ML20154Q706

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Amend 114 to License NPF-1,revising Tech Specs to Clarify Existing Operability & Surveillance Requirements & to Add New Requirements or to Correct Errors Already Identified
ML20154Q706
Person / Time
Site: Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date: 03/12/1986
From: Varga S
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20154Q698 List:
References
NUDOCS 8603210263
Download: ML20154Q706 (20)


Text

. ..A d 'e UNITED STATES

'8 1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

j wAsmNGTON. D. C. 20555

%,*...+/

PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY THE CITY OF EUGENE, OREGON PACIFIC POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-344 TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT '

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.ll4 License No. NPF-1

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Portland General Electric Company, et al., (the licensee) dated March 12, 1985, complies with the staIIdards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C. There is reasor.able assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

l 8603210263 860312 PDR ADOCK 05000344 1 P PDR

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technicil Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating Licente No. NPF-1 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 114, are hereby '

incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifica-tions, except where otherwise stated in specific license conditions.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I \ (LLd, -

s dteveh A. Varg'&, Director L'd PWR Project Directorate No. 3 Division of PWR Licensing-A

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: March 12, 1986 i

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. J8L ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.II4 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-1 DOCKET NO. 50-344 Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages Insert Pages 2-6 2-6 3/4 1-15 3/4 1-15 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-16 3/4 1-20 3/4 1-20 3/4 2-2 3/4 2-2 '

3/4 4-2e 3/4 4-2e 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-4 3/4 7-14 3/4 7-14 3/4 7-16 3/4 7-16 B 3/4 1-1 B 3/4 1-1 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-4 B 3/4 1-4 B 3/4 2-2 B 3/4 2-2 B 3/4 4-2 B 3/4 4-2 '

B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 6-3 6-3 l

/

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g TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued) o -

y REACTOR TRIP SYSTEN INSTRUNENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

$i M FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWA8LE VALUES

13. Steam Generator Water 2 5% of narrow range instrument 14% of narrow range instruntent Level - Low-Low span - each steam generator span - each steam generator
14. Steam /Feedwater Flow $ 40% of full steam flow at S 42.5% of full steam flow at Mismatch and Low Steam RATED THERMAL POWER coincident RATED THERMAL POWER coincident Generator Water Level with steam generator water level with steam generator water level 2 25% of narrow range instrument 2 24% of narrow range instrument span - each steam generator span - each steam generator
15. Undervoltage - Reactor 1 68% each bus (8.48 kv) 1 67% each bus (8.35 kv)

Coolant Pumps l m 16. Underfrequency - Reactor 1 57.5 Hz - each bus 1 57.4 Hz - each bus En Coolant Pumps

17. Turbine Trip A. Low Trip System 2 800 psig 2 700 psig Pressure
8. Turbine Stop Valve 1 1% open 1 1% open Closure 1

{ 18. Safety Injection Input Not Applicable Not Applicable.

g from ESF R Reactor Coolant Pump Not Applicable Not Applicable a 19.

Breaker Position Trip

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REACTIVITY CONTROLS SYSTENS BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTOOWN LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.7 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be I

OPERABLE:

a. A boric acid storage system with:
1. A minimum contained volume of 10,000 gallons,
2. Between 7,000 and 7,700 ppm of boron, and O. A minimum solution temperature of 65'F.
b. The refueling water storage tank with:
1. A minimum contained volume of 102,000 gallons,
2. Between 2,000 and 2,500 ppa of boron, and
3. A minimum solution temperature of 37'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 AND 6 ACTION With no borated water scurces OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water source is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i l

4.1.2.7 The above-required borated water source shall be demonstrated l OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:
1. Verifying the boron concentration of the water, i  !
2. Verifying the water level of the tank, and
3. Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside ambient air temperature is <37'F.

TROJAN-UNIT 1 3/4 1-15 Amendment No. 58, 95, 114 l

REACTIVITY CONTROLS SYSTENS BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.8 Each of the following borated water sources shall be OPERA 8LE:

a. A boric acid storage system with:
1. A minimum contained volume of 15,900 gallons, l
2. Between 7,000 and 7,700 ppe of boron, and
3. A minimum solution temperature of 65'F.
b. The refueling water storage tank with: ,
1. A minimum contained volume of 428,000 gallons of water,
2. Between 2000 and 2500 ppm of boron, and
3. A minimum solution temperature of 37'F.

APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:  ;

a. With the boric acid storage system inoperable, restore the storage system to OPERA 8LE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUT 00WN MARGIN equivalent to at least 15 Ak/k at 200*F; restore the boric acid storage system to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLO SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
b. With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERA 8LE status within one hour or be in at least HOT STAN08Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.1.2.8 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE:

l TROJAN-UNIT 1 3/4 1-16 Amendment No. 55,II4

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l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS POSITION INDICATOR CHANNELS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1. 3. 2 Control rod position indication system for control and shutdown l rods and the demand position indication system shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the control rod positions with 12 steps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

l ET_IR:

a. With a maximum of one rod position indicator per group inoperable l either:
1. Determine the position of the non-indicating rod (s) indirectly -

by the movable incore detectors at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and immediately after any motion of the non-indicating rod which exceeds 24 steps in one direction since the last determination of the rod's position, or ,

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER TO < 505 of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
b. With a maximum of one demand position indicator per bank inoperable either:
1. Verify that all rod position indicators for the affected bank are OPERABLE and that the most withdrawn rod and the least withdrawn rod of the bank are within a maximum of 12 steps of each other at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or
2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to < 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.2 Each rod position indicator shall be determined to be OPERA 8LE l by verifying the demand position indication system and the rod position

! indication system agree within 10 steps at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> except l during time intervals when the Rod Position Deviation Monitor is inoperable, then compare the demand position indication system and the rod position 1 indication system at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

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TROJAN-UNIT 1 3/4 1-20 Amendment No. 79, 114

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

b. THERMAL POWER shall not be increased above 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER unless the indicated AFD is within the 15% target band and ACTION 2.a)1), above has been satisfied.
c. THERMAL POWER shall not be increased above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER unless the indicated AFD has not been outside of the 15%

target band for more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> penalty deviation cumulative  :

during the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

4.2.1.1 The indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE shall be determined to be .

within its limits during POWER OPERATION above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER by- 1

a. Monitoring the indicated AFD for each OPERA 8LE excore channel:
1. At least once per 7 days when the AFD Monitor Alarm is i OPERA 8LE, and j
2. At least once per hour for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after restoring the AFD Monitor Alarm to OPERA 8LE status, i
b. Monitoring and logning the indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE for each.0PERABLE excore channel at least once per 30 minutes l when the AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE Monitor Alarm is inoperable. The logged values of the indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE shall be assumed to exist during the interval preceding each logging.

4.2.1.2 The indicated AFD shall be considered outside of its 155 target band wnen at least 2 of 4 or 2 of 3 OPERA 8LE excore channels are indicating the AFD to be outside the target band. POWER OPERATION outside of the 15%

target band shall be accumulated on a time basis of:

a. One minute penalty deviation for each one minute of POWER l

OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels equal to or above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and ,

b. One-half minute penalty deviation for each one minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels below 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

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TROJAN-UNIT 1 3/4 2-2 Amendment No. 114 l _ - -. . _ _ - _ _

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3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT St,STg 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS l NORMAL OPERATION i LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.4 A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the RCS cold leg temperatures 5 290*F unless:

a. Another reactor coolant pump is running, or
b. The secondary side temperature of each steam generator is less than 50*F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures

(!e, TSG < TC + 50*F), and overpressure protection systems are operable in accordance with Specification 3.4.9.3, or .

c. A bubble has been established in the pressurizer with a minimum v4por volume of 200 ft3 (895 pressurizer level).

APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 4 and 5.

ETlQN_:

If a reactor coolar.t pump is started and the above conditions are not met, i a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant

], to Specification 6.d.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the pump operatior..

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.4.1.4 Not applicable.

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114 TROJAN-UNIT 1 _

3/4 4-2e Amendment No. 75,

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, l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that the following valves 1 are in the indicated position with power to the operators removed:

Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position l a. MO 8806 a. RWST Isolation a. open*

b. MO 8812 b. RHR Suction a. open*
c. MO 8835 c. SIS Cold Leg Injection c. open*
d. MD 8802-A d. SIS Hot Leg Injection d. closed -

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e. M0 8802-8 e. SIS Hot Leg Injection e. closed,'
f. MO 8703 f. RHR Hot Leg Discharge f. closed'
g. MO 8809-A g. RHR Cold Leg Discharge g. open*
h. NO 8809-8 h. RHR Cold Leg Discharge h. open*
1. NO 8811-A 1. Recir. Sump, RHR Suction 1. closed *
j. MO 8811-8 j. Recir. Sump, RHR Suction j. closed *
k. MO 8813 k. SI Pump Mini-flow isolation k. open*
1. MO 8814 1. SI Pump Mini-flow isolation 1. open*
b. At least once'per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise socired in position is in its correct position.
c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:

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1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing containment integrity, and l
2. Of the areas affected within containment at the completion ,

of each containment entry when containment integrity is i established. j l

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  • Power to be restored and valves operated from within control room for switch from injection to recirculation mode following LOCA.

TROJAN-UNIT 1 3/4 5-4 Amendment No. N , 114 i

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PLANT SYSTEMS COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEN i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3.2 At least one component cooling water train capable of supplying cooling water to equipment needed in MODES 5 and 6 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With less than the required number of component cooling water trains OPERA 8LE, declare supported equipment inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.7.3.2 At least one component cooling water train shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE by verifying that necessary components (the portion necessary to support equipment which is required to be OPERA 8LE in the applicable MODES above) are OPERABLE when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5 i

TROJAN-UNIT 1 3/4 7-14 Amendment No. H , 114

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l PLANT SYSTEMS SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4.2 At least one service water train capable of supplying cooling water to equipment needed in MODES 5 and 6 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With less than the required number of service water trains OPERABLE, declare supported equipment inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4.2 At least one servce water train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that necessary components (the portion necessary to support equipment which is required to be OPERABLE in the applicable MODES above) are OPERABLE when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

TROJAN-UNIT 1 3/4 7-16 Amendment No. 74, 114

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3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES l 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 SHUTOOWN MARGIN  !

A sufficient SHUT 00WN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable.within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUT 00WN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS Tavg. The most restrictive condition occurs at E0L, with T at no load operating .

temperature,andisassociatedwithapostuNedsteamlinebreakaccident' and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.65 Ak/k is initially required to control the reactivity transient. Accordingly, the SHUTOOWN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR accident analysis assumptions. With Tavg less than 200*F the most restrictive reactivity transients resulting from the postulated Boron Dilution Accident are such that a 1.65 Ak/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN is initially required.

2/4.1.1. 3 BORON DILUTION A minimum flow rate of at least 3000 GPM provides adequate mixing, prevents stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual during boron ' concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. A flow rate of at least 3000 GPM will circulate an equivalent Reactor Coolant System volume of 13,104 cubic feet in approximately 33 minutes. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reductions will therefore be within the capability for operator recognition and control.

1/4.1.1.4 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC)

The limitations on MTC are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the accident and transient analyses remain valid through each fuel cycle. The surveillance requirement for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and towards the end of each fuel cycle is adequate to l confirm the MTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due l

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TROJAN-UNIT 1 83/41-1 Amendment No. Si, 114 l l

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i j REACTIVITY CONTROLS SYSTEMS i

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3/4.1.1.4 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC) (Continued) i principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. The confirmation that the measured and appropriately compensated MTC value is within the allowable tolerance of the predicted value provides additional assurances that the coefficient will be maintained within its limits during intervals between measurement.

3/4.1.1.5 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical . i with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 551*F. This.

limitation is required to ensure 1) the moderator temperature coefficien't is within its analyzed temperature range, 2) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERA 8LE status with a steam bubble 3) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum NOT temperature and 4) the protective instrumen-tation is within its normal operating range. ,

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS l 1

The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include 1) borated water sources, 2) charging pumps,

3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid transfer pumps, 5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200*F. a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single func-tional capability in the event an assumed failure renders of the systems in-operable. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUT 00WN MARGIN from all operating conditions fo 1.05 Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F. The maximum boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 14,418 gallons of 7000 ppe borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 74,752 gallons of 2000 ppe borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

The required volume for the boric acid storage tanks (two tanks) of l 14,418 gallons has been increased to a value greater than the minimum level indicating range of the storage tanks (741 gallons per tank) to 15,900 l

! gallons.

TROJAN-UNIT I B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 95' 114 1

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1' REACTIVITY CONTROLS SYSTENS BASES 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 200*F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions pro-hibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

The boron inventory in the RWST or the boric acid storage tanks is j f sufficient (a) to compensate for an inadvertent positive reactivity addition

' to the Reactor Coolant Systed of approximately 15 Ak/k while in MODE 5 at [

200'F; and (b) to maintain a constant RCS reactivity while the temperature in decreased from 200*F to 80*F. In MODE 6, the boron inventory is suffi - l 4 cient to increase the boron concentration to compensate for an inadvertent I

positive reactivity addition of approximately 15 Ak/k while in the refuel-ing mode. These conditions require 8494 usable gallons of 7000-gpm borated I water from the boric acid storage tanks or 23,432 usable gallons of 2000-gpm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

I The required volume for the boric acid storage tanks (two tanks) of l 8494 gallons has been increased to a value greater than the minimum level i indicating range of the storage tanks (741 gallons per tank) to 9976 gallons 1 (rounded to 10,000 gallons). The required RWST volume of 23,432 gallons must be increased to account for nonusable volume due to tank geometry.

l 1etdown and vortexing considerations (78,000 gallons), to 101,432 gallons

! (rounded to 102.000 gallons). '

4 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES f

i The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power j distribution limits are maintained. (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-

.tained, and (3) limit the potential effects of a rod ejection accident.

OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine

'I control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

l The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic

requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that j the original criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement l

of peaking factors or a restriction of THERMAL POWER; either of these 4 restrictions provides assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. The reactivity work of a misaligned rod is limited for the remainder of the fuel cycle to prevent exceeding the assumptions used in the accident analysis for a rod ejection accident.

TROJAN-UNIT 1 8 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 58, 95, 1 114 l l L._--_-_ _ . _ - . - - . . _ - - - .--- - - - - - -

REACTIVITY CONTROLS SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.3 MOVA8LE CONTROL ASSEM8 LIES (Continued)

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the accident analyses. Measurement with Tavg >550'F and I with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod pos'itions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied. '

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i TROJAN-UNIT 1 8 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. 58 //

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l POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES l Although it is intended that the plant will be operated with the '

i AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE within the 15% target band about the target flux difference, during rapid plant THERMAL POWER reductions, control rod motion will cause the AFD to deviate outside of the target band at reduced THERMAL POWER levels. This deviation will not affect the xenon redistribution sufficiently to change the envelope of peaking factors which may be reached on a subsequent return to RATED THERMAL POWER (with the AFD within the target band) provided the time duration of the deviation is limited.

Accordingly, a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> penalty deviation limit cumulative during the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is provided for operation outside of the target band but within the limits of Figure 3.2-1 while at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% & 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. For THERMAL POWER levels between 15% & 50% of rated THERMAL POWER, deviations of the AFD outside of the target band are less significant. The penalty of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> actual time reflects this reduced '

significance.

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I Provisions for monitoring the AFD on an automatic basis are derived l from the plant process computer through the AFD Monitor Alarm. The computer

determines the one minute average of each of the OPERABLE excore detector outputs and provides an alarm message immediately if the AFD for at least 2 of 4 or 2 of 3 OPERABLE encore channels are outside the target band and the THERMAL POWER is greater than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. During, opera-l tion at THERMAL POWER levels between 505 & 90% and 15% & 50% RATED THERMAL POWER, the computer outputs an alarm message when the penalty deviation accumulates beyond the limits of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, respectively.

Figure 8 3/4 2-1 shows a typical monthly target band near the beginning of core life.

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TRO.1AN-UNIT 1 8 3/4 2-2 Amendment No.114 i

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t REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i

BASES The power operated relief valves (PORVs) operate to reli. eve RCS pres-sure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves. These relief valves have remotely operated block valves to provide a positive shutoff capability should isolation of a relief valve be necessary. l 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER The requirement that 150 kw of pressurizer heaters and their associ-ated controls be capable of being supplied electrical power from an emergency bus provides assurance that these heaters can be energized during a loss of offsite power condition to maintain natural circulation at NOT STAN08Y. A minimum of 7 of the 23 kw heaters meets this requirement. l 3/4.4.5 STEAN GENERATORS [-

One OPERABLE steam generator provides sufficient heat removal capa-bility to remove decay heat after a reactor shutdown. The requirement for two OPERABLE steam generators, combined with other requirements of the Limiting Conditions for Operation ensures adequate decay heat removal capabilities for RCS temperatures greater than 350*F if one steam gen-erator becomes inoperable due to single failure considerations. Below 350*F, decay heat is removed by the RHR system.

] The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator i tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS l

will be maintained. The program for 17 service inspection of steam i

generator tub'es is based on a modificacion of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the

event that there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degra-dation due to design, manufacturing errors, or inservice conditions that lead to corrosion. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube i degradation so that corrective measures can be taken. l 1

The plant is expected to be operated in a manner such that the ,

secondary coolant will be maintained within those parameter limits found  !

to result in negligible corrosion of the steam generator tubes. If the secondary coolant chemistry is not maintained within these parameter l limits, localized corrosion may likely result in stress corrosion cracking.

The extent of cracking during plant operation would be limited by the limitation of steam generator tube leakage between the primary coolant l

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! TROJAN-UNIT 1 8 3/4 4-2 Amendment No. 55,114 i

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

BASES l 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS The OPERABILITY of each safety injection system accumulator ensures that a l;

sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the I reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure i that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis I

are met.

The limit of one hour for operation with an inoperable accumulator minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with

! failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3.1 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The OPERASILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient

emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA

! assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition,

! each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the J

recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

i With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERA 8LE ECCS subsystem is i

acceptable without a single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERA 8ILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety  ;

i analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveil- i lance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance i testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in l the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure j l

drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) pre-vent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

TRO1AN-UNIT 1 8 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 32, ll4 I

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