0800."

NH-10: "The Seabrook Station control room design l does not comply with general design criteria 19 through 22 and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, and NUREG-0737, item I.D.1 and I.D.2."

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s NH-13: , "The Applicant [s have] not; demonstrated that the folloWing [_] personnel, are qualified and properly trained in accordance with

- NUREG-0737," items I.A.'l.1, or I.A.2.1.,

I.A.2.3, II.B.4, I . C . l', and Appendix C: (a) station manager; (b)' assistant station manager; (c) senior reactor operators; (d) reactor operators; and (e)-shift / technical advisors." [As modified by the Board.]

NH-20: "Thecaccident at TMI demons'6 rated the inability of all parties involved to comprehend the nat6re of the accident as it unfolded; communicate the necessary information to one another, to the Federal, state and local governments and to the public in an accurate and timely fashion; and to decide in a/ timely manner what course -

to take to protect:the health and safety of the public. The Applicant [s] in these proceedings [have] not adequately demonstrated that [they have] developed and Wifl be 'able to implement procedures necessar y to assess the impact of an accident, classify it properly, and notify adequately [their]*own personnel, the affected government bodies, and the public, all of which is r'eq'uired under 10 C.F.R. 50.47 and Appendix E and NUREG-0654."

NH-21: "The' State contends that the Applicant (s']

emergency plan does.not demonstrate how, in case of an accident resulting in a site area or general emergency, the large numbers of people,in the zone of danger may be protected or evacuated. Until there is reasonable assurance that adequate on-site and off-site protective measures can and will be:taken, the Board should not issue an operating license [ sic]." [ Limited to "on-site" matters'enly.]

NECNP I.A.2: "The Applicants have not complied with GDC 4 standards regarding qualification tests of electric valve operators installed inside the containment."

NECNP I.B.1: "The Applicant [s havel not satisfied the requirements of GDC 4 and GDC 34 in that all systems required for residual heat removal, such as steam dump valves, turbine valves

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and the entire steam dumping system are not safety grade and environmentally qualified."

NECNP I.B.2: "The Applicant [s have] not satisfied the requirements of GDC 4 that all equipment important to safety be environmentally qualified because [they have] not specified tire duration over which the equipment is qualified."

NECNP I.C: "According to Table 1.3-2, sheet 14 of the FSAR, the applicant [s have] added a new heating ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) system for the emergency.feedwater pumphouse. Only parts of the HVAC system are considered safety-related and environmentally qualified. NECNP contends --

that the entire system and its function must be environmentally qualified, and that the environmental qualifications must take into account the likely duration of an accident during which the HVAC system would be relied upon."

NECNP I.D.1: "The Applicants have not complied with GDC 1 with respect to ultrasonic testing of reactor vessel welds during.preservice and ,

inservice examination."

NECNP I.D.2: "The Applicant (s'] proposed testing of '

protection systems and actuation devices f>

fails to meet the requirements of GDC 21 and NUREG-0737, Task II.D.1. In particular, the Applicants do not provide for the testing at full power of twelve safety functions (see FSAR at 1.8-9),~ justify that omission, or provide for other reliable means of testing them."

NECNP I.D.3: "The applicant [s have7 rot provided a reasonable assurance thit the leakage detection system (4 th Seabrook reactor will operate when lges i because not all of the system is to oe t .ted during plant

• operation as required by GDC 21. Only the airborne radioactivity detector has the capacity to be tested during power operation, FSAR at 1.8-17. The applicant [s]

thereby also fail [] to satisfy GDC 30, which requires a development of adequate leakage detecting system."

NECNP I.D.4: "The Applicants have not complied with

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GDC 21 in that the Applicants indicate compliance with an outdated standard, IEEE 338-1975, which has been superseded by IEEE 338-1977. Furthermore, the Applicants improperly assert that they do not comply with IEES 338-1975 whenever the standard states that an action should be taken or a requirement should be met. All the provisions of the IEEE standard should be treated as mandatory unless the Applicants can show an alternative means of achieving the same lev'el of safety."

NECNP I.F.: "The Applicants have not met the requirements of GDC 17 or Criteria III, Appendix B in that [they have] not indicated compliance with IEEE 323-1974." -

NECNP I.G.: "NECNP contends that there is not reasonable assurance that the public health and safety

-will be protected in'11ght of the RCS wide-range, pressure i'struments n being utilized at Seabrook'which cannot be relied upon toLprovide ac' curate information.

Reliance upon the instruments could result

-in inappropri, ate operator actions or premature or late tripping of RCS pumps during the course of a small break

' ' ' loss-of-coolant accident."

NECNP I.I: "NECNP contends that the Applicants must

> identify and environmentally qualify one path to cold shutdown as per IE Bulletin 79-OlB, Supplement 3."

NECNP I.L: " Applicants have not provided for a direct indication of Power Operated Relief Valve positions and, therefore, have not complied with NUREG-0737, Item II.D.3. A safety grade environrehtally qualified system in compliance with GDC 4 should be installed."

l NECNP I.M: "The Applicants' fire protection system does

' not meet the requirements of GDC 3 as implemented by the Commission in CLI-80-21 with respect to the following items:

1 A. General Guidelines for Plant Protection I

1. Building design a.i cable spreading rooms s  !

b. floor drains

c. floors, walls and ceilings

2. Control of Combustibles

a. reactor coolant pump lube oil system

3. Electric Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations

a. cable spreading rooms

b. cable trays outside cable spreading rooms

c. control room cabling

4. Ventilation

a. discharge of products of -

combustion

b. power supply and controls

c. protection of charcoal filters

d. stairwells

e. smoke and heat vents

5. Lighting

a. fixed emergency lighting B. Fire Detection and Suppression

1. Detection -- alarm and annunciation

2. Water Sprinkler and Hose Standpipe Systems

a. sprinkler and standpipe layout

b. supervision of valves C. Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas

1. Primary and secondary containment

-- normal operation

2. Control room

3. Cable spreading room

4. Switchgear rooms

5. Remote safety related panels

6. Diesel generator areas

7. Diesel fuel oil storage areas

8. Safety related pumps

9. New fuel area

10. Spent fuel pool area

11. Radwaste building

12. Decontamination areas

a D. Special Protection. Guidelines

1. Welding and cutting, acetylene-oxygen fuel gas systems

2. Storage areas for dry ion exchange resins" (1-Tr. at 369-373) (As reworded in July 26, 1982 filing.)

NECNP I.N: "The Applicant has not provided.a-means~to handle radioactive solid waste [ produced]

during normal reactor operations including anticiapted operational occurrences as required by GDC 60."

NECNP I.U: "The Applicants have not demonstrated that ,

i they meet GDC 4 of Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 in that they have not provided that structures, systems, and components important to safety be protected against the effects of turbine missiles whose launching might occur as a result of equipment failure."

NECNP II.B.1: "FSAR addresses Quality Assurance for plant operations at Section 17 2. Section 17.2

fails to address each of the criteria in Appendix B in sufficient detail to enable an independent reviewer to determine whether or how all of the requirements'of Appendix B

! and the guidance in all applicable

regulatory guides will be satisfied."

NECNP II.B.3: "The Quality Assurance Organization does not have the independence required by Appendix B, Criterion 1."

NECNP II.B.4: "The Quality Assurance Program for operations as described in the ESAR does not demonstrate how'the' Applicants will assure that replacement materials and replacement parts incorporated into structures, systems, or components.important to safety will be i equivalent to the original equipment, installed in accordance with proper procedures and requirements, and otherwise adequate to protect the public health and safety. Similarly, the Quality Assurance program does not assure or demonstrate how j repaired or reworked structures, sys ems, or

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components will be adequately inspected and documented in 'as-built' drawings."

NECNP II.B.5: "The Quality Assurance program for operations as described in the FSAR fails to assure the presence on the operating staff of an adequate number of qualified QA/QC personnel, particularly during off-shifts."

SAPL Supp. 3: "The applicable requirements of the Commission's Interim Policy Statement issued June 13, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 40101 on Nuclear Power Plant Accident Consideration Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 have not been met."

CCCNH-4: "The Applicant has not adequately demonstrated that it has developed and will be able to implement procedures necessary to assess the impact of an accident, classify it properly, and notify adequately its own personnel, the affected governmental bodies, and the public, all of which is required by 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E, and NUREG-0654."

CCCNH-5: "The Applicant has failed to demonstrate adequate on-site and off-site protective measures in the event of an emergency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(a)(6), 10 CFR 50 App.' E, and NUREG-0654."

CCCNH-7: "The Seabrook design does not provide an adequate program'for monitoring the release of radioactivity to the plant and its environs whether-under normal operating conditions or in pre- and post-accident circumstances. Thus the applicant is not in compliance with general design criteria 63, 64 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50, and the requirements of NUREG-0737 and NUREG-0800."

See LBP-82-76, 16 NRC 1029 (September 13, 1982). All other petitions were denied, and all other proffered contentions were excluded for the reasons set forth'in the Order of September 13, 1982.

6. Subsequently, the Board received motions for reconsideration (or documents that were treated as motions for reconsideration) with respect to certain of the excluded contentions. On November 17, 1982, the Board issued its-Order on Reconsideration, pursuant to which the following additional contentions were admitted:

NECNP III.1: "The emergency plan does not contain an adequate emergency classification and action level scheme, as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(4) and'NUREG-0654, in that

"(a) No justification is given for the ,

classification of various system failures as unusual events, alerts, site area emergencies, or general emergencies.

"(b) The classification scheme minimizes the potential significance of transients.

"(c) The Applicants' classification scheme fails to include consideration of specific plant circumstances, such as the anticipated time lag for evacuation due to local. problems.

"(d) The classification scheme fails to provide a reasonable assurance that Seabrook onsite and offsite emergency response apparatus and personnel can be brought to an adequate state of readiness quickly enough to respond to an accident.

"(e) The emergency action level scheme fails to identify emergency action levels or classify them according to the required responses.

"(f) The scheme is incapable of being implemented effectively to protect the public health and safety because it provides no systematic means of identifying, monitoring, analyzing,

and responding to the symptoms of .

transients and other indicators that transients may occur."

NECNP III.2: "The emergency plan does not demonstrate the Applicants' ability to respond to failures at both units of the Seabrook reactor, or a failure at one unit which affects the other's capacity to operate safely. Events that could cause.a simultaneous emergency at both. units include earthquakes, severe storms, loss of offsite power, or degraded grid voltage. This constitutes a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), (2), (3), (4), (6),

(7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (13) and (15),

each of which would involve diferent actions for a simultaneous event than for an event at a single reactor." -

NECNP III.3: "The emergency plan fails to conform to Part IV(F) of Appendix E to Part 50 in that it does not provide for the training of unit shift supervisors to enable them to deal with special problems involved in emergencies, including making choices among alternative responses under stress."

NECNP III.12: "The evacuation time estimates provided by the Applicants in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan are inaccurate in that they provide unreasonably optimistic estimates of the-time required for evacuation. .In addition, the estimates provided in the radiological emergency plan are useless to emergency planning because they fail to include bounds of error, to indicate the basis for codes or assumptions used for the time estimates, to indicate

, whether the model used is static or dynamic, to provide.a sensitivity analysis of-the estimates or to reveal the underlying assumptions."

NECNP III.13: "The preliminary evacuation time estimates submitted by the Applicants assume favorable l weather conditions and thus fail to account for the worst case situation of adverse 1 weather conditions developing on a busy summer weekend afternoon. Nor do they take into account evacuee directional bias, evacuation shadow, or reasonably expected vehicle mix. As a result, the estimates are l

unduly optimistic and useless to future

planning."

See LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649 (November 17, 1982). Other proffered cententions were excluded for the reasons set forth in that Order.

7. Prior to the deadline established by the Board in its Memorandum and Order of September 13, 1982, the Board received motions for summary disposition pursuant to 10 CFR

$ 2.749 as follows:

Motions by the Applicants: ,

1 Contention Date NECNP I.A.2 2/11/83 NECNP I.B.1 2/9/83 NECNP'I.C 3/9/83 NECNP I.D.1 2/11/83 i

NECNP I.D.2 2/11/83 NECNP I.D.3 2/11/83

! NECNP I.D.4 2/7/83 NECNP I.F 3/7/83 NECNP I.G 2/11/83 NECNP I.I 2/7/83  :

NECNP I.L 2/7/83  ;

l NECNP I.M 2/9/83 NECNP I.N 2/7/83 l

NECNP I.U 2/14/83 NECNP II.B.1 2/14/83 NECNP II.B.3 2/14/83 l l

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NECNP II.B.4 2/14/83 NECNP II.B.5 2/14/83 NECNP III.2 2/14/83 NECNP III.12 2/14/83 NECNP III.13 2/14/83 NH-9 2/11/83 NH-13 2/11/83 NH-21 2/14/83 SAPL Supp. 3 2/11/83 CCCNH-5 2/14/83 CCCNH-7 2/11/83 Motions by the Staff:

Contention Date NECNP I.B.1 2/28/83 NECNP II.B.3 2/28/83 NECNP II.B.4 2/28/83 NECNP II.B.S 2/28/83 NH-13 2/14/83 Motions by SAPL:

1 Contention Date SAPL Supp. 3 2/11/83 In addition, the Staff supported the motions for summary disposition filed.by the Applicants as to the following contentions: NECNP I.A.2, NECNP I.D.1, NECNP I.D.3, NECNP I.G, NECNP I.I, NH-9 (as noted), NH-13, and SAPL Supp. 3.

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The Board did not receive motions for summary disposition with respect to the contentions admitted by the orders of September 13, 1982, and November 17, 1982, from any other party.

8. On April 18, 1983, the Board issued a Memorandum and Order dismissing the contentions of CCCNH and dismissing CCCNH as a party for the reasons set forth therein.

9. Between September 13, 1982 and April 7, 1983, the l

'following contentions were withdrawn by NECNP: -

1 NECNP I.C NECNP I.D.1 NECNP I.D.3 i NECNP I.D.4 i

NECNP'I.F.

i j NECNP I.G I NECNP I.I NECNP I.L NECNP I.M NECMP I.M NECNP I.U

! NECNP II.B.1 NECNP II.B.5 NECNP III.2 F

10. On May 11, 1983, the Board issued its Memorandum i

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'and Order taking the following action on the pending motions for summary disposition as to the remaining contentions:

Contention Action NECNP I.A.2 Motion ALLOWED; Contention DISMISSED NECNP I.B.1 Motion ALLOWED; Contention DISMISSED NECNP I.D.2 DEFERRED, pending Staff review of Salem 4

event NECNP II.B.3 Motion ALLOWED; Contention DISMISSED NECNP II.B.4 . Motion ALLOWED; Contention. DISMISSED l NECNP III.12 DEFERRED, pending Staff issuance of SER Supp. on on-site emergency planning NECNP III.13 DEFERRED, pending Staff issuance of SER Supp. on on-site emergency planning NH-9 Motion ALLOWED; Contention DISMISSED NH-13 Motion' ALLOWED; Contention DISMISSED NH-21 DEFERRED, pending Staff issuance of SER

! Supp. on on-site emergency planning.

$ SAPL Supp. 3 Motion ALLOWED; Contention DISMISSED

11. On April 19, 1983, the Advisory. Committee on Reactor Safeguards issued its " Report on Low Power Operation of the Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2," which was received into evidence as Staff Exhibit 1B (Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement 2, Appendix I). The Committee's report concludes that, "if due regard is given to [certain items mentioned in I

the letter as to which the Committee wished to be kept informed], and subject to satisfactory completion of construction, staffing, and preoperational. testing, there is I

i reasonable assurance that the Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2, can be operated at core power levels up to 5 percent of full power without undue risk to the health and safety of 1 the public."

12. On June 13, 1983 and June 20, 1983, the Applicants wrote to the Board and parties advising that certain of the contentions admitted for the first phase of these l

proceedings would not be ready for litigation at the times set forth by the Board in its Order regarding scheduling, and requesting that those contentions be deferred (either to i the second phase of evidentiary hearings or, perhaps, for subsequent motions for summary disposition). The contentions to be thus deferred were:

NH-21 Protective Action On-Site (partially).

NECNP III.3 Shift Supervisor Training NH-10 Control Room Design NECNP I.D.2 Manual Reactor Trip No party objected to the suggestion of the Applicants.

13. Accordingly, hearings were held commencing on i August 16, 1983, on the following contentions:

NECNP I.B.2 Equipment Environmental l Qualification Time Durations 1

J NECNP III.1~& NH-20 Classification Scheme and Emergency Action Levels i

NECNP III.12 & .13 Evacuation Time Estimates (as revised by the Board on 6/30/83)

, A total of 8 days of hearings (including limited appearance

sessions).were held (the "1983 hearings").

l 14. In addition, the Board received limited appearance-I statements on August 20, August 22, August 26 and August 31.

15. After the evidentiary hearings concluded, proposed i

l findings and rulings were filed by Applicants, Staff, MassAG f (on evacuation time estimates only), NECNP, NHAG (on EAL's only) and SAPL (on evacuation time estimates only).

I 16. On February 23, 1984', the Board issued an order i

i approving the withdrawal of NECNP Contention I.D.2. ASLB j Mem. and Ord. (unpublished) Dkt. Nos. 50-443, 50-444 (Feb. 23, 1984).

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17. On March 7, 1984, the Board issued an order approving the withdrawal of NECNP Contention III.3. ASLB l

Mem. and Ord. (unpublished), Dkt. Nos. 50-443, 50-444 (March 7, 1984).

i 18. On May 24, 1984, the Board issued an order i

{ approving the withdrawal of NH Contention 21. ASLB Mem. and

Ord. (unpublished), Dkt. Nos. 50-443, 50-444 (May 24, 1984).

! 19. As a result of the three above-described orders all i

i of the issues admitted for litigation in the September 13, l

1982 Memorandum and Order (LBP-82-67) were resolved save

those as to which evidentiary hearings'had been held and NH Contention 10.

j 20. On September 13, 1985, as noted earlier this Board j '

4 was reconstituted to its present membership.

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21. Under the terms of the order reconstituting this Board, the Board has jurisdiction over all on-site safety and emergency planning contentions. This included NH-10 as-well as all issues as to which evidentiary hearings had been held in August of 1983, except NECNP III.12 and III.13 dealing with evacuation time estimates (ETE's). These contentions remained with the other licensing board in this proceeding chaired by Judge Hoyt. Prehearing Conf. Tr. 2131 (March 26, 1986): ASLB Mem. and Ord. (unpublished) (Denying SAPL's Motion for Decision on ETE) (August 14, 1986).

22. On November 4, 1985, this Board reopened the record for "the limited purpose of supplementation" on Contentions NECNP I.B.2, NECNP III.1 and NH-20. The Board also indicated that it would take evidence on NH-10 at a supplementary hearing if it was not informally resolved.

23. On July 21, 1986, this Board issued an order allowing New Hampshire's motion to withdraw NH Contention 10 but converted and replaced that contention by Contention SAPL Supp. 6. ASLB Mem. and Ord. (unpublished) (Ruling on NH's Motion to Withdraw Contention NH-10, and on Applicants' Motion to Strike SAPL's Objection to Motion to Withdraw)

(July 21, 1986).

24. On September 15, 1986, this Board issued an order granting partial summary disposition with respect to Contention SAPL Supp. No. 6. In summary, that decision granted the motion except to the extent the motion sought 1

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complete summary disposition of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) portion of the contention which encompasses an 5 allegation that there is no reasonable assurance that the safety of the population in the immediate vicinity of the i plant will be protected between now and when the SPDS is fully completed after the first refueling outage.

l 25. On September 30, October 1 and 3, 1986, the Board j held further evidentiary hearings (the "1986 hearings").

The transcript of these proceedings is cited "Tr." The 1983

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i transcript is cited "1-Tr." Under the terms of the order 1

setting those hearings the parties thereto were Applicants, i Staff, SAPL, NECNP, MassAG and NH. The Board also received J further limited appearances on September 29, 30 and October 3, 1986.

4 j 26. These are this Board's findings of fact and rulings 1

j of law upon the on-site safety issues still unresolved in 1

this proceeding.

CONTENTIONS NECNP III.1 AND NH-20 Classification Scheme and Emergency Action Levels (a) Introduction

27. Contentions NECNP III.1 and NH-20 provide as l follows: ,

l "The accident at TMI demonstrated the inability of all parties involved to comprehend the nature of the accident as it unfolded; communicate the necessary information to one another, to the Federal, state and local governments and

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to the public in an accurate and timely fashion; and to decide in a timely manner what course to take to protect the health and safety of the public.

The Applicant [s] in these proceedings

[have] not adequately demonstrated that

[they have] developed and will be able to implement procedures necessary to assess the impact of an accident, classify it properly, and notify adequately [their] own personnel, the affected government bodies, and the public, all of which is required under 10.C.F.R. 50.47 and Appendix E and NUREG-0654." (NH-20)

"The emergency plan does not contain an adequate emergency classification and action level scheme, as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(4) and NUREG-0654, in that

"(a) No justification is given for the classification of various system failures as unusual events, alerts, site area emergencies, or general emergencies.

"(b) The classification scheme minimizes the potential significance of transients.

l "(c) The Applicants' classification scheme fails to include consideration of specific plant circumstances, such as the anticipated time

) lag for evacuation due to local problems.

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"(d) The classification scheme fails to provide a reasonable' assurance that Seabrook onsite and offsite emergency response apparatus and personnel can be brought to an adequate state of readiness quickly enough to respond to an accident.

< "(c) The emergency action level scheme fails to identify emergency action levels or classify them according to the required responses.

"(f).The scheme is incapable of being implemented effectively to protect the public health and safety because it provides no systematic means of' identifying, monitoring, analyzing,

and responding to the symptoms of transients i and other indicators that transients may occur." (NECNP III.1)

! 28' . The witnesses offered on this contention in the 1983 hearings were the Applicants' Panel (Messrs. Anderson, l Thomas and MacDonald) App. Dir., Post 1-Tr. 1483, and the Staff Witness (Mr. Sears), Staff Dir., Post 1-Tr. 1691.

No other witnesses or direct evidence were offered by any-

party. In the 1986 hearings additional testimony was i

presented for the Applicants by J. A. MacDonald and G. S. -

Thomas, App. Dir., Post Tr. 487 and for the Staff by Donald f J. Perrotti and Gordon R. Bryan, Staff Dir. Post Tr. 489.

This testimony was admitted by stipulation; and no party sought to cross-examine it. Tr. 485-86, 488-89.

(b) Findings of Fact

29. The emergency classification scheme and emergency j action levels are included in Chapter 5'of the "Seabrook l Station Radiological Emergency Plan" (SSREP). App. Dir.,

l' i Post Tr. 487, Exh. 1. Chapter 5 of SSREP provides a i

! detailed emergency classification and emergency action level 4

scheme. ,

1 30. Potential emergencies at Seabrook are classified for purposes both of the Applicants' own on-site reactions l and for the purpose of triggering notification to any

activation of the emergency response organizations of the 1

federal, state and local governmental authorities.

i l

3 1

! i i

l l l

Conditions potentially leading to emergencies are classified J

into one of four classes:

4

1. Unusual Event

2. Alert j 3. Site Area Emergency

4. General Emergency j App. Dir., Post fr. 487 at 1-2.

J

, 31. The Applicants' classification scheme and emergency j action levels-are based upon a " symptomatic approach" to accident recognition. The emergency (or potential j

emergency) classes are defined in terms of the observable,

objective symptoms of non-normal conditions that an operator I will see (rather than, for instance, upon some in-plant condition that might or might not be recognized to exist i

i given whatever symptoms occurred). App. Dir. Post 1-Tr.

j 1483 at 14-15; Exh. 1 at p. 5-1. Moreover, for those symptoms indicative of some challenge to one of the five d

critical safety functions of the reactor systems (i.e.,

subcriticality, core cooling, heat sink, reactor coolant system integrity and. containment integrity), the symptoms

are related to logic trees, the conclusions of which are displayed on " status" indicators from instrumentation on the control board; the status indicators are also on the SPDS.

! Id.; App. Dir. Post Tr. 487, Exh. 1, Eigs. 5.1--5.5. These Critical Safety Function ("CSF") status trees are used to (1) monitor station safety status, (2) alert operators to potential emergency conditions, and (3) direct operators to i

1 d

..,r 4 . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- ~ - - _ . . _ _ -- ,-- - - __. _ . - - - -

i appropriate CSF restoration procedures. App. Dir.

Post 1-Tr. 1483 at 16.

32. The CSF status indications, and the conditions that-will produce them, are set forth for each of the four emergency classifications in the Applicants' direct testimony. App. Dir. Post Tr. 487, Exh. 1, Figs. 5.1--5.5.

33. In addition, the Applicants' classification scheme-i l and emergency action levels contain certain events that, though they do not represent (at least initially) challenges l to a critical safety function, are categorized into the classification scheme. Id. .

/

34. This symptomatic approach to accident i

classification and emergency action levels has been reviewed and approved by the NRC Staff. 1-Tr. 1699. The system serves the purpose that emergency actions levels are j supposed to serve "very well," and is, in fact, the "best approach" that the Staff reviewer and witness has seen so i

I far. 1-Tr. at 1721.

35. There is no event that ought to be included in the classification scheme that is not. 1-Tr. 1722. (During the August 1983 hearings, there were only two items on which witnesses were questioned in this regard. One involved the evacuation of the control room without control of the remote i

shutdown panel (in fact, there are two redundant remote shutdown locations at Seabrook, FSAR S 7.4.2, as amended by Amendment 49). 1-Tr. 1726. The Staff witness did not i

j 4 i

1 i

j believe that this was a credible scenario, id.; it is, in 1

'any event, classified in the Applicants' classification scheme. App. Dir., Post 1-Tr. 1483, Exh. 1, Table A.1 (Item 12a), Table A.3 (Item 12b), Table A.S. The second was phrased in terms of "a fire affecting one train of safety I related equipment, with a potential for affecting the other i

t train . . . ." 1-Tr. 1727. However, this question did not distinguish between controlled and uncontrolled fires.

(Under the Applicants' classification scheme and emergency -

action levels,- a " controlled fire which affects only one j train of safety-related equipment with the potential for i

j affecting the other train" is an Alert (Table A.2,

, Item lla), while an " uncontrolled fire which affects safety-related equipment" is a Site Area Emergency (Table i

f A.3, Item lib). The former is consistent with NUREG-0654, l Rev. 1, App. 1, p. 1-9 (Item 13), and the latter is 1

j consistent with id., p. 1-13 (Item 11).))

I 1 36. All the information associated with the i

I classification system is complete. The emergency event 1 listing in the SSREP, App. Dir. Post Tr. 487, Exh. 1, i

i Fig. 5.6, is incorporated into an emergency response j procedure that specifies in detail the specific emergency action levels (meter indications or alarms, CSF status tree displays, etc.) which are used as indicators of the various i

j emergency events. App. Dir. Post Tr. 487 at 3. This

! classification system is ready to be implemented at Seabrook s

, - - , , , , . . , , , - - - , - - -,,m.,-.- . . - - - - , , , - - - - - - - , - - - - - , - - , . , - - - . . , , - , , - . , , - , , . - , -

i Station and all station personnel responsible for its i

implementation have~been trained in its use. Id. at 3-4; Staff-Dir. Post Tr. 489 at 5.

37. Training on the Seabrook Station emergency classification system has also been provided to representatives of the State of New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency and Department of Public Health Services. Both agencies have indicated their agreement with the procedure used to classify emergency conditions. App. Dir. Post Tr.

487 at 4.

1

38. At the time the August 1983 hearings ended, there

! were incomplete aspects to the Seabrook Station classification system. One group of missing items was the

! Seabrook-specific setpoints, i.e. threshold values for some a of the CSE status tree indications. Id. at 4. All of the status tree branches now have Seabrook-specific parameter determinations. Id., Exh. 1, Fig. 5.1. The Staff has reviewed the Seabrook EALs and found them to be complete.

4 i Staff Dir. Post Tr. 494 at 4.

39. As of the time the August, 1983 hearings ended, another then unrealized goal was the fuller utilization of in-station radiation monitor indications within the classification system. App. Dir. Post.Tr. 487 at 4. The emergency response procedure that implements the emergency classification system incorporates indications and alarms i

i I

from six different radiation monitors as emergency action levels. Id. at 4. '

40. Also not accomplished as of August of 1983 was a comparison of the Seabrook Station classification system with the guidance of the NUREG-0654, Appendix 1 example emergency events. This has now been done; all the example events listed in NUREG-0654 are satisfactorily addressed by the Seabrook Station emergency classification system. App Dir. Post Tr. 487, Exh. 2. This has been confirmed by a

~

Staff review. Staff Dir. Post Tr. 489 at 5 *i .

(c) Rulings of Law

41. The Commission's Regulations require the Applicants' on-site emergency plan to contain, inter alia:

"A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters . . . ." 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(4).

See also 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, 9 IV.B.

42. Guidance as to the objectives for emergency plans is contained in a publication entitled " Criteria for.

Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1. This document is not a regulation and does not impose regulatory requirements on the Applicants; it functions, rather, like a Regulatory Guide in that it describes one satisfactory method by which the Commission's regulations may be satisfied. See i

I Louisiana Power & Light Company (Waterford Steam Electric 1

! Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1094 (1983). ("In

! addition, NUREG-0654 . . . provides guidance for developing and reviewing emergency plans.") (Emphasis added.)

43. The Applicants' classification scheme and emergency action levels fully satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR

$ 50.47 and Appendix E and the guidelines of NUREG-0654.

The emergency action levels provide a basis for the prompt.

a classification of events by the facility operators based on 4

I observable events. In addition to notification, the I emergency action levels provide a basis for the selection of I

l mitigation strategies and, together with information about i

in-plant conditions, the making of protective action recommendations to governmental officials.

i l CONTENTION NECNP I.B.2 Electrical Equipment Environmental i

Qualification Time Duration (a) Introduction

. 44. This contention reads as follows:

"The Applicant [s havel not satisfied the requirements of GDC 4 that all equipment important to safety be environmentally qualified because [they have] not

specified time duration over which the equipment is qualified."

l 45. At the August, 1983 hearings, the witnesses offered i

on this contention were the Applicants' Panel i (Messrs. Maidrand and Anderson) App. Dir., Post 1-Tr.'970 and the Staff Panel (Messrs. Lagrange and Walker), Staff f

i 28 -

1 l

- ~ , *. _ . . , * -,_..-w .

, m,. . . - , , - - - , - ~ ~ . - . - - , - - . . , . . , , . , -

a I

j Dir., Post 1-Tr. 494. In the 1986 hearings the Applicants

{ offered a panel of. witnesses composed of J.M. Salvo, G.S.

1 1 Thomas and N.K. Woodward. App. Dir. Post Tr. 357. The i

l Staff submitted further testimony by Mr. Walker. Staff Dir.

Post Tr. 494. No other witnesses were offered by any party.

(b) Findings of Fact

46. The Applicants have specified the time durations J

j for which electrical equipment required to be i

j environmentally qualified for a harsh environment will remain qualified.

47. The question of a time duration for environmental

[ qualification breaks down into two constituent questions.

The first relates to the period of time for which the j equipment will be qualified to perform in a normal i

environment without losing its ability to survive an

} accident. The second is the period of time (following the f

hypothetical accident) that the equipment will remain qualified to perform its function. These are referred to by j the Applicants as the " pre-a:cident qualification duration" ,

f and the " post-accident qualification duration" respectively.

See App. Dir. Post 1-Tr. 970 at 7-8.

4

] 48. The pre-accident qualification duration for

{ Seabrook electrical equipment qualified for the harsh

environment (other than electrical equipment supplied by the f Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor ("NSSS Electrical

! Equipment")) is the life of'the plant. If equipment cannot j -

29 -

)

i

be qualified for the life of the plant, then a shorter i period is specified for that equipment and the equipment j must be replaced or requalified before the period elapses.

4 Id. at 8. This standard is generic for all equipment required to be environmentally qualified for a harsh i

.j environment. Staff Dir., Post Tr. 494 at 3-4.

i'

49. The post-accident qualification duration for l

equipment required to be environmentally qualified for the harsh environment (other than NSSS Electrical Equipment)

selected by the Applicants is one year. This is extremely i

conservative inasmuch as the Staff finds 100 days to be I acceptable, Staff Dir. Post Tr. 494 at 5-6, Tr. 499, and the Board so finds. In the event that any equipment cannot be qualified to remain functional in the harsh environment for j one year, then a specific duration will be established for i

.I that equipment by the Applicants based on the duration that 4

I the equipment is required to remain operational in the case I

i of an accident in order to perform its safety function, plus i

! a margin. This duration standard is generic to all i

i equipment required to be environmentally qualified for a i

harsh environment. App. Dir., Post 1-Tr. 970 at 8-9.

! 50. These standards apply to all equipment that is i

i considered by the Applicants to be " safety related," which, i

as they use the term, includes all equipment required to

! function in order to perform a safety function and all 1

equipment required not to fail in order not to interfere i

l i

f

1 with the performance of any safety function. 1-Tr. 981,

985. This includes all equipment that falls within the i

definition of "important to safety" in 10 CFR S 50.49.

1 1-Tr. 981. The Staff concurs that all electrical equipment important to safety that is located in a potentially harsh environment has been~ included in the Applicants' program.

Staff Dir., Post Tr. 494 at 2-3.

51. All Safety Related Electrical equipment as defined J

1 1 above has been qualified for a one-year post-accident ,

duration, except the following:

i EQ File

number Description

! 248-36-01 Borg-Warner feedwater i isolation valves j 113-03-01 Okonite 600-V power cable subject to submergence 4 113-17-01 Anaconda 600-V control cable

] subject to submergence 113-18-01 Anaconda 300-V instrumentation cable subject j

to submergence 113-20-01 ITT Suprenant 300-V instrumentation cable subject to submergence 172-01-01 General Atomic Radiation Monitors and Detectors (inside containment) 252-38-01 ASCO Temperature Switches 173-05-03 Maisoneilan E/P Converter 600-06-01 Namco EC 210 Series Conduit Seals d

1

~ ~ _ , - - _ . . ,_e . - _ , - , - . . - , . , , - . . , _ . _ - , - . _

i j App. Dir. Post Tr. 357 at 5-7, 12-13, 14-16.

52. Engineering analyses for each of the above-listed items have been done which demonstrates that each of those items is qualified for a time longer than the actual required post-accident operability duration in the harshest environment it will face. App. Dir. Post Tr. 357 at 8-12, 13-14, 16-17.

2 (c) Rulings of Law

53. The Applicants have not failed to satisfy the l requirements of General Design Criterion 4 with respect to the time duration of the environmental qualification of electrical equipment required to be environmentally I

qualified.

J CONTENTION SAPL SUPP. 6 (FORMERLY NH-10) (as j modified by the ruling on summary disposition)

(a) Introduction

54. The only issue remaining to be addressed under Contention SAPL Supp. 6 is the following:

! Whether or not in light of the fact that

} '

the SPDS is not currently at an optimum, i.e. incomplete, because of the certain

, deficiencies enumerated by the Staff in i a draft license NPF-56 of June 26, 1986 l and an Affidavit of Richard H. Eckenrode j of August 18, 1986 there is reasonable assurance that in deferring improvements

, to the SPDS until the first refueling i

outage the safety of the population in

the immediate vicinity of the plant will 1 be protected. See ASLB Mem. and Ord.

l (Unpublished), supra, July 21, 1986.

l i

i

J 1

(b) Findings of Fact

55. The only witnesses who testified with respect to this contention were those of the Applicants, L. A. Walsh and G. S. Thomas, App. Dir. Post Tr. 739 and the Staff, R. J. Eckenrode, Staff Dir., Post Tr. 822.

56. The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) is not considered a safety system. Operator actions are not taken at the SPDS. Rather, the purpose of the SPDS is to provide operators with a concise display of certain information

~

about certain relevant plant variables. App. Dir. Post Tr.

739 at 1-2.

57. As indicated in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, the SPDS is to be used in addition to existing control instrumentation and serves to aid and augment this instrumentation. Moreover, Supplement 1 also provides that operators should be trained to respond to accident conditions with and without the SPDS available. Therefore, even if there were no SPDS at all, the necessary information would be available to the operators from other sources within the control room and the operators would be capable of taking the appropriate action Lased on this information.

These provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public in the vicinity of the plant will be protected. Id. at 2 as corrected at Tr. 729.

58. The particular items proposed to be deferred under the June 26, 1986 draft of Licens'e NPF-56 and the reason why i

such deferral will not result in there not being reasonable assurance that the local population will not be protected are set forth below.

59. Continuous display of the top level critical safety function summary at the assigned SPDS control room location raises the concept of continuously displaying the top level critical safety functions instead of calling them up when desired. Until a mutually acceptable resolution to this concern is reached, the result sought may be accomplished by having the SPDS/STA Console CRT continuously display the top level critical safety functions during normal plant operation. App. Dir. Post Tr. 739 at 3.

60. RHR flow and hydrogen concentration parameters are presently indicated on the main control board in more than one location and are considered when using emergency procedures to respond to the plant upset conditions. Thus, the data is available to the operators even without the SPDS. Id. at 3. The main control board is only a maximum of four feet from the operators on watch when sitting in their assigned seats. Tr. 978.

61. Containment isolation status is also present on the i 3; main control board in a location other than the SPDS. Id.

3 at 3-4. It is some 26 feet away.from the SPDS, Tr. 977.

?.)

However, it is not necessary for the person at the SPDS to read the labels on the individual lights; it is the presence

, l' or absence of a solid uniform bank of lights that disclose '

,, - . - , , n - ,, - ---.-l--------

7 ,

t *

s whether containment isolation exists. Tr. 781-83, 863, 965-66. -

62. Steam generator and stack radiation parameters are t

available to the operators at.the RDMS console. The RDMS console is within an arm's length of the SPDS. Tr. 779, 866. Thus, the data is available to the operators even without the SPDS. App. Dir. Poat Tr. 739 at 4.

i

63. The heat sink screen has been changed and is now i consistent in labeling. If. at 4. The subcriticality and core cooling screens enhancements have been completed.

Tr. 730.

64. Approved isolationidevices between the Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System (RVLIS) and SPDS have been installed. Qualify.ing teste have been completed with satisfactory results. App. Dir. Post Tr 739.

65. Set forth below are discussions of the five additional deferrals which are discussed in Supplement 6 of the SER, as prereleased by the Staff.

66. Awkwardness in the display call-up method referred to by the Staff derives from the fact that currently the call-up of these displays requires the operator to position a cursor and then press two buttons' simultaneously. Staff

)

recommends that the SPDS be changed so that only a single operator' action is'necessary. The Staff ' recommendation.

p r

)i 3 will, if adopted, simplify.the procedure,)bu,t the procedure x

I 1 s t ,

presently available is certainly adequate to the task, and thus the necessary " reasonable assurance" exists. Id. at 5.

67. As stated by the Staff in SSER No. 6 9 18.2 at

p. 4:

The audit indicated that the data validation methodology includes only range checking, averaging, and auctioneering. Concern was raised that a parameter value could be within an acceptable range but significantly different from other measures of the same parameter, causing the average value to be incorrect and possibly 2

misleading. A more sophisticated data ~

validation algorithm, to ensure display of more valid data, is being pursued by the applicant.

In short, the Staff is recommending a more sophisticated methodology; the present methodology is not inadequate for the task. Moreover, by procedure, the operators are required to validate any SPDS conclusions prior to implementing any corrective action. Thus the necessary

" reasonable assurance" exists. Id. at 5-6,

68. SSER No. 6 states: " top-level CSF summary display appears to aid operators in rapidly determining plant status, but lower-level display -formats do not seem to be as useful," SSER No. 6 6'18.2 at p. 6. The combination of SPDS top level display with operator training ma.'.es it possible to satisfactorily monitor plant status without SPDS I

lower-level displays being available on the main plant computer system. The staff's comments indicate a disagreement on specific usage of the SPDS lower level l

I l

l

c i

l displays; however, the ability of the SPDS to aid the operators is not in question. App. Dir. Post. Tr. 739 at 6.

69. An availability calculation including RVLIS and RDMS cannot be completed prior to the actual interface of both units with the SPDS. In any case, the availability percentage does not affect the safety of the public because there is backup instrumentation for the computerized SPDS.

Id. at 7.

70. SSER No. 6 states: " system response times appears to be satisfactory but the staff observations were made during a lightly loaded sequence," SSER No. 6 5 18.2 at

p. 6. A meaningful system load test, which will give representative SPDS response times, will be performed when the main plant computer system is loaded to support an operational plant. Performance of a system load test under nonrepresentative main plant computer conditions will not help to ensure the health and safety of the public. App.

Dir. Post Tr. 739 at 7.

71. Absence of any or all of the Staff suggested additions to SPDS will have no meaningful effect upon operator reaction and response time in an accident situation. Tr. 986-89.

i (c) Rulings of Law

72. There exists reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the population near the plant will be

protected until the first refueling outage when the SPDS will be placed in an optimum, i.e. complete condition.

, PROPOSED FORM OF ORDER

73. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's rules and

regulations, that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is authorized, upon making the findings on all' applicable matters specified in 10 CFR S 50.57(a) to issue to

[ Applicants a license authorizing low-power testing and ,

operation (up to and including 5% of rated power) of Unit 1 of Seabrook Station. A license to authorize full-power operation of Unit 1 is within the jurisdiction of the separate Licensing Board constituted to consider and decide offsite emergency planning cententions. The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is also authorized, upon the necessary. findings and a favorable decision by the emergency planning Board, to issue licenses for fuel loading and operation of Unit 2 upon completion of that facility. See Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),

LBP-84-24, 19 NRC 1418, 1485 (1984).

74. This Partial Initial Decision is effective i immediately and will constitute the final decision of the 4 I

Commission forty'-five days after the date hereof, unless a l l

party appeals or seeks a stay. Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.762, an appeal from this Partial Initial Decision may be taken by l

e l

, i I

1 filing a notice of appeal with the Atomic Safety and j

. Licensing Appeal Board within ten days after service of this

decision. .A brief in support of an appeal must be filed within thirty days after the filing of the notice of appeal  ;

(forty days if the appellant is the NRC Staff). Within thirty days after the period for filing and service of the briefs of all appellants has expired, any party not an appellant may file a brief in support of or in opposition to, the appeal. The NRC Staff may file a responsive brief within forty days after the period for filing and service of the briefs of all appellants has expired. Any party may apply to the Appeal Board for a stay of this Partial Initial Decision pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.788.

Respectfully submitted,

.-/ - ,

f

u. 7 ,; _pyf

~

Thomas G."Dignan, Jr.

R. K. Gad III Kathryn A. Selleck Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 (617) 423-6100 Counsel for Applicants f

OtrEi!:

4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE t

I, Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., one of the attorneys for8thWOV -3 PS :11 Applicants herein, hereby certify that on October 30, 1986, es I made service thereof of the within with Federal document Express, prepaid, by depositing cop'pr, fordeliveryt(g 7 where indicated, by depositing in the United States mal , r:- a first class postage paid, addressed to):

Administrative Judge Sheldon J. Robert Carrigg, Chairman Wolfe, Esq., Chairman, Atomic Board of Selectmen Safety and Licensing Board Panel Town Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atlantic Avenue Commission North Hampton, NH 03862 East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 ,

Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Diane Curran, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Andrea C. Ferster, Esquire Board Panel Harmon & Weiss

< U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Suite 430 Commission 2001 S Street, N.W.

East West Towers Building Washington, DC 20009 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Dr. Jerry Harbour Stephen E. Merrill Atomic Safety and Licensing Attorney General Board Panel George Dana Bisbee U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Assistant Attorney General Commission Office of the Attorney General East West Towers Building 25 Capitol Street 4350 East West Highway Concord, NH 03301-6397 Bethesda, MD 20814

• Atomic Safety and Licensing Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire Board Panel Office of the Executive Legal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Director Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Tenth Floor 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, MD 20814

• Atomic Safety and. Licensing Robert A. Backus, Esquire Appeal Board Panel Backus, Meyer & Solomon U.S. Nuclear Ragulatory 116 Lowell Street Commission P.O. Box 516 Washington, DC 20555 Manchester, NH 03105

Philip Ahrens, Esquire Mr. .J. P. Nadeau Assistant Attorney General Selectmen's Office Department of the Attorney 10 Central Road General Rye, NH 03870 Augusta, ME 04333 Paul McEachern, Esquire Carol S. Sneider, Esquire Matthew T. Brock, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Shaines & McEachern Department of the Attorney General 25 Maplewood Avenue One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor P.O. Box 360 Boston, MA 02108 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Mr. Calvin A. Canney Chairman, Board of Selectmen City Manager RFD 1 - Box 1154 City Hall Route 107 126 Daniel Street Kensington, NH 03827 Portsmouth, NH 03801 ,

• Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Mr. Angie Machiros U.S. Senate Chairman of the Washington, DC 20510 Board of Selectmen (Attn: Tom Burack) Town of Newbury Newbury, MA 01950

• Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Mr. Peter J. Matthews 1 Pillsbury Street Mayor Concord, NH 03301 City Hall (Attn: Herb Boynton) Newburyport, MA 01950 Mr. Thomas F. Powers, III Mr. William S. Lord Town Manager Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter Town Hall - Friend Street 10 Front Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Exeter, NH 03833 H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire Brentwood Board of Selectmen Office of General Counsel RFD Dalton Road Federal Emergency Management Brentwood, NH 03833 Agency 500 C Street, S.W.

Washington, DC 20472 Gary W. Holmes, Esquire Richard A. Hampe, Esquire Holmes & Ells Hampe and McNicholas 47 Winnacunnet Road 35 Pleasant Street Hampton, NH 03841 Concord, NH 03301

b e s

Mr. Ed Thomas Judith H. Mizner, Esquire FEMA, Region I Silverglate, Gertner, Baker, 442 John W. McCormack Post Fine, Good & Mizner Office and Cour.t House 88 Broad Street Post Office Square Boston, MA 02110 Boston, MA 02109 Charles P. Graham, Esquire McKay, Murphy and Graham 100 Main Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Y _p Thomas WhitTHEn, Jr.

(*= Ordinary U.S. First Class Mail.)

v