ML20248B720

Applicant Proposed Findings & Rulings of Law W/Respect to Sirens Issues.* Issues Addressed in Response to ASLB 880602 Memorandum & Order Admitting Contention Re Adequacy of Public Alert & Notification Sys.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20248B720
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	05/30/1989
From:	Dignan T PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ROPES & GRAY
To:
References
CON-#289-8717 LBP-89-09, LBP-89-9, OL-1, NUDOCS 8906090154
Download: ML20248B720 (38)

Text

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11 COLF;UjD M a y '3 0 ",~ 1 9 8 9 I

UNITED STATES.OF AMERICA 89 JLN -5 All

49 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 6n:e before the 003 !. !

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

)

. PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL-1 OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, at al. ) 50-444-OL-1

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 ) (Onsite Emergency and 2) ) Planning and Safety

) Issues)

-)

APPLICANTS' PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RULINGS OF LAW WITH RESPECT TO SIRENS ISSUES

1. On June 2, 1988, this Board issued a Memorandum and Order (unpublished) admitting for litigation in this proceeding a single contention with numerous bases (most of which amounted to contentions also) raising the issue of the ,

adequacy of the public alert and notification system (PANS) for that portion of the population in that portion of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station (Seabrook) plume emergency planriing zone (EPZ) located in The Commonwealth of 1

Massachusetts (The Commonwealth).

2. The design, construction, and use of this system is  !

necessitated by virtue of the fact that the Applicants have

-been denied permits to erect a conventional pole system by The Commonwealth and its political subdivisions. Ir. 416-17.

8906090154 890530 PDR ADOCK 05000443 G PDR

__ CP!3 J

L-y3. The system which the Ap;Aicants propose to use is called a Vehicular Alert Notification System (VANS). This is a l

transportable fixed system consisting of trucks which will proceed to certain preset locations, raise a siren above the ground by means of a hydraulic telescoping boom, and then, as necessary, sound the siren to alert the public. At the same time, prescripted emergency broadcast messages will be broadcast over the emergency broadcast system (EBS) to which the public will have been referred by various preemergency notification devices (calendars, notices etc.). Egg generally, App. Exs. 11A & 11B; App. Dir., cost II. 75, Attachments A-G.

4. On March 3, 1989, this Board issued a memorandum and order in this matter which granted, in part, a summary disposition motion filed by Applicants with respect to this contention and all of its bases. Public Service Company of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-09, 29 NRC (March 3, 1989), hereafter referred to as "LBP 09" and cited to the slip opinion.

5. In LBP-89-09, this Board left open for litigation only the following issues with respect to the PANS:

A.1-1. Whether sound levels in excess of 122 dBC cause enough discomfort so that the Board

I1 e.

l 0

l should not approve the use of sirens at a 1

( higher level of sound? 1 A.1-2. If there is some level higher than 123 dBC that the Board should allow, what is that level?

A.1-3. Whether Applicants' sirens can provide adequate coverage if used at sound levels that

' are not unduly uncomfortable?

A.1-4. Whether Applicants' position on the sound level resulting from their sirens is an under estimate because of sound reflection from buildings?

A.3-1 Whether the appointed destination locations, including VL-06, VL-07, VL-12, are sufficiently level for the safe deployment of the VANS vehicles?

A.3-2. Whether or not VANS vehicles may gain physical access to VL-03, VL-06, VL-07, and VL-12?

A.5-1 What is the appropriate conservative estimate of the length of time it would take drivers to take the necessary actions before their i

vehicles leave their stations during i The Board also noted that this question involved a legal issue as to what standard should be applied to determine the possible relevance of discomfort and invited briefs on that question.

.s; conditions likely to prevail at the time of need?

A.5-2. 'Given that there is snowfall of 0.5 inches or more during 5.5% of the days'of the year, r would a conservative estimate of travel times to VANS acoustic locations include the i somewhat prolonged travel times anticipated during snow conditions? If so, what time estimates should be included?

A.5-3. What is~an appropriate conservative estimate of the length of time it would take people within five miles of Seabrook to receive the informational message to be-broadcast over the EBS?

A.5-4. What is an appropriate conservative estimate of the total length of time for alerting and informing people within five miles of Seabrook? Is that estimate within acceptable

. guidelines? (If it is longer than 15 minutes, what are the factors we are to consider in deciding whether the time period is adequate?)

LBP-89-09 at 37-38.

6. The issues denominated "A.3-1." and "A.3-2." above, have been resolved by stipulation of the parties.

7. The remaining issue came on for hearing before this

l:

Vs Board on May 2, 1989. A total of 2 days of hearings were held on May 2 - 3, 1989, in Boston, Massachusetts.

8. The parties to the proceeding were the Attorney General for The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (MAG), the Applicants, and the Staff of the United States Nuclear l

Regulatory Commission (Staff).

9. Applicants presented a panel of witnesses consisting of Edward W. Desmarais of the Independent Review Team for New Hampshire Yankee Division of Public Service Company of New Hampshire, David N. Keast, Principal Consultant, Warning System Services, Karl D. Kryter, Staff Scientist, Bioengineering Division of SRI International, Edward Lieberman, President, KLD Associates, Inc. and Louis C. Sutherland, Deputy Director and Chief Scientist, Wyle Research, Wyle Laboratories. (Qualifications, cost II.

38); App. Dir. oost II. 75, passim.

10. The Board finds each of these witnesses competent to testify with respect to the matters as to which he testified.

11. MAG presented a panel of witnesses consisting of Ruth Kanfer, Professor, University of Minnesota, Karl S.

Pearsons, Senior Consultant, Acentech, Inc., Charles B.

Perrow, Professor, Yale University, and Gregory C. Tocci, President, Cavanaugh Tocci Associates. HAQ Dir. Dost II.

454, cassim.

m 9'

12. : Staff presented the testimony of Kenneth M. Eldred, Eldred Dir. post II. 310. Dassim, and the testimony of Falk Kantor, Kantor Dir. post II. 310, Dassim.

13. The Board finds each of these witnesses competent to testify with respect to the matters as to which he testified.

14. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has approved the design of VANS. App. Dir. Dost II. 75 at 4.

15. This clothes the design with a rebuttable presumption as to adequacy which presumption, MAG is required to overcome. 10 CFR 5 50.47 (a) (2) .

16. -The sirens to be utilized in the VANS system operate at a frequency of 550 Hz and are rated at 134 dBC at at 100 feet. App. Ex. 11B at 2-2 -- 2-3.

17.. In order to clarify the difference between the rated sound output of sirens and the sound level to which bystanders might be exposed, one can draw an analogy between the sound emanating from the horn of a siren and the light from a flashlight. A flashlight produces a focused beam of

-light. Some light is shed to the side of this beam but the amount is less than that within the beam. Similarly, the sound from the horn of a siren is focused into a beam and

'less sound is radiated to the sides of the beam. App. Dir.

post Ir. 75 at 5-6.

18. Sirens are normally rated in terms of the maximum sound levels observed in the focused beam of sound, at 100 l

_ _ _ _ - _ _________-_____________D

m. .

l

' feet' from'the siren.

Hence, in the case of the VANS siren, it is rated at 134 dBC at 100 feet in the main bqaE.

However, because the siren is elevated above the ground, the sound level to which bystanders might be exposed is generally less than the rated sound output of the siren, just like the light received from a flashlight would be less than in its main beam if the flashlight shined over their heads. App.

Dir. post Tr. 75 at 6.

19. In this regard it should be noted that there are several nuclear power plant EPZ's in the country where such high-power sirens are used to alert the public. For example, FEMA and the NRC have approved the use of ACA Penetrator-50 sirens at Clinton Power Station. FEMA accepted the ACA Penetrator-50 siren as being correctly rated at an output of 132 dBC at 100 feet from the siren. App. Dir cost II. 75 at 6.

20. Assuming that a VANS vehicle is able to get to its acoustical location, and raise the siren to its full 51-foot height, and assuming that there is no account taken of reflection of sound from buildings, it is undisputed that no member of the public will be subjected to a sound pressure level greater than 123 dBC. App. Dir. post Ir. 75 at 6-14.

21. NUREG-0654, which is the definitive guidance document in this area, states that:

"The maximum sound levels received by any member of the public should be lower than 123 dB, the level which may cause

i-

! discomfort to individuals." NUREG-0654,

. App. 3 at 3-8.

22. Applicants have addressed the situation, thought i conceivable at the time the contention was admitted, where the onset of a site area emergency (SAE) or general emergency (GE) was not preceded by an alert, and therefore, in order to meet notification criteria, the sirens might have to be initially sounded at a height as low as 25 feet above the ground. App. Dir. oost II. 75 at 15; II. 88.

23. In such a hypothetical case, the maximum sound exposure will be for someone who is standing on the ground l under the siren axis and located about 90 feet from the base 1

of-the siren. A person at this location could be initially exposed to 131 dSC as the siren rotates past their position.

By the time the siren has rotated back to that starting position the siren will have elevated to approximately 45 feet. With the siren at 45 feet a person at 90 feet will then be exposed to a sound pressure level of approximately 123 dBC. During the next oscillation and for all subsequent oscillations the siren will have risen to over 45 feet and the person at 90 feet will be exposed to a sound pressure level of approximately 120 dBC. App. Dir. post Ir. 75 at 15-16 & Attach. H.

24. This exposure to sound pressure levels above 123 dBC would occur for less than four seconds. App. Dir cost II. 75 at 16.

4

25. Exposure to this sound pressure level for this short period of time will not cause permanent hearing damage nor result in temporary hearing loss. LBP-89-09 at 29.

26. The 123 dBC figure for discomfort set forth in-NUREG-0654, Revision 1, is the same as the 123 dB limit recommended to avoid hearing damage in FEMA publication CPG 1-17 and the National Academy of Sciences. FEMA Guidance Memorandum #13. It is reasonable to conclude that the selection of the precise value of 123 dBC was a deliberate decision by the authors of NUREG-0654 to use that number specified in CPG 1-17. This is reasonable especially in light.of the conspicuous and numerous references to CPG 1-17 throughout Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654.

~

App. Dir. cost II. 75 at-12-13 and Attach. I.

27. Applicants' witness, David Keast, who is the author of CPG 1-17, derived the 123 dB limit "to assure that no person is likely to be subject to a sound level great enough to cause hearing damage" (CPG 1-17 at p. 8). The background document to CPG 1-17, BBN Report No. 4100, which Keast also prepared (also cited on pp. 3-8 of NUREG-0654), points out that the 123 dB limit was chosen from Figure 3 of a paper by Applicants' witness Karl.D. Kryter, " Hazardous Exposure to Intermittent and Steady - State Noise", Report of Working Group (WG) - 4 6, National Academy of Science - National Research Council (NAS-NRC), Committee on Hearing, Bioacoustics, and Biomechanics (CHABA), January, 1965

(referred to hereinafter as the "Kryter WG-46 Report"). This 123 dB limit applies to a daily exposure, over a 10-year period, to a 1000Hz tone for i 1/2 minutes or less. It is clear from Figure 3 in the Kryter WG-46 Report, copied as Figure 4.3 in BBN Report 4100, that the 123 dB limit is conservative for sirens operating at frequencies below 1000 Hz. For example, the 123 dBC value is at a frequency of 1000 Hz on the 1 1/2 minute contour of Figure 3. For the VANS frequency of 550 Hz, the corresponding value is 127 dBC.

App. Hir. post II. 75 at 13.

28. In addition to sound frequency, and frequency of exposure, the time duration of exposure to sound is important in establishing limits'for sound levels. The most appropriate means now available for the purpose of objectively setting upper limits of exposure and discomfort to siren signals is to use the 123 dB in NUREG-0654 as a reference for exposure and to compute a comparative exposure for the reference source and a proposed siren system. App.

Dir. post II. 75 at 13-14.

29. Exposure of the ear to loud sounds can fatigue the sensory receptors in the ear, causing some temporary loss or shift in the ability of the ear to detect very weak sounds.

Auditory fatigue can be used as a measure of " discomfort" for hearing sensitivity. Temporary shift in hearing sensitivity is jointly determined by the frequency, intensity and duration of a sound. Doubling the amount of time during a

q

'~

day when a given sound is present will, to a first approximation, have the same effect on temporary threshold shift (TTS) as will increasing by 6 dB the intensity of the signal but keeping the duration the same. These shifts in hearing sensitivity are measured by the increase in intensity required to make audiometer test tones barely audible in the absolute quiet after, as compared to before, exposure to an intense sound of sufficient duration to cause a threshold shift. If sufficiently large and often repeated (from near daily exposures over years), temporary threshold shifts can become permanent losses in hearing sensitivity. For this reason, the " discomfort" effect on the threshold of hearing sensitivity was the fundamental criterion behind CPG 1-17, the apparent source for NUREG-0654. App. Dir. Dost II. 75 at 8-9.

30. Possible adverse effects of the warning-alert signal upon the ear can be estimated from the results of studies in which people were exposed, under laboratory conditions, to a wide variety of sounds and noise of different spectra, intensities, durations and temporal patterns. It was standard practice in most studies of these phenomena to express the described amount of threshold shift, if any, that remains two minutes after cessation of the exposure condition. This is called TTS2. App. Dir. post II.

75 at 9-10.

31. A comparison can be made using the Temporary Threshold Shift (TTS) method between the reference expressed in NUREG-0654 and the VANS siren system as follows:

Reference VANS i

Maximum sound level received: Maximum Sound Level Received:

123'dBC 131 dBC**

Frequency: 1000 Hz 550 Hz Non-Rotating Rotating 2.5 times per min.

Duration of Sound: 3.0/1.5 min.* 3 min.

TTS2 3.0 minutes: 18 dB TTS2: 3 to 4 dB (Negligible)

TTS2 1.5 minutes: 12-dB

• 3 minute duration per NUREG-0654.

1 1/2 minute duration per BBN-4100

• • For a siren at a height of 20 feet above listener 90 feet from base of siren and the sirens rated at 134 dBC at 100 feet.

App. D.ir. cost T.E. 75 at 14.

32. ~ The TTS2 for the average listener from an exposure to the reference system would be about 18 dB for a 3-minute duration and 12 dB for a 1 1/2 minute duration. These amounts of temporary threshold shift would last for only a l' brief period (43 minutes for a 3 minute duration and 12 minutes for a 1 1/2 minute duration). There would be negligible TTS2 effects expected from exposure to the VANS.

App. p.ir. post II. 75 at 14-15.

33. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the brief exposure of four seconds or less to a sound pressure level of l

c.

'131'dBC from a' rotating siren which could hypothetically occur is far less harmful or discomforting to the public than would be the continuous exposure to a 123 dBC siren tone for 3-5 minutes as permitted by the suggested guidance of NUREG-0654. App. Dir. post. II. 75 at 16.

34. Staff witness Eldred concurs in the view that such a brief exposure to sound pressure levels of the order here involved would cause no harm to the receptor. Eldred Dir.

Dost II. 310 at 8.

35. Finally, it is to be noted that improvements in the design.made to the VANS system's hydraulics now make it unnecessary for the sirens ever to be sounded at a height of

-less than the full 51 feet. Agg. Dir. post II. 75 at 19-19A.

36. There appears to be no difference of opinion between the Applicants' and Staff's witnesses and those of MAG with respect to measurements. That is to say, it is undisputed that assuming the sirens sound at 50 feet or higher, and assuming that one ignores reflection from buildings, MAG's witnesses agree that no member of the public wil1~be exposed to sound level pressures in excess of 123 dBC.

37. It is the position of MAG that 123 dBC which is described in NUREG-0654 as "the level which may cause discomfort to individuals" is to be read as a regulatory limit and that in the absence of a demonstration that a siren

c-system will never cause any member of the public to be subjected to a sound level pressure of more than 123 dBC, the siren system is not in compliance with the regulations and must'be rejected. It is on this theory that MAG's case was structured'and in support of which MAG's witnesses testified.

38. MAG's witnesses testified, first, that 123 dBC "is F

already on the high' side of discomfort for most individuals."

E Hir. post II. 454 at 8.

39. This conclusion of the MAG witness panel was based almost entirely on a study conducted by Silverman, 31 al.,

" Tolerance for Pure Tone and for Speech in Normal and Hard-of-Hearing Ears," (St. Louis: Central Institute for the Deaf, OSRD Report 6303, 1946). E Dir post Ir. 454.at 5.

40. This study, App. Ex. 12A, involved the playing of tones to subjects through earphones and increasing the tone until the subject stated subjectively that he or she felt discomfort. Id. at 4-5, 12. The purpose of the study was to yield data which would be utilized in the design of hearing aids, and could guide procedures for the clinical selection of hearing aids. Id. at 1.

41. The overall experiment yielded a defined level of discomfort for the subjects with normal hearing of as low as 95 dBC. App. Ex. 12A at 31. In free field, it is accepted that the level of discomfort would be reached by any given person at an even lower level than in the experiment, II.

214', perhaps by as much as 5 dBC, Ir. 214.

I

42. The level of discomfort defined in Dr. Silverman's experiment was subjective, App. Ex. 12A at 4, 14, 92, as agreed to by MAG's own witnesses, II. 485-86; II. 488-91.

43. It is clear than, as stated by MAG's own experts, II. 493-98,the 123 dBC level referred to in NUREG-0645 is simply not the lowest level "which may cause discomfort to individuals." NUREG-0634, App. 3 at 3-8.

44. Indeed, Applicants' witness Keast who is the author of the study from which the 123 dBC figure was derived stated unequivocally that he viewed the figure as one it was safe to say would not cause hearing damage, and that it was derived in order to provide guidance for local fire departments on the installation of sirens. II. 266-69.

45. It has been held on numerous occasions that NUREG-0654 is not a regulation, but merely guidance. E.g, Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1) , ALAB-698, 16 NRC 1290, 1298-99 (1982).

And Regulatory Guidance is always subject to attack in licensing proceedings. E.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-179, 7 AEC 174 (1974); Gulf States Utilities Cox (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 772 (1977).

46. Thus, if it be that the statement in NUREG-0654 discussed above is to be read as stating that 123 dBC is the lowest level at which any member of the public will experience discomfort, the Board finds that this statement is

factually insupportable as a matter of law and therefore we hold that 123 dBC cannot be read as an absolute limit which must be adhered to by the Applicants in all cases for all members of the public.

47. Without attempting to decide what the exact limit should be for all emergency warning systems at all nuclear power plants, the Board is able to. find that the sirens in this particular case,;which, according to all experts who testified cannot possibly cause any permanent or temporary hearing damage, and which will not exceed even the 123 dBC limit except in extremely unlikely situations is adequate and

-incompliance with the Commission Regulations.

48. Prescinding from the above, MAG witnesses argue that in any event the sound levels derived by the Applicants must be increased to account for reflection from buildings, MAG Dir. post II. 454 at 10-13. After doing so, and demonstrating that if one adds up to 6 dBC, a hypothetical person, standing in the exactly right space could receive as much as.137 dBC from a siren at a twenty-five foot height, Mhg Dir. post Tr. 454 at 12, and 128 dBC from a siren at a 50-foot height, Id.

49. MAG's witnesses then go on to state that absent a program to tailor the coverage in light of the buildings in the area, which they believe to be difficult, if not impossible, the only solution is to reduce the sound levels for the VANS sirens to 123 dBC in the sound axis at 100 feet.

L' MAG Dir post II. 454 at 13. This, of course would have the L effect of reducing the sound coverage to unacceptable levels.

MA2 Dir Post II. 454 at 13, as Applicants concede, II. 206-07.

50. To begin with, even accepting MAG's view, it is not necessary to reduce the rating of the sirens all the way to 123 dBC in order to meet the requirements of NUREG-0654 as MAG would interpret them. The sirens will be 51 feet in the air. They are rated now at 134 dBC. Reducing that number by MAG's 6 dBC gives 128 dBC which presumably would then assure that no one received 123 dBC.

51. As to building reflection, Applicants agree that there is a possibility of a member of the public, while standing in certain positions close to a building, to hear simultaneously the VANS siren sdund and also some sound reflected from the building. This reflected sound could, under exceptional conditions, cause a person to hear an increased siren sound level. In reality, atmospheric effects such as wind, temperature gradients, turbulence, and diffraction of signals around the human head will reduce the theoretical effects of constructive interference of reflected-sound waves received by a listener standing close to a large

-structure. The actual effect of reflection will depend upon

'(1) the siren height in relation to both structure and listener, (2) the angle of incidence of the sound at the structure and at the listener, (3) the relative distances 2-___________-_- _ - _ _ _ _ _ .

h.- ,  !

.4

- between siren, structure and listener, (4) the directivity of

. the sireniand (5) the reflective properties of the surface of the structure. Theoretically, if a listener has his head positioned at certain locations near a building surface, he could experience en increase in sound pressure level of up to 6 dB. This theoretical increase in sound level diminishes to zero as the listener moves away from the structure and atmospheric effects impact the sound dispersion. App. Dir.

post II. 75 at 16-17. Egg also Tr. 189-200.

52. From a planning standpoint, this theoretical increase in sound pressure level is of very limited concern because of the limited area potentially affected and the remote probability of a person being at the precise position with the. precise conditions at the precise time necessary-to

- cause this affect. App. Dir. post II. 75 at 17.

53. Furthermore, as pointed out by Staff witness Eldred,' the convention appears to be in setting regulatory noise levels, to ignore sound reflection from structures, Eldred Dir. oost II. 310 at 9-11, and see Tr. 273, and it can be. presumed that to the extent that the 123 dBC figure in NUREG-0654 is to be deemed a regulatory level, it also is intended to be utilized without reference to sound reflection from structures.

54. Finally, for the reasons set out earlier, it is established beyond doubt in this record that, even assuming sound levels as high as 131 dBC or even 137 dBC were received j

g- ,

E by some hypothetical member of the public, no permanent or

'~ '

even temporary damage to hearing would result given the l:'act that we are dealing here with rotating sirens. II. 210; Tr. 264-65; Ir. 409; II. 429; Ir. 502..

55. Based upon all of the foregoing, The Board finds s

that the siren system is adequate and in compliance with Commission Regulations.

56. We turn now to the issue of whether the VANS system satisfies the so-called "15 minute design objective" for alerting and notifying the public.

57. As described in App. Ex.-11B, the duration of the

VANS alerting function can be determined by summing the time

(-

to alert the operators (alert time), the time to dispatch the vehicles from the staging areas (dispatch time), the timtt to travel from the staging areas to the acoustic locations (transit' time), the time to raise the sirens at the acoustic locations (setup time), and the time to provide the alerting signal (siren activation time). App. Dir. post Ir. 75 at 19B.

58. This Board has already decided that there is no issue of fact to be tried with respect to the alert time, the

.transit time, the setup time, or the siren sounding time.

LBP-89-09 at 25.

59. As to dispatch times: A number of actions have l been taken to assure that VANS operators (i.e., the drivers) f will be alert at the time the VANS staging areas are notified to promptly dispatch vehicles. These actions include setting of staffing policies, the training of VANS operators and advance warning of operators at a lower emergency classification. App. Dir. post II. 75 at 20-21.

60. This Board has already found that procedural requirements are in place to ensure vehicle readiness. LBP-89-09 at 25.

61. In order to ensure a prompt response by the VANS operators to a notification to dispatch vehicles, each driver is trained and qualified prior to assuming the role of a VANS operator. Each of.the operators will be trained in the proper implementation of the applicable procedure, the proper use of communications equipment, emergency response equipment and the VANS. vehicle including auxiliary equipment. This training program also includes familiarizing the operators with each VANS staging area and each route between the staging area and the respective acoustic locations. Each VANS operator will be subjected to periodic training and L

annual're-qualification to this training program. App. Dir.

l l post Ir. 75 at 21.

62. In addition, the applicable procedure requires the VANS operator to perform established procedural steps when 1

I assuming his duty station at the staging area. These non-1 emergency (ongoing) actions required of each operator provide additional assurances that the operators will respond w-___---_____________ _

promptly to a notification to dispatch as trained, h22. Dir.

Post II. 75 at 21

63. The New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization (NHY ORO) maintains the 24-hour per day staffing f capability through continuous manning of the VANS staging areas. NHY maintains a total shift complement of one supervisor and twenty-four VANS operators. The primary VANS shift complement consists of the one supervisor and twenty VANS operators assigned as the primary drivers for the sixteen primary VANS vehicles. In addition to the sixteen primary vehicles and twenty drivers, there are four backup vehicles and four backup VANS operators located continuously at Seabrook Station. (There are two additional VANS vehicles which are assumed to be unavailable for maintenance and surveillance activities.) This shift complement of twenty primary drivers ensures that an adequate number of drivers will be available to relieve the "on duty" operators. This primary shift complement of twenty VANS operators and four backup VANS operators from the onsite shift complement also ensures that there is an adequate number of drivers to handle l

periodic route verification, rotating the VANS vehicles through vehicle and siren maintenance, surveillance testing every two weeks and normal routine administrative functions.

Thus, the sixteen primary VANS operators are not required to leave their duty station to perform any administrative l

functions. In addition, the applicable procedure also 1

l l

i lI indicates that the on-shift primary VANS operator remains on duty until relieved by the incoming VANS operator. App. Dir.

post II. 75 at 21-22.

64. Thus, staffing policies ensure the ability to respond promptly and the availability of adequate numbers of trained operators to relieve on-duty operators. On-shift functions do not require the operators at staging areas to leave their duty station. Operators are not, per procedure, to leave their staging area duty station until relieved.

BEE. Dir. oost Ir. 75 at 22-23,

65. The multiple VANS operators at each Staging Area provide that, in the event that an operator is momentarily indisposed, a prioritized dispatch will occur. This form of dispatch will effectively prioritize the sequence for sending the first VANS vehicles dispatched to the furthest acoustic location. Each of the staging areas has a minimum of one corresponding acoustic location where a VANS vehicle can be completely deployed in an average of 7 minutes or less, which provides a 5-minute margin in the event that a driver is momentarily indisposed. In the situation where the ratellite staging area is manned on sumner weekends and holidays, VL-01 and VL-15 (VANS vehicles normally at the same staging area) have approximately a 7-minute margin to account for an operator being momentarily indisposed. App. Dir. post Ir. 75 at 23.

L.

66. Actions are taken to provide an advance warning to VANS operators. The ORO Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Contact notifies the VANS Staging Areas and places the Operators on standby status at an UNUSUAL EVENT, the lowest emergency classification. This contact advises the VANS operators of a condition at Seabrook Station which, if it escalated, would require the dispatching of VANS vehicles.

At ALERT or higher emergency classifications, VANS vehicles are dispatched to the acoustic locations. App. Dir. oost II.

75 at 23-24.

67. The Vehicular Alert and Communication System (VACS) also assures prompt vehicle dispatching by the VANS operators. Upon activation by the ORO EOC Contact, the VACS automatically sounds audible alarms and activates visual alarms (i.e., flashing strobe-type lights) at the staging area. This combined auditory and visual alarm notifies the operator that an emergency condition exists at Seabrook Station requiring the prompt dispatch of a VANS vehicle. In the event of a false alarm, the VANS vehicles will dispatch  ;

as if responding to a real activation signal. Through VANS operator radio communication with the EOC Contact the false l alarm condition would result in VANS vehicle recall. In addition to the alarming function, upon activation VACS automatically opens overhead doors at those staging areas where vehicles are stored indoors. Ann. Dir. oost II. 75 at

) I 24.

l L f

68. The VACS will be regularly maintained and l periodically tested. In the unlikely event of VACS failure, the EOC Contact would revert to a simultaneous radio notification to the VANS staging areas. If the radio also fails, the EOC Contact would dispatch the VANS using the telephone system. App. Dir, post II. 75 at 24.

69. During the graded exercise the back-up radio system was in fact used. Communication of the necessary information took place in the order of one minute. II. 121.

70. NHY selected a one-minute alert and dispatch design based on input from emergency response personnel. A testing program was conducted to validate the design basis and to establish reasonable bounding time estimates of how long it would take to dispatch VANS vehicles from a staging area.

Since each staging area will have a unique set of operating characteristics (e.g., indoor versus outdoor vehicle storage, etc.) test' conditions were chosen which would be representative of staging area conditions in general (i.e.,

indoor storage, vehicles located 100 feet from duty station).

App. Dir. post II. 75 at 24-25.

71. In addition, other test conditions, such as requiring the operator to walk to the vehicle after being mobilized and having two separate operators for the testing program, assure that the testing program results would be reasonable boundina time estimates. Other conservatism in the testing program result from the performance of certain

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actions by the operator during the testing programs which will be performed by 71ACS, such as opening of overhead doors and acknowledging the telephone communication to mobilize.

Given the inherent conservatism in the testing program, the design basis time is b/mnding and appropriate. App. Dir.

post II. 75 at 25.

72. Applicants presented uncontroverted testimony to the effect that:

- Only three of the seven VANS trucks which provide coverage to areas within 5 miles could have estimated travel times, due to winter adverse road conditions, which exceed 10 minutes using a speed reduction estimate of 25 percent.

- One of these three does not provide the sole coverage of an area during the winter.

- The VANS trucks should move through snow more effectively during adverse winter road conditions than do passenger vehicles.

- Actual tests have shown that VANS transit times to these three locations during severe winter adverse weather should not materially exceed 10 minutes. App. Dir. post II.

75 at 25-30.

73. The 25% speed reduction as a planning basis represents the use of a figure which has a reasonable expectation of occuring rather than an extreme condition.

Ir. 125-26, 260. Data from Portland, Maine, shows that over an eight year period on only 21 days was there snowfall which

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' caused traffic speed reductions in excess of 25%. II. 245-46.

, 74. With respect to the issue of informational' messages, there is at the outset a question of law to be decided. MAG believes that the guidance and regulations should be read as requiring =that within fifteen minutes, the PANS must first, sound a three-minute warning, and complete thereafter a full playing of the appropriate ~EBS message.

75. In essence it is the argument of MAG that notification is not " essentially complete," 10 CFR 50, App. E IV.D(3), until the public-has not only heard the siren, but-also heard a complete EBS message.

76. In addition, MAG points to the language in NUREG-0654 which sets forth as onelof the " minimum acceptable design objectives for coverage by (a siren] system" as:

" capability for providing both an alert signal and an informationalyor instructional message to the population on an area wide basis-throughout the 10 mile EPZ, within 15 minutes." 'NUREG-0654, App. 3, at 3-3.

77. As set forth below, Applicants intend to activate the EBS messages concurrently and coincidentally with the commencement of the siren tones. It is conceded that, assuming certain messages that are prescripted are in fact used, there would not be time, with respect to certain of the acoustical locations, assuming an immediate general emergency, to complete the three-minute warning tone and thereafter play a complete version of the EBS message before

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the expiration of the 15-minute window contemplated by the regulations.

78. This, claims MAG, means that the system does not comply with the regulations and guidance. Applicants, naturally disagree.

79. However, Applicants begin by pointing out that NUREG-0654, Appendix 3 states:

A prompt notification scheme shall include thecapability of local and State agencies to provide information promptly over radio and TV at the time of activation of the alertina sianal."

(Emphasis added.)

App. J2ir, post Tr. 75 at 30.

80. FEMA Guidance Memorandum AN-1, FEMA Action to Oualify Alert and Notification Systems Acainst NUREG-0654/ FEMA- REP-1 and FEMA-REP-10 provides the following guidance and suggestions for evaluating and confirming compliance with design objectives:

"In confirming that the alert and notification system time requirements are satisfied, the evaluator should begin timing from the point at which the pecision to activate the alert and notification system is made. Within 15 cr 45 (if applicable) minutes of this decision by offsite officials, the alert signal must be activated and an instructional message must be 2D_tha Air."

81. Applicants also point out, that, as testified to by Staff Witness Kantor, NRC does not purport to regulate, nor L

can NRC regulate the length or brevity of the EBS message which a State-elects to use in a situation where a State is cooperating,'nor does NRC purport to regulate the length-of the EBS messages which are used in a utility plan. II. 415-

17. 'Moreover, it is conceded that in a given situation, a l

Governor may authorize only a new, never before seen or timed EBS messageLto be given. Tr. 415. This being the case it is difficult to see how NRC would require that the EBS message be completed in full once before expiration of the 15-minute window when NRC does not purport to write, edit, regulate, compose or otherwise have a hand in the message that is used.

82. These facts along with the langauge from NUREG-0654 relied upon by Applicants and the above-quoted language from the FEMA guidance ~ memorandum lead to an interpretation of the-regulation _and other guidance langauge to the effect that simultaneous playing of an EBS message along with the sounding of-the sirens satisfies the regulations so long as a three-minute siren alert precedes the termination of the "about 15 minutes" window. The Board so rules.

83. In light of the foregoing legal ruling, there is little doubt the Applicants' PANS satisfies the regulations with respect to prompt alerting of the public.

84. The utility-sponsored SanbrocP. Plan for Massachusetts Communities (SPMC) vhich is the eme.rgency response plan applicable to the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook EPZ, has procedures which provide that the informational message will be transmitted over EBS

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. concurrently with the alerting signal. App. Dir. post II. 75 at 30 and Attach. E. See also II. 115-36.

85. The EOC Contact or Communication Coordinator begins the siren activation upon hearing the EBS broadcast. The initial message is played three times and subsequently repeated at 15-minute intervals. Subsequent changes in protective action recommendations are implemented in the same manner. App. Dir. oost II. 75 at 30-31.

86. For events requiring immediate protective action recommendations, the NHY ORO maintains prerecorded informational messages at each EBS station, which ensures that the requirements of the applicable procedures can be met. The prerecorded messages were timed to determine the length of tiae necessary to deliver the mescage. Each message has an approximate duration of slightly in excess of 2 minutes with a maximum of 2 minutes and 38.5 seconds.

Ir. 285. EBS messages are preceded by a 55 second period wherein persons are advised that "this is not a drill," the areas affected, and a tone is broadcast. Specifically scripted informational messages may contain additional information that could slightly extend the time necessary to deliver the message; however, these messages would not be used for events requiring immediate protective action recommendations. App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 31. , .

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87. As to the total time to perform alert and notification, Applicants testified that the most limiting m_________________m.______________--_

-9 vehicle location which is needed to provide coverage to the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ within five miles of j Seabrook is VL-1; the time to complete the alerting signal on a day without snow is approximately 13 minutes and 37 seconds; for a day where roads are icy, the time is expected to be 15 minutes and 13 seconds, which falls within the parameter of "about 15 minutes." App. Dir. post Tr. 75 at 32-33.

88. In all circumstances, the NHY PANS meets the 15-minute design objective.of providing an alerting signal and informational message in about 15 minutes. Moreover, it further accounts for practical considerations by initial serial repetitions of the message followed thereafter every 15 minutes. The most constraining scenario, involving the unlikely need for immediate protective actions, is satisfied by the PANS. In the more probable situation of an escalating emergency, the VANS are in their deployed condition effectively acting as a fixed pole siren system long before siren activation is actually required and thereby eliminating any considerations, beyond the actual 3-minute siren alerting signal and informational message, for satisfying the 15-L I minute design objective. App. Dir, post II. 75 at 33-34.

89. The Staff's expert concurs in the Applicants' view that the VANS system is an adequate means of satisfying applicable Commission regulations requiring the ability to l

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promptly alert and notify the public of a radiological emergency. Kantor Qir, pgst II. 310, cassim.

90. Again, MAG does not directly controvert any of the testimony or data offered by the Applicants with resp (ct to the notification tirda issues. Rather MAG begins.by taking the position that the boredomiof the job of being a VANS driver will result in inattention to the job, absenteeism, leaving the station unmanned and a number of other difficulties. MAG Hir. post II.~454 at 15-18.

91. The basis for much of the MAG position is a study done by.one P. Baken, "An Analysis of retrospective Reports Following an Auditory Vigilance Task," Vicilance: A Synoosium, ed. D.N. Buckner, J.J. McGrath (1963). MAG Dir.

post II. 454 at 15-16.

92. This study was a study whereby a total of 100 Royal Air Force Recruits were seated for 48 minutes while a tape recording recited digits to them at the rate of one digit per second; the recruits were required to detect and write down the digits whenever they heard three odd digits in a row, all of the digits being different. II. 511-12.

93. Not surprisingly, the study found that the ability of the recruits, on average, to continue to detect the odd three consecutive nonrepetitivo digits decreased with tine.

II. 513.

94. The relevance of this type of study to the problem at hand is marginal at best. Here a VANS operator, no matter l

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how inattentive, will be subjected to an alarm of horns and lights, II. 100, which mean only one thing; that he should get in a truck and drive to a preset. location. There is

- nothing repetitive about this. Indeed, MAG's witness admitted that if the drivers were, in fact, at their posts,

.th ey would likely respond. II. 517. She testified that there was no doubt in her mind that the VANS operators would respond in the case of a large accident. Ir. 520.

95. MAG's witnesses testified that they doubted that the rule that VANS operators were not to leave their post until relieved would be followed because studies (uncited) have shown the "only if there are recognized negative consequences of breaking that rule will it be honored." MAG Dir. Post Tr. 454 at 18.

96. There will be periodic drills, and people will be fired if the post is not manned; presumably this will be recognized by all hands as a " negative consequence." II.

523.

97. And MAG's witness, herself, indicated that if the VAN's drivers were given something else to do with their

" dead" time that was not trivial, they would be motivated not to leave their posts. II. 527-28.

L 98. Applicants concede that it is conceivable that on some day,.some VANS operator may be absent from his post; that no one would notice it and call it in; and that if the alarm sounded it would be necessary to go to the back-up .

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drivers which could result in an acoustical location being manned later than expected. Tr. 121. Applicants take the position that this is unlikely, and the Board agrees.

99. MAG's final attack on the VANS system is testibony to the effect that some people may not hear the sirens, may not react.as anticipated when they do, may panic, and thus not turn on their radio, and other suggestions that human behavior factors will result in some people not being notified and alerted within "about 15 minutes." MAG Dir.

post Tr. 454 at 21-24 100. The evidence which MAG adduced on this latter point came from a witness who relied for the most part on a study which showed that decision-making ability was compromised by time pressure. The study involved subjects who were give two tasks of picking the best household appliance (in one case, refrigerators, and in the other case, evens) and were given different periods of time to do so (15 seconds, 30 seconds, and two minutes) ; not surprisingly, even after training in decision-making analysis techniques, the evidence was that those with the lowest amount of time made the worst decisions. II. 537-39.

101. It is difficult to see the relevance of such a study to the matter at hand, and the MAG witness admitted that six other studies which he mentioned but did not actually cite were also defective, Tr. 547, and as absurd as the one he did cite, Tr. 540.

102. Prescinding from the fact that the Board has its doubts, as expressed above, with respect to MAG's theory, the l short answer to this entire line of evidence is found in the regulations and guidance. The requirement in the regulations is that the PANS have the capability to provide an alerting signal and informational message to the public in the EPZ in about 15 minutes. The PANS for the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook EPZ clearly has such capability as set forth above.

103. The notification and alerting process is to be carried out by means fully recognized as adequate by the guidance, i.e., sirens and emergency broadcast messages.

NUREG-0654 App 3 at 3 3-15.

104. The Board finds and rules that the PANS for the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook Station EPZ meets the requirements of the Commission's regulations and that there exists reasonable assurance that the persons located in the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook EPZ will be essentially notified of a radio]ogical emergency at Seabrook Station within about 15 minutes of the time that cogni: ant officials

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of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts decide to make such notification.

Respectfully submitted, 4

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'7f Thomas G. Digiian, Jr.

Kathryn A. Selleck Jay Bradford Smith Ropes & Gray One International Place Boston, MA 02110-2624 (617) 951-7000 Counsel for Applicants 5

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 20 db ~

I, Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., one of the attorneys (forLthe.. M Applicants herein, hereby certify that on May 30, 19B91i'I;pader service of the within document by depositing copies thers6f'with Federal Express, prepaid, for delivery to (or, where indicated, by depositing in the United States mail, first class postage paid, addressed to):

Administrative Judge Ivan W. Smith Administrative Judge Peter B.

Chairman, Atomic Safety and Bloch, Chairman, Atomic Licensing Board Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission East West Towers Building East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814 Administrative Judge Richard F. Cole Dr. Jerry Harbour Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission Board East West Towers Building U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 4350 East West Highway Commission Bethesda, MD 20814 East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Administrative Judge Kenneth A. Administrative Judge Emmeth A.

McCollom Luebke i 1107 West Knapp Street 4515 Willard Avenue Stillwater, OK 74075 Chevy Chase, MD 20815 Robert R. Pierce, Esquire Adjudicatory File Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Board Panel Docket (2 copies)

U.S. Huclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission .

East Went Towers Building East West Towers Building  !

4350 East West Highway 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20314 Bethesda, MD 20814

! John P. Arnold, Esquire Diane Curran, Esquire Attorney General Andrea C. Ferster, Esquire George Dana Bisbee, Esquire Harmon, Curran & Tousley Assistant Attorney General Suite 430 Office of the Attorney General 2001 S Street, N.W.

25 Capitol Street Washington, DC 20009 Concord, NH 03301-6397

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• Atomic Safety and Licensing Robert A. Backus, Esquire Appeal: Board .

116 Lowell Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory P. O. Box 516 Commission Manchester, NH 03105 Washington, DC 20555 Philip Ahrens, Esquire Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of General Counsel' Department of the Attorney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory General Commission Augusta, ME 04333 One White Flint North, 15th F1.  ;

11555 Rockville Pike i Rockville, MD 20852

' Paul McEachern, Esquire John Traficonte, Esquire Shaines & McEachern Assistant Attorney General 25 Maplewood Avenue Department of the Attorney P.O. Box 360 General Portsmouth, NH 03801 One Ashburton Place, 19th Fl.

Boston, MA 02108 Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Mr. Calvin A. Canney Chairman, Board of Selectmen City Manager RFD'1 - Box 1154 City Hall Route 107 126 Daniel Street Kensington, NH 03827 Portsmouth, NH 03801

• Senator Gordon J. Humphrey R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esquire U.S. Senate Lagoulis, Hill-Whilton &

Washington, DC 20510 Rotondi (Attn: Tom Burack) 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950

• Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Leonard Kopelman, Esquire One Eagle Square, Suite 507 Kopelnan & Paige, P.C.

Concord, NH 03301 77 Franklin Street (Attn: Herb Boynton) Boston, MA 02110 Mr. Thomas F. Powers, III Mr. William S. Lerd Town Manager Board of Selectman  !

l Town of Exeter Town Hall - Friend Street 10 Front Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Exeter, NH 03833 H. Joseph Flynn, Esquire Charles P. Graham, Eaquire office of General Counsel Murphy and Graham Federal Emergency Management 33 Low Street Agency Newburyport, MA 01950 500 C Street, S.W.

Washington, DC 20472 1 l

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Gary W._Hdlmes, Esquire Richard A.'Hampe,. Esquire Holmes & Ells Hampe andMcNicholas-47 Winnacunnet Road. 35 Pleasant Street Hampton,'.NH 03842 Concord, NH 03301 Mr., Richard R. Donovan ' Judith H. Mizner, Esquire-Federal Emergency Management 79 State Street, 2nd Floor.

' Agency .

Newburyport, MA~.01950 i

' Federal-Regional Center 130 228th' Street, S.W.

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. Bothell,. Washington 98021-9796 ,

Ashod:N. Amirian, Esquire '

145' South Main Street-P.O. Box.38 Bradford, MA'. 01835 Mr. J. P. Nadeau Selectmen's Office'  ;

10 Central Road Rye, NH 03870'  ;

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,=y - Wf i Thomas ' G.. Digtfi! n, Jr.

(*= Ordinary U.S. First Class-Mail)

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