ML20245J701
| ML20245J701 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1989 |
| From: | Berry G NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#389-8843 LBP-89-09, LBP-89-9, OL-1, NUDOCS 8907030131 | |
| Download: ML20245J701 (43) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .gg jug 29 P3 54 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-cr w >
'Q BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 00CKU.ggf- ,
l In the Matter of ) )
) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL-01 j PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY'0F ) 50-444 OL-01 1 I NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) On-site Emergency Planning :)
) and Safety Issues ]
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) ]
i NRC STAFF PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WITH RESPECT TO SIRENS ISSUES
- 1. On June 2, 1988, this Board issued a Memorandum- and Order l
(unpublished) admitting for litigation in this proceeding a . single !
contention with numerous bases raising the issue of the adequacy of the-public alert L: notification system for the population in that portion of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station (Seabrook) plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) which is located in the Commonwealth of-Massachusetts (Commonwealth).
- 2. The system which the Applicants propose to use is called a Vehicular Alert Notification System (VANS). This is a transportable fixed system coraisting of trucks which will proceed to certain preset locations, raise l a siren above the ground by means of a hydraulic telescoping boom, and then, as necessary, sound the siren to alert the public. At the came time, prescripted emergency broadcast messages will be broadcast over the emergency broadcast system (EBS) to - which the public will have been referred by various preemergenev notification devices (calendars, notices 8907030131 890622 PDR ADOCK 05000443 O. PDR
etc.'. See generally, App. Exs. 11A & 11B; App. Dir., post Tr. 75, Attachments A-G.
- 3. The design and use of this system is necessitated by virtue of the fact that the Applicants are unable to employ a conventional pole system by The Commonwealth and its political subdivisions. Tr. 416-17. For an extended discussion of the circumstances culminating in Applicants' decision to d sloy the VANS, see Public Service Company of New Hamsphire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-883, 27 NRC 43, 46-48 (1988).
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- 4. On March 3,1989, this Board issued a memorandum and order in this j proceeding which granted, in part, a summary disposition motion filed by Applicants with respect to this contention and all of its bases. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),
.l LPP-89-09, 29 NRC 271 (1989) (hereafter "LBP-89-09").
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E. In LBP-89-09, this Board left open for litigation only the following j issues with respect to the public alert and notification system for that part of the Seabrook EPZ which is located in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
A.1-1. Whether sound levels in excess of 123 dBC cause enough discomfort so that the Board should not approve the use of sirens at a higher level of sound?
A.1-2. If there is some level higher than 123 dBC l
that the Board should allow, what is that level?
l-A.1-3. Whether Applicants' sirens can provide adequate coverage if used at sound levels that are not unduly uncomfortable?
A.1 4 Whether Applicants' position on the sound level resulting frorr their sirens is an under estimate because of sound reflection from buildings?
A.3-1 Whe~.h e r the annointed destination locations, including !
VL-06, VL-07, VL-12, are sufficiently level for the safe j
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deployment of the VANS vehicles? '
A.3-2. Whether or not VANS vehicles may gain physical access to VL-03, VL-06, VL-07, and VL-IV A.5-1 What is the appropriate conservative estimate of the length of time it would take drivers to take the necessary actions j l
before their vehicles leave their stations during I concitions likely to prevail at the time of need?
A.5-P. Given that there is snowfall of 0.5 inches or more during 5.5% of the days of the year, would a conservative estimate of travel times to VANS acoustic locations include the j somewhat prolonged travel times anticipated during snow conditions? If so, what time estimates should be included?
A.5-3. What is an appropriate conservative estimate of the length ,
i of time it would take people within five miles of Seabrook to receive the informational message to be broadcast over I the EBS?
T..' 4. What is an appropriate conservative estimate of the total length of time for alerting and informing people within five miles of Seabrook? Is that estimate within acceptable l
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guidelines? (If it is longer than 15 minutes, what are the factors we are to consider in deciding whether the . time l
period is adeouate?)
LDP-89-09, 29 NRC at 294-95.
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- 6. The issues denominated "A.3-1." and "A.3-2." above, have been resolved by stipulation of the parties. See Memorandum and Order (Adoption of Stipulation on Site Access and Levelling) at 1 (April 4,
' 1989).
- 7. The remaining issues were heard by this Board on May ^ 2, '1989. A total of 2 days of hearings were held on May 2 and 3,1989,- at the Thomas l
P. O'Reill Federal Building in Boston, Massachusetts.
E. The parties to the proceeding were the Attorney General for The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (MAG), the Applicants, and the Staff of the j United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Staff).
- 9. Applicants presented a panel of witnesses consisting of Edward W.
Desmarais of the Independent Review Team for New Hampshire Yankee Division of Public ' Service Company of New Hampshire, David N. Keast, Principal Consultant, Warning System Services, Karl D. Kryter, _ Staff Scientist, Bioengineering Division of SRI International, Edward Lieberman, President, KLD Associates, Inc. and Louis _C. Sutherland, . Deputy Director and : Chief
-Scientist, Wyle Research, Wyle Laboratories. (Qualifications, post Tr.
38); App. Dir, post Tr. 75, passim.
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10, MAG presented a panel of witnesses consisting of Ruth Kanfer, Professor, University of Minnesota, Karl S. Pearsons, Senior Consultant, Aceritech, Inc., Charles B. Perrow, Professor, Yale University, and Gregory C. Tocci, President, Cavanaugh Tocci As:;ociates. MAG Dir, post Tr. 454, passim.
- 11. The NRC Staff presented the testimony of an acoustics consultant, Kenneth M. Eldred, P.E. (Eldred Dir. post Tr. 310, passim) and the testimony of Falt Kantor. Kantor Dir post Tr. 310, passim. Mr. Eldred is the principal of the acoustics consulting firm, Ken Eldred Engineering, and has been involved extensively fer more than 35 years in the field of acoustics. Eldred Dir. Tr. at 312. Mr. Kantor is employed by the U.S.-
f,'ucl ea r Regulatory Commission as a Section Chief in the Emergency Preparedness Branch, Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Planning, Office of Nuclear Deactor Regulation. Kantor Dir. Tr. at 355 (Statement of Professional Qualifications of Falk Kantor). In this capacity, Fr. Kantor is responsible for supervising the review and evaluation of radiological emergency plans submitted by reactor applicants and licensees to ensure proposed plans meet the regulatory. requirements and guidance of the Commission. Id.
- 12. The Board finds each of these witnesses competent to testify with respect to the matters as to which he or she testified.
- 13. Although the precise issues which were the subject of this proceeding were not singled out for special treatment, Kantor Dir. Tr. at 365-70, the
t Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has approved the design of VANS. J_d.,Tr. at 348; NRC Staff Ex. A-1; App. Dir, post Tr. 75. at 4.
This clothes the design with a rebuttable presumption 'as to the adequacy of Applicants' public alert notification system, which the MAG is required j 1
to overcome. 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47/a)(2). The Board has so ruled. Tr. at -)
307, 309.
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l Applicable Legal Standards l 14 In LBP-89-09, the Board discussed at length the substantive legal l
standards applicable to public alert notifications systems. 29 NRC at )
l' 273-76. Paragraph (b)(5) of the Commission's emergency planning regulation,10 C.F.R. s 50.47, provides in pertinent part that "means 'to !
l provide early notification and clear instruction .to the ' populace within ')
i the plume exposure pathway Eniergency Planning Zone have been established" 1 1
by the applicant. Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 provides, inter alia, j that the " design objective of the prompt public notification system shall i be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about H minutes." (Emphasis added).
- 15. The emphasized portion of Appendix E is important because it differs from NUREG-0654, Rev. 1 (1980), Appendix 3 at page 3-3 which states that one of the " minimum acceptable design objectives" of a public alert notification system is the "[ capability l for providing both an ' alert signal and an informational or instructional message to the population on an area wide basis throughout the 10 mile EPZ within 15 minutes." In the-
face of this apparent inconsistency in language, the terms of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E must be controlling. This is because Appendix E has
.the " force of law," 29 NRC at 274, while NUREG-0654, which is merely a
" guidance" document, does not. Id., citing Carolina Power and Light Company (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-86-11, 23 NRC 294, 364-69 (1986); Metropolitan Edison Company '(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-698, 16 NRC 1290, 1298-99 (1982).
- 16. That NUREG-0654 does not carry the force of-law does not mean that it is irrelevant, however. As we stated in LBP-89-09, NUREG-0654 "hs s a nonbinding or suggestive effect." 29 NRC at 274. NUREG-0654 states that the alert notification siren signal "shall be a 3 to 5 minute steady signal . . . capable of repetition." NUREG-0654, Rev.1, supra, Appendix 3 at 3-12. With respect to the sound pressure level of sirens used by an applicant in its public alert notification system, NUREG-0654 has this to say:
Siren systems should be designed considering the demography and topcgraphy of an area, and taking into account other alert or, notification systems in place or planned. The maximum sound levels received bJ any member of f the public should be lower than 123 dBC, the level which may cause discomfort _t_o, o iiidividualsl.J
_I d . at 3-3 (emphasis added). The Board notes that the use of the phrase
should be lower" rather than "shall be lower" is consistent with the document's purpose in providing " suggestive" guidance as opposed to establishing a mandatory requirement.
- 17. The Board turns now to the issue identified in LBP-89-09 as A.1-1:
"Whether sound levels in excess of 123 dBC cause enough. discomfort so_ that
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the Board should not approve the use of sirens at a higher level of sound?" 29 NRC at 277, 294. Because NUREG-0654 does not define the term j
discomfort," we noted that this question of fact also appears to involve a legal question: "What standard should we apply to determine the possible relevance of discomfort? id. To aid in our resolution of this question, the Board solicited the parties' views on the matter. Id .
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- 18. The MAG takes the position that 123 dBC which is described in NUREG-0654 as "the level which may cause discomfort to individuals" is to l
be read as a regulatory limit. In his view, in the absence of a J demonstration that a siren system will never cause any member of the public to be subjected to a sound level pressure of more than 123 dBC, the siren system is not in compliance with the ' regulations and must be rejected. See Mass AG Brief On Relevance Of Discomfort, passim (April 21, )
1089). It is on this theory that the MAG's case was structured and in support of which the MAG's witnesses testified. See MAG Dir. Tr. at 1
456-62.
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- 19. For similar reasons, Applicants and the Staff. take issue with the MAG's position. See Applicants' Brief Regarding Relevance Of Discomfort, passim (April 3,1989); NRC Staff Brief Regarding Relevanc'e Of Discomfort, passim (April 25, 1989). According to them, in determining the relevance of discomfort, the Licensing Board should apply a standard which achieves the purposes of the applicable regulatory requirements.. In the context of alert notification systems, that standard should permit the use'of sirens at a sound pressure level sufficient to provide early notification of an 1
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emergency but which does not pose a threat of hearing damage to the persons intended to be alerted. Applicants' Brief at 2, 4; NRC Staff 4 i
Brief 2, 3. l I
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- 20. The Staff and Applicants emphasize that the purpose of a public alert I and notification system is tn notify persons in the affected portions of
~J the emergency planning zone in the event of an emergency at the facility involved. As Applicants point out, "[t]o do this, [the sirens) must. be sufficiently load to get people's attention." Applicants' Brief at 2.
The Staff observes correctly that "to be effective, the siren system must I be loud enough to heard above the din." NRC Staff Brief at 2. In these circumstances, it is to be expected that the sound from the sirens may be' irritating, annoying, or yes, discomforting. In the Staff's view, the .j H
salient question is not whether alert notification sirens cause i i
discomfort, but whether the discomfort which may be experienced is outweighed by the benefit to be achieved.
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- 21. The Board cannot accept the MAG's position that a public alert notification system siren cannot pass muster if the se ad pressure level received by any member of the public exceeds 123 dBC. In the first place.
and as noted above, NUREG-0654 does not impose any mandatory- requirement but instead only provides guidance as. to how the requirements of the .;
regulations (10 C.F.R. G 50.47(b)(5) and Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50) might be met. See Three Mile Island, supra, ALAB-698, 16 NRC at 1298-99. -
Just as an applicant may -- not simply rely .upon a regulatory guide in j defending against a contention, see Public' Service Company of .New I
L Hampshire (Seat' rook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-875, 26 NRC 251, 260-61
(.'9671, an intervcnor may not rest its position solely upon an applicants' nrsncompliance with the literal terms of a regulatory guide. Put another way: a regulatory guide can ha used neither as shield nor sword in an operatir.g licensing hearing. Regulatory guidance always is subject to attack in licensing proceedings. Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 772 (1977); see Seabrook, supra, ALAB-875, 26 NRC at 260-61.
- 22. Second, even were the Board to agree with the MAG that NUREG-0654 imposes a regulatory limit on siren sound levels, we would riot agree that the limit necessarily is 123 dBC. As we pointed out earlier, NUREG-0654 states that the maximum sound pressure level received by members of the public "should," as opposed to "shall," be less than 123 dBC. NUREG-0654, I
Pev. 1, App. 3 et 3-3. It is horroook law that "should" is precatory, not l l
mandatory, in nature. Thus, the most that can be said of the guidance in question is that it expresses a preference, whenever possible, for sirens which do not expose any member of the public to more than 123 dBC.
- 23. The Board also notes that the term " discomfort" used in NUREG-0654 offers only limited assistance in our effort to determine whether the sirens which Applicants propose to employ should be approved. Nowhere is the term defined in NUREG-0654 and, unlike the MAG, we are not persuaded that its meaning is clear and unambiguous when read in its full context.
Thus, to ascertain its meaning, the Board finds it necessary to examine l the materials from which the 123 dBC figure was derived.
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N. The source of the 123 dPC sound pressure limit is CPG 1-17, issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in March 1980. Of this there can be little doubt. In June 1980, FEMA stated that "a level of 123 db should be used [as recommended in CPG 1-17 and by the National Academy of Sciences) as the maximum sound level that can be received by any member of the public." See Attachment I to App. Dir. post Tr. 75 (FEMA Guidance Memorandum #13 at 5 (June 17,1980)). Mr. Keast, the author of CPG 1-17, testified that the 123 dBC level discussed in CPG 1-17 was developed as a conservative estimate of the level of sound that, in order to avoid hearing damage, should not be exceeded when an individual is exposed on a_
daily basis, over a_10 year period, to- a 1000 Hz tone for li minutes or less. App. Dir. Tr. at 13; see CPG 1-17 at p. 8. Mr. Keast testified unequivocally that he viewed the figure as one it was safe to say would not cause hearing damage, which was important because it was developed to provide guidance to local fire departments on the installation of sirens which could be sounded daily, usually at the noon _ hour. Tr. 266-69. The avoidance of " hearing damage," therefore, appears to be the purpose to be achieved by the 123 dBC limit suggested in NUREG-0654.
- 25. Mr. Keast's testimony is supported by the background document to CPG 1-17, BBN Report No. 4100, which Mr'. Keast also prepared (also cited on pp. 3-8 of NUREG-0654). BBN Report No. 4100 points out that the 123 dB limit was chosen from Figure 3 of a paper by Applicants' witness Karl D.
l l Kryter, " Hazardous Exposure to Intermittent and Steady . State Noise",
Report of Working Group (WG) - 46, National Academy of Science - National Research Council (NAS-NRC), _ Committee on Hearing, Bioacoustics, and Biomechanics (CHABA), January, 1965 (referred to hereinafter as the
E.. j "Kryter WG-46 Report"). Again, this 123 dB limit applies to a daily ,
exposure, over a 10-year period, to a 1000Hz tone for 1.1/2 minutes or less. It is clear from Figure 3 in the Kryter WG-46 Report, copied as Figure 4.3 in BBN Report 4100, that the 123 dB limit is conservative for !
sirens operating at frequencies below 1000 Hz, or, as is the case here, are not sounded o,n_ a daily basis. In this connection, the Board notes that the .123 dBC value is at a frequency of 1000 Hz on the li minute !
l contour of Figure 3. For the VANS frequency of 550 Hz, the corresponding j value is 127 dBC. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 13. Additionally, the 123 dBC level in CPG 1-17 and NUREG-0654 presupposes daily exposure over a ten j year period. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 13. The VANS sirens, on the other hand, will not be sounded on a daily basis.
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- 26. In view of the foregoing, the Board agrees with Mr. Eldred, the Staff's witness, that the term " discomfort" as used in NUREG-0654 "is somewhat misleading because the choice of the ' level' was not' predicated on consideration of any feelings or reactions of people when they are l
hearing the sound, but rather on consideration of its possible long term I physical effect. See e Eldred Dir. Tr. at 322-23. The Board finds and rules that the avoidance of hearing damage is the underlying- and overriding purpose of the 123 dBC limit contained in NUREG-0654. Thus, to l
pass muster, the sound pressure level received by members of- the public l
l from Applicants' sirens must not pose a danger of hearing damage to the l public. This standard strikes the proper balance between the purpose of i
en effective alert and notification siren (to be loud enough to get l i.
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people's attention) ar.d the public interest in avoiding hearing damage to persons hearing the sirens.
T~. In determining the risk of hearing damage posed by a particular
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siren, it is not enough to focus exclusively on the sound pressure level as the MAG would have the Board do; the frequency of exposure and the time duration of exposure to the sound is equally important. See App. Dir, post Tr. 75 at 13-14; Eldred Dir. Tr. at 323. One appropriate means now available for the purpose of objectively setting upper limits of exposure and discomfort to siren sionals is to use the 123 dB in NUREG-0654, together with its frequency of 1000 Hz and duration of li minutes, as a refe ence for exposure and to compute a comparative exposure for the reference source and a proposed siren system. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 13-14
- 28. Exposure of the ear to loud sounds can fatigue the sensory receptors in the ear, causing some temporary loss or shift in the ability of the ear to detect very waak sounds. Auditory fatigue can be used as one measure of this dimunition in hearing sensitivity. Temporary shift in hearing sensitivity is jointly determined by the frequency, intensity, and duration of a sound. Doubling the amount of time during a day when a given sound is present will, to a first approximation, have the same effect on temporary threshold shift (TTS) as will increasing by 6 dB the intensity of the signal but keeoing the duration the same. These shifts in hearing sensitivity are measured by the increase in intensity required to make audiometer test tones barely audible in the absolute quiet after, as compared to before, exposure to an intense sound of sufficient duration
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' to cause a threshold shift. If sufficiently large and often repeated (from near daily exposures over years), temporary threshold shifts . can become' permanent losses in hearing sensitivity. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 8-9.
- 29. Possible adverse effects of the warning-alert signal upon tne ear can be estimated from the results of' studies in which people were exposed, under laboratory conditions, to a wide variety of sounds and noise of different spectra, intensities, durations and temporal patterns. It was standard practice in most studies af these phenomena - to express the described amount of threshold shift', if any.. that remains two minutes after cessation of the exposure condition ("TTS2"). App. Dir.' post Tr.
75 at 9-10.
- 30. As the following chart demonstrates, using the Temporary Threshold Shift (TTS) method, the VANS sirens compare favorably with the guidance set forth in the reference documents from which -the 123 dBC level in NUREG-0654 and CPG 1-17 was derived:
Reference VANS Maximum sound level received: Maximum Sound Level Received:
123 dBC 131 dBC**
Frequency: 1000 Hz 550 Hz Non-Rotating Rotating 2.5 times per min.
Duration of Sound: 3.0/1.5 min.* 3 min.-
TTS2 3.0 minutes: 18 dB TTS2: 3 to 4 dB (Negligible)
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TTS2 1.5 minutes: 12 dE' j
- 3 minute duration per NUREG-0654, 1 1/2 minute duratior. per BBN-4100 l
- For a siren at a height of 20 feet above listener 90 feet from base- )
of siren and the sirens rated at 134 dBC at 100 feet. 1 l
App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 14. '
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- 31. The TTS2 for the average listener from an exposure 'to the reference-system would be about 18 dB for a 3-minute duration and 12 dB for a 1 1/2 minute duration. These amounts of temporary threshold shift would last-for only a brief period (43 minutes for a 3 minute duration and 12 minutes I I
for a 1 1/2 minute duration). There would be negligible TTS2 ' effects. 'i expected from the 3 minute exposure to the VANS contemplated under
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NUPEG-0654. ' App. Dir post Tr. 75 at 14-15.
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- 32. As discussed in paragraphs 44 and 45, infra, in the worst case l
scenario, a member of the public conceivably could be' exposed to a sound' pressure level of as much as 131 dBC for approximately four (4) seconds.
App. Dir, post Tr. 75 at 16; Eldred Dir. Tr. at 317. There is compelling evidence, however, which suggests that, this brief exposure of four seconds or less is far less harmful or discomforting' to the public than would be the continuous exposure to a 123 dBC siren tone for 3-5 minutes as i permitted by the suggested guidance of NUREG-0654. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 16. The Staff's witness, Mr. Eldred, concurs in the view that such a brief exposure to sound pressure ' levels of the. order here involved would '
cause no harm to the receptor. Eldred Dir. Tr. at 318. ;
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, 31. The Mr.C's witnesses testified . hat 123 dBC "is already on the high sice of discomfort for most individuals." MAG Dir. Tr. at 462. Assuming arouendo this is tru2, it is auite beside the point. " Discomfort" is not synonymous with " hearing damage" and the MAG does not assert that such damage would result from brief exposure to a siren sound level of 123 dBC.
See Tr. at 502 (Tocci). In this circumstance, it is not necessary to consider further the MAG's position that a sound pressure level of 123 dBC should not be approved. Nevertheless, the Board has done so in the interest of fully ventilating the MAG's position.
- 34. The MAG's position that 123 dBC "is already on the high side of discomfort for most individuals" was based almost entirely on a study conducted by Silverman, et al., " Tolerance for Pure Tone and for Speech in Normal and Hard- of-Hearing Ears," (St. Louis: Central Institute for the Deaf, OSRD Report 6303, 1946). MAG Dir. post Tr. 454 at 5. This study involved the playing of tones to subjects through earphones and increasing the tone until the subject stated subjectively that he or she felt discomfort. App. Ex. 12A at 4-5, 12. The purpose of the study was to yield data which would be utilized in the design of hearing aids, and could guide procedures for the clinical selection of hearing aids. Id. at 1.
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- 35. The overall experiment yielded a defined level of discomfort for the ]
1 subjects with normal hearing of as low as 95 dBC. App. Ex. 12A at 31. In ;
free field, it is accepted that the level of discomfort would be reached by any given person at an even lower level than in the experiment, Tr. at
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214 (Kryter), perhaps by as much as 5 dBC. M. The level of discomfort oefined in Dr. Silverman's experiment was subjective, App. Ex. 12A at 4, 34, 92, as agreed to by MAG's own witnesses. Tr. at 485-86, 488-91 (Pearsons). It is clear then, as stated by MAG's own experts. Tr. at 493-98, the 123 dBC level referred to in NUREG-06/5 is simply not the lowest level 'which may cause discomfort to individuals." NUREG-0654, App. 3 at 3-8. Thus, if it be that the statement in NUREG-0654 discussed above is to be read as stating that 123 dBC is the lowest level at which any member of the public wil' experience discomfort, the Board finds that this statement is factually insupportable as a matter of law and therefore we hold that I?3 dBC cannot be read as an absolute limit which must be adhered to by the Applicants in all cases for all members of the public.
Further, it should be noted that there is nothing in the record which suggests that the Silverman study was known to the authors of NUREG-0654, much less relied upon by them,
- 36. Applying these principles, we turn now to the question whether the VANS sirens which Applicants propose to use should be approved.
The Vehicular Alert Notification System Sirens
- 37. The sirens to be utilized in the VANS system operate at a frequency of 550 Hz and are rated at 134 dBC at 100 feet along the axis of symmetry.
App. Ex. 11B at 2.2-2.3.
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- 38. In order to clarify the difference between the rated sound output of sirens and the sound level to which bystanders might be exposed, one can draw an analogy between the sound emanating from the horn of a siren and
1 . j lthe light' from a flashlight. . A flashlight produces. a focused beam of ;
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' light. Some light is shed to the side of this beam but the amount is less !
1 than t' hat within the beam. Similarly, the sound from the horn of a siren is focused into a beam and less sound is radiated to the sides of the beam. App. Dir. post Tr.-75 at 5-6.
- 39. Sirens normally are rated in . terms of the maximum sound levels observed in the focused beam of sound, at 100 feet from the siren. Hence, I
in the case of the VANS siren, it is rated at 134 dBC at 100 feet jn the main beam. However, because the siren is elevated above the ground, the sound level to which bystanders might be exposed is generally less than the rated sound output of the siren, just like the light received from a l
flashlight would be less than in its main beam if the flashlight shined over their heads. App. Dir, post Tr. 75 at 6.
- 40. Mr. Eldred, the Staff's witness, agreed with this analysis. He
.1 testified that the majority of the sound power of the Whelen WS-4000 j electo-acoustic transducer (siren) utilized by Applicants "is focused within a sound beam that is centered on the axis of symmetry." The J
horizontal width of this sound beam is in the order of 20 degrees which is about 1/18th. of a circle. The vertical dispersion is much less so that most of the sound is transmitted horizontally where it can fulfill its i i
intended use rather than be wasted by being transmitted up in space .or i down into the earth. Because of this beaming characteristic and the fact that the. siren is mounted on a tall boom, the sound levels near the ground i I
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within a few hundred feet of the siren are much lower than they are on the
.i siren's axis of symmetry. Eldred Dir. Tr. at 315-16.
- 41. Mr. Eldred provided a drawing which . illustrates the foregoing principles. See Eldred Dir., Attachment 2, Tr. at 337. None of the' MAG's witnesses disagrees with tt.a acoustical principles discussed above. See MAG Dir. Tr. at 463-67.
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- 42. Assuming that a VANS vehicle is able to get to its acoustical location, and raise the siren to its full 51-foot height, and assuming j that there is no account taken of reflection of sound from buildings it is undisputed that no member of the public will be subjected to a sound pressure level greater than 123 dBC. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 6-14; MAG Dir. Tr. 464-67; Eldred Dir. Tr. at 317-19.. 1
- 43. Applicants have addressed the situation,- thought conceivable at the time the contention was admitted. Where the onset of a site area emergency ,
(SAE) or general emergency (GE) was not preceded by an alert, and therefore, in order to meet notification criteria, the sirens might have l to be initially sounded at a height as low as 25 feet above the ground.
App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 15; Tr. 88. (This situation, however, no longer !
is conceivable because recent improvements in the design of the VANS ;
hydraulic system now make it unnecessary for the' sirens ever to be sounded at a height of less ' than the full 51 feet. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 4
19-19A.)
f l-44 In the hypothetical case where it becomes necessary to sound the sirens at a height as low as 25 feet above ground level, the maximum sound exposure will be for someone who is standing on the ground under the siren axis and located about 90 feet from the base of the siren. A person at this location could be initially exposed to 131 dBC as the siren rotates past their position. By the time the siren has rotated back to that starting position the siren will have elevated to approximately 45 feet.
With the siren at 45 feet a person at 90 feet will then be exposed to a sound pressure level of approximately 123 dBC. During the next oscillation and for all subsequent oscillations the siren will have risen to over 45 feet and the person at 90 feet will be exposed to a sound pressure level of approximately 120 dBC. App. Dir, post Tr. 75 at 15- 16 and Attach. H; Eldred Dir. Tr. at 317-19.
- 45. This exposure to sound pressure levels above l?3 dBC would occur for less than four seconds. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 16; Eldred Dir. Tr. at 317.
- 46. In LBP-89-09, the Board found that exposure to this sound pressure level (i.e., 131 dBC) for this short period of time (i.e. 4 seconds) will .j not cause permanent hearing damage nor result in temporary hearing loss.
l 29 NRC at 290. In fact, each 03rty's witness agreed -- even those of the MAG -- that, even assuming sound levels as high as 131 dBC or even 137 dBC were received by some hypothetical member of the public, no permanent or even temporary damage to hearing would result given 'the fact that we are I
.i i
dealing here with rotatir.g sirens. E3 ., Tr. at 210, 264-65 (kryter); Tr.
at 409, 429 (Eldred); Tr. at 502 (Tocci).
Increased Sound Level Due To Building Reflection
- 47. In LBP-89-05, the Board expressed a concern over whether the sound pressure level of the sirens which Applicants proposes to deploy is understated due to a failure to account for building reflection. 29 NRC at 294 Building reflection is the phenomena resulting from sound waves bour.cing off buildings or exterior surfaces. See Eldred Dir. Tr. at 320.
According to Fr. Eldred, the effect on sound measurements taken close (e.g., within 5-10 feet) to a small building or the exterior wall of a building which is exposed to both incident and reflected sound waves from a specific sound source may be as much as 3 dBC. Id. The witnesses for Applicants and the MAG agreed. See MAG Dir. Tr. at 463-66; Tr. at 194 (Sutherland). The increase may be as much as 6 dBC at the exterior surface. Tr. at 401 (Eldred) The only way a person could experience an increase in sound pressure of this magnitude, however, would be "if [hel were inside the building and cut a hole for [his] ear and fit [hisl ear in the plane of the outside of the building." Id.
- 48. The MAG argues that in the event the sound levels derived by the Applicants are increased by 6 dBC to account for reflection from buildings, a hypothetical person, standing in the exactly right space could receive as much as 137 dBC from a siren at a twenty-five foot height, and 128 dBC from a siren at a 50-foot height. MAG Dir. Tr. at ;
l 466. The MAG goes on to state that absent a program to tailor the
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.1 coverage it. light of the buildings in the area, which they believe to be difficult, if not impossible, the only solution is to reduce the sound levels for the VANS sirens to 123 dBC in the sound axis at 100 feet. MAG Dir. Tr. at 467. This, of course would have the effect of reducing the-sound coverage to unacceptable levels, id., as Applicants concede. Tr. at 206-07 (Kryter).
t
- 49. The Board is not persuaded by the MAG's argument. To begin with, I
even accepting MAG's view, it is not necessary to redurc the rating of the 1 sirens all the way to 123 dBC in order _ to meet the requirements of NUREG-0654 as MAG would interpret them. The sirens currently are rated at 134 dBC. If that number were reduced by 6 dBC to accomodate the MAG, the sirens would be rated at 128 dBC which would then assure that no one received 123 dBC. This is because the sirens will be 51 feet in the air which decreases substantially the sound pressure level received by persons standing at ground level. See e.g. Eldred Dir. Tr. at 315-16.
- 50. As to building reflection, there is a possibility of a member of the public, while standing in certain positions close to a building, to hear simultaneously the VANS siren sound and also some sound reflected from the building. This reflected sound could, under exceptional conditions, cause a person to hear an increased siren sound level. In reality, however, l atmospheric effects such as wind, temperature gradients, turbulence, and dlffraction of signals around the human head will reduce the theoretical I
effects of constructive interference of reflected sound waves received by j j
a listener standing close to a large structure. The actual effect of j l
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reflection will depend upon (1) the siren height in relation to both structure and listener, (2) the angle of incidence of the sound at the structure and et the listener, (3'). the relative distances between siren, structure and listener, (4) the directivity of. the siren and (5) the reflective properties of the surface of the structure. Theoretically, if a listener has his head positioned at certain locations near a building surface, he could experience an increase in sound pressure. level ~of up to 6 dB. App. Dir, post Tr. 75 at 16-17. See also Tr. at 189-200 (Sutherland); Elred Dir. Tr. at 319-21. -4
- 51. This theoretical increase in sound level diminishes to zero as the listener moves away from the structure and atmospheric effects impact the sound dispersion. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 16-17. See also Tr. at 189-200 (Sutherland); Elred Dir. Tr. at 319-21. Thus, from a planning standpoint, this, theoretical increase in sound pressure level is of very limited concern because of the limited area potentially affected and the remote probability of a person being at the precise position with the precise conditions at the precise time necessary to cause this affect.
App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 17.
- 52. Furthermore, as pointed out by the Staff's witness, Mr. Eldred, the ;
I convention appears to be in setting regulatory noise levels, to ignore j sound reflection from structures. Eldred Dir. Tr. at 319-21; see Tr. at i 1
273 (Sutherland). It can be presumed therefore that to the extent that.
the 123 dBC figure in NUREG-0654 is to be deemed a regulatory level, it l l
1
dso is intended to be utilized without reference to sound reflection from structures.
E3. In view of the foregoing, and without attempting to decide what the l
exact limit should be for all emergency warning systems at all nuclear power plants, the Board finds that the sirens in this particular case, which wil' exceed the 123 dBC level only in an extremely unlikely situation (and even in that case only for 4 seconds or lest?, will not cause any permanent or temporary hearing damage. Accordingly, the Board finds the VANS sirens adequate and in compliance with 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(5) and Appendix E of 10 C.F.R. Part 50 of the Commission's regulations. The Board concludes therefore that the sirens Applicants propose to utilize in connection with their public alert notification system for the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook emergency planning zone should be and are hereby approved for use.
Notification Time Estimates 54 We turn now to the issue of whether the VANS system satisfies the so-called "15 minute design objective" for alerting and notifying the public. See LBP-89-09, 29 NRC at 295.
- 55. As described in App. Ex. 118, the duration of the VANS alerting function can be determined by summing the time to alert the operators 1
(alert time), the time to dispatch the vehicles from the staging areas l i
(dispt +.ch time), the time to travel from the staging areas to the acoustic locations (transit time), the time to raise the sirens at the acoustic
l 1
1 locations (setup time), and the time to provide the alerting signal (siren activation time). App. Dir, post Tr. 75 at 198.
1 Ef. This Board has already decided that there is no issue of fact to be 'I tried 'with respect to the alert time, the transit time, the setup time, or the siren sounding time. LBP-89-09, 29 NRC at 283-85, 287-88.
- 57. As to dispatch times: A number of actions have been taken to assure that VANS operators (i.e., the drivers) will be alert at the time the VANS-staging areas are notified to promptly dispatch vehicles. These actions include ' setting of staffing policies, the training of VANS operators .and-advance warning of operators at a lower emergency classification. App.
Dir. post Tr. 75 at 20-22.
- 50. This Poard has already found that procedural requirements are in place to ensure vehicle readiness. LBP-89-09, 29 NRC at 287.
I
- 59. In order to ensure a prompt response by the VANS operators to a notification to dispatch vehicles, each driver is trained and qualified prior to assuming the role of a VANS operator. ' Each of the operators will l 1
be trained in the proper implementation of the applicable procedure, the i j
proper use of communications equipment, emergency response equipment and i 1
the VANS vehicle including auxilbry equipment. This training program i i
also includes familiarizing the operators with each VANS staging area and {
1 each route between the staging area and the respective acoustic locations. ;
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Each VANS operator will be subjected to periodic training and annual ]
re-qualification to this training program. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 21. !
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- 60. In addition, the applicable procedure requires the VANS operator to j perform establis'hed procedural steps when asse.1ing his duty station at the staging area. These non-emergency (ongoing) actions required of each operator provide additional assurances that the operators will respond j promptly to a notification to dispatch as trained. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 21
- 61. The New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization (NHY ORO) .)
maintains round the clock staffing capability through continuous manning j of the VANS staging areas. NHY maintains a total shift complement of one i
supervisor and twenty-four VANS operators. The primary VANS shift i complement consists of the one supervisor and twenty VANS operators assigned as the primary drivers for the sixteen primary VANS vehicles. In l addition to the sixteen primary vehicles and twenty drivers, there are four backup vehicles and four backup VANS operators located continuously at Seabrook Station. (There are two additional VANS vehicles which are I assumed to be available for maintenance and surveillance activities.)
This shift complement of twenty primary drivers ensures that an adequate number of drivers will be available to relieve the "on duty" operators. !
This primary shift complement of twenty VANS operators and four backup VANS operators from the onsite shift complement also ensures that there is an adequate number of drivers to handle periodic route verification, rotating the VANS vehicles through vehicle and siren maintenance, l
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surve , lance testing every two weeks and normal routine administrative tunctions. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 22-23. l 4
6:. Thus, the sixteen primary VANS operators are not required to leave their duty station to perform any administrative functions. In addition, the applicable procedure also specifies that the on-shift primary VANS !
l operator remains on duty until relieved by the incoming VANS operator. J App. Dir, post Tr. 75 at 21-22.
- 63. The floard finds that Applicants' staffing policies are adequate to ,
l ensure that VAN 5 operators respond promptly and t iht idequate numbers of trained operators will be available to reliev.s on-duty operators. Shift functions do rot require the operators et staging areas to leave their ;
duty station. Operators are not, per procedure, to leave their staging l
area duty station until relieved. App. Dir, post Tr. 75 at 22-23.
1
- 64. The multiple VANS operators at each Staging Area provide that, in the event that an operator is momentarily indisposed, a prioritized dispatch will occur. This form of dispatch will effectively prioritize the sequence for sending the first VANS vehicles dispatched to the furthest acoustic location. Each of the staging areas has a minimum of one corresponding acoustic location where a VANS vehicle can be completely deployed in an average of 7 minutes or less, which provides a 5-minute margin in the event that a driver is momentarily indisposed. (This margin l
is computed as follows: 15 minutes allowed to complete notification less 7 ;
minute alert, dispatch, transit, and set-up time less 3 minutes to sound
. I i
i u ren = 5 minutes margin.) In the situation where the satellite staging ]
1 a ree is manned on summer weekends and holidays, VL-01 and VL-15 (VANS i
vehicles normally at the saae staging area) have approximately a 7-minute margir to account for an operator being momentarily indisposed. App. Dir.
post Tr. 75 at 23.
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- 65. Actions are taken to provide an advance warning to VANS operators.
The ORO Emergency Operations Center (E0C) Contact notifies the VANS l
Staging Areas and places the Operators on standby status at an UNUSUAL EVENT, the lowest emergency classification. This contact advises the VANS operators of a condition at Seabrook Station which, if it escalated, would require the dispatching of VANS vehicles. At ALERT or higher emergency classifications, VANS vehicles are dispatched to the acoustic locations.
App. Dir, post Tr, 75 at 23-24
- 66. The Vehict 'ar Alert and Communication System (VACS) also assures i
prompt vehicle dispatching by the VANS Operators. Upon activation by the l OR0 E0C Contact, the VACS automatically sounds audible alarms and activates visual alarms (i.e., flashing strobe-type lights) at the staging area. This combined auditory and visual alarm notifies the operator that an emergency condition exists at Seabrook Station requiring the prompt dispatch of a VANS vehicle. In the event of a false alarm, the VANS vehicles will dispatch as if responding to a real activation signal.
Through VANS operator radio communication with the E0C Contact the false alarm condition would result in VANS vehicle recall. In addition to the alarming function, upon activation VACS automatically opens overhead doors
I Et those staging areas where vehicles are stored indoors. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 24
- 67. The VACS will be regularly maintained and periodically tested. In the unlikely event of VACS failure, the E0C Contact would revert to a ,
I simultaneous radio notification to the VANS staging areas. If the radio i ai o fails, the EOC Contact would dispatch the VANS using the telephone system. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 24 l
- 68. During the graded exercise the back-up radio system was in fact used.
Communication of the necessary information took place in the order of one minute. Tr. 121 (Desmarais).
- 69. NHY selected a one-minute alert and dispatch design based on input from emergency resperse personnel. A testing program was conducted to validate the design basis and to establish reasonable bounding time estimates of how long it would take to dispatch VANS vehicles from a staging area. Since each staging area will have a unique set of operating characteristics (e.g., indoor versus outdoor vehicle storage, etc.) test l conditions were chosen which would be representative of staging area conditions in general (i.e., indoor storage, vehicles located 100 feet from duty station). App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 24-25.
1
- 70. In addition, other test conditions, such as requiring the operator to '
walk to the vehicle after being mobilized and having two separate operators for the testing program, assure that the testing program results
i
. 1 woulc be reasonable by ' ding time estimates. Other conservatism in the testing program result om the performance of certain actions by the i
nperator during the testint. nrograms which will be performed by VACS, such as opening of overhead doors and acknowledging the telephone communication to mobilize. Given the inherent conservatism in the testing program, the design basis time is bounding and appropriate. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 25.
- 71. Applicants presented uncontroverted testimony to the effect that: ;
I
- Only three of the seven VANS trucks which provide coverage to 1 areas within 5 miles could have estimated travel times, due to
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1 winter adverse road conditions, which exceed 10 minutes using a j speed reduction estimate of 25 percent. !
- One of these three does not provide the sole coverage of an area during the winter.
- The VANS trucks should move through snow more effectively during adverse winter road conditions than do passenger vehicles.
- Actual tests have shown that VANS transit times to these three locations during severe winter adverse weather should not materially exceed 10 minutes. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 25-30.
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- 72. The 25L speed reduction as a planning basis represents the use of a figure which has a reasonable expectation of occuring rather than an extreme condition. Tr. at 125-26, 260 (Lieberman). Data from Portland, Maine, shows that over an eight year period on only 21 days was there
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snowfall which caused traffic speed reductions in excess of 25%. Tr. at
?45-46 (Lieberman).
- 73. With respect to the issue of informational messages, there is a 1
threshold question of law to be decided. MAG believes that the guidance and regulations should be read as requiring that within fifteen minutes, the PANS must first, sound a three-minute warning, and complete thereafter e full playing of the appropriate EBS message.
74 In essence it is the argument of MAG that notification is not
" essentially complete," 10 CFR 50, App. E 9 IV.D(3), until the public has not only heard the siren, but also heard a complete EBS message. 3
- 75. In addition, MAG points to the language in NUREG-0654 which sets forth as one of the " minimum acceptable design objectives for coverage by
[a siren] system" as:
Capability for providing both an alert signal and an informational or instructional message to the population on an l area wide basis throughout the 10 mile EPZ, within 15 minutes.
NUREG-0654, App. 3, at 3-3. !
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- 76. As set forth below, Applicants intend to activate the EBS messages concurrently and coincidentally with the commencement of the siren tones.
It is conceded that, assuming certain messages that are prescripted are in fact used, there would not be time, with respect to certain of the acoustical locations, assuming an immediate general emergency, to complete the three-mirute warning tone and thereafter play a complete version of l 1
the EBS message before the expiration of the 15-minute window contemplated ]
l This, claims the MAG, means that the system does not by the regulations.
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coaply with the regulations and guidance. Applicants, -joined by the . l l Staff, disagree. ]
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- 77. NUREG-0654, Appendix 3 states:
A prompt notification scheme shall include the capability of ;
local and State agencies to provide 'information promptly over ;
radio and TV tat the time of activation of the alertinin signal. .
(Emphasis added.) ]
i App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 30.
l 78.- FEMA Guidance Memorandum AN-1, FEMA Action to Qualify Alert and Notification Systems Against NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and FEMA-REP-10 ;
i provides the following guidance and suggestions for. evaluating and I confirming compliance with design objectives:
In confirming that the alert and notification system time requirements are satisfied, the evaluator should begin timing :
from the point at which the decision to activate the alert and ;
notification system is made. Within T5 or 45 (if applicable) '
minutes of this decision by offsite officials, the alert signal must be activated and an instructional message must be on the air. j i
- 79. The Board notes that, as testified to by the Staff's witness, Mr. !
Kantor, the Commission does not purport to regulate, nor can it regulate the length or brevity of the EBS message which a State elects to use in a ,
situation where a State is cooperating, nor does NRC purport to regulate !
the length of the EBS messages which are used in a utility plan. Tr.
415-17 (Kantor). Moreover, it is conceded that in a given situation, a <
l Governor may authorize only a new, never before seen or timed EBS message to be given. Tr. at 415 (Kantor). This being the case it is difficult-to see how NRC would _ require' that the EBS message be completed in full once i
before expiration .of the 15-minute window when NRC does not- purport to
l.
vrite, ecit , regulate, compcse or otherwise have a hand in the message ;
that is used. ir. at 415-17; see NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, 6 E.7 at 46 ("Each j organization shcil provide written messages . . ."). ]
- 00. These f acts along with the language from NUREG-0654 relied upon by Applicants and the above-quoted language from the FEMA guidance memorandum lead to an interpretation of the regulation and other guidance langauge to I 1
the effect that simultaneous playing of an EBS message along with the j j
sounding of the sirens satisfies the regulations so long as a three-minute i siren alert precedes the termination of the "about 15 minutes" window.
The Board so rules. 1 l
l M. In light of the foregoing legal ruling, the Board is constrained to j find that Applicants ' public alert notification system satisfies the regulations with respect to prompt alerting of 1.he public. l l
- 82. The utility-sponsored Seabrook Plan fa' Massachusetts Communities (SPMC) which is the emergency response plan applicable to the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook EPZ, has procedures which provide ;
that the informational message will be transmitted over EBS concurrently with the alerting signal. See App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 30 and Attachment E; see also Tr. at 135-36 (Desmarais).
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- 83. The E0C Contact or Communication Coordinator begins the siren activation upon hearing the EBS broadcast. The initial message is played three times and subsequently iepeated at 15-minute intervals. Subsequent l
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changes in protective action recommendations are implemented in the same manner. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 30-31.
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Ba. For events requiring immediate protective action recommendations, the NHY ORO maintains prerecorded. informational messages at each EBS station, which ensures that the requirements of the applicable procedures can be rr.e t . The prerecorded messages were timed to determine the length of time necessary to deliver the message. Each message has an approximate- j duration of slightly in excess of 2 minutes with a maximum of 2 minutes and 38.5 seconds. Kantor Dir. Tr. at 353; Tr. at 285 (Judge Bloch). EBS messages are preceded by a ER second period wherein persons are advised that "this is rot a drill," the areas affected. and a tone is broadcast.
Specifically scripted informational messages may contain additional.
information that could slightly extend the time necessary to deliver the message; however', these messages would not be used for events requiring' immediate protective action recommendations. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 31.
j E5. As to the total time to perform alert and notification, Applicants !
testified that the most limiting vehicle location which is needed to I
provide coverage to the Massachusetts portion of the EP2 within five miles of Seabrook is VL-1; the time to complete the alerting signal on a day 1 without snow is approximately 13 minutes and 37 seconds; for a day where !
roads are icy, the time is expected to be 15 minutes and 13 seconds, which falls within the parameter of "about 15 minutes." App. Dir. post Tr. 75 l
at 32-33. -1 1
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- 86. In all circumstances, the VANS meets the 15-minute design objective of providing - an alerting signal and informational message in about 15 minutes. Foreover, it ' further accounts for . practical considerations by i
initial serial repetitions of the message followed thereafter every 15 minutes. The mcst constraining scenario, involving the unlikely need for immediate protecthe actions, is satisfied by the - VANS. In the more l
probable situa. tion of an escalating emergency, the VANS are in their deployed condition effectively acting as a fixed pole siren system long before. siren activation is actually required and thereby eliminating any
.1 considerations, beyond the actual 3-minute siren alerting. signal and -
informational message, for satisfying the 15-minute design objective.
App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 33-34.
- 87. The Staff's expert concurs in the Applicants' view that the' VANS system is an adeouate means of satisfying applicable Commission
)
regulations requiring the ability to promptly alert and notify,the public )1 of a radiological emergency. Kantor Dir. post Tr. 310, passim. l I
- 88. Again, the MAG does not directly controvert any of the testimony or data offered by the Applicants with respect to the notification time issues. Rather, the- MAG takes the position that the boredom of the job of being a VANS driver will result in inattention to the job, absenteeism, leaving the station unmanned and a number of other difficulties. MAG Dir.
Tr. at 469-72.
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- 89. The basis for much of the MAG's position is a study _ done by one P.
Baken, "An Analysis of Retrospective Reports Fellowing an Auditory. i Vigilance Task," Vigilance: A c,vmposium, ed. D.N. Buckner, J.J. McGrath (1963). MAG Dir. Tr. at 469-70.
- 90. This study was an experiment whereby a total of 100 Royal Air Force Recruits were seated for 48 minutes while a tape recording recited digits to them at the rate of one digit per second; the recruits were requireo to detect and write down the digits whenever they heard three odd digits in a row, all of the digits being different. Tr. at 511-12 (Kanfer). Not surprisingly, the study found that the~ ability of the recruits, on average, to continue to detect the odd three consecutive nonrepetitive digits decreased with time. Tr. at 513 (Kanfer).
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- 91. The relevance of this type of study _ to the problem at hand is marginal at best. Here a VANS operator, no matter how inattentive, will be subjected to an alarm of horns . and lights, Tr. at 100 (Desmarais),
I which means only one thing; that he should get in a truck and drive to a 1
preset location. There is nothing repetitive about this. Indeed, Professor Kanfer admitted that if the drivers were, in fact, at their posts, they would likely respond. Tr. at 517 (Kanfer). She testified that there was no doubt in her mind that the VANS operators would respond in the case of. a large accident. Tr. at 520 (Kanfer).
- 92. The MAG's witnesses testified that they doubted that the rule that VANS operators were not to leave their post until relieved would be
[,
followec because studies (uncited) have shown the "only if there are recognized negative consequences of breaking that rule will it be 1 honored." MAG Dir. Tr. at 472.
- 93. There will be periodic drills, and people will be fired if the post is not manned; presumably this will be recognized by all hands as a
" negative consequence." Tr. at 523 (Kanfer). Moreover, Professor Kanfer indicated that if the VAN's drivers were given something else to do with their " dead" time that was not trivial, they would be motivated not to leave their posts. Tr. at 527-28 (Kanfer) 94 Applicants concede that it is conceivable that on some day, some VANS operator may be absent from his post; that no one would notice it and call it in; and that if the alarm sounded it would be necessary to go to the back-up drivers which could result in an acoustical location being manned later than expected. Tr. at 121 (Desmarais). Applicants take the position that this is unlikely; the Board agrees.
- 95. The MAG's final attack on the VANS system is testimony to the effect that some people may not haar the sirens, may not react as anticipated when they do, may panic, and thus not turn on their radio, and other suggestions that human behavior factors will result in some people not being notified and alerted within "about 15 minutes." MAG Dir. Tr.
475-78.
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i TE. The evidence which the MAG adduced on this latter point came from a witness who relied for the most part on a study which showed that l l
decirion-making ability was compromised by time pressure. The study ir<volved subjects who were give two tasks of picking the best household appliance (in one case, refrigerators, aad in the other case, ovens) and were given different periods of time to do so (15 seconds, 30 seconds, and two minutes); not surprisingly, even after training in decision-making a"alysis techniqu, , the evidence was that those with the lowest amount of time made the worst decisions. Tr. at 537-39 (Perrow). l i
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- 97. It is difficult to see the relevance of such a study t.o the matter at hand, and Professor Perrow admitted that six other studies which he mentioned but did not actually cite were also defective, Tr. at 547, and as inapposite as the one he did cite. Tr. at 540.
- 98. The short answer to this entire line of evidence is found in the regulations and guidance. The requirement in the regulations is that an applicants' public alert and notification system have the capability to provide an alerting signal and informational message to the public in the .l l
EPZ in about 15 minutes. Applicants' public alert and notification system i for the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook EPZ clearly has this capabili ty.
l l 99. The notification and alerting process is to be carried out by means l 4 l fully recognized as adequate by the guidance, i.e., sirens and emergency l
I l.
l,
broadcast messages. NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, App. 3 at 3.7-3.15. The Board so firds.
CONCLUSION OF LAW 100. In resolving the issues placed in controversy, the Board has 1
considered all the evidence submitted by the parties and the entire record j of this proceeding. That record consists of the pleadings filed by the l
parties, the orders issued by this Board, the transcripts of the hearing, )
i and exhibits received into evidence. All issues, arguments, or proposed J findings presented by the parties, but not addressed in this decision, have been found to be without merit or unnecessary to this decision. ,
l i
101. Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, which are supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence as required by the !
Administrative Procedure Act and the Commission's Rules of Practice, and upon consideration of the entire evidentiary record in this proceeding, the Board concludes as a matter of law that Applicants' public alert notification system for the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook Station EPZ meets the requirements of the Commission's regulations and that there is reasonable assurance that persons located in the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook EPZ will be notified of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station within about 15 minutes of the time that cognizant officials of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts decide to make such notification.
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102. This decision disposes of a discrete and major segment of the full power operating license proceeding. Accordingly, any party may take an cppeal from this decision by filing a Notice of Appeal .within ten (10) days after service of this decision. Each appellant must file a brief
. supporting its position on appeal within thirty (30) days after filing its Notice of Appeal (forty (40) days if the Staff is the appellant). Within thirty (30) days after the period has expired for the filing and service of the briefs of all appellants (forty (40) days in the case of the Staff), a party who is not an appellant may file a brief in support of'or in opposition to the appeal of any other party. A responding party shall file only a single, responsive brief regardless of the number of appellants' briefs filed. See 10 C.F.R. 6 2.762.
Respectfully submitted, 0
h regory Al Counsel fo Ber' RC '
k(
aff Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 22nd day of . lune 1989
y -
!H j UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '89 J34 29 E3;54 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING B,0ARD. ,
q In the Matter of ) bW'
) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL-01 PUPLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) 50-444 OL-01 ,
NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
_ ) On-site Emergency Planning j
) and Safety' Issues 1 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the "NRC STAFF PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND . l CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WITH RESPECT TO SIRENS ISSUES" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or as indicated by an asterisk, by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, or as indicated by double asterisks, by express mail, this 22nd day of June 1989:
Peter B. Bloch, Chairman
- H. J. Flynn, Esq.
Administrative Judae Assistant General Counsel Atomic Safety and [icensing Board Federal Emergency Management Agency )
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 500 C Street. S.W. ]
Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20472 4 Dr. Jerry Harbour
- Philip Ahrens, Esq.;
Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission State House Station Washington, DC 20555 Augusta, ME 04333 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke John Traficonte, Esq.**- !
Administrative Judge Stephen A. Jonas, Esq. j 4515 Willard Avenue Assistant Attorney General ,
Office of the Attorney General Chevy Chase, MD 20815 One Ashburton Place,19th Floor Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esq.** Boston, MA 02108 3 Robert K. Gad, III Esq. .!
One International Place Geoffrey Huntington, Esq. l Boston, MA 02110-2624 Assistant Attorney General i Office of the f.ttorney General i 25 Capitol Street ~ i Concord, NH 03301 4
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I Diane Curran, Esq. Mrs. Anne E. Goodman, Chairman Harmor, Curran & Tousley Board of Selectmen 20C1 S Street, NW 13-15 Newmarket Road Suitt 430 Durham, NH 03824 Weshington, DC 20009 Hon. Gordon J. Humphrey l Calvin A. Canney United States Senate )
! City Hall 531 Hart Senate Office Building 126 Daniel Street Washington, DC 20510 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Peter J. Matthews, Mayor Allen Lampert City Hall Civil Defense Director Newburyport, MN 01950 Town of Brentwood 20 Franklin Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Exeter, NH 03833 Board of Selectmen South Hampton, NH 03827 !
William Armstrong Civil Defense Director Ashod N. Amirian, Esq.
Town of Exeter Town Counsel for Merrimac 10 Front Street 145 South Main Street l Exeter, NH 03833 P.O. Box 38 )
Bradford, MA 01835 I Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
Holmes & Ellis Robert A. Backus, Esq.
47 Winnacunnet Road BacFas, Meyer & Solomon Hampton, NH 03842 1]S Lowell Street Manchester, NH 03106 ,
J. P. Nadeau l Board of Selectmen Paul McEachern, Esq. i 10 Central Street Shaines & McEachern !
Rye, NH 03870 25 Maplewood Avenue !
P.O. Box 360 l Judith H. Mizner, Esq, Portsmouth, NH 03801 79 State Street 1 Newburyport, MA 01950 Charles P. Graham, Esq.
McKay, Murphy & Graham Robert Carr1pg, Chairman 100 Main Street Board of Seleitmen Amesbury, MA 01913 Town Office Atlantic Avenue William S. Lord North Hampton, NH 03862 Board of Selectmen Town Hall - Friend Street Sandra Gavutis, Chairman Amesbury, MA 01913 Board of Selectman RFD #1, Box 1154 Kensington, NH 03827 R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esq.
Lagoulis, Clark, Hill-Whilton
& McGuire 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950
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l Partara J. Saint Andre, Esq. Ps. Suzanne Breiseth Vepelman & Paige, P.C. Board of Selectmen 77 Franklin Street Town of Hampton Falls boston, PA 02210 Drinkwatter Road
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Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appe61 Panel (5)* Docketing and Service Section*
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Secretary j Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission j Washington, DC 20555 i Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ,
Panel (1)*
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 M ~M" Gregory alm Berp 'ff (
Counsel fo G RC 3.a I L'
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