ML20246F033

NRC Staff Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Re Seabrook Plan for Commonwealth of Ma Communities & Exercise Contentions.* State of Nh Radiological Emergency Response Plan Ruled Adequate & Implementable.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20246F033
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	08/24/1989
From:	Bachmann R, Chan E, Sherwin Turk NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246E987	List: ML20246E985 ML20246F033
References
OL, PLED-890824, NUDOCS 8908300124
Download: ML20246F033 (252)

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8/24/89 s  ?,ki UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSION 39 AUG 25 P2 :39 before the cn e y u 3gw w . ,, ; r dr.,,

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD UC

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In the Matter of PUBLIC SERVICE' COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-443-0L 0F NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) 50-444-OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1- (Offsite Emergency and-2) Planning Issues)

NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE SEABROOK PLAN FOR MASSACHUSETTS

-COMMUNITIES AND THE EXERCISE CONTENTIONS

~1. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 1.1. These findings and rulings address the remaining contentions in this proceeding as to the radiological emergency response plans for that portion of the emergency planning zone (EPZ) for Seabrook Station (Seabrook) which lies within The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the remaining contentions concerning made-as-te the 1988 graded exercise of the emergency plans for Senbrook.

1.2. Seabrook is a nuclear power facility located in the Town of Seabrook, New Hampshire, constructed and to be operated by the New Hampshire Yankee Division of Public Service Company of New Hampshire (NHY), the lead owner of Seabrook.

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1.3. This Board, with the exception of a discrete ETE issue involving returning commuts , as to which it has retained jurisdiction, has previously decided all issues arising from contentions concerning the New Hampinre Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP) (App. Ex. 5) ,

which is the emergency plan for the portion of the Seabrook EPZ which lies within the State of New Hampshire. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-88-32, 28 NRC 667 (1988)

(hereafter referred to as "PID" and cited to the Slip Opinion).

1.4. The emergency plan litigated in this phase of the proceeding is known as the "Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities" (SPMC). This i plan was admitted into evidence as Applicants' Exhibit 42. Herein it will be referred to and cited as "SPMC" and'" App. Ex. 42" interchangeably.  ;

1.5. The SPMC is a utility authored plan, made necessary by the decision of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (The Commonwealth' not to participate in emergency planning for Seabrook.

1.6. It is designed to be implemented either in " Mode 1," (which assumes The Commonwealth responds to the emergency and calls upon the utility only for resources and personnel, as needed) or in " Mode 2," which assumes that The Commonwealth delegates full authority to the utility to respond to the emergency and carry out SPMC, or in any other mode lying within the spectrum bounded by Mode 1 and Mode 2.

1.7. The utility organization responsible for carrying out SPMC is the NHY Offsite Response Organization (OR0), an association of volunteers drawn from various companies and callings.

l 1.8. Of some 198 contentions proffered by the interveners, a total of 123 were admitted for litigation. As consolidated, 63 were admitted l

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with respect to the SPMC, they being Joint Intervenor (JI) Contentions JI-1 through JI-63, and 21 were admitted as to the graded exercise, being .

denominated hereinafter by party and number.

1.9. 0f the above-stated admitted 84 contentions, a total of 22 were wholly withdrawn, resolved by settlement or previously ruled upon by this Board, leaving a total of 62 to be litigated and resolved in this Initial Decision. These contentions are:

JI-1 (ETEstudy)

JI-2 (Accuracy of Massachusetts ETEs)

JI-3 (Real-time Beach Counter)

JI-4 (TrafficManagementPlan)

JI-5 (Removal of Road Impediment)

JI-7 (Transit-Dependent Bus Routes)

JI-9 (Strikes)

JI-11 (Second-Shift Staffing)

JI-12 (Yankee Atomic as Second Shift)

JI-13 (Training for Specific Positions)

JI-15 (WorkerLiability)

JI-17 (Beach PARS)

JI-18 (PARCriteria)

JI-19 (Sector Evacuation) 1 JI-20 (ETEs and PARS)

JI-21 (P5akSummerPopulation)

JI-22 (Local Refusal to Accept OR0 PARS)

JI-23 (PAR Coordination with New Hampshire) l l

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,. 4 .. j JI-24 (Delays in PAR Decisionmaking) .

.JI-27'- .(Liaisons) -l JI-30 (TelephoneCommunications)~

JT-31 (Lateral Field Communications)

JI-34 (NotificationofContractPersonnel)

JI-35 (EBSMessages) it-36 (Media Coordination)

JI-39 (Pre-EmergencyInformationtoBeach Transients)

JI-41 (Refusal of State / Local Governments to Follow SPMC)

JI-42 (Ad Ho: State / Local Re'sponse)

JI-43 .(Uncertainty as to State / Local Response)

~JI-45 (Schools)

JI-46 (EPZHospitals)

'JI-47 (Institutionalized Persons Who Cannot Be Evacuated)

JI-48 (Special Needs Survey)

JI-49 (Special Needs Residents)

JI-50 (Special Facilities)

JI-51 (Special Host Facility)

JI-53 (Haverhill Staging Area)

~

JI-54 (Reliance on American Red Cross)

JI-55 (MannedVehicles)

JI-56 (Radiological Monitoring) 1

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JI-57 (Radioactive Waste)

JI-S8 (Letters of Agreement) ,

.JI-61 (Mode 1 Response)

JI-62 (Mixed Mode Response) ,

JI.-63 (State / Local Resources)

MAG EX-2 (Scope / Mass. EPZ Hospitals)

MAG EX-8 (ORO Radio Communications)

MAG EX-9 (EBS/ Media Messages)

MAG EX-10 (PARS for Mass. Schools)

MAG EX-11 (OROPARDecisionmaking)

MAG EX-14 (MS-1 Hospital Performance)

MAG EX-19 (Onsite PAR Decisionmaking)

MAG EX-21 (Scope / Ambulances)

SAPL EX-2 (Nil Bus /Ambularice Performance)

SAPL EX-4 (Scope /SamplingTeams)

SAPL EX-6 (Scope / Traffic Control)

SAPL EX-7 (Scope /DecontaminationofNHEmergency Workers)

SAPL EX-8 (Scope /NHShiftChanges)

SAPL EX-12 (NH Reception Centers)

SAPL EX-13 (Scope /Special Facilities)

SAPL.EX-14 (NH PARS)

T0H/NECNP EX-1 (Scope Generally).

1.10. The active parties to this phase of the proceeding are the Applicants, the Staff of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Staff), the Attorney General of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (MAG),

--.-__.____.m_ _ _ __.____.__ . . . 3

The Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL), The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP), the Town of Amesbury, Massachusetts (T0A), the Town of Newbury, Massachusetts (TON), the Town of West Newbury, Massachusetts (TOWN), the Town of Salisbury, Massachvzetts (TOS), the City .

of Newburyport, Massachusetts (CON) and the Town of Hampton, New Hampshire i (T0H).

1.11. The Town of Merrimac, Massachusetts (TOM) and the City of l

Haverhill, Massachusetts (C0H) participated pt rsuant to 10 CFR 9 2.715(c),

but presented no evidence.

1.12. In addition, although not a party as such, the Federal I l

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) filed testimony and participated in the hearing as contemplated by the Meinrandum of Understanding between the NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)andFEMA. Memorandum of l

Understanding, 50 Fed. Reg. 15485, 15487 (Apr. 18, 1985) (M00). As also contemplated by the regulations and the MOU, FEMA conducted a review of the offsite radiological emergency plans for Seabrook, and the graded exercise thereof, and reached a conclusion that the plans, including the SPMC, were adequate. More specifically, FEMA found and concluded that, subject to the installation of a vehicular alert and notification system (VANS) for the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ, M and enhancements to the alert and notification system for the New Hampshire portion of the EPZ, I

1/ VANS is a matter which is within the jurisdiction of another Licensing Board, and, therefore, is not dealt with in this decision. The Board notes, however, that all VANS issues were recently decided in Applicants' favor. See Public Service Co.

of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-17, -

29 NRC --- (June 23, 1980), appeal dismissed (Aug. 1, 1989).

the plans and preparedness will be adequate to protect the health and

. safety of the public living in the Seabrook EPZ by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency and are capable of being implemented.

Letter, Peterson to Stello (Dec. 14,1988), App. Ex. 43A. See also App.

Exs. 43B-43F; Donovan Dir., ff. Tr. 21653 at 3; Tr. 21651.

1.13. The Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) was involved throughout the FEMA review and concurred in all reports filed. Tr.  ;

19092-93.

1.14. A FEMA reasonable assurance finding is based on four " legs." .

Theseare(1)reviewoftheplanagainstNUREG-0654orNUREG-0654, Supp.1, as appropriate, (2) test of the plan in an exercise and an evaluation of that exercise (3) verification that equipment, personnel and resources are actually there, and (4) verification that the personnel ..

have been trained. Tr. 18498-99, 18502.

1.15. FEMA thoroughly reviewed all facilities and equipment to be utilized to implement the SPMC. Tr. 19108-09.

1.16. In addition, FEMA reviewed the results of the graded exercise of the radiological emergency response plans for Seabrook. App. Ex. 43F, passim.

1.17. The overall conclusion reached by FEMA in evaluating the June 1988 Seabrook exercise was that the exercise demonstrated that the SPMC and the emergency plans for the State of New Hampshire and the State of Maine can be implemented. Donovan Dir., ff. Tr. 21653 at 3; Tr. 21651.

1.18. These FEMA findings constitute a rcbuttable presumption that all aspects of the Seabrcok offsite plans and emergency preparedness

. are adequate and capable of implementation, except as otherwise specifically noted by FEMA. 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2).

1,19,--in-additioni-FEMA-findings-eenstitute-a-rebuttable-presumption to-the-effeet-that-where-FEMA-did-net-deem-4t-neeessary-te-leek-at-seme ,

issue-er-aspeet-of-the-plans-and-exere(se-and-make-a-f4nding-with-respeet therete,-then-ne-review-ef-that-matter-4s-neeessary-te-make-the-requis4te adequaey-and-reasonable-assuranee-finding, 1.20. FEMA reviewed the SPMC on what is referred to as a " Mode 2 full" basis; that is to say the assumption was that the nonparticipating governments would only delegate authority, but no resources or assistance would be given to the ORO to execute the plan. Tr. 18422. The graded exercise also was conducted on the basis of Mode 2 full. Tr. 22384-85.

1.21. Because FEMA found SPMC to be adequate in this mode, and because it can be assumed that any response which included assistance and/or resources from The Commonwealth would be better than a response by the utility OR0 alone, FEMA believes, and has found, that the SPMC operating in Mode 1 (0R0 contributing resources and personnel only), or in any Mode between Mode 1 and full Mode 2, would also provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook. Tr. 18432, 18442, 18444-45, 18459-61. In addition, the graded exercise, conducted as Mode 2 full, demonstrated the implementability of the SPMC in other modes.

Mede-1-er-Mede-2 2 partial," Tr. 22389 22387-89.

1.22. FEMA also has found that, even though The Commonwealth's responders may not be familiar with the SPMC, the SPMC contains adequate  ;

i plans, procedures and liaison personnel to permit necessary explanations 1

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to be made to The Commonwealth's responders at the time of an emergency.

1 The ability of ORD to provide that function was evaluated during the i exercise and found to be adequate. Therefore, it is FEMA's finding that I

any lack of familiarity with SPMC on the 'part of The Commonwealth is .

adequately compensated for and has no adverse effect on the reasonable )

assurance finding with respect to operations in any mode less than Mode 2 full. Tr. 18471-73.

l 1.23. By agreement of the participants in the hearing, the litigable issues were tried by various subject matters as follows:

Evacuation Time Estimates Traffic Management Plans Evacuation of Transit Dependent Persons Personnel and Training Protective Action Recommendations Generation Communications / Notification Protective Actions For Particular Populations Evacuation Equipment and Facilities Coordination of Governmental Resources and Response Exercise Contentions With Respect to SPMC New Hampshire Exercise Performance.

These findings and rulings follow the above categorizations.

1.24. Hearings were held on 58 days in Boston, Massachusetts, on March 21-23, 27-31, April 5-7, 10-14, 18-20, 24-28, May 15- 19, 22-26, 30-31. June 1-2, 5-9, 12-16, 19-23, and 26-30.

1.25. The Board finds and rules that Applicants have made a sustained, good faith effort to secure and retain participation of the

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. pertinent state and/or local governmental authorities, including the furnishing of copies of its emergency plan. Tr. 18842-43, 18974, 19011, 21062, 21207, 21400, 21550-51, 22412, 22597-98; App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr.

22702, Attach. D; App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 7, 8 and Attach. F; Tr. 23669.

1.26. The Applicants' inability to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 9 50.47(b), to the extent any such inability exists, is wholly or substantially the result of the nonparticipation in emergency planning by The Commonwealth and its political subdivisions. Tr. 16849-52, 18842-43, 18974, 19011, 21062, 21207-08, 21400, 21550-51, 22412, 22597-98; App. Reb.

No. 23. ff. Tr. 22702, Attach. D; App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 7, 8 and Attach. F.

2. EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES 2.1. FINDINGS OF FACT 2.1.1. A total of three contentions, JI-1 through JI-3 raised issues as to evacuation time estimates (ETEs). Joint Intervenor (JI)

Contentions on the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities (SPMC) and the June 1988 Graded Exercise (Draft of July 5, 1989) (hereafter

" Contentions Memo.") at 1-6. In support of these contentions, MAG introduced the testimony of Dr. Thomas J. Adler, Adler Dir., ff. Tr.

26482, passim.

2.1.2. Dr. Adler had a number of complaints about the SPMC ETEs. First, although he realizes they were generated by the same model and methods and by the same firm that did the NHRERP ETEs, he was concerned that this is not stated in the SPMC, and that there is not a

complete write-up as to how the study was done, including a description of- the assumptions, inputs and data utilized in preparing these ETEs --

which Dr. Adler claims is necessary both as a matter of law and to make l .the plan workable. Adler.Dir., ff. Tr. 26482 at 3-8. .

2.1.3. Dr. Adler detailed where in Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654 he attributed a basis for his view that the SPMC must contain, such a write-up. Tr. 26486-88. In none of these references was there language that requires the ETE report to be part of the emergency plan itself.

See Tr. 27177. Thus, Volume 6 of NHRERP, upon being republished in an organized manner, as discussed infra, would does afford compliance with i the requirements guidance of NUREG-0654, App. 4 which Dr. Adler is 4

concerned about. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 27150 at 4, 9; Tr. 27177, 27180, 27182.

2.1.3.1. Staff witness Dr. Thomas Urbanik, while finding the ETE analyses to be adequate, indicated that an organized presentation of the ETEse including assumptions and methodology, should be prepared, so that the SPMC ETEs could readily be use,i by decision-makers at the time of an emergency. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 27150 at 9. Dr. Urbanik further stated that with the exception of the need for such an organized presentation, the existing ETEs satisfy the guidance of NUREG-0654, Appendix 4, and all applicable regulatory requirements. Id. In Dr. Urbanik's opinion, no further analytical work is required; and the preparation of this organized presentation of ETEs is essentially an editorial or " ministerial" task.

Tr. 27179-80.

2.1.4. Nevertheless, Applicants have committed to publish a revised evacuation time study in the future. This update will document

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l all ETE inputs and assumptions, including those described in Applicants' Direct Testimony No. 7, ff. Tr. 5622 and Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 16. App. Reb. No. 16. ff. Tr. 26681 at 3. See also Tr. 27184, 27187.

2.1.5. Dr. Adler listed eight matters which he believes will ,

affect ETEs and were not accounted for in the original ETE studies for the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ. These are: (1) the fact that this Board has found that 31,000 cars is the " reasonably expectable peak occupancy" and 35,000 cars is the " expectable maximum peak occupancy," which are higher numbers than that used in the NHRERP study; (2) the access control points (ACPs) will not be activated for two hours after the Order to Evacuate (OTE), and traffic control points (TCPs) may not be manned

'immediately in a fast-breaking accident; (3) the fact that SPMC TCPs and ACPs may be manned by Traffic Guides instead of police; (4) the configuration of certain TCP/ACP diagrams has changed; (5) the use of VANS as opposed to fixed pole sirens; (6) the a_n alleged change of j_nn Applicants' position as to the extent of shadow evacuation; (7) the fact that the Massachusetts beaches will not be closed until the site area emergency level, as opposed to the alert level; and (8) the EPZ popula-tions are-larger have grown since 1986. Adler Dir., ff. Tr. 26482 at l

8-12. It should be noted that the foregoing criticisms were actually '

directed to superceded ETEs. I,_d,. at 3, 13. See also App. Reb. No. 16, ff. Tr. 26681 at 3; Tr. 26506.

2.1.6. In addition, Dr. Adler gives a number of reasons for his belief that the realistic ETEs for the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ should be larger longer than those set out in the SPMC. These include:

the fact that civilian Traffic Guides will not be as efficient at handling .

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the traffic as trained police officers would be; and his view that the number of cars which will travel in the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ i

has been underestimated for various reasons; Adler Dir., ff. Tr. 26482 at

. 15-21. He also decried the lack of transit depende_nt and special facility ETEs, M. at 21-25, and the lack of a beach population monitoring system, M.at25-29.

2.1.7. Dr. Adler's reasons for why civilian Traffic Guides would~not be as efficient at handling traffic as police officers are l simply beliefs which do not hold up objectively under careful analysis.

Tr. 26490-95. The Board finds no reason to believe that trained civilian traffic guides could not perform their tasks with substantially the same efficiency as police officers, Tr. 26462-63, nor is such training likely to be difficult or lengthy. Tr. 26312-14. Moreover, Dr. Adler indicated that even thre use of untrained guides would result in only a small increase in ETEs. Tr. 17114-15.

2.1.8. His assertions as to the effect of the VANS reflect an I ignorance of the requirements of NUREG-0654 and, specifically, of the 15-mir/fte notification requirement. Tr. 26496.

2.1.9. Similarly, allegations that the ETEs should account for purported notification delays associated with VANS are also without basis.

The VANS has been designed to comply with the same regulatory requirements for a prompt notification system as was the fixed siren system. App. Reb.

No. 16. ff. Tr. 26681 at 35.

2.1.10. Dr. Adler's shadow evacuation assertion (in the range of 56%, as contrasted to the Applicants' 25-50% shadow evacuation assumptions) even if true, admittedly does not allege anything likely to have a e

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significant effect on ETEs in many cases.- Tr. 26497. See also Tr.

26505-06;. App. Dir. No. 7,'ff. 5622 at 40, 44; Tr. 6638-42.

2.1.11. Moreover, even assuming all his concerns were valid, Dr. 'Adler views the result, at maximum, to be a one-hour addition to a .

10-hour ETE in the longest scenario (a summer day with sudden rain), a 10%

addition; he provided no estimate of how his concerns would affect ETEs in shorter, less problematic, evacuation scenarios; and he was unable to think of any Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) which would be affected thereby. Adler Dir. ff. Tr. 26482 at 20-21; Tr. 26498-502.

2.1.12. As to the beach population monitoring system to identify real-time indicator values, this is an idea first brought up during the NHRERP phase of-the hearings. Tr. 26502-03. Dr. Adler agrees that no such system has been required or employed at any other plant.

Tr. 26503. Furthermore, there is no assurance that such a system is feasible. By " feasible", it is meant that the accuracy and reliability of

.the data collected,-and of the inferred estimate of beach area vehicle population, satisfy reasonable criteria under all circumstances and represent significant improvements relative to estimates based on time of day, day of week and weather conditions. Even if it were feasible, it -

does not appear to offer any incremental benefit or to constitute a material improvement over the current SPMC procedures for determining ETEs such that the PAR decision process is materially affected. App. Reb. No.

16, ff. Tr. 26681 at 53-61. Staff witness Urbanik agreed that there is no need for any real-time monitoring system. Urbanik Dir. ff. 27150 at 8-9; Tr. 27164-65, 27170.

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j 2.1.13. On the question of ETEs, the Applicants presented a panel of two witnesses: Edward A. Lieberman (Qualifications ff. Tr. )

i 17318), and Anthony M. Callendrello (Qualifications ff. Tr.17318). App. )

Reb. No. 16 ff. Tr. 26681, passim.

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2.1.14. The Board finds these witnesses to be competent to testify with respect to the subjects they addressed. i 2.1.15. Applicants have explained in detail the assumptions which they have utilized as to roadway capacities and population inputs.

App. Reb. No. 16 ff. Tr. 26681 at 4-26. The Board finds these assumptions to be reasonable.

2.1.16. Applicants t.lso explained, in detail, the assumptions which had been utilized in modf ang the vehicles that will travel ,

southbound on Route 1A from St.; W )ok Beach into Salisbury Beach. App.

Reb. No. 16, ff. Tr. 26681 at 29-31. The Board finds the assumptions and parameters used are reasonable. In particular, the assumption that the overriding motivation of evacuees is to leave the area at risk as quickly as possible appears to the Board to be reasonable. Tr. 26744-45.

2.1.17. Applicants have made sensitivity runs to see if the ETEs would be affected by a slower-than-assumed evacuee mobilization, as would be the case if persons were confused by conflicting EBS messages; these runs indicate that while there are some limited differences in the internal distribution of evacuation time, there is no overall impact on l the ETE. App. Reb. No. 16, ff. Tr. 26681 at 31-33.

2.1.18. Allegations that the ETEs should assume New Hampshire beaches are closed prior to the Massachusetts beaches are misplaced.

l Although the NHRERP and the SPMC provide for consideration of closing the 1

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beaches at the Alert and Site Area Emergency, respectively, the ETE i planning basis scenario begins at the Site Area Emergency. "The Trip

' Generation Time Distribution for.the beach areas has its origin point l (i.e., time zero) at the time of the announcement of the Site Area .

Emergency.(assumed to be concurrent with the Alert level)." NHRERP, Volume 6, page 4-17., Under this scenario both the NHRERP and the SPMC q

[ would provide for consideration of beach closure at the initiation of the  !

accident. App. Reb. Nc,16, ff. Tr. 26681 at 34.

Allegations that the ETE planning basis should account 2.1.19.

for hypothetical delays associated with the involvement of Massachusetts officials in the PAR development process are without basis. The ETEs contained in the SPMC are referenced to the OTE and do not include the i-times between notification or an order for " beach closure" and the OTE; this was done because beach closure may precede an OTE by hours and possibly days in a given situation. Thus, any small incremental time increase required for Massachusetts officials to make a PAR decision would delay the OTE. It would not affect ETEs. App. Reb. No. 16, ff. Tr. 26681 at 35. See also Urbanik Dir. ff. 27150 at 5; Tr. 27151-53.

2.1.19.1. If the New Hampshire beaches are closed substantially earlier in time than Massachusetts beaches, Massachusetts decisionmakers would still have a considerable amount of information available to them upon which to make a very informed judgment as to how the ETEs would be affected for their portion of the EPZ. Tr. 27124; Tr. 27157; T.r. 27164-65; see also Urbanik Dir ff. Tr. 27150 at 7-9. Moreover, it is undisputed

- that the ETE planning basis for 25 minutes between an EPZ-wide beach closure and the OTE was accepted by Massachusetts officials. Tr. 27119-21.

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r 2.1.20. The ETEs include reasonable estimates of roadway i-capacity and represent the evacuation conditions expected under the implementation of the SPMC's traffic control plan. App. Reb. No. 16, ff.

Tr. 26681 at 35-36. See also Urbanik Dir. ff. 27150, at 3-5, 6-7. ,

2.1.21. With respe:t to the allegation that the ETEs are unrealistic because they do not reflect delays in the staffing of TCPs, the Applicants have made a thorough study of this question and have revised the ETEs as a result thereof. The results indicate that there is little impact on ETEs between the staged arrival of Traffic Guides and when they are immediately available at the outset of the evacuation. App.

Reb. No.16, ff. Tr. 26681 at 36-48. Staff witness Urbanik agreed that the ETEs are realistic and that adequate consideration has been given to potential TCP staffing delays. Urbanik Dir. ff. 27150 at 4-5.

2.1.22.. The SPMC's ETEs provide all of the necessary information and parameters to allow proper selection of a representative

'ETE for determination of PARS. Local conditions and the location of traffic impediments could vary widely. It is not possible nor prudent to attempt to analyze in advance every situation which could occur during an emergency evacuation. App. Reb. No. 16 ff. Tr. 26681 at 48-49; Urbanik Dir. ff. 27150 at 7-8. The Applicants have provided an understanding of the sensitivity of the ETEs to a variety of conditions, consistent with the guidance of NUREG-0654, Appendix 4, and there is no n'eed for any further enumeration of potential evacuation scenarios. Urbanik Dir. ff.

Tr. 27150 at 7-8.

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'2.1.23. In particular,' the Board finds that the number of ETEs

. generated, and:the regions'and scenarios for which they are generated, are

' sufficient and correctly limited to a reasonable number so _as to be usable by a decisionmaker fairly quickly and not be overly cumbersome. Tr. ,

1 26707-08, 26714-15; Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 27150 at 7-8.

2.1.24. The ETEs, as updated, and subject to their being published in an organized presentation, are adequate for PAR decision making for the following reasons:

1. The ETEs were calculated using a state of the art methodology and are as accurate as reasonably achievable.

2. The ETEs provided to the PAR decisionmakers are for an adequate number of scenarios which account for the most predominant conditions and variables normally experienced in the Seabrook EPZ.

3. The ETE scenarios in the SPMC are the same ones used in the NHPERP, which the Board concluded were adequate for PAR decisionmaking.

4. The ETEs prove to be relatively insensitive to roadway impediments and expected variations in beach area population.

5. PAR decisionmakers are alerted to consider emergency-specific conditions which may direct additional logistical considerations for added flexibility.

6. Under most conditions, evacuation would be the preferred PAR for the Seabrook EPZ.

7. There is no evidence to support the argument that further refinement of the ETEs would make a further contribution to public protection.

_____________._._____________..m.______________________.__m__ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _

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6' - App., Reb. No. 16. ff. Tr. 26681 at 52; see also Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr.

27150 at 7d.

2.1'. 25. The revised ETEs presented by the Applicants in App. l

. Reb. No. 16. ff.-Tr. 26681, Attach. D, will be incorporated into the SPMC. .

App. Reb. No. 16, ff. Tr. 26681 at 3.  !

2.1.26. ' Applicants have explored the need for. and usefulness of. ETEs for.special populations. App. Reb. No. 16. ff. Tr. 26681 at 61-67.

2.1.27. The only way that ETEs for each special population group and special facility would be of any use is if comparisons of dose savings afforded by evacuation and sheltering were calculated for each and every facility and population group in the area implementing the PAR.

This approach would require not only ETEs but sheltering dose reduction factors for each special facility and population group within the area of interest. This is an impractical, unreasonable and time-consuming

approach to making a PAR. A r . Reb. No. 16. ff. Tr. 26681 at 62.

2.1.28. Even if this information was available, recommending PARS on a group-by-group or facility-by-facility basis is not likely to provide any additional dose savings for_the special populations. The only situations where making a PAR on a facility-by-facility basis could even have the potential for increased dose savings is if one assumes that the special facility ETEs a.ae substantially longer than those for the general population, evacuation is recommended for the general population and the dose reduction factors for special facilities are better than those for the gene ~ral population. However, even in a situation where these three hypothetical assumptions are all true, evacuation would still remain the

._L.--. - -___I_ ._ . . _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ - _ - _ - - . _ - . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . - _ . _ _ - - - - _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - . - _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ -

' preferred PAR. This is because the only other alternative would be to shelter, and this is the action the special populations would be taking prior to the time when transportation arrives to assist with evacuation.

Thus, the special facility population would already be receiving the dose. ,

savings from sheltering. When the transportation arrives, this population

. group would then evacuate. This trip out of the EPZ under this hypothetical situation would be at normal travel speeds'due to post-evacuation uncontested conditions. Thus, the trip would take approximately 15 minutes or less to reach the EPZ boundary. App. Reb. No.

16, ff. Tr. 26681 at 62-63.

2.1.29. In fact, the special facility ETEs are comparable to those for the general population, thus eliminating any need to consider -

separate PARS for special facility populations. App. Reb. No. 16, ff. Tr.

26681 at 63, 64-67. See also Tr. 21231-33; Tr. 22596-97. Dr. Urbanik agreed that adequate consideration has been given to special facility ETEs. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 27150 at 7.

2.1.30. Given that the special facilities and special populations PARS are comparable to those of the general public, the SPMC l will provide for special consideration of these groups. The SPMC will be revised to incorporate e priority list for allocating evacuation vehicles to all special populations. This list vill indicate which population category should receive resources first and the sequence in which i

facilities within each category will be serviced. Specifically, schools ]

and day care facilities would be assigned vehicles first, followed by the transit dependent general population routes, curbside pickup (homebound)

. routes, special facilities and then hospitals. When there are multiple I

j

facilities within a category, the facilities which are closest to Seabrook would be serviced first followed by those that are further away. This assignment priority ensures the most efficient use of transportation resources. Thus, the SPMC takes all appropriate steps for maximizing dose reduction for EPZ special populations. App. Reb. No. 16, ff. Tr. 26601 at 63-64.

2.1.31. For fast-breaking scenarios (such as are considered in ,

the ETE), the Applicants will use an expedited bus mobilization procedure.

For this scenario the ORD will utilize the Northern Essex Community College as a forward staging area. This procedure will results in buses being mobilized in a time frame comparable to that assumed in Volume 6 of NHRERP. App. Reb. No. 16, ff. Tr. 26681 at 65- 66; Tr. 27099.

2.1.32. The fact is that for Seabrook, because PARS will be generated largely based on plant conditions, and because of the uncertainties associated with predicting accident sequences and eventst a PAR other than evacuation is unlikely except in a very small number of scenarios. Tr. 27072-74; Tr. 27126-27. And, indeed, it is doubtful that even a difference of as much as one and one-half hours in a_n ETE could affect any PAR choice at Seabrook. Tr. 26933-34.

2.1.32.1. Dr. Urbanik testified that the Applicants' ETEs account for the specific circumstances, difficulties and delays which might exist in' conducting an evacuation in the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook EPZ. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 27150 at 3. Further, Dr. Urbanik stated that the ETEs are realistic, Id. at 4-5, and that no significant errors exist in the ETEs' assumptions as to the number of vehicles that will be using roadways, intersections and ramps in Massachusetts or as to

l I

the number of vehicles that may be expected to evacuate from and through .

Massachusetts. Id. at 6. l 2.1.33. Staff-witness-Der-Themas-Weban4k-test 4ffed-thats-4n-his judgments Based on his review of the SPMC ETEs, and his evtensive ,

knowledge of the Seabrook EPZ and of Seabrook ETE modeling efforts which i

have been made over the past years (see e.g., Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 i at 2-3), Staff witness Dr. Urbanik concluded that no further ETEs are were necessary, Urbanik Dir., ff. Tr. 27150 at 2-3, 9; Tr. 27167; Tr 27170; Tr. 27180. and-that-there-was-ne-need-fev "real-time -ETEs,-Urban n 4k-94re, i

fir-Ter-27159-at-8, l 2.1.34. Indeed, Dr. Urbanik stated that "the sensitivity of the 1 i

Seabrook EPZ [is known] in a way that's unseen any place else in the l world." Tr. 27170.

2.1.35. Dr. Urbanik did suggest a compilation of the data and what amounted to an updating of Volume 6 of NMRERP, Urbanik Dir., ff. Tr. i l

27150 at 4, 9; Tr. 27180, and Applicants have committed to do this, Tr.

27184, 27187; App. Reb. No. 16 ff. Tr. 26681 at 3. See PFF 2.1.3.1 and 2.1.4, supra. With this provision, however, the SPMC ETEs are fully j consistent with NUREG-0654, Appendix 4, and comply with all regulatory requirements. rbanik Dir. ff. 27150 at 9.

2.1.36. The ETEs in the SPMC do not explicitly consider i commuter traffic flows, just as was the case with respect to the ETEs in the NHRERP litigated earlier. The Board retained jurisdiction over this subject in the PID issued with respect to NHRERP, and we address it now.

2.1.36.1. The question of what impact returning commuters have {

upon the ETEs is only of concern in connection with the prospect of early

beach evacuation involving large transient populations; for all other scenarios, returning commuters may be assumed to have no significant impact upon the ETEs. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 27197 at 1-2; Tr. 27202-03.

2.1.37. Dr. Adler testified for MAG that the modeling of ,

commuter trips is possible as a modest extension of the ETE work done to date. Adler Dir., ff. Tr. 26484 at 1 (13), 9-?.0 (1125-26). Yet he told this Board, in another context, such modeling was "very difficult." Tr.

17010. See also Tr. 26509-11. Subsequently, he stated: "[t]o model all origins and all destinations of all commuters . . . isn't fiasible." Tr.

28208.

2.1.38. Dr. Adler stated that consideration of commuters could only increase ETEs, Tr. 26511-12, but he also revealed that he has no sound analytical basis for saying that consideration of commuters will, in fact, result in ETE increases which have any significance to dcc);1on-makers. Tr. 26517-48 26512, 26514-18.

2.1.39. Dr. Urbanik testified that such modeling was extremely difficult and, in his judgment, unnecessary for Seabrook as of this time.

Urbanik Dir., ff. Tr. 27197, passim. As explained by Dr. Urbanik, proper modeling of returning commuters would require an extensive revision and expansion of the matrix of origin and destination points, as well as a substantial expansion of the number and direction of routes included in the roadway network; would require knowledge of the actual or likely routes that would be used by returning commuters, as well as their days and hours of employment; and would necessitate modeling of the interaction between returning commuters and evacuees at critical intersections, which is beyond the capability of any existing models. Moreover, this

unprecedented and complicated effort is of no practical utility, since there is no reason to believe that returning commuters could have a significant impact on the ETEs for Seabrook. -Urbanik Dir. ff. 27197 at l

2-4; Tr. 27195-96, 27198-201, 27204; Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 27150 at 7. ,

See also Tr. 17089.

2.1.40. Applicants presented a well-reasoned analysis of the entire commuter modeling concept, which included sensitivity runs, and I

which concluded that an expenditure of the necessary extensive effort and resources to treat commuter traffic explicitly cannot be justified on the basis of material improvements in ETE accuracy. App. Reb. No. 16 (Supp.),

ff. Tr. 28135, passim. These sensitivity runs produced changes in the ETEs of no more than a few percentage points. Id. at 35-36, 39.

2.1.41. MAG witness Adler presented a piece of rebuttal testimony to the Applicants' analysis wherein he stated that the modeling done by Applicants' witness was sound (Tr. 28205), and to the extent he disagreed with the assumptions, he made no claim that there would be any .

increase in ETEs in excess of that which the evidence (as to ETE I

variables, generally), Tr. 26933-34, shows would result in no change in ]

PARS. Adler Reb., ff. Tr. 28198, passim; Tr. 28213-14.

2.1.42. Dr. Adler made clear that certain ETEs referenced at page 6 of his Rebuttal Testimony simply represented a redistribution of the source of the "last person out" of the region being modeled. Tr.

28201. He did not mean to imply that a large increase would necessarily be shown if one modeled individual towns with and without commuters.

Tr. 28201. See also Tr. 28229-30. Moreover, he conceded that these projected times assumed that all " returning commuters" were employed at

c the time an OTE was issued, without regard to the fact that their~ work.

hours and days of employment are staggered -- which of course would decrease the actual number of commuters at any given time from that modeled, with a correspondingly lesser impact on the ETEs. Tr. 28227-28, ,

-28166-69..

2.1.43. It seems that what Dr. Adler wants is to have all ETEs

' presented not only for the regions which will govern PARS, but also for various areas within the entire region, and, in particular, for the Massachusetts portion of the region being evacuated, Tr. 28219, 28252-53, although he is vague as to what use such information'would have in a real emergency and admitted he wasn't sure it would be useful at all, Tr.

'28231-36, 28240-41 28241. Indeed, it is unlikely that such a presentation would have any practical utility, given the likelihood that New Hampshire towns:and beach areas-(in closer proximity to the plant than Massachusetts areas) will evacuate -- by order or voluntarily -- before or as soon as an OTE is issued'in Massachusetts. Tr. 28232-33, 28237-38.

2.1.44. In short, it appears that commuters can affect a given ETE only slightly, if at all.

2.1.45. The Board finds that with the additional demonstration

~

and sensitivity studies now provided by the Applicants, returning commuters have been adequately accounted for in the Seabrook ETEs. No further analysis or revision of the ETEs to. account

• for returning commuters is required. See also Urbanik Dir. ff. 27197, passim; Tr. 27202-03, 28170.

2.2. RULINGS OF LAW 2.2.1. An ETE should not reflect a worst case scenario, rather, it should reflect realistic conditions so that it is of use to the J

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i

- 26 '

decisionmakers; for an ETE to be too conservative in its assumptions is'as detrimental as it would be for all assumptions to be made in a highly unconservative' manner, Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-845, 2t; NRC 220,.246-(1986); Philadelphia

~

Electric Coz, (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC479,491(1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-25, 22 NRC 101, 106 (1985).

2.3. CONCLUSIONS 2.3.1. .The' Board finds and rules that, subject only to the publication of an organized presentation of the ETEs, including methodologies and assumptions, as those ETEs have now been refined during this litigation, the Applicants have provided an adequate analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations as required by 10 CFR 50 App. E, 5 IV.

2.3.1.1. The Applicants' republication of the ETEs in an organized manner, reflecting the revisions arising from this litigation, shall be presented to the NRC Staff for verification, consistent with NRC practice. See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 494-95 (1986); Id., ALAB-808, 21 NRC 1595, 1600 (1985); Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1103-07 (1983).

1

3. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PLANS 3.1. FINDINGS OF FACT l

3;1.1. Two contentions were litigated which deal with the area

-of traffic management. These are: JI-4, which raised overall questions

as to the adequacy of the personnel, traffic control strategies, and the clarity.of the traffic control diagranis in SPMC, and JI-5, which raised .

issues as to the handling of surveillance and removal of road blockages.

Contentions Memo. at 6-10. In addition,"JI-7A raised questions as to the traffic control strategy for Plum Island. Id. at 11.

3.1.2. Turning first to JI-4, the basic contention is that SPMC is so poorly designed and so inadequately staffed that there is no reasonable assurance that an evacuation will proceed as efficiently as possible and, therefore, there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. Specific issues are raised in the bases as to the sufficiency of nur..bers of traffic control personnel, capacity enhancing measures and other traffic control strategies, problems that may occur in the event that a certain "Gillis Bridge" is closed to traffic to permit passage of boats,' and alieged inadequacies of particular traffic control diagrams. Id.

3.1.3. FEMA has made findings that staffing of SPMC is adequate. App. Ex. 43C at 13 [ global 31]. FEMA has also found that the plans for ACPs and TCPs are adequate. App. Ex. 43C at 66-67 [ global ,

85-86]. 4 3.1.3.1. The development of a traffic management plan is not i l

a regulatory requirement. However, NUREG-0654, Appendix 4, permity applicants to develop special traffic rranagement plans to effectively utilize available capacity. NUREG-0654, Appendix 4, at 4-5. In addition, applicants are instructed to provide " specific recommendations l

for actions that could be taken to significantly improve evacuation times." Id. at 4-10. As explained by Staff witness Dr. Urbanik, who was a principal author of Appendix 4, the purpose of traffic management planning in conjunction with radiological emergency planning and preparedness is (1) to provide a mehns to identifs and plan for those actions which could be taken to significantly reduce evacuation times in the event of ~a radiological emergency, thereby providing the lowest reasonably feasible evacuation times, and (2) to make the most effective use of available traffic management resources. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr.

26337 at 4. See also Tr. 26456.

3.1.4. MAG's lead witness with respect to this contention was Dr. Thomas J. Adler. Adler Dir., ff. Tr.16952, passim.

3.1.5. Although he ultimately commended SPMC's general strategy, philosophy and " realism," Tr. 17144-45, and viewed the majority of the TCPs as properly designed and located, Tr. 17072, 17141-42, 17144-45, Dr. Adler criticized the design and planned operation of certain of the TCPs and ACPs (TCP B-SA-06, TCP B-AM-06, ACP GT-2, and ACP HA-4) in his evaluation of the traffic management plan in the SPMC. Adler Dir., ff. Tr.16952 at 4-9; Tr.17142. These criticisms, in the main, were made on the basis of criteria set out in the Manual on Uniform j Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) which Dr. Adler asserts to be the proper standard by which to judge such posts in a radiological emergency plan, i

Adler Dir., ff. Tr.16952 at 3-4. However, MUTCD is clearly a document I t

which sets out criteria for traffic control devices in general, not traffic management plans of the nature here involved. Tr. 16962. While the principles set forth in the MUTCD may be of general relevance to 0 1

- 29'-

4

- proper traffic management design, compliance with the MUTCD is not a-regulatory requirement. See Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 3-4,16; -

' Tr. 26448-49; Tr. 26465.. Dr. Adler made no attempt to analyze the SPMC against NUREG-0654 (and was unaware of any guidance in NUREG-0654 in this ,

regard),Tr. 16966-67, even though NUREG-0654 does set out general traffic management plan criteria. See NWREG-9654,-App,-4-6-111 Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 3-4.

3.1.6. In addition, Dr. Adler recommends the use of reflectorized barricades, as opposed to non-reflectorized traffic cones, 6t' certain " key" TCPs and ACPs. Adler Dir., ff. Tr.16952 at 9. He also criticizes certain procedures, and instructions and diagrams for ambiguity, Adler Dir., ff. Tr. 16952 at 10-11. Finally, Dr. Adler claims that the SPMC traffic management plan's provision of traffic

- guides at three critical intersections (TCPs D-HA-02, B-SA-06 and B-AM-06) results in longer evacuation times than would result if those ,

intersections were left unstaffed. Adler Dir. ff. Tr. 16952 at 5-6 and Figures 1 and 2.

3.1.7. MAG also offered the testimony of TOS Acting Police Chief Frank Beevers. Beevers Dir., ff. Tr. 17217, passim. Chief Beevers' testimony is a description of the congested conditions normally encountered in TOS on a sunny summer weekend afternoon, from which he .

concludes that an evacuation in TOS on a busy weekend sumer day would require the use of over fifty trained police officers to handle traffic (many spaced every 100 yards along major evacuation routes), and opines that the small number of Traffic Guides assigned the task in SPMC cannot l

do the job adequately. Beevers Dir., ff. Tr.17217 at 5-18. I_nn 1

l

{-

addition Chief Beevers urges the use of barricades rather than cones, L which he asserts will be knocked over by evacuating vehicles. Id. at 17. .

3.1.8. Chief Beevers admits to no expertise as a traffic engineer, Tr.17231, or competence to draft or review traffic management plans, Tr. 17232; Tr. 17254; Tr. 17255-56. Chief Beevers had never participated in'an evacuation of all or part of the town, Tr. 17258; nor was he able to express an opinion as to whether the number of personnel provided by the SPMC traffic management plan would be adequate.

Tr. 17257-58.

3.1.9. Interestingly enough, Chief Beevers did testify that as late as three years ago, TOS handled the problem of beach traffic congestion by utilizing three officers to control traffic in Salisbury

, Square, which is the location of the TCP which SPMC proposes for the same 1

l purposes -- and which the SPMC will staff with six traffic guides.

Compare Tr. 17231, 17241-42, with, App. Reb. No. 9, ff. Tr. 17333, Attach. A.

3.1.10. T0A presented the testimony of its- police chief, Michael A. Cronin. Cronin Dir., ff. Tr. 16267, passim.

3.1.11. In his testimony Chief Cronin makes the following allegations relative to the issues arising under JI-4: he and his 1

officers did not cooperate in the drafting of the SPMC as it affects T0A; the drafters of SPMC did not properly take into account the heavy influx

- of transients that occurs during certain summer and holiday periods in T0A; the diagrams of certain specific T0A TCPs contain errors and in general lack sufficient clarity; the designs of TCPs in SPMC, in general, are not good; there is a need for Traffic Guides (and presumably TCP l -

l

___m_ .i____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

l diagrams) at an additional 20 intersections in T0A; it is wrong to use traffic cones, as opposed to repositioned concrete barriers (which he says would also be useless without repositioned trained public safety officers _ to put them in place with a advance warning of an (minent radielegfeal emergency); and, finally, OR0 does not have sufficient staffing to properly manage traffic and clear obstructions. Cronin Dir., ff. Tr. 16267 at 3-1215.

3.1.12. It should be noted that Dr. Adler endorsed the views of' Chief Cronin and other local officials as to their suggestions as to additional TCPs, Tr. 17148-49, but he did not appear to have much by way of an independent basis for doing so, Tr. 17150-52.

3.1.13. Under cross-examination, Chief Cronin, who initially claimed that his testimony was entirely of his own input, Tr. 16275-76,

but later indicated that, in some respects, his testimony was not based upon his personal knowledge, but, rather, on what counsel had told him, Tr. 16396-97, see also Tr. 16375-78, admitted to no experience in town-wide evacuations. Tr.16278, Tr.16372, his experience being confined to the evacuation of houses in neighborhoods such as for gas leaks, Tr.

16279. He admitted that the use of concrete barriers is cumbersome and {

creates its own set of problems, Cronin Dir. ff. 16267 at 13, Tr.

16367-68, Tr. 16401-02 16402, and also stated that if.all of his I

i suggestions with respect to the plan were adopted, the result might be a safer evacuation, but there would be no significant increase or decrease

]

in evacuation time Tr. 16403.

3.1.14. [ Moved to f 3.1.43.1] ]

i 1 ,

i g

l

L

--32~-

~

'3.1.15. TOWN" sponsored -testimony _ of its Superintendent of Streets, Albert Knowles, and Sandra- Raymond, a member of its Board of' j

' Selectmen. -TOWN.Dir., ff. Tr. 16621, passim. Neither of these- 'l

. individuals.had any experience or training in emergency planning. Tr. ,

i

46624 16623-24.-

_3.1.16. . With respect te the. issues arising under JI-4,_ TOWN's ,

witnesses made the_ following~ allegations: certain specified TCP diagrams

~are confusing or inadequate; certain TCPs are poorly-designed for the purpose intended; TCPs are needed at an additional eight intersections and

at three facility entrances; 35-40 additional Traffic Guides and 18 additional traffic cones are needed; traffic control devices shiuld be pre-positioned; there is an alleged lack of parking spaces for emergency personnel at certain locations; and traffic allegedly will be blocked by

' disabled or improperly parked vehicles, due to a lack of parking space for traffic guides-or t-end the existence of certain narrow roads (s-noted.

' TOWN Dir. , ff. Tr.16621 at 3-12.

3.1.17. TON, wherein the area known as Plum Island is located, sponsored testimony by its Police Chief Roger Merry and the Chairman of its Board of Selectmen, Angelo Machiros. TON Dir . ff. Tr. 17801, passim. d With respect to the issues arising under JI-4, the following allegations are made: there are large traffic jams on sunny summer days on Plum Island and 6-10 Traffic Guides assisted by a police cruiser with flashing lights would be necessary to control the situation on the Plum Island S rnpike in the event of an evacuation, as opposed to the one Traffic Guide called for in SPMC, and therefore, SPMC would result in an evacuation of Plum Island that was no more rapid or efficient than an

uncontrolled evacuation; there are c rors in the diagrams of certain specified TCPs; and there are an additional 131 cps needed in addition to those now called for in TON by SPMC. TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 4-13.

Their testimony also indicated that the only road leading off of Plum Island (the Plum Island Turnpike) is sometimes impassable due to flooding.

Id. at 3.

3.1.18. Under cross-examination Chief Merry was unable to say whether his suggested changes to the SPMC TCPs or the inclusion of additional TCPs would result in lowering the evacuation time or that his plan was any better than the SPMC. Tr. 17860, 17863; Tr. 17876-77. His criticisms with respect to the SPMC TCPs also stemmed, in part, from h4s erreneous-assumptfen a fundamental misunderstanding on his part that the plan assumed the blockage, rather than the " discouragement," of certain traffic movements. Tr. 17866 17865-66. In addition, it became apparent that his opinion that TCPs could not be established was not grounded in any belief that cars would be moving too fast for a Traffic Guide to obtain control, but rather his belief that drivers simply would not obey the Traffic Guides. Tr. 17869-72. Staff witness Urbanik sees no difficulty in the concept of Traffic Guides establishing control after they arrive at an assigned eengested intersection which has already become congested. Tr. 26443. Moreover, Plum Island is successfully cleared during normal congested traffic conditions without the use of any traffic guides whatsoever -- despite TON's claim that many traffic guides should be required, TON Dir. ff. Tr. 17801 at 4; and traffic I

congestion from the Island following an earthquake was successfully j i

handled with only minimal traffic control. Tr. 16511-15, Tr. 16521. l i

_ _ _ _ _ _ _____- -_____ ________ _ a

- 34'-

3.1.19. CON submitted the testimony of its City Marshall.

Francis E. O'Connor. O'Connor Dir., ff. Tr. 16458,' passim. In this testimony, Mr. O'Connor made the following allegations: CON's police department did not participate in the drafting of SPMC; he opines that the' ,

use of concrete barriers repositioned in the field would be a preferable traffic control device to cones; he criticizes various TCP diagrams and designs;.he opines that additional Traffic Guides should be provided at various designated TCPs and that there should be a Traffic Guide at all intersections involving a major thoroughfare in CON; he points to a certain conglomeration of schools and a hospital which would be difficult for buses to reach in congested traffic; he states that CON does not have the police resources itself to execute SPMC and concludes that an evacuation carried out pursuant to SPMC would be no more (and possibly

-less) efficient than the-equivalent-efs-and-na-better-thans an uncontrolled evacuation. O'Connor Dir., ff. Tr. 16458 at 3-12 4-19.

3.1.20. On cross-examination, the Marshall O'Connor, while adhering to his position that the use of traffic cones was totally' unacceptable, Tr.16486, Tr.16492, because of their easy movability, Tr.

16523, admitted that his next choice, wooden saw horses, also were easily moved Tr. 16529-30. He also could not account for the similarity between )

his testimony and that of Chief Cronin and opined that if it were identical in any respect, it was coincidence, Tr. 16473, although he did define at least one common term in the prefiled testimony, " breakdown",

differently than Chief Cronin, compare Tr. 16373-74 with Tr. 16503. He also admitted that the plan approach which he was advocating would require hundreds of officers, which he agreed would not be practical, and that it I

r. ,

i -

)

would be impractical to use concrete barriers, as his direct testimony 4 had strongly rec 1mmended. O'Connor Dir. ff. Tr. 16458 at 4-5; Tr. 16520.

3.1.21. In response to all of the fore _ going witnesses' testi-mony, Applicants submitted testimony by a panel of witnesses consisting of Stephen M. Baldacci (Qualifications, ff. Tr. 17318), the Emergency j Planning Technical Issues Coordinator of NHY; Anthony M. Callendrello (Qualifications, ff. Tr.17318), Manager of Emergency Preparedness j

Licensing of NHY; Edward B. Lieberman (Qualifications, ff. Tr. 17318), j President, KLD Associates; and Dr. Dennis S. Mileti (Qualifications, ff.

Tr.17318), Professor of Sociology and Director of the Hazards Assessment Laboratory, Colorado State University. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at  !

1-46.

3.1.22. The Board finds these witnesses to be competent to l testify on the subjects they addressed.

3.1.23. The Applicants' Traffic Management Plan is to be found in Appendix J of SPMC. App. Ex. 42, Appendix J.

3.1.24. The primary objective of traffic management is to support emergency evacuation operations to ensure an adequate and efficient evacuation from the area of concern. To support this objective j it is necessary to recommend evacuation routes and implementable traffic control str.ategies to utilize efficiently the available roadway network capacity. In some instances, control strategies which enhance existing roadway capacity can significantly expedite evacuation traffic movements.

l Since such treatments are frequently resource-intensive, they should be J limited to those locations which offer the greatest potential benefits.

Thus, a well-designed traffic management plan identifies the most l

1

effective control strategies, quantifies the resulting benefits, and balances these benefits with the available resources to define the most effective and implementable plan responsive to the stated objective. App.

Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 1. 1 3.1.25. The SPMC traffic management plan was the result of an extensive recursive and iterative process which the Applicants' witnesses summarized succinctly for the record. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 2-5. Fine-tuning of the traffic control plan continued until no material improvement in ETEs was obtained. Id. at 4-5. See also Urbanik Dir. ff.

Tr. 26337 at 6-7.

3.1.26. TCPs in the SPMC are designed to perform e number of functions: (1) facilitate evacuating traffic movements which serve to expedite travel out of the EP2 along the planned evacuation routes; (2) discourage traffic movements which permit evacuating vehicles to travel in a direction which takes them significantly closer to the power station; and (3) resolve potential conflicts between traffic streams at intersections by assigning right-of-way so as to promote safe operations and to keep traffic moving. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 6.

3.1.27. The number of Traffic Guides assigned to each TCP and ACP was determined based upon the complexity of the point's traffic strategy, the location's general configuration, and the type of equipment assigned for use. Police Chiefs in the Massachusetts EPZ communities were requested to provide input on the traffic routing, TCP and ACP strategies, and how many personnel and what equipment would be required to implement I l

the desired strategies. Detailed inputs to the design of the traffic l I

control plan were received from five of the Police Chiefs (all except that

of the TOA) during interviews Mr. Lieberman conducted with them and

-through subsequent correspondence. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 6-7.

See also App. Ex. 50; Tr. 17451,.Tr. 17464-66.

3.1.28. The number of Traffic Guides at each TCP was minimized to the number required to implement its control strategy in an efficient-manner, in order to avoid confusion and conflict between guides. Tr.

17443; see also Tr. 17153-54. .The Board finds that the SPMC provides' an adequate number of traffic control personnel. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 9; Tr. 26449-50; Tr. 26456. Nor is the SPMC traffic management plan constrained by any lack of necessary resources. Tr. 26381-82, Tr. 26456.

3.1.29. Questions were raised by Dr. Adler as to the control policy utilized for the intersection of Routes 1, 1A, and 110 in TOS Center. This policy is illustrated on the diagram for TCP B-SA-06. App.

Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333, Attach. A.

3.1.30. The original control policy developed for this intersection was to facilitate both the westbound travel along Route 110 toward I-95 and I-495, and the southbound travel along Route 1. App. Reb.

No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 7. The police chiefs in TON and CON, however, objected to this policy. Id. at 7-8; see also Tr. 16968-69. They q believed that Route 1 would be congested with evacuating traffic from Salisbury Beach to the extent that evacuees from CON and TON would be unduly delayed as a result. To respond to these concerns, the traffic control policy at Salisbury Center was revised and took its present form, whereby all traffic is routed over two lanes along westbound Route 110 to I-95 and I-495. This revised policy was reviewed with the then TOS Police Chief (Chief Olivera), who approved it and stated that the town police j

could implement it. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 8. See also, Tr.

16963-69.

3.1.31. This change, as were all changes suggested by Police Chiefs, was made only after Mr. Lieberman satisfied himself that the effect of the change requested would be either neutral or beneficial to the evacuation time estimates for the areas affected and any other areas closer to Seabrook. Tr. 17453-54; Tr. 17460-61.

3.1.32. The TCPs from a draft of a Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) for The Commonwealth, which The Commonwealth has stated the State Police would look to for guidance in the event of a real emergency, have also been utilized in formulating the SPMC. App. Reb. No.

9 ff. Tr.17333 at 8. See also Tr. 17671.

3.1.33. As noted earlier, a number of Intervenor witnesses have testified to their belief that additional TCPs to those provided for in the SPMC are necessary. However, the Board finds that while additional TCPs might be helpful in providing reassurance to evacuees and in assisting traffic rnovements, they would have a minimal impact on reducing evacuation times. Placement of additional TCPs at non-capacity constrained locations would not further expedite evacuation traffic flow because traffic demand is less than capacity at these locations.

Placement of additional TCPs at capacity constrained locations could potentially expedite local traffic flow. However, this benefit is minimal if this expedited flow encounters a more restrictive bottleneck downstream; in such an event, gains that are realized locally would be canceled at the more restrictive locations. Because the existing plan accounts for the restrictive locations that have ultimate control of the l

traffic flow, the placement of additional TCPs elsewhere would not reduce the ETE. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr.17333 at 9-10; Urbanik Dir., ff. Tr.

26337 at 5-6, 9, 13-16. See also Tr. 17112-13. Indeed, the SPMC provides more TCPs than are actually required. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 .

at 18; Tr. 26452-53, 26464.

3.1.34. Complaints have been made as to the setup of certain TCPs in T0A. T0A's Police Chief rejected a request to provide input and did not participate in the development of the town's traffic plan.

Accordingly, the TCPs and Traffic Guide requirements for the T0A were determined by KLD Associates. The resulting SPMC traffic plan designed for the T0A specifies 9 TCPs staffed by 17 Traffic Guides. This is adequate for this town. It is interesting to note that the June 13, 1986, Amesbury Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, App. Ex. 44, developed by T0A's Civil Defense Director and state officials, which plan has been used by T0A's Civil Defense Director, Tr.16763; Tr.16770, and would be I used by him in the event of an emergency today, Tr.16768; Tr.16832-33,  !

specifies only two TCPs for evacuation of the entire town. App. Reb. No.

9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 10 and Attach. B; App. Ex. 44, Annex M; Tr. 16750-54.

1 Both of these TCPs are included in the SPMC. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. l 17333 at 10-11; see also Tr.16818.

3.1.35. Allegations have been made, as noted earlier, to the effect that additional TCPs are necessary at schools and other facilities.  !

The Board finds that, while traffic control at these locations might assist the ingress and egress of vehicles to these facilities, such assistance would not influence the ETE. While the absence of such traffic control might delay, somewhat, vehicles evacuating from these facilities, i

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.: 40 other evacuating vehicles in the. traffic stream'would benefit accordingly, and.there would not be an effect on ETE. Thus, placement of Traffic Guides at these locations would not provide any systemic benefits and would constitute a wasteful use of emergency response.' resources. App.

Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 11-12.

See also Urbanik Dir., ff. Tr. 26337 at 92 13-16, 18; Tr. 26452-53; 26464.

I 3.1.36. The Board also finds that suggestions for the need for vehicles with flashing lights at TCPs are unwarranted, and would not provide a material improvement in either the traffic management plan or the ETEs. may-lead-to-mere-eenfusion-rather-than-fae444 tat 4ng-traff4e eentrol-at-T6Ps, ' App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 12; Urbanik Dir. ff.

Tr. 26337 at 17. The Traffic Guides' wearing of special safety vests and their planned use of flashlights are sufficient to command motorists' attention. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 17.

' 3.1.37. It has been suggested that Traffic Guides will be tied up by people seeking information, and thus, will not be able to do their primary job of facilitating traffic movement. However, with a view to this problem, the Traffic Guides are instructed not to have any long  ;

J conversations with drivers, but rather to tell them to tune their radios to the EBS stations for information. Tr. 17439. In addition.

Applicants' witnesses testified in some detail concerning the procedures for manning TCPs, and, in particular, the procedures for handling inquiries of various kinds from the public so as not to be distracted from their main tasks. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 28-31.

3.1.38. In sum, the traffic management plan represents the -

combined contributions of 5 of the 6 incumbent Massachusetts 1

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I l municipalities' police chiefs at the time of development. The plan has I

been thoughtfully and carefully designed to implement effective control strategies to support the evacuation process. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr.

17333 at 12-13; Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 18-19. .

3.1.39. Applicants have addressed various complaints with i

respect to the TCP and ACP diagrams, both of a particularized and a general nature. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 13-16. Additional diagram revisions were suggested by Dr. Urbanik. Urbanik Dir, ff.

Tr. 26337 at 10-11. Such particularized errors are not fundamental flaws in a RERP as that term has been defined in NRC jurisprudence, Id. at l 10-11, 18-19, Tr. 26403; and, in any event, Applicants have committed that any errors or material improvements in the TCP and ACP diagrams identified by the interveners or through subsequent field surveys as part of the annual update process will be corrected and incorporated into the diagrams. Specifically, all priority 1 and 2 TCPs and ACPs will indicate a minimum of 3 cones (instead of 2) for all " discouraged" directions of travel. In addition, the diagrams will be refined so that all elements are drawn to a reasonable scale, and so that clarity of exposition is improved. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 17. The needed revisions to the diagrams can easily be made, and do not constitute a deficiency in the plan. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 11,18-19.

3.1.40. The Applicants also agreed to correct specific errors identified in the TCP and ACP diagrams and have provided additional details on the proposed diagram upgrades. Tr. 16343-44, 16349-50, 16355-56, 17000-92, 17439-4142, 17606-07, 17715, 27050. App. Reb. No. 9, ff.Tr.17333at14-1615-12 I

3.1.40.1. In addition, the Applicants should review the traffic control diagrams to be certain they provide at least 2 traffic cones for each lane of traffic sought to be discouraged, and more than two traffic cones per lane where the road pavement is in excess of .

12 feet per lane, such as skewed intersections or roadways with i shoulders, in addition, they should consider whether it is appropriate to provide any additional cones at each TCP and ACP to handle potential contingencies. Urbanik Dir, ff. Tr. 26337 at 9-10.

3.1.41. As noted earlier, criticisms have been leveled at the l

SPMC because of the decision to employ traffic cones instead of b6rricades at TCPs and ACPs. However, the Board finds that traffic cones, suitably reflectorized as indicated by Applicants, App. Reb. No. 9, ff. Tr. 17333 at 17, 20, provide a highly visible means for alerting and channelizing traffic, and will be an appropriate and adequate traffic control device for short-term control of emergency evacuation operations. App. Reb. No.

9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 17-20. The SPMC's selection of such traffic. control devices is consistent with the MUTCD, and is acceptable. Id.; Urbanik Dir. ff. 26337 at 10, 17. Moreover, no apparent benefit is afforded by the use of wooden barricades as opposed to cones. See Tr. 16529-30; Tr. 17093-94; Tr. 17266.

3.1.42. Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect, under a best-effort response, that State and local police will be available to assist with traffic and access control activities. Specifically, in addition to TCPs, police will likely assist in establishing and activating ACPs and in screening vehicles, when ORO guides are' instructed to do so l

approximately two hours after the OTE. In the process, use of the police j e

I----___--______-____.-_-__-_-.-.-.--______-_____.-._--._-_-.-___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ___ _. . - _ . ._ _ _ - - _ _

l cruisers' emergency flashing lights at ACPs would provide additional conspicuity for alerting approaching motorists. In addition, all State Police cruisers are equipped with microphones and loudspeakers which can be used to inform and guide motorists approaching the EPZ. The location ,

of the State Police Barracks in TON (off Scotland Road adjoining the interchange with I-95) would facilitate an expeditious response by State Police. Cruisers dispatched from.the barracks can reach ACP GT-2 within 5 minutes, and HA-4 within 10-15 minutes. For longer term control, it is reasonable to expect that the State Department of Public Works'(DPW) would be able to provide additional traffic control devices (e.g. barricades, arrow boards, advitcry and warning signs) for ACPs as specified in NHRERP, Volume 6, and the MUTCD. If these devices are not in the State DPW inventory, they can be requisitioned from other sources. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 20-21.

3.1.43. For a number of reasons, use of concrete barricades would be inappropriate and impractical for traffic operations in an evacuation. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 21-22.

3.1,43.1. Staff witness Urbanik believes that in most cases cones are preferable to barricades because of g e need for rapid deployment, flexibility in planning, and ease of implementation, and because they are consistent with the SPMC's goal of discouraging (but not prohibiting) vehicular passage. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 10; Tr. 26425-26. See also Tr. 26418.

3.1.44 NHY maintains an adequate number of traffic cones to support traffic control operations. The Applicants have determined that a A total of 615 traffic cones (including the amount necessary to

replace barricades) is required to perform traffic and access control functions. App. Ex. 42, Appendix J, a,t J-13. The ORO maintains a total of 800 traffic cones at the staging area for use at ACPs and TCPs. An additional 50 cones are available at the Emergency Worker Facility (EWF).

App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 22. Nonetheless, upon revision of the TCP arid ACP diagrams as discussed above in 11 3.1.39 - 3.1.40.1, the l Applicants should verify that this number of traffic cones continues to be sufficient.

3.1.45. Traffic Guides utilize their personal vehicles for transporting traffic control equipment from the staging area to TCPs and ACPs. TCPs and ACPs with large amounts of equipment generally require more than one Traffic Guide and the equipment is distributed among these guides accordingly. This procedure was adequately demonstrated during the 1988 FEMA evaluated exercise when Traffic Guides transported all required equipment to their respective TCPs and ACPs. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr.

17333 at 22-23 ano Attach. D.

3.1.46. Applicants have explained in detail the theory and methodology utilized for prioritizing the staffing of TCPs and ACPs, 3 as to provide staffing first at those points where their cctions can influence the ETEs, and at other points in descending order of importance.

App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr.17333 at 23-27; Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 8-9.

and The Board finds that the SPMC procedures allow for staffing of TCPs and ACPs prior to the onset of congestion (other than for beach closure) for all but very fast-breaking accidents. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 23-27.

- _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . ~ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . -

3.1.47. In response to TOWN's concern that "there are no plans providing for parking for emergency response personnel along roads in

[ TOWN] that have no provisions for off-street parking," it should be noted that there is no need for such plans. Traffic Guides will park their ,

vehicles in any location, for which there are many alternatives, out of the path of traffic. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 28; Urbanik Dir.

ff. Tr. 26337 at 16. See also Tr. 16649-54. TOWN's concerns as to street widths are rather limited, Tr. 16649-54, and do not establish any flaw in traffic management planning.

3.1.48. The Traffic Guide procedures and TCP/ACP diagrams which are used by the Traffic Guides to implement the SPMC Traffic Management Plan have been demonstrated effectively. The Traffic Guides participating in the 1988 FEMA Evaluated exercise met the objective of demonstrating the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. App.

Ex. 43F at 226 [ global 234]. Specifically, Traffic Guides at 34 ACPs/TCPs in the Massachusetts portion of the plume EPZ were interviewed by FEMA in the field and found to be well equipped and prepared for their mission.

Additionally, Traffic Guides from 16 ACPs/TCPs were interviewed at the Staging Area and the same finding was determined. During this evaluation the Traffic. Guides were asked to explain how their post was to be set up 1

and how they would implement the traffic control strategy. To do this the 1

Traffic Guides had to utilize the TCP diagrams. NHY Field Controller )

1 records indicate that all of the Traffic Guides who were evaluated )

answered these questions satisfactorily, Thus, the SPMC's TCP diagrams i and procedures are clear and understandable sufficiently so as to be I

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and implementable. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 31-32; Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 10.

3.1.49. It is possible under fast-breaking accidents that some evacuation routes may experience congestion prior to the time when Traffic .

Guides arrive at the TCPs. Under these conditions the Traffic Guides would have to establish the TCP's traffic control strategy in a congested traffic environment. While activating a TCP may potentially be more difficult under congested conditions than when traffic volume is light, it is not expected that the existence of congestion would preclude activation. It is quite common for police to establish control during congested conditions, such as at tic tchne of an accident. Evacuating traffic would be moving slowly under congested conditions. Motorists would cooperate with the Traffic Guides' efforts to establish control. In general, motorists would welcome the implementation of traffic control strategies which increase capacity or otherwise expedite evacuation movements. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 32-33; Tr. 26443.

3.1.50. Traffic Guides will be instructed to activate the ACPs approximately two hours after the OTE, providing that traffic volume has declined to the extent that the activity of screening motorists will not result in the formation of long queues of inbound vehicles. This provision is based on the analysis presented in NHRERP, Volume 6, which indicates that virtually all commuters will have returned home within two hours following the evacuation recommendation. The delayed staffing of ACPs avoids delays for returning commuters, and is appropriate. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 27150 at 7; Tr. 26433. Furthermore, other travelers, who will most likely be informed of the emergency by this time through EBS and l

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O other media messages, will avoid the area due to the potential risks.

App. Reh. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 33-34 3.1.51. Upon ACP activation, the Traffic Guides will screen vehicle occupants in accordance with their procedure. As discussed ,

previously, it is expected that State police will participate in this activity. If traffic volume remains high after the elapsed two-hour period following the OTE, such that the screening process creates long queues (approximately 20 or more vehicles), the Traffic Guides will temporarily stop the screening activities until the queue dissipates.

Once the queues dissipate, the screening process will resume. App. Reb.

No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 34.

3.1.52. The Applicants are to assure that the access control procedures in both the New Hampshire and Maine Traffic Management Plans are consistent with the current access control procedures. Tr. 26869-71.

3.1.53. Dr. Adler's argument, that the function of ACP screening procedures is inf'easible, does not appear to be supported by the statistics that he, himself, presented, as shown below:

"[A]Imost one vehicle per second will arrive at the northbound I-95 ACP . . . ."

"[A] total of over 5,000 vehicles will be generated at this point by returning comuters."

If one accepts these figures (which are by no means reliable, see Tr.17085-88), then 5,000 vehicles representing returning comuters arriving at the rate of one per second (3,600 vehicles per hour) implies that all commuters "during normal rush hour conditions" will return within 5,000/3,600 = 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. It is reasonable to expect that most of the-i

n .  !

initial. 5,000 inbound vehicles will be comuters, since discretionary travel into the area will be discouraged by the emergency conditions. In fact, Applicants' studies of the time distribution of commuters arriving home, App. Ex. 5, Vol. 6 at p. 4-16, Distribution B, indicates that 95 ,

percent of all commuters will have arrived home within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of the OTE.

This figure of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is consistent with the calculation of 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, above, since.some of the first 5,000 vehicles to arrive will not be comuters. Some commuters would, indeed, arrive between 1.4 and 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Thus, using the above figures negates the suggested assumption that these 5,000 commuters should be averaged over 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr.

17333 at 34-35.

3.1.54. Subsequent.to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the Order to Evacuate (OTE), few commuters remain to arrive, and there will be still fewer travelers who are unaware of the emergency and who will arrive at the ACP location. At this time of low traffic volume, see Tr.17018, it is reasonable for the ACP to be activated and for screening to commence.

Such screening at the anticipated low traffic volume levels will not cause large delays to those subsequently arriving vehicles whose occupants have j a valid emergency response function, and whose entrance to the EPZ will be i

facilitated. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 35. I 3.1.55. Dr. Adler's suggestion that the pour design of certain enumerated ACPs located on interstate highways will " disrupt" the evacuation seems to have little force in view of the fact that these ACPs are located on inbound barrels of the highways involved and thus, by j i

definition, will not affect outbound flow. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 i g at 35-36; Tr. 17029-33. Nonetheless, the traffic control diagrams for 1

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i two interstate highway access control points, ACP GT-2 and ACP HA-4, I should be revised to reflect a more gradual phase-in of traffic control measures and advance warnings, in order to lessen the potential for traffic accidents and increases in evacuation times for persons dependent j on vehicles or' drivers in the queue; and additional traffic cones should be provided'for this purpose. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 11-12; Tr. 26451; 27169-70. The Applicants have indicated their willingness to 1

make these changes. Tr. 26449.

3.1.56. Dr. Adler's criticisms of the ACPs also was based on the erroneous assumption that the ACPs will be activated coincidentally with the OTE. Tr. 17017. When this was brought to his attention, he agreed that this alleviated his concern about long queues at the ACPs.

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.Tr. 17017-18.

3.1.57. The Board does not share Dr. Adler's concern with respect to the TCP at the intersection of I-95 and Rte. 110 in T0A (TCP B-AM-06) because his concern does not account for the fact that there is an option for traffic to proceed west on Rte. 110, past I-95, and exit to I-495 and also because it appears to be based in part on a misunderstand-ing of the actual configuration of Rte. 110 at the interchange. App. Reb.

No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 36-38. See also Tr. 16976, 16979, 16983, 16990.

3.1.58. The Board rejects Dr. Adler's suggestions that the staffing of certain TCPs will result in longer evacuation times for certain portions of the Massachusetts section of the EPZ, because the computer runs which developed the data he relies upon were based on i assumptions, see Tr. 16947-51, at total variance with real-world conditions, i.e., desp4te,-and after, much evasion, Tr. 16992-99; Tr.

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17065,'he finally admitted that he assumed that certain TCPs which are priority one TCPs would not be staffed while others which are to be manned i much later in the relevant manning sequences already are staffed, aji reflected in vehicle turning percentages. Tr. 16999-17001; Tr. 17063-64; ,

Tr. 17139-4241. See also, App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 40-43.

Ultimately,'Dr. Adler conceded that his computer runs included numerous extraneous assumptions which increased the ETEs, and that they did not reflect a comparison between the SPMC and an uncontrolled evacuation.

' Tr. 17035-40; Tr. 17066; Tr. 17099-104. Dr. Adler, likewise after some evasion, Tr. 17004-9705; Tr. 17007-08; Tr. 17010-14, acknowledged that it

-would have been scientifically more appropriate to have modeled the comparative case on the basis that if the key TCPs he was addressing were unmanned, those which called for later manning should also be assumed to be unmanned. Tr. 17008-10; Tr. 17015. In addition, his analysis also assumed that, at the Rte 110/I-95 interchange, no traffic would elect the option of continuing west on Rte.110 to I-495, but would instead remain in a long queue awaiting access to I-95. Tr. 16981-82. This is simply unrealistic.. See Tr.16975-79; Tr.16981-90; Tr.17097; Tr.17105-06. He also artificially loaded exeess vehicles in transit onto the Salisbury Beach area, Tr. 16956-57, for which an appropriate (and similar) number of vehicles have already been accounted. See PID 11 9.103, 9.120.

3.1.58.1. Having considered Dr. Adler's testimony on this subject, the Board is fully satisfied that the SPMC traffic management plan will assist in lowering evacuation times below those that would pertain in an uncontrolled evacuation, and that the SPMC has taken -

advantage of every available opportunity to reduce evacuation times to i

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the greatest reasonably feasible extent. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 12, 18; Tr. 26429, 26430-31. See also Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 27150 at 7. ,

I 3.1.59. As to the allegations with respect to Gillis Bridge, it i is not expected that it would remain impassable for a long period of tima ,

l during an evacuation and even if it did, evacuation traffic would not be 1

substantially delayed or impeded. se-few-veh4eies-are-expeeted-te-have to-use-44-thatr-even-assum4ng-the-bridge-was-4mpassable-for-50-m4nutes-te an-heurr -the-evera44-evaevatten-time-wowid-net-be-extended, App. Reb.

No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 54-55. See also Urbanik Dir., ff. Tr. 26337 at 12.

MAG admitted on the record that any Gillis Bridge problems were easily solved. Tr. 17135-36.

3rir691--in-add 444ent-4f-the-bridge-was-lest-for-a-4engthy pe r 4 e d-ef-t ime-dw e-t e-me c h a n 4 sa 4 -f a 44 W re-e r-seme -e th e r-rea s e n t- t h e re-4 s suff4e4ent-flex 4b444ty-4n-the-5pMG-te-Fereute-the-nesessary-traff4e-se that-the-evaevat4en-44me-wesid-net-be-materfally-extended,--Appr-Rebr-Ner 9-ffr-Ter-17333-at-55-56, 3.1.61. Chief Cronin expressed concern that the SPMC did not properly take into account the heavy influx of transients that occurs during certain summer and holiday periods in T0A. Based on the l

Applicants' analysis, we conclude T0A's special events do not warrant consideration in the ETEs. App. Reb. No. 16, ff. Tr. 26681 at 16-18, 21-23; see also Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 9,14 3.1.62. Contention JI-5 raises issues as to whether SPMC has ,

1 l the necessary procedures and equipment to clear impediments blocking evacuation routes. Contentions Memo. at 9-10.

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3.1.63. FEMA has found SPMC to be adequate in this respect.

App. Ex. 43C at 67-68 [ global 86-87]. Staff witness Dr. Urbanik l similarly indicated that the Applicants' ETEs afford sufficient consideration to the removal of road blockages by tow trucks. Urbanik  !

Dir. ff. Tr. 27150 at 5.

3.1.64. The only direct evidence offered with respect to this contention by the interveners was offered by MAG and consisted of survey testimony demonstrating that there is in place a letter of agreement (LOA) for 15 tow trucks and 22 drivers to implement the SPMC. Mangan Dir., ff.

Tr. 19429, passim.

3.1.65. Applicants' panel of Messrs. Baldacci, Callendrello, Lieberman and Mileti also addressed this contention. App. Reb. No. 9 ff.

Tr. 17333 at 46-57.

3.1.66. Personnel at thirty-seven (37) TCPs and at any supplemental ACPs provide a readily available source of feedback information regarding impediments to evacuation traffic along prescribed evacuation routes within the Massachusetts portion of the plume EPZ. j These personnel will be in place during the evacuation regardless of weather conditions and time of day. These TCPs and ACPs are located at f interchanges and intersections along major evacuation routes, and Traffic Guides may directly or indirectly observe road impediments. Even if a i blockage occurs beyond their visible range, the effects would be observed by either a sharp decline of evacuating traffic or by having downstream

! traffic back up past their post (NHRERP, Volume 6, pg. 12-3). It is also 1

probable that a passing motorist will inform the Traffic Guide that a j blockage has taken place. Id. These Traffic Guides are instructed to

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contact the Evacuation Support Dispatcher via radio if traffic.is blocked or if there is no evacuating traffic. App Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 47; App. Ex. 42, Appendix J at J-3, J-5; see also Urbanik Dir. ff.

Tr. 26337 at 9, 18; Tr. 26417-18.

3.1.67. Traffic Guides are dispatched to their assigned TCPs and ACPs at the site area emergency classification. They are instructed to wait at the side of the road until notified that the point should be activated. However, even prior to the activation order, they are instructed to report traffic problems to the Evacuation Support Dispatcher. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 47-48; App. Ex. 42, Appendix J at J-2, J-4.

3.1.68. Moreover, it is highly likely that some evacuees will inform Traffic Guides of an upstream impediment, particularly if it

'.mpedes traffic. Tr. 17758.

3.1.69. Additionally, up to 20 Route Guides for backup notification of the hearing-impaired may be traveling roads within the Massachusetts portion of the plume EPZ while performing their emergenqy duties. They are instructed to report any obstacles, stalled cars or other impediments to traffic flow to the Evacuation Support Dispatcher via radio. App. Ex. 42, IP 2.11, Attachment 3, Item 3C. Route Guides for notification of the hearing-impaired are dispatched at a site area or general emergency classification, and at a sheltering or evacuation recommendation. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 48.

3.1.70. A total of 146 Route Guides are also assigned to buses to assist the evacuation of schools, special facilities, and the general population who are transit dependent. These Route Guides travel through

the Massachusetts portion of the plume EPZ and are instructed to report

.any obstacles, stalled cars, or other impediments to traffic flow by radio to the Staging Area Leader for those assigned to schools and special

~ facilities, or to the Transfer Point Dispatcher for those assigned to ,

transfer points. App. Reb. No. 9 ff, Tr. 17333 at 48; App. Ex. 42, IP 2.10, Attachment 3, Item 10.

3.1.71. Twelve Transfer Point Dispatchers are dispatched to the six Massachusetts transfer points (one transfer point for each town) at the Site Area Emergency classification. Two road crew vehicles (tow trucks)arealsoassignedtoeachtransferpointatthistime. Road crews are issued NHY OR0 radios upon arrival at the Transfer Points (App. Ex.

42, IP 2.10, 5.4.7H). These radios allow them to connunicate with the Transfer Point Dispatcher, Staging Area and EOC. Transfer Point Dispatchers are responsible for deploying road crews to identified road impediments. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 48-49; App. Ex. 42, IP 2.10, 5.4.

3.1.72. Aerial surveillance of road network impediments is available by helicopters during acceptable flight conditions. App. Ex.

42, . IP 1.3, Attachment 1; Plan, Appendix C, LOA for use of helicopters.

The helicopter pilot is briefed and dispatched by the Evacuation Support Coordinator or his designee. Communications are routed through the helicopter company, which maintains radio contact with their aircraft.

App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 49.

3.1.73. Traffic impediment, road construction, and flood information will also be available from local police and road departments via the local Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs). The six Local E0C

y Liaisons, who are to report to the local EOCs at the ALERT classification, maintain contact with the Local EOC Liaison Coordinator throughout i

l emergency operations. App. Ex. 42, IP 1.8. Any information on road 1

impediments is expected to be available to the Local E0C Liaison H . Coordinator. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr.17333 at 49.

3.1.74.. The Communication Coordinator at the NHY Offsite Response E0C monitors all communications on the Massachusetts Governmental Interface'(MAGI) radio system. The frequencies monitored include state and local public safety frequencies (App. Ex. 42 at 4.6-1). The Communication Coordinator keeps the Assistant'Offsite Response Director, Response Implementation, informed of important events-(e.g., traffic impediments) taking place as monitored from the Massachusetts communities (App. Ex. 42, IP 1.4, Attachment 2, Step 7). App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr.

17333 at 49-50.

3.1.75.- The SPMC Section 3.6.5 and IP 1.11 will be modified in future revisions to include reference to bridges as potential impediments to evacuation traffic. Specifically, IP 1.11 will be revised to have the State Liaison coordinate with the Massachusetts Department of Public Works to ensure continued operation of the drawbridges. Any problems with bridges would be reported to the Evacuation Support Coordinator in the EOC. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 50.

3.1.76. Communications procedures, as indicated above, call for field personnel to report traffic impediments via radio to the Evacuation Support Dispatcher at the Staging Area or to the Transfer Point Dispatchers at the transfer points. The Transfer Point Dispatchers ,

provide this information to the Evacuation Support Dispatcher. This s

information is then provided to the Staging Area Leader who informs the Evacuation' Support Coordinator in the E0C. Additionally, personnel in the E0C monitor all radio communications and they forward impediment p

information to the Evacuation Support Coordinator as it is received. App. ,

Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 50-51.

y 3.1.77. The Evacuation Support Coordinator, in conjunction with the Staging Area Leader, evaluates the impediment's impact on the evacuation roadway network. A road crew is selected to respond and a determination is made whether there is a need to reroute evacuation traffic (App. Ex. 42, IP 1.3, Attachment 1). In making the road crew selection, consideration is given to which crews are closest to the impediment and their respective direction of travel to respond to the impediments. The Staging Area Leader then has the Transfer Point Dispatcher contacted, via radio, to have the appropriate crew dispatched.

App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 51.

3.1.78. Following this, the Evacuation Support Coordinator and Staging Area Leader continue to monitor the road crew's progress in responding to the impediment. If the crew encounters delays, the situation is evaluated and additional crews are dispatched or other appropriate responses are formulated. After the road crew (s) complete I

their response, they are available to be dispatched via radio to other locations. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 51. .

3.1.79. The redundancy of the impediment response procedures i

(e.g., Staging Area Leader and Evacuation Support Coordinator concurrently j evaluating impediments; radio communications to road crews and other field personnel from both the E00 and Staging Area) provides flexibility to

ensure that an appropriate and coordinated response is formulated and implemented for road impediments under all scenarios. App. Reb. No. 9 ff.

Tr. 17333 at 51-52.

3.1.80. Any impediment, including localized flooding of ,

roadways, which is determined by the Evacuation Support Coordinator in consultation with the Staging Area Leader to have a significant impact on evacuation traffic flow, may require rerouting. This evaluation considers the impediment location, time of occurrence, extent of roadway blockage, estimated time to remove the impediment, and evacuation routes affected.

To implement rerouting, the Evacuation Support Coordinator and Staging Area Leader modify strategies at appropriate TCPs or relocate Traffic Guides to direct evacuees along the new route. Upon determination of the rerouting plan, the Evacuation Support Coordinator informs the Public Notification Coordinator for incorporation into EBS messages. App. Reb.

No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 52.

3.1.81. During the exercise two simulated traffic accidents were reported in the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ. One simulated accident blocked an onramp to a major evacuation route and Traffic Guides were reassigned to establish new TCP/ACPs in a timely manner. The second i

simulated accident required the dispatch of road crews to remove the I impediment. OR0 assessed and responded to both of these field problems i

correctly. App. Ex. 43F at 227 [ global 235]; App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. l 17333 at 52-53.

3.1.82. As noted earlier, TON takes the position that SPMC is i deficient because in the event of a flood, Plum Island Turnpike may become impassable. An impediment of this magnitude would be identified and i

l

_m _ _ _ _ _____________________;

i considered in the early stages of an emergency and responses would be formulated, coordinated, and implemented with the appropriate governing bodies. If the roadway remained impassable at the declaration of a General Emergency, that fact would be considered in the PAR development process. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 53. In any event, this potential for flooding does not constitute a flaw in the SPMC traffic managemant plan. See Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 13.

3.1.83. Allegations were made to the effect that a certain B&M Railroad Bridge located in Salisbury had the potential for having a large truck stuck in it. The clearance at the bridge is 13'3" which is higher than the vast majority of trucks and there are signs on the approach to the bridge warning of its clearance. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 56-57.

3.1.84 While it is thus highly improbable that a truck would become stuck under the bridge, the diagram for TCP B-SA-01 will be revised to include a note to the Traffic Guide that vehicles turning right (south) onto Route 1 should be limited to those whose height does not exceed 13'3". Tall trucks will either be directed to perform a U-turn using the store parking area in the northeast corner of the TCP and return westward on Route 286 or be instructed to proceed south on Route 1, turn right (west) onto New Toll Road (just north of the bridge) and proceed to I-95.

Reflecting the few vehicles potentially involved, this routing will not have any material impact on the evacuation times. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr.

17333 at 57.

3.1.85. Staff witness Urbanik stated ep4ned that while he believed certain refinements to it should be made as indicated above, i

which refinements are were easily ma'e,d the SPMC traffic management plan is adequate.and is consistent with the guidance of NUREG-0654, Appendix 4.

Urbanik Dir., ff. Tr. 26337, passim.

3.1.86. He also opined that the SPMC traffic management plan is one of_the most extensive in the United States and probably only one or two others are even comparable to it. Tr. 26389.

3.1.86.1. The Board finds that the plan takes advantage of

.available opportunities to reduce evacuation times to as great an extent as is reasonably feasible. Urbanik Dir. ff. Tr. 26337 at 18. Further, the SPMC traffic management plan utilizes appropriate and sufficient' capacity enhancing measures and other traffic control strategies; and the SPMC has identified those' actions that could significantly improve evacuation times, consistent uith NUREG-0654, Appendix 4. Id.

3.2. RULINGS OF LAW This Board adopts the ruling of the Licensing Board in 3.2.1.

Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 724 (1985): "There are accidents that could progress to'the general emergency stage before the E0C or staging areas could be activated, and that would allow inadequate time to go through i

LILCO's planned mobilization process before evacuation began. The Board can find no defect in planning, however, since complete and timely mobilization under those conditions is simply impossible. The consequences of a failure to mobilize LERO before evacuation begins are relatively small because an evacuation unaided by LILCO Traffic Guides could still be accomplished although it would take more time than the controlled evacuation." Additionally, as this Board has concluded on this

l. 1 same issue: "The staffing problem arises from a postulated rapidly

~ developing accident at the very end of the spectrum of accidents within l the NUREG-0654 planning basis" and "{t] hat particular accident sequence need not be isolated from all others for emergency traffic management purposes." PID 1 9.87. Further, this Board has recognized that evacuation would be implemented on an area-by-area basis and "an i

evacuation of only a portion of the EPZ, even in a fast-breaking accident, will ameliorate or eliminate the problem of limited police mobilization".

.I._d .

3.2.2. "There is no requirement under NUREG-0654 or under 10 CFR 6 50.47 that all emergency workers be in place before protective actions are implemented." Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick GeneratingStation, Units 1and2). LBP-85-14, 21 NRC 1219, 1352 (1985),

aff'd, ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479 (1986).

3.3. CONCLUSIONS 3.3.1. The Board concludes that the traffic management plan included in SPMC is adequate and implementable, subject to Staff verification of Applicants' TCP and ACP diagram revisions as discussed above.

3.3.2. 'The Board concludes that the Applicants have made sufficient provision for the detection, analysis and removal or avoidance of impediments during an evacuation.

61 - .

4. EVACUATION OF TRANSIT DEPENDENT PERSONS 4.1. FINDINGS OF FACT 4.1.1. Contention JI-7 is to the effect that the bus routes for transit dependent persons in TON, CON and TOWN are not the most .

expeditious. Contentions Memo. at 11-24. The bases for the contention contain a number of detailed allegations as to discrete problems with the routes shown in the SPMC.

4.1.2. FEMA has found the procedures for the evacuation of the j transit dependent to be adequate. App. Ex. 43C at 64-65 [ global 82-83].

4.1.3. The Superintentfent of Streets for TOWN, Albert Knowles, testified that there had ben no street signs at certain intersections on the bus routes; one sign is not easily read; certain streets on the bus i

routes are subject to flooding; that the bus transfer point is in a bad location, is too small, and is subject to being inaccessible in a i snowstorm; certain streets are subject to blockage during snowstorms; and, finally, he states that delays in the bus runs may result from the inadequacies previously detailed in the TCPs. TOWN Dir., ff. Tr. 16621 at 12-14 4.1.4. On cross-examination, however, the Superintendent admitted that for all except ene three of the intersections which he had identified as being unmarked, TOWN has subsequently either installed a 1

sign or has obtairied a sign to install. Tr. 16634-35. He also stated j that no persons reside along one of the road sections which he testified were subject to flooding. Tr. 16635-36.

4.J.5. Likewise the TON panel testified as to various ,

difficulties alleged to infect the four bus routes in the SPMC for TON.

--62 --

These include alleged congestion, misplacement of traffic cones, a lack of

'an alternative route if there is the reoccurrence of a washout on one route which apparently has occurred some time in the past, an alleged .

' inability of buses to cross Route 1, and the requiring ~ of difficult ,

maneuvers. It is also alleged that the transfer point is inadequate in size and lacks shelter. Finally,-it is stated that one of the evacuation routes includes'a nonextant road. . TON Dir., ff. Tr. 17801 at 13-16.

4.1.6.- Contention JI-7 was also addressed by CON witness E.

James .Gaines, CON's Director- of Planning and Development. Gaines Dir.,

ff. Tr.16552 at 1. Mr. Gaines criticized the selection of the Water Street Transfer Point in CON because it is located in a flood plain, and is too small in area. Gaines Dir. , ff. Tr.16552, passim.

4.1.7. Mr. Gaines admits to no expertise in emergency planning.

Tr. 165567. He also admitted, under cross-examination, that he had not examined the SPMC, but rather was testifying on the basis of what counsel for CON had told him the contents were. Tr. 16562-63. He did not bring ,

with him to the hearing the map he relied upon to determine the location l of the transfer point within the flood plain. Tr. 16585. 2_/ Nor was the map produced to Applicants prior to the hearings. Tr. 16566_8-69. The  ;

witness was unable, without the map, to determine whether other buildings  !

in CON '-- including a building located on the same street as the transfer

. point, which apparently is to be used by CON'as an emergency facility in a 2_/ Expert witnesses'in NRC proceedings are expected to have at hand enough of the background information to provide for reasonable i g probing of the ultimate opinions given. Virginia Electric and Power '

Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-555, ,

F NRC 23, 27 (1979). '

chemical spill -- were located outside the flood plain. Tr. 16584,5. As for his opinion that the transfer point is too small, Mr. Gaines admitted that he applied no standard whatsoever to the physical space available in .

order to reach that determination, and that, if he had applied the numerical standard he previously has used in his capacity as Planning Director,.then the space was big enough to accommodate 2,000 or more people. Tr. 16591-92.

4.1.8. In addition, CON witness Marshall O'Connor, charged that the bus routes only " skirt" the large centers of the city's population, and that the routes do not have sufficient TCPs. Like witness Gaines, witness O'Connor criticizes the Transfer Point. He says that it is too small, and requires difficult turns by the buses. O'Connor Dir., ff. Tr.

16458 at 12-14 19-24.

4.1.9. In response to all of the foregoing, Applicants submitted certain testimony by a panel of witnesses consisting of Stephen M. Baldacci (Qualifications, ff. Tr. 17318), the Emergency Planning Technical Issues Coordinator of NHY; Anthony M. Callendrello (Qualifications, ff. Tr. 17318), Manager of Emergency Preparedness Licensing of NHY; Edward B. Lieberman (Qualifications, ff. Tr. 17318),

President, KLD Associates; and Dr. Dennis S. Mileti (Qualifications, ff.

~

Tr. 17318), Professor of Sociology and Director of the Hazards Assessment Laboratory, Colorado State University. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 57-109.

,. 4.1.10. The Board finds these witnesses to be competent to serve as witnesses on the subjects they addressed.

4.1.11. Evacuation bus routes were initially developed for the six Massachusetts communities by emergency planners under the direction of Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency (MCDA) with input from EPZ planning contacts (e.g., local civil. defense directors, selectmen) in each of the .

six Massachusetts comunities. The routes were designed to start at the Local Staging Area (i.e., Transfer Point) and extend through the town to form a closed path while generally following the guidelines stated below:

a. No house would be more than approximately one-half mile from a bus route;

b. Buses would not back-track on the same route where possible; and

c. Buses, in general, would follow the directions provided at the Traffic Control Points.

In developing the SPMC bus plan, NHY relied on the bus routes developed by MCDA. Once the routes were designed, a field verification was done to ensure the roadways were correctly shown on the map. Due to changes in the locations of the transfer points (i.e., local staging areas), the evacuation bus routes were slightly modified. App. Reb. No. 9 ff.

Tr. 17333 at 58-59.

4.1.12. A comprehensive field study was conducted of the evacuation bus routes for all six SPMC communities between November 7 and 15, 1988. Standard full-size school buses were used for field verification of-the evacuation bus routes. The buses were 9'6" wide with both mirrors extended and 7'6" wide with mirrors retracted. Thus, at least 17 feet of road width (pavement plus shoulders) was needed for two buses to pass each other. The weight of the bus was 26,600 pounds when empty. The field study consisted of three separate runs. First, specific

roadways where potential problems had been identified through drill comments, exercise comments, and contention bases were driven with a bus to assess the existence or severity of the stated problems. Road ]

measurements, where appropriate, were taken at the observed narrowest point on roadways to determine if the road was wide enough to accomodate an evacuation bus and opposing traffic. Second, all routes were driven with automobiles to verify the information on the bus route maps regarding the existence of street signs, landmarks, roadway configuration and correct labeling of streets. A set of criteria was developed and given to the personnel to direct them in the method which should be followed when driving the routes. Third, all bus routes were driven with buses to verify that a bus could perform all turn movements and to record route distances. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 59-60 and Attachs. I & J.

4.1.13. As a result of this field survey, 4 out of the 26 evacuation bus routes were revised and then rerun to record route distances. An analysis was then performed to determine new bus route transit times, total trip completion times and the number of buses to be allocated to each route. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 60 and Attach.

K.

l 4.1.14 The Applicants have committed to certain changes in Bus l

l Route maps which will clarify and make them more uniform; Applicants have also comitted to certain route changes in light of the field surveys which have been done. App. Reb. No. 9 tf. Tr. 17333 at 60-63.

4.1.15. Applicants' panel testified as to how the bus transfer points will operate, how the estimates of transit dependent persons were made, and how the number of runs to be made was determined, the duties of

L L

the Route Guides and how the Route Guides will interface with the Bus Drivers. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 63-67. The Board finds all of these procedures and estimates to be reasonable.

1 4.1.16. Evacuation buses are not expected to encounter undue l delays when crossing heavily congested evacuation routes. The evacuating l

vehicles will permit the bus to get through. The amount of time spent by evacuees waiting in personal vehicles for the' bus to cross the evacuation l route will be minimal. The backed-up traffic will quickly rejoin the original line of evacuating traffic due to the fact that minimal forward progress would have occurred in the time span it took for the bus to cross the evacuation route. The evacuees will reason that the impact on their exiting the area would be insignificant. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 68.

l 4.1.17. During actual emergencies people abandon personal forms of identification and personal interests, and they identify with the entire human collective or community that is threatened. There is a dramatic decline in activities and behavior that run counter to the good of the collective and those that are based in individual or personal interests, and a dramatic increase in acts and behavior that bring people together and help one another. People respond by helping other human beings who are in need of help. This would include stopping to enable an evacuation bus to cross an intersection so it could pick up people in need of transportation. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 68-69. q 4.1.18. To evaluate the potential for area-wide flooding, flood l plain maps were obtained from the Flood Map Distribution Center in Baltimore, Maryland, for TON, CON, TOS, and TOWN. Flood plains are

classified into 1-year,10- year, 50-year, 70-year,100-year and 500-year intervals based on the expected occurrence of a major flood incident in the respective time period. The roadways identified in the Interveners' contention bases as problematic all fall into either the 100-year or 500-year floed ple.in intervals. This translates into the probability of 0.01 or 0.002 that major flooding will occur on these roadways in any year. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that these roadways will be rendered impassable by flooding concurrently with an emergency at Seabrook. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 69.

4.1.19. Due to certain weather conditions, evacuation buses might encounter sections of roadway that may be covered by water. An evacuation bus would still be able to traverse roads and pick up transit-dependent evacuees, depending on the level of flooding. Buses used in picking up transit dependent residents have a clearance of approximately 15 to 20 inches from the road surface to the tailpipe. This distance is the limiting factor for buses traversing flooded routes. If a segment of roadway which appears to be impassable due to local flooding or some other obstacle is encountered, the Route Guide is to contact the Transfer Point Dispatcher and, using the detailed route map (App. Reb.

No. 9, ff. Tr. 17333, Attach. L), determine alternate roadways available to rejoin the assigned route. The Route Guides will " report any obstacles, stalled cars, or other impediments to traffic flow . . . to the

-Transfer Point Dispatcher . . ." (App. Ex. 42, IP 2.10, pg. 26). SPMC j procedures call for the evaluation of constraints such as " road conditions, current weather conditions, and special evacuation problems."

If a significant rerouting is necessary, as determined by the Evacuation .

1

f Support Coordinator, Traffic Guides will be reassigned as necessary (App.

Ex. 42, IP 2.11 at 5, step 5.1.7). App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 69-70.

4.1.20. The evacuation of a school or special facility is ,

l- accomplished by dispatching all necessary buses with one Route Guide to the facility. This has been referred to as the use of convoys. Forming convoys of vehicles is a common practice in the military. The formation l of buses into convoys provides greater assurance that all buses will reach their common destination in a timely manner. Convoys will travel at posted or prevailing speeds, whichever is lower, subject to maximum speeds of 50 mph on the interstate highways and 45 mph on all other roads. Any difference in travel speed for a convoy relative to a collection of single buses has a negligible impact on response time. For example, the time difference to travel 60 miles at 50 mph Instead of 55 mph is less than 7 minutes. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 70-71.

4.1.21. Convoys of buses should encounter less difficulty than single buses when entering an EPZ during an evacuation. It is far more efficient to move buses through an intersection as a convoy than it is to move single buses. The competing traffic flow is interrupted only once by a convoy instead of multiple times for individual buses. App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 71. .

4.1.22. Finally, the Applicants' witnesses addressed the many-detailed bases admitted in connection with JI-7 in similar detail.

App. Reb. No. 9 ff. Tr. 17333 at 71-109. The Board finds that these bases have been fully and satisfactorily addressed by this testimony.

l 4.2. APPLICABLE PRIOR BOARD RULINGS 4.2.1. " Members of the public, without specific direction, would remove impediments to evacuation and other such tasks." PID f 7.96

-(subparagraph 7 at p. 173), 28 NRC at 750. .

! 4.2.2. "Any evacuation -- tornado, earthquake, hurricane or chemical: hazard related -- may. require evacuees to brave adverse weather l conditions." PID T 4.22, 28 NRC at 695.

l 4.3. CONCLUSIONS 4.3.1. The Board concludes that the bus routes in the SPMC, with the commitments which the Applicants have made on the record of this proceeding, are adequate for the purpose intended and are implementable.

l S. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING 5.1. FINDINGS OF FACT 5.1.1. A total of six contentions were litigated which dealt with the subjects of personnel and training. These were JI Nos. 9, 11, 12, 13, and 15 and MAG EX-14.

5.1.2. JI-9 raises the issue of whether there are in place sufficient procedures to execute SPMC in the event that an emergency occurs when one or more unions at one or more of the companies from whom ORO members are drawn are on strike. Contentions Memo. at 24.

5.1.3. FEMA has found that the ORD is adequately staffed. App.

^

Ex. 43C at 13 [31 global]. See also Tr. 18836.

5.1.4. No direct testiinony in support of this contention (JI-9) was filed by the opponents of the facility. MAG statt d that he ,would make

l his case on this contention by cross-examination of FEMA witnesses. MAG Trial Brief (2/21/89) at 8.

5.1.5. MAG did not cross-examine on this subject. Therefore, the rebuttable presumption of overall planning adequacy results in a .

finding for the Applicants with respect to this contention.

5.1.6. JI-11 and JI-12 raise the question of whether the SPMC provides for adequate staffing to sustain an emergency response and, particularly, whether there is sufficient manpower to staff a second shift. Contentions Memo. at 24-26.

5.1.7. FEMA has found SPMC staffing to be adequate. App. Ex.

43C at 13 [ global 31]. See also Tr. 18836, 5.1.8. Second-shift staffing for certain positions will be requested and supplied through Yankee Atomic Electric Company by means of the Yankee Atomic Mutual Assistance Plan. Second-shift staff will be briefed by the personnel they replace to the extent necessh y. App. Ex.

42 at 2.1-1, IP 2.11, IP 2.17, IP 3.2 IP 3.5, IP 2.9; App. J.

5.1.9. Vankee-Atemie-Eleetr(e-Gempany-has-an--exeelle4t techsteal-reputatien-threugheut-the-United-States. FEMA is confident that the personnel pool drawn from the Yankee Atomic Electric Co. is capable of providino individuals with the appropriate skills for a second shift. Tr. 19170, 22613.

5.1.10. These reserves, used to man staff evacuation specific second-shift positions, are personnel cepable of perforwing the required functions. The only training required for them at the time of an emergency would be orientation to the OR0, that is, as to where, when, and to whom they report. Information such as the specific report forms 1

j

f' ,

-utilized by the ORD for recording and reporting information and the

.particular equipment and techniques to be employed are supplied by ORO personnel when reserve personnel report to their assigned locations.

Donovan Tr. 19163-64,-19174-75, 19177 Tr. 22613 App. Cross Tr. 25512. ,

See also App. Ex. 42 IP.2.9 at 7,10; App. J at J-3 IP 3.5 at 4, 5 &

Attach. 2 at 3.

5.1.10.1. Mr. Donovan indicated that two shifts are planned for all monitoring personnel except for evacuation specific positions which only require one shift. Tr. 18683. SPMC Section 2.1.1, Figure 2.1-1.

5.1.11. FEMA witness Donovan testified that the Applicants-demonstrated shift change capability at both reception centers during the -

exercise, including shift change capability for evacuation monitoring positions. Tr. 18685, 19163. See also App. Ex. 43F at 240 [ global 248].

The replacement shift was well-trained and fully knowledgeable of their responsibilities. App. Ex. 43F at 239 [ global 247]. FEMA observed from the exercise that the Yankee Atomic Staff designated as the second shift

'for monitoring positions are as adequately trained as first-shift personnel. Tr. 18686, 18691, 19160. Personnel provided through the Yankee Mutual Aid Program would be drawn from a group of people who already have pre- identified skills and knowledge of radiation monitoring 1

equipment and other knowledge necessary to be able to perform designated tasks. Tr. 18688, 19126. See also App. Ex. 41 at 658, 662, 663. FEMA observed that the second shift was able to step in, receive a turnover shift briefing and use the instruments and demonstrate its proficiency

+ just as the first shift did. Tr.19164-65, Tr. 22613. FEMA witness 4

__-_._____m_m_._-m__________-__________________m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .-.__ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Donovan testified that the supervisors for the second shift have been pre-identified and trained. Tr. 18687.

5.1.12. MAG offered no testimony and elicited no statements involving personnel staffing which contradicted the rebuttable presumption ,

of adequacy arising from FEMA's evaluation. Tr. 18670-703, 19160-87.

5.1.13. JI-13 raises the issue of whether SPMC requires the proper prerequisite experience for certain of the positions in the ORO, viz., Traffic Guides, Public Notification Coordinators, PAR decisionmakers and Bus Drivers, although there is no regulatory requirement in this regard, and aise whether the training provided for those positions is adequate. Contentions Memo, at 27-28.

l 5.1.14. FEMA has found that the prerequisite experience l

required for these positions and the training provided are adequate. App.

1 1 Ex. 43C at 10-11 [ global 28-29],95-100 [ global 114-19].

5.1.15. As noted earlier, FEMA did not identify any deficiencies in the graded exercise; was-deffefeney-freet it is FEMA's basic view that a full participation exercise is the best method of testing whether training is adequate. Tr. 4602-03; Tr. 4074; Tr. 4088-89.

MAG witness Harris does not seem to contest this theory. Tr. 26199-205.

5.1.16. MAO's first witness on this issue was Dr. Howard i

Harris, Harr.is Dir., ff. Tr. 26156, passim.

3.1.17. Dr. Harris criticized the training given to ORO Traffic Guides, E8S message drafters, and PAR decisionmakers. Id.at4. He testified that the training program does not have " meaningful verbal learning situations," that the training program suffered from an imprecise definition of prerequisite experience for the three positions, a supposed

l lack of any overall instructional plan, the use of an approach of "short tenn recall," absence of " instructional linkages" between classroom and )

exercise, a lack of instructor training, and use of open-book tests. He concludes that the training is fragmented 4 end mu;t be totally revamped. .

Harris Dir., ff. Tr. 26156 at 5-14.

5,4,48,--Bre-Harris-seems-te-be-overstating-his-qua44ffeat4 ens te-some-extents-see-Tr,-261683-and-admitted-te-managing-a-prefeet-fer FEMA-and-always-reviewed-all-b(14s-in-cennectien-therewithi -Tr,-26159, wh4eh-bills-were-later-found-te-have-4neluded-devble-bi444ngsi-TP,-26176, 5.1.19. It appears that Dr. Harris, in the main, is complaining l of what appears to him to be a lack of documentation as to training program design rather than making an assertion that, in fact, the training program is deficient. See Tr. 26196, 26197, 26217. Specifically, he indicated that he had not seen a task analysis, Tr. 26218, although he did not dispute evidence that a task analysis had been completed.

Tr. 26197. Significantly, he did not claim to challenge the content of the training modules he reviewed. Tr. 26184, 26195-99. Indeed, he shared a concern expressed by a member of the Board that his testimony was the result of a superficial review limited to fevnded-en two fairly small sections, Section 6 and Appendix K of the SPMC without the benefit of a thorough review of referenee-te other materials that must have preceded l the drafting of the two sections. Tr. 26218.

5.1.20. A job analysis was performed in accordarce with Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) training development principles as the basis for the ORO training program. Tr. 27403-09. See also App. Reb. No. 20...ff. Tr. 27388, Attach. C.

-.74 -

5.1.21. As-te MAG witness Harris disagrees with the Applicant's 6

testing of ORO members through the use of open-book tests. Tr. 26220.

Applicants utilized this methodology to reinforce the use of procedures and position-specific materials by ORO members. Tr. 27520-23. ,

5.1.22. MAG's second witness on this contention was Dr. Adler who criticized the training given to Traffic Guides. According to Dr.

Adler there are two deficiencies in the training program. These are: (1)

.an absence of instruction on how to direct traffic efficiently, and (2) a lack of detail in describing the traffic control function.

Adler Dir. , ff. Tr. 26265 at 5. Dr. Adler was concerned that the Traffic Guides are not told the assumed cycle lengths (i.e., " green time") that are used in ETE calculations (75 seconds). ld.

d He further worried expressed concern that no formal instruction is given on hand motions.

Id. at 6. Another problem he suggests is that the Traffic Guides are not instructed as to the overall meaning of their post and thus do not know when ii. would be all right to hold up traffic to answer questions. d .

I_d at 6-7. Dr. Adler deer 4es complains'the-alleged-fast that there is no written instruction or training on traffic cone placement other than ACP/TCP diagrams. train 4ng-en-hew-te-place-traff4e-eenes. Id. at 7. He is concerned 'that there is allegedly no training on how to give details for an accident report; and.no instruction on when a Traffic Guide without a radio should leave his or her post to tell a Traffic Guide with a radio of a road impediment. Id. something. Finally, h_e also claims that suff4eient-er there is a 'need to have all Traffic Guides actually direct traffic flows at congested at-a-busy intersections as part of

l 1

their training in order to assure that they can do their assigned job.

Adler Dir., ff. Tr. 26265, passim. at 9.

5.1.23. Dr. Adler has had no hands-on traffic direction

. instruction which included hand signalling training but he nevertheless .

asserts that he has directed traffic and trained other individuals to direct traffic in certain situations as part of his business. Tr.

26266-67. He, himself, has no formal training in this area, Tr. 26302-03.

It should be noted that Dr. Adler believes one hour of classroom traffic management training would suffice. Tr. 26312.

5.1.24. The Traffic Guides are instructed to use their discretion and apply common sense in handling traffic streams in changing direction of flow; do not change too frequently; determine the length of l

flow by amount of back up heading in each direction and waiting time. Tr.

I 27423, 27451.

5.1.25. Dr. Adler's concerns that the Traffic Guides are not provided with instruction on the cycle lengths assumed in the IDYNEV model are not significant because the model's cycle length is arbitrary and is l

insensitive to differences between the actual " cycle length" representing the actions of the traffic guides and the 75 seconds used in IDYNEV. are ef-ne-sensequencer Tr. 26494-95. See also App. Reb. No. 16, ff. Tr.

26681 at 6-7.

5.1.26. MAG's third witness was T. Michael Carter who gave his

! view that the ORO Public Notification Coordinators are neither well educated nor trained. Carter Dir. , ff. Tr. 27546, passim.

5.1.27. This view of Public Notification Coordinators is based ypon deposition excerpts regarding the actions of a single individual in

1 I

l l

making modifications of prescripted EBS messages, who, admittedly, as i recognized by FEMA and Applicants, required more training in this area, but it fails to har6y demonstrates an overall inadequacy in the training of ORO Public Notification Coordinators. Tr. 27477-78. ,

5.1.28. Finally, MAG's witness Goble testified that there was insufficient training for the OR0 decisionmakers to provide assurance that they will issue proper PARS. Goble Dir., ff. Tr. 24125 at 21-22, 25-27.

5.1.29. Applicants presented a panel of witnesses on this contention consisting of Anthony M. Callendrello, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Licensing for NHY (Qualifications ff. Tr.17318); S. Joseph Ellis, Manager, Response and Implementation, New Hampshire Yankee (Qualifications ff. Tr. 27367); Catherine M. Frank, Emergency Planner, Impell Corporation (Qualifications ff. Tr. 23530); and Thomas F. Grew, Specialty Training Manager, New Hampshire Yankee (Qualifications ff. Tr.

27367). App. Reb. No. 20. ff. Tr. 27388, passim.

5.1.30. The Board finds these witnesses to be competent to serve as witnesses on the subjects they addressed.

5.1.31. Prerequisites are pro /ided in the SPMC as screening criteria for the selection of individuals to fill ORO positions. The prerequisites alone do not qualify a volunteer to perform a specific job.

Meeting the prerequisites for a given position does, however, indicate that an ir.dividual is capable of con.pleting training and then becoming qualified. As stated in the SPMC, Section 2.1, prerequisite experience "is required for training and qualification," leading to placement in a j given position. The initial development of prerequisites and refinement of screening criteria were iterative, relying on the on-going development s

of the basic position descriptions during the planning process. App. Reb.

No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 1-2.

5.1.32. ORO personnel recruitment and screening were conducted in the following manner. Applications were accepted and reviewed to .

determine the best candidates for each position. Approximately 2,000 applications were received to fill approximately 1,000 ORO non-contract positions. The applications were grouped by using. job- specific prerequisite requirements established in the SPMC as initial guidelines.

Once grouped, the applications were reviewed to determine which of the individuals applicants had the combination of background, work, and educational experience best suited to filling a given position. To obtain additional input, contacts were made with individuals who either super-vised or worked with the applicants. Individuals Ap>44eants were assigned to positions which would best utilize their previous experience. App.

Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 2.

5.1.33. One generally applied screening criterion for all positions gives was-te-g4ve priority to personnel who had prior experience in emergency response. The Applicants considered utilities were eens4dered to be a good source for recruiting such individuals because i

utility workers routinely respond and work under emergency conditions. In addition, because utilities share common job titles and work functions, they also share a common understanding of the general level of expertise, training, and experience required for those titles and functions. Thus, NHY could assume that a utility dispatcher could be trained as an ORD l

l dispatcher. By recruiting non- contract position volunteers from a 1

uniform environment, NHY could utilize the applications to make a

l preliminary assessment of training requirements. Once individuals were o selected for positions in the ORO they were entered into the training program. Use of the present SPMC prerequisites for recruitment results in the identification of personnel who are able to successfully complete ,

training. Their performance was. demonstrated to be adequate during the FEMA- observed 1988 exercise. App. Reb. No. 20. ff. Tr. 27388 at 2-3.

5.1.34. A total of twenty-one training modules have been

developed for instruction of ORO personnel. App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr.

27388 at 3.

5.1.35. The training program was developed to meet the planning l guidance set out in NUREG-0654, Rev 1, Supp.1 11.0.4. App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 4-5.

l 5.1.36. The methodology used in developing the training program is Training System Development (TSD); this method is endorsed by INP0 and has been found to be effective in the training of onsite emergency l

responders. App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 5-7.

l 5.1.37. The training program has been modified since its initiation and Appendix K of SPMC commits the Applicants to an ongoing program of training improvement. App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 8-9.

5.1.38. After completion of all training modules required for a position, an ORO member must then demonstrate satisfactory perfonnanc? in a tabletop demonstration. App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 9-10.

5.1.39. Once ORO personnel are initially qualified, their training continues with drills and additional training activities.

Supplemental training, above and beyond the required classroom modules, may be scheduled in response to: Changes to the emergency plan or l

6 i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

y.

l

!. l l implementing procedures, performance evaluations such as drill or exercise l - comments, and requests or recommendations for the development of L

additional training. App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 10-11.

l 5.1.40. Applicants described in detail the experience required and training given with respect to the area of protective action decision making for the five positions challenged by MAG Offsite Response Director, Radiological Health. Advisor, Technical Advisor, and the two Assistant Offsite Response Directors, App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 12-28, and the Board finds the plan to be satisfactory in all respects.

i 5.1.41. Dose / accident assessment training is provided to the Technical Advisor and to the Accident Assessment Coordinator, who reports to the Radiological Health Advisor. The Technical Advisor and the Accident Assessment Coordinator are responsible for actual performance of dose / accident assessment and for providing this information to the Radiological Health Advisor for use in the formulation of a PAR. App.

Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 23-26; Tr. 27516-19.

5.1.42. In evaluating the ability of the NHY OR0 to make appropriate protective action decisions, FEMA' stated that "[o]verall, the NHY ORO E0C staff performed in a very commendable and satisfactory manner." App. Ex. 43F at 213 [ global 221]; App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr.

27388 at 23.

5.1.43. The prerequisite established in the SPMC for the Public Notification Coordinator is public information experience. The Public Notification Coordinator is responsible for a timely and coordinated activation of the Public Alert and Notification System, development of Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages, and coordination of EBS

- 80 -

messages with New Hampshire and Massachusetts. SPMC, pg. 2.1-13. App.

Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 29.

5.1.44. In developing an EBS message, the Public Notification Coordinator will use one of several types of messages, in accordance with IP 2.13. One type may be the prerecorded messages in place at the EBS radio station. In this case, no modification of the messages will occur.

App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at.29.

5.1.45. The second type of message that may be used is a prescripted message. In this case, the Public Notification Coordinator will finalize a prescripted message by inserting information such as the 1

names of the communities affected. The prerecorded and prescripted sample messages utilized by the Offsite Response Organization were based on the messages used in the NHRERP and have been reviewed by Dr. Mileti to ensure that they properly account for human behavior and have the attributes needed for good emergency information. App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 29.

5.1.46. The Public Notification Coordinator may need to modify i or originate an EBS message. These messages will be developed us1ng the prescripted messages as a basis. Once the message is developed, the Public Notification Coordinator is required by procedure to obtain the review and approval of the message from the Offsite Response Director. In all cases, the EBS messages will be provided to The Commonwealth for their review, input, and concurrence with the content. In addition, the Offsite Response Director will obtain concurrence from The Commonwealth before a message is issued. App. Reb. No. 20 ff. Tr. 27388 at 30.

5.1.47. To address an Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) arising from the 1988 exercise, New Hampshire Yankee has committed to providing te the Public Notification Coordinator additional training dealing with the modification and development of EBS messages and the characteristics of good emergency messages. App. 'leb. No. 20 ff. Tr.

27388 at 30.

5.1.48. Such training will be in addition to the required classroom instruction of approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />. This training consists of: Emergency Plan Overview, Emergency Management, Public Alert and NotificationSystem(PANS) Activation,EOCOperations, Transportation, Procedure Checklists, and Tabletops. App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 30.

5.1,49. The criterion applied in screening Traffic Guide recruits was to identify as many volunteers as possible with traffic direction background. In fact, fifty persons have been recruited for this position who do have prior experience in public safety functions including directing traffic. App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 31.

5.1.50. An adequate training module has been developed for the training of Traffic Guides. App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 32 and )

1 Attach. L. I 5.1.51. Traffic Guides are provided written instruction in  ;

i their procedures on the placement of cones. This instruction, used in j conjunction with the specific TCP or ACP intersection map provides guidance on cone placement. Traffic Guides are also trained to report the exact location of impediments including accidents (town, route or street, l direction of travel, and nearest intersection) and the extent of damages l

(injuries, hazards, types and numbers of vehicles involved). App. Reb.

No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 32.

5.1.62.. Traffic Guides are required to attend 6 training l modules. comprising approximately -10 hours of instruction. These modules ,

l l are: Emergency Plan Overview, Staging Area Operations, Traffic and Access-i.

Control, Procedure Checklists. Tabletop, and Communications. Supplemental 1

training sessions were conducted on November 9, 1987, and June 7, 1988, L

.which involved the practical aspects of controlling traffic, i.e.,

l g

directing actual traffic- through mock intersections. This supplemental training will be incorporated into the training for all Traffic Guides.

App. Reb. No. 20 ff. Tr. 27388 at 32-33.

5.1.53. The' direction of traffic at mock intersections is a form of " hands on" training. Tr. 27454- 55.

5.1.54. Actual experience is of limited utility for a Traffic

' Guide; the diagrams give procedural direction and the task involved s4mply is not all-that difficult. Tr. 27458-59; Tr. 27465. See also Tr.

26266-67.

5.1.55. Law enforcement functions play no role in the Traffic Guide duties. App. Reb. No. 20,'ff. Tr. 27388 at 32. l 5.1.56. FEMA found that the NHY ORD demonstrated that it had l the organizational ability and resources to control evacuating traffic and to control access to restricted areas. In particular, " Traffic Guides

. . . were found to be well-equipped and prepared for their mission."

l App. Ex. 43F at 226 [ global 234]; App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 33.

5.1.57. With respect to Bus Drivers, the prerequisites are  !

experience as a Bus Driver and requisite license. There are no 1

_ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____._____._..__m___ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. _

g 4

1 emergency-specific aspects to the tasks assigned in the SPMC definition to l Bus Drivers.. Drivers are required to perform their normal duty - to j de-what-they-nerma44y-des-wh4eh-4s drive buses. No special procedures or I

training are required because bus operation does not change when a bus is .

used during an emergency. The navigation of designated routes is defined as the responsibility of Route Guides. App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 34.

5.1.58. The number of Bus Drivers required to implement the SPMC is 367. The number of Bus. Drivers currently available on the NHY OR0 bus driver roster is (as of February 22, 1989) 673. The number of Bus Drivers who have received the training modules as of February 22, 1989, is 531. App. Reb. No. 20, ff. Tr. 27388 at 35.

5.1.59. JI-15 raises the question of whether OR0 workers will shirk from or perform less than optimally in their duties because of fear of personal liability. Contentions Memo. at 28.

5.1.60. Beeause-ef Due to the extremely vague and speculative nature of this assertion, the Board admitted the contention only on the condition that MAG carry the burden of going forward with the evidence.

Memorandum and Order - Part I (Ruling on Contentions on the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities) at 106-07 (July 22, 1988).

5.1.61. FEMA did not address this contention except insofar as it found that the SPMC adequately set forth the responsibilities and authorities of the OR0 members. App. Ex. 43C at 9-12 [ global 27-30].

5.1.62. No direct testimony was e44e4ted offered by the Interveners eppenents of the facility on this contention.

I i

- 84.- ,

5.1.63. MAG' elicited from FEMA witness Donovan the fact that he ,

l

had Lattended seminars on the subject of governmental cr corporate liability with respect to suits for failure to-plan, failure to. notify the population, and.. failure to follow plans in the nature of technical advice. ,

Tr. 19025-26, 19029.

5.1.64. - However, no testimony was elicited by MAG.to support the proposition that emergency workers would fail to perform out of fear of personal liability or to rebut the FEMA view that such concerns need not be. accounted for in SPMC. Thus, the condition to the contention's admission was not fulfilled; in addition, the FEMA rebuttable presumption-to that effect was not rebutted.

5.1.65. Contention MAG EX-14 raised the issue of the training and staffing of the MS-1 hospitals. Contention _s, s Memo. at 110-11. In i

particular, it is alleged that'because additional training has been recommended for the staff of the hospital on the biological effects of radiation, the ability of the hospital to perform its function of treating contaminated injured is at issue. Contentions Memo. at 111.

5.1.66. MAG presented a' panel consisting of an investigator from his office and two nurses and a doctor from St. Joseph's Hospital l

with respect to MS-1 hospitals. See Lonergan Dir., ff. Tr. 23317, passim.

Nothing adduced from these witnesses indicated any training deficiency.

and the appearance of the St. Joseph's personnel only served to enhance the Board's view that that hospital is well qualified and competently staffed to perform the role assigned to it in the SPMC. Tr. 23304-82.

5.1.67. Dr. Peele, who is Chief of Radiology and serves as the hospital's Radiation Safety Officer, testified that St. Joseph's is

1 able to provide emergency care to individuals who have been exposed to radiation, contaminated, or physically injured. Tr. 23358-59. The )

process of decontamination does not limit the number of patients that St.

Joseph's can treat, because once patients are decontaminated, they can be I moved out of the designated area and treated in other parts of the emergency room or other parts of the hospital. Tr. 23344. Moreover, since the effects of ecliation exposure generally take several days to develop, and since individuals who have not been contaminated do not require special precautions to be treated, patients who have not been contaminated may also be transferred to other facilities for extended care. Tr. 23360.

5.1.68. Sister Paula Bradley, the Nurse Manager of St. Joseph's emergency room, and her predecessor, Sister Doris Brouillette, explained that the medical staff understands the biological effects of ndiation, including the need to segregate contaminated individuals, control the amount of contamination people are exposed to, and apply appropriate medical procedures. Tr. 23352. By working as a multidisciplinary team, the hospital staff are able .to draw upon the expertise of their radiation safety officers in answering questions about safe monitoring practices.

In addition, hospital staff will continue to participate in further training sessions on biological effects of radiation. Tr. 23352-56.

5.1.69. The ARCA identified in the exercise is that the staff of St. Joseph's Hospital should receive additional training in the use of two types of radiation detection equipment and their purpose. During the exercise, the staff utilized the correct instruments and performed in a 9

)

! very professional manner without impact either to their or the simulated l

l patient's health and safety. Tr. 22237-46. 3 j

l In sum, this testimony shows no evidence of any 5.1.70. ]

I deficiency in training or conduct during the exercise. I 5.2. RULINGS OF LAW 5.2.1. The Interveners failed to carry their burden of coming 1

forward with any evidence'to demonstrate that the possibility that a i

' l strike would affect the ability of the ORO to function in an emergency at Seabrook. There-4s-no-reasen-te-assume-that-a-werker-en-strike-against his-regular-employer-will-net-hener-his-4ndividwai-eemmitment-te-9RG-at the-time-ef-an-emergeney-as-there-weu4d-be-ne-neeessary-eentraetwal-er ,

1 ether-ebl4gatten-for-hts-er-her-te-refuse-te-hener-the-eemmitment, j

5.2.2. " Emergency workers, as a group will not abandon their roles in a radiological emergency." PID 7.96 (subparagraph 3).

5.2.3. Emergency workers as a group stand by their posts and do ]

not abandon a well-defined role in emergency situations. PID at 7.96 (subparagraph 3 at p. 172).  !

5.3. C0'NCLUSIONS 5.3.1. There is reasonable assurance that strikes will not l disable the OR0. I i

5.3.2. There is adequate staffing in the OR0 to implement the l SPMC.  ;

l 5.3.3. There is no evidence that ORO personnel will be constrained in their efforts by fear of personal liability.  !

i

5.3.4. Personnel at St. Joseph's Hospital are fully qualified

' and well-equipped to provide emergency medical care under.the, provisions of the SPMC..

I 5.3.5. Training and prerequisite experience for ORO personnel, ,

l 'in particular PAR decisionmakers,. Public Notification Coordinators.

Traffic Guides, and Bus Drivers, is adequate.

6. PAR GENERATION 6.1. FINDINGS OF FACT 6.1.1. . A number of contentions were litigated with respect to the generation of PARS. JI-17 raised the issue of whether a range of protective actions was provided for the beach area populations.

Contentions Memo. at 29.

6.1.2. JI-18 raised'the ' issue of whether the SPMC set forth -

coherent decisionmaking criteria for PARS, Contentions Memo. at 30-32; JI-19 raised the issue of whether the requirement should always be for evacuation of a 360' 5- mile radius around the plant out to the distance necessary instead of allowing the option of evacuation by sectors, Contentions Memo. at 32-33.

6.1.3. JI-20 raises the issue of whether SPMC cets forth adequate procedures for the utilization of ETEs in PAR decisionmaking.

Contentions Memo. at 33-34.

6.1.4. JI-21 raises-the issue of whether the SPMC is deficient because it does not contain adequate population distribution maps.

Contentions Memo. at.35.

__.-._m_-___ .m______ . _ . . _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ .

6.1.5. JI-22' raises th'e-issue of whether The Commonwealth's lack of confidence in the ETEs contained in SPMC will result in only g hoc response, or, in any event, will result in a delayed response in the crea of PAR decisionmaking. Contentions Memo. at 35-36. .

6.1.6. JI-23 raises the issue of whether the SPMC decisionmaking criteria for PARS are properly coordinated with those in the NHRERP. Contentions Memo. at 36.

6.1.7. JI-24 raises the issue of whether the granting of legal authority to ORO would take so much time as to preclude prompt notification of the public. Contentions Memo. at 37.

6.1.8. FEMA has found that the SPMC is adequate in establishing a capability for implementing protective measures based upon Protective Action Guides (PAGs) and other criteria, App. Ex. 43C at. 53-58 [ global 73-76]; FEMA has also found that SPMC adequately describes the basis of l

choice of recommended PARS during emergency conditions, App. Ex. 43C at j' 69-70 [ global 88-89]; FEMA'has also found that SPMC adequately describes l those functions which' require state and local authorization before implementation, App.'Ex. 43C at 9-12 [ global 27-30].

6.1.9. FEMA has found that ORD has executed the necessary agreements with respect to all support organizations including the State of New Hampshire and found that the agreement for coordination between those two entities is adequate. App. Ex. 43C at 12-13 [ global 30-31].

6.1.10. MAG prefiled the testimony of Drs. Thompson, Goble and Beyea with respect to contentions JI-17. JI-18, Bases A-E, G-I, and JI-19.

MAG Ex. 72 for identification. It-was-eneluded, This testimony was ,

excluded in its entirety by the Board, not only because it was extremely

difficult to understand -(see -Tr.18885), full of uncertainties and speculations, and far short of expected. scientific standards, but alto because it postulated hypothetical with no evidentiary basis and improperly sought to compare sites and emergency plans. Further, the ,

4 testimony revisited matters already decided with respect to the sheltering option for the transient beach population. Tr. 18879-85, 18905.

6.1.11. T0A adduced certain testimony directed to contentions JI-23 and JI-24. The point was made that the selectmen of Amesbury might not be available on the day of an emergency, since they are part time officials who work as far away as Boston peesumably-to-give autherinations, Cronin Dir., ff. Tr.16267 at 16, and that the police chief is not familiar with SPMC or any other emergency plans except for the community of Amesbury. Id.

6.1.12. Under State law, the Director of Civil Defense is responsible for emergency planning. Tr. 16751. In the event the selectmen who are in charge of civil defense programs for Amesbury, Tr.16783, are not available, the Civil Defense Director, the coordinator of emergency services, (Tr.16790) of T0A or his deputy will take over and do what is necessary. See also Tr.16769, Tr.16809-10. They are thoroughly familiar with operations of the town and could implement a plan if necessary. Tr. 16804.

6.1.13. SpMG The decision criteria of the SPMC contains a full range of protective actions. Donovan Tr. 18572-18573. These include a shelter option for the permanent population. Tr. 18574-75.

6.1.14. There is no requirement for a shelter survey to be included in a radiological emergency response plan (RERP). Tr. 18576.

. 6.1.15. FEMA witness Donovan testified that the selection in ]

the SPMC of the 0.9 dose reduction factor (drf) is appropriate the most

~

3 prudent and conservative approach to take. Tr. 18578; Tr. 18587-88; 18590.

6.1.16. EPA draft guidance suggests that shelter is a protective action that is viable for only a limited time equal to less than six hours. Donovan Tr. 18593. thus, The fact that an area may have long ETEs does not mean that there is any greater need for to explore sheltering alternatives. Donovan Tr. 18590-932.

6.1.17. FEMA witness Donovan explained at length how, during an exercise, FEMA checks the reasonableness of Applicants' dose projections usir.g its owa (FEMA's) dose code; in this case, Applicants projections were found to be reasonable. Tr. 18324-28; App. Exh. 43F at 155-57, 212-1B 220-221.

6.1.18. He also explained that at the plan review stage, FEMA reviews the dose projection assumptions; then, during the exercise the reasonableness of the results are checked as described above. Tr.

18328-29.

6.1.19. No evidence has been adduced to contravene the rebuttable presumption as to the adequacy of the SPMC with respect to the generation of PARS; the Board finds that the SPMC is adequate and implementable in this respect.

6.1.20. No evidence in the record contradicts FEMA's finding that Applicants' population distribution information for the permanent population and methodology for estimating the transient population is

__________________m__._____________. _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _

adequate. App.Ex.43 Cat 59[ global 77];seealsoTr. 18059-60; Tr.

18602-03. -.

6.1.21. A number of contentions and bases, in whole or in part, raised issues as to the generation and execution of PARS by the offsite .

response organizations during the graded exercise. These include MAG EX-11, Bases A, and B(1)(3)(5)(6)(7), MAG EX-19, bases (A) (B) & (D).

Contentions Memo. at 106-10, 111-13.

6.1.22. No contentions were raised and litigated with respect to the onsite portion of the exercise except a contention that the "METPAC" computer model was either inadequate or wrongly utilized during the exercise. See MAG-EX-19(D). Contentions Memo, at 113.

6.1.23. While it is true that the general wording of MAG-EX-19(A)(B) could be read as alluding to unspecified issues other than the METPAC issue arising from the onsite portion of the exercise, the fact is that the only specific basis pleaded for the allegedly erroneous PARS given to the offsite organizations by the onsite organization was the METPAC allegation described above. See, e.g., Tr. 25302; Tr. 25360-61.

6.1.24. FEMA found no deficiencies with respect to PAR generation or execution by the ORO or the New Hampshire offsite response organization. App. Ex. 43F at 155-57 [ global 163-65], 212-13 [ global 220-21].

6.1.25. No evidence at all was adduced to challenge the rebuttable presumption thus created with respect to the offsite organizations.

l l-

'6.1.26. The Staff offered a panel of witnesses with respect to MAG-EX-19 consisting of Robert J. Bores and Edwin F. Fox..

Bores et al.

Dir., ff. Tr. 24627, passim.

6.1.27. The Board finds that these witnesses were competent to testify with respect to the areas they addressed. See Bores, et al. Dir.

1 ff. Tr. 24627, " Professional Qualifications."

6.1.28. In essence, it was the Staff position that the PARS 9enerated by the onsite organization to the State of New Hampshire and the NHY ORO were timely and appropriate. ' Bores et al. Dir., ff. Tr. 24627 at 8214-15.

6.1.29. In addition. Staff witness Perrotti, testifying by deposition, stated that the onsite response organization had procedures for formulating PARS which were adequate under NRC standards and'that those procedures were correctly tellowed during the exercise. Perrotti Dep., ff. Tr. 25614 at 91-92,192-93.

6.1.30. MAG offered the testimony of two witnesses in support of these PAR exercise contentions. The first was Dr. Goble. Goble Dir, ff. Tr. 24125, passim.

6.1.31. Br,-Geblels-qual 4(4 eat 4 ens-were-marg 4nal-at-best-4n-the aree-of-PAR-generation, The Board finds this witness sufficiently qualified to render the testimony. Tr. 24155; see generally Tr. 24130-44.

6.1.32. It is interesting to note that in the one matter where he had previously been given the job of planning PARS, the PARS which he and his colleagues working on the matter developed were remarkably similar to the approach taken by the Applicants in the SPMC. Tr. 24156-57; Tr. 24163-64.

6.1.33. It was developed on cross-examination that in that project, Dr. Goble and his colleagues recommended the adoption of keyhole evacuations with the 360-degree radius being evacuated for five miles and a downwind area extended beyond the five mile radius central core.

Tr. 24156-57. This is precisely what was done in the Seabrook exercise.

Compare Tr. 24163 with Tr. 24204-05.

6.1.34. Dr. Goble began his direct testimony by describing the 1

accident scenario used in the graded exercise. Goble Dir., ff. Tr. 24125 at 4-6. Next, he described the PARS made by the Seabrook Station personnel and the protective actions (pas) taken by New Hampshire and the ORO over the first day of the exercise. M.at6-8.

6.1.35. Dr. Goble next claimed that, while he does not have much direct evidence, he is concerned that the pas taken were not the result of sufficient independent evaluation by the decisionmakers in New Hampshire or at OR0. M.at9.

6.1.36. On cross-examination it became apparent he had little or no basis for his suggestion that there may not have been independent evaluation by these decisionmakers. Indeed, he said that the-en4y-defense of the opinions as written on page 9 of his testimony was-that-they were not very strong and were stated " vaguely" because he did not have sufficient evidence to draw very sharp conclusions. enewgh2-te-remain viable-after-eress-examinat4en-had-revealed-the4r-tenwews-bas 4sv Tr. 24200.

6.1.37. Next,~while-stating-4t-te-be-a-diff4ewit-quest 4en-te answerr Dr. Goble also opined that the PARS would have been largely ineffective in a real emergency, although he recognized that a proper

answer would depend on where people are and how they would behave at the time of an emergency. jdy Goble Dir. ff. Tr. 24125 at 10.

6.1.38. When-quest 4ened-further, Dr. Goble's real concern, however, was that while ind4eated-thats-4n-fast, the protective actions .

reconsnended during the exercise were, in fact, appropriate, but Jhey were not recommended in a timely manner. Tr. 24197, 24199.

6.1.39. Applicants explained that the first General Emergency protective action in Massachusetts (evacuation of T0A and TOS, sheltering of the remaining four communities) was recommended based upon indications of in-plant radiological conditions and made prior to any release of radiation. Tr. 26926-27.

6.1.40. The second General Emergency protective action (evacuation of the remaining four Massachusetts communities) was made as

! soon as the windshift towards Massachusetts began to occur. Tr. 26928.

6.1.41. It was developed on cross-examination that Dr. Goble's opinions in this regard, to the effect that many people would not have had I dose reductions, were based on his surmises as to human behavior in large part (including strained speculations that people told to leave the New

(

l Hampshire beaches during an alert at Sea' o rook Station would repair to the nearby beaches in Salisbury, Massachusetts, to continue sunbathing, Tr.

24168-69), and he admittedly is without qualifications as an expert in human behavior. Tr. 24172-73. See also Tr. 24229. ,

6.1.42. Moreover, while he stated that many people would not, in his judgement, have received dose reductions, he happily admitted that many would have received sveh significant dose reductions. Tr. 24179.

l 6.1.43. In another particular, he criticized the fact that the northern towns had not been evacuated before the plume crossed them at eight to ten o' clock in the evening. Goble Dir., ff. Tr. 24125 at 12.

However, as Mr. Donovan testified, Tr. 22682-85; Tr. 22687-88, and Dr. ,

Goble admitted, Tr. 24179-80, the play on PARS ceased at six o' clock.

Confronted with this, Dr. Goble took the position that the New Hampshire decisionmakers should have realized that such a wind shift had been predicted and should have evacuated this area in anticipation of it. Tr.

24181-82. However, he was unable to identify any weather forecast that made such a prediction for the coastal area. Tr. 24182-86. Indeed, he .

agreed that the decisionmakers had "no evidence that would give them a firm basis for believing that [the plume] would be over those northern towns," Tr. 24187, and admitted that his claim in this regard was l

" controversial," Tr. 24528.

6.1.44. He also questioned the fact that the ORO decisionmakers did not evacuate CON earlier given the fact that there had been forecasts that the wind would shift from westerly to easterly during the afternoon of the first day. Goble Dir. , ff. Tr 24125 at 11,14-15. His point was that in order to shift from westerly to easterly, the wind would have to swing for a period to northerly, and, thus, blow the plume toward CON to the south. Id. However, although Dr. Goble believes that the PAR decisionmaker should have attributed the wind shift to frontal activity those forecasts, on their face, reveal an effect consistent with the " sea breeze" concept, Goble Attachments, ff. Tr. 24129 at 8,11; Tr. 24239-40, and Dr. Goble himself agrees that the sea breeze shifts from off-shore to-on-shore with a period of calm in between; Tr. 24351-52; that is to say.

i-l l

L it is not necessarily so that the shift involves a swinging around of the i wind through'a 180 degree arc. In addition, the wind speeds were extremely low. Tr. 24202, and any change in wind direction would not q result in any effect on unevacuated areas beyond five miles for a few 1

l hours. Thus, if this decision in hindsight was erroneous, it was nevertheless soundly based at the time it was made. and-the-dee4s4enmaker eennet-be-faulted-fee-the-fudgment-mader l 6.1.45. The Staff witnesses indicated (s-of-the-pos444en that the PAR not to evacuate beyond five miles was appropriate for several stated reasons, such as (1) any radiation releases that might be expected would not be likely to cause exposures in excess of the EPA protective l

l action guides (PAGs) beyond the evacuated areast (2) evacuation beyond 5 miles from the plant could adversely impact the evacuation of those

. closer to the plant; (3) a 360 degree evacuation to 5 miles eliminated the need to consider shifting wind directions; (4) evacuation to 5 miles provided prompt protection for those persons most at risk; and (5) the recommendation to shelter in the rest of the EPZ afforded a better opportunity to provide those persons with emergency information and protective action recommendations. Bores et al. Dir., ff. Tr. 24627 at 19-20.

l 16.1.45.1. The Staff witnesses also specifically rejected the concept that CON, once sheltered, should have remained sheltered because the forecast was for winds to continue shifting so as to remove CON from

' the area of plume transport and passage within a relatively short time.

Tr. 24814-28. . Staff pointed out that the decisionmaker could not be sure that the windshift would continue, since frontal systems frequently stall, i

j

as-advert 4 sed-er hew nor could the decisionmaker be sure that the release  ;

-woul d terminate. I d_.

6.1.46. In addition, even if the Board were to find, which it does not, that there was an error in judgment as to the PAR for CON ,

because of inadequate or erroneous consideration of weather forecasts, this-would-demonstrate-at-mest-a-need-fer-further-training-for-a-eertain dee4s(enmakert it hardly-would still does not demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the plan arising out of METPAC or otherwise which is what MAG must show to prevail in the area of the onsite portion of the exercise.

6.1.47. Dr. Goble made many suggestions he felt were necessary to properly handle wind shifts in the decisionmaking process. Goble Dir.,

ff. Tr. 24125 at 18-21.

6.1.48. However, as he agreed, one of the purposes of adopting the keyhole approach to PARS is that action is taken in the full circumference around the plant, thus mitigating the effect of wind shifts for everyone within the close-in radius. Tr. 24201-02.

l 6.1.49. In any event, Dr. Goble acknowledges that the faults he perceived, themselves, are not sufficient evidence in themselves to show l that the plan and implementation were deficient. Goble Dir., ff. Tr.

24125 at 16-18. Dr. Goble then gave some general observations on how to handle the problem of wind shifts, complimented the Applicants on their preparation to acquire regional weather infonnation and forecasts, decried l their reliance on only one (Seabrock's) meteorology tower for local conditions, and leveled sone general criticism against one facet of the METPAC model - its lack of provision for correcting the direction of a plume segment. Id. at 18-21.

4 e

L_____--__-_____-__--_-____--__-_________-__-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

6.1.50. However, Dr. Goble acknowledged that METPAC was as good or better than any other model available for the same purposes; Tr.

24208-09; Tr. 24338; and also the fact that it was already in use in other nuclear power stations; Tr. 24208-09. See also, Tr. 24069.

6.1.51. Staff witness Bores stated that METPAC was is,one of the better dose evaluation models he had rev4ewed seen in use by any of the utilities. Tr. 24951.

6.1.52. Dr. Goble took the position that METPAC was deficient because it doesn't utilize interactive data processino, Tr. 24209, and l because it called for the use of a default value for duration of release of eight hours. Goble Dir., ff. Tr. 24125 at 2319 as modified by Tr.

24282 et seq. However, a review of that procedure indicates that this default value was to be used only when the decisionmaker was without any l basis for selecting some other release duration. Tr. 24282; 24334-35.

Dr. Goble argues that a default value of eight hours is too long because it biases the selection process in favor of evacuation. See Tr. 24296.

As seen below, this argument does not square with the theory that planning l

is to be done for a spectrum of accidents rather than being targeted upon a relatively narrow portion of the spectrum.

l 6.1.53. Dr. Goble criticized the Massachusetts Emergency Response Protective Areas (ERPAs) in terms of their location and design.

Goble Dir., ff. Tr. 24125 at 16. He made the point that one of his PARS

- i.e., to shelter Salisbury and evaucate Amesbury - could not be accomplished under the plan's present procedures, given the ERPAs. Tr.

24505-06; Tr. 24518-19. However, these ERPAs were arrived at by KLD Associates at the tilne they were operating under the direction of l

I

l MCDA. Tr. 24007. In fact, the ERPAs were drawn so that one ERPA includes communities within five miles of the plant and the other those five-ten miles from the plant, which is consistent with the type of protective actions normally taken. Tr. 24074. ,

l 6.1.54. iir. Goble also criticized as a fundamental flaw in the SPMC the fact, if it ths a fact, that the SPMC precluded the ordering of the closing of Massachusetts beaches at the alert level. Goble Dir. , ff.

Tr. 24125 at 14. As Dr. Gob 17 admitted on cross-examination, he had-ne bas 4s-for-suppos4ng-that-the-SPMG-eentained-such-a-prek(b4t4en meant, rather, that the SPMC does not consider beach closing until the site area emergency level, Tr.14189, and but, in fact, there is none no prohibition on considering beach closing at an earlier level. Tr. 23962.

6.1.55. It is clso clear that Dr. Goble's criticisms of the l

l selection and exercise of PARS are based upon hindsight, Tr. 24512, 24514, including hindsight as to the lack of ground-shine problems under the particular scenario involved, Tr. 24254-56. This approach is without value, since decision-makers during an emergency must base their actions on information available at the time, without the benefit of hindsight.

E.g., Tr. 24821-27; Tr. 24946-47.

6.1,56. It turned out that all of Dr. Goble's positions were based upon his view that the planning and (at least until the existence of a different type of event was firmly established) PAR decisionmaking process at the time of an event should be driven by a goal of seeking to mitigate to the greatest extent possible a fast-breaking, serioes and fast-ending accident, even at the expense of not accomplishing otherwise i

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reasonable achievable dose savings in other less severe situations. Tr.

24577-78; Tr. 24582; Tr. 24586-87.

6.1.57. This theory held by Dr. Goble simply is not in conformity with the regulations and guidance of the NRC which require that plans be designed with flexibility and to address a spectrum of accidents, not just one end of the spectrum. NUREG-0654 at 6-7. I 6.1.58. MAG's other witness offered with respect to this area was Witness Harris whose testimony as to training has aiready been discussed above.

6.1.59. As to JI-20, Applicants provided persuasive testimony that the SPMC's ETEs for the regions and scenarios considered are adequate for PAR decisionmaking. See ,_ 2, supr,a_.

6.1.60. As to JI-21, Applicants provided adequate basis for concluding that the population numbers in the SPMC will be evaluated as part of the annual review process and updated as necessary. See App. Reb.

No. 16. ff. Tr. 26681 at 13.

6.2. RULINGS OF LAW I 6.2.1. "Our emergency planning requirements do not require that an adequate plan achieve a preset minimum radiation dose saving or a minimum evacuation time for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone in the event of a serious accident. Rather, they attempt to achieve reasonable and feasible dose reduction under the circumstances; what may be reasonable or feasible for one plant site may not be fur another."

Long Isl_and Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

CLI-66-13, 24 NRC 22, 30 (1986). (Emphasis added.)

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6.2.2. "The existing emergency planning [ regulation] does not require that plans achieve any preestablished minimum dose savings in the event of an accident. For example, approved emergency plans with full State and local governmental cooperation have highly variable evacuation time estimates ranging from several hours to over ten hours and the projected dose savings for such plans would vary widely. Thus, the '

regulation is inherently variable in effect and there are no bright line mandatory minimum projected dose savings or evacuation time limits which could be viewed as performance standards for emergency plans in the existing regulations. Moreover, the dose savings achieved by implementa-tion of an emergency plan under adverse conditions, e.g., during or following heavy snow, could be substantially less than under perfect conditions. This variability is consistent with a concept or approach to emergency planning and preparedness that is flexible rather than rigid."

Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State and/or Local Governments Decline To Cooperate in Offsite Emergency Planning (Proposed Rule), 52 Fed. Reg. 6980, 6982 (March 6, 1987).

6,2,3,- aThe-Gemm4ss4en-presumes-as-dees-FEMA-that-effs 4te 4nd4v4dwals-4n-the-Ep2-may,-c.s-a-resuit-ef-a-nvelear-plant-aee4 dent, )

e4ther-beseme-externa 44y-eentaminated-w4th-radteaetive-materials-er-beceme exposed-te-danserews-levels-ef-radiat4ent-er-bethra--Seethern-Gal 4fernia Edisen-Ger-fsan-Onefre-Nuelear-Generating-Statten,-Un4ts-2-and-3), I l

GH-83-10,-17-NRG-528,-534-35-fl983),

)

6.2.4. It avails-the-eppenents-ef-Seabreek-nething is not f sufficient'for Interveners to demonstrate the existence of an error or lac!r of judgment on the part of players in the exercise as such; rather,

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what must be demonstrated is that these-th4ngs-whieh-d4d-net-ge-perfectly imperfections in the exercise demonstrate the existence of a fundamental .

flaw in the plan or plans being exercised. Long Island Lighting Company I

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-903, 28 NRC 499 (1988).

6.2.5. "[A] fundamental flaw in an emergency plan, as revealed in an exercise, has two principal components. First, it reflects a failure of an essential element of the plan, and, second, it can be remedied only through a significant revision of the plan." Long Island i Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-903, 28 NRC 499, 505 (1988) (emphasis in original).

6.2.6. Any purported deficiency observed in an exercise which can be corrected by the provision of supplemental training cannot be held to evidence a fundamental flaw in a radiological emergency response plan. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-918, 29 NRC , (Slip Op. at 24-25, June 20, 1989).

6.3. CONCLUSIONS 6.3.1. The SPMC contains a range of possible protective actions which are suitable to the circumstances of the Seabrook site.

6.3.2. The SPMC sets forth adequate procedures and criteria for the generation of PARS.

6.3.3. The SPMC appropriately provides for " keyhole" evacuation protective actions and has adequate procedures to provide reasonable assurance that such recommendations will be made upon the basis of adequate information and appropriate criteria.

6.3.4. The SPMC adequately incorporates ETE information into the PAR decisionmaking process.

I l

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6.3.5. -The SPMC contains adequate population distribution information.

6.3.6. The SPMC contains adequate procedures to provide for the notification of PARS to State and local officials and the general public, l and for coordination of PARS with the State of New Hampshire.

l 6.3.7. PAR generation and execution during the graded exercise revealed no fundamental flaws in the emergency plans exercised.

7. COMMUNICATIONS / NOTIFICATION 7.1. FINDINGS OF FACT l

7.1.1. A total of nine contentions were litigated with respect to the area of notification and communications.

7.1.2. Contention JI-27 raises the issue of wheths. the relationships between ORO and other organizations are adequately defined to facilitate communications between them. Contentions Memo. at 37-39.

j 7.1.3. FEMA has found that the Applicants have adequately described the ORO organization and the areas where it needs legal authorization; in addition, FEMA has found that adequate and necessary LOAs with the State of New Hampshire and others have been executed. App.

Ex. 43C at 10-12 [ global 30].

7.1.4. This contention is further addressed in Section 10, infra, along with' other contentions with respect to organizational and

• governmental coordination.

7.1.5. JI-30 raises the issue of whether SPMC relies too much on the commercial telephone system in light of the alleged overload of that system which will occur in an emergency. Contentions Memo. at 40-41.

l l

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7.1.6. FEMA has found the provisions in SPMC for communications within ORD, with other organizations (including states and local governments), with federal agencies, the plant, for activating response personnel, and for communicating with medical support facilities to be adequate. App. Ex. 43C at 29-34 [ global 47-52].

l 7.1.7. CON witness O'Connor gave testimony setting forth his l opinion that reliance on the commercial telephone system for communication is (appropriate unreliable because, in the case of CON, there are no public telephones available at four of the seven TCPs. O'Connor Dir., ff.

Tr. 16458 at 24.

7.1.8. There is an-unvarn4shed a_ conclusory opinion by MAG witness Sikich 3/ that there is " foreseeable line overload," Sikich Dir.,

ff. 20800 O at 2, 22, 40 and also a statement that phones at special facilities may not be manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, Id. at 41.

7.1.9. There are three methods for notifying schools of the emergency: telephone, the sirens, and tone alert radios which will be supplied. Tr. 19015.

7.1.10. Interveners raised a limited concern that notification provided to school principals may not be able to be verified by return

-3/ The qualifications and credibility, or lack thereof, of Mr. Sikich who, given the volume of his prefiled testimony, was apparently supposed to be the lead witness for MAG, is discussed in detail in Section 8 below.

4/ This Sikich testimony appears at two places in the record. The first time is at Tr. 20230; the second is at the cited page, 20800. It is the latter one that is utilized herein, because that is the one which i reflects all of the strikings made as a result of the full cross- l examination and later motions with respect to this testimony.

I

l

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1 L

phone' call due to commercial telephone overload considerations. In I response Applicants stipulated that upon the issuance of a full power B license, they will provide school principals in the Massachusetts EPZ with L a code in a' sealed envelope to be used as a verification code when called ,

l by the ORO School Liaison. Tr. 19905-06.

7.1.11. Initial notification of offsite authorities of an l

emergency at Seabrook does not rely on the commercial telephone network.

Such notification, including that of Massachusetts governmental entities, is made by Seabrook Station Control Room via the Nuclear Alert System

.(NAS). The NAS is comprised of various microwave and leased telephone I links and does not rd'* on commercial telephone-line availability. App.

Ex. 42, Section 4.1.

l, 7.1.12. The-public notification system in Massachusetts does not rely on the availability of. commercial telephone lines for primary communications. Initial activation of the VANS operators at the VANS Staging Areas will be made by the EOC Contact Point via the Vehicular Alert and Communications System (VACS) which transmits a radio signal that .

1 activates an alarm system. Subsequent voice communications between the i

Offsite Response EOC and the VANS Operator is via the ORO Emergency Radio j Network (ERN). App. Ex. 42, Section 4.5.

7.1.13. The graded exercise tested all the mechanics for l

~ b notifying the appropriate parties to activate the siren alerting sy' stem. j Tr. 18312, 7.1.14. JI-31 raised the issue of whether there were extant adequate horizontal or lateral communications between field personnel.

Contentions Memo. at 41.

1

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l l

7.1.15. CEMA has found such communications to be adequate. I App. Ex. 43C at 29-34 [ global 47-52].

7.1.16. MAG EX-8 also raised the issue of communications within the ORD in the context of the exercise. Contentions Memo. at 95-96. ~

l 7.1.17. With respect to these two contentions, MAG presented as his witness Stanley I. Cohn. Cohn Dir., ff. Tr. 26042, passim.

7.1.18. The first point made in this testimony was that the ERN cannot reach buses outside the EPZ because of the ERN's limited range.

This means that Route Guides are not reachable for some of the time. Cohn Di r. , ff. Tr. 26042 at B.4_-7.

7.1.19. Next, the point is made that en-the-basis,-4nter-alia, of-an-assertien-that an average waiting time of 30 seconds to access the channel is significantly greater than the Justice Department reconnenda-tion that eens4ders Ean acceptable system access time to-be 3 2.5 seconds,2 Hence, too many people are asserted to have been assigned to the Route Guides radio channel. Cohn Dir., ff. Tr. 26042 at 7-11.

7.1.20. The testimony goes on to criticize the roll call procedure to be sure Route Guides (i.e. all ERN channel users) have all received a general message (such as to ingest potessium iodide (KI))

because it will add to channel overload. Cohn Dir., ff. Tr. 26042 at 11-12.

7.1.21. In fact, a roll call procedure will not be used. Tr.

27342; App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223 at 18-19.

7.1.22. Mr. Cohn had not expended a great deal of time on the j preparation of his testimony, and such preparation as he did consisted of a review of what an associate of his prepared, Tr. 26043; Tr. 26051; Tr.

- I i

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26054. Indeed, the first version of his testimony filed in this E . proceeding had him as a witness jointly on a panel with Mr. Sikich; however, Mr. Cohn testified that he had had no contact with Mr. Sikich, that he was not aware of who Mr. Sikich was. Tr. 26052, that he only ,

skimmed.the original testimony when it was filed Tr. 26053, and that he was not involved in the process of cutting down the testimony after Mr.

Sikich was withdrawn as a witness. Tr. 26054.

7.1.23. It also appeared on cross-examination that the Department of Justice had not adopted an absolute 2.5 second standard as Mr. Cohn described in his testimony, Tr. 26056-59, and that the document in which the " standard" appeared as the opinion of the authors was directed to trunk line requirements for incoming telephone communications in police stations. Tr. 26059-60.

7.1.24. Mr. Cohn also agreed that police departments are often in the position where decisionmaking is ad hoc by virtue of the fact that procedures cannot cover the myriad of situations a police officer on patrol may face, Tr. 26074, 26076, and that radio communications can substitute for previously adopted procedures to affect decisionmaking in the field. Tr. 26077-78.

Per contra, the decisions facing most field personnel 7.1.25.

in a nuclear emergency response ere, for the most part, predetermined and governed by procedures, thus lessening. the nee'd for radio communication s for such purposes. See Tr. 26106. For exaaple, the witness acknowledged that Bus Drivers seldom need to use the radio unless they had a breakdown.

Tr. 26080.

1 1

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7.1.26. It also appears that the testimony, as filed, did not i

take into account that the system used in SPMC has provisions for the E0C- i i

being able to override and interrupt all communications in the emergency l radio network with an " alert tone" which tells all field personnel to ,

stand by for an important message. Tr. 26119.

i 7.1.27. It would appear that even if one agreed with Mr. Cohn as to the. possibilities for channel overload with respect to field personnel, the problems could be overcome by relatively simple fixes in the nature of channel reassignments, Tr. 26087, 26090-91, Tr. 27326, er precedural-ehanges,-erges-Tev-27276, and thus, .even if Mr. Cohn's

. testimony were accepted in all respects on this matter, this hardly-would does not demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the SPMC.

l 7.1.28. In fact, since the exercise, the Applicants have received a license for a fifth channel for use during drills by drill controllers and which would be available for use during an emergency. Tr.

27257-58; Tr. 27272; Tr. 27277.

l 7.1.29. In addition, some of the concerns Mr. Cohn brought up (to the extent they exist'at all) would appear to be ones that con be

! alleviated by proper trainin2, and Mr. Cohn indicated that he was not 1

I completely ware of the training that had been given to ORO personnel who j were required to use radios. Tr. 26100. See also, Tr. 26107-108_. For example, the witness did not know if these personnel were trained to pause in their radio communications in order to permit, if necessary, others with a higher priority message to break in. Tr. 26099-101.

l 7.1.30. We-alse-stated-that-he-was-tnable-te-say-whether-er-net any-neeessary-semmun4 eat 4 ens Mr. Cohn was unable to identify any 9

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communications that were precluded by system design and configuration JLring the exercise. Tr. 26104. None, in fact, were. Tr. 27287; App.

Reb. No. 22. ff. Tr. 27223 at 23 and Attach. D.

7.1.31. In response to the testimony presented on the subject .

contentions, the Applicants offered a panel of witnesses consisting of Anthony M. Callendrello, Manager, Emergency Planning Licensing, New Hampshire Yankee (Qualifications Tr.17318); Gary Catapano, President, AllComm, Inc. (Qualifications Tr. 27223); and William F. Renz, Emergency Planning Specialist, Aidikoff Associates (Qualifications Tr. 27223). App.

Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223, passim.

7.1.32. The Board finds that these witnesses are competent to 1

testify with respect to the areas they addressed. App. Reb. No. 22, ff.

Tr. 27223," Professional Qualifications of Gary Catapano & William Renz".

7.1.33. During the time of an emergency, ORO field personnel primarily execute preplanned actions and have a very narrow scope of responsibilities. Accordingly, their need to communicate laterally to other field workers is extremely limited. The primary need for ORO field personnel to communicate is in a vertical fashion (up or down the chain of command). The circumstances under which even tnese vertical communications are expected to occur are minimized by preset plans and procedures which to the greatest extent possible attempt to obviate the need for any communication to take place. This contrasts greatly with the need of police and fire department personnel who must deal with a broad ran:;e of emergencies on an g hoc basis. In order to perfcrm effectively, police and fire personnel must be able to resolve localized problems via g hoc decisionmaking and utilize lateral communications to achieve the L_________._.________._.____.___-_____._____.____.____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

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desired results. Apparently, the Interveners feel that this approach should be applied to ORD activities in the EPZ. Should this be the case, widespread a,d hoc decisionmaking by field personnel would quickly lead to chaos because it amounts to decisionmaking in a vacuum. App. Reb. No. 22, ,

l 'ff. Tr. 27223 at 2-3.

7.1.34. The command personnel at the Staging Area and EOC have a view of the " broad picture" relative to other emergency response activities that may be taking place beyond the " vision" of field personnel who may be involved with a response to a localized event. Additionally, they have access to a pool of knowledge and information relative to resources available to the ORO for responding to an " emergency occurring within an emergency." App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223 at 3.

7.1.35. The vertical comand structure utilized by the OR0, however, does not require that all communications must first be vertically transmitted, processed and recommunicated through the entire ORO chain of command for resolution. App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223 at 3.

7.1.36. The vertical comand structure utilized by the OR0 allows for decisions to be made and problems to be resolved at each of the various levels of its structure. The more complex problems necessarily must move higher up the chain of comand for resolution while the less complicated problems are resolved at a lower leul within the comand structure (Staging Area). App. Reb. No. 22, ff Tr. 27223 at 4.

7.1.37. Additionally, there are" intelligence-gathering mechanisms (M/AI and ERN radio monitors) which provide information to the tcp of the comand structure relative to all significant events (problems) taking place in the field. These information m9chanisms are not dependent

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upon.the chain of comand for their operation. App. Reb. No. 22. ff. Tr.

27223 at 4.

7.1.38. As noted earlier, there were allegations that the ORD communications network was not up to the standards of public safety .

. communications because access delays could exceed the allegedly recommended time of 2.5 seconds. It is known that, in general, the standards applied to public safety agency communications do not apply to ORO communications. The communications needs of the ORO differ from the needs of public safety agencies such as police or fire departments.

Whereas, the ORO is responding in _a predetermined manner to the situation of evacuation, public safety agencies must respond in an ad hoc manner to a variety of emergency situations. App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223 at 4-5; Tr. 27298-99. See also Tr. 27314.

7.1.39. ORO Traffic Guides, Route Guides, Transfer Point Dispatchers, Road Crews, and VANS Drivers are provided with two-way radios capable of operating on 'five (Tr. 27257- 58) paired frequencies of the ERN. The ERN allows field personnel the ability to comunicate directly with each other, if necessary, as well as with the Offsite Response E0C and the ORO Staging Area and Reception Centers. In other words, all ERN l radio equipped ORO personnel can talk directly to all other ERN radio I. equipped personnel. The ERN allows communications to occur in both lateral and vertical mcdts as needed during the emergency response. App.

Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223 at 7-Gt- N -27272.

7.1.40. The ERN provides the required communications 3 capabilities to support field operations as outlined by the SPMC both inside and outside the EPZ. These capabilities have been successfully

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demonstrated on numerous occasions during drills and the graded exercise.

App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223 at 8-10. .

7.1.41. Irrespective of the fact that the ORO utilizes a vertical command structure and the need for field personnel to communicate ,

directly with ore another will be minimal, there exists provisions for lateral communications amongst field personnel in the unlikely event this should become necessary. These provisions are supported by both the designed hardware capabilities of the communications networks and equipment and the training provided ORO personnel. App. Reb. No. 22, ff.

Tr. 27223 at 11-12.

7.1.42. At the time of an emergency, Massachusetts State and local authorities will continue to provide the standard functions associated with police, fire and other public safety activities. The NHY ORO maintains the capability to communicate with State and local governments via the MAGI (Mass 6chusetts Governmental Interface) radio network. The MAGI network operates on existing radio frequencies which are routinely utilized by Massachusetts State and local response organiza-tions. App. Reb. No. 22, ff, Tr. 27223 at 13.

7.1.43. During 1985 and 190fi, NHY designed or redesigned, 3 provided and installed many of the primary comm"nication systems now In use by many of the Massachusetts Public Safety entities that would be f involved with a response to an emergency at Seabrook. The ORO MAGI system we.s designed to provide a communications link to these and other public .

safety ertities. The hardware components cf MAGI were thosen and configured to allow compatibility and integration with these public safety l

{

communications systems. Accordingly, riAGI can be thought of as a l

l 1

i

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" Gateway" mechanism allowing the MAGI radio operators at the E0C the ability to monitor the public safety activities taking place in fiassachusetts. App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223 at 13-14.

7.1.44. In the event it becomes necessary, 6ue to the failure .

of primary communications paths between the ORO and Massachusetts Public Safety entities, MAGI will also allow a voice communications link to the various Massachusetts state and local public safety agencies. App. Reb.

No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223 at 14.

7.1.45. During an emergency, should unacceptably heavy communications traffic develop on the channel being utilized by Route Guides or Traffic Guides, it is planned that both the overflow channel and/or the back-up interfacility channel could be utilized as acditional capacity for conveying any necessary communications. Moreover, the drill controller channel could also be used to provide additional capacity in an emergency. This effectively provides three additional channels or a total of five channels (Tr. 27257-58) which could be made available for either l

Boute Guide or Traffic Guide communications. App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr.

27223 at 14-15, 7.1.46. During the graded exercise sc.te Route Gaides and Bus Drivers aissed the one KI ingestion transmission at 1545. FEMA recommendations to alleviate this problem were as f'ollows:.

" Review and revise Attachment 5 of IP 1.4 to include a roll call process or other means to insure appropriate communications are complete." The roll call process was reviewed and it was decided thet it was ir, appropriate to

)

achieve the desired results and, in fact, may be ". counterproductive by contributing significant additional racio traffic to the channel. To I

s a

- 114 - l address this, IP 2.8, Step 5.4.3 now instructs dispatchers to repeat KI ingestion directives to ORO field personnel approximately every 30 minutes to ensure that these personnel receive these instructions upon arrival within the ERN coverage area. App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223 at 18-19. . i 7.1.47. The two-way radios provide the capability for a Traffic Guide at any given TCP or ACP to communicate directly with any other TCP or ACP. Similarly, Route Guides can directly communicate with one another, both in their roles on the buses, and as the providers of notification to hearing impaired. The two-way radios also enable Traffic Guides and Route Guides to report ioad impediments or other information which could impact an evacuation to the appropriate personnel. App. Reb.

No. 22 ff. Tr. 27223 at 19.

7.1.48. Applicants also described the communications l capabilities available to Transfer Point Dispatchers, Road Crews, and Ambulance Drivers. App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223 at 19-22. The Board finds these to be adequate for the purpose intended.

1 l 7.1.49. ORO field personnel issued two-way radios operating on

(

the ERN hcVe been provided training on their use.. This classroom training l

1s included in Module 20 of the 020 Emergency Plan Training program, which 1

specifically d19 cusses guidacce for ORO field personnel on how to 1

communicate with each other over the ERN. In addition, walk-through drills were conducted in preparation for the FEMA Graded exercise

'of June 28 and 29, 1988. App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27?23 at 22-23 and L

j. Attachs. D & E.

7.1.50. There was an appreciable amount of radio traffic during  ;

the exercise and at some points delays may have resulted. However, at no

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point 'did radio ' traffic preclude any needed communication from occurring.

Recognizing that radio traffic can be heavy, training of all ORO personnel issued two-way radios emphasizes the need to limit radio communication to that which is required. Other important communications protocols are also emphasized. App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223 at 23 and Attach. D.

7.1.51. Some portion of the congestion during the exercise was caused by controller use of radios as opposed to actual players. Tr.

27277; Tr. 27285; Tr. 27320.

7.1.52. The ability of the ORO to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel (Objective #4) was met during the FEMA Graded exercise for Seabrook. App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 27223 at 23; App. Er 43F at 204-207 [ global 212-15].

7.1.53. JI-34 raised the issues as to whether communications for the notification and mobilization of response personnel are aGquate.

' Contentions Memo. at 41-42.

7.1.54. All bases for JI-34 were withdrawn by MAG except Basis C, which raised an issue as to whether the SPMC contained adequate provisions for alerting and notifying emergency pzrsonnel responsible for driving the various conveyances involved. Contentions Memo. at 42, 7.1.55. FEMA has found that the SPMC does centain adequate provision for notifying ORO response perscnnel. App. Ex. 43C at 22-23

[ global 40-41], L9-34 [ global 47-52].

i 7.1.56. MAG submitted the only direct testimony filed by ariy opponent with reference to this issue and it consisted of a paragraph which speculated, in effect, that if an emergency occurs during late afternoon or early evening or on weekends, the drivers will not be at

1

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work, and may not be at home to receive a telephone call. Mangan Dir.,

l ff. Tr.19429 at 37. This speculative te,stimony is not enough to defeat the rebuttable presumption of adequacy accorded by the FEMA finding.

7.1.57. JI-35 raises the issue of the adequacy of the SPMC's l EBS messages and news releases. Contentions Memo. at 42-43.

7.1.58. FEMA has found SPMC to be adequate in this respect.

App. Ex. 43C at 27-28 [ global 45, 46]; App. Ex. 43F at 215-18 202-207

[ global 223-26 210-215].

7.1.59. JI-36 raises the issue of the adequacy of the procedures for coordinating with the news media. Contentions Memo. at 43-44.

7.1.60. FEMA has found SPMC to be adequate in this respect.

App. Ex. 43C at 39-41 [ global 57-59); App. Ex. 43F at 218-20 [ global 226-28].

7.1.61. MAG EX-9 raises the issue of whether the exercise demonstrated that ORD had the ability to effectively communicate with the public. Contentions Memo _. st 95-98.

7.1.52. MAG's witness with respect to these issues was T.

Michael Carter. Carter Dir. , ff. Tr. 27546, passim.

7.1.63. Dr. Carter began with a dissertation on what he believed the criteria for constructing EBS messages should be which were taken from Dr. Dennis Mileti's testimony in the NHRERP phase of this proceeding, Aop. Dir. No. 7, ff. Tr. 5622 at 149-59, and Sorenren, Vogt,  !

1 and Mileti, Evacuation: An Assessment of Planaing and Resources, ORNL- ]

1 6376 5.4 at 110-12, and Perry, t.indell and Greene, Evacuation Plannina il j i

l i

i I

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Emergency Management (1981), embellished with hurricane warning overtones.

Carter Dir. , ff. Tr. 27546 at 5-19.

7.1.64. He criticized the prescripted EBS messages generally because they fail to give instructions to all persons in the EPZ, incorporate a statement as to the actual or forecasted 74sk severity of the release or potential health effect of the release, and instruct listeners as to how to prepare for future actions which may be taken. His testimony then particularized his criticisms of the exercise EBS messages.

Carter Dir., ff. Tr. 27546 at 20-32.

7.1.65. These criticisms concern EBS messages infoming one group in the EPZ (e.g., boaters, beach and wildlife refuge visitors, and residents of distinct towns in the Massachusetts EPZ) to take protective actions without informing other groups within the EPZ of those actions and why they are being taken except b; issuance of news releases. Dr. Carter asserts that this division of instructions creates confusion and anxiety.

Id. at 21. See also App. Reb. No. 19, ff. Tr. 27843 at 32.

7.1.66. The prescripted messages, however, do give recommended actions to all members of the EPZ. These nessages are designed to give recommended actions to people in the EPZ based on the risk which they face. Everyone in the EPZ is advised to stay tuned to the EBS station.

People in towns are advised to consult emergency infomation materials sent to their homes or information flyers at beach and recreation facilities. People who would be safe if they sneltered r.re advised to do so, and thosa who should evacuate are so advised. A.pp. Reb. No. 19, ff, j l

Tr. 27843 at 32. I

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7.1.67. It would be inappropriate to include potential health effects in EBS messages, contrary to Dr. Carter's suggestion, for the danger is that it might detract from the needed certainty of the message and lead to the public's discounting or second guessing the risk. App.

' Reb. No. 19, ff. Tr. 27843 at 33.

7.1.68. The EBS messages do refer listeners to the public information materials for further information and to stay tuned to the EBS station or a local radio station. Any further preparatory information, as Dr. Carter suggests, would be based on speculation regarding the unknown course of the emergency. Such speculation is not required for the needed attention and focus to the message. To the contrary, this type of j speculation would probably induce more of the anxiety and confusion that Dr. Carter wants to avoid. App. Reb. No. 19, ff. Tr. 27843 at 34.

7.1.69. Dr. Carter decried the facts that during the exercise ORO gave no message to the public until after the State of New Hampshire had issued information and closed the New Hampshire beaches and that the ORO messages, when issued, did not tell people that New Hampshire beaches ]

had been closed or give a recommendation for visitors to Massachusetts beaches or the wildlife refuge. Carter Dir. , ff. Tr. 27546 at 24.

7.1.70. He criticized the distinction of functions between the l EBS system and the news release system. Carter Dir., ff. Tr. 27546 at 3?-35. In this his quarrel is not with the SPMC, but Patter may be with g nuidance of NUREG-0654 that there be separate med b enteg ar.d_F;B_S,S systems. Tr. 27628-30.

7.1.71. He criticized the way ORD is set up to handle the media; he feels that it is necessary to be ready for a potentially i

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disruptive and highly-charged atmosphere; he opined that during the graded exercise, messages were haphazard and delayed and in a real emergency, a hostile press would have used these matters to say that those in charge did not know what they were doing. Carter Dir., ff. Tr. 27546 at 39-41. .

7.1.72. Dr. Carter has no background or expertise in the area of emergency planning for nuclear facility emergencies; his training and experience has been exclusively in connection with regional weather related disasters, principally hurricanes. Tr. 27504; Tr. 27635-37..

Dr. Carter's testimony draws upon his weather related disaster experience.

Admittedly weather related disasters, which are regional, present different uncertainties as to risk and protective actions than nuclear point source hazards. Tr. 27600-04. The weight to be given his evaluations of the SPMC EBS messages and procedures must be examined against this backdrop.

7.1.73. Applicants presented, with respect to these matters, a panel of witnesses consisting'of Anthony M. Callendrello, Manager, Energency Planning Licensing - New Hampshire Yanke9 (Qualifications Tr.

17318), Dennis S. Miloti, Professor of Sociology and Director of the Hazards Assessment Laboratory, Colorado State University (Qualifications Tr. 17318); and Gary Catapano, President - ALLCOMM, INC. (Qualifications Tr. 27223). App. Reb. No. 19, ff. Tr. 27843, passim.

7.1.74. Applicants have described in detail the public

)

information resources and personnel available to execute SPMC. App. Reb. j No. 19, ff. Tr. 27843 at ?-11]O,. f l

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7.1.75. Similarly, they have described the methods by which

, emergency information will be developed, disseminated, and coordinated under SPMC. App. Reb. No. 19, ff. Tr. 27843 at 11-22-18, 21-22.

7.1.76. Facilities and equipment for the media have been provided at the Media Center, not the EOF. Consistent with current NRC guidance, the media need not be accommodated at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) as alleged. " Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities", NUREG-0696 (February,1981). In fact, their presence there l

might interfere with emergency response activities. ,(Cf. Carter Dir. , ff.

Tr. 27546 at 39-40.,}, With respect.to accommodating the media, it is I

important to provide them accurate and timely information., as well as reasonable access to authoritative sources of information. The Media Center functions and processes provide this type of information and access l- to official utility and governmental information without interference with response activities. Similarly, the Public Information Advisor (PIA) functions and processes at the E0C provide for the coordination of information between the E0C and the Media Center, Finelly, the close proximity of the Media Center to the EOF and C0C and.their equipment assure that information flows will be prompt and authoritative sources of information can be readily available that might not otherwise be airpdy available at the Media Center. App. Reb. No. 19, ff. Tr. 27843 at 4F t3.

7.1.77, Videspread disseraination (both local and national) of .

I n2w:: is assured regardless of attendance at the Media Center because $PMC )

procedures require news releases to be provided to AP and UPI wire services (SPMC at 5.6.7.5.7.2). Therefore, local and national broadcast media stations will have access to all news releases in a timely manner i

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i

)

! since virtually all TV and radio stations receive either or both wire l

l services. App. Reb. No.19. ff. Tr. 27843 at 43.

l 7.1.78. The SPMC also provides adequate procedures to ensure that media inquiries to the Media Relations Assistants at the Joint Telephone Information Center (JTIC) will be responded to with official utility and governmental information. Current EBS messages issued by the utility are provided promptly to the JTIC by the PIA as soon as they are approved. Similarly, the Public Information Coordinator (PIC) provides the JTIC with copies of all news releases and EBS messages issued by other organizations at the Media Center. App. Reb. No. 19, ff. Tr. 27843 at 43-44.

7.1.79. In an actual emergency, PARS will depend on the risk to the affected public. Recommendations to evacuate a specific pcpulation, for example, will depend on the existing and projected risk of exposure.

That risk is location and time specific depending on meteorological conditions, distance from the release, and other factors concerning the status of response functions. These factors pertaining to risk were built into the exercise scenario. Thus, cotamunities in New Hampshire might be evacuated sooner than communities in The Commonwealth depending on meteorological and distance factors. The Exercise scenario indeed required communities in New Hampshire to take protective actions sooner than communities in The Commonwealth based on the plume trajectory. Thus, EBS messages reflecting the PARS were issued sooner in New Hampshire than in The Commonwealth. This was consistent with the exercise scenario and found to be adequate by FEMA. App. Reb. No. 19, ff. Tr. 27843 at 54.

s

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7.1.80. EBS messages for Massachusetts are developed by the Public Information Staff in' the E0C and are coordinated with the New Hampshire E0C Operations Officer in the Concord EOC as well as New Hampshire officials in the EOC prior to final approval by the NHY Offsite ,

Response Director. Overall coordination of EBS messages is further ensured by the fact that the Media Center provides a mechanism and a facility for representatives of the principal State, Federal and utility response organizations-to coordinate and interact on public information matters. In addition, representatives of the ORD, the onsite Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and the State of New Hampshire review all news releases and EBS messages at the JTIC prior to distributing them to their staff. This provides another process for the review, coordination and correction, if necessary, of EBS messages and news releases. App. Reb.

No. 19, ff. Tr. 27843 at 55-56.

7.1.81. Applicants have made the following commitments as to EBS messeges: The prescripted EBS messages which are carrently located in the plan will be incorporated into IP 2.13 in the next revision of the SPMC. App. Reb. ilo.19, ff. Tr. 27843 at 11. References to the telephone book insert will be removed from the EBS messages and the plan. Tr.

I 27877-78. Ga rree t- 4 n fe rma ti en-w444 -b e-4 eies ep e ra te d- 4 nt e- EB S-me s s e g e-We r 17-as-4 dent 4(4ed-by-MAG,--Tee-27879-81,  ;

I 7.1.82. JI-39 raised the issue of the adequacy of PIM.

Coateg, ions Memo at 24.  ;

7.1.83. /.11 aspects of this contention were withdrawn by I i

stipulation, save one, and that is the issue of whether the transients in I

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the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ will have adequate access to PIM.

Stipulation, ff. Tr. 28285, t

7.1.84. Applicants will distribute, according to SPMC 9 3.7, PIM to a large number of facilities such as hotels, motels, restaurants, ,

campgrounds and parks, frequented by transients. Tr. 27872-73; Tr.

27876-77.

7.1.85. The Commonwealth has prevented the Applicants from erecting signs on beaches, as will be done in New Hampshire, to alert people as to the meaning of the sirens. Tr. 27967-68. Applicants stand ready to erect signs when, as, and if The Commonwealth pemits such activity. I_d . In addition, Applicants are pursuing alternative approaches, such as use of billboards. Tr. 27968-69.

7.1.86. Based upon the foregoing, the Board finds that the Massachusetts transients are afforded sufficient access to PIM.

7.2. RULINGS OF LAW 7.2.1. The provisions of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) require that means

exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations and to emergency personnel and tc the public. It does not require that communications provisions exist so that members of the public can telephone requests for assistance should the need arise.

7.3. CONCLUSIONS 1

l' 7.3.1. Relationships between OR0 and other organizations are adequately defined and adequate provisions for communications between ORD I

and such organizations have been provided.

7.3.2. SPMC does not place undue reliance on the commercial q a

telephone system.

l J

L __ . _._. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .]

1

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7.3.3. There is adequate provision for communications between and among persons in the field.

7.3.4. There are adequate provisions for notifying response personnel.

7.3.5. The EBS messages are adequate.

7.3.6. Adequate provision has been made for communications with the media in the event of a radiological emergency.

7.3.7. Adequate provision has been made for PIM.

8. PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR PARTICULAR POPULATIONS 8.1. ' FINDINGS OF FACT 8.1.1. Six SPMC contentions, being JI-45 through JI-50, were litigated which dealt with protective actions for particular populations.

L 8.1.2. JI-45 raises the issue of whether there existed reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken with respect to school and day care center populations. Contentions I

Memo. at 48-52. JI-46 raises the same issue with respect to hospital populations and those who become contaminated-injured. Contentions Memo.

at 53-57.

8.1,3. JI-47 raises the issue of whether the SPMC contains adequate protective mer.sures whicn can and will be taken with respect to 1

institutionalized persons who cannot be evacuated. Contentions Memo, at 58-59, i

8.1.4. JI 48 raises the issue of whether the Applicants have properly identified the special needs populations within the EPZ or the l-solutions to those needs. Contentions Memo. at 59-61.

1  !

l

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8.1.5. JI-49 raises the issue of whether the provisions for assisting the special needs resident population are adequate. Contentions Memo. at 61-63.

8.1.6. Finally, JI-50 raises the question of whether the .

Applicants have identified all of the special needs facilities located in the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ. Contentions Memo. at 64-70.

8.1.7. In addition, a number of issues with respect to protective actions for Massachusetts schools were raised in connection with the contentions filed with respect to the exercise.

8.1.8. MAG EX-9(A) and (B) raise issues as to whether the EBS messages issued during the graded exercise were confusing as to the status and selected protective action for schools and, in particular, whether an inaccurate EBS message was broadcast with respect to the Newburyport Schools. Contentions Memo. at 96-97.

8.1.9. MAG-EX-10 alleges that the ORO was unable to notify all day care centers and schools; in particular, the attempts to reach a l school in Amesbury were criticized; it was also alleged that the PAR  ;

. 1 decision was made too late by the OR0 decisionmakers, that efforts to communicate the PAR were confusing and conflicting, and particularly, it is alleged that a certain message, ELS #3 was particularly confusing as to I whether children could or should be pf cked up or remain in school.

Contentions Memo, at 98-105 i

8.1.10. MAG-EX-11(B)(2) alleg6s that 0RO erred in not ordeH ag an early scho,; closing as the State of New Hampshire did; Contentions Memo. at 107; MAG-EX-11(B)(4) alleges that an OR0 PAR to hold children in school pa'st normal closing times was a " disastrous" one; id,. at 108; MAG-

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EX-11(D) states that the school PAR decisionmaking process of the ORO was g hoc and not guided by preset procedures,jd_. at 109-10.

8.1.11. FEMA has found that the provisions of SPMC with respect to special needs populations are adequate. App. Ex. 43C at 57 [ global ,

75],60-62[ global 78-80], 64-65 [ global 82-83].

8.1.12. MAG introduced the testimony of Maureen Mangan and John Paolillo; this consisted of a survey of bus, ambulance and tow truck companies being relied upon by SPMC.. rrom this survey, the witnesses stated their personal belief that the number of emergency vehicles that will respond with reasonable assurance will be substantially less than the numbers set forth in the LOAs in the SPMC. Mangan Dir. , ff. Tr.19429 at 20-21, 36-38, 38-39.

8.1.13. MAG witness Sikich testified to a number of criticisms of SPMC in the special needs area. Sikich Dir., ff. Tr. 20800, passim.

8.1.14. Mr. Sikich clearly overstated his background expertise and qualifications and did so to an extent that draws into question his credibility as a witness.

8.1.15. He stated his educational background to include, among other things:

"M.A., Management: Central Michigan University (graduate I studies)"

Sikich [ sir. , ff. Tr. 20800, resulae, p. 2.

8.1.16. Crcss-examination revealed the entry for "M.A.,

Management" was supposedly not intended to mislead the reader into j

)

believing he had a Master of Arts in Management, but rather that he studied in such a program, not completing the degree, Tr. 20249; indeed, he never attended classes on the Central Michigan University Campus, Tr.

__i___i.__________________.____________________________________._______ _. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

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20249, and did not know how many classes he took, Tr. 20250. Although he admitted that it would be incorrect for him to claim to have a Master of Science in Psychology, Tr. 20238, or a Master of Arts in Educational Psychology, Tr. 20240, it was revealed that he has claimed both, one in a -

resume, App. Ex. 69 and Tr. 20238-40, the other on a perss nel form on which he wrote that his major was educational psychology pe>senally-wrote in-the-begus-ela4m. App. Ex. 70 for identification and Tr. 20240-42.

8.1.17. Mr. Sikich claimed he was " negotiating tae publication of a book [he] wrote on emergency planning and preparedness." Sikich Dir., ff. Tr. 20800 at 12. The book is not completed and there has been l no result of the alleged negotiation. Tr. 20256-57.

1 8.1.18. Mr. Sikich in his direct testimony at least implied that he had the entire responsibility for developing the initial emergency preparedness training program for Detroit Edison's Fermi 2 Reactor, Sikich Dir., ff. Tr. 20800 at 4; this claim, if made, was untrue at least in part, Tr. 20547-48. He admitted that, in fact, an outside corporation had developed the program. Tr. 20270. He claimed in his direct testimony that he " wrote the Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Training Instruction Manual for Detroit Edison in 1982." Sikich Dr. ff. Tr. 20800 at 12. He admitted under cross-examination that a large part of the manual was in fact the compilation of materials written by others. Tr.

20266-67.

S.I.19. Mr. Sikich testified that when he left the Byron Plar.t in Illinois to go to work at the Comanche Peak facility in Texas, the Byron project engineer for Impell, his then employer, was satisfied with -

the quality of his work. Tr. 20273. Mr. Seier, who was a Division a

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Manager of the Operating Service Division for Impell Corporation and Mr. Sikich's superior, testified that Mr. Sikich had been removed from the  !

Byron project at the request of the project engineer, Tr. 20480, a fact which had been made known to Mr. Sikich. Tr. 20481-82. ,

8.1.20. Mr. Sikich testified that after contluding his second i

Comanche Peak Plant assignment for Impell, he "went back to the Chicago area and became self-employed." Sikich Dir., ff. Tr. 20800 at 7. On cross-examination, Mr. Sikich admitted stated that upon returning to Impell's Chicage office his collateral duties were suspended, Tr. 20279, and that subsequently his employment was terminated. Tr. 20279- 80. Mr. j Seier also testified that Mr. Sikich had been fired from Impell because of )

negative feedback from two key clients, an-4 nab 414ty-te-werk-with-elfents-ewtraging-fellow-employees-by, taking credit for work ethers fellow employees had done, and expense account and hourly time charge irregularities. Tr. 20499-501; App. Ex. 72.

8.1.21. Mr. Sikich also claimed to have spent 31 months doing l

evacuation studies and revising some offdte emergency plans for dene l

extensive-werk-in-emergeney-plann4ng-at the LaSalle and Dresden plants in Illinois. Sikich Dir., ff. Tr. 20800 at 6. See also Tr. 20276-77. His involvement was actually not nedere-near t. extensive, consisting at o_f verification of work performed by others as-elaimed. Tr. 20480-81.

8.1.22. In his direct testihony, Mr. Sikich claimed: "At the Vogtle Plant we were successful in, one putting together offsite emergency plans and, two, identifying problems and having them taken care of internally and to the satisfaction of outside observers." Sikich Dir. ,

ff. Tr. 20800 at 8. Cross-examination and other evidence from his

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supervisors on that job demonstrate that "we" in the above-quoted sentence was not to be read As "me"; Tr. 20309; all the plans for Vogtle were l

drafted and in essentially final stage before he arrived, App. Exs. 74 &

75; Tr. 20385- 87, 20391; and the one county plan he primarily worked on, .

in fact, covered an area which had zero population and no special facilities, Tr. 20295; App. Exs. 76, 77; Tr. 20304; Tr. 20391-92.

8.1.23. His direct testimony appeared to imply that Mr. Sikich held a number of copyrights and trademarks or had applications pending therefore. Sikich Dir., ff, Tr. 20800, resume; App. Ex. 78; in fact, no

. applications for such matters had ever been made; and, although he was aware that there is a formal copyright application process, he claimed to believe that a copyright may also be effectuated simply by placing a copyright symbol by the name of a document. Tr. 20314-17. See also Tr.

20320-21.

8.1.24. His direct testimony stated he had developed a system called AUDITRAK which was an emergency preparedness compliance project and went on to say "A prototype version of this system was used at Texas Utilities' Comanche Peak Plant." Sikich Dir., ff. Tr. 20600 at 10.

Cross-examination revealed that the prototype was developed by another person. Tr. 20318-19; see also Tr. 20328-29.

8.1.25. Mr. Sikich testified on direct: "I have also developed federally-mandated hazardous materials response plans for clients in Indiana and Illinois. The Indiana plan is currently being used and recommended by state officials as a model plan for all hazardous riaterials e esponse planning for local emergency planning comittees." Sikich Dir.,

ff. Tr. 20800 at 13. Only some six weeks before he adopted that testimony

r

t.  !

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. under oath, he had been forced by the State of Indiana to withdraw that .j 1

claim because (a) he aid riot, in fact, really develop the plan alone and ,

)

. (b) because it had not been adopted by the State. App. Exs. 80, 81; Tr.

]

20331-37; Tr. 20625-31.

8.1.26. It was brought out that Mr. Sikich has issued brochures j 4

indicating certain utilities are his clients when, in reality, they were clients of other companies to whom_he subcontracted. These brochures also listed a mar =gement consulting engagement under which he, in fact, has )

done no work. App. Ex. 83; Tr. 20360-64. See also Tr. 20394-97.

8.1.27. Turning to the merits of his testimony, Mr. Sikich at times demonstrated little familiarity with both-his-test 4meny,-e,gr,-Tr.

BG634-35,-and the SPMC, ed ., Tr. 20636-37, 20638-41, 20644, 20706-08; Tr.

20796-97; Tr. 20713.

8.1.28. This lack of familiarity with SPMC perhaps accounted for some of the illogical positions he takes; for example, he is concerned that phone lines will be so jammed that the liaisons will not be able to get through to schools and other special facilities; but, those calls will be made at the Alert emergency classification level before the public is generally aware of any problem, and therefore, it is difficult to accept the concept that the phone lines will be jamed by worried friends and relatives. See Tr. 20727.

8.1.29. In addition, Mr. Sikich has demonstrated that he has no unique knowledge of the specific needs or capabilities of the various special facilities located within the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook EPZ. He admitted that he has not interviewed any school principals or special facility administrators. Tr. 20646. He has not

f i

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personally ascertained made-a-determination-regarding the number of communication lines to or from any of these facilities. Tr. 20647.

8.1.30. It appears that much of Mr. Sikich's criticism of SPMC is basically grounded in his belief that a utility plan should be held to a hicher standard than a State plan. 4t-4s-4mpess4H e-fer-a-util4ty-te eeme-up-w4th-an-emergeney-pian-en-4ts-ewnr Tr. 20648; Tr. 20799.

l 8.1.31. Mr. Sikich claims with respect to the schools that I

there are not enough liaisons for the schools and they will get so hung up answering questions during the initial phone calls that they will not be able to complete all their calls in an appropriate amount of time; he

' believes ORO should supply staff at each school to explain things and thus avoid confusion which he surmises will otherwise occur; he claims there are not enough buses which will be available to evacuate the schools; and, finally, he argues that a site-specific plan for each school is required.

Sikich Dir., ff. Tr. 20800 at 15-21, 27-35.

8.1.32. As to hospitals, Mr. Sikich alleges that the telephone lines into the hospitals will become jamed as relatives of patients call in, thus preveriting ORO from reaching the hospital in order to ascertain transportation needs. He complains of a deerfes-the lack of individual plans for each hospital and claims that there is not enough host hospital bed capacity for those who will be evacuated. In addition, Mr. Sikich testified tnat the SPMC does not contain enough information on the shelter potential of the hospitals; that there will not be sufficient hospital staff to assist in the evacuation and to care for those remaining in the hospital, especially at night; and, that there are not enough ORO staff to

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assist in the cases of people who have to shelter in a hospital for lack of ability to move. Sikich Dir., ff. Tr. 20800 at 22-27.

8.1.33. After the cross-examination above described MAG withdrew a total of five additional pieces of prefiled testimony by Mr. ,

Sikich. Tr. 22274-75, 22278,.22298; Tr. 23939; Tr. 25813, 25814.

8.1.34. MAG Witness Moriearty gave testimony which described various kinds of disabilities which she feels should be considered in the planning process; asserted that a disproportionate portion of persons with disabilities are poor; and argued that the SPMC is deficient because it concentrates only upon certain disabilities, i.e., those which give rise to a need for transportation and hearing impairment which would prevent a person from hearing warning sirens. Moriearty Dir., ff. Tr. 20151, passim.

8,1,BEr--Ms,-Mer4earty-alse-444Wstrated-the-peint-ef-v4ew-ef-The Gemmenwealth-4n-th4s-preeeedingr-by-4nd4 eating-that-she-wowid-net-make ava44able-to-App 44eants-the-4nfermatien-that-her-agency-had-gethered eeneerning-the-handleapped,--Ter-201735-20175.

8.1.36. Ms. Moriearty indicated her view that even the techniques used by her agency and other state agencies to identify the handicapped (including public service announcements and media coverage) did not reach, in her judgment, the full disabled population of The Commonwealth, Tr. 20192-94, 20205-06; and she suggested advocated fa'ce to face contact and an "all out effort to talk directly with the

[ disabled]wheneverpossible." Tr. 20206. She did note, however, that Applicants' media coverage enhanced the response of individuals in filling out special needs forms, Id., and that the Applicants' efforts

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i to gather information as- to areas of functional need were very good.

Tr.'20189.

8.1.36.1. Ms. Morierty stated that her agency maintains several thousand crse records from which aggregate analyses and analyses .

of disability type, necessary special equipment, family and social situation and of economic resources are performed. Tr. 20195-96.

8.1.37. Ms. Moriearty also made-elear stated, however, that her agency would not even identify individuals known to it without

-those individuals' permission even if the health and safety of those individuals would thereby be placed in greater jeopardy, Tr. 20211-14; and asserted it would ba inappropriate to use her outreach program to inform disabled or mentally retarded persons to contact the Applicants so as to be sure their needs are considered in the event of an emergency.

l Tr. 20173-75.

i 8.1.37.1. She did say, however, that her agency would provide I

technical assistance and share information which would not require disclosure of individual names. Tr. 20158. This kind of information would be useful to the Applicants in emergency planning. Tr. 20187-88.

And, to be sure, her office has given technical assistance in support of emergency planning for Pilgrim. Tr. 20186, 20198.

8.1.38. MAG witness Sikich, while admitting to no expertise with respect to persons with disabilities nevertheless felt competent to, and did, agree wholeheartedly with Ms. Moriearty's criticisms of the plan and stated that more detailed knowledge is needed and provisions must be made for persons with additional disabilities to those already addressed. .

Sikich Dir., ff. Tr. 20800 at 36-39.

_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._= . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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l l 8.1.39. MAG also presented the' testimony of Guy Daines,

?

Director of Civil Emergency Services for Pinellas County, Florida. : Daines q l

Dir., ff. Tr. 19515, passim.

8.1.40. Mr. Daines' organization did a mail survey similar to .

l that done by the Applicants to ascertain the names and locations of those who would need assistance in an emergency, using a combination of bulk mailing and utility bill inserts in follow-up; whereas Applicants' survey revealed a list of handicapped persons equal to about 1% of the population; see App. Ex. 42, App. M; Mr. Daines' survey in his county revealed a. total of 3,000 out of 830,000 persons, equal only to some 4/10thsof1 percent (0.004). Daines Dir., ff. Tr. 19515 at 2-4, 5,.

8.1.40.1. While Mr. Daines stated that the effort to identify the special needs population in his county had been more extensive,  !

having been complied over a period of 8-9 years, Daines Dir., ff. Tr.

19515 at 7, on cross examination he could not say that annual updating  ;

had improved the county list. Tr. 19539-40.

8.1.41. Mr. Daines argues that the return card survey method is  !

deficient because of the hesitancy of the population with disabilities to self-identify. It is his assertion that there are likely to be many people who should be, but are not, on the list and they will come out in an emergency and there will not be adequate resources.be-ne-fae444 ties to cope with them. Daines Dir., ff. Tr.19515 at 5-10. His basis for this 1

'is his recall of a survey (which was not provided) of essentially unknown i authorship which he alleges supports the intuitively unlikely concept that over one person in twenty- five in an evacuating population will require assistance. Tr. 19566-74.

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8.1.42. Mr. Daines 'also criticizes SPMC for lack of staff to load the elderly or disabled into vehicles and lack of extra vehicles to handle the oysrflow not on the list which he (.laims will surely n terialize in a real emergency. At the same time, however, he stated .

that his experience was that other individuals who had been pre-identified did not, in fact, require assistance during actual emergencies, thus

. presumably freeing up response resources. He advocates a medically-trained person on every bus utilized to evacuate special needs persons. Daines Dir., ff. Tr. 19515 at 8, 11- 13.

8.1.43. Mr. Daines did acknowledge that SPMC met what he termed basic requirements as to special needs. Tr. 19544, 19583.

8.1.44. T0A witness, Police Chief Cronin testified that certain facilities are not included in SPMC that should be. Cronin Dir., ff. Tr.

16267 at 18-19.

8.1.45. Emergency planning for special facilities has been hampered by the fact that a number of public and private institutions, schools, resource groups, hospitals and other institutions have refused to participate in planning out of deference to the stand of the Governor of The Commonwealth against Seabrook. E3 ., Tr. 18842-43, 18970, 18974, 1

19011.

8.1.46. Where a nursing home or other facility would not cooperate, the planning basis for special needs vehicles was based upon a "best guess," with the actual transportation requirements to be verified at the time of an actual emergency. Tr. 21369.

. 8.1.47. FEMA has found the SPMC provisions with respect to l

protective actions for schools, hospitals, and special needs populations l

1

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I

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to be' adequate. App. Ex. 43C at 38-39 [ global 56-57]', 57 [ global 75],

~

60-62 [ global 78-80], 64-65 [ global 82-83).

l-8.1.48. Applicants addressed these matters with a panel of witnesses consisting of Anthony M. Callendrello, Manager Emergency Preparedness Licensing, New Hampshire Yankee (Qualifications ff. Tr.

17318); Michael C. Sinclair, Emergency Planning Specialist, Aidikoff l

Associates (Qualifications admitted Tr. 20807) E and Dennis.S. Mileti, Professor of Sociology and Director of the Hazards Assessment Laboratory, Colorado State University (Qualifications ff. Tr.17318). App. Reb. No.

6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 1-64.

8.1.49. The Board finds that these witnesses were competent to testify with respect to the areas they addressed.

8.1.50. Appendix M of the SPMC, which is reviewed and updated at least annually, contains a listing of all presently known schools, I

special facilities and special populations in the six EPZ communities.

App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 3.

8.1.51. Applicants have committed to include the intervenor identified special facilities in the SPMC Appendix M listing. App. Reb.

No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 3-8.

8.1.52. Applicants have committed to updating the data on day care centers quarterly due to apparent volatility of this segment of the 5/ Mr. Sinclair's qualifications were admitted in this phase of the

~

proceeding at the referenced page. For some reason they were not bound into the transcript. His qualifications do appear in the transcript of the NHRERP phase of the case ff. Tr. 4222.

I

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special facilities universe. Tr. 21637-43. See also Tr. 21112; Tr.

21115;. MAG Ex. 86; Tr.'21186-92.

8.1.53. Applicants are not presently relying upon any public or private social service advocacy organizations within or adjacent to the i

EPZ. However,-Applicants intend to contact all such handicapped advocacy {

organizations in Northeastern Massachusetts which deal with the various categories of handicapped and seek assistance. Tr. 21057.

8.1.54. -An I_ndividuals in an elderly housing project would be identified through the special needs survey. Tr. 21265-66.

8.1.55. FEMA has thoroughly reviewed a special needs survey done by the Applicants. Tr. 18101. The survey was found by FEMA to be in full compliance with FEMA guidance with respect to such surveys, Tr.

18097, and, indeed, went beyond FEMA guidance requirements Tr. 18099-100.

8.1.56. Indeed, it is the position of FEMA that Applicants have made every possible effort to identify the special needs population done an-excellent-feb-4n-bu(4 ding-and-semmitt4ng-te-maintain-the-database, and the Board so finds. Tr. 18831-32, 18842, 18868-71.

8.1.57. Special needs individuals identified have been assigned to one of the five categories of special needs in order to provide a response specific to the individual's condition. The five needs codes were selected to enable the ORD to adequately respond to an individual's i

needs in an emergency. The needs codes and the corresponding categories are:

01 - Evacuation Bed Bus 02 - Wheel-chair van I

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03 - Curbside pick-up 04 - Hearing impaired 05 - Sight impaired  !

The SPMC includes notification methods and transportation provisions j specifically tailored to the needs code. (Needs codes in Appendix M will be revised.to reflect evacuation bed buses.) App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr.

21049 at 16-17.

8.1.58. Transportation for the handicapped has been sized to assure that there is transport for persons required to accompany such individuals from their homes or institutions. Tr. 20874-75.

8.1.59. The assumption of SPMC is that transportation will have to be provided for 100% of the population of each facility. Tr. 21267; Tr. 21330-31.

8.1.60. In the event a call to verify needs for a special facility or homebound individual is unanswered and the failure to answer is not satisfactorily explained by other facts known to ORD, the default value vehicle or vehicles will be dispatched. Tr. 21073.

8.1.61. All pre-identified persons will get the vehicle they need. Tr. 23155.

8.1.62. While not required, supporting plans specific to the type of facility (i.e., school, day care center, or nursing home, etc.)

were developed. The plans contain sufficient basic infonnation and instructions to assist a facility in implementing protective actions and j provide directions on how to interact with the ORD. The plans also contain spaces to gather specific emergency-related information such as telephone numbers and transportation needs as part of the pre-emergency j.

i

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planning process.. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 18-19; see also Tr.

21204-05.

8.1.63. Each special facility identified in the SPMC has been or will be offered a copy of an emergency plan specific to its type of l- facility, with an offer of assistance from NHY planners in tailoring the plan to reflect the circumstances of each facility. These plans use standard radiological emergency response plan techniques which are in use in The Commonwealth for other fixed nuclear sites. Tr. 21203; Tr.

21219-20; Tr. 21632. However, these supporting plans are not essential to ensure the' protection of health and safety during an emergency since other mechanisms exist within the SPMC to compensate for the lack of a specific plan for each facility. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 19; Tr. 21205; Tr. 21219-20; Tr. 21632.

8.1.64. Applicants remain ready to sit down with all special facilities willing to do so and tailor the generic facility-specific plan to their needs. Tr. 21194; Tr. 21204-05; Tr. 21632.

8.1.65. The plans which have been generated would be usable without drills and training; indeed, past history has shown that nursing homes do a good job in most disasters with their own plan. Tr. 21222-23.

8.1.66. The responsibility for the care and supervision of school and special facility populations remains with t'he administration and staff during any emergency. The supporting plans for all schools and special facilities are intended to facilitate the implementation of protective actions such as sheltering or evacuation within each facility by the staff and students / residents. Should an evacuation be recommended, and the action concurred with by facility officials, facility staff will

l

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fulfill their responsibilities to ensure that the patients / residents are safely boarded on evacuation vehicles and supervised during and after transport to Reception Centers and/or host facilities. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr.'21049 at 22.  !

8.1.67. The loading of individuals into vans can be assisted by the drivers thereof, if necessary; .in the event of a special conveyance such as an ambulance or wheel chair van, the drivers-thereof are trained, as part of their norcal duties, to do the loading. Tr. 21069-70; Tr.

23156.

8.1.68. Bus Drivers are not trained to assist loading people, but buses will not be sent to transport special needs people requiring

-such assistance. Tr. 23156- 57; Tr. 23158.

8.1.69. In the case of nursing homes, staff is reduced at night, but there-exist provisions for calling in additional staff in an emergency, Tr. 21271, and the experience is that staffs do come in. Tr.

21317.

8.1.70. With respect to the participation of teachers during a protective action, this Licensing Board found in the PID that teachers can be relied upon to perform their duties in an emergency. As this Licensing l

Board there noted, the role of the teachers shifts during an emergency to that of service providers in that they are relied upon to assist and supervise evacuees during transport. Their responsibilities, however, are not significantly different than those which existed prior to the emer-gency, and they are not called upon to perform any extraordinary emergency l

actions. The same rationale applies to other non-medical special facility personnel . NHY will make SPMC orientation available to schools and

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special facility personnel. The SPMC personnel listings represent those individuals who have designated ORO emergency response assignments. The plan oces not designate specific school or special facility staff to i

supervise and assist facility populations during an emergency. Any assignments of individual teachers and staff is an administrative responsibility of the facility, and these individuals will carry out their professional responsibilities to care for the individuals bi;c'er their supervision. Ambulance crews will assist special facility staff in loading individuals to be moved in ambulances. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr.

21049 at 22-23.

8.1.71. Teachers, under the provisions of the SPMC, are relied J upon to do the same things that the MCDA relies upon them to do in plans for other fixed nuclear sites. Tr. 21326, 8.1.72. Homebound special needs individuals will be transported, if necessary, by evacuation bed buses. Tr. 21064.

8.1.73. The evacuation bed buses provided to special facilities will be operated by a driver fully trained to utilize the equipment. At each facility, the driver will be assisted in loading the unit by facility  ;

staff. Where more than one bus unit is assigned to a facility, drivers from other units will be available to assist in loading each of the bus units. When only one unit is assigned to a facility, ORO personnel will be assigned to ensure adequate capability to load the bus. For evacuation bed buses assigned to pick up impaired homebound individuals, ORO personnel will be assigned to assist the driver on each bus. App. Reb.

No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 23-24; Tr. 18837; Tr. 21065-66; Tr. 21279-80.

1

{

t i

t- - 142 - l L 8.1.74. The individuals assisting Bed Bus Drivers will be.

chosen from either the route guide pool or the dosimetry record keeper pool. Tr. 21307-21808.

8.1.75. No special training is required for individuals

- assisting evacuation Bed Bus Drivers. Tr. 21280.

8.1.76. MAG offered testimony to the effect that bed buses could not be registered or licensed as ambulances in Massachusetts. St.

Hilaire et al. Dir ff. Tr. 23209, passim. Voir dire and cross-examination of Gerard St. Hilaire, who is Chief Legal Counsel and a Deputy Register for the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles, showed that the Registry has not previously applied the law of Massachusetts in ways that would be relevant to the facts at issue; St. Hilaire's testimony, which offered his

- advisory testimony on the law, was therefore stricken. Tr. 23232-36.

l 8.1.77. The other member of MAG's panel, Howard Saxner, is a Deputy General Counsel for the Massachusetts Department of Public Health.

He testified that he knew of one instance in which his Department had taken legal action against an out-of-state company that had been providing 1

emergency transportation services in Massachusetts without a Massachusetts 1

ambulance license. Tr. 23238-39. That company, however, operated in  ;

Massachusetts on at least several occasions, was prepared to offer standby care, and most importantly, was not responding to a " major catastrophe."

Tr. 23244. The witness could not recall any occasion on which the Department of Public Health has sought an injunction against a vehicle l L

that is designed to transfer the sick and injured in the event of a major 1 i catastrophe but that is not certified as an ambulance. Tr. 23257-58. 1 L _ _ _ __ _ _

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8.1.78. The short answer to these assertions is that DPH's own l

regulations expressly contemplate the use of uncertified vehicles to  !

transport sick and injured persons in the event of a major catastrophe i

such as a radiological emergency that requires widespread evacuation 105 i CMR 6 170.010. Moreover, as this Board has already found, the Governor of {

the Commonwealth has more than ample power to permit use of such vehicles in an emergency. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-8, 29 NRC 193, 197 (1989).

8.1.79. OR0 will arrange for emergency transportation and keep the facilities advised of the emergency situation; however, staffing of these institutions during an emergency will remain the responsibility of 1

the facility. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 24. See also Tr. 21264; Tr. 21285-86.

8.1.80. The assurance of adequate staff availability during an emergency is the responsibility of medical care facility administrators.

Instructions to call in additional, off-duty staff, and hold existing staff past the normal shift turnover are found in the emergency operating procedures of medical care facilities. If events precluded the call-in of additional facility staff before an evacuation was recommended, requests for assistance could be made both to the ORO through the facility Liaison and to local police and fire departments. App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 24 and Attach. I.

8.1.81. FEMA has found that special facilities, hospitals and nursing homes, collectively, take pride in providing care and is satisfied they will act to implement emergency planning appropriately. Tr. 22413, 22605. See also Tr. 21281.

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I 8.1.82. The Generic Hospital and Nursing Home Plans, prepared for, and delivered to, these special facilities in the EPZ, contain instructions to administrators that during an emergency.they are to ensure that adequate personnel are available to staff the institutions. As such, facility staffing determinations are made prior to any protective action i

recommendation for either sheltering or evacuation of the general public.  !

App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 24. 1 8.1.83. During an evacuation, special populations would be relocated to host facilities outside of the EPZ. The staff of EPZ special facilities will. fulfill their professional responsibilities during an evacuation, including accompanying patients / residents requiring medical, supervisory, or custodial care to the assigned host facilities. Upon arrival, the evacuees would remain under the care and supervision of the staff until they are transferred as necessary to a host hospital or other facility, or until other suitable staffing arrangements can be made. App.

1 Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 25.

8.1.84. The SPMC does not rely upon host facility arrangements which may exist between nursing homes, but is sufficiently flexible to allow for the use of such arrangements if the facility administrators so opt. Tr. 21255; App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 67, 69.

8.1.85. It is expected that school faculty and day care / nursery I school staff arriving at the School Host Facility with evacuated students / children will continue to supervise them until the children are 1

released to the custody of parents or guardians, or transferred to a Congregate Care Center operated by the American Red Cross (ARC). At those host facilities operated by the ARC, the SPMC does not rely upon ARC to

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provide care for the special populations. ARC volunteers, however, will' assist where appropriate, and ARC, through its agreements with federal and state governments and private relief organizations, can request assistance as may.be required to assist special facility staff personnel in ensuring that evacuees' needs are met. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 25.

8.1.86. The capabilities of the ARC can be augmented when necessary.through its role as the coordinating response organization for other private relief organizations. In Massachusetts, for example, the Massachusetts Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan (CERP) states that The Commonwealth has established an Advisory Committee consisting of appointees from MCDA, the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare, the Salvation Army, the Mennonite Disaster Service, Catholic Charities, the Society of St. Vincent de Paul and the Seventh-Day Adventists for coordinated provision of private agency resources, and that ARC's New England Division has agreed to " exercise the responsibility of providing liaison" with MCDA and private relief organizations represented on the Advisory Committee. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 26 and Attach. J.

8.1.87. In addition, The Commonwealth, through its Department of Human Resources, has, at its disposal, the staff and facilities of state institutions which currently house such groups as the mentally ill and emotionally disturbed. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 26.

8.1.88. NHY has offered to provide training and planning support to all EPZ special facilities, and will continue to do so. App.

Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 26.

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8.1.89. Appropriate implementing procedures for protective actions with respect to special populations have been included in SPMC.

App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 27- 29.

8.1.90. The EPZ Hospital plans (Sec. 3.0), and the corresponding SPMC Implementing Procedures (IP 1.10 and 2.7) provide for l

the notification of EPZ and Host hospital facilities at the Alert l emergency classification level for the purpose of determining the current census of each EPZ hospital by patient classification, the type of transportation that would be required during an evacuation, and the capability of the Host hospital to accommodate potential evacuees in each patient classification. App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 29.

8.1.91. The SPMC contains provisions to supply each of the EPZ hospitals with a sufficient number of ambulances and other transportation resources to effect an evacuation of all or part of the expected facility population. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 30.

8.1.92. While the SPMC plans for providing resources for all of the patients in a facility, Section 2.6 of the hospital facility plans prepared for and provided to the administrators of the Amesbury and Anna Jaques Hospitals include instructions for exercising the option of reducing the hospital patient census during the early stages of an emergency by discharging some patients on their own, to the custody of family members or custody of others. Such patients should be identified at the Alert classification (Step 3.2.13) and subsequently discharged at a Site Area Emergency (Step 3.3.6), if appropriate. A similar procedure for the discharge of patients during an emergency is referenced in Anna Jaques Hospital External Disaster Plan. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 30.

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8.1.93. Eight EPZ nursing homes provided information about their transportation needs in response to' inquiries about the patient considerations that should be taken into account. These considerations are reflected in the forms of Evacuation Transportation Resources available under the SPMC. For example, for patients the nursing homes indicated might require continuous medical treatment during transport, the plan provides for an ambulance. For those requiring only supine transport, the planned for resource is an Evacuation Bed Bus. For those requiring transport in a wheelchair, the plan provides a wheelchair van, and the remaining ambulatory nursing home patients are provided for with buses. For those 2 nursing homes which declined to provide patient information, planners utilized licensed bed patient classification definitions as the basis for determining the types of evacuation transportation resources that would be planned for as the default values for.these special facilities. These definitions provide a relatively accurate and stable means for assessing the needs of individuals. App.

Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 30-31.

8.1.94. ORO has under LOA a total of 89 ambulances. Tr.

21510-11; Tr. 21518; Tr. 21583. This is equal to the number called for by the planning basis plus three extra; in addition, there are 187 ambulances in companies which have refused or been unable to contract with ORO and even more which are controlled by municipalities through fire and rescue services. Tr. 21369-70; Tr. 21386. In addition, another eight ambulances are under invoice and the companies contracted with have an additional 42 ambulances in their fleets. Tr. 21589.

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8.1.95. The estimatec' need for 86 ambulances is probably an.

overestimate in light of former planning efforts done by Massachusetts l'

where the needs shown were less. Tr. 21513.

8.1.96. In general te'rms, the patient classifications and their related transportation resources are as follows:

Level 1: Patients requiring the highest level of medical care provided by the facility. In a nursing home, these patients would be those requiring constant skilled nursing care due to the seriousness of their condition. Patients in this category would require an ambulance if the facility staff deemed it necessary to provide continuing medical treatment during transport.

Level 2: Patients who may be bedridden or mobility- impaired as a result of sickness or injury, but who may not require constant medical supervision. Patients in this category generally would require transport in a supine position.

Level 3: Patients who are usually ambulatory, although some may be l- mobility-impaired. In a nursing home, these patients generally require supervision and assistance with such daily activities as dressing and taking required medications. The majority of patients in this category could be transported in a bus, van, car or station wagon, or if necessary,

'in a wheel-chair van.

Level 4: Patients are ambulatory and generally self- sufficient but require some assistance with daily activities such as the administration of required medications. These patients could be transported by bus, van, car or station wagon.

App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 31-32.

8.1.97. At the time of an emergency, the special needs facility administrator determines the particular transportation needs for each individual. Tr. 21372.

8.1.98. The administrators of licensed group homes operate under the guidance of, and in association with, state and community mental health programs which could be called upon for assistance 1.1 the event of an emergency to deal with the relocation of patient populations. App.

Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 32.

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8.1.99. NHY's current listing of special facilities includes a number of elderly persons' housing projects where a portion of the inhabitants were found to be mobility or sensory impaired. The special transportation needs of the entire housing project population were assessed and provided for in the plen. Initially, the SPMC identified a contact point at each facility where telephone notification was to be provided by a Special Population Liaison. Subsequently, it was determined that in some instances, the contact points are not manned 24-hours a day.

NHY is re-evaluating the data on each facility and its resident population, and will revise the notification procedure in each instance to ensure that it is appropriate for the particular circumstances. App. Reb.

No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 33; Tr. 21635-36.

8.1.100. Even if evacuation is the recommended protective action for an area, administrators of special facilities may elect to shelter in the best interest of their patients or residents. SPMC contains procedures for facilitating such a decision and for the distribution of KI should that be authorized by The Commonwealth. App.

Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 33-37. These include the availability of i

liaisons for advice as to where any needed assistance can be obtained, including health physics advice. Tr. 21408-09, 21413-14; App. Reb. No. 6, I

ff. Tr. 21049 at 36.

8.1.101. Appropriate plans have been developed for use by schools in a radiological emergency by the Applicants. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 37-45.

8.1.102. In order to alleviate a problem revealed during the exercise of certain school liaisons not being able to get through their

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notification lists, a change has been made in the SPMC to have liaisons with fewer facilities, after completing their calls, assist those with more facilities to notify. Tr. 21362.

8.1.103. The supporting plans developed for use by the public i

and private Gehools contain detailed instructions for implementing a sheltering recommendation. Potential sheltering areas have been identified in each EPZ school building based on a preliminary assessment of each facility by a NHY planner, and the information provided in the facility-specific sections of each school plan. Basic sheltering instructions provided in the supporting plans include directions to close windows and doors, move children to interior areas, and turn off all HVAC systems during sheltering. App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 44-45.

8.1.104 Should a school not have.its supporting plan, similar sheltering instructions will be provided by School liaisons. App. Reb.

No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 45.

8.1.105. It is highly unlikely that physically or mentally-impaired residents of the Seabrook EPZ would not be able to engage in protective actions during a Seabrook emergency because of their impairments. The reason for this is straightforward: neighbors, friends or relatives would offer and provide help. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 46; Tr. 18872-73.

8.1.106. There are no known cases in any historical emergency in which a physically or emotionally- impaired person was unable to engage in a protective action because no one offered to help them. App. Reb. No.

6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 46.

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8.1.107. Additionally, a lack of helping behavior in' an emergency of this sort is simply contradictory to established theory in i

disaster research. First, hundreds of empirical studies on geological,

. climatological and technological emergencies provide a vast data base about helping behavior. Second, emergencies comparable to an emergency at l a nuclear facility such as Seabrook are, by definition and in reference to human behavior, extraordinary situations. Third, such emergencies change l'

the priorities of ongoing social life and transform social goals, objectives and identifications. People abandon personal forms of identification and personal interests, and they identify with the entire human collective or community that is threatened. One of many names given this phenomenon is the " therapeutic community." Fourth, a consequence of these changes is that the threatened community experiences a dramatic.

decline in behavior that runs counter to the collective good and those that are based in individual or personal intereits, ahd a dramatic increase in behavior that brings people together to help one another.

Fifth, this " shift" would undoubtedly occur in an emergency at Seabrook since it has occurred in every mass emergency of this sort studied by social scientists. In general, therefore, people in emergencies become concerned about the safety of others. Consequently, people check on the safety of others; communicate with friends, neighbors and intimates; and offer help and provide assistance to each other, including those with physical or mental impairments. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 47-48.

8.1.108. The SPMC encourages helping behavior in several ways.

In the public information calendar distributed to all households there is a section entitled " Good Neighbor Assistance" which states: "If your 1

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neighbors, relatives, or co-workers might need help it, evacuating, please  ;

L check on them before you leave." Also, each EBS message that recommends

' I evacuation includes a request that "All persons in the area to be' j 1

l evacuated are urged to be good neighbors and help one another by sharing rides and helping others with problems." App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 48-49.

8.1.109. Applicants' human behavior expert Dr. Mileti, advocates reliance upon friends and relatives to assist the handicapped for emergency planning purposes because this is what, in fact, happens in a real. emergency. Tr. 21086-87.

8.1.110. The SPMC will be amended to specify that Special Population Liaisons, when notifying special populations about emergency classifications, should inquire whether individuals require special assistance other than transportation. Any such requests will be-relayed to the Special Population Coordinator at the ORO E0C for appropriate disposition. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 49.

8.1.111. Second, individuals who need to reach the OR0 during an emergency have been provided with suitable instructions via the public information calendar mailed to all households. On page 1 of the calendar it states:

"The NHY Offsite Response Organization (ORO) is prepared to help you in an emergency. If you are handicapped or need special help, or if you need information during an emergency, you could call: 1 (800) 458-2407" Similar instructions are repeated on page 3 of the calendar. App. Reb.

No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 50.

8.1.112. Blind or deaf individuals who are not self-sufficient generally have live-in assistance, relatives, neighbors or other people

i i

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i

who look after their needs. These people would be available to assist t

during an emergency. However, in the rare situation where such a blind or deaf individual might, upon notification, request help to comply with a protective action recommendation, that request would be made to the Special Population Liaison who in turn would route the request to the ORO Staging Area where ORO personnel would be assigned to respond. App. Reb.

No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 50.

8.1.113. If necessary, the ORO personnel assigned to provide assistance to the handicapped during an evacuation would remain with the individual being assisted until that person was taken through the Reception Center and transferred to a host or Congregate Care facility.

App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 50.

8.1.114. NHY will initiate contacts with advocacy organizations, including those which deal with blind and deaf individuals, and seek the cooperation of these organizations as a potential source of support and assistance for these individuals during an emergency. These advocates also will be asked to review and provide recommendations on the SPMC provisions for assisting handicapped individuals. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 51; Tr. 21057.

8.1.115. The option of sheltering rather than evacuation for mobility-impaired individuals remains the choice of those individuals during an emergency. Individuals would elect that option based on their knowledge of their own circumstances and their ability to carry out the necessary sheltering actions described in the public information materials and/or EBS messages. It is assumed that a person who could not shelter would not do so and will inform the OR0 via the telephone number provided.

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The shelter-in-place concept employed by the SPMC does not involve extraordinary measures 'that would require special assistance to any

/ . individual. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 51; Tr. 21078.

8.1.116. In the event the PAR of choice is sheltering or a mobility-impaired individual elects to shelter despite the evacuation PAR, the ORO special population liaisons will be able to supply information and instructions concerning sheltering. App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 28, 49, 51; Tr. 21077; App. Ex. 42 at IP 2.7 at 13. See Tr. 21408-09, 21413-14.

8.1.117. "Non-functional and emotionally disturbed" l

individuals, as referred to by the interveners, are commonly defined by medical authorities as people who cannot function on a day-to-day basis in society without assistance. Such individuals usually are in an institutional setting except where they live with family or in supervised, community-based settings, i.e., group homes with resident staff. It is reasonable to assume that should emotionally or mentally-impaired individuals who fit the descriptions outlined above require sheltering or

. evacuation, they would continue to be cared for by guardians or custodial staff familiar with each " patient's" condition. The same personnel would be available to assist with recovery /re-entry situations, since the individuals would likely be returning to their previous locations. App.

Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 51-52.

8.1.118. The SPMC makes specific provisions for monitoring and decontamination of special needs evacuees, including nursing home residents and the handicapped, at the Reception Centers before they are

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transported to the designated host facilities. App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr.

21049 at 52.

8.1.119. Handicapped access.to the ORO-designated Reception Centers is not necessary because mobility-impaired individuals transported by ambulan;e, bus, wheelchair van or other vehicle will be monitored in the vehicle in which they arrive at the Reception Center by NHY ORO Monitoring / Decontamination personnel. App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 52.

8.1.120. If contamination is found on special needs evacuees, decontamination is performed in the special vehicle by Monitoring /

Decontamination personnel under the direction of the Monitoring /Decon-tamination Leader at the Reception Center. If a determination is made that a special needs evacuee may require decontamination which cannot be performed by the Monitoring / Decontamination personnel at the Reception Center facilities, they would be diverted to an MS-1 Hospital for further processing. Those individuals evacuated from hospitals or other special facilities by ambulance are transported directly to an MS-1 Hospital where monitoring, and decontamination if necessary, is performed by trained hospital personnel. These special facility evacuees either remain at the MS-1 Hospital or aie then transported to a host hospital. App. Reb. No.

6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 52-53.

8.1.121. School and day care / nursery evacuees are monitored, and, if necessary, decontaminated, at their assigned Reception Centers before being transported to the School Host Facility. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 53.

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l 8.1.122. FEMA GM MS-1 (at pg. 3, L.1) provides specific i

direction on the required number of hospitals for treatment of contaminated-injured individuals.

"There should be one primary local hospital and one backup hospital for each site for the evaluation and emergency treatment of ' contaminated injured' members of the general public."

Those hospittis which are designated as " primary" and " backup" in compliance with MS-1 are clearly identified in the SPMC, Appendix M, as St. Joseph's Hospital of Lowell and Brigham and Women's Hospital of Boston, respectively. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 53-54.

8.1.123. The SPMC considers " contaminated injured" as defined in FEMA Guidance Memorandum MS-1, Medical Services, Backgrourd, pg.1:

"As used in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12) and planning standard 'L' of NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep-1, Rev.1, the tenn contaminated injured means 1) contaminated and otherwise physically injured;

2) contaminated and exposed to dangerous levels of radiation; cr 3) exposed to dangerous levels of radiation."

MS-1 does not specify the capacity required at each hospital for treatment of contaminated-injured individuals. The capacity of the primary and backup hospitals for handling contaminated individuals is stated in the SPMC Appendix M, and proper annotatior, of the list (name, location, type e r facility, capacity and any special radiological capabilities) is provided as directed in MS-1, pg. 3, NUREG-0654, Rev. 1. Supp. 1. II.L.3, and 51 Fed. Reg. 32903. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 54.

8.1.124. The two designated MS-1 hospitals also meet the Joint Commission on Hospitel Accreditation (JCAH) national standards for radiology or nuclear medicine. FEMA has indicated in MS-1 that JCAH accreditation is er acceptable indicator of a hospital's ability to treat contaminated-injured individuals. MS-1 at 2.

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"The written agreements should contain simple assurances that the providers have adequate technical information (e.g.,

treatment protocols) and treatment capabilities for handling

'contrainated injured' individuals. An. indication of Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation (JCAH) accreditation will suffice for such assurance. (Note: Veterans Administration (VA), military and other governmental hospitals are not usually accredited by JCAH but usually have the desired capabilities.)"

Treatment pc tocols and trained personnel are available at the designated MS-1 hospitals, and are part of the SPMC supporting plans identified in SPMC, Appendix F. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 55.

8.1.125. St. Joseph's Hospital officials have advised NHY that the hospital has an average occupancy of 162 of its total licensed capacity of 232 beds, indicating the potential availability of approximately 70 beds. Contucts with Brigham and Women's Hospital determined it has an average occupancy of 504 of its 720 licensed beds, indicating the potential availability of approximately 216 beds. App.

Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 55.

8.1.126. The LOAs with St. Joseph's Hospital and with Brigham and Women's Hospital comply with the guidance in MS-1. This provision, which is taken directly from MS-1, pg. 4, 0.4-Areas for Review and Acceptance Criteria, states in part that:

"Each hospital listed under Evaluation Criteria L.1 and L.3 shall have at least one physician and one nurse on call within about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> who can supervise the evaluation and treatment of radiologically ' contaminated injured' members of the general public."

App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 56.

8.1.127. The ability of St. Joseph's Hospital to provide appropriate treatment for contaminated-injured individuals was demonstrated as part of the 1988 Seabrook Station FEMA-NRC Gt 'tded

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exercise. This medical emergency drill was conducted in compliance with NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.N.2, which ,rects that the drill involve 1.

simulated contaminated individuals and provide for participation by local support services agencies. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 57.

8.1.128. In addition to the MS-1 Hospital arrangements contained in the SPMC, The Commonwealth has identified 12 hospitals in communities near the Seabrook Station EPZ that have the capability to deal with contaminated-injured individuals. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049, Attach. N. Supplemental medical resources are alst available through the activation of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (SPMC, pages 2.3-7, 3.2- 4). App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 58.

8.1.129. A third MS-1 hospital has been signed up by ORO to be-either the primary or the back-up facility, if needed. Tr. 21599-600.

8.1.130. All ambulance drivers are trained to handle contaminated-injured individuals. Tr. 21510-11; Tr. 21518.

8.1.131. ORO Monitoring / Decontamination personnel are trained in the specific steps necessary to identify contaminated-injured individuals as described in IP 2.9, Sec. 5.2.15, A through E. Individuals who cannot be decontaminated at the Monitoring Trailers are offered the option of enrolling in the Radiological Screening Program also available to OR0 emergency workers. (SPMC, Sec. 3.5.3, pgs. 3.5-9, 3.5-10; IP 2.9, i

Sec. 5.2.16). The Radiological Health Advisor is responsible for initiating and tracking follow-up actions for these individuals which may include requests for bioassays at MS-1 hospitals or the use of Yankee Atomic Mobile Body Burden Van services (IP 2.8, 5.1.5; Attachment 2).

App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 59-60. l L-______________-_____________

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8.1.132. Based on the information used to develop the transportation needs, the need for host hospital beds is approximately 129 from the two EPZ hospitals, Amesbury Hospital in T0A and Anna Jaques Hospital in CON. The maximum licensed capacity of Amesbury Hospital is 63 beds. The maximum licensed capacity of Anna Jaques is 156 beds. These

_ figures represent a combined maximum capacity of 219 beds. However, the l

1987 annual reports for each of these hospitals indicate that the average 1

daily census at Anna Jaques Hospital was 97 patients, and at Amesbury Hospital was 32 patients. The combined figure is 129. To this is added a need for approximately 119 beds for EPZ nursing home and special-facility populations that are evacuated by ambulance. This results in a total need for approximately 248 beds in host hospitals. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr.

21049 at 61 and Attachs. 0 & P.

8.1.133. Three hospitals have indicated their willingness through the execution of Letters of Agreement to accept evacuees. These facilities are St. Joseph's Hospital of Lowell, Hunt Hospital of Danvers, St. John's Hospital of Lowell. The total potential availability of beds for these three hospitals is 190 beds. App. P.eb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 62.

8.1.134. Subsequent to the publication of Appendix M.

l Amendment 6. the New England Deaconess Hospital of Boston has signed a Letter of Agreement making its facilities available. Deaconess officials have stated that the average occupancy of the facility's 489 licensed beds is 374, indicating the potential availability of 115 beds that could be used to acconinodate EPZ medical facility evacuees. Deaconess officials also say that if needed, 65 additional beds could be made available at the L - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - _ - _ _ _ - . - - _

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facility by transferring patients to the affiliated Joslin Center. This would raise the number of beds potentially available at Deaconess to 180.

App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 62-63.

8.1.135. Thus, the SPMC contains LOAs with hospitals whose average daily occupancy reflects the potential availability of at least 305 beds (excluding the Joslin Center 65 beds at New England Deaconess) to accommodate the approximately 748 EPZ evacuees who may require hospitalization. App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 63.

8.1.136. Appendix M of the SPMC is being revised to list approxitnately 60 other major eastern Massachusetts hospital facilities as

j. required by NUREG-0654, Rev.1, Supp.1, II.L.3). NUREG-0654 further states that LOAs with these facilities are not required. It is expected l that these hospitals could be called upon during an emergency to house evacuees with medical needs. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 63.

8.1.137. In addition to the host hospital facilities, the SPMC also relies on two designated MS-1 Hospitals to serve as treatment centers for hospital and nursing home patients and injured individuals who may be radiologically contaminated. The combined capability of these two MS-1 facilities (St. Joseph's and Brigham and Women's Hospitals) to accommodate contaminated evacuees is approximately 286 beds. This number exceeds the number of patients that could come from at-risk hospitals. Tr. 18990. In the unlikely event that all 70 of St. Joseph's beds were required for the treatment of contaminated individuals, there would still be sufficient capacity in the other host hospital facilities to accommodate all of the anticipated non- contaminated EPZ hospital, nursing home and special

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facility evacuees, with additional MS-1 capacity represented by the Brigham and Women's Hospital. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 63-64.

8.1.138. There is no need to include in the SPMC plans and procedures for the transfer of patients between hospitals; all accredited hospitals have such plans and procedures. .Tr. 18979-81. All accredited hospitals must have emergency plans also. Tr. 21633.

l 8.1.139. Nursing homes in the EPZ have approximately 659 l patients. However, as stated previously, it is anticipated that approximately 118 of these patients, if evacuees, would be transported directly to host hospitals. The remaining population would be held at a Congregate Care facility until more suitable alternate arrangements can be made, or until the? e e allowed to return to the EPZ. If deemed necessary due to their physical condition, additional nursing home evacuees may be transported to host hospitals. App. Reb. No. 6,,ff. Tr. 21049 at 64.

8.1.140. In addition to the testimony discussed earlier, MAG also presented, with respect to school populations, various assertions and pieces of testimony, which addressed the handling of school populations in I the context of the exercise.

{ 8.1.141. MAG relied, inter alia, on the testimony of Dr.

Harris. Harris Dir., ff. Tr. 26156, passim, and Dr. Goble Goble Dir., ff.

Tr. 24125, passim, as to PARS which has already been described above in further support as to the contentions with respect to school populations.

8.1.142. The fact that, for the most part, Massachusetts schools would not participate did not affect the ability to sufficiently exeecise the plans. Tr. 22604-22605. j il

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8.1.143. It is the view of FEMA witness Donovan that FEMA had really " stressed" the ORD with respect to the handling of the schools, their PARS and their transportation during the exercise, presenting the ORD with a true " worst case;" and that ORO had performed extremely well.

Tr. 22393- 94, 22468-73, 22576-86, 22593-94.

8.1.144. Allegations that ORD is to be faulted for not taking protective actions at the time New Hampshire did was not a fault of OR0; rather the FEMA Control Cell precluded such actions, when requested, in order to create a " worst case" scenario. Tr. 22576; Tr. 22588.

8.1,145. FEMA witness Donovan adequately explained why an alleged inconsistency in an EBS message issued by ORO affecting school children, if it was an inconsistency at all, was not significant, and did not constitute a deficiency. Tr. 22460-61, 22464, 22476-78, 22491-92.

See also Tr. 22475- 76; Tr. 22482-83.

8.1.146. The giving of a hard copy of an EBS message (even if partly erroneous) to the press at a news conference as to what was broadcast is proper and not an exercise inadequacy because otherwise credibility would be lost. Tr. 22497-998.

8.2. RULINGS OF LAW 8.2.1. Hospi ulization for most people who are contaminated (but not injured) would not be an emergency matter. Southern California l

Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, L 136-38(1982).

l l' To be accredited by the Joint Commission on Hospital 8.2.2.

Accreditation, a hospital must have the capability to treat l

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Phil'adelphia Electric Co. (Limerick contaminated-injured individuals.

Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-85-15, 22 2NRC 184, 186 (1985).

8.2.3. "Nothing in NUREG-0654, 10 CFR 5 50.47, Annex E of Pub.

L. No. 2332 requires any special planning for day care facilities, nursery or pre-school facilities . . . . In particular, there is no requirement for detailed, site- specific plans for each and every school or l ' institution within a nuclear power plant's EPZ." Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-14, 21 NRC 1219, 1326-27 (1985), aff'd, ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479 (1986).

8.2.4. Massachusetts law expressly allows for the use of 1

vehicles not certified as ambulances in Massachusetts for emergency medical transportation in the event of a " major catastrophe." 105 CMR S 170.010. Even if it did not, the Governor of The Conrnonwealth has the power to suspend certification requirements in an energency. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station Units 1 and 2),

LBP-89-8, 29 NRC 193, 197 (1989).

8.3. CONCLUSIONS 8.3.1. The Board finds that adequate and implementable provisions have been made for special needs populations in the Seabrook EPZ.

9. EVACUATION EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES 9.1. FINDINGS OF FACT 9.1.1. A total of seven contentions were admitted for i litigation, and litigated, raised-4ssues with respect to evacuation equipment and facilities. These are JI-51, and JI 53-58.

. _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J

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9.1.2. JI-51 raises the issue of the adequacy of the congregate care facilities. to be-used, and, in particular, the Shriner's Auditorium.

1 Contentions Memo. at 70-74.

9.1.3. FEMA has found that the congregate care facilities contemplated for use are adequate. App. Ex. 43C_at 65-66 [ global 83-85].

9.1.4. MAG witness Sikich criticized the Shriner's Auditorium as a-host center for the disabled because: as he understands it, ARC will provide only minimum care and no medical care or staff to take care of the disabled who arrive there; in such a case, Mr. Sikich believes there could be trouble. Sikich Dir., ff. Tr. 20800 at 45-47. However, Mr. Sikich was not able to remember where his information about the ARC came from.

Tr. 20767-70. He also says that the Shriner's Auditorium is only partially handicapped accessible. Id. at 47. Mr. Sikich was not aware at the time he wrote his testimony that NHY is installing an elevator te grovide access to the second floor for the mobility-impaired. Tr. 20728-29.

9.1.5. Applicants addressed these matters with a panel of witnesses consisting of Anthony M. Callendrello, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Licensing, New Hampshire Yankee (Qualifications ff. Tr.

17318); Michael C. Sinclair, Emergency Planning Specialist, Aidikoff Associates (Qualifications admitted Tr. 20807); N and Dennis S. Mileti, Professor of Sociology and Director of the Hazards Assessment Laboratory, 6/

~

Mr. Sinclair's qualifications were admitted in this phase of the '

proceeding at the referenced page. For some reason they were not bound into the transcript. His qualifications do appear in the transcript of the NHRERP phase of the case ff. Tr. 4222.

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Colorado State University (Qualifications ff. Tr.17138). App. Reb. No.

6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 64-75.

9.1.6. The Board finds that these witnesses were competent to testify with respect to the areas they addressed.

9.1.7. The planning basis for total numbert of anticipated special population evacuees that must be accommodated at Host / Congregate Care facilities assumes 100 percent of the enrollments for schools and special facilities, the full licensed capacity of nursing homes, and all of the. identified special needs individuals. The actual need during a real emergency is determined at the time of the emergency through contact with the facilities and special needs individuals, and is anticipated to be a smaller number. This is due to the fact that school and day care attendance is seldom 100 percent; that nursing homes and special facilities generally operate at about 95 percent capacity or less, and that many homebound individuals will receive assistance from neighbors, friends or relatives in relocating. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 64-65.

9.1.8. Concurrent with the efforts in the fall of 1988 to update the SPMC data regarding special populations, as well as the continuing efforts to develop additional supporting resources, NHY planners modified and expanded the concept of dedicated Host Facilities for these categories of indiviwJals. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 65.

9.1.9. The revised' concept involves assigning the public and private school populations, including day care center and nursery schools, ,

to a single, dedicated School Host Center. The remaining special

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populations, including nursing home patients and staff, special facility residents and staff, and special needs individuals, will be assigned to a dedicated Congregate Care Facility. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 65.

9.1.10. A subsequent amendment to the SPMC will reflect that a School Host Center has been designated in Worcester, Massachusetts, and that Shriner's Auditorium in Wilmington, Massachusetts, will be utilized as the primary Congregate Care Center for other evacuating EPZ special populations. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 65.

9.1.11. The total number of special populatforts it is anticipated may require congregate care accommodations, excluding school and day care / nursery school children and those evacuees who will be taken directly to host hospitals, is approximately 2,836. The total includes 541 nursing home patients and 291 staff; 1,306 special facility residents and 194 staff; and 503 impaired, homebound individuals. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 66.

9.1.12. The initial evaluation of the capacity of Shriner's Auditorium relied on the estimate of indoor space provided by the building manager. That estimate was 125,000 square feet. A survey of the building by NHY determined that usable space was approximately 79,000 square feet which yielded a capacity for 1,950 evacuees. This-eapaelty-was-suffielent feP-a44-spee4al-pepulat4en-evaevees-expeeted-at-that-time-te-need eengPegate-e&Pe. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 66.

9.1.13. Subsequently, NHY has re-evaluated the space available for sheltering at Shriner's Auditorium. This re-evaluation did not take credit for space in storage and utility areas, office space, loading docks and portions of the area under the fixed bleacher section. The result of

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this evaluation was a revised estimate of the usable space to be approximately 59,360 square feet. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr._21049 at 66. ,

l 9.1.14. Therefore, Shriner's Auditorium has the capability of accommodating approximately 1,484 people by converting the b9,360 square I feet of open floor space for congregate care use. The capability figure 4 was arrived at by using the American Red Cross minimum requirement of 40 3 square feet per person for mass care sheltering. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr.

21049 at 66-67.

9.1.14.1 Shriner's Auditorium is fully handicapped-accessible;  ;

NHY has agreed to install an elevator which will provide access for the I mobility-impaired to the second floor of the facility. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at L 9.1.15. While the SPMC relies on Shriner's as the primary congregate care facility for special populations, should the Auditorium reach capacity, space for additional evacuees' would be provided utilizing a portion of the space at the Westboro Congregate Care Center in the New England Power Company's facility, which has an ARC certified capacity of approximately 2,063 people. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 67.

l Together, the Shriner's Auditorium and the Westboro facility provide s'ufficient capacity to accommodate special populations.

l 9.1.16. At the same time, Applicants are pursuing the identification of nursing homes and other special facilities outside the EPZ which could serve as congregate care host facilities for evacuees from like facilities in the EPZ communities. Where possible. NHY will seek to effect cooperative agreements between individual EPZ facilities and host l

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l facilities to provide for the direct transfer of evacuated individuals.

during an emergency. App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 67.

9.1.17. Should any of these individuals, such as nursing home patients, and other special facility residents, require more than custodial care (i.e., medical supervision), they will subsequently be moved from the congregate care facility to other facilities as soon as the Red Cross, in conjunction with the special facility staffs, can make suitable arrangements for their relocation. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr.

21049 at 67-68.

9.1.18. The dedicated School Host Center in Worcester, Massachusetts, is for public and private school and day care / nursery evacuees, including staff, from all six EPZ communities. The total number in these categories of evacuees is 10,753, including one faculty member per bus from public and private schools and all of the staff from day care centers and nurseries. The center has seating capacity for 8,398 people in various facilities plus the availability of 53,630 square feet of enclosed open space capable of accommodating an additional 2,681 individuals (at 20 square feet per person) for a total short term capacity of 11,079. App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 68.

9.1.19. Provision of a school host facility goes beyond applicable criteria with respect to schools. Tr. 19012.

9.1.20. The use of the School Host Center facilities on a short-term basis is predicated on the assumption that evacuated school children.will be picked up by their parents or guardians within a matter of hours after the evacuation. Public Information materials and EBS messages advise parents that their children have been evacuated to the

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facilities. Each school will be designated a specific area at the Center and facility diagrams will instruct teachers where to retain the students until they are reunited with their parents. Parents arriving at the Center will be provided with directions so they can easily locate their children. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 68-69.

9.1.21. The LOAs between NHY and Shriner's Auditorium, the Westborough facility, and School Host Center provide for the availability of the facilities upon request. Facility officials have stated that even if a special event were in progress when such a request was made by the OR0, the facilities could be emptied and readied for at least partial utilization within one to two hours. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 69; App. Ex. 41 at 299-316.

9.1.22. This time frame is consistent with the evacuation time estimates for special facilities and populations within the EPZ, i.e., the facilities would be available to receive the first evacuees sent there by the time those evacuees were transported from the EPZ, processed at a Reception Center, and forwarded to the facilities. App. Reb. No. 6, ff.

Tr. 21049 at 69.

9.1.23. It is expected that owners, operators or administrators of special facilities within the EPZ will utilize the designated Host / Congregate Care facilities. The SPMC will be modified to reflect any preferred alternative arrangements by any EPZ facility when those arrangements are made known to NHY planners. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. )

21049 at 69.

1 l

l'!-

L j

- 170 - J l' I 9.1.24. JI-53 raises the issue of the availability of the  !

Haverhill, Massachusetts, staging area in light of local opposition thereto. Contentions Memo. at 75-76.

9.1.25. FEMA has genert.lly found the SPMC facilities to be adequate. App. Ex. 43C at 44-48 [ global 62- 66].

9.1.26. MAG e44e4ted offered no direct testimony in support of this contention and elicited no evidence on cross-examination. Tr. 27362.

To the contrary, the Massachusetts Courts have invalidated the local challenges made to date to the facilities use, thus removing the under-pinning of the contention. App. Ex. 92(a)&(b).

9.1.27. In JI-54 it is essentially contended that the American Red Cross (ARC) has not entered into a Letter of Agreement (LOA) with OR0, and will respond, if at all, in the area of congregate care in an ad hoc fashion, and that therefore the congregate care centers will not be properly operated and manned. Contentions Memo at 77.

9.1.28. FEMA has found the provisions in SPMC for staffing congregate care centers to be adequate. App. Ex. 43C at 44-45 [ global 62-63].

I 9.1.29. MAG elicited testimony from witness Lonergan to the l k

effect that a survey of all congregate care centers revealed that in only  !

nine of the centers that responded was there a plan for clearing the necessary space. Lonergan Dir., ff. Tr. 19605, passim. Based upon this information, MAG witness Sikich opined this lack of clearing plans was a serious flaw. Sikich-2 Dir., ff. Tr. 20232, passim. The problem is that 1 the MAG witness Lonergan did not know what kind of plan he was looking l for. Tr. 19621. Nor did he try to learn whether a plan is necessary.

l l

I

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Lonergan did not know how much usable space is available at each facility; what proportion of available space is assigned to particular functions l outside of an emergency; or whether the facilities were evaluated l

L according to ARC criteria on shelter management. Tr. 19615-17. He was not even aware of the ARC requirements for congregate care centers.

Tr. 19617. Lonergan also testified that most of the congregate care l- center landlords he talked to knew what was expected of them. Tr. 19623.

.Apparently. all the areas in question at the facilities Lonergan contacted i

can be easily cleared since most.of what needs to be done involves only moving tables, desks, and chairs. Tr. 19618-20; App. Ex. 62.

l 9.1.30. No direct testimony was elicited by MAG as'to the role of ARC, although the T0A Civil Defense Director indicated that from his l

experience with the local Red Cross Chapter in his area he questioned ARC's ability to fully staff the congregate care centers Tr. 16844, 16864. However. .T0A's Civil Defense Director also stated that he was no expert on the question of ARC's ability to supplement its resources from l

other areas, Id., and he recognized that ARC officials have indicated they could augment their personnel resources from other ARC chapters, if necessary. Tr. 16863.

l )

9.1.31. FEMA testified that in in relying upon landlords to clear space and set up, Applicants are utilizing the same procedure as is used all over the nation. Tr. 19154. FEMA interviewed all congregate care center landlords to be sure they understood what was expected of i

them. Tr. 19158.

9.1.32. According to FEMA, ARC would not participate in planning with the ORD with respect to SPMC because of a memorandum of i

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understanding it has executed with The Commonwealth, which is opposed to ,

I the licensing of Seabrook. has-taken-an-anti-Seabreek-pes 4tten, Tr. J 18727-28, 18764, 19146. Since the Commonwealth will not participate in planning for Seabrook, the ARC believes its own participation would violate the memorandum. Tr.18766. i 9.1.33. On September 10, 1987, in a letter from Elbert Brown, Vice President / General Manager, American Red Cross Eastern Operations  ;

Headquarters to Edward A. Brown, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of NHY, Mr. Elbert. Brown committed ARC to providing mass care services in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 69-70 and Attach. Q.

9.1.34. The letter, included in the SPMC, Appendix C, specifically states:

"[T]he public authorities in Massachusetts have not undertaken a planning process in which the Red Cross can participate.

There should be no doubt that without the close cooperation of Red Cross and government activities within the framework of a tested response plan, Red Cross relief efforts will be negatively affected.

Nonetheless, the humanitarian mission of the Red Cross requires that in the event of a nuclear accident and evacuation, the Red Cross will provide mass care services to the extent of its abilities and will cooperate with public and private organizations, including New Hampshire Yankee, to meet the needs of evacuees and disaster workers . . . ."

App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 70.

9.1.35. The ARC official goes on to cite ARC Board of Governors policy on Disaster Services Regulations and Procedures:

. . . the Red Cross will maintain its status as an independent voluntary body dedicated to performing the disaster preparedness and relief obligations entrusted to it by the Congress of the United States and will cooperate with all private and governmental bodies and agencies . . . ."

_ __ __- -__.-_-__ _ __-___ _ _ _ _ a

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4 App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 70.

9.1.36. Mr. Brown concludes his letter with the unequivocal statement:

"I hope that my. comments and the several citations of Red Cross administrative regulations make it clear..that.-in the event of a nuclear accident at the Seabrook plant, the American Red Cross will fulfill its humanitarian responsibilities to the citizens of Massachusetts and New Hampshire by providing appropriate mass care services in cooperation with public and private organizations."

. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 70-71.

9.1.37. FEMA assumes, and properly relies upon, the fact that ARC will meet its responsibility to staff and run the congregate care centers. Tr. 18750, 18812, 19147.

9.1.38. FEMA, because of the fact that ARC had not engaged in planning, performed its own investigation of the congregate care centers to be used; normally, such an investigation would not be done. Tr. 18743.

As a result of the investigation, FEMA determined that each and every facility was prepared to make the space available to the ARC as a congregate care center.. Id.

9.1.39. There is no FEMA requirement that medical care be provided at a congregate care center. Tr. 18948-49.

9.1.40. The SPMC correctly assumes that medical staff from hospitals and other institutions will accompany those persons who require l

medical care to their destinations and provide such care. Tr. 18938, l

18943, 18947, 18951.

9.1.41. Notwithstanding the lack of appropriate participation in the planning pro:ess by The Commonwealth, the SPMC provides the required framework of a disaster response plan, which was tested during J-

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l ORO drills, combined functional drills with the State of New Hampshire, and the 1988 Seabrook Station FEMA-NRC Graded exercise. App. Reb. No. 6 f ff. Tr. 21049 at 71.

9.1.42. The identification, inspection and selection of Congregate Care Centers was carried out by NHY personnel who were trained and certified by the ARC. Certification of two of the currently listed Congregate Care facilities in the SPMC was provided by Mr. Robert Saydlowski of the ARC in August, 1987, while the balance of the facilities were certified by Mr. Michael R. Lewis or Mr. Roger Paddock of NHY,- both ARC-trained Shelter Managers, between August,1987, and December,1988.

App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 71. See also.Tr. 18724-25;.Tr.

20955-57.

9.1.43. The SPMC provides for notification and activation of the ARC through the State of New Hampshire. The Assistant Reception Center Coordinator notifies the ARC representative at the Concord, New Hampshire, E0C at an Alert emergency classification. SPMC, Section 2.4.2; Section 3.2.4; Section 3.6.3; Section 3.8.4; Figure 4.0-1; Section 5.2.8; Appendix H; IP 1.1, Attachment 2; IP 1.6; App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 72; Tr. 20957-59. MCDA has also indicated that it will, in a real emergency, coordinate with ARC. Tr. 20953-54.

9.1.44. Congregate Care Centers are activated in accordance with the SPMC, Appendix M; IP 1.1, Attachment 2; IP 1.6, Attachment 1.

Activation of each facility is described in the Congregate Care Center activation procedure issued at each congregate care facility contact.

Internal operation of each facility is perfonned by the ARC in accordance 1

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with ARC Procedure #3074. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 72 and Attachs. R and S.

9.1.4f. ARC shelter planning guidance (ARC #3074) indicates that staffing levels in shelters may vary depending on the size and nature of the facility. However, at a minimum, ARC would be expected to provide l

a Sheltcr Manager for each Congregate Care facility, and perhaps one or 1

two assistants. Additional staffing could be arranged on an ad hoc basis utilizing facility personnel and evacuees to assist when appropriate.

Thus, the SPMC relies upon ARC to provide approximately 60-90 volunteers to initiate operations of the 30 Congregate Care facilities identified in the plan. App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 72.

9.1.46. It was suggested that ARC had a standard to the effect that congregate care centers should not exceed 1,000 persons in capacity.

No such standard exists, App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049, Attach. S; Tr.

19188-90, and ARC has managed congregate care centers with capacities well in excess of 1,000. Tr. 19148-49.

9.1.47. The potential staffing capability of the ARC is acknowledged in detail in Annex H of the Massachusetts CERP. The Annex includes a listing of 16 ARC Chapters in the " Northeastern Massachusetts Territory" and 17 Chapters located in the " Eastern Massachusetts Territory" with an additional 29 Chapters located elsewhere throughout The Commonwealth. All 62 of these chapters are under the supervision and coordination of the ARC New England Division Headquarters in Boston. App.

Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 73 and Attach. J.

9.1.48. Training on the scope of congregate' care required by the SPMC will be periodically offered to the ARC as a support organization

I 1

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I in accordance with NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, 11.01. App. Reb. No. 6, L

l' ff. Tr. 21049 at 73.

i Per discussions with the ARC, and in accordance with I

~

9.1.49.

ARC training and procedures, staffing of the first Congregate Care Centers will be initiated within two hours of notification of the ARC. Full staffing of all Congregate Care Centers should be accomplished within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Local ARC chapters are prepared to continue their participation for the duration of the response requirement and can anticipate support from regional and national ARC resources. App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 73. See also Tr. 19150-53, 19155; Tr. 20962-76.

9.1.50. The ARC has the resources functionally to set up and operate the SPMC's congregate care facilities as established by the historical record of the organization in disaster response situations as well as by the ARC's internal activation process. The capability to shelter and care for those displaced during a major disaster is amply chronicled in New England and throughout the nation where the ARC has responded to calls for assistance in the wake of natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes, and as well when man-made disasters such as fires, industrial and transportation accidents have required large-scale evacuations. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 73-74.

9.1.51. Discussions with ARC officials indicate that there are internal procedures triggered by initial local or state chapter notifications which activate the Red Cross national disaster response apparatus. The purpose of this activation is to put in a stand-by mode the resources of Red Cross chapters in contiguous areas and at regional

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resource centers located throughout the country. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr.

21049 at 74.

9.1.52. Additionally, as an organization chartered by the United States Congress to function as a disaster response agency for the federal government, ARC has the ability to call upon a wide range of federal resources, including transportation and materials available from federal agencies, should ARC resources prove inadequate to meet an identified need. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 74.

9.1.53. FEMA's Review and Evaluation of the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities, December, 1988, at A.1.a page 6 states:

"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has acdressed the role of the American Red Cross (ARC) in CLI 5: e.g., the American Red Cross charter from Congress, as well as the American Red Cross policy, require ARC to provide aid in any radiological or natural disaster. NRC indicated to FEMA (9/27/88 memorandum) that this ruling is applicable to the FEMA review of the SPMC."

App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 74-75.

9.1.54. While the Red Cross is relied upon to administer the activities associated with operating the Congregate Care facilities, the organization is not expected to provide "special care" that may be required by some special population evacuees. Special facility staffs, including teachers and nursing home personnel, are expected to accompany the special facility populations during an evacuation as part of their professional responsibilities, and thus would be arriving at the Congregate Care Center with the special facility populations where they would be available to provide continuing assistance until other arrangements could be made. This assures that in the case of some elderly and emotionally-handicapped individuals, the psychological impact of a I

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sudden dislocation caused by an emergency evacuation will be minimized through the continued presence of trained and familiar staff personnel during the relocation process. App. Reb. No. 6. ff. Tr. 21049 at 75; Tr.

18938. 18943, 18951.

9.1.55. ARC does provide first aid and routine medical assistance at congregate care facilities. Tr. 20976- 77.

9.1.56. JI-55 raises the issue of.whether there is reasonable assurance that sufficient emergency vehicles and drivers will be available if there 'is a radiological' emergency at Seabrook. Contentions Memo, at 77-82.

9.1.57. FEMA has made a number of findings which together constitute a finding that there are sufficient personnel and vehicles.

App.-Ex. 43C at 17-18 [ global 35-36],61-62[ global 78-80],64-65[ global 82-83], 67 [ global 86]. See also, Tr. 18952. In so finding, FEMA verified vehicle LOAs and checked the SPMC to be sure the numbers required.

were reasonable in light of SPMC's provisions. Tr. 18896-98. FEMA checked with all vehicle providers, Tr. 18908, and went beyond FEMA's own criteria to check out the vehicle providers' methods of notification to their drivers. veh4elesi-means-ef-eemmunfeat4ent Tr. 18918-19. See MAG.

Ex. 73.

9.1.58. MAG's only direct testimony on this contention was the survey of most vehicle-supplying companies involved pursuant to which MAG claims that at least at certain times there will be fewer vehicles than necessary available. Mangan Dir., ff. Tr. 19429, passim.

9.1.59. The MAG witnesses have no background in emergency planning, Tr. 19273-75; they used what can only be described as

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intimidating questionnaires, App. Ex. 53, and see Tr.19303; they were aware of the existence of binding contracts but based their testimony on LOAs; Tr. 19298, 19355; and the objectivity of the sampling process could not be known since the interviews were based on selections made by counsel, without the witnesses' knowledge as to how the selections were made. were-seleetive-4n-their-4nterviews, Tr. 19320, 19360.

9.1.60. The best evidence of resources is the LOAs and contracts which were introduced into the record. App. Ex. 41. This exhibit includes written agreements with transportation and road service resource providers which set forth the terms and conditions under which the committed personnel would receive training and the committed resources would be made available during an emergency. App. Ex. 41, passim.

9.1.61. In order to meet the identified need, App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at Attach. T, NHY has reached agreement for sufficient transportation resources. See Tr. 21527, 27333-34. This includes agreements with twelve bus companies denoting the availability of 530 buses, 166 vans and 37 wheel chair vans, App. Ex. 41 at 11-20, 31-32,33- .

42, 56-66, 77-86, 101-10, 11-13, 119-28, 164-73, 498-507, 538-47, 698-706, see also Tr. 18952-53, eleven ambulance service companies denoting the )

availability of 89 ambulances and ambulettes (more current information indicates this number to be 97, Tr. 21589), and 44 wheel chair vans, App.

Ex. 41 at 88-100, 129-39, 140-49, 175-84, 211-21, 446-416, E 471-81, 7/ The Board notes that early on in Volume 2 of Applicants' Exhibit 41 the page numbering proceeds from "449" to "410", therefore i providing two sets of pages numbered from 410 through 449. We make this observation in order to clarify the noted citation.

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482-93, 592-601, 707-15, 716-24, and three tow truck providers denoting the availability of 18 tow trucks App. Ex. 41 at 1-10, 21-30, 634-42.

9.1.62. As FEMA has verified, Tr. 18897-98, 18908, Applicants -

have under. LOA sufficient emergency vehicles to execute SPMC. App. Ex. i 41.. }

9.1.63. JI-56, bases A and B raise the issue of whether adequate provision has been made for monitoring and decontaminating members of the public and emergency workers. Contentions Memo. at 83-84.

9.1.64. FEMA has found that the provisions of the SPMC with respect to this matter are adequate. App. Ex. 43C at 44-47 [ global 62-65], 72-74 [ global 91-93].

9.1.65. MAG's only direct evidence with respect to this contention is the testimony of Carol Sneider, Esquire', a former Assistant Attorney General of The Commonwealth who once acted as counsel for The Commonwealth in this proceeding. Sneider Dir., ff. Tr. 24974, passim; Tr.

25004- 06; Tr. 25008-09.

9.1.66. Ms. Sneider has no experience of any kind in the fields of radiological monitoring and decontamination. Tr. 24977-81.

9.1.67. Essentially she had no knowledge of the probes used by Applicants and their capabilities. Tr. 25025- 26; Tr. 25030-31.

9.1.67.1 It is apparent that Ms. Sneider has no expert knowledge of the monitoring science nor anything more than a reasonably well-informed layman's knowledge of human behavior. Tr. 24996.

l 9.1.68. Ms. Sneider observed the monitoring and decontamination i exercise carried on during the graded exercise. She made the following observations: she did not think the monitoring test was fair because only j

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seven stations were used instead of fourteen; the trailer is cramped and if there were fourteen in use it would have been too crowded to keep up the pace that was kept in her opinion. Sneider Dir., ff. Tr. 24974 at 5-6.

9.1.69. She states that the simulated evacuees were very compliant; there were no children or other potentially difficult cases.

She notes that the simulated radioactive source could have been surmised by the monitors to have to be in the pocket or fold of clothing (but see Tr. 25027) of the individuals being monitored and, therefore, the monitors did not have to be careful; in addition, there were no suitcases and no breaks during the 20-minute drills. Sneider Dir., ff. Tr. 24974 at 6-7.

9.1.70. However, she admitted that the way the Applicants did the simulation "may be the best way to simulate it," and that she was not trying to suggest a better way. Tr. 25029.

9.1.71. She notes that the monitors did not monitor themselves, and there was no wiping down of the monitoring area when contamination was found. She states that the exercise of monitoring was too short and therefore there was no fatigue factor. She also gives her " expert" opinion as an observer (as opposed to a lawyer) that one cannot judge a j

\

monitoring rate by how fast people execute the process under the -

conditions used in the graded exercise. However, Ms. Sneider's lack of technical expertise in monitoring leads us to give no weicht to her opinion as to monitoring rates. Tr. 25031. She argues that FEMA has a 90-second standard which must be used. She also points out that the rate of emergency worker monitoring during the exercise was 'l every 79 seconds.

She also did a computation by which she comes up with a 73-second per l

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person rate. Finally, she worries about 10-minute breaks and thereafter does an overall calculation by which she shows that OR0 is short of monitoring capacity under a the 20% planning basis. ruler Sneider Dir.,

ff. Tr. 24974 at 8-15. Unfortunately, as seen below, because of her misunderstanding as to the number of monitoring stations used during the exercise, Ms. Sneider's computations are invalid. See, infra, n.8.

9.1.72. With respect to' the issue of monitoring and decontamination, the Applicants presented a panel of witnesses consisting of Joseph Bisson, Emergency Planner, Impell Corporation (Qualifications, ff. Tr. 25423); Anthony M. Callendrello, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Licensing, New Hampshire Yankee (Qualifications, ff. Tr. 17318); Robert Cotter, Emergency Planning Specialist, Aidikoff Associates (Qualifica-tions, ff. Tr. 25423); and Peter Littlefield, Manager, Radiological Engineering Group, Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Qualifications, ff. Tr.

25423). App. Reb. No. 17 ff. Tr. 25423, passim.

9.1.73. The Board finds that each of these witnesses were competent to testify with respect to the matters they addressed.

9.1.74. Applicants explained in detail how they calculated the j monitoring load which the reception centers should be designed to l I

accormnodate App. Reb. No.17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 1-10, and the Board finds '

the methodology used acceptable.

9.1.75. Applicants committed to adding four more monitoring i locations, and associated personnel and equipment, to each reception

\

1 center. App. Reb. No.17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 6. Applicable procedures in j the SPMC will be revised to reflect the commitment. Id,. at 2.

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9.1.76. The design of the additional locations will be similar to the ones presently in the Monitoring Trailers, but will be contained in a separate trailer. The trailer will be limited solely to monitoring activities and will have comparable lighting and climate control features to those in the larger Monitoring Trailers. App. Reb. No. 17, ff. Tr.

25423 at 12-13.

9 .1. 7.7. The combined capacity of the Reception Centers can provide monitoring for approximately 30% of the summer population and approximately 50% of the resident population in the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ in a 12- hour period. App. Reb. No.17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 4-5.

9.1.78. NHY has developed a policy of having surplus radiation detection instruments used for monitoring in the trailers to allow l expansion of monitoring capabilities. The additional equipment is in the process of being procured and deployed and Appendix I will be revised to reflect the increase. App. Reb. No. 17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 13.

l 9.1.79. Applicants also explained the design basis for the facility to be utilized to monitor and decontaminate emergency workers, App. Reb. No.17 ff. Tr. 25423 at 14-16, and the Board finds this acceptable.

9.1.80. This Board requested the Applicants to address the

. issue of parking facilities at ORO reception centers which the Applicants did with a panel consisting of Joseph Bisson, Emergency Planner, Impell Corporation (Qualifications ff. Tr. 25423) and Anthony M. Callendrello, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Licensing, New Hampshire Yankee (Qualifications ff. Tr.17318), App. Reb. No.17 (Supp.), ff. Tr. 25424, passim, w_ __ __ _

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9.1.81. The Board finds that these witnesses were competent to

]

testify with respect to the areas they addressed.

9.1.82. The monitoring load at the OR0 Reception Centers was recalculated in accordance with the methodology described in the PID.  !

App. Reb. No. 17 (Supp.)',.ff. Tr. 25424 at 1.

9.1.83. The revised evacuee numbers resulting from that recalculation have formed the basis for the calculation of the number of 1

parking spaces needed at the OR0 Reception Centers. App. Reb. No. 17 (Supp.), ff. Tr. 25424 at I and Attach. A.

v.1.84. In order to calculate the parking space needed at each i facility it was necessary to determine the flow rate of evacuees through the' facility, total stay time of evacuees at the facility, and number of I

evacuees per ar. The number of cars parked for the general population at any one time could then be calculated by the following formula:

(evacuees) stay time. (hour)

Number of = flow rate of evacuees (hour) X at facility Parked Cars number of people in each car (evacuees)

(carj App. Reb. No. 17 (Supp.), ff. Tr. 25424 at 1.

9.1.85. This calculation assumes everyone monitored in the trailer arrives by car. In fact, at certain times a substantial portion of the evacuees, specifically school children and transit dependent persons, arrive by bus (which require less parking space than a car on a per person basis). Therefore, this calculation significantly overesti-mates the parking space needed. App. Reb. No. 17 (Supp.), ff. Tr. 25424 at 1-2.

9.1.86. A tour and measurement of the parking areas at the two reception centers determined the available parking space at the North

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l Andover snd Beverly Reception Centers. App. Reb. No.17 (Supp.), ff. Tr.

25424 at 2.

9.1.87. The following table details the parking space needed and available parking space.

North Andover Beverly Number of Spaces 88 81 Parking Needed (Cars)

Number of 182 180 Parking Spaces Available (Cars)

The Board finds that there is adequate general population parking available at both ORO Reception Centers. App. Reb. No. 17 (Supp.), ff.

Tr. 25424 at 2.

9.1.88. The evacuees who arrive by bus will proceed through the monitoring trailer and return to the bus. Using a similar calculation to that used for cars, the number of parking spaces needed for buses is five.

Applicants introduced facility layout diagrams showing the locations for bus parking. As shown on those diagrams, the bus parking is separate from that provided for cars. Visual inspection and measurement verified the adequacy of the assigned space. App. Reb. No. 17 (Supp.), ff. Tr. 25424 at 2-3 and Attach. A.

9.1.89. Evacuees from health care-related facilities arriving at the reception center will be monitored inside their vehicle. This monitoring will be done while the vehicle is in the initial vehicle-monitoring lane. Upon completion of the monitoring, the vehicle will exit the facility and therefore does not require allotted parking space. App.

l Reb. No.17 (St.pp.), ff. Tr. 25424 at 3.

t; l;

1

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) 9.1.90. MAG presented three witnesses in rebuttal concerning l parking lot capacity. The first of these'was Dr. Colin I. High. High l

l Reb., ff. Tr. 27974, passim. Dr. High testified that in' his opinion the Applicants had underestimated the peak monitoring trailer load by some 2,456 people (13.168 vs.10,712). Compare High Reb., ff. Tr. 27974 at 7 l- with App. Reb. No. 17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 5.

l-9.1.91. Dr. High generated this increase as a result primarily_

of two major assumptions which he made, Tr. 27991-92, both of which turned 1

=

out to be demonstrably erroneous.

9.1.92. First, he included some 3,820 persons in the population universe of interest whn were employees within the EPZ on the understand-L- ing that the' Applicants also included them in the calculation. Tr. 27987, 27988. Applicants, in fact, did not include such people and for the goed and-suff4e4ent reason that such persons would either be residents of the EPZ and, thus, picked up in the town clerk census data as such, or they would be residents outside the EPZ in which case they would proceed to their homes instead of going to a reception center to seek congregate care. App. Reb. No. 17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 3.

9.1.93. Dr. High's second assumption was that all but 7% of the i

beach transient population should be counted to be part of the population l universe of concern, whereas Applicants used the figure of 50%. Compare 1

1 High Reb., ff. Tr. 27974 Attach. A at p. 3, f n), with App. Reb. No. 17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 3.

9.1.94. It turned out that Dr. High's 7% figure was based upon his misunderstanding of a sumary of data, and when the original data were

, ('y .

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brought to his attention, he conceded that his 7%. assumption was simply l'

incorrect. Tr. 28033.

9.1.95. Per contra, Applicants' decision to exclude 50% of'the -

beach transient population, because they were- day trippers who.either were residents of the EPZ and thus already accounted for by the population data-or were nonresidents of the EPZ who would go to their homes instead of

, seeking congregate care, is well founded in the data. NHRERP Volume 6 at

p. 2-12 (50% of transient population are day trippers), see also Tr.

27876, and correctly reasoned from that data, App. Reb. No. 17, ff. Tr.

25423 at 3.

9.1.96. The Board rejects the High analysis.

9.1.97. The next MAG witness on this subject was Dr. Ortwin Renn, who testified to a time motion study to the effect that, whereas Applicants had determined that the average stay time for an' individual at the Beverly reception' center was .229 hours0.00265 days <br />0.0636 hours <br />3.786376e-4 weeks <br />8.71345e-5 months <br /> (or 13 minutes and 44 seconds), App. Reb. No. 17 (Supp.), ff. Tr. 25424. Attach. A, the more appropriate time would be 22 minutes and 23. seconds. Renn Reb., ff. Tr.

28062 at 29.

l 9.1.98. Cross-examination revealed that this increase in time was essentially all due to his assumptions as to delays which would be caused by decontamination activities and delays caused by people going to the restroom. Tr. 28094-95.

9.1.99. However, Dr. Renn admitted that he had no reason to challenge testimony to the effect that if individuals were contaminated, the car in which they arrived would be contaminated. Tr. 28084. As he further admitted, cars which are contaminated will not be taking up space

L I

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in the parking-lot of concern. Tr. 28085. With respect to his observations as to tima in the restroom, the Board notes that it is by no means certain or even likely that persons in long evacuation queues will have waited until arriving.at the reception centers to relieve themselves.

If one subtracts out the time which Dr. Renn allots to decontamination activities and restrooms one finds that his own number for stay time at Beverly is less than that assumed by Applicants in their study. Tr.

.28095. The Board finds that Dr. Renn's time estimates are substantially overstated, just as were his previous estimates that it would take extremely long times for persons to leave the beaches following the sounding of beach area sirens. See Goble, et al. Dir. ff. Tr. 10963 at 70-80; Tr. 11032-34.

9.1.100. Finally, Dr. Adler testified that he felt that Applicants had alloted too little square footage per car in their parking analysis, did a calculation utilizing numbers he thought were better, and further opined that if there were no parking attendants even a lesser number of spaces would be available. Adler Reb., ff. Tr. 28262, passim.

9.1.101. Even if one accepts all of Dr. Adler's theories in this respect, the number of spaces he comes up with are more than what is required under Applicants' time motion study. Compare Adler Reb., ff. Tr.

28262 at 4, with App. Reb. No. 17 (Supp.), ff. Tr. 25424 at 2.

9.1.102. The Board finds that parking is adequate at the reception centers.

9.1.103. Applicants also described the staffing of the reception center monitoring and decontamination facilities and the

I r - 189 -

l facility for emergency workers, App. Reb. No. 17 ff. Tr. 25423 at 17-19, and the Board finds the staffing to be adequate.

9.1.104. The monitoring process involves evacuees stepping up to a station inside the Monitoring Trailer where they are scanned by NHY ORO personnel using the Bicron meter and Aptec probe. The monitoring process itself entails a frisking which focuses on the areas of the body that are most likely to be contaminated such as head, face, shoulders, buttocks, hands and feet. The process starts with a frist of the individual's head, face and shoulders, followed by a scan of the remaining front of the body from top to bottom using a single sweep. The individual is asked to turn in place for a similar frisking of the back of the body.

(SPMC, IP 2.9, Step 5.4.3) This type of personnel survey takes about I minute to complete. App. Reb. No. 17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 19.

9.1.105. The 1-minute monitoring time is achievable because of the radiation detection instrument selected for use in the SPMC. The

-large area of the Aptec probe allows movement of the probe at a faster rate while still retaining a detection efficiency equal to a standard pancake probe moved at a slower rate. The performance of the Aptec probe was evaluated in tests conducted by the NHY Health Physics Department under the direct observation of Dr. Joseph Ring of Harvard University Radiation Protection Office. The tests indicated that the performance of the Aptec probe, even at a frisking rate three times the standard frisking rate of 2 inches per second, exceeds the performance of the HP-210 pancake probe at 2 inches per second. App. Reb. No. 17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 19-20 and Attach. A. See also Tr. 18605.

I

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- 9.1.106'. The actual monitoring rate experienced during the Exercise was compared to the planning basis monitoring time. Two  ;

20-minute tests employing 5 monitoring locations E were conducted at each Monitoring Trailer to demonstrate the monitoring process for evacuees. A description of tim tests was included in the FEMA-approved extent of play section of the Exercise Scenario. The average monitoring rate was 54.7 evacuees per hour per monitoring location, which compares favorably with the 51 evacuees per hour per monitoring location used as a planning basis.

Moreover, during the Exercise some of the mock evacuees who passed through the trailers had hidden radioactive sources (i.e., Coleman lantern mantles ). Seventy-eight out of seventy-nine sources were found during the monitoring process. App. Reb. No.17. ff. Tr. 25423 at 20 and Attach. B &

C.

9.1.107. The evacuee flow path for the Monitoring Trailers is shown in Attachment 4 of IP 3.4. The lead Monitoring / Decontamination person in the trailer holds evacuees at the trailer's entrance when all 14 l

monitoring locations are occupied. Evacuees awaiting monitoring are i

8/ Mr. Donovan of FEMA confirmed that only five monitoring stations were used in the drills. Tr. 22633, 22638. There is no credibility question here, because as Ms. Sneider testified, her only look into the monitoring area was before the drill commenced and she saw seven stations manned. Tr. 25036-37. See also Tr. 25025. Mr. Donovan testified that under the extent of play all seven stations were required to, and were, manned up until the commencement of the flow-through drill. Tr. 22633.

This is when Ms. Sneider was observing the monitoring area.

However, the effect of Ms. Sneider's honest misunderstanding is to vitiate the assertions she made as to monitoring rates which were dependent on her misunderstanding to the effect that the simulated evacuees were being monitored in seven rather than five stations.

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directed to monitoring locations as the locations become available.

' = ' ' Evacuees are able to walk from the trailer's entrance to any monitoring location within the 5 seconds allocated for this action. In the event that contamination is found on an evacuee at a monitoring location, the lead Monitoring / Decontamination person holds incoming evacuees at the trailer's entrance. Therefore, a contaminated evacuee has an unobstructed path to the trailer's decontamination area and there is little chance of cross-contaminating evacuees waiting to be monitored. App. Reb. No. 17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 21.

9.1.108. The Monitoring / Decontamination Leader establishes a rotation of staff to ensure that Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel assigned to monitor evacuees inside the trailer receive a 10-minute break after fifty minutes of monitoring. Initially, this was to be accomplished through the use of excess personnel outside the trailer. However, because the four monitoring locations which are to be added to each trailer place new demands on personnel available to establish a rotation, four personnel (in excess of the four to staff the additional monitoring locations) will be assigned to each trailer to ensure that the Monitoring / Decontamination Leader can establish a rotation without compromising activities outside the trailer. App. Reb. No.17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 21-22.

9.1.109. The monitoring process for evacuees will not be significantly delayed by personnel breaks, dosimetry checks or decontami-nating a monitoring location as asserted by Interveners. Additional staff will be available to establish a rotation for Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel assigned to monitoring locations inside the trailer. Therefore, it is unnecessary to shut down a monitoring location as assumed by

- 19.2 -

. Interveners, or to subtract the time for a 10-minute break from the time available for monf toring evacuees as done by Interveners in their calculations. App. Reb..No. 17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 22.

9.1.110.- The personal dosimeters (i.e., direct reading' pocket 1

l' dosimeters) used by Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel can be read within the time allowed for evacuees to walk up to or away from a monitoring location. Therefore, no additional time need be allocated for

' dosimetry checks. App. Reb. No. 17, ff. Tr. 25423 at 22.

9.1.111. Contrary to Interveners' testimony, it is not necessary to allocate time for Monitoring / Decontamination staff assigned to monitoring locations in the trailers to perform self- monitoring.

" Controlled" and "noncontrolled" areas.are identified for the monitoring areas of the trailers. Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel stand in the "noncontrolled" area facing evacuees at the monitoring locations, which are part of the " controlled" area. Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel are not in physical contact with evacuees in the " controlled" area. Therefore, they are unlikely to become contaminated while performing monitoring. Moreover, only clean evacuees are allowed to step L into the "noncontrolled" area and so, if by chance they brush against Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel, there will not be a transfer of contamination. App. Reb. No. 17 ff. Tr. 25423 at 22-23.

9.1.112. It is also not necessary to allocate time for Monitoring / Decontamination Personnel to hand out clean tags (SPMC, 2P 7.9, Step 5.4.3 and Attachment 3) as asserted by Interveners. The clean tags can be handed to evacuees during the time allocated for them to walk away from the monitoring station. App. Reb. No. 17 ff. Tr. 25423 at 23.

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9.1.113. The use of the 1-minute per hour time estimate provided by Interveners to decontaminate a monitoring location still leaves 59 minutes of each hour as effective monitoring time at each monitoring location. This leads to an effective monitoring rate at each i

location of 50.6 persons per hour per location which, when rounded, equals the SPMC planning basis of 51 persons per hour per monitoring location.

70 seconds per person for 59 minutes per hour = 50.6 persons per hour.

Additionally, adding 3 seconds to the monitoring time for the monitoring of personal items such as purses, as suggested by Interveners, still allows the monitoring of 20% of the Massachusetts population inside the EPZ "within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />" (NUREG-0654, J.12 at page 65).

73 seconds per person for 59 minutes per hour = 48.5 persons per hour.

This 48.5 persons per hour yields an overall monitoring rate of 873 persons per hour based on 18 monitoring locations. Applying this overall hourly rate to the anticipated numbers of evacuees expected at the Beverly and North Andover trailers yields total monitoring times of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 16 minutes and 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> 58 minutes, respectively.

Beverly: 10,712 persons 873 persons per hour = 12.27 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br /> (or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 16 minutes)

North Andover: 8,698 persons 873 persons per hour = 9.96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> (or 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> 58 minutes).

App. Reb. No. 17, ff. Tr. 25423 ct 23-24.

9.1.114. The adequacy of the monitoring process for evacuees was evaluated by FEMA during the Exercise. FEMA concluded that "the New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization demonstrated adequate

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procedures . facilities, and equipment for registration, radiological monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees." App. Reb. No. 17, ff. Tr.

25423 at 24; App. Ex. 43F-at 227 [ global 235].

9.1.115. Applicants also described the monitoring procedures for emergency workers (which are the same as those for the general public), and special needs evacuees, who will be monitored either in their vehicles or at an MS-1 Hospital, App. Reb. No.17. ff. Tr. 25423 at 25-27, which the Board finds a' dequate.

9.1.116. These monitoring analyses included an assessment of time needed to monitor vehicles and people inside them. Tr. 21426.

9.1.117. Applicants committed to revise IP 2.9 to include a statement indicating that the Monitoring / Decontamination Leader may

reassign personnel to assure adequate coverage of the monitoring activities as needs arise. App. Reb. No. 17 ff. Tr. 25423 at 10.

9.1.118. MAG raised issues regarding registration of evacuees at the reception centers. Tr. 25587-90. In response, Applicants committed to revising IP 3.5 to reflect changes in the assignment of Reception Center Staff, Tr. 25587-88, combining the functions of evacuee registration and congregate care referral Tr. 25588, 25590, and changes to the reception center layout diagrams Tr. 25589.

9.1.119. Basis C of JI-56 raises the issues of whether the MS-1 hospital LOAs are sufficient and also questions the existence or comprehensiveness of other hospital LOAs, Contentions Memo. at 84.

9.1.120. FEMA has found SPMC to be adequate insofar as hospital LOAs are concerned. App. Ex. 43C at 17-18 [ global 35-36].

i

)

l, l

l[

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ln 9.1.121. No direct testimony was' elicited by Interveners in 1:

support of this basis'.

'9.1.122. Applicants adduced evidence which supports the view, and the Board so. finds.:that the LOAs for hospitals which are extant are adequate and-that there is reasonable assurance that other contemplated

, letters will.be obtained. App. Reb. No. 6 ff.'Tr. 21049 at 56 61-63.

L 9.1.123. The SPMC contains LOAs with hospitals whose average

' daily occupancy reflects the potential availability of at.least 350 beds

~(excluding the Joslin Center 65 beds at New England Deaconess) to 1

accommodate the approximately 248 EPZ evacuees who may require hospitalization. App. Reb. No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 63.

l' 9.1.124. . Appendix M of the SPMC is being revised to list approximately 60 other major eastern _ Massachusetts hospital facilities as l! FeqW4 Ped suggested by NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, II.L.3. NUREG-0654 further states indicates that LOAs with these facilities are not mandatory. PeqW4 Fed, It is expected that these hospitals could be called l~

l ' upon during an emergency to house evacuees with medical needs. App. Reb.

No. 6, ff. Tr. 21049 at 63.

l 9.1.125. JI-57 raises the issue of whether SPMC contains adequate provision for the handling of contaminated wastewater and materials. Contentions Memo. at 85-86.

9.1.126. FEMA has found SPMC to be adequate in this respect.

App. Ex. 43C at 78-79 [ global 97-98].

1 9.1.127. No direct testimony was elicited by the opponents of the facility with respect to this contention.

1

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9.1.128. . Applicants have contracted with a licensed contractor of world-wide reputation for the disposal of waste-water from decontamina-tion operations. Tr. 19064, 19088, 19119- 20.

9.1.129. Applicants have holding tanks for wastewater from decontamination operations; this goes beyond federal requirements, which would permit the discharge of such material to a sewer system. Tr.

19100-102.

9.1.130. All procedures used for handling contaminated articles are normal, well-established health physics procedures such as double bagging, etc. Tr.19064-65; Tr.19087-89.

9.1.131. The monitoring functions are staffed such that if any one activity becomes overloaded, management of the facility can move persons from one job to another to relieve temporary overload, and the procedures are flexible enough to create a " hot area" where people can await decontamination if the facility becomes overloaded. Tr. 19066-67;

.Tr.19071-72; Tr.19082-85.

9.1.132. JI-58 raises the issue of whether there are sufficient personnel and vehicles under LOA to execute SPMC. Contentions Memo, at 86-87.

9.1.133. FEMA has found that SPMC is adequate with respect to the governing criterion on LOAs. App. Ex. 43C at 17-18 [ global 35-36].

9.1.134. As to this contention, MAG presented a survey which purported to show that there would be fewer vehicles than necessary at least at certain times. Mangan Dir., ff. Tr. 19429, passim.

9.1.135. Applicants have under LOA sufficient vehicles to execute SPMC. App. Ex. 41; Tr. 27333-34.

l L_ __ _ _ . _ - _ _

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9.2. RULINGS OF LAW' l j

9.2.1. ARC's Congressional Charter mandates its' participation j

\

and assistance in a radiological emergency at Seabrook.

]

9.3. CONCLUSIONS I

9.3.1. There is reasonable assurance that there will be available adequate equipment and facilities to carry out the SPMC in.the event of a radiological emergency.

10. C0 ORDINATION OF GOVERNMENTAL RESOURCES AND RESPONSE 10.1. FINDINGS OF FACT 10.1.1. Contentions JI-61 through JI-63 raised issues as to the coordination between and among the ORO and New Hampshire and Massachusetts State and local governments. Contentions Memo. a t 87-93. In addition, JI-27 raised similar issues. Id.. at 37- 39.

10.1.2. FEMA found that the SPMC adequately addresses the organization interface with The Commonwealth under various modes of operation. App. Ex. 43C at 6-7 [ global 24-25].

10.1.3. MAG's first witness with respect to these contentions was Charles D. Jones. Jones Dir., ff. Tr. 23397, passim. Mr. Jones specifically limited his testimony to JI-27(A) and JI-61 and JI-62. Tr.

23413.

10.1.4. Mr. Jones believed was-ef-the-pesitten that the OR0 liaisons will not be able to function effectively in a Mode 1 or Mode 2 partial response, because they do not know enough about how Massachusetts operates to interpret the SPMC to Massachusetts officials and personnel.

Jones Dir., ff. Tr. 23397 at 16-17.

f' E - 198'-

10.1.5. Mr. Jones overstated his qualifications to opine on the matters ' addressed in his testimony. His experience is limited to the public information portion of Illinois state plans. Tr. 23399-403, 23434..

10.1.6. The witness repeatedly seemed evasive, or at least' confused as to what questions he was answering. For example after  !

repeated questioning Jones' finally conceded that his opinion - that a utility plan would be viewed with more skepticism than a state plan -

I was not based on any 'special expertise. Tr. 23504 507; see also Tr. l 1

23400-401, 23413-15; Tr. 23438-40; Tr. 23450-51; Tr. 23477; Tr. 23502-11; j

. Tr. 23516-17. At one point, the witness professed ignorance of the f existence of a Commonwealth plan, CERP, about which he testified in 1

- response to a question asked by his own counsel'just a few minutes earlier. Compare Tr. 23519-520'with Tr. 23498-99.

10.1.7. The central premise underlying the witness's testimony

- was his apparent belief that a utility-generated plan is inherently inferior to a government-sponsored plan. Tr. 23449. Mr. Jones advocates this proposition despite his admission that he has had no experience with any other utility-generated plan and no special expertise. Tr. 28519 23502-23511.

10.1.8. Mr. Jones also suggested that fear of radiation and skepticism of the nuclear industry would lead to confusion and a situation of "every person for themselves", at least in Mode 2 partial. Tr.

23453-54, 23455. However, he finally admitted, after repeated inquiry, to having no expertise as to these issues of human behavior. Tr. 23511-12.

The Board accordingly assigns no weight to these assertions.

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10.1.9. He admitted to having no knowledge a: to what training l

~ the SPMC liaisons had, in fact, had. Tr. 23418-19. He also admitted, under cross-examination, that it was not fair to assume that Massachusetts officials would not be familiar with the SPMC, Tr. 23431, Tr. 23440, and he.could make no prediction as to the degree of familiarity they would l

have or how it might affect the coordination among the OR0 and state and local government officials responding in an' emergency, Tr. 23445, Tr. 23446-48. Further, Mr. Jones, himself, spent only two to four hours reviewing the SPMC, not reading it in detail, and believed that he understood it. Tr. 23408-09.

10.1.10. Mr. Jones at first claimed that there is no state emergency plan which is specific to Seabrook, Jones Dir., ff. Tr. 23397 at 10; Tr. 23427; Tr. 23448; he later acknowledged ,that more than one existed, Tr. 23449, Tr. 23517, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Plan, the NIAT handbook and the CERP. The witness discounts the relevance and though-he-questiens-4ts effectiveness of the CERP because it is several years old, despite the Commonwealth's assertion that it would look to it in a Seabrook emergency. Tr. 23428-29.

10.1.11. In addition, MAG relies upon the testimony of T.

Michael Carter. Dr. Carter applies his experience with hurricane PARS to nuclear facilities without explaining why he believes these situations are comparable. Carter Dir., ff. Tr. 27546, passim.

10.1.12. Mrr Dr. Carter stated that the exercise revealed that the coordination between ORO and the State of New Hampshire was less than optimal because of allegedly " inconsistent" messages between adjacent jurisdictions -- the State of New Hampshire had closed its beaches

- 200 - i before OR0 made gave.its first public announcements and those announce- )

ments', when finally made, given did not say what had been done in a_t New Hampshire beaches or give a recommendation for Massachusetts. the-New Hampshire-beachest In addition, the State of New Hampshire acted on, and gave out, recommendations on schools before the ORD informed the'public of these actions or explained what was being done in Massachusetts.

did,-and, In the witness' opinion, such actions this would cause parental concern in Massachusetts. Carter Dir., ff. Tr. 27546 at 24-26.

Hewe-again Dr. Carter-4s-draw 4ng draws on his hwericane experience with emergency responses to storms, without consideration as to whether and-unwarrantedly-equat4ng hurricane PARS may be equated with those for nuclear facilities, as-thevgh-they-were-fung 4ble-as-discussed-ear 44er-w4th respect-te-EBS-messages, 10.1.13. TON offered testimony to the effect that the town does not, by itself, have sufficient personnel and equipment to promptly

' implement the extensive traffic controls which TON officials indicated they thought necessary. TON Dir. , ff. Tr.17801 at 16-17. The testimony is silent, however, as to whether TON could implement the SPMC traffic management plan, even without the ORD, The Commonwealth, and/or other assistance available to the localities pursuant to SPMC.

10.1.14. T0A offered testimony, admitted by stipulation, by the chairman of its Board of Selectmen concerning T0A emergency response planning and resources. Morrissey Reb., ff. Tr. 23938, passim. While stating that T0A has refused to engage in planning specifically for Seabrook, the witness testified that T0A has a " strong", "well prepared"

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civil defense force that has received ample funding, significant training and direct mutual aid experience, and a permanent EOC. Jd.at2,4.

According'to the witness, T0A's refusal to engage in Seabrook planning has had no detrimental effect on T0A's other emergency planning efforts. J d_.

at 4. It is noted, also, that T0A's Civil Defense Director has used a draft emergency plan prepared for the town, and would use it again if necessary. See Tr.16763; Tr.16768; 16770-72; Tr.16832-33.

10.1.15. Gisen this high level of preparedness by T0A, it is reasonable to assume that T0A's best-efforts response to any Seabrook-related emergency would be well equipped and competently directed. The Board's views in this regard are reinforced by the testimony of T0A's Civil Defense Director. Tr. 16750-16899.

10.1.16. The Board notes that, despite the fact that these contentions involve numerous questions about the state of The Commonwealth's plans, capabilities, resources, and information, MAG did not offer as a witness even one Commonwealth official who is involved in emergency planning or response. Similarly, MAG did not offer even a single document relating to state or local emergency plans or resources.

Applicants, on the other hand, provided extensive documentation as to the plans, capabilities, and resources of the Commonwealth and the six EPZ communities. E_.g., App. Exs. 44, 48, 51, 55-60; see also App. Reb. No. 21 ff. Tr. 23537 Attachs. A-E, G-Q.

10.1.17. Applicants offered the testimony of a panel of j witnesses consisting of: Anthony M. Callendrello, Manager, Emergency y i

Preparedness Licensing, New Hampshire Yankee (Qualifications ff. Tr. I 17318); Catherine M. Frank, Emergency Planner, Impell Corporation i

E____.______ _ . _ . _ . _

t i

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(Qualifications ff. Tr..'23530); and John G. Robinson, Direc. tor of-Environmental Engineering, Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Qualifications ff. Tr. 23531). App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537, passim.

10.1.18.. The. Board finds that these witnesses were competent to testify with respect to the areas they addressed.

10.1.19. In particular, the Board notes that the members of the panel have between them at least 26 years of experience working directly with Commonwealth officials in emergency planning for nuclear power plants. Tr. 23598-23602. In addition, Mr. Robinson -- whJse ORO position is as liaison to the Massachusetts Department of Public Health -- is one of the individuals whom the Commonwealth has designated to be called upon to respond to a radiological emergency at the other power plants in the state. See App. Ex. 59 at 21; Tr. 23602.

10.1.20. Applicants explained in detail the existing capabilities in the emergency planning area of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 8-23.

10.1.21. State and local officials will generally follow the SPMC by utilizing provisions in the SPMC for determining and implementing protective actions, implementing traffic control, use of reception and host facilities, monitoring / decontamination facilities, and transportation operations. It is not necessary for State or local officials to insert themselves into the ORO and follow the specific mechanics of all SPMC procedures. Tr. 23916-18; Tr. 23990-24016.

10.1.22. There is no difference between The Commonwealth's responding to a radiological emergency at Seabrook and its responding to a radiological emergency at any of the other three nuclear plants for which

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it does have specific plans. The response by the Commonwealth's Department of Health and the NIAT teams would be essentially the same as for Yankee Rowe, Vermont Yankee and Pilgrim. Tr. 23635-56. Tr. 23634-35.

10.1.23. Although the Applicants have made a substantial good faith attempt to secure and retain the cooperation of The Commonwealth in emergency planning, the position of The Commonwealth has-been, since September of 1986, has been, despite extensive participation in the planning process by state and local officials prior to that time, that no state or local planning will be undertaken for an emergency at Seabrook.

App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 24-25 and Attach. F; Tr. 23669.

10.1.24. Because it incorporates and expands upon the emergency l planning in place prior to State and local withdrawal, the SPMC constitutes an outgrowth of The Commonwealth's identification in 1986 of l the need for a compensatory response plan for non-participating Massachusetts communities. State-level withdrawal from the planning process dictated that the utility- sponsored plan would have to incorporate the capability to compensate for response actions of both State and local levels of government as well as to commit all necessary resources and accommodate any degree of governmental response. "To ensure a smooth integration, this plan has been developed to be consistent with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan which is currently used for the operating nuclear power plants located in, or within 10 miles of, the Commonwealth's boundaries . . .", SPMC, pg.

1.2-2, and ". . . in particular with the generic sections A and B which describe the Statewide radiological emergency response program." SPMC, l

pg. 1.3-1. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 25-26. ]

7_

l

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10.1.25. As' Applicants' witness testified, it-is-to-be-nsted that. the key individuals who were involved for The. Commonwealth in emergency planning for'Seabrook prior to the Governor's decision to cease such efforts are still in office. Tr. 23952, 10.1.26. Mode 1 through full Mode 2 implementation represents a spectrum of response integration as described in the SPMC at pg.1.1-2:

"The compensatory actions which are delineated in this plan can range from supporting requests for augmented personnel and

. resources to performing emergency response actions or implementing the total response in place of those organizations."

The SPMC provides Mode 1 and Mode 2 levels of operation to allow for integration of Massachusetts and ORO resources in response to an emergency at Seabrook Station. The Commonwealth participated extensively in radiological emergency preparedness in support of the two nuclear power plants in the State as well as for one in the State of Vermont. During a Seabrook Station emergency this preparation will provide the basis of a planned Mode 1 response. The fundamental concepts of emergency classification, protective action decisionmaking and public notification are well understood by personnel from the MCDA and Department of Public Health, and guidance is available to them in The Commonwealth's CERP.

This statement is supported by Massachusetts Attorney General's Answers to NRC Staff's Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of f Documents, 12/19/88, at pages 4, 5, and 6, respectively:

" . . . DPH NIAT members would respond to an emergency by relying on previous training and experience in handling emergencies at other nuclear power plants." ,

1 "MCDA would look to the CERP for guidance . . . rely on 4 professional experience . . . ."

1

L

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l.

App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 27-28.

10.1.27. Thus, it is expected that during an emergency, i

Massachusetts officials will have the capability to evaluate the situation rapidly and implement those actions that are in the best interests of their citizens. The decisionmaking exercised by The Commonwealth determines the OR0's level of response. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at'28.

10.1.28. Standby Mode is instituted to provide Massachusetts the option for response implementation using resources of its own that The Commonwealth deems adequate. During Standby, the ORO continues to perform accident assessment analyses in concert with the Seabrook Station onsite Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and the State of New Hampshire. The ORO maintains a state of readiness during this mode by having personnel report to their assigned locations to enable rapid support of The Commonwealth's response. No authority is required to implement Standby Mode. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 28.

10.1.29. In Mode 1, the ORO responds to requests for resources to support The Commonwealth's planned response. This action is consistent with the stated position of The Commonwealth that it will utilize whatever resources it feels are necessary to protect the public health and safety.

The Commonwealth's response, and that of local comunities, is not ad hoc under Mode 1 operation. Mode 1 recognizes that State and local officials will respond to the extent possible to protect the public and anticipates that such response will be in accordance with the established emergency response plans of The Commonwealth and the local comunities where such 1

-. _ _ _ _____._...._______u

' l l

1

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i plans exist. These plans all demonstrate that decisionmaking structures are in place. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 28-29.

10.1.30. It was asserted that The Commonwealth's response, if it.uses Mode 1, will be ad, hoc in nature; however, if The Coninonwealth is 1 following some plan (The Commonwealth's or the SPMC), using pre-defined resources, including NHY's, this would not be an ad hoc response. Tr.

23979.

10.1.31. In Mode 2 operation the OR0 is authcri:ed by The Commonwealth to take responsibility for specific functions, which may include the following: activation of public notification system and broadcast of Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages, recommending protective actions to the public for both plume and ingestion exposure pathways, recommending recovery and reentry actions to the public, directing traffic, performing access control, and removing obstructions (including private vehicles) from roadways. Once authorization is granted, for any or all areas of implementation, the necessary activities are carried out by the OR0. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 32.

10.1.32. Objective #37 in the 1988 Graded exercise was evaluated by FEMA as-having-been was met. This objective required that  !

l the ORD demonstrate the capability of utility offsite response ]

organization personnel to interface with nonparticipating State and local governments through their mobilization and provision of advice and assistance. The Control Cell, which acted as the nonparticipating governments, was staffed by FEMA evaluators who simulated a low level of l l

SPMC knowledge.

FEMA specifically noted:

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"The FEMA Control Cell did not commit any state or local resources'or personnel to assist in the NHY ORO response.

Legal authority was requested and received for appropriate response activities -(as specified in the NHY OR0 Plan, IP

'2.14)."

App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 34-35; App. Ex. 43F at 242 [ global 250].

10.1.33. Protective Action decisions and implementation of these. decisions were coordinated effectively with all appropriate organizations. App. Ex. 43F at 203 [ global 211].

10.1.34. Liaison functions are specifically designed to establish and maintain immediate communication with State and local organizations, thereby enhancing the coordination of emergency response activities and compensating for the lack of Seabrook Station-specific planning and training by State and local responders. App. Reb. No. 21 ff. Tr. 23537 at 36.

10.1.35. State Liaison functions are divided among three liaisons: two who establish communications and coordinate joint OR0/MCDA activities at Emergency Operations Centers at Framingham (State) and Tewksbury (Area 1), and one who establishes communications and coordinates joint OR0/ Massachusetts Department of Public Health activities. These State Liaisons will report to the two MCDA E0Cs and to the appropriate MDPH office. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 36.

10.1.36. Major responsibilities of the Local EOC Liaisons are to: establish communications with the Local EOC Civil Defense Dirr. tor / Senior Local E0C Official, or other local official as listed in SPMC, Appendix H. New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Communications Directory; apprise the local EOCs of current event classification and

e

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plant conditions; request the status of local community response capabilities; explain the capabilities of the ORO (SPMC, pg. 2.1-22); and provide such additional services for local emergency workers and institutionalized individuals who cannot be evacuated. SPMC, pg. 2.1-23 The Local E0C Liaison will report to the local community E0C and function from that location, thereby eliminating the need for communications by the local governmental responders to equivalent ORO personnel. SPMC Section 3.5, pg. 3.5-2 explains the issuance of extra dosimetry to the Local E0C Liaisons for use by the local community's emergency workers. App. Reb.

No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 37.

10.1.37. State and Local E0C Liaisons are issued copies of the SPMC, including Appendix M, NHY Offsite Response Emergency Resource Manual, and Appendix J, NHY Offsite Response Traffic Management Manual, for their reference in advising government officials on the capabilities of the ORD. These volumes, as well as appropriate maps and sample EBS messages, are taken to the State or local offices by the Liaisons for use by them and by local officials in integrating response to an emergency.

These materials contain the Seabrook EPZ-specific information which may be otherwise unavailable because of State and local nonparticipation in the planning process. App. Reb. No. 21 ff. Tr. 23537 at 37-38.

10.1.38. Local E0C and State Liaisons are available to State and local government to explain both the roles assigned to these organizations in the SPMC and the capabilities for expanded response. By using SPMC Tables 2.2-1 and 2.2-2, liaisons can explain which local and State government levels correspond to the comand and control functions of 1

l l

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the NHY Offsite Response Organization. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 1 38.

10.1.39. No State or local emergency response personnel are required to communicate or coordinate actions with individual counterparts j l

in the utility organization because the contact point at each State or- j local E0C is the ORD Liaison. The SPMC, however, does not preclude such one-to-one communication. Rather than being either cumbersome or time-consuming, as alleged by Interveners, such communications by The Commonwealth or local communities for specific assistance would require contact with, at most, approximately 10 ORO personnel other than the Liaisons. The presence of Commonwealth representatives at the EOC or the E0F further enhances communications between organizations. App. Reb. No.

21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 39.

10.1.40. Knowledge of the overall structure, function, operation, and available resources of the SPMC is ensured through the training required for State and Local E0C Liaison positions. All Local EOC and State Liaisons receive a total of approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of classroom training in: Emergency Plan Overview, Emergency Management.

Transportation, Procedure Checklists, Tabletop, Protective Action Decisionmaking, and Communications. Local E0C Liaisons receive an additional hour of training in Staging Area Operations. State Liaisons to MDPH receive Dose / Accident Assessment, Dosimetry Recordkeeping, and E0C Operations, totaling an additional 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> of training. State Liaisons to MCDA receive E0C Operations (I hour) in addition to the 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> all Liaisons receive. In addition, a guidance document has been prepared detailing the anticipated Commonwealth response to an actual emergency, L-_--__-_-----__-_------_--_-- __

]

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based on the information supplied by The Commonwealth and local

.comunities te-App 14eants during discovery. Copies of the State and local plans and other guidance material cited will be placed in the OR0 E0C and the Staging-Area for reference. Training on this detailed anticipated response will be conducted for appropriate positions in the OR0, including State and Local E0C Liaisons. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 39-40.

10.1.41. Drills and walk-throughs in which State and Local E00 Liaisons have participated also provide significant training on the overall functions of the OR0. FEMA has found that the Liaisons adequately demonstrated their ability to interface with non- participating State and local governments through their mobilization and provision of advice and assistance during the 1988 Graded exercise. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr.

23537 at 40; App. Ex. 43F at 240-242 [ global 248-50].

10.1.42. SPMC does contemplate that even in Mode 2, the government will continue to provide normal services in such areas as security, law enforcement, fire and public health App. Reb. No. 21, ff.

Tr. 23537 at 41-46.

10.1.43. The SPMC assigns no responsibility to local rescue l agencies to effect evacuation of individuals from institutions in the event of an emergency at Seabrook Station. The SPMC provides adequate resources and personnel to accomplish evacuation without reliance on local resources. If large-scale evacuation of individuals is removed as a local l level of response, local rescue agencies will not be called upon to perform any services except those falling within their nonnal capabilities. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 46-47; SPMC Section 3.6.

N_ _ _ _ _ -- - - _ - _ - - - -- - ----D

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10.1.44. Mutual aid agreements to provide assistance to the six communities in the Massachusetts segment of the EPZ are not limited to agreements among.these six communities or with New Hampshire EPZ communities. For example, aid is available to the six Massachusetts communities in the case of fire from additional communities such as Haverhill, Rowley, Groveland, Georgetown, Methuen, Ipswich, Andover, Boxford, Lawrence, North Andover, and Middleton, all of which are outside the Seabrook plume EPZ. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 48-49 and Attach. I. See also Tr. 25578-81.

10.1.45. The SPMC does not rely on the use of The Commonwealth's communication systems, laboratory facilities, or governmen t-owned or operated local EOC's; nevertheless, extensive facilities of these types are available. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 51-57.

10.1.46. The SPMC has been drafted with a view to coordination with the various local governments. App. Reb. No. 21. ff. Tr. 23537 at 57-59.

10.1.47. There is no need for communication between ORO and its contracted support organizations as to the mode in which the plan is operating, because these organizations remain under the command and l

control of ORD. App. Reb. No. 21 ff. Tr. 23537 at 59-60.

10.1.48. To clarify the definition of " support organization"

$ 2.0 of the SPMC will be revised to remove the reference to local governmental organization functions under the heading " Support Organizations." App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 59. 1

i I

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10.1.49. SPMC has provisions for coordination with the Massachusetts State Police in the event of an emergency. App. Reb. No.

21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 60-63. ,

-l 10.1.50. IP 2.14 will be revised to direct the Offsite Response i Director to inquire specifically whether MDPH and MCDA intend to dispatch representatives to the Offsite Response E0C. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr.

23537 at 62.

10.1.51. SPMC has adequate provisions to assure coordination to the extent necessary with the State of New Hampshire. App. Reb. No. 21, ff. Tr. 23537 at 63-66.

10.2. RULINGS OF LAW 10.2.1. It is not sufficient for Interveners avails-the eppenents-ef-Seabreek-nething to demonstrate the existence of an error or lack of judgment on the part of players in the exercise as such; rather, what must be demonstrated is that those things which did not go perfectly ,

in the exercise demonstrate the existence of a fundamental flaw in the plan or plans being exercised. Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-903, 28 NRC 499, 505-07 (1988).

10.2.2. "[A] fundamental flaw in an emergency plan, as revealed in an exercise, has two principal components. First, it reflects a failure of an essential element of the plan, and, second, it can be i

remedied only through a significant revision of the plan." Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-903, 28 NRC499,505(1988).

10.2.3. Any purported deficiency observed in an exercise which can be corrected by the provision of supplemental training cannot be held

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to evidence a fundamental flaw in a radiological emergency response plan.

Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units I and 2),

ALAB-918, 29 NRC , , Slip Op. at 24-25 (June 20, 1989).

10.3. CONCLUSI0h 10.3.1. There is reasonable assurance of adequate coordination between OR0 and State and local responders in all modes of SPMC.

10.3.2. No lack of State or local resources has been shown to exist, let alone one which could prevent there being reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station.

10.3.3. In the event of an emergency at Seabrook Station, The Commonwealth and its political subdivisions will follow the utility plan by either (1) delegating authority to OR0 for a full Mode 2 response by OR0; (2) responding with their best efforts pursuant-te-their-own-plan,.

while calling upon the ORO for resources as needed, as contemplated in Mode 1; or (3) some degree of partial response and partial delegation, pursuant to Mode 2 Partial.

11. MISCELLANEOUS EXERCISE CONTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SPMC 11.1. FINDINGS OF FACT 11.1.1. A number of issues with respect to the scope of the SPMC' exercise which have not been previously addressed are addressec' in this section.

11.1.2. Th e- p u r po s e- e f- t he-ex e re 4 s e -o f-a - r ad 4 el eg ic a l-eine rgeney respense-plan-45-te-test-the-4mplementabil4ty-of-that-plan,-net-some-ether plan-er-the-plan-at-hand,-with-enhancements, _A radiological emergency

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\

preparedness (REP) exercise is a test of the implementability of the plan (s). In FEMA's Exercise evaluation process, exercise participants )

are requested to demonstrate the implementation of their plans. These j demonstrations are evaluated against exercise objectives based on the 1

offsite plar.ning standards contained in 44 CFR 6 350.5. FEMA's exercise f objectives are contained in FEMA's Guidance Memorandum GM EX-3,

" Managing Pre-Exercise Activities and post-Exercise Meetings", and its amendment, issued on March 7, 1989. Donovan Dir., ff. Tr. 21653 at 2; see also Tr. 21713; Tr. 22243; Tr. 22255-56.

11.1.3. The extent of play represents FEMA's best judgment as to what is required to demonstrate that the adequacy of the plan. te-be tested-4s-sat 4siasteryr Tr. 21722-23. The expected demonstrations are defined by extent of play agreements between FEMA and the exercise participant (s) on the manner in which a particular response function will be demonstrated. Donovan Dir., ff. Tr. 21653 at 2 & Attach. A.

41,4,4 r--The-exe re( se-wa s-net-a-v er4 f 4e a t4en-o f-re sourc es t-FEMA had-prev 4eusly-verified-the-ex4stence-ef-resewrees,-thus-14miting-the seepe-with-respest-te-hew-many-vehieles-aetwally-had-te-be-rune--Ter i

28121r--See-alse-Ter-23086, J 11.1.5. The FEMA witness, Mr. Donovan, who ran the exercise for .

that agency, has 15-years experience in running radiological emergency plan exercises Tr. 21858, and has run over sixty such exercises, Tr. J 22671.

11.1.6. MAC and the other opponents of the plant attempted to make much of the fact that Mr. Donovan had not retained individual evaluator reports and other documents. However, the Board finds that this

- 215 - 1 action of Mr. Donovan does not lessen the weight to be accorded his testimony on the exercise because (a) the practice of discarding these documents was his normal practice. Tr. 21889; Tr. 21894, (b) he was, at the time, unaware that similar documents had been retained in the case of the Shoreham exercise, Tr. 21903, (c) the basic " source" documents, the l player logs and papers were retained, Tr. 21950, cnd (d) he was not advised by counsel that he had to retain the documents and, indeed, was given advice that could be interpreted to be the opposite, Tr. 21902.

The Board makes no inference one way or the other as to the quality of FEMA's exercise report based on the lack of the documents. Tr. 21959.

11.1.7. With respect to the scope issues, Applicants presented a panel of witnesses consisting of: John W. Baer, Emergency Planning Specialist, Aidikoff Associates (Qualifications ff. Tr. 22695); Anthony M.

Callendrello, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Licensing, New Hampshire Yankee (Qualifications Tr.17318); and George R. Gram, Executive Director of Emergency Preparedness and Community Relations, New Hampshire Yankee (Qualifications Tr. 22694). App. Reb. No. 23. ff. Tr. 22702, passim.

11.1.8. The Exercise was a large event. During the two days of the Exercise,1,525 persons participated as players in the three offsite ,

i organizations; 338 persons simulated evacuees, and 274 NHY controllers, j 151 FEMA evaluators, and 40 NRC observers participated. Notwithstanding the fact that FEMA put more evaluators in the field for the Seabrook exercise than for any other previous exercise, the availability of f<

1 evaluators did influence the number or sequencing of events that could )

l reasonably be observed. App. Reb. No. 23. ff. Tr. 22702 !2t 22.

4

l

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l l 11.1.9. The required scope of a pre-license or qualifying exercise finds its roots in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F.1 which i

requires "a full participation exercise which tests as much of the . . .

emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation." "' Full participation' includes testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel' and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario." Id., fn. 4. App. Reb. No. 23. ff. Tr. 22702 at 3-4.

11.1.10. Development of the extent of play for the Seabrook exercise involved the design of exercise activities that would ,

demonstrate, test, and verify the capability of particular offsite emergency response functions relied upon in the offsite response plans for Seabrook Station.- The extent of play for the Exercise was designed to conform with FEMA guidance which states: "The degree of demonstration of individual exercise objectives should test the workability of that aspect of the plan." (Emphasisadded.) GM EX-3 Amendment, page 3. App. Reb.

No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 12.

j 11.1.11. Those components of the major observable portions of ]

the plans found to be impacted by external influences were reviewed and

- discussed by the organizations' representatives to ensure that these components would be demonstrated to the extent reasonably achievable or necessary to test their ability to be implemented. App. Reb. No. 23 ff.

Tr. 22702 at 17. J 11.1.12. MAG EX-2, Basis E alleges that the PHY Offsite l Response Organization (OR0) did not attempt to demonstrate that it could

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muster the appropriate vehicles and personnel for the timely and proper I

evacuation of patients from EPZ hospitals, nursing homes, an' other special facilities. It also alleges that the Exercise failed to test the-preparedness of the bus, ambulance, and wheelchair van companies for the evacuation of patients. Contentions Memo. at 94.

11.1.13. Participants in the development of the extent of play for the Exercise determined that the ability to implement protective actions would be demonstrated by performing the following functions:

the protective action decisionmaking process; the initial notification of all companies providing special transportation resources; notification of special facilities by contact with participating facilities or by simulated contact of non- participating facilities by calls to the NHY Control Cell;

• the assignment of transportation resources to meet the identified requirements; and the extension of that process into the field by the deployment of a representation of resources.

l App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 25-26.

11.1.14. FEMA guidance with respect to the proper evaluation of the availability of buses and training of drivers focuses on pre-exercise evaluation of the availability and training of these resources. App. Reb.

No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 24 & Attach. C.

11.1.15. FEMA, during its evaluation of the SPMC, conducted a survey of transportation resource providers. App. Reb. No. 23 ff. Tr.

22702 at 26-27 & Attach. H.

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11.1.16. During the Exercise, the tapability of the ORO to  ;

coordinate aad integrate with the ambulance and van functions was demonstrated. As a result of the declaration of an Alert, ORO personnel  !

initially contacted all bus, wheelchair van and ambulance companies under agreement with NHY for resource support during an emergency at Seabrook )

1 Station to determine available transportation resources. Concurrent with the notification process, Special Population Liaisons contacted participating special facilities or, in the alternative, made simulated contact of non-participating special facilities by calling the NHY Control Cell to determine their specific transportation requirements at the time of the event. Transportation resources were assigned accordingly.

Special vehicle dispatch personnel at the OR0 Staging Area filled out dispatch forms for all of the assignments for special vehicles included in j i

Appendix M of the SPMC for the entire Massachusetts portior, of the 10-mile EPZ. Thus, the major functional elements of the plan pertaining to the notification, allocation and deployment of transportation resources for special needs populations were demonstrated. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr.

22702 at 27-28.

11.1.17. Three (3) wheelchair vans were mobilized to the OR0 Staging Area. At the Staging Area, they received assignments (previously selected with FEMA) to evacuate patients from special care facilities (two nursing homes and one elderly housing unit). Upon completing the transport of simulated patients to Reception Centers for monitoring and subsequently to host facilities, the NHY Controller directed the drivers j of the vans to proceed back to the OR0 Staging Area for further assignments. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 28.

o

Il '

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11.1.18. The Exercise demonstrated one ambulance assignment to 1

.supportevacuationforspecialpopulationsinMassachusetts.lThe ambulance was dispatched to,the OR0 Staging Area where an assignment was received to evacuate a patient from Amesbury Hospital and transport that patient to the host facility, Deaconess Hospital. After completion of this assignment the ambulance was directed to return to the Salem ORO Staging Area'where it was released _from exercise participation. App. Reb.

No. 23. ff. Tr. 22702 at 28-29.

11.1.19. MAG EX-21. Basis B alleges that the scope of the Exercise was insufficient because only one of the ambulances relied on by the NHY OR0 to transport contaminated-injured persons was tested; and Basis D alleged that errors by this one crew precluded any valid generalizations with respect to the ambulance fleet as a whole.

Contentions Memo. at 114. MAG introduced no evidence to support Basis D.

11.1.20. Demonstration of the objective involved by use of only one ambulance is consistent with FEMA guidance contained in a FEMA memorandum, " Clarification of Selected Provisions of Guidance Memorandum 1GM)MS-1.MedicalServices." and-the-usual-praetieer App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 30-31 & Attach. B. t-Trv-22405, FEMA's normal approach ~

to this objective is that the use of one ambulance with one victim is an appropriate demonstration of this response function. Tr. 22167; see also Tr. 22405. The need to limit the involvement of public safety resources, such as additional ambulances, the ability of the assigned FEMA evaluator to observe each of the medical aspects of the Exercise, and the impact on the resources of the MS-1 hospital during a non-emergency situation were

- _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i

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further considerations taken'into account when determining the Extent of Plan. App. Reb. No. 23 ff. Tr. 22702 at 30.

11.1.21. Transport of a contaminated-injured individual was demonstrated by the ORO on the second day of the Exercise out-of-sequence with the scenario time line. To demonstrate this capability, an accident was simulated where a victim was injured and potentially contaminated.

ORO ambulance personnel demonstrated procedures to implement precautions for controlling the spread of contamination and to provide transport to an MS-1 hospital where the victim would be treated for injuries and decontaminated if necessary. The demonstration of this aspect of the plan included the proper handling of the individual simulated to be injured and contaminated and the use of the appropriate equipment by the ambulance and MS-1 hospital personnel. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 31. See also App. Reb. No. 6 ff. Tr. 21049 at 59.

11.1.22. FEMA found that the objective involved was met. App.

Ex. 43F at 229 [ global 237 239].

11.2. RULINGS OF LAW 11.2.1. It-ava44s-the-eppements-ef-Seabreek-nething It is not sufficient for interveners to demonstrate the existence of an error or lack of judgment on the part of players in the exercise as such; rather, what must be demonstrated is that those things which did not go perfectly in the exercise demonstrate the existence of a fundamental flaw in the plan or plans being exercised. Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-903, 28 NRC 499, 505-07 (1988).

11.2.1.1. With respect to the scope of the exercise, interveners must demonstrate that the exercise was so unduly limited that l-L- - __ - - _ - - _ . - _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ________

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it did not permit a meaningful test and evaluation of the emergency plan in order to ascertain if that plan is fundamentally flawed. Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-900, 28 NRC 275, 286 (1988).

q 11.2.2. "[A] fundamental flaw in an emergency plan, as revealed in an exercise, has two principal components. First, it reflects a failure of an essential element of the plan, and, second, it can be remedied only through a significant revision of the plan." Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-903, 28 NRC499,505(1988).

11.2.3. Any purported deficiency observed in an exercise which can be correcteJ by the provision of supplemental training cannot be held to evidence a fundamental flaw in a radiological emergency response plan.

Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),

ALAB-918, 29 NRC , , Slip Op. at 24-25 (June 20, 1989).

11.3. CONCLUSIONS 11.3.1. The scope of the graded exercise was sufficient to test the adequacy of the SPMC.

12. NEW HAMPSHIRE EXERCISE PERFORMANCE 12.1. FINDINGS OF FACT 1

l 12.1.1. A number of contentions have been raised with respect 1

to the State of New Hampshire's exercise performance. These include:

- MAG EX-19; Bases B.1, B.2, and D which assert, among other things, that the licensee did not issue appropriate protective action recommendations (PARS) to the State of New Hampshire and that, because of

o

(;

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the high degree of reliance placed by New Hampshire on the licensee's PARS, the State of New Hampshire's PARS were also inappropriate. In particular, MAG asserts that the evacuation PAR for ERPA F comunities was made too late, the shelter-in-place PAR for ERPA G communities was

' inappropriate, and the METPAC computer model is flawed and was used inappropriately. Contentions Memo. at 112-13.

l

- SAPL EX-2 which asserts that the exercise of the NHRERP failed

,n.

to demonstrate the ability to provide sufficient buses and ambulances with properly trained drivers for transit dependent, special facility and special needs populations or that the buses that were deployed could be adequately routed. Contentions Memo. at 114-17.

- SAPL EX-12 which asserts that the procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees were not demonstrated and that facilities were neither organized nor run effectively. Contentions Memo. at 120-21.

- SAPL EX-14 which asserts that there was an inadequate demonstration that appropriate protective action decisions will be made for the plume EPZ communities in that, in view of the radiation levels in the plume as the wind carried it over ERPA G, the evacuation PAR should have encompassed ERPA G communities. Contentions Memo, at 122-23.

- T0H/NECNP EX-1 also asserted deficiencies in the scope of the exercise. Contentions Memo. at 123-25.

12.1.2. With respect to PAG EX-19 and SAPL EX-14, opponents of -

the facility rely for their direct case upon the testimony of Dr. Goble, described earlier.

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12.1.3. With respect to SAPL EX-12, SAPL introduced the testimony of two firefighters from the Town of Salem, New Hampshire.

Breton Dir., ff. Tr. 25535, passim.

12.1.4. The firefighters testified that upon the occasion of the Exercise, 15 on-duty firefighte:s from Salem responded to set up the reception and decontamination center. Breton Dir., ff. Tr. 25535 at 315.

No off-duty firemen responded. Jd.

12.1.5. The firefighters expressed reservations as to whether there were enough firefighters to carry out the tasks they were assigned under the NHRERP. Breton Dir., ff. Tr. 25535 at 5- 6.

12.1.6. To the extent that the semplaint-4s,-as-a44eged, contention alleges lack of manpower, that is a plan issue, not an exercise issue, and, in any event, it is clear that available firefighter manpower is " unlimited" in an emergency when mutual aid from surrounding comunities is considered. Tr. 25561.

12.1.7. The firefighters stated that, in their judgment, there was confusion at the reception center on the day of the exercise. Breton l Dir. , ff. Tr. 25535 at 7. However, most of the confusion was in unloading i

boxes containino equipment to set up the reception and decontamination center from a truck which the witnesses stated were wrongly loaded. Tr. 1 25551; Tr. 25569-71. Assuming the-serreetness-ef the testimony is valid, a wrongly-loaded truck hardly rises to a demonstration of a fundamental flaw in the emergency plan.

12.1.8. The firefighters also stated that their knowledge as to the approximate time of the drill helped make the response more efficient .l than it otherwise would have been. Breton Dir. , ff. Tr. 25535 at 8. They l I

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also testified that the need to carry out their regular duties by responding to emeroency calls impeded the performance of the exercise.

M. at 9.

12.1.9. FEMA Guidance Memorandum EX-3 provides that a qualifying The exercise was is_ not required to be unannounced. App. Reb.

No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 5; Tr. 289 M-78 23077-79; App. Ex. 61 at 2.5-12.

Furthermore, one of the ground rules for the exercise tas that safety had priority over exercise events; therefore, personnel were to respond to actual emergencies if such occurred during the exercise. See, g ., App.

Ex. 61 at 4.4-4.

12.1.10. One of the firefighters, the shift commander, was not even present during the monitoring and decontamination part of the exercise, Tr. 25542-43, 25549. and-the-ether-was-w4th-the-Gh4ef-mest-ef i t h e - *.4 me- a n d - t h e re fe r e ,- a p p a re n t ly , - n e t- a - e e n s t a n t- e b s e r v e r, Seeah Tr. 25544.

12.1.11. FEMA found the performance of the Salem reception center during the exercise to be adequate, and that the objective of demonstrating the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for monitoring and decontamination was met. App. Ex. 43F at 183-184 [ global 191-192].

12.1.12. SAPL EX-4 alleges that only two (2) State of New Hampshire sampling teams were utilized during the Exercise and, therefore, sample collection and transport were not adequately demonstrated.

Contentions Memo. at 117.

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'12.1.12.1. FEMA found that the objective of demonstrating the appropriate'use of equipment and procedures by the samplire teams was

' met. App. Ex.-43F at 192-193 [ global 200-201].

12.1.13. The NHRERP contemplates the use of up to three two-man environmental teams.- App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 32.

12.1.14. During the development of the extent of play portion of the exercise scenario, the New Hampshire Division of Public Health Services expressed concern of the impact to normal State operations and requested.that only two of'the three teams participate in the exercise.

App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 32-33; Tr. 23126-27.

l l 12.1.15. The purpose of the Exercise objective was to demonstrate.that equipment and procedures are adequate for the proper collection and transport of environmental samples and that the training provided to sample collection teams is adequate to ensure proper utilization of equipment and procedures. -Two sample collection teams are sufficient for this purpose, because equipment, procedures and training for all' sample collection teams designated in the NHRERP for Seabrook Station are the same. The NHDPHS sampling teams are experienced and trained in sampling equipment, techniques, and procedures. App. Reb. No.

23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 33.

12.1.16. On Day 2 of the Exercise, two environmental sampling teams (fourpersons)weredispatchedfromConcord,NewHampshire,tothe NH IF0, co-located with the NHY EOF, in Newington, New Hampshire. From there, the environmental sampling teams were dispatched to sampling locations in the field by NH accident assessment personnel. In the field, the two teams demonstrated the procedures for collecting environmental

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samples, collected examples of environmental samples, and demonstrated procedures for labeling, logging, and delivering the samples for analysis.

' App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 34.

i -12.1.17. SAPL EX-6 and TOH/NECNP EX-1, Basis d, allege.that TCPs and ACPs staffed by New Hampshire State Police and local law enforcement officers were too few in number to demonstrate adequately all that is necessary to provide traffic and access control functions in the New Hampshire portion of the 10-mile EPZ or to support FEMA's conclusion that the. State and local police had adequately shown the capability to deploy the required number of officers. Contentions Memo. at 118, 124.

12.1.17.1. FEMA found that the objective of demonstrating ability and resources to manage evacuation traffic and to control access was met. App. Ex. 43F at 182-183 [ global 190-191].

12.1.18. The process of directing traffic and controlling access is a normal day-to-day function of the law enforcement organizations involved in the Exercise. Similarly, the ability to use radio communications, dispatch personnel, locate various intersections, and direct and control traffic are routine law enforcement activities that these personnel are trained to perform on a regular basis. App. Reb. No.

23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 35.

12.1.19. Traffic control personnel in New Hampshire receive identical training. The extent of deployment of police personnel into the field during the Exercise necessarily considered the impact on normal State and local law enforcement operations in a non-emergency situation.

App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 35.

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l 12.1.20. The organ.izational ability and identification of resources necessary to implement traffic and access control functions were to be demonstrated. This demonstration was to include notification, coordination, assessment, assignment and field deployment of personnel and resources. To accomplish this, four New Hampshire State Police Troopers and one local police officer in each of the.11 participating New Hampshire EPZ communities having traffic control responsibilities were allocated to demonstrate traffic or access control functions in the field. The purpose of the field deployment was to extend demonstration of organizational ability into the field and to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures and training for field personnel. As the procedures and training are the same for all field personnel, the number of officers to be deployed was sufficient to attain this objective. App. Reb. No. 23. ff. Tr. 22702 at 35-36.

12.1.21. During the Exercise, notification and coordination functions were demonstrated. This demonstration showed that the various law enforcement organizations could properly notify, assess and assign resources in support of protective action recommendations. NHRERP procedures for this function were demonstrated. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr.

22702 at 36, 12.1.22. The actual field implementation aspects of traffic and access control functions were demonstrated by at least one police officer for each of the eleven participating New Hampshire communities with traffic control responsibilities and four State Troopers. (In several

' instances, local communities deployed more than one police officer into the field resulting in the field participation of a total of sixteen local

i j - 228 -

l officers.) The use of additional police personnel to test these functions f

was neither required nor appropriate. Consistent with the NHRERP, Volume 48 State Police Communications section, a State Police E0C Liaison was notified to report to the New Hampshire Emergency Operations Center (E0C) located in Concord at the ALERT emergency classification level. This State Police representative serves as the coordination point between the State of New Hampshire emergency response organization and State Police operations. One of the actions the State Police E0C Liaison at the State EOC performs is to establish communications with State Police Headquarters in Concord. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 36- 37.

12.1.23. It was not necessary to have a significant number of State Troopers set up TCPs because capability of response by those who are called upon to do things which they normally do in their regular employment can be assumed by virtue of that fact alone. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 18-19; Tr. 22939-41. See also Tr. 23164.

12.1.24 In order to assess State Police personnel resource availability, the State Police EOC Liaison requested State Police Headquarters to transmit a copy of the daily trooper roster. This roster included information regarding on-shift police personnel duty locations throughout the State for that specific day. Additionally, this roster included information with respect to off-duty personnel, e.g., State Troopers off-shift, on vacation, or on sick leave. App. Reb. No. 23, ff.

Tr. 22702 at 37. The roster contained the names, badge numbers, car l i

numbers of on-shift personnel, and estimated times for troopers to arrive in the vicinity of the EPZ, to be deployed to an actual ACP or TCP. Tr.

22431-33.

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12.1.25. During the Exercise, the State Police Troop A IFO Representative at the New Hampshire Incident Field Office (IFO) utilized information in coordination with the State Police E0C Liaison to make priorities and assignments of actual personnel. In an actual emergency, these personnel would be dispatched to Troop A headquarters from various State Police barracks throughout the state. At Troop A headquarters, they would rective dosimetry and field assignments and be dispatched into the field. The actual assignment of available State Police personnel resources as they were on the day of the Exercise provided the basis for a determination that the New Hampshire State Police had demonstrated the capability to deploy sufficient State Police Troopers for implementation of access and traffic control functions. Exercise controller messages identified the specific ACP and TCP assignments to be demonstrated in the field and their respective activation times. App. Reb. No. 23, ff.

Tr. 22702 at 38.

12.1.26. Similar actions were taken on the local level by personnel in participating municipalities which have the responsibility for traffic control functions. That is, local resources were determined and then at least one local officer from each of these municipalities demonstrated field implementation. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 38.

12.1.27. Provisions for the distribution of traffic control equipment were also demonstrated. During the Exercise, in addition to the  !

l twenty (20) State and local police officers demonstrating access and traffic control, four (4) State and seven (7) local support personnel were l

also deployed to demonstrate distribution of equipment. App. Reb. No. 23,  !

l ff. Tr. 22702 at 39.

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12.1.28. Intervenor's specific assertion that personnel from the Town of Hampton did not staff any traffic control location is correct.

As the Town of Hampton did not participate in the Exercise, traffic control responsibilities for the town fell to the New Hampshire State Police. New Hampshire State Police, in conjunction with the State Department of Transportation, demonstrated traffic control at TCP D-HA-01, located.in the Town of Hampton at the intersection of High Street and Lafayette Road. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 39.

12.1.29. SAPL EX-7 alleges that the exercise of the NHRERP failed to demonstrate the capability to provide for the decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and facilities because the Hillside Junior High School in Manchester was not opened and demonstrated during the Exercise. Furthermore, interveners assert that there was no showing of adequate provisions for the disposal of contaminated wastes. Contentions Memo. at 118-19.

12.1.29.1. FEMA found that the objective of demonstrating decontamination of emergency workers and waste disposal was met. App.

Ex. 43F at 190-191 [ global 198-199].

12.1.30. Monitoring and decontamination activities for emergency workers were to be demonstrated at activated Reception /

Decontamination Centers. Emergency workers were to be directed to report to one of the activated Reception / Decontamination facilities for evacuees to be monitored after the completion of their assignment. This demonstration was reasonable because the procedures for monitoring and decontaminating both members of the public and emergency workers are identical. Furthermore, identical training is provided to emergency a-_____-_-_. i

3: .

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y

, , response organization members who staff the monitoring ard decontamination functions for Reception Centers and- for the Emergency Worker Decontamination facility. The demonstration was to include monitoring and decontamination techniques, the identification, tagging and bagging of contaminated articles, 'and handling of contaminated vehicles. App. Reb.

No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 41.

12.1.31. There is no requirement that each and every emergency response facility participate in an Exercise. On the day of the Exercise, the Hillside Junior High School, which serves as a secondary Reception / Decontamination facility for the host community of Manchester and as the_ Emergency Worker Decontamination facility, was not demonstrated. Monitoring and decontamination activities for emergency workers were demonstrated at the activated Reception / Decontamination facilities in the host communities of Salem and Dover. App. Reb. No. 22, ff. Tr. 22702 at 42; Tr. 22165-66.

12.1.31.1. The Extent of Play clearly indicated that the Hillside Facility was not available. It acknowledged the State's position that the facility could not be used on the day of the exercise.

The-only thing that was not tested was the facility itself. Tr. 22164-66. j 1

12.1.32. In order to assess the adequacy of the EWF and its j l- 1 l associated supplies, equipment and staffing, representatives of FEMA I

}

inspected the Hillside Junior High School. This inspection was conducted on July 22, 1988, and included observation by a representative of the Joint Interveners. The facility, its operational layout, procedures, staffing, equipment and supplies were assessed in conjunction with FEMA's j I

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Exercise evaluation and found to be adequate. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr.

22702 at 42-43; App. Ex. 43F, at 191 [ global 199]; Tr,-22165-66.

I 12.1.33. The NHRERP contemplates the identification and decontamination or retention of contaminated materials such as vehicles and other personal effects. During the exercise, clothing and personal effects simulated to be contaminated were removed, inventoried, bagged, tagged and stored in a secure place. Parking areas for contaminated vehicles were also identified and utilized. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr.

22702 at 43.

I 12.1.34. With respect to the disposal of contaminated wastes, their ultimate disposition is considered to be a post- emergency response function which results from decontamination ar.tivities and, as such, is included as part of a recovery action plan developed at the later stages, or end, of an actual emergency response pursuant to recovery procedures.

Accordingly, at 1400 on Day 2 of the Exercise, NH State E0C officials discussed the matter of decontamination waste materials and contaminated vehicles. At 1452, they requested assistance from New Hampshire Yankee for removal of decontamination wastes in accordance with the existing ,

agreement for this purpose. Subsequently, on Day 2, NH State EOC officials developed a long-term sampling and recovery plan that included provisions for periodic monitoring of contaminated vehicles held in I restricted areas and for disposal of decontamination waste materials by New Hampshire Yankee. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 43-44, 12.1.35. SAPL EX-8 alleges that there was no demonstration of 1

24-hour continuous staffing of the New Hampshire Staging Areas and Reception Centers and that continuous staffing of local and host E0Cs was l l

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not.shown to be adequate. Furthermore, interveners assert that key positions in the NH IFO were not fully staffed, there were no provisions employed for filling vacant positions, and the Governor's office was not properly represented. Contentions Memo. at 119-20.

12.1.35.1. FEMA found that the objective of demonstrating continuous 24-hour staffing by means of a shift change was met, with only minor exceptions. App. Ex. 43F at 198-200 [ global 206-208).

12.1.36. Approximately 575 responders in the New Hampshire organizations participated in the Exercise. This was a significant number of participants'for a demonstration of an integrated emergency response capability during a non-emergency situation. Generally, full response facility activation was demonstrated within approximately one hour of the initial notification of an Alert classification. App. Reb. No. 23, ff.

Tr. 22702 at 46; App. Ex. 43F at 138 [ global 146].

12.1.37. Due to the various pre-existing commitments and the non-emergency nature of the Exercise, several participants could not or did not report to their emergency response facility assignments. For example, the Town of Seabrook staffing of the local EOC was observed to be not in accordance with the Seabrook RERP (Volume 16 of the NHRERP). FEMA noted in the exercise Report that:

" Specific staff could not be present due to prior engagements:

The Fire Chief and school Principal were out of town; the Health Officer had a court appearance; and other persons (Road Agent, Water Superintendent, and Town Clerk) could not leave their offices. It was noted that the personnel present in the EOC assumed multiple duties and that the telephone contact was maintained with those individuals who were at work. We also noted that the Building / Health Officer arrived at the EOC after his Court duties."

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App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 46-47; App.Ex.43 Fat 140[ global 148].

12.1.38. Response facilities and positions were. however, adequately staffed to demonstrate the appropriate response to events dictated by the Exercise scenario. While there may have been personnel shortages in isolated areas of the overall response organization, these absences did not impact the organiz6tional ability to implement the assigned response functions. Shift changes for key staff positions were demonstrated in all but two of the eleven pai ticipating local New Hampshire EOCs. In the NH State IF0, three of the nine Local Liaison Officers were not replaced on the second shift. The plan specifies a maximum of nine Local Liaison Officers if all seventeen communities do not participate. Eleven EPZ communities in New Hampshire participated in the Exercise. On the second shift, the Local Liaison Officer functions were handled with six Local Liaison Officers. Thus, the Exercise provided a test of the organizational ability to perform response functions, ensuring-that the emergency plans and procedures are flexible and adaptable to meet both expected and unexpected circumstances. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr.

22702 at 47-48.

12.1.39. Host facilities also were sufficiently staffed and operational in a timely manner. This includes demonstrated host community E0Cs and Reception Centers. The Exercise demonstrated the ability to alert, mobilize and activate personnel necessary for facility functions.

On May 23, 1988, FEMA conducted an inspection and review of personnel rosters compiled in support of the NHRERP. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr.

22702 at 48.

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12.1.40. At the time the exercise was run, NHRERP did not require 24-hour staffing of staging areas and reception centers. Tr.

21713. As a result, the extent of play did not require demonstration of 24-hour capability for those positions by actually turning over a complete shift. p.

12.1.41. Although second-shift staffing of transportation staging areas was not part of the extent of play, the State Transportation Staging Area Supervisor presented Posters to FEMA evaluators showing sufficient personnel for protracted staffing of positions and explained arrangements that would be made for protracted staffing. The same method was utilized to demonstrate protracted staffing capability at Reception Centers. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 48.

12.1.42. New Hampshire has corrected for the lack of 24-hour management staffing at reception centers by stating that it will invoke the New England Compact. In FEMA's judgment, the making of the necessary telephone call to Vermont requesting certain people was sufficient; it was not necessary to actually bring people from Vermont to demonstrate a shift change. Tr. 21721-22, 22019. New Hampshire has also identified a group of individuals that has been trained to provide second-shift supervision at reception centers. Tr. 21722.

12.1.43. The Exercise of NHRERP included a demonstration of a 1 i

second shift capability through a combination of the physical change out l I

of personnel and the presentation of personnel rosters. App. Reb. No. 23,  ;

I ff. Tr. 22702 at 48-49.

12.1.44. The Exercise Report at page 138 [ global 146) states that "[t]he Governor's office was not represented according to the Plan." l I

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This statement refers specifically to the provision of the NHRERP that '

briefing the press is a non-delegable duty for the Governor. During the  ;

Exercise, the New Hampshire Public Information Officer provided briefings to the press. The applicable language in the NHRERP was revised in the October,1988, amendment of the plan to make press briefings a delegable responsibility. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 49.

12.1.45. T0H/NECNP EX-1, Bases a and b, allege that the June 28-29, 1988 exercise of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Seabrook Station failed to meet a priniary objective because the availability and participation of school teachers relied upon under the NHRERP was not demonstrated. It further asserts that this lack of participation by teachers resulted in FEMA's inability to observe an adequate demonstration of the organizational ability of resources necessary to effect an early dismissal, sheltering or evacuation of school children. Contentions Memo. at 123-24.

12.1.45.1. FEMA found that the applicable objective was met.

App. Ex. 43F at 172-182 [ global 180-190].

12.1.45.2. Interveners presented no evidence on this contention, Tr. 22274-78, other than to elicit on cross-examination that no New Hampshire, teachers participated in the exercise. Tr. 22952-53.

12.1.46. Notification of and coordination with the New Hampshire School Administration Units (SAU's) and private schools during the Exercise was provided by NH Department of Education representatives at the State EOC in Concord and by the participating towns and/or the local liaisons at the IFO in Newington. Communications and coordination were demonstrated with at least one administrative representative of each of

\ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _

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the five SAU's. FEMA noted in the Exercise Report that EPZ schools and-L potential host schools were promptly notified of changes in situation by New Hampshire Department of Education representatives. App. Reb. No. 23 ff. Tr. 22702 at 51; Apo. Ex. 43F at 173 [ global 181].

L 12.1.47. The fact that New Hampshire schools were not in session did not affect the ability to properly exercise the plan because the ability to' contact schools was demonstrated. Tr. 22500-501; Tr.

22973-75.

12.1.48. Transportation requirements for schools were simulated by the Exercise scenario based on default values for schools contained in the NHRERP. These transportation requirements were provided by Exercise controller messages to the local EOC transportation coordinators or to the IFO Local Liaison Officers in the case of schools in non-participating communities. The transportation requirements were communicated to the IFO Resource Coordinator by these personnel in accordance with their procedures. The IF0 Resource Coordinator then made assignments from the total vehicle pool indicated by the Exercise scenario to be available at the State Transportation Staging Areas at the Rockingham County Complex and at the Portsmouth Circle Business Center. The IFO Resource Coordinator communicated these assignments to the State Transportation Staging Areas and directed the deployment of the required number of vehicles for schools to the local transportation staging areas. The vehicles were directed from the local staging areas to the schools. A representation of vehicles for schools was actually deployed from the transportation staging areas to the schools. These vehicles traversed the bus routes from the transportation staging areas to the schools and then i

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L to the appropriate host community reception centers. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 51-52.

12.1.49. Within each SAU and private school, there is an internal emergency operations procedure. Under these procedures, superintendents / administrators receive notification and protective action recommendations from state and/or 1ccal emergency response officials and coordinate the implementation of the appropriate actions, including the provision of trans'portation resources, with the individual school facilities under their jurisdiction. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at

, 52-53.

12.1.50. The administrative structure, therefore, provides that a decision regarding' school' protective actions is made by the superintendent or facility administrator who, in turn, directs its implementation. In this context, the implementation of an administrator's decision by teachers does not require unusual or extraordinary skill. The actions required are consistent with those that would be taken, at the direction of administrators, for other emergency related situations such as early dismissal during a winter storm, sheltering during a power outage, or evacuation demonstrated during a fire drill. App. Reb. No. 23 ff. Tr. 22702 at 53.

12.1.51. Teachers are " relied upon" in the NHRERP during implementation of school protective actions only to the extent that they

. are expected to carry out their professional responsibilities to supervise students under their jurisdiction during any type of emergency situation.

'As such, teachers are expected to take direction from their administrative supervisors and to provide direction and control of their students. The

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purpose of the Exercise objective was accomplished by the participation of representatives of the New Hampshire Department of Education and of each of the affected School Administrative Units and by demonstration of transportation resources for schools. App. Reb. No. 23. ff. Tr. 22702 at 53-54.

12.1.52. Mr. Donovan was clear in his view that nonparticipation by Massachusetts schools'and teachers did not diminish the ability of FEMA to make, or the force of, a reasonable assurance finding. Tr. 22604-22605.

12.1.53. As Applicants point out, schools were not in session and the fact that schools elect not to participate is of no consequence in analyzing transportation needs, because the default value in the plan was used as it would be in the case of a real emergency where a school did not respond to inquiries for any reason. Tr. 22958, 22961, 22972.

12.1.54. SAPL EX-13 alleges that there was no test of the capability to transport hospital and nursing home patients to host facilities by ambulance and an insufficient test of evacuation bed bus capability in that only two mini-scenarios were conducted for this purpose during the New Hampshire portion of the Exercise. It further alleges that there was no test of: (1) the ability to make decisions regarding the l administration of KI to institutional populations; and (2) the capability of host facilities to receive, monitor and decontaminate patients.

TOH/NECNP EX-1, Basis f asserts that insufficient regular buses (18 of 453), special needs buses (2 of 71) and ambulances (1 of 48) were demonstrated; Basis g asserts there was no demonstration of actual 1

l' availability of transportation resources. Contentions Memo, at 121-22, 125.

L_________________________________ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ __ .___________o

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1 12.1.55. Twenty buses, running a total of 118 routes for schools' and 66 routes for special populations is a sufficient demonstration.. Tr. 23065-67; App.: Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 56-60.

12.1.56, lhe number of buses utilized reflected the .

availability of FEMA evaluators. it-maltes-ne-sense-te-put Putting more buses on the road when there are no evaluators to evaluate them would not do anything to verify the capability to respond. Tr. 23065; See-alse App. Reb. No. 23,'ff. Tr. 22702 at 26.

12.1.57 As in the case of the schools, the decisionmaking process associated with providing transportation resources for special populations was to be demonstrated'by the State of New Hampshire emergency response organization. Notification of special facilities was to be demonstrated with participating facilities and simulated for non-participating facilities by Exercise participants calling into a NHY Control Cell. Vehicle providers were initially contacted, and transportation resources were assigned in accordance with the requirements determined by contact with special facilities. Field demonstrations of transportation resources were conducted to allow for the observation and evaluation of one or more events by any one FEMA evaluator. For example, most of the actual buses run during the Exercise ran multiple routes, allowing the associated FEMA evaluators to observe more than one route.

App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 227n? at 56, 12.1.58, It was determined by the organizational representatives during the development of the extent of play portion of the Exercise scenario that the simulated deployment and dispatch of these )

evacuation vehicles would be sufficient to support the demonstration of j

s 1

_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ __ _ __. 1

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1

the transport and evacuation capability of special facility and special-needs populations in New Hampshire for the following reasons

-(1) The primary objective of the Exercise scenario was to test the sufficiency of the coordination and integration of the various personnel (State and local) and resources needed to evacuate special populations L

pursuant to the NHRERP. A main focus of this portion of the Exercise was to test information flows, decisionmaking functions and coordination aspects of the entire process and ascertain whether communications, maps, and other processes would be sufficient to implement protective actions.

AsindicatedintheexerciseReport[ global 173),theseplanprocesses were sufficient to mobilize more than enough transportation resources to meet demand.

(2) The actual process of transporting persons to and from hospitals, nursing homes, or other special care facilities is a normal day-to-day routine of the wheelchair van and ambulance company. personnel who would report to the State TSAs. Accordingly, the ability to drive to various locations, to load and unload patients, and.to transport special care persons properly are functions that these companies and drivers demonstrate daily. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 56-57.

12.1.59. During the Exercise, the process of providing transportation assistance for special populations was demonstrated by a range of actions. They were:

(1) Procedures were implemented at the NH State EOC by the E0C Resources Coordinator, the Pupil Transportation Safety representative, and the Bureau of Emergency Medical Services to contact transportation i

resource providers.

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(2) Special facilities (nursing homes and hospitals) were contacted

, st least once, in accordance with the extent of play, by either a Local Liaison Officer in the IFO or a local emergency response official in l participating comunities to demonstrate the ability to notify these l

l facilities and to determine their transportation requirements.

(3) The results of the actions described in item (2) above were L relayed to the IFO Resources Coordinator who assigned the appropriate transportation resources to the participating local communities or to the individual special facilities in non- participating communities.

(4) Buses for' traversing bus routes for transit dependent persons were assigned to local comunities in accordance with the numbers allocated in the NHRERP.

(5) Twenty buses, I wheelchair van, and I ambulance were deployed from transportation resource providers to State Transportation Staging Areas at the Rockingham County Complex and the Portsmouth Circle Business Center according to the provisions of the NHRERP. This deployment occurred at the SITE AREA EMERGENCY classification in accordance with the plan. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 58-59.

12.1.60. Vehicles for special populations were dispatched from the State Transportation Staging Areas to the local communities and to special facilities, and subsequently proceeded to either host comunity reception centers or to host facilities. App. Reb. No. 23. ff. Tr. 22702 at 59.

12.1.61. After transportation resources were identified and mobilized, and assigned on the basis of identified requirements, the demonstration was extended to the field by the actual deployment of

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vehicles from the State Transportation Staging Areas for special populations and for traversing transit dependent bus routes in the local communities. This deployment included eighteen buses for various bus routes, two buses for conversion to evacuation bed buses, one wheelchair

. van, and one ambulance. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 59.

12.1.62. The wheelchair van was dispatched to the Town of Seabrook local Staging Area. From there, the van simulated the pick-up of a handicapped person from the Pine Street Trailer Park and then continued on to the Salem Reception Center. The two conversion bed buses.were dispatched to nursing homes for transport of evacu'ees to host health care facilities. These nursing homes (where conversion beds were installed on the bus) were the Eventide Nursing Home in Exeter and the Edgewood Center in Portsmouth (where patient loading was demonstrated by the use of a mannequin). Both conversion bed buses completed the routes from the c nursing homes to their respective host facilities. App. Reb. No. 23, ff.

Tr. 22702 at 60,,

12.1.63. The one ambulance and crew that was mobilized by the State EOC Resources Coordinator was directed to the State Transportation Staging Area at the Rockingham County Complex in Brentwood. There, the ambulance crew was issued dosimetry and instructions. The TSA Ambulance Coordinator assigned the ambulance to the Hampton Local Staging Area.

Upon answering questions posed by FEMA evaluators, the ambulance crew was released from participation in the Exercise. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr.

22702 at 60.

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12.1.63.1. FEMA evaluated ambulance resources, thus verifying L

their preparedness. Tr. 23121-22. E 12.1.64. Sixty-six of the total of 77 bus routes (86 percent) for special' populations in the New Hampshire portion of the EPZ were demonstrated. ' App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 60. See also, Tr. 22118

(" Completed with controller intervention" not scored as " completed"). See also Tr. 22151-52; Tr. 22159-60.

12.1.65. Vehicles which demonstrated evacuation routes for special-facilities on Day 1 and Day 2 of the Exercise completed the routes from the special facilities to the designated host facilities. On Day 1 of the Exercise, two evacuation bed buses traversed routes from two EPZ nursir.o homes to the host facilities Of these nursing homes. The actual receipt of special facility evacuees by the host facilities was not demonstrated. These host facilities are hospitals and nursing homes which receive hospital patients and nursing home residents daily. App. Reb. No.

23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 61.

12.1.66. The personnel assigned this function under the NHRERP are equipped and trained accordit.] to the procedures currently contained in the NHRERP for radiological monitoring at reception centers. The 9/

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The performance of ,his evaluation is to be contrasted with the lack of any such evaluation in the Shoreham proceeding, as discussed in Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

ALAB-900, 28 NRC 275, 300 (1988).

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monitoring equipment.and procedures were demonstrated at two reception centers during the Exercise. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 61.

12.1.67. With respect to the decisionmaking process associated with the adminstration of KI to institutionalized persons, as delineated in the NHRERP, Volume 1, 5.2.7.3, Thyroid Protection, the Director of DPHS -f located at the. State E0C in Concord is responsible for making I

recommenefations on the use of KI as a thyroid blocking agent for the public and emergency workers pursuant to the nature of the emergency q situation. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 61-62.

12.1.68. During the Exercise, DPHS personnel responsible for recommending the use of KI recommended its use for emergency workers in municipalities located within two (2) miles of the plant. As a result, the direction for emergency workers located within this area to take KI was given at 1629. At 1405, over two hours earlier, New Hampshire had recommended the evacuation of towns located within five (5) miles of the plant. The only health care institution that could have potentially been affected by the KI directive, the Seacoast Health Center in Hampton, had l already undertaken to evacuate. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at 63.

12.1.69. The purpose of this exercise scenario, in part, was to demonstrate the ability of DPHS personnel to make appropriate decisions for the administration of KI to potentially affected persons based on the available information and the DPHS Procedures in the NHRERP. The information available to the State decisionmakers was that radiciodines were a concern in towns located within two (2) miles of the plant and that at the time of concern only emergency workers were present in this area due to the evacuation recommendation previously provided to the public.

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)

The appropriateness of the KI DPHS Procedures and the DPHS personnel to i properly implement them was demonstrated by the decisionmaking process that resulted in the recommendation of the ingestion of KI to emergency t ,

workers within the identified specific area of concern. App. Reb. No. 23, ff. Tr. 22702 at' 63- 64; App. Ex. 4?F at 163-64 [ global 171-72).

12.2. RULINGS OF LAW 12.2.1. It-ava41s-the-eppenents-ef-Seabreak-nething It is not sufficient for interveners to demonstrate'the existence of an error or lack of judgment on'the part of players in the exercise as such; rather, what must be demonstrated is that those things which did not go perfectly in the exercise demonstrate the existence of a fundamental flaw in the plan or plans being exercised. Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-903, 28 NRC 499, 505-07 (1988).

12.2.1.1. With respect to the scope of the exercise, interveners must demonstrate that the exercise was so unduly limited that it did not permit a meaningful test and evaluation of the emergency plan in order to ascertain if that plan is fundamentally flawed. Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-900, 28 NRC 275, 286 (1988). j 12.2.2. "[A] fundamental flaw in an emergency plan, as revealed in an exercise, has two principal components. First, it reflects a failure of an essential element of the plan, and, second, it can be remedied only through a significant revision of the plan." Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-903, 28 NRC 499, 505 (1988).

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l 12.2.3. Any purported deficiency observed in an exercise which can be corrected by the provision of supplemental training cannot be held to evidence a fundamental flaw in a radiological emergency response plan.

Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),

ALAB-918, 29 NRC , , Slip Op. at 24-25 (June 20, 1989).

12.3. CONCLUSIONS 12.3.1. The Board finds and rules that the graded exercise (-

demonstrated that the NHRERP is adequate and implementable.

13. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 13.0. The Board has considered all of the evidence presented by the parties on the admitted contentions concerning the adequacy of the SPMC and the results of the 1988 graded Exercise. Based upon a review of the entire record in this proceeding and the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the parties, and based upon the findings of fact set forth herein, which are supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record, this Board has now decided all matters in controversy. Accor.iingly, the Board reaches the following conclusions.

13.1. The Board finds and rules on the basis of the evidence before it that the SPMC is adequate and implementable and therefore Massachusetts Officials will generally follow the SPMC in the event of an actual emergency at Seabrook. Thus, the Board rejects as unsupported in this record Contentions JI-41 through JI-43.

13.2. The Board finds and rules that the NHRERP is implementable. ,

13.3. The Board finds and rules that the graded exercise revealed no mafer fundamental flaw in the SPMC or the NHRERP. l

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13.3.1. The SpMC meets the requirements 'of the emergency planning standards of 10 CFR 6 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The Board

- finds reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and yill be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station, in accordance with the Commission's emergency planning regulations, with respect to the issues litigated in this proceeding.

13.4. The Board orders that, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Commission's rules and regulations, and subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 9 2.764,. the Director of Nuclear Rear tor Regulation is authorized, upon his verification of Applicants' confomance with the provisions stated in Sections 2 and 3 of this Initial Decision, to issue

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to the Applicants an operating license for Seabrook Station Unit I to operate at power levels not to exceed 3,411 MW(t).

13.5, Pursuant to 10 CFR 5 2.760 this Initial Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission thirty days from the date of its service, unless an appeal is taken in accordance with 10 CFR i 2.762 or the Commission directs otherwise. See also 10 CFR ff 2.785, 2.786, 13.6. Any party may take an appeal from this Initial Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within ten days after its service. Each

, appellant must file a brief supporting its position on appeal within thirty days after filing its Notice of Appeal, or, if the Staff is the appellant, within forty days. Within thirty days after the period has expired for the filing and service of the briefs of all appellants (forty l l

days in the case of the Staff), a party who is not an appellant may file a i

brief in support of or in opposition to the appeal of any other party. A l

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b responding party shall file only a single responsive brief regardless of the' number of appellants' briefs filed. See 10 CFR 6 2.762.

Respectfully submitted, SheTwin E. Turk hA Y - , . &_

Elaine I. Chan r

Richard G. Bachmann W

/P h Lisa Clark '

Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 24th day of August, 1989

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y,U,I D m n..

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'89 ps 25 P239 BEFORE THE AT0*TC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD _ q . 3

( , -

~.y' In the Matter of ) M*'

) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) 50-444 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.l ) Off-site Emergency Planning

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE SEABROOK PLAN FOR MASSACHUSETTS COMMUNITIES AND THE EXERCISE CONTENTIONS" in the above captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or, as indicated by an asterisk, by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, or as indicated by double asterisks, by express maC this 24th day of August 1989:

Ivan W. Smith, Chairman (2)* Philip Ahrens, Esq.

Administrate' e Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission State House Station Washington, DC 20555 Augusta, ME 04333 Richard F. Cole

• John Traficonte, Esq.**

Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Washington, DC 20555 Boston, MA 02108 Kenneth A. McCollom Geoffrey Huntington, Esq.

Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General 1107 West Knapp Street Office of the Attorney General Stillwater, OK 74705 25 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301 Thomas G. Dignan, Jr. , Esq.**

Robert K. Gad, III, Esq. Diane Curran, Esq.

Ropes & Gray Harmon, Curran & Tousley One International Place 2001 S Street, NW Boston, MA 02110-2624 Suite 430 Washington, DC 20009 Robert A. Backus, Esq.

Backus, Meyer & Solomon 116 Lowell Street Manchester, NH 03106

H. J. Flynn, Esq. Judith H. Mizner, Esq.

Assistant General Counsel 79 State Street Federal Emergency Management Agency Newburyport, MA 01950 500 C Street, S.W.

' Washington, DC .20472 Robert Carrigg, Chairman BoarJ of Selectmen Paul McEachern, Esq. Towr Office Shaines & McEachern Atlantic Avenue 25 Maplewood Avenue Nortin Hampton, NH 03862 P.O. Box 360 Portsmouth,'NH 03801 William S. Lord Board of Selectmen Charles P. Graham, Esq. Town Hall - Friend Street McKay, Murphy & Graham Amesbury, MA 01913 100 Main Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Mrs. Anne E. Goodman, Chairman Board of Selectmen Sandra Gavutis, Chairman 13-15 Newmarket Road Board of Selectmen Durham, NH 03824 RFD #1, Box 1154 Kensington, NH 03827 Kensington, NH 03827 Hon. Gordon J. Humphrey Calvin A. Canney United States Senate City Hall 531 Hart Senate Office Building 126 Daniel Street' Washington, DC 20510 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Richard R. Donovan R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esq. Federal Emergency Management Lagoulis, Clark, Hill-Whilton Agency

& McGuire Federal Regional Center 79 State Street 130 228th Street S.W.

Newburyport, MA 01950 Bothell, Washington 98021-9796-Allen Lampert Peter J. Matthews, Mayor Civil Defense Director City Hall Town of Brentwood Newburyport, MA 01950 20 Franklin Exeter, NH 03833 Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Board of Selectmen William Armstrong South Hampton, NH 03827 Civil Defense Director i Town of Exeter Ashod N. Amirian, Esq.

10 Front Street Town Counsel for Merrimac Exeter, NH 03833 145 South Main Street j P.O. Box 38 j Gary W. Holmes Esq. Bradford, MA 01835 j Holmes & Ellis J '

47 Winnacunnet Road Barbara J. Saint Andre, Esq.

Hampton, NH 03842 Kopelman and Paige, P.C. .

77 Franklin Street Boston, MA 02110 l;

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Ms.-Suzanne Breiseth J. P. Nadeau Board of Selectmen- Board of Selectmen Town of Hampton Falls 10 Central Street Drinkwater Road Rye, NH 03870 Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Atomic Safety and Licensing Robert R. Pierce, Esq.* Board Panel (1)*

. Atomic Safety and Licensing' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Board Panel Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Samuel J. Chilk*

Office of the Secretary Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Panel (6)* _

Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555' Docketing and Service Section*

Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 k

Sherwin E. Turk Senior Supervisory Trial Attorney b

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