ML20094P797
| ML20094P797 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 11/22/1995 |
| From: | Karpyak S, Lettie R, Parkison W TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20094P773 | List: |
| References | |
| ER-EA-009, ER-EA-009-R00, ER-EA-9, ER-EA-9-R, NUDOCS 9511300133 | |
| Download: ML20094P797 (336) | |
Text
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ER.EA-009 4 i i Revision 0 Page_ .1 of N 5 l l Table of Contents 1.0 B AC KG ROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 - 1 2.0 PROJECT SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 3.0 PROJECT APPROAC H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 -2 3.2 Risk Importance Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5 3.3 Completeness Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 3-6 3.4 Cumulative Effects of Test Interval Changes ........................ 3-7 3.5 Expert Panel Process ...........................................3-8 3.6 Identification of Com Degradation and Feedback Process . . . . . . . . . . 3-9 3.7 _ Quality and Technica:ponent. Adequacy of CPSES IPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 4.0 IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 4.1 Risk Importance Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 I 4.1.1 IPE Risk Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 4.1.2 External Events Risk Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10 4.1.3 Outage Risk Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-15 4.1.4 Back-end Risk Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24 4.1.5 IST Com mnents Not in the IPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-30 4.1.6 High-Risk IPE Components Not in the IST Program . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-33 4.2 Completeness Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-34 4.2.1 Truncation Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-34 4.2.2 Supercomponents, Human Events, and Initiators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-40 ' 4.2.3 Common Cause Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44 4.2.4 IPE Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-44 4.2.5 Sensitivity Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-45 4.3 - Analysis of Cumulative Effects from Possible Increases in IST interval . . . 4-48 4.4 Expert Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5 9 5.0
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 6.0 TA B L ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6- 1 7.0 REF E REN C ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7- 1 8.0 APPENDI C ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8- 1
.. ij
t ER-EA-009 , Revision 0 ! Page .3 of 295 l , p.
# List of Tables ;
(All Tables Located in Section 6) Table .4.1.-1: Preliminary Importance Rankings ofIST Components in the IPE
. Table.4.1.-2: IPE Components That Changed Risk Categories Due To Symmetry Evaluation .
Table 4.1.-2a: IPE Component Symmetry Evaluation Table 4.1.-3: Risk Ranking Changes For IST Components Considering Fire and Tornado j External Events . Table 4.1.-3a: IPEEE Fire and Tomado IST Component Evaluation ;
~ Table 4.1.-4: IPE/IST Component Ranking Changes Duc To Evaluation of Shutdown ;
Considerations : Table 4.1.-4a: IPE/IST Component Evaluation for Shutdown Considerations { Table 4.1.-5: ' List of High/ Medium Risk Components Due to Back-end Considerations Table 4.1.-Sa: IPE/IST Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Back-end , Considerations Table 4.1.-6: List ofIST Components Not In IPE Table 4.1.-6a: IST Function Table i Table 4.1.-6b: Comparison ofIPE and IST Functions Table 4.1.-7: - High-Risk IPE Components Not In the IST
. Table 4.2.-1: Truncated Components Table 4.2.-2: Accident Initiators With Initiating Event Frequency and Conditional Core Damage Probability Table 4.2.-3: Table of Risk Importances With and Without Common Cause Failures Table 4.2.-3a: IST/IPE Cotoponent Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Common Cause Table 4.4.-1: Expert Pan-i Meeting Minutes Table 4.4.-2: Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE Table 4.4.-2a Expert Panel Meeting Minutes For High Rank IPE Components Not In The IST Program Table 4.4.-3: Results of Expert Panel Evaluation ot'IPE/IST Components and Final Ibnking of AllIST Components Table 5.1-1: Summary of Risk Ranking Results for IST Components n
lii
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page 4 ora 95 i List of Figures Figure 3-1: Decision Criteria - - --- - 3 [ Figure 4-1: Decision Criteria-,---- -- - - 7 , Figure 4-2: . Typical Accident Sequence- Loss of Decay Heat Removal -- 1-16' ; t
- Figure 4-3: Typical Accident Sequence- LOCA Inadvertent Draindown 1-16 Figure 4-4: Change in Core Damage Frequency versus Factor Change in Equipment Unavailability (Compensatory Measures not Credited)-- 1-55 i
Figure 4-5: Change in Core Damage Frequency versus Factor Change in Equipment Unavailability (Compensatory Measures Credited)---- - - 1 56 Figure 4-6: Change in Large Early Release Frequency versus Factor Change in Equipment Unavailability (Compensatory Measures not Credited) --
--4-57 i i
Figure 4-7: Large Early Release Frequency versus Factor Change in Equipment Unavailability .
. (Compensatory Measures Credited)-- ---- --4-58 e
i l i i l I IV l l I
! ER-EA-009 [ f Revision 0 . Page .5 or 295 L m, i
1.0 BACKGROUND
- ' In-service Testing (IST) programs were developed to ensure the reliable operation of safety- ,
p related pumps and valves at nuclear power plants. The codes, standards and guides for these ; j' tests were developed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operations
! and Maintenance (O&M) Committee. The essential Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) -
1 i regulation goveming this process of testing has been 10CFR50.55 and has been implemented : l l j . using ASME B&PV Code Section XI (Ref.1), both for passive component examination
- . - (welding, studs, etc.) and for active component testing (pumps and valves).
j For the past several years, both the nuclear industry and the NRC have devoted significant i attention and resources aimed at improving the performance of pumps and valves. In a letter (Ref. 2) dated September 9,1991 from James E. Richardson of the NRC to Forrest T. Rhodes ,
- of ASME, the NRC requested that the ASME O&M Committee consider revising existing ,
j mquimments for in-service testing. The letter requested revisions to ensure the ability of certain t i pumps and valves to perform their intended hydraulic and mechanical safety functions. The i revisions requested would:
- ?
.. Expand the scope to include specific components that are not constructed in accordance with -
ASME B&PV Code Section III rules for construction or tested in accordance with ASME ! B&PV Code Section XI; i j, . Require verification of each safety function for each included component; ' . Require such verification be accomplished at design basis conditions, or, where such i verification is not possible, a test at less than design basis conditions combined with an f < analysis may be substituted; and ! . Data collected during component testing may be compared with data taken during previous tests to allow determination of the condition of the component. t t l This request was made in part due to NRC concerns with the ability of some components to j perform their safety functions under design basis conditions, such as motor-operated valves and ! check valves, and concem that the in-service tests required by ASME B&PV Code Section XI :
- and inccrporated by reference into 10CFR50.55a(f) do not
- a) include each component that has a hydraulic or safety-related function; b) accomplish verification of each safety function of jl L
l-1 2
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page lo or M5 each safety-related component; or c) require that such verification be accomplished at the design
, basis conditions.
L The intent of current IST programs is to include all active safety-related pumps and valves that are credited in the plant design basis safety analysis. In general, the IST equipment lists are ! developed by review of plant drawings showing ASME Code Class 1,2 and 3 classification boundaries. All components within the boundaries are then reviewed to determine whether or not they were credited with an active safety function under the plant licensing basis. The FSAR analyses and other design basis documentation are reviewed to make these determinations. Older plants not initially designed to ASME B&PV Code Section III have applied ANSI Safety Class 1,2 and 3 classification rules to piping and components for purposes of establishing ASME B&PV Code Section XI test requirements, even though the systems and components - were not designed or constructed in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section III. As a result of the NRC request for IST program enhancement, there are industry concerns f involving the restrictive nature and basis for these requirements and their impact on plant operation. Overly restrictive requirements can complicate plant operation, cause unwarranted j operating costs, and most importantly, degrade plant safety through needless component testing and undue burden during plant outages. d Developments in the industry demonstrate an acceptance of the use of risk-based approaches using a plant's probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) to identify prescriptive regulations that have marginal safety benefits. The momentum in this direction is evidenced by recent NRC interest in graded QA and EPRI's applications of risk-based technologies, and most recently, in the issuance of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's final policy statement on the use of PSA in nuclear regulatory activities (Ref. 3). . Similarly, improvements to IST programs using a risk-based approach can reduce operating costs while maintaining a high level of plant safety. Possible savings from improved IST , programs include:
. Reduced costs of engineering analyses tc develop test criteria that adequately demonstrate ,
1-2
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page 7 or 295 c. functional capability at design basis conditions; .
. Reduced costs of plant modifications where current configurations do not support testing..
at or near design basis conditions;
. Reduced costs for development of new test procedures implementing the new test criteria; .
and
. Reduction ofincremental costs associated with performing the new tests, including:
- Additional time required to perform the tests and analyze results;
- Costs of specialized test equipment or vendor services;
- Possible effects on critical path outage duration; and -
- - Possible increases in radiation exposure.
For these reasons it is advantageous for utilities to pursue IST program improvements. The impact of changes on plant safety is of primary interest and is the controlling factor in implementing such changes. However, changes that negligibly reduce plant safety should not be ruled out, especially if such changes can lead to significant plant perfonnance improvements in other areas. 1-3.
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 l Page 8 of 9AS A 12.0 PROJECT SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES e L The scope of this project is to perform a review of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station IST program that optimizes the safety benefits in assuring pump and valve performance. It uses 3; a methodology for a risk-based approach to IST program review and enhancement that is ! _ founded on a blend of probabilistic and determir.istic methods and that has as its principal i ' results, recommendations for adjustments to test frequency intervals for these components. i- : Thus, it is not aimed at reducing the number of components within the scope of an IST program, [ rather at optimizing what is tested and when. In this study, all components within the scope of the IST program were examined. However, only those determined to be less safety significant will be considered for a code exemption. The ASME O&M Committee is reviewing the more safety significant components to ensure that the appropriate tests are identified and performed on those components for their respective failure modes. The objectives of this project are to apply risk-based technologies to IET components to determine their risk significance; to apply risk-based technologies to risk-significant components identified in the IPE and outside of ASME Code Classes 1,2 and 3 to determine whether additional compensatory measures are appropriate; and to apply a combination of deterministic and risk-based methods to determine appropriate testing frequencies and/or compensatory measures for IST components. The results of this project will be the basis for the CPSES code exemption submittal to the NRC and will be part of a pilot study for the industry. Several safety enhancements to a plant IST program can be derived, both directly and indirectly, by using the probabilistic and deterministic approach presented in this report. These safety enhancements are very similar to those attendant with the optimized performance of motor-operated valves discussed in NUMARC 93-05 (Ref. 4), from which elements of the following discussion were taken.
' Direct Safety Enhancements Greater attention and resources devoted to the high priority IST components could translate into many direct safety. enhancements. First, this group of components could be subjected to, where practical and meaningful, more frequent periodic tests than the lower priority groups. The 2-1
ER EA-009 Revision 0 Page 4 or M 5 "^' i timeliness of any problem identification and resolution would be improved. Second, requirements associated with the high priority group ofIST components are expected to be more rigorous and demanding in nature than for the other groups. These requirements provide added assurance that any problems that may impact the functionality of the components will be - identified and resolved. Third,*the resulting risk-based IST program will consider whether some l risk-significant components that are outside the scope of ASME Code Classes 1,2 and 3 should , be added to the IST program to improve safety. Finally, because extensive testing can have , adverse safety and operational consequences, reduction of testing may reduce component wearout and operator burden. These changes are expected to improve safety. Indirect Safety Fnhancements There are other indirect safety benefits to this approach that are as important. Risk-based prioritization efforts identify the safety-significant IST components and the impact of their f potential failures on plant safety. In addition, these analyses identify important scenarios that provide information with respect to the operational demand that may be placed on a given component. Such information is valuable because it relates the performance of the IST component to the broader context of plant safety. This allows more rational decision making, more efficient use of resources, and is central to optimizing safety benefits. . l l 2-2
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page lo or 495 3.0 PROJECT APPROACH The TU Electric risk-based IST project was developed and implemented as part of a tailored collaboration (TC) effort with EPRI. The project was conducted under the direction of a Steering Committee that interfaced with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) research program funded by the NRC, the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG), the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and other utilities, and coordinated its activities with other industry efforts such as the WOG check valve program and various NEI activities on risk-based regulation. The TC project was designed to provide plant-specific benefits to TU Electric and, as a pilot project, to provide generic insights and tools that will benefit similar industry projects. In particular, the project developed generic methods for identifying opportunities to reduce those IST-related regu q requirements and commitments that require significant resources to comply with and/or implement, but contribute insignificantly to safe and reliable operation. This work is being provided to NEI's Risk-Based IST Task Force and ASME B&PV Code Section XI IST Research Task Force to assist them in their formulation of guidelines and in-service testing requirements. The Steering Committee developed the overall project objectives and milestones and commissioned various work activities and studies in doing this work. The Steering Committee consisted of members with expertise in the areas of licensing, probabilistic safety analysis, ASME B&PV Code Section XI and WOG analysis activities. In addition to providing overall coordination, the Steering Committee served as the central point of decision making for major technical issues and provided technology transfer and guidance to the expert panel in performing its work. These latter activities were accomplished through common membership of several members on the Steering Committee and the expert panel. It was concluded that the strength of this risk-based IST program and the integrity ofits results lie both in the robustness of the methodology and in the work of the Steering Committee and expert panel. Further, the robustness of the methodology provides consistency in the results. l The project was divided into two phases. Phase 1 included the development of an l implementation guidelines document and actual implementation of the methodology to prioritize components in the IST program. Phase 2 involved the development of tools for evaluating test intervals for the risk-significant IST components. The work activities in each 3-1
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page it of M5 of these phases were reviewed by the Steering Committee and presented to various other peer groups at strategic points in the project. In this way the methodology was refined, and a fairly l mature process was arrived at before involvement of the expert panel. The various tasks that l support the project are described in more detail in the sections that follow. 1 3.1 Methodology l l The process described above iead to development of the methodology. The methodology was developed consistent with NUMARC Guides 93-01 (Ref. 5)(Maintenance Rule) and 93-05 (Motor Operated Valve (MOV) testing). The system level ranking approach from the Maintenance Rule process was merged with the component level ranking approach used for MOV testing. The merging of the two approaches was designed to ensure that the new IST program would benefit from and be consistent with the Maintenance Rule process and other industry risk-based programs. The Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) and Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) risk measures of the Maintenance Rule were combined with the Fussell-Vesely (FV) risk measure of MOV testing. Because this initiative was to reduce existing regulatory burden rather than focus on new regulatory initiatives, the methodology applies these risk measures in a manner intended to ensure a safety-neutral outcome. I 1 Because RRW and FV provide similar insights, only the FV importance measure was utilized in this analysis. Fussell-Vesely provides a measure ofincremental change in total core damage frequency (CDF) that indicates the importance ofincremental changes in reliability that might result from changing in-service test intervals. Risk Achievement Worth provides an indicator of the importance ofdegradations in component reliability. These measures were combined into a decision criteria such as that shown in Figure 3-1. As the figure indicates, components with a significant FV were considered "more risk l significant". Components with an insignificant FV were considered "less risk significant". l However, it was important to ensure that a reduction in test intervals did not allow unintended consequences, i.e., a compromise in safety resulting from a degradation in reliability. l 3-2 l l
Figure 3-1 ER-EA-009 Revision 0 , " ** 1 # l Decision Criteria Rhk imnortance Measures Fussell-Vesely importance > 0.001 ; Risk Achievment Worth > 2.0 < 10 11 1 ; i 2 Risk Achievment Worth i 111 IV , 0 0.001 0.1 Fussell-Vesely importance e 1: More Safety Significant Component (MSSC) II: Less Safety Significant Component (LSSC) With Compensatory Measures ' ill: Less Safety Significant Component (LSSC) IV: More Safety Significant Component (MSSC) Not Modeled - Components Reviewed By Expert Panet For Determination Of Ranking 3-3 1
o I i ER-EA-009 ;! Revision 0 - 1 i-F Page 13 or OM5 'l
- r. ,
1
- Therefore, if FV was insignificant, it was also required that RAW be insignificant for a l, l component to be classified as "less risk significant". If RAW was significant, the component l I
was considered by the expert panel for placement in the high category. If the panel decided the . l component could be ranked low, an additional requirement was imposed before a component could be classified as "less risk significant". A compensatory measure was required to be ! selected by the expert panel to limit degradations in reliability, j i During the development of this methodology, EPRI and NEI began working with NRC on the - ; 4 development'of the EPRI PSA Applications Guide (Ref. 6). In general, this methodology is 3-consistent with the guide. The guide did provide a specific acceptance criteria for permanent i risk increases that was used in this evaluation. A few minor differences between this :
- ' methodology and the EPRI PSA Applications Guide exit, most ofwhich are more conservative l t
i in this study. j l t l The general approach taken included four steps. First, risk importance was determined. This ; ! determination was based on the results of the IPE and the IPEEE and other plant operating [ modes, such as outage modes. In addition to this complete spectrum of core damage accidents, I a severe accidents leading to large and early fission product releases were also given special i
- ~ attention. Finally, the importance of components not in the IPE and IPEEE models or not in the j t
[ IST program were evaluated. i l t l The next step addressed the ccmpleteness and adequacy of these models through a number of !' sensitivity analyses to compensate for the limitations of the quantitative models. The third step ! evaluated the cumulative impact oflow risk significant components on plant risk if their in-service test intervals were extended. This step provided technicaljustification for proposed test I $ intervals for less risk significant components in the existing IST. The fourth and last step was l to review the process and results with an expert panel that was knowledgeable of plant risk, j li plant design, plant operations practices, and plant performance. This process blended deterministic safety insights with quantitative risk insights to ensure that risk significance was
- appropriately identified.
.' i J j The following sections further describe the methodology and provide some additional background to this work. 3-4 : i l 1 1 l
$ ER-EA-009 F ' Revision 0 . $ Page'14 of 1 % !
.( + l 3.2 L Rink Imnortance Determination i 1
- ')
h ' In this study, risk importance rankings of the IST components were determined based on the results of the CPSES IPE. These risk rankings were then complemented with rankings based . l on consideration of other accident initiators and plant operating modes. These other accident ; j. initiators are extemal events such as fires, tornados, and earthquakes. The other plant operating - i
. mode is the outage mode. Each of these evaluations considered importance with respect to core .
damage prevention. Core damage prevention has been found to be a good measure of the spectrum of releases that can result from severe accidents. However, unique risk contributions j j can occur if severe accident releases are large and early. Hence, risk rankings were also complemented by considering components important to preventing large, early releases. This
- approach is consistent with the intent of the safety goal and the severe accident policy statement
- and is a requirement of the EPRI PSA Applications Guide.
1 i i ?
- . In applying the above method, it was found that a significant fraction ofIST components are l
- l. not in the IPE. While it is likely that such components are not risk significant, this study {
L specifically evaluated each component and the design basis functions addressed by the IST
- program. Most components that are not in the IPE were found to be implicitly modeled by the 'fs study. That is, the IPE found that the components either were not required for the system to 'l I
- prevent severe accidents, were in systems that provided a highly redundant function, or performed functions that were extremely unlikely to be required. The systematic review of l j these components used quantitative and qualitative insights to determine whether components {
should be considered more or less risk significant and whether risk insights implied that l compensatory actions should be considered. The risk ranking process also identified some IPE components that were more risk significant ! l but which were not in the IST program. These components typically were found to be outside ! the code class boundary and therefore not subject to IST requirements. These components were l t i considered for compensatory action equivalent to those defined for components in the IS f ; 4 Program. r i ! i . 3-5 i i
+?
l L
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page 15 or M 5 3.3 Comoteteness Issues l Quantitative risk models have limitations associated with the structure of the models and the assumptions and the input data used. The limitations were compensated for by evaluating . truncation limits, identifying IST components masked by the IPE, applying a conservative treatment of common cause failures, requiring an expert panel to identify components with operational concerns, and performing selected sensitivity studies. The risk ranking process described above used the FV and RAW importance measures. The values for these importance measures are calculated based on cutsets. The cumulative effects analysis described below also is based on cutsets. Cutsets are obtained by solving the model with a truncation limit. Experience has shown that setting the truncation limit arbitrarily low creates inefliciencies such that analysis costs quickly exceed the value of risk insights gained. This project evaluated the truncation limit used in the CPSES IPE and found it to be sufficient for both risk ranking and estimating cumulative effects. The IPE model may " mask" certain components because they are associated with supercomponents, human events or initiating events but not explicitly identified. The components masked by the IPE model are typically small contributors to the overall probability of the event. However, it was considered appropriate to verify this consideration for this effort. The project evaluated those IST components that were: 1) contained in supercomponents (e.g., , i some components on the diesel generator skid),2) required to function as part of a human action, and 3) might cause a significant plant initiator.
- Risk ranking results can be strongly affected by the contribution of conunon cause failure. The ,
I approach taken in the project was to conservatively assume that a common cause event in the 1 cutsets should have its entire risk significance assigned to all components represented by the event. This approach lead to the inclusion of a significant number of components in the more risk significant category which otherwise would have been considered less risk significant. The expert panel confirmed that the approach identified potentially important components. Both risk ranking measures used are influenced by the reliability data assigned to the component. The CPSES IPE uses generic data since an insufficient amount of plant-specific 3-6 l
4 ER-EA-009 Revision 0 - Page Ib or M5 4"> , 3 data was available. ' Generic data (and indeed, most interpretations of plant specific data) i !- . considers components in groups. But ranking was done on a component basis. Consequently, : ! i ' the expert panel considered whether or not plant specific operational insights indicated l I ' component reliability problems that might affect the ranking of an individual component or small group of components. Components with operational concerns were considend more risk j significant by the expert panel.- ! 4 Finally, the completeness of the models, assumptions and input data were tested by sensitivity . i studies. In one sensitivity study designed to consider the impact of human event modeling, risk j i ranking results were compared assuming operator events in the IPE always failed to occur.' l ? 'Another sensitivity study was designed to consider whether changes to in-service testing offered j the potential for conunon-cause-like degradations in components in different systems. Less risk ! ! significant components were assumed to be influenced two at a time. Four such components' j l were identified which, together with other components, offered the potential of becoming more -f 5 risk significant. Appropriate compensatory actions designed to limit reliability degradations wem imposed on these components.' A similar sensitivity study was performed where less risk j significant components were assumed to be influenced three at a time. ] 3.4 Cumulative Effects of Test Interval Chanoes i
. A risk ranking approach based on importance measures such as was used in this project does {
not necessarily guarantee that acceptable levels of risk will result Risk importance measures ; are based on changes to components one at a time. Changes to many components simultaneously may cause unintended increases in risk despite meeting the selected conservative l risk ranking measures. l An analysis was performed to determine the potential risk impact ofincreasing in-service testing intervals simultaneously on all less risk significant components. Consideration was given to .! available information on how changes in test intervals will change component unavailability, i Uncertainty in this information, together with the complexity required to model such an
- approach, dictated the use of a very conservative approach. That is, risk impact was measured l assuming that component unavailability (including both on demand and time dependent failure j rates) increased by the same factor that the test interval increased. Despite the use of this l 3-7 :
i 1 ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page l'I or 19 5 , i m.. . conservative assumption, calculations indicate that test intervals could be increased from j quarterly to six years or more with acceptable increases in risk. If consideration were given to l improvements in performance that are possible to occur from a risk-based IST program, it is . ;
; plausible that core damage risk may not increase at all.-
l 3.5 Exnert Panel Process For the CPSES Risk-Based In-Service Testing (RBIST) Program, an expert panel (EP) was , established to make the final determination of risk ranking for the pumps and valves in the '
- CPSES Unit I and 2 IST program. The panel was constituted in part ofindividuals who were ,
members of the Steering Committee and of others who were members of the expert panel established for the implementation of the Maintenance Rule. The members of the panel were selected based on their nuclear power plant experience which included expertise in the areas of ; ASME codes and studards, plant operations at the Senior Reactor Operator level, maintenance engineering, systems engineering, design engineering and probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). The chairman had significant technical expertise in PSA applications and project management. The expert panel also utilized the expertise of other consultants and engineers in , doing its evaluations. To prepare for the expert panel review, the risk ranking team developed a set of simplified ; P& ids for all the systems modeled in the IPE. The IPE risk category results, component tag . numbers, and the location of the components in the systems were all shown on the simplified diagrams. Using this information and the design basis functions addressed by IST as documented in the IST plan, the panel reviewed and validated or adjusted the ranking results. , The panel's principal responsibility was to ensure the risk ranking information was consistent ; with plant design, operating procedures, and with plant-specific operating experience. The panel made a qualitative assessment of the risk importance categories that were developed for the components using the IPE results and insights discussed in the preceding sections of this report. i This assessment was based on deterministic insights, plant-specific history, engineering
-judgements, regulatory requirements, and probabilistic safety analysis insights. . The panel {
reviewed the IPE component risk. rankings, compared the IPE and IST functions to ensure , I . consistency with plant design, analyzed applicable deterministic information and determined ( 3-8 .
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! 1 ER-EA-009 l Revision 0 Page ' II or M 5 the final safety significance categorizations for all the IST components. At the end of the expert panel evaluation process, every component in the CPSES IST program was reviewed and ^ evaluated by the expert panel members. The guideline under which the expert panel performed this work is provided as Appendix A to this report. The results of this' evaluation are discussed i
~
in the section 4.4. 3.6 Identification of Comnonent Degradation ~and Feedback Process t At CPSES, various station procedures are used to govern the activities related to the IST ~ program and other areas such as corrective action and root cause programs. These procedures l ! form a consistent means of controlling and integrating site-wide activities. The ASME B&P-
- Code Section XI in-service testing of pumps and valves is implemented by procedure STA-711, "ASME Section XI In-service Testing Program for Pumps and Valves" . This procedure
- provides guidance to ensure effective, consistent and coordinated implementation of the code .
l requirements. It provides guidance on how the in-service testing program interfaces with other I e station procedures to perform surveillances, to maintain test records, to assure deficiencies are identified, tracked and resolved, and to assure that corrective actions are performed and documented. These procedures provide the means by which feedback of failures of IST.
~ components to the IST program is accomplished. They provide assurance that failures ofIST , components will be promptly identified and addressed and modifications to the in-service testing program (e.g., change to surveillance intervals) are made in a timely manner, i
A failure of an IST component may be identified in the course of doing ordinary maintenance d and tests or as part of a surveillance activity. These activities are controlled primarily by STA-l 606, " Work Requests and Work Orders," and STA-704, " Surveillance Program". When a
- failure is identified as part of a surveillance test or maintenance activity, a ONE Form is prepared per STA-421, " Operations Notification and Evaluation (ONE FORM)", depending on the nature of the failure. This form is used at CPSES to report potential adverse conditions and resolve issues and to assure that corrective actions are performed and documented. Resolution ;
of a ONE Form is accomplished in accordance with the requirements of STA-422, " Processing
- of Operations Notification and Evaluation (ONE) Forms". Resolution of a ONE Form includes:
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- Assigning a unique identification number and logging in appropriate plant j information systems, and initial distribution for trending purposes. i f
- Reviewing the reported condition to determine the category of correction action required. -
- Considering the generic implications of the item, i.e., the potential for the condition to exist elsewhere and initiating works order as required to investigate.
- Determining the probable cause of failure.
- Identifying and performing corrective action.
Depending upon the nature of the adverse condition, the corrective actions may include reporting to outside agencies, performing an engineering evaluation or performing a root cause evaluation. Root cause evaluations are preformed in accordance with STA-515," Root Cause Analysis." These evaluations include a structured analysis ofissues in order to identify causes of and contributing factors to component failure. As appropriate, root cause evaluations consider human performance issues and require failure analysis of components. In addition to these activities, the implementation of the Maintenance Rule at CPSES requires that failures of components in systems within the scope of the rule be reviewed to determine whether these failures are maintenance preventable functional failures. The IST systems are l within the scope of the maintenance rule and thus will come under these provisions. l Maintenance preventable failures that result in system functional failures receive root cause analysis and corrective action evaluations, if the Maintenance Rule has been implemented on the system. For deficiencies arising from surveillance work orders, records of corrective action are documented on work orders per the requirements of STA-606, " Work Requests and Work I Orders". Work orders contain details of all corrective actions performed. Records ofin-service testing to confirm operational adequacy following corrective actions are documented on post-work test reports per the requirements of STA-623, " Post-Work Test Program." The IST 3-10
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. engineer reviews all closed IST-related surveillance work orders and post-work tests. The IST engineer also reviews in-service valve test results during the work order post-work review process and extracts and records any trendable data for early identification of equipment problems that may require modification to the IST program.
At Because the IST engineer is a member of the systems engineering group, his activities are closely integrated with those of the system engineers. The pump and valve performance records
. maintained by the IST engineer are used extensively by systems engineers to determine j
^ corrective actions and to monitor system performance. The IST engineer is also a member of the expert panel for implementation of the Maintenance Rule and the risk-based IST program. He participates in periodic reviews of the performance of systems within the scope of these _ programs, and through these means, he can provide timely feedback of performance of components in the systems. Thus, the various procedures and programs in place at CPSES provide assurance that failures ofIST components will be promptly identified and addressed and modifications te the in-service testing program will be considered and made in a timely manner. 3.7 Onnlity and Technical Adequacy of CPSES IPE In general, the IPE study for CPSES fully satisfies the requirements of a full-scope Level-I and Level II PRA. One of the main objectives of the IPE development was to be able to utilize its results and insights toward the enhancement of plant safety through risk-based applications. With this objective in mind, the IPE elements were developed in detail and integrated in a manner sufficient to satisfy both the NRC Generic Letter 88-20 requirements and support future plant applications. The CPSES IPE study was performed by developing large fault trees and small event trees. The large fault trees were then linked together according to the event tree logics for quantifying accident sequences. The major elements of the IPE study were developed and reviewed in a manner consistent with and in excess of the good practices of the time. In general, it is believed that the CPSES IPE meets or exceeds the quality standards subsequently suggested by the EPRI PSA Applications Guide. These major elements are briefly described below. 3-11 _ _x
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W ER-EA-009 Revision 0 ' Page 1 1 of 29 6
- Initiatino Event Analysis !
r ; 1 j - A detailed review of plant equipment and operating procedures was performed to identify all I
- the potential plant-specific initiating events as well as those initiating events that were identified -
m the industry. The loss of support system initiators such as service water, component coolmg i f water, safety chilled water, HVAC, Instrument Air, Electrical Power subsystems were also ; h
- identified and evaluated in the IPE study. In addition, other special initiators includmg i interfacing systems LOCA, SGTR, ATWS, intemal flooding and station blackout were analyzed
[ in detail and documented in the IPE. l ~. 4 I Accident Sequence Analysis L A detailed accident sequence analysis was performed and resulted in the development of l functional event trees for all the initiating events identified in the IPE study. This also included j induced LOCA initiating events such as stuck open primary side safety valves, stuck open j PORVs, and most importantly, reactor coolant pump seal LOCA. ; i . . I The accident sequences were quantified using the fault tree linking methodology. The common !
- i. t concern in the industry is the truncation limit which could potentially impact the importance {
evaluation. The total core damage frequency for CPSES was estimated to be 5.72 E-05. The j truncation limit chosen for the CPSES accident sequence quantification was set at 1.0E-09 l 1
- which is approximately 2.0E-05 below the total core damage frequency. The recommended j 4
truncation limit in the EPRI PSA Application Guide document is 10 below the baseline IPE l core damage frequency. The analysis of truncation limits for this application is described in section 4.2.1. Most assumptions related to IST components were in effect validated by the treatment of not-modeled IST components as described in section 4.1.5. In addition, ATWS " mitigating IST components have been ranked appropriately. ; l Systems Analysis j 1 4 1 One of the major elements of the CPSES IPE study was the system analysis task. A total of 15 l 9 . systems including support systems and front-line systems required for accident mitigation were l analyzed. For all 15 systems, detailed system notebooks were developed which are found to 3-12 4 4 4 w _ , .-,..c y-.- - - - - - - - - y- . p , _. - y- - ,o y.
i ER EA-009 l Revision 0 l Page 22., of M5 ; be excellent documents for plant support activities. The impact of the loss of room cooling on equipment operability was carefully evaluated by the plant-specific room heat-up calculations ; and other available information in the industry. As part of this effort, the impact ofloss of room cooling on the control room and switchgear room were also evaluated. l Common Came Failure Analysis ; i Common Cause Failures (CCF) impacting two or more components in a system were carefully examined and appropriately placed in the system fault tree models. The Multiple Greek Letter , (MGL) method described in NUREG/CR-4780, " Procedures for Treating Common Cause . Failures in Safety and Reliability Studies," was used to quantify the effect of common cause f i failure events. The evaluation process is consistent with the NRC and EPRI guidelines. The typical IST-related component types are included in the CCF analysis. These are: i a Motor operated valves l
- Air operated valves l 1
l
- Check valves
- Electro-hydraulic valves :
- Solenoid valves
- Operating pumps ;
- Standby pumps n
p
- Turbine-driven pumps i
1
- Positive displacement pumps i: Human Reliability Annivsis 4
- TU Electric spent extensive amount of time to review, analyze and document human
" interactions that were modeled in the IPE study. This analysis is consistent with the guidelines ' 3-13 i y _v <- , .9 g -* , #-. . . - - - .-_-_ -__m _._ _ ,-_ -_____-
l l I ER-EA-009 Revision 0 i Page 2 3 or395 of SHARP methodology developed by EPRI. This analysis included an evaluation of operator timing and emergency operating procedures that might create more demands on the operator. . In general, three groups of human interactions were considered, namely, latent human errors, human errors associated with initiating events, and dynamic human errors. In addition, a detailed recovery analysis was performed to properly account for the possible recovery actions.
'Ihe approach adopted for the CPSES IPE follows the general guidelines in the EPRI recovery analysis (EPRI RP 3206-03,"Modeling of Recovery Actions in PRAs"). The recovery analysis included the interview of operations staff with extensive plant experience, development of decision trees, review of related procedures and drawings, and consideration of the available time for each critical recovery action. The human reliability analysis process and results were all documented in a separate notebook.
IPE Review Process To ensure a high-quality IPE and to provide quality control to the IPE Process, two types of independent reviews were conducted. One was done intemally by TU Electric staff, and the other was done externally by outside PSA experts. In general, both reviews were applied to the entire examination process except when it was not possible due to the availability of resources or required skills. In those few cases, as a minimum, each task was reviewed thoroughly by either an internal or external independent reviewer. Furthermore, a final independent review was performed after the IPE study was completed. A team of PRA experts was selected from the industry to independently review the entire IPE study and its supporting analyses. The review team spent one week at the TU Electric offices where documents, procedures and supporting calculations and analyses were available for use. The results of all independent review activities performed by internal and external reviewers were well documented as part of the IPE documentation requirements. 3-14
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e 1 ER-EA-009 l Revision 0 [ Page M of 295' O 4.0 IMPISMENTATION PROCESS r I
.i Section 3.0 provides an overview of the process used to develop the risk-based IST plan for j CPSES. This section provides a more detailed description of the process with emphasis placed j on issues that needed to be addressed to successfully implement the process. ,
i y One key aspect of those implementation issues was integration with the Maintenance Rule . The details of this process were anticipated while CPSES was implementing the risk ranking portion ( of the Maintenance Rule. Consequently, despite some differences in ranking guidance between ; j NUMARC 93-01 for the Maintenance Rule and NUMARC 93-05 for MOV prioritization, the two processes were found to be straight-forward to implement. The process was integrated at ; a technical level by using basically the same data for importance ranking and at the j programmatic level by using basically the same expert panel. The resulting CPSES system ranking for the Maintenance Rule is consistent with the component ranking used in the risk- ] based IST plan whose development is described in the remainder of this section.
~
4.1 Risk Imnortance Determination } l
~ The ranking process involved an iterative set of activities for selecting risk categories. Initially, it was anticipated that a high, medium or low categorization based on Fussell-Vesely would be used, i.e., an approach modeled after NUMARC 93-05. NUMARC 93-05 was chosen as a starting point over NUMARC 93-01 because it addressed component level ranking for MOVs, l one of the principal components in the IST plan.
Insights gained during the ranking process caused this approach to be modified. Instead, Fussell-Vesely was used as the principal measure with the Risk Achievement Worth measure used to compensate for weaknesses in the FV approach. The criteria developed were found to I be practical to implement, generally consistent with the deterministic insights of the expert panel and effective in producing a safety neutral outcome. Based on the selected categories, two lists were developed. First, the IST components were listed in groups based on: a) whether the component is modeled in the IPE or not, b) which risk j sources the component affects, e.g., IPE, IPEEE, and outage, and c) which risk measures the j t 4-1
t. ER-EA-009 Revision 0 i Page A5 or M5 n i i component affects, e.g. core damage frequency (CDF) and large, early release frequency (LERF). Second, a list of pumps and valves not in the IST program that meet the criteria of the high-risk category was created. Ultimately, these lists were reviewed by the expert panel and found to generate a logical grouping of significant and insignificant components. The expert panel review entailed an expert panel validation of both the technical bases and the individual results. The lists were combined to obtain the final list of more and less risk significant components. The development of the lists and the expert panel process are described in subsequent subsections. This subsection describes the development of the ranking criteria. Selecting Importance Categories The purpose ofranking IST components according to their importance to safety was'to assign specific testing requirements according to their safety significance. Because there are many components within the scope of ASME Code Classes 1,2 and 3, it was impractical to develop a different set of requirements for each component. Therefore, once components were ranked according to their safety significance, it was useful to group them into priority or importance categories. Then each category was assigned a number of distinct requirements such as type of 1 test, periodic testing frequency, etc. The development of risk importance measures for ranking required selecting the measures to j be used, selecting the number of categories and ranges for each importance measure, and determining the implication of each category to in-service testing. Use of Risk Importance Measures The most common risk importance measures, i.e., those identified in NUMARC 93-01 and 93-05 and in the EPRI PSA Applications Guide, are: 1) Risk Achievement Worth (RAW),2) Fussell-Vesely Importance (FV),3) Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) and 4) Core Damage Frequency Contribution. RRW and FV measures are related, yielding essentially identical rankings in the range in which most ranking decisions are made. i The core damage frequency contribution measure provides the most insight for systems or highly important components. Because RRW offered insufficient resolution for lower ranked components and less insight into the component's role in the plant model, it was eliminated i 4-2 i
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ER-EA-009 - Revision 0 Page M(0 of R95 ,; i m from consideration for component level ranking. 1 f FV was used as the principal measure since it provides the best measure ofincremental risk ; changes in reliability that might result from changing in-service test intervals. RAW also was found to be a very useful measure. RAW provides a measure of functional importance that is 1 independent of the reliability of the component. That is, two components having the same [ i functional role, e.g., in the same " functional train", will have the same RAW. The findings ; indicated that such functionally similar components could have sufficiently different Fussell-4 Vesely measures. Often the differences were such that one could be ranked high and another i low This finding implies that the analyst must be relatively certain of a component's failure , . probability to draw reliable insights from the FV measure. The ranking process adapted the RAW to compensate for this weakness in the FV measure. j That is, the RAW was used when the FV is low to discriminate functionally significant ; components from those that are insignificant. This distinction was important to ensure the methodology generated a safety-neutral outcome. ; i Said another way, if in-service testing intervals are to be substantially changed or testing f removed entirely, it is possible that degradations in component reliability could occur. Therefore, it was important to establish that functionally important components, i.e., those with i
- significant RAW values, are subject to other plant programs that will ensure their reliability. i
? Y Number of Categories The IST components were divided into three importance categories l l t based on the risk importance measures for each risk source, e.g., core-damage frequency. There i were no rigorous mies to establish the number of categories. Too few categories can result in ; a loss of the benefits from grading requirements. Too many categories can make implementation unnecessarily burdensome and little distirction between requirements for i different categories could become arbitrary and unimportant. Based on past experience, three or four categories are the optimum for component categorizatin. Boundaries Between Categories Category boundaries should be chosen so that completeness issues are addressed, and each category can have distinct test requirements assigned to it. The boundaries between categories is based on engineering judgment. Those individual components ! 4-3
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. .es -
- whose failure would significantly increase the potential for core damage should be placed in the
- high-importance category. Additionally, if the assessment of common-cause events resulted in !
a group of components having a significant impact on CDF, then those components should be' added to the high-importance category as well. To select the categories, it was useful to start with an explicit criteria related to one or more of the four importance measures discussed earlier. NUMARC 93-05 presents an example criteria , used as the starting point for this effort. The criteria were based on a three-category structure using Fussell-Vesely (FV) as the risk importance measure: t Category Criterion , High: FV > 0.01 Medium: 0.01 > FV > 0.001 Low: FV < 0.001 It should be noted that this boundary for the low category is less than 0.005, the value recommended in the EPRI PSA Applications Guide. , 1 When the results were obtained, it was found that only a small fraction of components fell into i the high and medium categories. The small number of components meant that the cost of a test l effectiveness study for medium components that had been anticipated in the original project i t plan outweighed the economic benefits that could be gained, and therefore that study was not done. The medium category was retained for future use or use in other ranking projects; however, for this project, the medium category components were essentially grouped with the ! l high category components. (When referring to the results in general, the high and medium 1- category components are often referred to as high and the low category components as low.) Given the intent to use the RAW to compensate for weaknesses in the FV measure, NUMARC . 93-01 was used. This guideline states that the RAW criteria should be: l l 4-4 907 r+m- ' e -+ se
l ER EA-009 ' Revision 0 Page'A 8 of M S
,g ,
Catenorv Criterion - ; High: . RAW > 2 ; Low: RAW < 2 These same values are recommended in the EPRI PSA Applications Guide. These category j boundaries seemed to provide a reasonable division of components. ( Final detailed results reviewed by the expert panel indicated that a slight decrease in the boundaries for the RAW and FV would provide a logical break in components.' A few components were found to have FV and/or RAW combinations near the category boundaries. The expert panel concluded that these components would be ranked as high. ; The FV and the RAW were combined into a decision criteria such as that shown in Figure 4-1. t 1 As the figure indicates, components with a significant FV were considered "more risk: significant". Components with an insignificant FV were potentially "less risk 'significant". However, it was important to ensure that a reduction in test intervals did not allow unintended
-t consequences, i.e., a compromise in safety resulting from a degradation in reliability ~
I Therefore, if FV was insignificant, it was also required that RAW be insignificant for a component to be classified as '1ess risk significant". If RAW was significant, the component was considered by the expert panel for placement in the high category. If the pare:1 decided the component could be ranked low, an achlitional requirement was imposed before a component . i could be classified as "less risk significant". A compensatory measure was required to be j
)
selected by the expert panel to limit degradations in reliability. The final evah'ation resulted in the following categorization: l Category Criterion e High: FV > 0.001 1 Potentially high: FV < 0.001 and RAW > 2 ; 3 Low: FV < 0.001 and RAW < 2 l 1 This categorization was found to be practical to implement. Its robustness was indicated by the deterministic review of component ranking and safety function that were performed by the PRA ] 1 u 4-5 l 1 l l I
ER BA-009 Revision 0 Page jl9 or #15 analysts and the expert panel. The quantitative analyses of cumulative effects from test interval increases also indicated the robustness of this categorization. For the potentially high categ'ory, logical and effective compensatory measures were readily found by the expert panel. Their potential importance to ensuring a safety neutral outcome also was demonstrated by the results of the cumulative effects study. 4 4-6 l
Figure 4-1 ER-EA-009 l Revision 0 Page 30 of)3_5 Decision Critena Risk Imnortance Measures Fussell-Vesely importance > 0.001 Risk Achievment Worth > 2.0 10 , ll l 2 Risk Achievment Worth lli IV , i I f 0 0.001 0.1 Fussell-Vesely importance I: More Safety Significant Component (MSSC) e 11: Less Safety Significant Component (LSSC) With Compensatory Measures 111: Less Safety Significant Component (LSSC) IV: More Safety Significant Component (MSSC) ~ Not Modeled - Components Reviewed By Expert Panet For Determination Of Ranking i 4-7 ..
+
[
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page'31 of445 7, 4.1.1 : IPE Rink imnortance The initial risk importance determination was performed on the internal events portion of the CPSES IPE (Ref. 7). This work started with a systems level evaluation where the various basic events were mapped into systems. This was followed by a detailed review of the basic events and a mapping of these into components. Following this work, importance categories were defined and final rankings were performed. The system-level ranking was based on NUMARC 93-01 and was performed primarily for the Maintenance Rule. Component-level ranking was based on an enhancement of the guidance in NUMARC 93-05 described above.
. Preliminary Rankino Based 'on IPE Results In this preliminary ranking, systems were ranked first, then components. A system was considered risk significant if: 1) it contains an SSC whose Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) exceeds 0.5 percent of the overall CDF (RRW > 1.005),2) it contains an SSC that is included in cut sets that, when ranked in decreasing order, cumulatively account for about 90 percent of the CDF,3) it contains an SSC whose Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) exceeds 2.0, or 4) it contains an SSC whose Fussell-Vesely (FV) exceeds 0.001. The resulting systems were evaluated by the Maintenance Rule expert panel and a list of risk significant systems were selected.
Regardless of whether a system has been identified as important, the previously-mentioned ranking methods were again used to obtain preliminary component rankings. All IST components that satisfied any of the risk measure criteria were identified. All other pumps and valves not in the IST program but modeled in the IPE that satisfy any of the risk measures were also identified. The IST components were subsequently grouped into the similar importance categories described earlier. In some cases, IST components were categorized high even though the system was categorized low for the Maintenance Rule. In many cases, IST components i were ranked low even though the systems were ranked high. The principal reason for these differences was the unique functions performed by individual components in the system. In determining the importance at the component level, the overall importance of an IST component was determined by considering all pertinent failure modes and assuming all failure 4-8
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modes are changed simultaneously to 1.0 or 0.0 according to the type ofimportance measure ,
- being calculated. The results of the risk measure calculations at the component level are shown in Table 4.1-1. The table provides FV and RAW importance measures for IPE-modeled
' components found in the IST plan. Each importance measure is accompanied by its associated !
i ranking category. The importince measures shown are based on the IPE study and do not report , any additional evaluation or sensitivity study conclusions.
- . Symmetry Evalnation ;
j- When component ranking was performed, the preciseness of the ranking often exposed certain - , I limitations in the IPE that were important to ranking within systems. One such limitation was j the asymmetrical nature of the IPE system models. This limitation occasionally caused j l disparate rankings for similar components in the same system. Consequently, an effort was l
- performed to evaluate the effects of both IPE modeling approaches and plant alignment features [
- on the risk importance ofcomponents. The IPE-based ranking is performed on cutsets. These f cutsets are a combination of specific accident sequences and functional failures of major !
c components. To examine the effects ofIPE modeling approaches and plant alignment on ranking results, components that provide a similar functional role but exhibited different risk importance measures were each checked to determine the cause of these differences.
- i The differences identified in this evaluation were grouped into three categories. These are: 1) j those differences associated with initiating event assumptions,2) those differences associated l with plant alignment, and 3) those differences associated with support systems. For example, f the dominant contributor to differences associated with initiating events dealt with the assumed loss of a component due to the initiating event (e.g., the Loss of a DC Bus initiator assumes ;
- Train A PORV unavailable) thereby creating a higher importance for the opposite train U component (in the example given, the Train B PORV) when all sequences were considered. ;
The second group dealt with the increase in risk ranking due to plant alignment. In this case, , the additional failure modes associated with equipment in a standby train (e.g., failing to start) : compared to the opposite train assumed to be running created the differences between like components. For the last group, differences in importance measures were attributed to the slight ; differences in supporting systems. These differences were usually found to be associated with j the system alignment ( i.e., one train running, the other in stand-by) or in a few cases due to ; i 4-9 l
I ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page 33 or A45 n
' physical plant layout of the support systems.
The symmetry evaluation provided two major insights into the ranking ofIPE/IST components. First, the majority of similar components that had differences in importance measures were - attributed to the asymmetries in the support systems; and second, the original risk ranking categories of most components did not change as a result of this symmetry evaluation. For < those that were affected by the outconn of the symmetry evaluation, it was conservatively j assumed that the higher ranking of the similar components would be assigned to the group. 3 . This was done even though in some cases the higher ranked component may have been ranked equivalent to the lower component when the asymmetry was removed. p j Table 4.1-2 provides a list of the components whose risk rank changed due to the symmetry evaluation (i.e., low to medium, medium to high or low to high). A complete list of all IPE components in the IST program along with the evaluation of all similar components (pairs) and the groupings that form the basis for the revised component ranking is shown in Table 4.1-2a. Final Risk Ranking From IPE The final ranking of components was done using the high, medium or low categorization discussed above. Based on the selected categories and using Table 4.1-1, three lists were developed: 1) the list of pumps and valves not in the IST program that meet the criteria of the , high-risk category,2) the IST component list grouped into the anticipated high, medium and I low categories based on FV, and 3) the IST component list grouped into the anticipated i high/ low category based on RAW. Then these lists were reviewed by the Steering Committee, and subsequently reviewed by the CPSES expert panel using guidelines developed by the I Steering Committee for this review. L [ 4.1.2 External Events Rick Imnortance The previously-mentioned ranking is based upon the front-end IPE (i.e., those systems that can be used to prevent core damage). While the front-end IPE represents the majority of risk-significant components and accident initiators, the model is not complete. Therefore, to ensure
. an IST component is truly less-risk significant, a careful check was performed of the functions 4-10 ';
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ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page 34 of 86 , /x of each IST component in responding to extemal events. Extemal events such as fires, tomados or earthquakes can cause accidents that require components to perform IST functions. The IPEEE process produced quantitative and qualitative analyses to measure risk due to these three sources. The quantitative fire and tomado analyses indicated that risk levels were about one-half of that due to internal events, most of which was due to fire. The qualitative seismic analysis demonstrated that even with damage from a significant earthquake, at least two trains must then randomly fail for core damage to occur. A component's importance in responding to extemal events was evaluated using these quantitative and qualitative models. The process for generating and interpreting these importance measures is described below. Fires and tornados A cutset file was constructed for the risk significant fire and tornado scenarios from the CPSES IPEEE (Ref. 8). Using this cutset file, risk importance measures were calculated. A comparison of these calculated values and the IPE values was made to identify those components which were less risk significant for the IPE but more risk significant for fire and tomado. Twenty such I components were submitted to the expert panel for review. These twenty components were associated with fire-induced risk. No additional components were found to be risk significant due to wind that were not risk significant for IPE or fire. These insights are discussed in more detail below. The components and their ranking changes are shown in Table 4.1-3. Table 43-1a shows all the IPE components in IST that were evaluated for fire and tomado and the results of the evaluation. The expert panel confirmed that the basis for the ranking and the corresponding risk insights were reasonable (i.e., the risk importance of these components increased because the direct effects of the extemal event affected the ability of components in the opposite train to perform their intended function). The twenty additional components were ranked as more risk significant. It should be noted that importance measures calculated in this manner are believed to be conservative. The method for calculating the importance, namely considering each external event risk by itself, is cow-rvative. By generating importance relative only to external events, 4-11 , t
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^ '. . .
' rather than total CDF which is over two times higher, components uniquely.important to .
external events have an importance which is over two times higher than their importance to total
. CDF. I i
. In general, the additional importance of most of these components (12/20) is based on the increased importance of the Safety I'njection (SI) and Chemical and Volume Control system I
i _ (CS) systems to provide Reactor Coolant system (RCS) inventory makeup for fire-induced seal , LOCAs. Fire scenarios located in the plant electrical rooms as well as the control / cable ! spreading rooms tend to induce Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal failure and a loss of one train ] of ECCS equipment (mainly loss of motive / control power). For fires, these two systems are - more important than they are in the IPE. Consequently, those components with importance i
- - measures just below the IPE ranking threshold meet the ranking criteria for fire mitigation
) functions. f [
' Eight other components are important, two in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system and
! two in the UPS HVAC system. The RHR components are important for ECCS makeup in ?- recirculation mode. Their increased importance is for similar reasons as for SI and CS. In the , case of UPS HVAC, fire induced failures can cause failure of trains in multiple systems and l increase the importance of these components. The Main Steam system components are 7 , important for decay heat removal. l-In general, the risk insights associated with high winds (tomado) are similar to those associated l with fire. The results of the tornado analysis indicate that, unlike fire, no major safety systems / I components are lost due to the direct effects of the tornado and therefore, no new components were found to be more significant for wind than for IPE or fire. { I Seismic 1 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station is located in a region oflow seismicity, hence seismic 1 events pose very minimal risk of damage to the plants. (The safe shutdown earthquake for CPSES Units 1 and 2 is 0.12g peak ground acceleration (pga).] For this reason, the Nuclear i Regulatory Commission identified CPSES Units 1 and 2 as reduced-scope plants for the IPEEE and approved the use of the seismic margin evaluation to evaluate seismic severe accident risk 1 . I a. 4-12 i I i l l l
- _. , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _________o
4 ER-EA-009 I Revision 0 Page 36 of 345 in lieu of a seismic probabilistic risk assessment. TU Electric chose the reduced-scope seismic margin evaluation (SME) that is based on the EPRI methodology (Ref. 9). Since the seismic margin evaluation is not a PRA method, it does not provide a core damage frequency measure that can be used to rank components for seismic importance. As a result, dsk insights from the SME are qualitative in nature." However, for the IST risk based evaluation, the SME provides a list of equipment that is mquired for safe shutdown following a seismic event. This list, called the safe shutdown equipment list (SSEL), was reviewed for specific risk insights. In the seismic margin evaluation, the seismic event was assumed to cause a loss of offsite power and a very small break LOCA. The SSEL identifies the equipment that is required to mitigate these events. The SSEL is based only on the equipment modeled in the IPE for these events, and thus, it is comprised only of equipment included in the IPE. The SME included a review of containment systems and those containment systems components are included in this evaluation. The pumps and valves are either on the SSEL or containment systems list and in the IPE and in the IST; or on the SSEL or containment systems list that are in the IPE but not in the IST. A listing of equipment that is on the SSEL and in the IST program was developed and the > rankings of these components from the IPE were reviewed. The rankings show that the active components on the SSEL are included in this list and oe typically ranked medium to high. There is no seismic basis for ranking any of these components higher. Pumps and valves have generally performed well in seismic events up to 0.5g pga, and thus, they are considered to be seismically rugged to earthquake levels substantially above the SSE (0.12g) for CPSES. (The i SSEL is comprised of components that are seismic category I.) Further, the seismic review team noted that, in general, the response spectra developed for CPSES are conservative. Thus, for IST considerations of the SSEL equipment, there is no reason to assume that the failure rate for these components would be significantly higher in earthquake situations than otherwise. The experience data (Ref. 9, Appendix A) shows that some pumps wear out faster after earthquakes, possibly because of mis-alignment; however, given the relatively short mission time, this is not an important consideration. The frequency of seismic events at CPSES was also reviewed and found to be quite low. The frequency of occurrence of a seismic event greater than the SSE was determined to be about 4-13
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} .
l A- ~ 1.0E-4 events per year (Ref.10). It is assumed that for an SSE-type earthquake, a loss of offsite power and a very small break LOCA would result. Ratioing these initiating event frequencies with the earthquake frequencies and using the IPE calculated' core damage frequency l contributions from these initiating event types shows a seismic contribution to CDF from seismic events greater than the SSE to be less that SE-08. Thus, seismic events would likely l contribute little to overall core damage frequency. 1 [ r Consideration was also given to whether some components may have a higher importance in a seismic event. For example, for normal plant upsets, steam isolation is assumed to be at the turbine stop and control valves.' Since these components are not seismic category I, they were i not assumed to function in the seismic event and isolation was assumed to occur at the main n steam isolation valves (MSIV), either as a result of the main steam line break (MSLB) and , subsequent protection system closure or as the result of operator action to close the valves, an action that is proceduralized. The same is true for feedwater isolation. The IPE modeled the main steam line break initiating event with a frequency of 1.07E-2, and calculated a CDF i
~
contribution of 5.48 E-08. That initiating event frequency is 100 times higher than the assumed frequency of the SSE. dased on this, these valves should not be changed from low category. b Components that are on the SSEL and in the IPE, but not in the IST were also reviewed to determine whether any of these components should be evaluated further and on what basis. In general, the components that are in the IPE but not in the IST program have been reviewed and a determination has been made as to their disposition. The results of that review are included in section 4.1.6. For the seismic extemal events review, these valves were checked for type and function and it was concluded that they are generally those that are not required to be included e in the IST program. Most of the components in the SSEL but not in IST are manual valves that are locked in position and/or are in the required position. As noted above, there is no reason to assume that the failure rate for the SSEL components would be significantly higher in caithquake situations than otherwise. Based on the ruggedness of these components and the frequency and magnitude of seismic events at CPSES, none of these valves should be added to the IST program. 1 I
. Thus, it was concluded that components important to seismic safe shutdown are includedih nte ;
IST and are typically ranked higher; and given the ruggedness of pumps and valves in seismic , 4-14 ,c ! o i' !
l ER-EA-009 l ' Revision 0 ' Page 38 of 2 % l ,-w l events and given the relatively low frequency and magnitude of seismic events at CPSES, no
. components need to be increased in ranking category for seismic reasons.- ,
4.1.3 Ontaoe Rick imnortance A qualitative assessment of IPE systems modeled for shutdown modes was performed to $ determine the impact of shutdown modes on IST rankings. To perform tMs analysis a three step f process was used. First, using existing IPE system models as the basis, components and system configurations that are unique to the shutdown modes from the at power IPE were identified. ; Second, using a qualitative set of rules, components in key trains were ranked into three ; categories: 1) High Components- Category 1- High FV; 2) Potentially high components- ; Category 2- Low FV, moderate to high RAW; and 3) Category 3 - Low Importance. Third, supports that are unique to shutdown configurations were identified and ranked accordingly. There are several safety functions important to shutdown. These are Over-Pressure Protection, : Shutdown Cooling, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, Inventory Control, Reactivity Control, AC Power, and Containment Integrity. Rather than analyzing each function separately, the systems l required for the shutdown accident sequences were analyzed and ranked with respect to their i shutdown configuration. This provided a comprehensive review of the shutdown systems and their unique configurations. Typical accident sequences for loss of decay heat removal and loss ofinventory are given below. , t h h t 4-15 ; m I
._ _ _ _ . . . . .- . __ . . . . _ . . ~ _ , _ _ _ . . _ . . . ....__..._....._...m .
ER-EA-009 - l Revision 0 Page 39 of 295 1
. Initiating RHR Secondary Feed and Gravity Feed End State j Event / Loss . Fails Heat Removal Bleed Fails .. from RWST ofDHR Fails Fails
.OK OK i OK ,
OK Core Damage r Figure 4.-2: Typical Accident Sequence- Loss of Decay Heat Removal t Initiating Loss of Loss of Safety Loss of RHR Gravity Feed End State Event / Charging Injection from RWST LOCN Fails Draindown i OK OK OK OK Core Damage i Figure 4-3: Typical Accident Sequence- LOCA Inadvertent Draindown j
?
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The risk profile for an outage changes as maintenance activities start and stop and plant states' - 4
- change. Therefore, the importance ofcomponents can also change during the outage, depending .
- on the plant configuration as govemed by the outage schedule. There can be times when almost ;
any component can become more risk significant depending upon the outage scenario. If the 7 l 2 - plant is in a configuration ofidereased risk, and an IST component must operate to respond to an accident, that component will be more risk significant for that time period. If that period of.. 7 time is extended, then the component on average will be more risk significant.
' 'Ihe use of the Outage Safety Function Guide (Ref. I1), station administrative procedures and the ORAM software (Ref.12) tend to minimize periods ofincret. sed risk with contingency plans .
and increased awareness. Outage risk evaluations indicate that outage risk is lower than at ] power risk.- Therefore, there should be no time period ofincreased risk that would cause an j unimportant component at power to be important during an outage if the component performs L the same function. ! A major difference between at power and shutdown is that safety systems are in a standby mode i at power and active components' must start or reposition automatically for success. Since ! - actuation failure is much more likely than failure to continue to operate, a reliability-orierted l 3 risk importance measure like Fussell-Vcsely is lower for outage than at power. However, since } functional importance is similar, the RAW value is likely to be the same and its FV is correspondingly lower. Also, during shutdown, automatic actuations are blocked and pumps and valves are actuated by manual operation only. Since the failure probability for human i action may at times be more likely than automatic actuation, the contribution of equipment failure is relatively less likely. Therefore, in most cases the ranking of components at power is higher than during shutdown, although the system configuration must still be compared to $ determine if there are unique differences for the shutdown mode. Based upon the insights discussed above, the approach to risk ranking is as follows: J
. If a component performs the same function and is in the same initial state as at power,
. i the at power ranking is assumed to bound the outage ranking.
* 'If a component performs a different function or is in a different initial state than at power, then the outage ranking must be evaluated.
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I' ER-EA-009 - l Revision 0 Page 41 of 295 n , The latter evaluation involves cases where a different system is used, i.e., spent fuel pool cooling, or where a different function is performed by a component in a system "used" at power , or during an outage. Additionally the following mies are a guide to risk ranking for shutdown. , 4 i Hioh Comnonents- Category 1- High FV: i
- Pumps that must start to perform function (assume all pumps in systems that (
cycle operating trains)(High FV) i .
- Motor Operated Valve (MOV) or Air Operated Valve (AOV) that must change !
state to perform function (but not portions with redundant paths, e.g. two supply r '~ sources to one pump)(High FV)
- MOV or AOV that must change state to prevent flow diversion that can fail ,
redundant trains (high FV, extremely high RAW) , j . . Pressure relief valves (safety or power operated) needed to control pressure so i
- that redundant trains of systems can perfonn function (high FV or low FV, high ,
l MM . 1 7-Potentially High Comoonents- Catenorv 2- Low FV. Moderate to High RAW: i l !
- Pumps that must continue running (low FV, moderate RAW)
!
- Valves in single path portions of redundant systems that are not required to ;
change state (RHR outlet valves)(usually low FV, moderate or high RAW) j
\ ;
- Check valve plus MOV or AOV that must remain as is if they are in the trains ,
j only flow path (low FV, moderate RAW) J !
- Check valves for which reverse flow can fail redundant trains simultaneously l (low FV, extremely high RAW)
L
- MOV or AOV which if they change state can cause flow diversion that can fail 4
- 4-18
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. ER-EA-009 . ;
Revision 0 Page 4 or 195 j j 6 . redundant trains (Iow FV, extremely high RAW) }- t
- Control components that need to function to prevent system degradation (e.g. j AFW flow control valves to the Steam Generators that can fail the Turbine
. Driven AFW pump)(low FV, moderate RAW) ;
~ Cateoorv 3 - Low imnortance: 1 I . !
- All other Components that do not fall into category 1 or 2 were ranked low. t i
- These rules were applied to the systems that support the safety functions described above. What i . follows is a detailed discussion of the considerations for the systems and functions, provided either at the function level or at the system level or both, depending on the nature of the function l i
and its associated systems. The results of the evaluation are shown in Tables 4.1-4 and 4.1-4a. $ Table 4.1-4 shows only those components that increased in risk due to outage considerations. j Table 4.1-4a shows the results of the outage evaluation for all the IPE in IST components, j including the ranking disposition. l t l Containment Inteurity i !j The shutdown requirements for containment integrity are bounded by the IPE. Therefore, the l causes oflarge, early release (LER) for shutdown are bounded by the IPE. Also the Outage ; Safety Function Guide (OSF) delineates the requirements for containment closure for modes i j 5 and 6. The OSF requires that open penetrations and all open hatches must be capable of being closed prior to reaching saturation of the RCS. Pre-approved means of temporarily sealing open ; penetrations are required and disconnect capability is required for lines routed through open hatches. Activities that require opening of containment during periods of reduced inventory or j mid-loop are avoided. 4 i t - Low Temnerature Over Pressure Mitiontion 1 i i Over pressure mitigation is required by CPSES technical specifications to protect the RCS from i t L pressure transients and possib'y causing damage to the RCS. This protection is required in 4-19 i 4 l I _~ l
7
< . -. ___ _. . . . _ __ _ .- ~ _ ___. _ -_
l' L l ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page 6 or A95 F : modes 5 and 6 whenever the RCS is not vented through a large vent path. Over pressure ! mitigation is provided by having a combination of relief paths available. The valves required for this function are 1-8708A and B (RHR suction relief valves) and 1-PCV-0455A and 1-PCV-0456 (Pressurizer PORVs). ' These four valves would be ranked Category 1 for shutdown. -] However, since the PORVs are ranked high for IPE and the RHR suction relief valves are f ranked high by the expert panel for insurance reasons, no additional evaluation is required. .l Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System . l 1 The AFW system is only required for a short time during refueling outages. Early in the outage, before RHR is placed in service, AFW is used in conjunction with the Atmospheric Relief l l Valves (ARVs) or the steam' dumps to cool down the RCS. Typically after the first day or two of thei outage, AFW could not be used because the steam generators have been drained and there ; is no path for cooling. After the RCS has been depressurized and the reactor head lifted, then even in accident conditions AFW could not function. When shutting down the AFW pumps in , accordance with SOP-304A, "AFW System Operating Procedure", section 5.2 pertains to i i placing the system in shutdown or standby. Therefore, the AFW system will operate the same as at power when used for shutdown cooling except that no automatic actions take place, all actions will be initiated by the operators. While this may change the importance of the j operators, the equipment importance should remain about the same unless operator actions were } extremely unreliable. j Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System During shutdown operation the RHR system would normally be operating on a flow path taking a suction from the hot legs and discharging to the cold legs. There are times when the refueling ; cavity is being filled that the suction path would be from the Refueling Water Storage Tank
- (RWST) to the cold legs or when the cavity is being drained the discharge would be back to the l RWST. For a large part of the outage, the system is operating with one train in service and the other stopped but operable. The RHR system can be in several different configurations during l the outage, they are as follows:
i a Mode 4 or 5 with the RCS intact, one/both trains in operation to cool down the primary. ! 1 4-20 ; i I w._ , _ . .-. ._- . - .- .. .-- - - . -
l ER-EA-009 ' ! Revision 0 i I' Page M of M 5 - l q-e
.- ' Flooding the refueling cavity from the RWST l l
. ? Draining'the refueling cavity to the RWST l
- Reduced inventory operation / midloop operation The RHR IPE system notebook contains a valve alignment chart for the different modes of - l i
operation of the system including shutdown cooling. The valves included are the major flow-path control' valves required for success. SOP-102A, " Residual Heat Removal System" was
- also reviewed to determine if any unique configurations or components exist for this system l I
when the plant is in shutdown modes. The most significant difference between shutdown and standby configuration of RHR is that the hot leg retum valves 1-8701 A and B and 1-8702A and B are open for Shut Down Cooling (SDC), while for low pressure injection, high head l recirculation and cold and hot leg recirculation these valves remain closed. Valves 1-8701 A ar.d l B and 1-8702A and B are in the IST program and in the IPE. Because these valves must remain ; open for shutdown cooling to function, they meet one of the criteria for category 2 ranking. j However, since these valves are ranked high for IPE and accident mitigation, no additional l t evaluation is required. i In IPO-010A "RCS Reduced Inventory Operations," RHR flow is maintained by manually l t tinottling the RHR heat exchanger flow control valves (1-HCV-0606 &O607) and the heat l exchanger bypass flow control valve (1-FCV-0618 &O619). The significant difference between j shutdown and standby configurations is that these valves must perform a control function for l SDC, while for low pressure injection, high head recirculation and cold and hot leg recirculation l these valves must only remain as is. Because these valves must operate for shutdown cooling , to function, they meet one of the criteria for category I ranking. However, valves 1-FCV-0618
&0619 are low importance category. Even if they fail closed, the flow path through the heat ;
exchangers is still available. Excessive cooldown can still occur but this will not fail the l function of RHR. If they transfer open, then DHR capability will be reduced but adequate time I for operator action would be available. ! If RCS level is reduced below 56 inches (midloop) then the cold leg injection valves (MOVs l 1-8809A and B) are deenergized and manually throttled to maintain flow to prevent vortexing
]
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ER-EA-009 l !: Revision 0 Page 45 or MS !W . o
- of the RHR pumps.1 After the valves are deenergized and throttled they must only remain "as !
is" for shutdown cooling to function. Therefore, they meet one of the criteria for category 2
' ranking. If this evolution is performed with the core offloaded, then these valves would be ranked low. However, since these valves are ranked high for IPE, no additional evaluation is required. - During power operation, these valves are open for low pressure injection. During shutdown cooling, these valves are closed and function as boundary valves for SDC.
Upon loss of SDC, MOVs 1-8812A&B can be opened and used for gravity drain from the l RWST to the RCS in accordance with ABN-104A, " Residual Heat Removal System ! Malfunction". These valves meet one of the criteria for category I ranking. However, since ; these valves are ranked high for IPE, no additional evaluation is required. . Sent Fuel Pool Coolino (SFPC) System ; i
- SOP-506, " Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Operating Procedure," and the IPE j system notebook for SFPC were reviewed for this analysis. The SFPC system is somewhat less i i
complex than other systems to analyze because it was designed only for manual operation. Th: system consist of two independent trains of cooling, each capable of supplying the fuel pool for both units 1 and 2. The SFPC pumps are powered from common 480 VAC motor control i centers which can be supplied from either unit I or unit 2. If unit 1 is in an outage, the power ; supplies will be aligned to unit 2 and the reverse is true if unit 2 is in an outage. The SFPC heat , exchangers are cooled by non-safeguards CCW. For this analysis, it is assumed that train B SFPC is cooling the fuel pools and train A is available. The SFPC system has other functions, such as cleanup, associated with it but only the safety function of cooling is considered here. ; r The only time the SFPC system can contribute to core damage is during fuel movement. During these times, the refueling cavity is flooded (ABN-909, " Spent Fuel Pool / Refueling Cavity Malfunction") and time to RCS boiling and core damage is many hours, giving operators time to recover faulted equipment. Therefore, SFPC system components would be ranked low with regard to core damage. , l There is also risk associated with boiling and consequently fuel danmge in the spent fuel pool. I However, the time to boiling for the SFP is typically many hours (approximately 8 hours with 4 22 i _ _ = . - - - .
e , 4 I ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page Wo of495 i ' newly discharged fuel) and there is much redundancy in the electric power and cooling water $ supports. Therefore, the components of this system would all be ranked low importance. , 4 Safety Iniection (SI) System
, a 4 When in a shutdown condition, the safety injection pumps will be safety tagged and cold leg -
I injection isolation valve MOV l-8835 (in IST) will be closed ~and the power tumed off
- according to IPO-005A," Plant Cooldown from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown," and SOP-201 A," Safety Injection System Operating Procedure". If a loss of SDC occurs, the SI pumps
-f could be used to provide injection to the RCS if RHR could not be recovered or if secondary j . heat removal is not available. The operators would have to manually recover the pumps and then perform the valve alignment in accordance with IPO-0010A, " Reactor Coolant Reduced ;
Inventory Operation," and ABN104A," Residual Heat Removal System Malfunction," or ABN- , 108A, " Shutdown Loss of Coolant,"(depending upon mode and RCS status). Valve 1-8835. would become a category I valve for shutdown but all other components would rank the same j as at power (standby condition). However, since these valves are ranked high for fire and accident mitigation, no additional evaluation is required. i il The SI accumulators could also be used to mitigate an accident during shutdown if any of the ; i accumulators are not drained for maintenance and the discharge valves (1-8808A,B,C and D) were manually opened. However, since the accumulators will be in various stages of maintenance and there are redundant water supplies, these valves are ranked low. ; Chemical and Volume Control System (CSV Emergency Boration l , y When shutting down the plant from hot standby to cold shutdown using IPO-005A, " Plant ; !- Cooldown from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown," step 5.1.40 directs operators to place at least _ t ~ one chargmg pump m an moperable status within four hours after entering mode 4. The pump selected for this step could be the positive displacement pump (PDP) or one of the centrifugal charging pumps (CCPs), although it would be more conservative for this study to assume that l j one of the CCPs is made inoperable. In reviewing the SOP for shutting down the CCPs, it was . found that no valves required for high head safety injection are repositioned in this step. l 4-23
.[
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ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page W7 of A% n Emergency boration is accomplished by pumping fluid from the boric acid tanks with the boric acid transfer pumps to the suction of the CCPs. This flow path can also be achieved using gravity feed from the boric acid tanks' to the CCPs. There are many redundant flow paths for accomplishing emergency boration (ABN-107A," Emergency Boration") therefore, all components are ranked low for this function. 4.1.4 Back-end Rink Imnortance - Past ranking calculations have been developed mostly from front-end IPE analysis rather than from back-end IPE analysis. It is equally important to identify those pumps and valves that prevent containment failure or bypass that could result in an unacceptable release. Examples might include the valves that provide the boundary between the reactor coolant system and low-pressure systems located outside containment. Those IPEs with back-end analyses can be used to establish analogous rankings. Various analyses have sh..wn that large releases, though infrequent and of low probability, tend to dominate offsite consequences. Therefore, those IST components identified by back-end analyses may be ranked according to their importance to large-release frequency only. , Containment isolation failures or containment bypass events can, in some accident scenarios, cause a large, early release. The associated valves represent a substantial fraction of [ components treated by the IST program. However, their importance varies significantly j depending on their initial position, their size, the leak path they are in, etc. These factors should be evaluated with a simple model consistent with the IPE back-end analysis. Risk importances of containment functions were measured by developing quantitative importance measures for accidents contributing to large, early releases (LERs). The CPSES IPE i was reviewed and accident scenarios were classified as to whether or not they were large, early releases. l The EPRI PSA Applications Guide was used as a basis for the definition of a LER. However, because of the NRC's concern regarding that definition documented in Appendix D of the - Guide, additional consideration was given to certain accident scenarios that may be subject to l 4-24 f
- - - -w- -
- . w w e e v .ew. w ,,w--, w
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- ER-EA-009 j Revision 0 Page W or 29 5 m . 4: interpretation. Specifically, compensatory actions were required for large releases that were not I classified as early (see below). The CPSES IPE found that large, early releases are more likely to result from accidents with the
- following attributes
i . A failure in containment exists at the time of the accident, either because the containment fails to isolate or it is bypassed, or a A high-pressure core meltdown occurs with containment heat removal (sprays) L unavailable at the time of core melting. One cause of a large, early release is a steam generator tube rupture, with immediate failure of 3 core cooling, and failure of the main steam system to isolate. A large but not early release can ' also occur if the same scenario occurs except that co e cooling fails late in the accident rather than immediately. This latter scenario is the most likely source of a large release. However, ; because adequate time would be available to implement emergency response measures, this source of a large release was not considered in the importance measure calculation. Instead, the most important sources of main steam isolation failure were considered potentially important and were reviewed by the expert panel to determine if the associated valves should be categorized as high. The expert panel decided to require compensatory measures if the valves were not otherwise ranked high. l Except for the previous scenarios, there are essentially four sources of potential contributors to large, early release. The sources are:
- containment cooling systems
- containment isolation valves
. high-low pressure interface valves, and a safety systems uniquely important to preventing high pressure core melt scenarios.
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. The rankings of the components as' sates vith these sources are shown in Table 4.1-5 and 4.1- j Sa Table 4.1-5 provides a list of a c- ponents that were determined to be high/ medium j category for large, early release. Table 4.1-Sa shows all the components that were evaluated in l the study and the results of the evaluation. A description of the evnluation of each source is
{ provided here with emphasis bn the specific components imponant to each source. j l Containment sorays ! In the case of containment cooling systems, CPSES uses containment spray for heat removal. l
- Because of a few key factors, containment spray is not risk significant at CPSES when LERF j is considered. First, CPSES uses a large, dry containment with significant energy retaining (
capability. As a result, the containment can withstand significant energy releases without heat _ 'l removal and still reliably remain intact. Therefore, the probability of containment failure does ! i i not change significantly for cases where containment spray does not function except in , scenarios involving reactor pressure vessel failure at high pressure during core melt down. [ J Second, containment sprays require support systems, e.g., electric power and component l cooling water systems. Failutes of these support systems are ofkn the cause of core damage. l Hence, the operability of the containment spray system is moot for most dominant sequences. ; 4 These two factors combine te make containment spray system components rank low for LERF. l It should be noted-that despite this risk information, the expert panel decided to rank ; containment spray pumps high because of past problems with pump vibration. In-service l testing was deemed by the panel as an effective means to ensure that such problems have been I j' resolved. Because containment spray pumps were classified as high, many containment spray valves that rank low will be " tested" when the pump IST tests are performed. Many of the other i active components, e.g., MOVs, are tested because of technical specification requirements for . t ) slave relay testing. Hence, while IST testing would be reduced for the remainder of the containment spray system components, there are adequate compensa: cry measures to ensure that containment spray will be a reliable system at CPSES. i 4-26 1 4
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ER-EA-009 i Revision 0 Page So or 295 ; , ' Containment Isolation Valves (CIV) , 5 The CIV analysis calculation was reviewed by the expert panel with respect to which l
. containment penetrations required detailed evaluations. It was concluded that the analysis {
4 assumptions pertaining to important penetration valves was acceptable. The detailed analysis j j was broken down into two parts, the first CIV and the second main steam line break isolation f 1 i following a SGTR. l; 3 j The cutsets were reviewed for each set of CIVs to determine which would have the equivalent { of a high FV with respect to LERF. Four lines dominate the contribution of CIVs to LERF. l 1 Based on the value of this contribution, any single line would have a FV LERF of about 5.0E-03 j
- or a medium FV ranking. Bcsed on the IPE results for CIV, the following valves contribute !
L i greater than 1% to the total cutset CIV and therefore when combined with the FV measure ( calculated above, would remain above the high/ medium-low cutoff. The remaining quantified ! 4 )- valves and those valves not explicitly modeled in the IPE would be considered low in ranking. i { Hich/ medium LDE . n i i 1-HV-5157 1-HV-5548 I-HV-5158 1-HV-5549 f ! l HV-4725 1-HV 3487 b l HV-4726 1CI-0030 t 1-8160 [ 1-8153 1-7136 i ! l-LCV 1003 t 1 i i For SGTR scenarios, isolation was not a significant (i.e., >0.1%) contributor to LERF. The l most frequent SGTR and isolation failures were large releases but not early ones. Because these
- {
! teleases were large, the :xpert panel decided as a precautionary measure to require - compensatory measures for steam line isolation valves, or if no appropriate measure was 1 t 4-27 i i i i
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 ! Page S/ of195
- m. ,
available, to rank them higher. A similar approach was taken to the CIV case and again four j lines dominated the IPE results for SGTR isolation. However in this case, valves that , contributed greater than 0.1% to the cutsets total probability were considered potentially ! important for large releases, thus necessitating additional review and expert panel action. The ; remainder were ranked low. - [ However, while reviewing the IPE results, the expert panel identified that specific operator actions, namely closing certain valves, to isolate the leak path had not been fully credited. (Leak path isolation is identified in the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) as an operator action for SGTR.) When such actions were determined to be practical for the accident scenario, j three of the four sets of valves were found by the expert panel not to require compensatory actions. The remaining valve set was checked for compensatory measures and found to be : satisfactory. ; i Comnenutory Action Reauired Lag 1 HV 2409 l HV-2333A 1-HV-2397 l-HV-2452-1 1 HV 2397A 1-PV-2325 1CI-0300 , { 1-HV-3487 1Cl-0030 g Valves corresponding to steam generators 2,3 & 4 were grouped with their associated valves.
- The valves presented above are for steam generator 1. !
i High-Low Pressure Interface Interfacing Systems LOCA (ISLOCA) sequences were reviewed to determine their significance , to large, early release frequency. The following summarizes the results of this review. There are ten (10) ISLOCA initiating events in the IPE. These were reviewed to identify specific j valves contributing to each initiator. Only four (4) contribute more than 1% to total LER risk. l ISLOCA sequences represent roughly 14% of total LER risk. ISLOCA valves most significant l to LER risk involve valves in the RHR suction, low pressure injection (LPI) and intermediate I injection (IPI) lines. 4-28
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Based on the information above, equivalent FV relative to LERF can be determined for each line and the components in the line can then be assigned the appropriate risk ranking. The l rankings of the ISLOCA valves is shown below. Hioh/madium . g i 1 8717 1-8890A 1-8701A 1-8890B l 8701B l-8825 ! l 8702A 18809A i 1-8702B l8809B [ 1-8818A 1-8841 A i 1 8818B l-8841B = l l-8818C 18949A l-8818D l 8949B , l l-8948A 1-8949C 1-8948B l-8949B ; 1 8948C 18802A i 1-8948D l 8802B i ISI-8819A 1 8835 ISI-8819B ISI-8905A ! 1 ISI-8819C ISI-8905B '! ISI-8819D ISI8905C ISI-8905D Safety Systems Uniauely Imnortant to Preventing High Pressure Core Melt Scenarios The evaluation oflarge, early releases based on the accident sequence cutsets indicated that core damage sequences that resulted in high pressure core melt scenarios were more important than other scenarios. These scenarios tended to involve RCP seal LOCA and transients that resulted from loss ofinjection. Because of a marginal increase in importance in these scenarios over their contribution to core damage frequency, certain components in Si and CS increased in importance. These components tended to be slightly below the threshold for FV relative to 4-29
I ER EA-009 Revision 0 Page 53 or 295 CDF, but with their elevated importance tended to exceed the threshold. The components ranked high because of LERF are listed below. Hich/ medium 1-8806 1-8923B l-8835 1 8926 1-8923A X-PCV Hil6A & B 4.1.5 IST Components Not in the IPE Just as there may be IPE components that do not appear within the scope of ASME Code Classes 1,2 and 3, there can be components within the IST scope that do not appear within a plant IPE. While the front-end IPE model represents the majority of risk-significant components, it is not complete. For example, accident scenarios involving passive pipe breaks and ruptures in the RCP thermal barrier heat exchangers were not included. That is, such scenarios were not explicitly modeled by the IPE. (However, in effect they were modeled implicitly.) Therefore, to ensure an IST component is truly low risk, a careful check was performed of the functions of each IST component (e.g., flowpath boundary) that are not explicitly modeled in the IPE. The unmodeled components and functions were reviewed to determine if they belonged in the IPE. If so, then they were carefully documented and can be added to the IPE as appropriate. Their equivalent importance was determined u. sing insights gained from implementing the ranking methods discussed previously. The method for ranking them was similar to the qualitative component ranking process used for outage risk and described in section 4.1.3. The components that were considered are shown in Table 4.1-6. l The first effort in assuring completeness in the ranking process was to compare the typical IPE
" safety functions" to typical IST component functions. After a general understanding of how the two " safety models" compare, a detailed component and function level comparison was performed. This comparison essentially linked the IPE to the design basis, thereby allowing 4-30 i
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'Page M of M 6 j 0,, a probabilistic and deterministic insights to be integrated in a traceable format. l l
. IST Functions There are two basic types ofIST functions. The first is to maintain the integrity I
of fission product boundaries, and the second is to ensure safety system operability. Table 4.1-6a indicates those IST functions and the systems that perform them. These IST functions ensure ' the integrity of the primary and secondary systems and provide containment isolation. The table also indicates the IST functions and the systems that require them to ensure system operability, j namely the system flowpath and system flowpath boundary functions. The IPE ofkn implicitly models the integrity of fission product boundaries in a number ofways.
. Some IST components are represented by high level basic events such as initiating events, whereas other components are excluded because they mitigate highly unlikely scenarios.
Initiating events such as small LOCAs and main steam line breaks outside containment l implicitly include some contribution from spurious opening ofIST relief valves or MOVs, and interfacing system LOCAs include similar contributions plus reverse flow from IST check j valves. Also, the IPE ofkn makes assumptions based on the low likelihood of certain scenarios that exclude from explicit models the possibility ofIST valves failing to function. Examples of this include:
. system pipe breaks occurring coincidentally with an accident, followed by IST valve failure;
- multiple failure of fail safe valves; and .
1
- failure of multiple relief valves to open, sometimes at substantially elevated pressure, coincidentally with failure of power-operated relief valves. l The IPE explicitly models most safety system operability functions. For example, most if not all components in the system flowpath are modeled by the IPE. Exceptions to this, that is where system flowpath is not modeled, include five IST functions that are assumed to have low significance due to ample opportunity for operator action to recover, restore or establish an alternative, and one function that is considered part of the basic events used to model the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The five that are assumed to have low significance are:
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- 0' . Boration dilution;
* ' Spent fuil pool cooling;
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r
. Spent fuel pool emergency makeup; a.
. . Sump discharge (equipment sumps); and !
- Surge tank emergency makeup. l
. The IST safety function that is considered part of the EDG is: ;
. ' Pump discharge (lube oil and jacket water for the EDG). ;
While in most cases, IST functions for system flowpath are modeled in the IPE, the IPE often i does not explicitly model IST components that are intended to function to ensure the system flowpath boundary is maintained. Such flowpath boundary valves and pump mini-flow paths ; 1 are often evaluated implicitly by the IPE but not modeled explicitly. IPE functions Table 4.1-6b compares the IST and IPE functions looking from the perspective of the IPE. It presents the IPE safety function and the corresponding IST function. As can be l seen, the IST safety functions represent most of the IPE safety functions. i Evaluation ofIST Comoonents not Explicitiv Modeled by the IPE Given the development of this basic understanding ofIST and IPE safety functions, a process f was developed for evaluating components not explicitly modeled by the IPE. The process for ; evaluating such components depended heavily on two sources ofinformation. One of the most j important sources was the IPE system notebook documentation of why certain components, j primarily flowpath boundary components and pump mini-flow lines, were not needed. The r CPSES IPE was particularly strong in this regard. As compared to many PRAs which assume [ that small flowpaths will not divert sufficient flow to affect system function, the CPSES IPE was supported by a number of thermal-hydraulic calculations. These deterministic calculations j which supported the IPE were valuable additions to the engineering judgement available from the expert panel. 4-32 c a
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p ' The second source ofinformation was the expert panel knowledge of plant operations and .
~ design. Plant operations support and engineering support from the panel was used to rank a number of components such as those associated with surge tank emergency makeup. In this [
case for example, the frequency of use of the system was an important factor in the ranking. In [ other cases, the expert panel served as an expedient source for understanding system operatica t and verifying the component failure modes that would have to occur and redundant components required to fail for the IST function to be needed. In these cases, documentation was provided ; i which demonstrated that system failure modes were unlikely enough that components should be ranked low. l 3 The evaluation was documented in two forms. First, expert panel meeting minutes were f developed that identified the component, the IST function, the risk ranking, the panel basis, compensatory actions (for potentially high components) and comments that often clarified the technical basis for ranking. The ranking was again performed qualitatively but based on l component performance insights drawn from the IPE quantitative risk determination. A summary of the expert panel meeting results is provided in Tables 4.4-1 and 4.4-2. , i i 4.1.6 High-Risk IPE Comnonents Not in the IST Program ; The importance of a risk-based approach to component ranking includes identification of other i high risk pumps and valves that are not in the IST program but that should have testing j commensurate with their importance. An evaluation of such components was done as part of j this study. This involved a careful evaluation of the IPE modeling assumptions and ! 1 conservatisms, component failure modes, operator action, recoveries and any other effects that ] could substantiate the rankings. These were reviewed by the expert panel. Table 4.1-7 lists the f importance ranking of pumps and valves explicitly modeled in the IPE that are not in the IST program. Table 4.4-2a describes the expert panel disposition of these components and any recommended compensatory actions. . Generally, the panel felt that additional evaluation was required to determine the appropriate testing requirements. The panel concluded that it was not clear that strict compliance with the ASME code recommendations was the most appropriate means for addressing the IPE failure mode. In the case of manual valves, no ASME code testing requirements applied to these specific cases since the valves in question had no remote 4-33
ER EA-009 Revision 0 Page PI of.M6 position indication. The panel felt that current plant programs to ensure that these valves remain open were commensurate with the importance of these valves. In other cases, the panel determined that the IST test would be the most appropriate (e.g., Instrument Air system relief valves will be bench tested per IST requirements.) 1 4.2 Completeness Issues Quantitative risk models have limitations associated with the structure of the models and the assumptions and the input data used. The limitations were compensated for by evaluating truncation limits, identifying IST components masked by the IPE, applying a conservative treatment of common cause failures, requiring the expert panel to identify components with operational concerns, and performing selected sensitivity studies. The details of the evaluations of each of these completeness issues are presented in the sections that follow. 4.2.1 Truncation Limits The risk ranking process described above used the FV and RAW importance measures. The values for these importance measures were calculated based on cutsets. The process also involved a cumulative effects analysis that determined new risk levels given an increase in the in-service test interval. Cutsets were obtained by solving the model with a truncation limit. Experience has shown that setting the truncation limit arbitrarily low creates inefficiencies such that analysis costs quickly exceed the value of risk insights gained. This project evaluated the truncation limit used in the CPSES IPE and found it to be sufficient for both risk ranking and estimating cumulative effects. Ideally, IPE models would be solved without a truncation limit so that the cutset file would be an exact representation of the plant model. In the past, technology limits of computers and I cutset solution algorithms have made it difficult to use very low truncation limits. These technology limits have often been seen as the reason for selecting truncation limits. For the CPSES IPE, limits of technology were not the overriding constraint. The actual constraint on truncation limits was the ability to review the cutsets and evaluate realistic operator actions that would occur. That is, the actual constraint was performing recovery analysis. ! 4-34 l l 1 l
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Iflarge numbers of cutsets are found and recovery analyses are not performed, then this set of conservative cutsets can mask other contributors. That is, a large number of marginal, but ! conservative cutsets will reduce the relative contribution of dominant cutsets. If the { contribution of unrecovered cutsets is enough, the importance of a dominant contributor might : be reduced below the FV limit. Therefore, a balance must be made when choosing the truncation limit. Creating conservatisms that mask component importance of non-truncated components must be balanced against eliminating components from the cutset list. The CPSES IPE quantification approach tended to maximize the amount of un-truncated but : recovered cutsets. In the CPSES IPE, a number ofimportant efforts were employed to add ! efficiency and improve understanding of the model so that recovery analysis could be performed both accurately and on as many cutsets as possible. The plant model was structured to make solving the model and performing recovery analysis easier. Segments or modules were { developed which represent logical portions of a system flow path. These segments are a group of basic events performing the same " function" in the fault tree. By grouping basic events in this manner, pumps, motor operated valves (MOVs) and check valves performing the same .i function are considered at the same time. This process results in a recovery analysis for one i event rather than three and it prevents truncating the lower probability portion of the train, e.g., . the manual valves. As will be seen below this method results in truncation of very few of the IST components modeled in the CPSES IPE. ) The models were also built to make recovery analysis easier. Equipment used in most recovery actions were included specifically in the model rather than implicitly in the operator action j event. The recovery process also included a rule-based recovery technique that automated ; simple recc ,eries and allowed more effort to be placed on complex actions and on additional cutsets, Finally, the CPSES recovery analysis used a program called BROWSER which ; allowed cutset impacts to be viewed directly for their impact on the plant model. Since analysts spent less time tracing down model links, more time could be spent performing recovery analysis and ensuring operator actions were correctly included. These efficiencies allowed the ,] CPSES IPE to use a relatively low truncation limit and yet perform detailed recovery analysis on a large fraction of the cutsets. l 4-35 l
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ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page 69 or 195 e p . For the IST project,'a change to the truncation limit was made to ensure the IPE recovery ; analysis insights were properly reflected in the IST importance calculations. The intemal events l
~
' portion of the IPE contained cutsets at or above IE-09. In the course of recovering cutsets in l the original IPE effort, some of the cutsets between 1E-08 and 1E-09 were recovered and some - 1 were not.- The concern was that including the components associated with the unrecovered !
cutsets would potentially mask the importance of some other components. I t
'Before a change to the truncation limit was made, an analysis was performed to determine whether the truncated model provided a good representation of the full model, i.e., were there l
any components that were significant from a risk perspective not included as a result of the j change in truncation. The analysis looked at components not in the IE-08 list but in the IE-09 list. The following findings confirmed the change would provide a complete representation of l IST component importance. t
. Valves that appear in the risk achievement worth list tend to be those in low !
probability cutsets that were not recovered.
. The majority of the components on the list have RAW values less than 2.0 and ;
thus are not important with respect to risk ranking.
. Most of the components with RAW values above 2.0 are manual valves
- . Those components that are not manual valves have RAW near 2.0.
Finally, those components in the IE-08 model that were ranked low but were just below the cutofflimit were reviewed with respect to their basic events found in the 1E-09 list. It was
- concluded that the additional risk associated with these truncated cutsets would not cause these components to change ranking categories. The results of this analysis therefore concluded that all the pumps and valves that should be considered in the risk-based review are included in the cutsets greater than or equal to IE-08.
l- The effectiveness of both the truncation limit and the model building process was further i 4-36 i , e
, - - - - . . . ~ . . . - . . - . . . - - .- - - - -
4 ER EA-009 Revision 0 ' Page 60 or 295 [p confirmed by the expert panel. Occasionally, the panel identified conservatisms in a RAW or FV measure for a component close to the ranking threshold. Their findings caused changes to f the component rankings for a few components. But because so few changes were made, the panel review further demonstrated the reasonableness and the completen'ess of the recovery analysis. This process of model solution and review as discussed above indicated that even though the truncation limit was set relatively low, it was appropriate to avoid masking conservatisms. In addition to the above effort, three mathematical tests were performed to validate the truncation limit used in the IPE. First, as described above,'little change was found in I importance ranking from 1E-8 to IE-9 truncation. This provides indication that lowering the limit'would probably not change ranking results. . Second, as a further mathematical test and to better understand the effect of using segments, the cutset list was expanded so that all basic events in the truncated segment file were explicitly represented. The expanded list included cutsets as low as IE-24. The number of cutsets expands from about 900 to nearly 20,000. Of these, nearly half are below IE-12. Consequently, while the truncation limit is set at 1 E-8, because of the use of segments, the limit
) is equivalent to a much lower limit in a model containing solely basic events.
As a final test, it was noted that the CPSES truncation limit is comparable to the EPRI PSA Applications Guide recommendation, i.e., a truncation limit of 1E-4 below the total CDF. The CPSES truncation limit of 1 E-8 was only slightly higher than that. (The core damage frequency of CPSES due to internal events was estimated to be 5.72 E-05 per year.) The acceptability of the truncation limit was considered notjust with mathematical tests but also based on its impact on the model. It was judged to be important that truncation meet mathematical tests, but it was judged even more important that truncation make sense based on how important truncated components were to system operation. The following provides an overview of this model understanding process by showing how truncation affects one system - (AFW) specifically and the plant model in general, a 4-37
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- . ' AFW is a three train system. The components no.1 tr-~3 meet the following general characteristics.
, r
. . components whose failure can affect more than one train l
' . components whose falhare both causes train failure and prevents its recovery by use of f an attemate flowpath, e.g., the plunp, and
; *. components affecting operation ~of the turbine driven AFW pump -l Stated another way, the components retained in the model include all components in third order or above cutsets for system failure and all components in the AFW train important for Station I
Blackout (SBO) accident scenarios. Components truncated from the model only included those that were truly insignificant to risk. l Specifically, they involved components whose system cutset was fourth order or greater: , I~ e in a path to one of 4 generators .B !
- in a path to one of 8 paths to the generators
. in a recoverable path to one of the pumps (provided it was the motor driven pump) such V that both the path and its recovery plus the other two pumps must fail for the system to fail
- t The truncated model is adequate to measure increases in component probabilities needed to i evaluate increases in IST interval. In such calculations, the impact of an increase would be limited for two reasons. First, the truncated components are lower in probability than the un-
; truncated pumps. Second, the truncated components are contained in fourth order cutsets rather j than third order cutsets as for pumps. As an example, consider a combination of check valves and/or normally open MOVs that have failure probabilities on the order of or less than a percent of a pump's failure probability. Increasing them by a factor of 100 would make each component's failure probability comparable to the pump, but as a whole their cutsets would still
' be small contributors (e.g., less than a few percent) because their truncated cutsets were still one 3
order higher By examining the model in this manner, it was concluded that the tmncation limit for this study is clearly sufficient to support cumulative effects analyses where component 4-38 1
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;- - failure rates increase by large factors. j Table 4.2-1 provides a list of truncated components for CPSES systems. Some systems are not j l
' included because they do not contain truncated components. Reviewing the modeling insights i j
as a whole, the following conclusions can be drawn- f I
- Truncated components are often in fourth order cutsets of systems that in tum are -
redundant to at least one other system, e.g., AFW redundant to CS and to SI :
!
- Truncated components are sometimes instrument air related, e.g., components in AFW l
; . and main steam system boundaries that connect to instrument air. These components - f involve redundant check valves which must fail together with the entire air system to i in tum fail a single air operator. l 1
.
- Tmncated components are often either not IST components or the IST function was not ;
explicitly modeled because it was extremely low probability. Examples include l A normally open valves, such as MOVs and AOVs, that do not have to function for the system to perform its IST design basis functions. Another example is manual valves without remote position indication. t ! In conclusion, the CPSES model was prepared with avoiding truncation problems in mind. .The 1 use of the cutset results places the proper balance between ensuring all components are included and avoiding masking real contributors with large numbers of unrecovered cutsets. When j evaluating the truncation limit from a mathematical perspective, the truncation seems sound. I When considering directly the components that are truncated and the role they play in system ! ! operation, truncated components are clearly risk insignificant components even if one assumed -{ c that failure probabilities were increased by large magnitudes. Therefore, the CPSES cutset l , model is sufficiently robust to support ranking as well as evaluate increases in component failure probability. 4 1 ^ 4-39 i
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'4.2.2 Sunercomnonenti Human Eventt and Initintnrs i
Because there are several mechanisms by which the true importance of an IST component may be affected, the IST components that may be " masked" within opercomponents, human errors j or initiating events were identified and accounted for in ranking IST components. Initiating ! events may include certain IST component failures, therefore the linking of the initiating event -l
- importance to CDF was examined to extract the role of an IST component from the safety- ;
significant initiating event. ; h Sunercomnonents e Where groups ofcomponent failures were modularized (i.e., supercomponents or segments) and ; treated as basic events in the IPE analyses, such as pumps and certain associuted valves, the IPE
-l was reviewed to identify any IST components included in such modules so that their importance could be evaluated. This was important in power block supercomponents for two reasons, first ,
because oflatent human error (discussed below), and second multiple IST components in one , module. In general, these supercomponents wen: expanded to their basic events and importance l
. were either calculated directly or were apportioned to the components within them.
t Another use of the supercomponent was where a component such as the diesel generators, i which is composed of multiple components, was modeled as a single supercomponent. A j number of components in the diesel generator auxiliary systems were modeled in this way. In { these cases, the importances of these sub-components were evaluated based on the ranking of the diesel generator and qualitative insights about risk ranking. For example, if a sub- , i component caused failure of the diesel, the subcomponent's RAW is the same as the diesel since they have the same functional impact. Human Events l For most operator actions in the CPSES IPE, associated components were modeled explicitly. In selected recovery events, human error dominated the event. The associated IST component (s) . failure was not explicitly modeled. These components were evaluated to determine effects on : 4-40 l
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IST component importance. Where operator recovery actions were modeled in the IPE and
. these enhance the importance of an IST component or introduce an IST component not explicitly modeled, this effect was considered and reflected in the IST component's ranking, j
- i t
j For the CPSES IPE, two sets of operator actions are important contributors. Both actions deal-with the action to replenish and/or supply alternate sources of water. Specifically the Reactor ; Make-up and Demineralized Water systems are those required to function in support of these l actions but were not always explicitly modeled in the IPE. i 1 The importances of these systems and their components were determined based on the ! importance measure for the recovery and the configuration and redundancy of the equipment. ;
- Since the failure probability of the human is significantly higher than the failure probability of these highly reliable dual train systems, the hardware contribution to failure of the systems and
- their implied contribution to core damage frequency are small. The small hardware contribution guarantees a low FV. The redundancy provided by the systems, each with redundant trains, l guarantees a low RAW even when intra-system common cause failures are considered.
s Another example of human actions that could influence the importance of an IST components are those that deal with latent human errors associated with inadvertent alignment of power i block components following test and maintenance. For these cases in the IPE, the error ! probability was assigned to the pump in the power block (this is also an example of a . supercomponent issue). If the error probability were distributed to all the components in the , l block, the FV could increase for the other components in the block that were manipulated in the test. Because ofits relatively high failure probability, the latent human error accounts for a significant portion of the FV for the power block. However, because the latent human error failure probability is a conservative screening value, when these screening values were reviewed in greater detail as part of the IPE study, the latent error failure probability was reduced at least , one order of magnitude and therefore, any potential increase of FV from apportioning the latent i ! error to all power block components would be commensurately decreased. Additionally, these components are normally tested and their operation verified following test and maintenance. , . i i ri 4-41 i IJ
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_ - . _ _ . _ . . , . . ._ - . . _ . . _ . - . _ . _ _ . . - . ~ . . _,_;._._. I : { ER-EA-009 Revision) + Page D of NS + Evaluation ofInitiatars I I The evaluation of accident initiators for IST purposes presents some unique considerations. l Initiators generally deal with events at a system level rather than with mitigation functions at . the IST component level. ' An evaluation was performed to determine if there are sfstems [ associated with these initiating events that require some additional component level evaluation : I beyond that already done. The process is not necessarily straight forward since risk measures for initiating events can be misleading since setting the event probability to one is'not ] meaningful for frequencies. For this study, it was determined that the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) is an appropriate measure of risk importance for an initiator. CCDP provides a measure of available ;
- defense in depth assuming the initiator has occurred. For initiators with a high CCDP, little mitigation capability remains. Therefore, component failures that can cause the initiator are probably important. To establish the criteria for the CCDP, consideration was given to plant ;
programs for controlling plant trips. TU Electric uses INPO plant trip criteria of approximately l once per year to control the performance of trip-critical systems. Using the INPO criteria { assumes that once an initiator occurs at the rate of once per year, significant efforts will be made to significantly reduce the likelihood of plant trips within that system. Since the CPSES IPE , core damage frequency is about 5 E-05, once per year implies a CCDP of 5 E-05. This value serves as a quantitative measure for initiator insights. j The systems with high conditional core damage probability (CCDP), i.e., those with CCDP greater than 5.0E-05, are the Reactor Coolant system, Station Service Water system, and the Component Cooling Water system. These high CCDP systems can be characterized as sources of LOCAs and Interfacing Systems LOCAs for the RCS and special or common cause initiators for the Station Service Water and Component Cooling Water systems. This quantitative insight j matches the qualitative insight that both the RCS pressure boundary and systems that both cause trips and mitigate them are important. In this regard, it was noted that Safety Chilled Water is a system that meets the qualitative definition ofinitiator importance but not the quantitative one. To be conservative, this system was added to the list ofimportant initiators. 4-42
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ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page Edo of Ub Certain components and sub-systems can be associated with special initiating events that have a high conditional core damage probability. Examples of such components are those associated with Interfacing Systems LOCA. For these systems, the IST components were examined in considerable detail. For these special initiators, the cumulative effects ofincreasing the test frequencies of IST components on both the initiating event frequency and the CCDP were evaluated. Table 4.2-2 shows the initiators and the associated initiating event frequency and the CCDP. IST components that are important to core damage mitigation subsequent to a plant trip and also to initiating event frequency for initiators with high CCDPs are typically ranked high due to , their core damage mitigation function. This was judged to be the case for the Component . r
. Cooling Water system, the Station Service Water system and the Safety Chilled Water system.
The initiators are typically represented in the IPE model as point estimates at the system level ' derived from reliable data sources. However, for the three special initiator systems, namely the Component Cooling Water system, Safety Chilled Water system and the Station Service Water system, system fault trees were used to determine initiating event frequencies for loss of these systems. As noted above, the IST components that are important to core damage frequency are I also contributors to initiating event frequency and are typically ranked high. The potential effect of proposed interval changes increasing the failure rates of other system components was evaluated for the initiating event frequencies and determined to be law. Because these three j systems cumulatively contribute less than 6 percent to total CDF, the small change in initiating event frequency (due to the relatively small number of components affected) ensures that the l cumulative effects on the CDF and LERF due to IST test interval changes is insignificant. l In general, this evaluation concluded that those components of systems that are associated both with initiators and with significant mitigating functions are important for both, and have been adequately treated in the IPE importance rankings based on mitigation. These initiator systems , are characterized by a high CCDP. The other systems associated with initiators are not used for mitigation, have low CCDPs and have been appropriately ranked. Any evaluations of the increase in event frequencies due to component failures in these systems is best considered as they are now in other evaluation programs, such as the Maintenance Rule or trip reduction programs, and not by requirements in the IST plan. ; i 4-43 l , l
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4.2.3 .. Common C- Failures . !
. In a large system such as a nuclear power plant, most but not all component failures can be ,
assumed to be independent of one another. Common cause failure events are dermed as a subset j l I of dependent events in which two or more component fault states exist at the same time, or in l a short time interval, and are a direct msult of a shared cause. Multiple component failures due
. to a single shared cause are clearly an important hazard in complex, highly redundant systems ;
such as a nuclear power plant. For a realistic estimate ofrisk (CDF or LERF), they merit careful . analysis. I q I There are many models for common cause failures. In general, the probabilities of two, three, or more component failures are assumed to be some function of the failure rate for a single j i h component. ' Since they have a shared cause, the probability of two component failures is j somewhat smaller than that for a single failure but if they occur in two redundant trains, the ; consequences would be much more serious.- i i The CPSES IPE followed the EPRI/NRC approved guidelines for treating common cause ;
- - failure. Therefore, the FV and RAW importances reported in section 4.1.1 for individual I components reflect their potential for common cause failures. In order to gauge the influence j
- of common cause failures on a component's relative importance, the importance measures were {
recalculated without common cause failure effects. As presented in Table 4.2-3, the importance t measures for many components were lower without consideration of common cause failures. l The importance values for all components both with and without common cause failures were l 4 provided to the expert panel. In each case, the panel felt that all the components that were high ) solely due to common cause failure should be ranked high regardless of common cause failure. ) ! i
- .4.2.4 IPE Data Sources For the IPE and the IPEEE evaluations, a comprehensive data analysis was done to develop the CPSES IPE Generic Database. This analysis relied heavily of the work of Pickard, Lowe and
.Garrick, Inc. (PLG) for both a consistent methodology and a comprehensive database. The PLG t data is generally recognized as being among the most comprehensive, complete, and accepted 4-44 1
1 i i
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page'(A of M5 G~ I / data' bases for use in probabilistic safety analysis work.' The PLG methodology and database
- were used to determine initiating event frequencies, component failure data, common cause failure data, and portions of the maintenance unavailability data. The maintenance data is restricted to operating and/or hot' shutdown conditions. Separate calculations were used to develop human reliability data and other maintenance unavailability data.
The component' failure data for the CPSES IPE was generally based on the generic data since not enough plant operating data was available at the time of the IPE project on which to base adjustments. However, the maintenance data does reflect considerable plant specific information. Surveillance and test intervals and preventive maintenance frequencies and durations ' are based on the plant procedures in place at the time of the IPE freeze date. For a typical IST system, a component was considered unavailable due to testing or maintenance if the' component is required to be functional if the system is demanded during the test or maintenance and the function of the component is unavailable during the test or maintenance activity Further, the maintenance duration is based on a combination of generic and plant-specific data. The frequency of corrective maintenance activities is based on generic data, while typically the durations of these activities are based on component-specific technical specification allowed outage times, adjusted for generic data. Some initiating events, such as loss of HVAC, loss of service water, or loss of component cooling water, were quantified based on evaluations of the system fault trees using a combination of generic and plant-specific data as discussed above. 4.2.5 Sensitivity Studies 3 This task included performing sensitivity analyses to confirm the ranking results using j NUMARC 93-01 and 93-05 importance measures. Sensitivity studies were performed to test ! certain assumptions that might be significant to the importance ranking results. f Rhk Measures for Comoonents Taken Two at a Time l To further test the sensitivity of the results, risk importance measures, RAW and FV, were
- calculated assuming two components fail at the same time. This sensitivity study measure I
4-45 l
~
- a. 2
. . . - -- - - - - - --- . . . . - -- = ~ ~ . - - . . .
1 e c ER-EA-009 - Revision 0 . Page (99 or M5 i j
- s
[ provides insight into the potential for intersystem common cause failure in a risk-based IST plan. In general, the IPE considered only intra-system conunon cause failures.~ The sensitivity study was performed for low components. High components were not evaluated. Each low component in the cutset model was evaluated in conjunction with the other low- ! I -- components. In every case, FV measures remained low, i.e., below IE-3, even given two component failures. For this reason, RAW was evaluated for important insights. : b The calculation performed for the RAW identified a large number of combinations with RAWS r l greater than 2. However, most of these cases involved at least one component whose individual j RAW was greater than 2. For this reason, it was necessary to evaluate the results from the s 4 perspective of a change in RAW rather than a total RAW. ,
+
a The RAW of two events can be approximated by RAW 2 = RAWA + RAWB -1. That is, the i
- increase in risk, RAWB-1, is the contribution from the second event. This approximation was discovered in the review of component results involving more than one basic event. This ;
l ' relationship is true only if the events are neither under the same AND gate nor do they create some synergistic risk condition. In the first case, the RAW will be less than the approximation. f For example, two components in the same train (segment or module for the CPSES IPE) will have the same functional impact resulting in RAW 2 = RAWA = RAWB. These cases are of f - little concern. The case of concern is the synergistic effect. Component combinations whose RAW is greater < l than the approximation are the ones of concern. Therefore, for each combination of low components, the RAW was calculated directly from the cutsets and from it, the RAW based on l the approximation was subtracted. This indicator identified the RAW contribution to the j synergistic risk effect. In performing this calculation, a number of component combinations I yielded high RAW values. When these combinations were evaluated, the results indicated that combinations each included one of four components. That is, four components when combined with other components frequently yielded high RAWS. p These four components were considered to have high RAW sensitivity to components taken two 4-46 4 l
ER-EA-009 i-Revision 0 Page 90 or 195
~. '
at a time. Of the four components, two had high individual RAWS, namely 1CC-0031 and 1-I L 8481B. (The sister valves to these, namely ICC-0061 and 1-8481 A, were assigned high RAW based on the symmetry evaluation and thus, they were also assumed to have high RAW
' sensitivity to components taken two at a time. With these additions, there are six valves that have high RAW sensitivity fo components taken two at a time.) For the remaining two components with low individual RAWS, it was decided to require compensatory measures, i.e.,
. to treat them as if they had high individual RAW values. The'two components were valves 1-4 8922A and 1-8922B. These valves are the discharge check valves for the SI pumps. Since the a four valves all were discharge check valves on pumps in Component Cooling Water, Safety [ Injection, and Chemical and Volume Control systems, this risk measure appears to be'giving a consistent result. Further, since these three systems also all had elevated importance for fire and large early releases, the sensitivity study seems to confirm a pattern of underlying 3 ' importance for selected components in these systems despite the fact that they did not meet the original importance thresholds. A similar RAW evaluation was performed for components taken three at a time. Components were selected from the Component Cooling Water, Safety Injection, and Chemical and Volume i Control systems. The components were selected because they were ranked low and had no
~
. compensatory measures applied. Since the focus of the sensitivity study was inter-system i common cause failure, in general, the combinations included one component from each system. l (The inter-system common cause failure evaluations already performed would have measured the importance of the three components in a single system.) The cases evaluated consistently indicated no sensitivity using the RAW measure. That is, no synergistic effect was found as it ! was for the two-at-a-time case. Hence, no change in ranking or consideration of compensatory ) measures was required. 1 Comnonent Imnortance to Human Error Values [ The risk rankings, FV and RAW, were re-quantified without any human recovery actions to l determine if the results were overly or uniquely sensitive to human error values. This was done with the following cases being run: 4-47
ER EA-009 !- Revision 0 Page '7l ofM5
* . case 1 - set both recovery actions and dynamic actions to 1 l
- case 2 - set recovery actions only to 1 i case 3 - set dynamic actions only to 1 ,
i All the dynamic and recovery actions were identified and listed to a separate file. These are the human recovery actions (HRAs) in the cutsets in the IST model and not all the HRAs that were developed for the IPE. From this listing, two smarate lists were developed, one for dynamic actions and one for recovery actions. For this purpose a dynamic action was defined as an , operator action performed in the ordinary course of controlling a system; a recovery was defined r as an operator action performed to restore failed equipment or functions. This is somewhat . i subjective. Basic event (BE) reports with the importances for each of the cases were developed. The BE reports for the cases had importances for the modules and for a few individual BEs. It j was necessary to partition the importances (done only for Fussell-Vesely) to the components in the modules. This was done by using the component-to-module ratios developed for the fire- I i IST work. The resulting file was then reduced to include only pumps and valves. The i components were then sorted according to FV and the resulting values compared to the values determined previously, i.e., including recoveries. The results indicate that there is no increase in risk ranking category compared to the IPE/IST risk rankings. In other words, human recovery / dynamic actions did not mask the importance of any IST components. 4.3 Analysis of Cumnhtive Effects from Possible Increases in IST interval : The purpose of this analysis was to evaluate the potential impact of various test intervals for less safety-significant components (LSSCs) on total plant risk (i.e., total core damage frequency). This analysis was only performed for those IST components that were determined to be in the i less safety-significant category. A risk ranking approach based on importance measures such as was used in this project does not necessarily guarantee that acceptable levels of risk will result. Risk importance measures are based on changes to components one at a time. Changes to many components ,
^
4-48 I
-_ . . . - . . _ _.___-____________-_____l
4 ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page ')2. or 295 simultaneously may cause unintended increases in risk despite meeting the conservative risk , 2 ranking measures selected. , j
. An anali ys s was perf ormedto d eterm ne i t ehpotent a r si l i k impact ofincreasing in-service testing I intervals simultaneously on all less risk significant components. Consideration was given to available information on how changes in test intervals will change component unreliability.
1 Uncertainty in this information, together with the complexity required to model such an approach, dictated the use of a number of conservative assumptions: j.
- It was assumed that any increase in test intervals would simultaneously impact the reliability of all IST components in the less safety-significant (LSS) category.
I = The component unavailability was assumed to be: Q = Aoo + A(T/2) { i Q = total component unavailability Where: 100 = Component unavailability on demand I ~ 1 = Component failure rate per hour
- T = Interval between tests that verify operability of the component
. The component unavailability was ass.uned to increase by the same factor as the increase in the test interval. For example, a change in the test interval from quarterly to semi-annually would increase the total com;.onent unavailability by a factor of two. This is a very conservative assumption because it assumes that not only the A(T/2) term would be increased by a factor of two, but also the failure on demand term (Aco) would be increased by the same factor. In other words, the (Aoo) term is assumed to be directly impacted by the change in the test interval.
. Decrease in wearout due to less frequent testing was assumed to be negligible although I frequent testing has been seen to cause components to be less availab!e due to wearout.
t . Component unavailable hours due to testing were not adjusted for change in the test interval. If a component is tested less frequently, the component unavailability due to testing should f 4-49 W
ER EA-009 -l Revision 0 Page 73 of245 l e . J also be reduced. However, the component unavailabilities due to testing were kept at the higher value in this analysis. ,
. It was conservatively assumed that all IST tests are completely effective in finding the causes of component unavailabilities.
Despite the use of these conservative assumptions, calculations indicate that test intervals could be increased from quarterly to six years or more with acceptable increases in risk. If consideration is given to improvements in performance that are possible to occur from a risk- l based IST program, it is plausible that core damage risk may not increase at all. These calculations are discussed below. Eight cases were included in this analysis. The unavailabilities of the IST components in the law-risk category were increased by factors of 2,3,5,10,20,30,40 and 100. These factors correspond to changes of the test interval from the current quarterly test interval to a new test l interval ranging from semi-annual to 25 years. For each case, the IPE cutset results were-requantified using the adjusted component unavailabilities due to assumed test intervals. The new total core-damage frequency for each case was then obtained. In addition, component risk importances were recalculated for selected cases. Two groups of IST components were evaluated: Group 1: Low FV, high RAW with credit taken for compensatory measures identified by the expert panel (i.e., other surveillance tests on the same piece of equipment). Group 2: Low FV, low RAW with no credit taken for compensatory measures because this category implies that increases in component unavailabilities are not expected to impact risk significantly. Two sensitivity studies were conducted. The first one assumed that no other compensatory measures exist and, therefore, all IST components in Groups 1 & 2 would experience higher l unavailabilities according to their corresponding test intervals. The second sensitivity study . l l 4-50 1 l
. . -. -- -. - . .. . - . . . - - - - - - .= . -
L ER-EA-009 - Revision 0 Page 14 of 295 i O i- assumed that Group 1 (low FV, high RAW) would experience no increase in unavailability i
- because other compensatory measures were available. In the second study, Group 2 (low FV,- ,
l
- low RAW) would still experience increased unavailabilities.
$ Figure 4-4 presents the results of the first sensitivity study. This figure shows the CDF and percent CDF increase for Group 1 & 2 components. The results indicate that even with a factor of 100 increase, which is equivalent to virtually no further in-service testing, the CDF increases by only about sixty-six percent. j t Figure 4-5 presents the results for the second sensitivity study, which assumes that the compensatory programs are as effective as an IST program. The risk increase is about 6 percent l l , for a factor of 100 increase in component unavailability. .! l Figure 4-6 presents the results of the first sensitivity study except for large early release frequency (LERF) instead of CDF. The results indicate that even with a factor of 100 increase, which is equivalent to virtually no further in-service testing, the LERF increases by only about b seventy percent. [ Figure 4-7 presents the results for the second sensitivity study, but again using LERF. This sensitivity assumes that the compensatory programs are as effective as an IST program. The ! j-risk increase is less than 17 percent for a factor of 100 increase in component unavailability. ' Based on these results, it was concluded that both the CDF and LERF risk increases are much
- less than any reasonable acceptance criteria for classifying something as safety neutral. These conclusions hold even with the very conservative set of assumptions about the impact of testing i on component unavailability.
First, the increases are much less than the uncertainty in the original estimate even when worst case uncertainties are considered in this evaluation. That is, the increase is less than a factor 4 of two when very conservative assumptions are used and testing is in effect considered to be eliminated, i.e., quarterly testing increased to 25 years. i l 4-51 g' I
. . --- .- -. . . . -. . . - - .-. - . . ~ --- .- .
e ER-EA-009 Revision 0 L .Page 'IS or N5 l .n : Second, the EPRI PSA Applications Guide criteria for cumulative effects are satisfied by'these
' calculations. Using the CPSES baseline CDF and Figure 4-1 in the EPRI PSA Applications
. - Guide indicates that approximately a 13% increase in CDF is acceptable for a permanent
-charge without considering further evaluation. This criteria is met for the second sensitivity
~
[ study for a factor of 100 increase, i.e., when compensatory measures are credited. For the first t sensitivity study, a 13% increase occurs at a factor increase of about 24. Hence, the desired ] extension to 6 years (i.e., a factor of 24 for quarterly tested components) is considered [ acceptable even with these assumptions. Using the CPSES baseline LERF and Figure 4-2 in the Guide indicates that approximately a 37% increase in LERF is acceptable for a permanent change without considering further l evaluation. Again, this criteria is met for the second sensitivity study for a factor of 100
- increase, i.e., when compensatory measures are credited. For the first sensitivity study, a 37%
increase occurs well beyond a factor increase of 40. Hence, once again the desired extension ! to 6 years is considered acceptable even with these assumptions.
)
l ! Further, examination of the results provides additional insight. The increase in CDF versus [ various test interval factors shows a small but linear increase until the factor reaches a value S somewhere below 100 for CDF. For LERF, the non-linearity begins to be perceptible earlier. ; L (Please note that the scale in the graph appears to overemphasize this point, i.e., individual l sensitivity calculations are separated equally rather than by an amount proportional to the ! factor.) After a point then, the percentage increase grows faster than the factor. The results in this region of the graph become non-linear with the percent CDF increasing faster than the factor I increase. This behavior indicates that accident scenarios involving more than one low risk-significant component are becoming risk significant. It is expected that the non-linearity will grow rapidly for factors beyond 100. The results suggest that a factor of 40 increase in test interval may be more prudent than 100 since the risk becomes more non-linear beyond a factor of40. When these results were examined in more detail, it was found that check valve unavailability 4-52 i c 4
. - .- - .. -_ -.- - .. . ~. .- . ..
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 l ' Page '7(a of 445 p...
~
is much more important than other component types. This result reflects the fact that check . l
- valves are ranked low more often because of their unavailability rather than their function.
Hence, as a component unavailability increases, check valves will become more important. This results supports the application of compensatory measures which is in tum reflected in the results of the sensitivity studies. The last step in evaluating the sensitivity study _ results involved examining component
- importance measures assuming factor increases in unavailabilities. If check valve unavailability increased by'a factor of thirty, many of the originally low ranked check valves would then have medium rankings. That is, for a new IST plan with increased test intervals, some more valves might become more risk significant. However, their importance would be in balance with the other components tested more frequently. In this sense, the IST program would be optimized.
It is important to note that many valves would still have ver. low rankings, even with l , substantial factor increases. These valves include those that were truncated from the IPE cutsets and those not modeled in the original IPE. Both were shown to be very low risk [ contributors, generally requiring a large number of components to fail simultaneously just to , I fail a single system. 4 The results of this analysis indicate that the risk increase is acceptable even with the very i conservative assumptions used in the study. The total risk may in fact decrease for one of two t reasons. First, high ranked valves not in the IST program are being considered for increased testing. The total importance of these few high ranked components is greater than the total importance of all the low ranked components. Ifimproved testing, i.e., the addition of selected in-service tests, eventually improves the reliability of these components in an amount 3 comparable to possible reductions in reliability caused by increased intervals, total risk would decrease. a Second, the overall IST program may become more efficient by focusing on the more important components. Each of those important components are represented more than once in nearly all of the cutsets containing pumps and valves. A small improvement in the unavailabilities of important components would likely translate into a corresponding reduction in risk. This 4-53
. .. . . . ... . ~.- - - ..~ - --_ . - -. = .-. - - - - . . . .
t ER-EA-009 j Revision 0 ! Page #17 of195 reduction in risk is probably larger than the increase that might result from increased test intervals since it is expected that the risk increase would be even less than the amounts , calculated here. . r
- In conclusion, modifying the test frequencies of the IST components in the low safety
). significance category to every 6 years is reasonable and at worst would result in an insignificant l increase in total plant risk. By every indication from both engineering judgment and risk : j insights, the selected test interval increase for less safety significant components is prudent and the overall change to the IST program is believed to be safety neutral. [ i L i Y ' l 4 l 1 I f ) ). e i s P < l 4 e 1 i a 4-54 t ce s r- = -
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page X of M _S FIG 4-4. Change in Core Damage Frequency versus Factor Change in Equipment Usavailability (Compensatory Measures not Credited) 8J50E-05 70.00 % - 8.00E-05
-+-Combined 7.5GE-05 +% % b W
- 50.00 %
7.00E-05 40.00 % 3 E 6.50E-05 h. I d r u 8 - ?0.00% = sh h [ 6.00E45 U 20.00 % 5.50E-05 5.00E-05 r 0.00 % 4.50E-05 b i 2 3 5 10 20 30 40 - 100 Factor Change la Equipuust Usavailablity i . 4-55
- - _ _ _ _ = _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. . . __ ____ . _..;.- _ - -. . .. ... _ . _. m -._ . - . . . _ .. -m ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Fanc 79 of.A15 FIG 4-5. Change in Core Damage Frequency versus Factor Change in Equipament Unavailability (Cosapensatory Measures Credited) 5 80E-05 , 6.00%
5.60E-05 5.00 % 5.40E-05
-Cominned 4.00 % -e-% Change in Coeninned C 5.20E-05 o h v
; 6
!- i r
j 5 00E-05 , 3,00% y
& S ch i E h
E 4.80E-05 o
.f'
- 2 00 %
4 60E45 1.00 % 4.40E 4.20E-05 : O . 0.00 % I 2 3 5 10 20 30 40 100 Factor Change im Equipament Umavaitaldlity 4-56 , , . . . . - , , . . . , , ,,--..~...--,.n~ . . - , .c -n.-, ,. c - - ,-. .-s,. - , . - . , - - . e e ,
4 ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page 8 0 of M FIG 4-6. Change in Large Early Release Frequency versus Factor Change in Equipseent Unavailability (Coeupensatory Measures not Credited) 1.40E-06 - 70.00 % I.20E-06 60 00 %
-+-Combined
-G-% Change in Combined 1.00E-06 $0.00%
C 6 in. ac O lr 8.00E-07 : ;
-- ; 40.00% d m
5 5* I .3 Y i ( 6 00E-07 30.00 % l t t-
*=
0 b
.3 4.00E-07 20 00 %
2.00E-07 10.00 % 0.00E+00 ; E O.00 % 1 2 3 5 10 20 30 40 100 Factor Change la Equipaneet Umavailablity 4-57
- - - - - .- - = ..
j ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page _ f f.,,or g FIG 4-7. Large Early Release Frequency versus Factor Change la Equipment Usavailability , (Compensatory Measures Credited) i> 16.00 % B 9.00E47 14.00 % 12.00 % C u N _ g 8.50E-07 W
. 10.00% j y ;
d: E e X b 8.00 % e. 8 x $ I 8.00E47 a. W a = = = - s 00 % 7.50E-07 2.00 % i l 0.00 % 7.00E-07 : 1 2 3 5 10 20 30 40 100 l I Factor Change la Equipsacet Usavailability I 4-58 1 . . - - . _ . . . , . . ** T rm--P--- ---..%e g,.. g- ,3 3
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page il of 195 4.4 Funert Panel The expert panel (EP) process for the CPSES Risk-Based IST Program had the distinct-advantage of occurring after much experience regarding the operation of such a panel had been gained by both the industry anti TU Electric. Most of the experience had been gained through the Maintenance Rule (MR) process. Industry-wide lessons learned from that project that influenced the TU process included: e variations in emphasis and interest among panels at different plants which in turn lead to concems about reproducibility of the results, e significant use of the panel for specific. technical bases, e.g., ranking for outage . conditions or containment performance, which in tum lead to much dependence ; on the panel for documentation to ensure the process was scrutable, i e- . significant variations in the types of technical bases available, e.g., quantitative i IPEs versus qualitative or no extemal event analyses, which made it difficult for , the panel to employ a systematic decision process, and 1 e variations in scope of the panels activities, varying from ranking only to ranking ! application ofit, the former of which requiring more assumptions by the panel { about how the ranking results would be used.
- Because the EP process was important to ensure limitations of the PRA are addressed and I - because it is so crucial to obtaining ownership from the plant and NRC staff, the CPSES project ]
goal was to overcome these aforementioned potential pitfalls. j Fortunately, a number of positive developments were occurring both at TU Electric and in the j industry to help facilitating this goal. First, TU Electric has recently completed its CPSES l IPEEE submittal for extemal events and it has begun a risk management program for outages. ! r Also, EPRI has initiated is risk and reliability workstation program that has provided TU ) Electric with tools for ease in calculation and interpretation of risk importance measums and for performing sensitivity studied to test their robustness. i i l 4-59 ) 1
)
i I h
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page I3 of 195 A '
. Lastly, the industry began to move forward on applications of PRA beyond the MR. These :
applications ranged from graded quality assurance, often implemented as a broader form of risk ranking than IST, and graded MOV testing, which in many ways is more limited scope that IST. As a result of these initiatives, NUMARC 93-05 for MOV testing, NErs guidelines for the graded QA pilot project, and the EPRI PSA Applications Guide were developed. These initiative lead to dialogue between the NRC staff and the industry which provided valuable insight to the CPSES program on the expert panel process. Gnnk and Obiective for Exnert Panel Process j Two goals of the CPSES project paid significant dividends during the expert panel process. l One goal was to make ranking results more understandable. That is, it was desireable to take a process which was time consuming for PRA practitioners but made it more understandable f for others such as expert panel members. By improving the understanding of the expert panel, f it was felt that the process would be more scrutable and reproducible and the limitations of PRA f would be better reflected in the final ranking results. Another project goal was to " merge" the
~
design basis and the PRA information and insights into a single integrated framework. By more clearly describing what was in both "models" and what was only in one of the two, it was felt . i that the process would be improved and, because ofimproved consistency in the models, the ! process could be more systematic. The specific objectives of the expert panel process were to be scrutable, reproducible, and ! systematic. Additionally, it was decided that the scope of the EP activities, would be both l determining and applying the ranking. These objective follow directly from the lessons learned i discussed earlier. l Role of Expert Panel The following describes the role of the expert panel in terms ofits structure and makeup, scope and process for decision-making. As described earlier, the expert panel acted in concert with
. a Steering Committee which in turn coordinated with other industry activities such as the ASME research program and the WOG check valve program. The expert panel was drawn almost 4-60
~. ._
c ER-EA-000 , Revision 0 i Page' N of g45 w entirely from the Maintenance Rule (MR) expert panel. Two individuals familiar with CPSES - codes and standards and in-service testing program were added to ensure IST related issues could be discussed and evaluated in detail. The EP chairperson was the chairperson of the MR expert panel and had a background of technical experience as well as project management skills ! in order to be able to facilitate the discussion and obtain end results. The membership qualification for the EP members consisted of a mixture of education and work experience. The i required functional disciplines for the panel are: e Codes and Standards e Operations with a Senior Reactor Operator license e Maintenance Engineering . i e System Engineering /In-Service Test Engineering ; e Probabilistic Risk Assessment
- Design Engineering ,
The minimal education and experience requirements for panel members were a BS in an j engineering discipline and eight years in nuclear power. The operations representative currently l holds a USNRC Senior Reactor Operator License and has held it for at least two years. The minimum quorum necessary for the EP to conduct business was four (4) members consisting of the representatives from Operations, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, System Engineering /In- ! Service Test Engineering, and Codes and Standards. It was also decided that the panel would be living and it would participate in periodic updates to the ranking whenever the IPE study is updated. The scope of the expert panel activities included both risk ranking and application ofit. For risk ; ranking, four types of data were considered in various roles by the panel. The panel's principal responsibility was to provide deterministic insights which might influence ranking. Its second responsibility was to identify cases where a component's poor performance justified changing its ranking from low to high. The panel of course played an important role in evaluating risk 4-61 - _ ]
ER EA-009 Revision 0 p Page #5 or 86 ranking information. However, the panel did not play a significant role in reviewing sensitivity calculations. While the panel was made aware of these calculations and the EP chairman was l familiar'with them in detail, the panel did not independently review or question these results. t The reason for this was that the sensitivity calculations were often of a specialty nature. ; However, if the sensitivity sfudies provided different insights that would impact the expert f panel's ranking results, they would be discussed with the EP in detail. i i
. Basically, the panel participated in validating' the component level ranking. The panel had previously approved the system level ranking during the MR process and re-validated the results j I
at the beginning of this project.' The panel also played a significant role in determining the appropriate changes to test frequencies. ' The panel identified compensatory measures for potentially important components, selected the test interval for less-safety significant components , and determined the test strategies for more-safety significant components not - f I currently in the IST program. This latter step is still ongoing. The criteria for decision making were reviewed and/or adjusted by the expert panel, i r
'Ihe Rankino Process ;
To prepare for the expert panel review, the risk ranking team developed a set of simplified P& ids for all the systems modeled in the IPE. The IPE risk category results, component tag numbers, and the locations of the components in the systems were all shown on the simplified diagrams. Using this information and the design basis functions addressed by IST as , documented in the IST plan, the panel reviewed and validated or adjusted the ranking results. PRA results were used to provide insights to start the ranking process. Three categories of components were input to the panel: t a high-risk significant I e low-risk significant e not-modeled i I 1 4-62 i i
- . - - - .-.- . . ~ - . - - - . . - - - - - -. . . . - . _ .
r f ER-EA-009 ~ Revision 0 ,
' Page $b of 196 _ !
c
- These results were considered with their associated limitations, and used together with sources ;
of deterministic information and operating experience insights that the EP felt were appropriate. ;
- The deterministic sources included the IST plan information which contained component ;
functions from the design basis documents and references to relevant plant licensing ; commitments for IST. Occasionally, design issues generic to Westinghouse plants were .' discussed by the cognizant EP member. Plant procedures were used when considering operator - -; ) actions not modeled in the IPE and in identifying tests that could serve as compensatory actions. ~; F
- The operating experience insights used to complement the validated generic database upon l which the IPE study is based included plant-specific experience for both functional failures and
- in-service testing performance and Westinghouse plant experience for selected rare events, e.g., thermal barrier heat exchanger rupture events.
- s 4
- The panel considered a range oflimitations in the IPE, examples of which are described below
- ,
e Because the IPE assumed the reverse flow failure mode could not occur, the panel evaluated the importance of reverse flow in each check valves and in one i case elevated an unmolded mini-flow valve to high because it might degrade the ! performance of more than one pump. 4 e To address the sensitivity of the results to common cause failures, the panel evaluated the risk ranking measures two ways, one assuming all CCF , importance assigned to the associated basic event and one assuming none. o To evaluate the sensitivity due to human action modeling, the panel noted that sensitivity s:udies had shown the ranking to be unchanged. In addition, the panel occasionally identified operator actions omitted by the IPE. These actions q were omitted recovery actions not credited because they were not important to the CDF. ;
- e. To ensure that assumed alignments of systems in the IPE did not affect the ranking, the panel checked similar components in the system assigned the higher i ranking.
I 4-63 i
~l 1
ER-EA-009 l Revision 0 Page $7 of 4 9 5 I e To compensate for use of generic data, the panel considered plant specific i performance for each low ranked component. For those that were potentially ' high, the panel ensured that other compensatory measures were available to maintain the reliability of the component.
- To ensure that safety margins were maintained, the panel retained in-service tests of some check valves that had experienced failures that caused plant entry into LCO conditions.
In summary, to blend deterministic and probabilistic information, the panel deliberated on the limitations ofIPE when it applied and made use of both plant-specific and generic information , and industry operating experience. During the review of the risk categories for components modeled in the IPE, the panel performed the following tasks: , e locate the component on the simplified P&ID, e review the IPE modeled function, i.e., component failure mode and accident scenario, e determine if that function is an IST function, i e if not, the result was documented, but the IST function was evaluated with the t not modeled components, i e identify similar components and validate the consistency of ranking, e understand the ranking in the context of other components in the flowpath, train, or system, e determine, if practical that whether or not mitigating operator actions were included in the IPE, e validate or change the IPE-based ranking, as appropriate 1 4-64 i
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page $$ 'of 19 6- .j (, e if the validated IPE ranking was high, the component was ranked high, e - if the IPE ranking was low, the other previously mentioned factors were checked - to validate the ranking, e.g., the operating performance of the component.
- l J
All the high-risk components ~not in the IST program were confirmed by the expert panel. In general, the importance ofinstrument air and the decay heat removal related portions of main I steam were the principal focus of the panel's considerations. Evaluations were performed to determine how to use existing in-service testing techniques most effectively to address the more safety significant failure modes modeled in the IPE. The following three questions were' j normally asked for these evaluations-I e Does in-service testing apply to the failure modes that are risk significant? e- What testing is currently being done? e Does rankmg justify an improvement in testing to an IST-type testing program? l For IST components or IST functions not modeled in the IPE, the same systematic approach was taken as for modeled components. In this case, a qualitative ranking process was used that was based upon the insights from the IPE ranking. That is, based on the type of component, the j I function it performed, and the effect ofits failure on the system, the component was ranked as high, potentially high or low. The criteria used is similar to the one described for outage risk in section 4. Once the IPE evaluation was completed, other sources of risk were considered. Because the containment perfonnance analysis, IPEEE study and risk management models for outage mode were developed in sufficient detail for CPSES, risk ranking evaluations due to these factors were performed in much the same systematic manner. The principal difference was that the evaluation focused on low ranked IPE components whose ranking could increase to high due to other risk factors. That is, not each and every component was separately evaluated by the expert panel, but rather only the ones which had increased were evaluated.
'Ihe panel also reviewed the sensitivity of the component rankings to common cause failures.
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ER-EA-009 i l Revision 0 Page 99 of MS I Many of these components were valves in the lower half of the FV medium category (i.e., from 0.005 to 0.001). The panel felt that these were important components and that they should be retained as is in the IST program. 4 It is worthwhile to note that the panel addressed the containment performance in some detail as it had for the MR evaluation. In particular, the panel reviewed components important to certain steam generator tube rupture scenarios. While these components were ranked low, the ranking was based, in part, on the PSA Application Guide definition oflarge, early releases. Because ~ this was an important assumption to the risk significance determination, the panel required - , compensatory measures for containment isolation components important to these scenarios. As described in section 4, these scenarios have the possibility of causing a large, but late release. i The results of the expert panel review and determination of risk ranking are provided in Tables 4.4-1,4.4 2 and 4.4-2a. Table 4.4-1 provides the minutes of the expert panel deliberations on a system basis. This table includes components in systems modeled in the IPE that are in the IST program. The table shows the panel's disposition of the components and includes information regarding compensatory actions. Table 4.4-2 provides a similar rendering of the disposition of components by the expert panel l I in the IST that are not explicitly modeled in the IPE. These components are also shown on a system basis. Table 4.4-2a provides the expert panel disposition of the high risk IPE components that are not included in the IST. This evaluation is discussed in detsil in section . 4.1.6. , i Testing Reauirements The panel considered testing requirements for three levels of ranking, namely high, potentially , high, and low. j i For high ranked components in the IST, the panel decided to maintain all in-service testing as is, regardless of whether some failure modes (and therefore some tests) were not risk significant. l This conservative approach was adopted for ease of implementation and administrative j 4-66 i
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page 90 or 245 A . - consistency. For low ranked components in the IST, the panel discussed the technical basis for extending test intervals and yet maintaining plant safety. In addition, the panel considered implementation insues associated with particular test intervals. The panel concluded that,- generally, a staggered test implementation over 6 years would be the best implementation strategy. In the event that the panel found a component to be potentially high (low FV, but high RAW), the panel selected a compensatory measure to ensure that component functionality would still be evaluated on a regular basis by other plant programs. Because pumps were oRen ranked high and potentially high components were often in the flow path for the IST pump test, the quarterly pump test was often found to be an effective compensatory measure for suction and discharge check valves. Potentially high MOVs were often " tested" by other technical specification requirements, namely slave relay test. Summary The expert panel process wasjudged to meet its objectives of being scrutable, reproducible and systematic as much as technically achievable. The process was scrutable because the panel was provided simplified P& ids which clearly documented the ranking. It is scrutable to others because written technical bases were provided to the panel and detailed expert panel notes were developed. The process was believed to be reproducible by another panel of similar technical knowledge because of the availability of detailed technical bases for all sources of risk and the use of - consistent ranking criteria for modeled and unmodeled components. Also, many of the other limitations that could affect the IPE results, such as components masked by supercomponents and initiators, were rectified by the PRA team before presentation to the expert panel. Finally, the process was believed to be systematic. A similar process was applied for all sources of risk as well as for unmodeled components. For each component, a systematic means of evaluating the risk insights was performed and a consistent set of criteria was used.
'^
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4 W ER EA-009 Revision 0 i Page 91 of A95 l 5.0
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 4 In this study, all components within the scope of the IST program were examined. In all, a total of 687 components were examined and ranked as either High-more safety significant or Low-I less safety significant. Of this total,654 valves were evaluated,117 (17.9%) of which were ranked high and 537 (82.1N of which were ranked low. Thirty-three (33) pumps were 1 evaluated,21 (63.6%) of which were ranked high and 12 (36.4%) of which were ranked low. l Of the total components,375 (54.6%) were modeled in the IPE and 312 (45.4%) were in IST-only, most (285) of the latter being low ranked valves. Only those determined to be less safety 4 significant (low) will be considered for a code exemption. Table 5-1 lists all the components by tag number that were examined in this evaluation. This ~ table shows the entire spectrum of the review and the results of the expert panel evaluations. The risk ranking process was concluded to be robust. It generated results that were consistent : 4
- with deterministic insights from the expert panel and found to be safety neutral. The following I spectrum of risk and deterministic insights demonstrates this conclusion
- ;
. a spectrum of risk sources were considered, i.e., IPE, extemal and outage, ;
l
. multiple risk measures were considered, i.e., CDF and LERF,
' . diverse importance measures were used, i.e., FV and RAW, ! . sensitivity studies consistendy demonstrated that the risk significant components had been identified, , a both IPE and IST functions were compared and evaluated and considered in an t integrated manner, and
. both PRA and deterministic insights from the expert panel were incorporated into both
- the ranking results and the resulting IST plan. The scope and level of detail of the results review by the expert panel, the emphasis placed on , understanding why components were ranked high or low, the careful comparison of the IPE and j the IST functions, and the sensitivity studies performed all demonstrated the technical adequacy ; of the IPE to serve as the basis for this and other risk based applications. The resulting risk f based IST program is considered by the expert panel to have the appropriate changes (both 5-1 l l l 1
1 I ER-EA-009 I Revision 0 .i Page 9'd. _ of 245 m increases as well as decreases in scope) and the appropriate checks and balances to ensure burden reduction can be achieved while maintaining or even improving plant safety. The results of this analysis indicate that the risk increase associated with the proposed interval changes is acceptable even with the very conservative assumptions used in the study.' The total risk may in fact decrease if the overall IST program becomes more efficient by focusing on the more important components. Each of the important components are represented more than once , in nearly all of the cutsets containing pumps and valves. A small improvement in the unavailabilities ofimportant components would likely translate into a corresponding reduction in risk. This reduction in risk is probably larger than the increase that might result from increased test intervals since it is expected that the risk increase would be even less than the amounts calculated here.
.In conclusion, modifying the test frequencies of the IST components in the low safety significance category to every 6 years is reasonable and at worst would result in an insignificant increase in total plant risk. By every indication from both engineering judgment and risk insights, the selected test interval increase for less safety significant components is prudent and the overall change to the IST program is believed to be safety neutral.
I P I b 9 5-2 1 . I
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page 93 ' of 295 j~ . 6.0 - TABMS List of Tables . I Table 4.1.-1: Preliminary Importance Rankings ofIST Components in the IPE Table 4.1.-2: IPE Components That Changed Risk Categories Due To Symmetry Evaluation Table 4.1.-2ai IPE Component Symmetry Evaluation Table 4.1.-3: Risk Ranking Changes For IST Components Considering Fire and Tornado Extemal Events Table 4.1.-3a: IPEEE Fire and Tornado IST Component Evaluation Table 4.1.-4: IPE/IST Component Ranking Changes Due To Evaluation of Shutdown Considerations
- . Table 4.1.-4a: IPE/IST Component Evaluation for Shutdown Considerations ,
Table 4.1.-5: List of High/ Medium Risk Components Due to Back-end Considerations Table 4.1.-Sa: IPE/IST Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Back-end
, Considerations Table 4.1.-6: List ofIST Components Not In IPE J
Table 4.1.-6a: IST Function Table Table 4.1.-6b: Comparison ofIPE and IST Functions l Table 4.1.-7: High-Risk IPE Components Not In the IST Table 4.2.-1: Truncated Components Table 4.2.-2: ' Accident Initiators With Initiating Event Frequency and Conditional Core Damage Probability : Table 4.2.-3: Table of Risk Importances With and Without Common Cause Failures Table 4.2.-3a: IST/IPE Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Common Cause Table 4.4.-1: Expert Panel Meeting Minutes Table 4.4.-2: Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component. Functions Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE Table 4.4.-2a Expert Panel Meeting Minutes For High Rank IPE Components Not In The IST e Program Table 4.4.-3: Results of Expert Panel Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and Final Ranking of AllIST Components Table 5.1-1: Summary of Risk Ranking Results for IST Components 6-1
?
d
Table 4.1-1 ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Preliminary Importance Rankings ofIST Components in the IPE Pagd.f_ or_b p. Raw Data W/Out Symmetry or Expert Panel Considerations Sorted by Tag Risk Fussell-Vesely Initial Risk Achievement initial Risk Component Tag importance Ranking Based Worth Ranking Based On Component Description Measure OnFV Importance RAW Measure 9 7136 Rcdt Pump Discharge ControfVa!ve n/a Low n/a Low 1-8000A Przr 1-01 Porv 0455A Bik Viv 0.0028 Medium 1.3049 Low 0.0110 High 2.6299 Potentially Hgh 9-80008 Przr 1-01 Porv 0456 Blk Viv 9-8010A Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv A 0.0057 Medium 3.0695 PotentiaHy High 1-8010B Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv B 0.0057 Medium 3.8695 Potentially Hs0h 1-8010C Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv C 0.0057 Medium 3.8695 PotefitaNy High 1-8100 U1 Rep St Wtr Ret isol Viv n/a Low n/a Low l 1-8104 U1 Emer Borate Viv n/a Low n/a Low l 1 8105 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt isol Viv 0.0002 Low 1.7840 Low 1-8106 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt isol Viv 0.0002 Low 1.7840 Low 1-8110 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Dnstrm Miniflow Viv 0.0002 Low 1.7840 Low 1-8111 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Upstrm Miniflow Viv 0.0009 Low 1.9458 Low ! n/a Low I 1-8112 U1 RC Pmp Seal Wtr Ret isol Viv n/a Low 1-8145 U1 Przr Aux Spr Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8146 U1 RCS Loop 4 Chrg Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8152 U1 Ltdn Cntmt Orc isol Viv n/a Low n/a Low 9-8160 U1 Ltdn Cntmt Irc isol Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1 Low I 1-8351 A RC Pmp 1-01 St Wtr inj Viv n/a Low n/a S-8351 B RC Pmp 1-02 Si Wtr in; Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8351C RC Pmp 1-03 SI Wtr inj Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1 8351D RC Pmo 1-04 Si Wtr inj Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8378A RCS Loop 1-04 Chrg Dnstrm Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8378B RCS Loop 1-04 Chrg Upstrm Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8381 Chrg Ln tre Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8481 A Ccp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv 0.0001 Low 1.5050 Low 0.0003 Low 2.0913 Potentally High 1-8481B Ccp 1-02 Disch Chk Viv 1-8497 Pd Pmp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low Ccp 1-01 Alt Miniflo isol Viv 0.0012 Medium 4.8723 Potentially Hgh 1-8511A 1-85118 Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo isol Viv 0.0012 Medium 4.8723 Potentia 8y Hgh Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo isol Viv 0.0012 Medium 4.8723 Potentially Hgh 1-8512A Ccp 1-01 Alt Miniflo isol Viv 0.0012 Medium 4 8723 Potentially Hgh 1-8512B 1-8546 Rwst 1-01 To Chrg Pmp Suct Chk Viv 0.0002 Low 1.7840 Low 1-8701 A RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Recire Omb isol Viv n/a Low n/a Low 9-8701B RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recirc Omb lsol Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8702A RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Reiere imb isol Viv n/a Low n/a Low 9-8702B RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recire imb Isol Viv n/a Low n/a Low S-8708A RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Rif Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8708B RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Rif Viv n/a Low n/a Low S-8716A RHR Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv 00034 Medium 5.3279 Potentially Hgh RHR Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv 0.0037 Medium 5.3988 Potentally High 1-87168 U1 RHR Pmps Disch To Rwst isol Viv 0.0002 Low 5.2624 Potentially High 1-8717 1-8730A RHR Hx 1-01 Disch Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-87308 RHR Hx 1-02 Disch Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8801 A Ccp 1-01/1-02 Si isol Viv 8801 A 00002 Low 1.7840 Low
. 1-88018 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Si isol Viv 88018 0.0002 Low 1.7840 Low 9-8802A St Pmp 1-01 To HI 2 & 3 ini isol Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1 S-8802B St Pmo 1-02 To HI 1 & 4 In; 1501 Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8804A RHR Pmp 1-01 To Ccp Suct Viv n/a Low n/a Low -
1-8804B RHR Pmo 1-02 To S1 Pmos Suct Viv 0 0011 Medium 1.1151 Low Table 4.1-1 Page i I I
1 l Table 4.1 1 ER EA-009 Revision 0 Preliminary importance Rankings ofIST Components in the IPE Page hof19_5 Raw Data W/Out Symmetry or Expert Panel Considerations Sorted by Tag Risk
"*** *** '""'* ^* ***"* I" '
Component Tag importance Ranking Based Worth Ranking Based On Component Description Number Measure On F-V Importance RAW Measure i-8806 Rwst 1-01 To St Pmps Suct VN 0.0005 Low 1.4773 Low 1-8807A U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Viv 8807A n/a Low n/a Low 1-88078 U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Viv 88078 n/a Low n/a Low 9-8808A St Accum 1-01 inj Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8808B n/a Low n/a Low Si Accum 1-02 in) Viv S-8808C n/a Low n/a Low Si Accum 1-03 Inl Viv 9-8808D n/a Low n/a Low St Accum 1-04 inl Viv 1-8609A RHR To Cl 1-01/1-02 in) isol Viv 0.0034 Medium 5.3279 Potentsally Hgh 1-8809B RHR To Cl 1-03/1-04 Inl Isol Viv 0.0037 Medium 5.3988 Potentially HQh Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmn 1-01 Suct Isol Viv 00045 Medium 5.0741 Potentially Hgh 1-8811 A 1-8811B Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct isol Viv 0.0072 Medium 9.4595 Potentsally Hgh 1-8812A Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 101 Suct Viv 0.0028 Medium 4 9150 Potentia 0y Hgh 1-8812B Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv 0.0031 Medium 4.9650 Potentially High St Pmp 1-01/1-02 Miniflo Ret Viv 0.0021 Medium 5.3732 Potentially Hgh 1-8813 1-8814A St Pmp 1-01 Miniflo Viv 0.0016 Medium 4.8719 Potentially Hgh i-88140 St Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv 0.0016 Medium 4.8719 Potentially Hgh Ccp 1-01/1-02 in; Chk Viv 0.0002 Low 1.7870 Low 1-8815 n/a Low n/a Low 1-8818A RHR Cl 1-01 Inl Chk Viv 1-88188 n/a Low n/a Low RHR Cl 102 in) Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low i 1-8818C RHR Cl 1-03 Inl Chk Viv ' 1-8818D n/a Low n/a Low RHR Cl 1-04 Inl Chk VW 1-8821 A Si Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv n/a Low n/a Low S1 Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8821 B 1-8835 Sl Pmp 1-01/1-02 To Cl in) Isol Viv 0.0006 Low 1.4773 Low 0.0247 High 13.9685 Potentially Hgh 1-8840 RHR To HI 1-02/1-03 in) Isol Viv 1-8841 A RHR To RCS HI 1-02 Upstrm Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 9-88418 RHR To RCS HI 1-03 Upstrm Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8875A Sl Accum 1-01 N2 SPLYNENT Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8875B SI Accum 1-02 N2 SPLYNENT Viv n/a Low n/a Low l 1-8875C SI Accum 1-03 N2 SPLYNENT Viv n/a Low n/a Low l 1-8875D SI Accum 1-04 N2 SPLYNENT Viv n/a Low n/a Low l 1-8877A St Accum 1-01 Tst Ln isol Viv n/a Low n/a Low i 1-8877B SI Accum 1-02 Tst Ln isol Viv n/a Low n/a Low l 1-8877C SI Accum 1-03 Tst Ln isol Viv n/a Low n/a Low j 1-8877D SI Accum 1-04 Tst Ln isol Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8878A Si Accum 1-01 Fill Viv n/a Low n/a Low 9-8878B SI Accum 1-02 Fill Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8878C SI Accum 1-03 Fill Viv n/a Low n/a Low j 1-8878D St Accum 1-04 Fill Viv n/a Low n/a Low j 1-8922A St Pmp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv 0.0001 Low 1.2558 Low 1-8922B S1 Pmp 1-02 Disch Chk Viv 0.0001 Low 1.4509 Low l l 1-8923A St Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv 00000 Low 1.0061 Low 1-8923B S1 Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv 0 0000 Low 1.0061 Low 1-8924 U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Isol Viv 00000 Low 1.0002 Low 1-8926 St Pmp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv 00001 Low 1.4773 Low 1-8948A n/a Low n/a Low l SI Accum 1-01 Dnstrm Inl Chk Viv 1-8948B n/a Low n/a Low St Accum 1-02 Dnstrm Ini Chk Viv 1-8948C St Accum 1-03 Dnstrm in) Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low i-8948D SI Accum 1-04 Dnstrm in) Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low Table 4.1-1 Page 2
l l i Table 4.1-1 ER-EA-009 Preliminary importance Rankings ofIST Components in the IPE 'g l
,, i Raw Data W/Out Symrnetry or Expert Panel Considerations Sorted by Tag Risk j Fussell-Vesely initial Risk Achievement Initial Risk i Component Tag Ranking Based W orth Ranking Based On Component Description importance Number On F-V importance RAW Measure Measure 1-8949A RHR To Rep HI 1-01 Dnstrm Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-89498 RHR To Rep HI 1-02 Onstrm Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8949C RHR To Rcp HI 1-03 Dnstrm Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8949D RHR To Rep HI 1-04 Onstrm Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8956A Si Accum 1-01 Upstrm in; Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8956B SI Accum 1-02 Upstrm In; Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8956C St Accum 1-03 Upstrm ini Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8956D St Accum 1-04 Upstrm In) Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-895BA Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-01 Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-89588 Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-02 Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8969A RHR To Ccp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-8969B RHR To St Pmp 101/1-02 Suct Chk Viv 0.0000 Low 1.1151 Low 1-FCV-0610 RHR Pmp 1-01 Miniflo Viv 0.0000 Low 1.3467 Low i-FCV-0611 RHR Pmp 1-02 Maniflo Viv 0.0001 Low 1.6200 Low 1 FCV-0618 RHR Hx 1-01 Byp Flo Ctrl Viv n/a Low n/a Low i 1-FCV-0619 RHR Hx 1-02 Byp Flo Ctrl Viv n/a Low n/a Low f 1-FV 2193 SG 1-01 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv n/a Low n/a Low l 1-FV-2196 SG 1-04 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-FV-4772-1 Cs Pmp 1-01 Recirc Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-FV-4772-2 Cs Pmp 1-03 Recire Viv n/a Low n/a Low j 1-FV-4773-1 Cs Pmp 1-02 Rectre Viv n/a Low n/a Low l 1-FV-4773-2 Cs Pmp 1-04 Recirc Viv n/a Low n/a Low l 1-HCV-0606 RHR Hx 1-01 Flo Ctrl Viv n/a Low n/a Low 1-HCV-0607 RHR Hx 1-02 Flo Ctrl Viv n/a Low n/a Low i-HV-2134 SG 1-01 FW ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2135 SG 1-02 FW ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2136 SG 1-03 FW ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2137 SG 1-04 FW ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 0 0004 Low 6.9592 Potentially Hgh 1-HV-2333A MSIV 1-01 0.0004 Low 6.9592 PotentWiv Hgh 1-HV-2334A MSIV 1-02 0.0004 Low 6.9592 Potentially Hgh 1-HV-2335A MSIV 1-03 0.0004 Low 6 9592 Potentially Hgh 1-HV-2M6A MSIV 1-04 1-HV-2397 SG 1-01 BLDN ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2397A SG 1-01 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2409 MSL 1-01 BEF MSIV D\ POT 1-25 ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2410 MSL 1-02 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2411 MSL 1-03 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2412 MSL 1-04 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2452-1 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV 0.0000 Low 1.0083 Low 1-HV-2452-2 MSL 1-04 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV 00000 Low 1.0083 Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 bHV-2459 FLO CTRL VLV n/a Low n/a Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 1-HV-2460 FCV n/a Low n/a low TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 l 1-HV-2461 FLO CTRL VLV n/a Low n/a Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 1-HV-2462 FLO CTRL VLV O0000 Low 1.9356 Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 j bHV-2491A ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low l
Table 4.1-1 Page 3 l l _J
l i l Table 4.1-1 ER-EA-009 Preliminary Importance Rankings ofIST Components in the IPE g Raw Data W/Out Symmetry or Expert Panel Considerations Sorted by Tag Risk Fussell Vesely initlet Risk Achievement initial Risk Component Tag importance Ranking Based Worth Ranking Based On Component Description Number Measure On F-V 1mportance RAW Measure MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 n/a Low n/a Low bHV-24918 ISOL VLV TO AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2492A ISOL VLV MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2492B ISOL VLV MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2493A ISOL VLV TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-2493B ISOL VLV MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 n/a Low n/a low 1-HV-2494A ISOL VLV TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-24948 ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 9-HV-3487 U1 CNTMT INST AIR HDR ISOL VLV ACCUM 1-01 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC n/a Low n/a Low 9-HV-4171 ISOL VLV ACCUM 1-02 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC n/a Low n/a low 1-HV-4172 ISOL VLV ACCUM 1-03 LlO SPACE SMPL LN IRC n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-4173 ISOL VLV ACCUM 1-04 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-4174 ISOL VLV Medium 9.0386 Potenhally Hgh 1-HV-4286 SSW PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV O0061 Low 37.1754 Putentally Hgh 9-HV-4287 SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH VLV 0.0001 n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-4393 DG 1-01 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-4394 DG 1-02 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV Medium 23.7844 Potentally Hgh 1-HV-4512 U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW RET VLV 0.0028 Medium 30.9018 Potentially Hgh 1-HV-4513 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW RET VLV 0.0018 Medium 23.7844 Potenhally Hgh 9-HV-4514 U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW SPLY VLV 0.0050 Medium 30.9018 Potenbally Hgh 1-HV-4515 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW SPLY VLV 0.0018 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM RET Medium 40.9779 Potentally High
?-HV-4524 VLV 0.0019 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM RET Medium 40 9779 Potenbally High 1-HV-4525 VLV O0019 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM Medium 40 9779 Potenbally Hgh 1-HV-4526 SPLY VLV 0.0019 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM Medium 40.9779 Potenbally Hgh 1-HV-4527 SPLY VLV O0019 Medium 9.2011 Potentally Hgh 1-HV-4572 RHR HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV 0.0045 Medium 9.2781 Potenbally High 9-HV-4573 RHR HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV 0.0048 n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-4574 CS HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-4575 CS HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV Low 5 9646 Potenhally Hgh 1-HV-4696 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV 0.0000 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC Low 19.2050 Potentally Hgh 9-HV-4699 UPSTRM ISOL VLV 0.0000 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC Low 19.2050 Potentally High 1-HV-4700 DNSTRM ISOL VLV 0.0000 n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-4701 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-4708 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV 0.0000 Low 5 9646 Potentally Hgh 1 HV-4709 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV Table 4.1 1 Page 4
I 1 l Table 4.1-1 ER EA-009 Preliminary Importance Rankings ofIST Components in the IPE Raw Data W/Out Symmetry or Expert Panel Considerations j i Sorted by Tag Risk
* *** '" "' * ^* **# '" "' I i Component Tag Ranking Based Worth Ranking Based On Component Description importance l Number Measure On F-V importance RAW Measure n/a Low n/a Low S.HV4725 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 IRC iSOL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-4726 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 102 ORC ISOL VLV RWST TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1 HV-4758 RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-4759 CS HX 101 OUT VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-4776 CS HX 1-02 OUT VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-4777 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT n/a Low n/a Low $-HV-4782 ISOL VLV CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV 4783 ISOL VLV RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 n/a Low n/a Low 9-HV-5157 DISCH HDR ORC ISOL VLV RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-5158 DISCH HDR IRC ISOL VLV U1 CNTMT PRESS RLF SYS ORC ISOL n/a Low n/a Low 9-HV-5548 VLV U1 CNTMT PRESS RLF SYS IRC iSOL n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-5549 VLV U1 CHARGE PMP SUCT Hi PNT VNT VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-8220 8220 n/a Low n/a Low 1-HV-8221 U1 CHARGE PMP HI PNT VNT VLV 8221 VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0.0002 Low 1.7841 Low 1-LCV-01120 01128 VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0.0009 Low 1.9459 Low 1-LCV-0112C 0112C RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112D 0.0002 Low 1.7841 Low 1-LCV-0112D RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112E 0.0009 Low 1.9459 Low 1-LCV-0112E RCDT LEVEL CONTROL VALVE n/a Low n/a Low 1-LCV-1003 PRZR 1-01 PORV 0455A 0.0128 High 1.5130 Low 9-PCV-0455A 0.0167 High 2.6291 Potentially High 1-PCV-0456 PRZR PWR OPERATED RELIEF VLV SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV 0.0008 Low 1.0329 Low 1-PV-2325 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-PV-2326 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-PV-2327 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV 0.0006 Low 1 0248 Low 1-PV-2328 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 9-PV-2453A MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CTRL VLV n/a low n/a Low 1-PV-24538 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CTRL VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1-PV-2454A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 0.0000 Low 2.8715 Potentially High 1-PV-2454B CTRL VLV SFTY CHLR 1-05 CCW RET PCV n/a Low n/a Low 1 PV-4552 1-PV-4553 SFTY CHLR 1-06 CCW RET PCV 00000 Low 1.1249 Low CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-01 SUCT CHK 1 AF-0014 VLV 0.0003 Low 2.0232 Low CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-02 SUCT CHK 1AF-0024 VLV 0.0004 Low 2.4741 Low Table 4.1 1 Page 5
Table 4.1-1 ER-EA-009 Preliminary importance Rankings ofIST Components in the IPE 8ig n i
! Raw Data W/Out Symmetry or Expert Panel Considerations Sorted by Tag Risk 5 see ese Initial e AcNmment inMal msk Component Tag Ranking Based Worth Ranking Based On 4 Component Description importance Measure On F-V Importance RAW 4 Measure i 1 AF-0032 CST 1-01 TO TD AFW PMP CHK VLV O0003 Low 2.0581 PotentneNy H$h 1 AF-0038 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV 0.0003 Low 2.0581 Potentia #y H4h
, 1 AF-0041 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV 0.0002 Low 2.0582 PotentiaHy Hgh 1AF-0051 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV 0.0004 Low 2.4741 Potentra#y Hgh 1AF-0054 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH ISOL VLV 0.0003 Low 2.4741 PotentanNy High 1AF-0065 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV 0.0003 Low 2.0232 Potentragy Hgh 1AF-0066 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV 0.0002 Low 2.0232 Potentm#y Hgh MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 1AF-0075 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low , TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 1AF-0078 CHK VLV n/a low n/a Low MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 + 1AF-0083 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 1AF-0086 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low ; MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 1AF-0093 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 1AF-0098 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low a MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 a 1AF-0101 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 1AF-0106 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR 1 AF-0215 SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV 0.0003 Low 1.9358 Low MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR 1AF-0216 SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV 0.0003 Low 1.9358 Low ! MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR a 1AF-0217 SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR 1 AF-0218 SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low ] MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR 1 AF-0219 SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR 1AF-0220 SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR 1AF-0221 SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV 0.0003 Low 1.9358 Low l MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR 1AF-0222 SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV 0.0003 Low 1.9358 Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR 1AF-0223 SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV 0.0003 Low 1.9358 Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR 1AF-0224 SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV 0.0003 Low 1.9358 Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR 1AF-0226 SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR 1AF-0227 SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV n/a low n/a Low TO AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR 1AF-0228 SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR 1AF-0229 SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low Table 4.1 1 Page 6
Table 4.1-1 ER-EA-009 Preliminary Importance Rankings ofIST Components in the IPE vi8pg Raw Data W/Out Symmetry or Expert Panel Considerations S;rted by Tag Risk Fussell-Vesely initial Risk Achievement initial Risk Component Tag Ranking Based Worth Ranking Based On Component Description importance Number OnFV importance RAW Measure Measure TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR 1AF-0230 SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV 0.0003 Low 1.9358 Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR 1AF-0231 SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV 0.0003 Low 1.9358 Low 1CC-0031 CCW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV 00005 Low 3.0208 Potenba#y Hgh 1CC-0061 CCW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV 0.0000 Low 38.5415 Potentia #y Hgh RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY 1CC-0646 UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV 0.0000 Low 6.1735 PotentiaHy Hgh RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR CCW SPLY 1CC-0657 UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV 0.0000 Low 6.1735 PotentaHy High RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY 1CC-0687 UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV 0.0000 Low 6.1735 Potentiaily Hgh RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY 1CC-0694 UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV 0.0000 Low 6.1735 Potentiany Hgh 1CC-0713 U1 RCP CLR CCW SPLY HDR CHK VLV 0.0000 Low 19.2052 PotentiaHy Hgh RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY 1CC-1075 STOP CHK VLV 0.0000 Low 6.1735 Potentially Hgh RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY 1CC-1076 STOP CHK VLV 0.0000 Low 6.1735 Potentially Hgh RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR CCW SPLY 1CC-1077 STOP CHK VLV 0.0000 Low 6.1735 Potentially High RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY 1CC-1078 STOP CHK VLV 0.0000 Low 6.1735 Potannany Hgh 1CC-1079 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT n/a Low n/a Low 1CC-1080 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT n/a Low n/a Low 1CC-1081 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT n/a Low n/a Low 1CC-1082 CIRCEL SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2 f NPT n/a Low n/a Low U1 INST AIR HDR TO U1 CNTMT CHK 1Cl-0030 VLV n/a low n/a Low U1 IRC SL WT R RET CNMT ISOL BYP 1CS-8180 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-8350A RC PMP 1-01 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-83508 RC PMP 1-02 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-8350C RC PMP 1-03 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-83500 RC PMP 1-04 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-8367A RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-8367B RC PMP 1-02 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-8367C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-8367D RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-8368A RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-83688 RC PMP 1-02 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-8368C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-8368D RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CS-8442 U1 EMER BORATE LN CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low i 1CS-8473 BA PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low j 1CS-8487 BA PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT CHK 1CT-0025 VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CT-0042 CS PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CT-0047 CS PMP 1-04 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CT-0048 CS PMP 1-02 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low Table 4.1-1 Page 7
Table 4.1-1 ER-EA-009 Preliminary Importance Rankings ofIST Components in the IPE 5 / Raw Data W/Out Symrnetry or Expert Panel Considerations Sorted by Tag Risk Fussell Vesely initial Risk Achievement initial Risk Component Tag importance Ranking Based Worth Ranking Based On Component Description Number Measure On F V importance RAW Measure ICT-0063 CS PMP 1-03 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low CS PMP 1-01 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1C T-0064 CS PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CT-0065 RWST TO CSP 101/1-03 SUCT CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CT-0077 CS PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CT 0094 U1 CS TRN A HDR IRC CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low S CT-0142 U1 CS TRN B HDR 1RC CHK VLV n/a Low n/a low S CT-0145 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low iCT-0148 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1CT-0149 DG 1-01 FO XREF PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 10 0-0004 DG 1-01 FO XREF PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK n/a Low n/a Low 100-0005 VLV DG 1-02 FO XFER PMP 103 DISCH CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low
$ DO-0016 DG 1-02 FO XFER PMP 1-04 DISCH CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 10 0-0017 DG 1-01 FO DAY TK 1-01 XFER HDR CHK VLV 0.0003 Low 1.9795 Low 1D0-0049 DG 1-02 FO DAY TK 1-02 XFER HDR CHK 0.0005 Low 3.0296 Potentially Hgh 10 0-0050 VLV ~1FW-0076 SG 1-02 FW HDR CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low S FW-0082 SG 1-01 FW HOR CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1 FW-0088 SG 1-04 FW HDR CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1FW-0195 SG 1-04 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1FW-0196 SG 1-01 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1 FW-0197 SG 1-02 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1 FW-0198 SG 1-03 FW PREHTR BYP 1RC CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1 FW-0199 SG 1-04 AFW NZL CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low S FW-0200 SG 1-01 AFW NZL CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1 FW-0201 SG 1-02 AFW NZL CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1 FW-0202 SG 1-03 AFW NZL CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL 1MS-0026 VLV n/a Low n/a Low SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL 1MS-0063 VLV n/a Low n/a Low SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL 1MS-0098 VLV n/a Low n/a Low SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL SMS-0134 VLV n/a Low n/a Low MSL 1-04 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM 1MS-0142 CHK VLV 0.0000 Low 1.0083 Low MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM iMS-0143 CHK VLV 0.0000 Low 1.0083 Low SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY 1MS-0680 UPSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY 1MS-0681 DNSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1
i Table 4.1 1 Page 8
Table 4.1-1 ER EA-009 l Preliminary Irnportance Rankings ofIST Components in the IPE 5 l g Raw Data W/Out Symmetry or Expert Panel Considerations Sorteo by Tag Risk Fussell-Vesely initial Risk Achievement initial Risk Cgow Tg Component Description importance Ranking Based Worth Ranking Based On Measure On F-V importance RAW Measure SG 1-02 ATMOiRLF VLV AIM SPLY UPSTRM CHK \/LV n/a Low n/a Low 1MS-0682 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1MS-0683 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY 1MS-0684 UPSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY 1MS-0685 DNSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1MS-0686 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low
$MS-0687 iSI-0047 RWST 1-01 TO SI ISOL VLV 0.0050 Medium 5.7600 Potentiony Hgh Si TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1SI-8819A Si TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1SI-8819B Si TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1SI-8819C Si TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1SI-8819D 1SI-8900A CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV n/a low n/a Low CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1SI-89008 CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low SSI-8900C CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low 1SI-8900D Si TO HL 1-01 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low j iSI-8905A Si TO HL 1-02 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low j S SI-8905B n/a Low n/a Low j iSI-8905C St TO HL 1-03 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV Si TO HL 1-04 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low ]
1SI-8905D Sl PMP 1-01 TO RWST CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low l 1SI-8919A Si PMP 1-02 TO RWST CHK VLV n/a Low n/a Low S SI-8919B 0.0005 Low 3.0296 Potentially Hgh 1SW-0016 U1 SSW TRN B SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV U1 SSW TRN A SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV 0.0003 Low 1.9796 Low 1SW-0017 0.0015 Medium 70.7025 Potentially Hgh 1SW-0373 SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV 0.0012 Medium 71.8633 PotentiaHy Hgh j 1SW-0374 SSW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV I MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY CP1-AFAPMD-01 FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 0.0282 High 2.8296 Potentia #y High MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY CP1-AFAPMD-02 FEEDWATER PUMP 1-02 0.0394 High 3.3020 Potentiady High TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY 0.2351 High 12.9035 Potentiany Hgh CP1-AFAPTD-01 FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1- f CP1-CCAPCC-01 01 0.0366 High 4.8323 Potentiany Hion i COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1 0.0303 High 38.5384 Potentiany High CP1-CCAPCC-02 02 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 0.0080 Medium 1.7278 Low I I CP1-CHAPCP-05 1-05 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP CP1-CHAPCP-06 1-06 0.0003 Low 1.3459 Low CP1-CTAPCS-01 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-01 n/a Low n/a Low CP1-CTAPCS-02 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-02 n/a Low n/a Low CP1-CTAPCS-03 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-03 n/a Low n/a Low CP1-CTAPCS-04 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-04 n/a Low n/a Low DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OIL cpi-DOAPFT 01 TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 0.0478 High 140.0000 Potentiany Hgh Table 4.1-1 Page 9 4
1 Table 4.1 1 ER-EA 009 Preliminary importance Rankings ofIST Components in the IPE
. ,m j
' Raw Data W/Out Syr.unetry or Expert Panel Considerations l Sosted by Tag Riek l Fussell Vesely initial Risk Achievement . Initial Risk
*"*" '8 Ranking Based W orth Ranking Based On Component Description importance Measure On F-V Importance RAW Measure OlESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OIL cpi-DOAPFT-02 TRANSFER PUMP 102 0.0478 High 140.0000 Potentially High DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL cpi-DOAPFT-03 TRANSFER PUMP 1-03 0.0478 High 140.0000 Potentially Hgh DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL ,
cpi DOAPFT-04 TRANSFER PUMP 1-04 0.0478 High 140.0000 Potenestly High CP1-SWAPSW-01 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-01 0.0969 High 77.6709 Potenhally Hgh CP1-SWAPSW-02 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-02 0.0386 High 107.0000 Potentmey High > TBX-CSAPBA-01 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 n/a Low n/a Low TBX-CSAPRA-02 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 n/a Low n/a Low TBX-CSAPCH-01 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-01 0.0125 Hgh 1.5301 Low TBX-CSAPCH-02 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-02 0.0271 Hegh 2.1861 Polenhally Hgh TBX-RHAPRH-01 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-01 0.0050 Medium 1.3468 Low TBX-RHAPRH-02 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-02 0.0088 Medium 1.6201 Low TBX-SIAPSI-01 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-01 0.0146 High 1.2559 Low ; TBX-SIAPSI-02 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-02 0.0257 High 1.4509 Low ! X-PCV-H116A UPS A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV 0.0000 Low 1.0132 Low l X-PCV-H1168 UPS A\C UNIT X-02 CCW RET PCV 0.0002 Low 1.1610 Low X-PV-3583 CR A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV n/a Low n/a Low n/a Low i X-PV-3585 CR A\C UNIT X-03 CCW RET PCV n/a Low i FV = Fussell-Vesely (Prob = 0) H > .01, Med > .001. Low > .0001 Negt < .0001 ; RAW = Risk Achievement Worth (Prob = 1.0) Hi >= 2.0 l n/a a component either truncated in PRA or not in RMOS 1E-8 cutsets l 1 l l i l l l l I l 1 4 i s Table 4.1 1 Page 10 i 0
.-._<e. , . . , , , , ,, , ,
7 .7, y _
1 I I RE-EA-009 Revision 0 Table 4.1-2 IPE Components That Changed Risk Categories Due To Symmetry Evaluation
~
Revised Risk Original Risk importance Component Tag importance Category Based on Component Description Number Category Symmetery Evaluation 1-8000A PRZR 1-01 PORV 0455A BLK VLV MEDIUM HIGH RHR PUMP 1-01 TO CCP SUCTION 1-8804 VALVE LOW MEDIUM SAFET( CHILLED WATER RECIRC CP1-CHAPCP-06 PUMP LOW MEDIUM 1-HV-4287 SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH VLV LOW MEDIUM 1SW-0016 SSW TRN B SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV LOW N/A (1) 1SW-0017 SSW TRN A SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV LOW N/A (1) (1) These components have been removed from the Service Water system. Table 4.1-2 Page 1 1
Table 4,1-2a ER-EA-009 f R i IPE Component Symmetry Evaluation gk,s i ^ Sorted By Tag Risk Rank Component Tag Component Description Change Due To Number Symmetry 1-7136 Redt Pump Discharge Control Valve N/A j 1-8000A (2) Przr 1-01 Porv 0455A Blk Viv Increased 1 80008 Przr 1-01 Porv 0456 Bik Viv No Change l E8'd10A Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv A N/A i 1-80108 Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv B N/A 1-8010C Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv C N/A 1-6100 U1 Rep Si Wtr Ret isol Viv N/A 1-8104 U1 Emer Borate Viv N/A 1 8105 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt isol Viv N/A 1-8106 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt isol Viv N/A Ccp 1-01/1-02 Dnstrm Miniflow Viv No Change 1-8110 (1) 1-8111 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Upstrm Miniflow Viv No Change 1 8112 U1 RC Pmp SealWtr Ret isol Viv N/A 1-8145 U1 Przr Aux Spr Viv N/A ; 1-8146 U1 RCS Loop 4 Chrg Viv N/A j N/A i 1-8152 U1 LTDN CNTMT ORC iSOL VLV 1-8160 U1 LTDN CNTMT IRC ISOL VLV N/A RC Pmp 1-01 SI Wtr inj Viv N/A i N/A
][$M h 1-8X,
- O RC Pmp 1-02 St Wtr inj Viv RC Pmp 1-03 SI Wtr Inj Viv N/A 1-8351D RC Pmp 1-04 SI Wtr inj Viv N/A l 1-8378A RCS Loop 1-04 Chrg Dnstml Chk Viv N/A l 1-83788 RCS Loop 104 Chrg Upstrm Chk Viv N/A l 1-8381 Chrg Ln tre Chk Viv N/A Ccp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No Change 1-8481A (1) ,
1-8481B Ccp 1-02 Disch Chk Viv No Change j
~
1-8497 Pd Pmp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv N/A 1-8511 A Ccp 1-01 Alt Miniflo isol Viv N/A 1-8511B Ccp 1-02 Alt Mintflo isol Viv N/A 1-8512A Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo isol Viv N/A 1-85128 Ccp 1-01 Alt Miniflo isol Viv N/A 1-8546 Rwst 1-01 To Chrg Pmp Suct Chk Viv N/A I8701A RHR Pmp 101 HI 1-01 Rectre Omb lsol Viv N/A 1-87018 RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recirc Omb isol Viv N/A 1-8702A RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Reierc Imb isol Viv N/A 1-87028 RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recirc imb isol Viv N/A 1-8708A RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Rif Viv N/A 1-8708B RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Rif Viv N/A RHR Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv No Change 1-8716A (1) 1-8716B RHR Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv No Change , 1-8717 U1 RHR Pmps Disch To Rwst Isol Viv N/A i 1-8730A RHR Hx 1-01 Disch Chk Viv N/A ( 1-8730B RHR Hx 1-02 Disch Cbt Viv N/A l 1-8801 A Ccp 1-01/1-02 Si isol Viv 8801 A N/A l 18801B Ccp 1-01/1-02 St Isol Viv 8801B N/A 1-8802A St Pmp 1-01 To HI 2 & 3 inj lsol Viv N/A , 1-8802B S1 Pmp 1-02 To HI 1 & 4 Inj isol Viv N/A l l N/A -Indicates Symmetry Evaluation Was Not Required Table 4.1-2a Page 1
Table 4.1-2a ER-EA-009 R vis IPE Component Symmetry Evaluation
- Sorted By Tag Risk Rank mp nent Tag Change Due To Component Description
"* ' Symmetry 1-8804A (2) RHR Pmp 101 To Ccp Suct Viv Increased 1-8804B RHR Pmp 1-02 To St Pmps Suct Viv No Change 1-8806 Rwst 1-01 To St Pmps Suct Viv N/A 1-8807A U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Viv 8807A N/A 1-8807B U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Viv 88078 N/A 1-8808A SI Accum 1-01 inj Viv N/A 1-88088 SI Accum 1-02 inj Viv N/A
.1-880M' SI Accum 1-03 Inj Viv N/A
'17808D SI Accum 1-041.ij Viv N/A 1-8809A (1) RHR To Cl 1-01/1-02 inj isol Viv No Change 1-88098 RHR To Cl 1-03/1-04 Inj ! sol Viv No Change 1-8811 A (1) Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Isol Viv No Change 1-88118 Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct isol Viv No Change 1-8812A (1) Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv No Change 1-88128 Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv No Change 1-8813 St Pmp 1-01/1-02 Min:flo Ret Viv N/A 1-8814A Si Pmp 1-01 Miniflo Viv N/A 1-8814B S1 Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv N/A 1-8815 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Inj Chk Viv N/A 1-8818A RHR Cl 1-01 inj Chk Viv N/A 18818B RHR Cl 1-02 Inj Chk Viv N/A 1-8818C RHR Cl 1-03 Inj Chk Viv N/A 1-8818D RHR Cl 1-04 inj Chk Viv N/A 1-8821 A S1 Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv N/A 1-8821 B St Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv N/A 1 8835 S1 Pmp 1-01/1-02 To Cl Inj lsol Viv N/A 1-8840 RHR To HI 1-02/1-03 Inj isol Viv N/A i8841A RHR To RCS HI 1-02 Upstrm Chk Viv N/A 1-8841 B RHR To RCS HI 103 Upstrm Chk Viv N/A 1-8875A SI Accum 1-01 N2 SPLYNENT Viv N/A 1-8875B SI Accum 1-02 N2 SPLYNENT Viv N/A 1-8875C St Accum 1-03 N2 SPLYNENT Viv N/A 1-8875D SI Accum 1-04 N2 SPLYNENT Viv N/A 1-8877A St Accum 1-01 Tst Ln Isol Viv N/A 1-8877B SI Accum 1-02 Tst Ln isol Viv N/A 1-8877C SI Accum 1-03 Tst Ln isol Viv N/A 1-8877D SI Accum 1-04 Tst Ln Isol Viv N/A 1-8878A St Accum 1-01 Fill Viv N/A 1-8878B SI Accum 1-02 Fill Viv N/A 1-8878C SI Accum 1-03 Fill Viv N/A 1-8878D SI Accun.1-04 Fill Viv N/A 1-8922A SI Pmp 101 Disch Chk Viv N/A 1-8922B S1 Pmp 1-02 Disch Chk Viv N/A 1-8923A St Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv N/A 1-8923B St Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv N/A 1-8924 U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Isol Viv N/A 1-8926 St Pmo 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv N/A l
N/A - Indicates Symmetry Evaluation Was Not Required Table 4.12a Page 2 l l
-- . - . . . . - _ . -- - - ~.- - _ .- . . -. - -. ~.- -- -- - _ . . - . . -
Table 4.1-2s ER-EA-009 f 5 IPE Component Symmetry Evaluation [ Sorted By Tag - Risk Rank
"' Component Description Change Due To
- - f Symmetry .
j 1-8948A - Si Accum 1-01 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv N/A ! 1-89488 St Accum 1-02 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv N/A , 1 j 1-8948C S1 Accum 1.03 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv N/A -l
; 18948D SI Accum 1-04 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv N/A j i- 1-8949A RHR To Rep HI 1-01 Dnstrm Chk Viv N/A ;
- 1 89498- RHR To Rcp Hi 1-02 Dnstrm Chk Viv N/A .
18949C RHR To Rcp HI 1-03 Dnstrm Chk Viv N/A { 18949D RHR To Rcp HI 1-04 Dnstrm Chk Viv N/A ; ] i 1-8956A St Accum 1-01 Upstrm inj Chk Viv N/A ; 1 1-8956B St Accum 1-02 Upstrm in) Chk Viv N/A j j 1-8956C St Accum 1-03 Upstrm inj Chk Viv N/A j i 1-8956D SI Accum 1-04 Upstrm inj Chk Viv N/A i 1-8958A Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 101 Chk Viv N/A f 1-89588 Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-02 Chk Viv N/A ! 18969A (1) RHR To Ccp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv No Change f {
, 1-89698 RHR To Si Pmp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv No Change $
1-FCV-0610 (1) RHR Pmp 1-01 Miniflo Viv No Change l 1-FCV-0611 RHR Pmp 1-02 Mintflo Viv No Change l 1-FCV-0618 RHR Hx 1-01 Byp Flo Ctrl Viv N/A l 1 FCV-0619 RHR Hx 1-02 Byp Flo Ctrl Viv N/A ; 1 FV 2193 SG 1-01 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv N/A 2
]
1-FV 2196 SG 1-04 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv N/A l 1-FV-4772-1 Cs Pmp 1-01 Recirc Viv N/A l 1-FV-4772-2 Cs Pmp 1-03 Recirc Viv N/A i i 1-FV-4773-1 Cs Pmp 1-02 Recirc Viv N/A l 1-FV-4773-2 Cs Pmp 1-04 Recirc Viv N/A 1-HCV-0606 RHR Hx 1-01 Flo Ctrl Viv N/A 1-HCV-0607 RHR Hx 1-02 Flo Ctrl Viv N/A j 4 1-HV-2134 SG 1-01 FW ISOL VLV N/A
- 1 HV-2135 SG 1-02 FW ISOL VLV N/A 1-HV-2136 SG 1-03 FW ISOL VLV N/A L 1-HV-2137 SG 1-04 FW ISOL VLV N/A i 1-HV-2333A MSIV 1-01 N/A i 1-HV-2334A MSIV 1-02 N/A 1-HV-2335A MSIV 1-03 N/A i MSIV 1-04 N/A 1-HV-2336A j 1-HV-2397 SG 1-01 BLDN ISOL VLV N/A 1-HV-2397A SG 1-01 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV N/A 1 1-HV-2409 MSL 1-01 BEF MSIV D\ POT 125 ISOL VLV N/A 1-HV-2410 MSL 1-02 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV N/A 1-HV-2411 MSL 103 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV N/A )
1-HV-2412 MSL 1-04 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV N/A 1-HV-2452-1 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV N/A l 1-HV-2452-2 MSL 1-04 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV N/A ) 1-HV-2459 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV No Change 1-HV-2460 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 FCV No Change 1 HV-2461 (1) TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 FLO CTRL VLV No Change i N/A Indicates Symmetry Evaluation Was Not Required Table 4.1-2a Page 3
. . . - _ . . - . . - - . - . = - - - . - - -. ~ _..-... ---. - ---. .
l
- Table 4.1-2a ER-EA-009 0
IPE Component Symmetry Evaluation gvi5i}"q5 j[O Sorted By Tag l Component Description Ch nge ue To Symmetry L 1-HV-2482 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 FLO CTRL VLV No Change f 1-HV-2491 A . TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 ISOL VLV N/A : i ! 1-HV-24918 N/A { MD AFW PIWIP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 ISOL VLV j 1-HV-2492A TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 ISOL VLV N/A f 1-HV-24928 MD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-02 ISOL VLV N/A l j 1-HV-2493A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 ISOL VLV N/A j 1 HV-24938 TD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-03 ISOL VLV N/A j j 1 HV-2494A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 ISOL VLV N/A ; i 1-HV-24948 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 ISOL VLV N/A .i 1 1 HV-3487 U1 CNTMT INST AIR HDR ISOL VLV N/A l 1 1-HV-4171 ACCUM 1-01 LIQ SPACE SMPL 1.N IRC ISOL VLV N/A 1 HV-4172 ACCUM 1-02 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN lRC ISOL VLV N/A l' 1 HV 4173 ACCUM 1-03 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV N/A 3 1-HV-4174 ACCUM 1-04 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV N/A l 1-HV-4286 - SSW PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV No Change f 1-HV-4237 (2) SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH VLV Increased 5 N/A I I 1-HV-4393 DG 1-01 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV I 1 HV-4394 DG 1-02 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV N/A l U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW RET VLV No Change ! 1-HV-4512 (1) ! j 1-HV-4513 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW RET VLV No Change U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW SPLY VLV No Change 1 HV-4514 (1) 1-HV-4515 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW SPLY VLV No Change ; N/A I } 1-HV 4524 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM RET VLV ' 1-HV-4525 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM RET VLV N/A 1-HV-4526 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM SPLY VLV N/A I } 1+HV-4527 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM SPLY VLV N/A i 1-HV-4572 RHR HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV N/A 1-HV-4573 M HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV N/A 1 HV-4574 CS HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV - N/A l l ' 1 HV-4575 CS HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV N/A ,' 1 HV-4696 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV N/A 1-HV-4699 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC UPSTRM ISOL VLV N/A U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC DNSTRM ISOL VLV N/A l' 1-HV-4700 1 HV-4701 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV N/A ,i 1-HV-4708 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV N/A i 1-HV-4709 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV N/A f i 1-HV-4725 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 IRC ISOL VLV N/A 1-HV-4726 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 ORC ISOL VLV N/A 4 1-HV-4758 RWST TO CS PMP 101/1-03 SUCT VLV N/A i 1-HV-4759 RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT VLV N/A 1-HV-4776 CS HX 1-01 OUT VLV N/A
/
1 HV-4777 CS HX 1-02 OUT VLV N/A 1 HV-4782 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT ISOL VLV N/A I 1 HV-4783 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT ISOL VLV N/A
- 1 HV 5157 VLV N/A 1 HV 5155 RX GAV SMP & GNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 DISCH HDR 1RG 150L N/A
!' 1 HV-5548 U1 CNTMT PRESS RLF SYS ORC ISOL VLV N/A N/A + Indicates Symmetry Evaluation Was Not Required Ts.ble 4.12a Page 4
, = _ . . _
___ _ - _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ .-- u e - - , . , . ,y _,.wp ,.m,y p,, . ,. 7g . _ _ -,.
Table 4.1-2a ER-EA-009 Revision 0 IPE Component Symmetry Evaluation pgg
/' Sorted By Tag Risk Rank Comp nt og Change Due To Component Description Symmetry 1-HV-5549 U1 CNTMT PRESS RLF SYS IRC ISOL VLV N/A 1-HV-8220 U1 CHARGE PMP SUCT HI PNT VNT VLV 8220 N/A 1-HV 8221 U1 CHARGE PMP HI PNT VNT VLV 8221 N/A 1-LCV-01128 (1) VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 01128 No Change 1-LCV-0112C VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112C No Change 1-LCV-0112D (1) RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112D No Change , 1-LCV-0112E RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112E No Change 1-LCV-1003 LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV N/A 1-PCV-0455A PRZR 1-01 PORV 0455A N/A 1-PCV-0456 PRZR PWR OPERATED RELIEF VLV N/A 1-PV 2325 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV N/A 1 PV-2326 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV N/A 1-PV-2327 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV N/A 1 PV-2328 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV N/A 1-PV-2453A MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV N/A 1-PV-2453B MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CTRL VLV N/A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CTRL VLV No Change 1-PV-2454A (1) 1 PV 2454B MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CTRL VLV No Change SFTY CHLR 1-05 CCW RET PCV No Change i
1-PV-4552 (1) 1-PV-4553 SFTY CHLR 1-06 CCW RET PCV No Change 1 AF-0014 CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-01 SUCT CHK VLV N/A 1AF-0024 CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-02 SUCT CHK VLV N/A 1AF-0032 CST 1-01 TO TD AFW PMP CHK VLV N/A 1AF-0038 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV N/A 1AF-0041 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV N/A 1AF-0051 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No Change 1AF-0054 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH ISOL VLV No Change MD AFW PMP 101 DISCH CHK VLV No Change 1AF-0065 (1) MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV No Change 1AF-0066 (1) 1AF-0075 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 CHK VLV N/A 1AF-0078 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 CHK VLV N/A 1AF-0083 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CHK VLV N/A 1 AF-0086 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CHK VLV N/A 1AF-0093 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CHK VLV N/A 1 AF-0098 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CHK VLV N/A 1 AF-0101 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CHK VLV N/A 1 AF-0106 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CHK VLV N/A 1 AF-0215 VLV N/A 1 AF-0216 VLV N/A l 1 AF-0217 VLV N/A 1 AF-0218 VLV N/A 1 AF-0219 VLV N/A 1AF-0220 VLV N/A 1 AF-0221 VLV N/A 1AF-0222 VLV N/A 1AF-0223 VLV N/A ! 1AF-0224 VLV N/A l N/A Indicates Symmetry Evaluation Was Not Required Table 4.1-2a Page 5 , I l
_ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _-~ _ _ _ , _ _ . - _ _ . . _ . _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ ___ ._ i ! l
- Table 4.1-2a ER-EA-009 ;
Revisio 0
- IPE Component Symmetry Evaluation gg Sorted By Tag Risk Rank i
*8 Component Description Change Due To Symmetry -
1AF-0226 VLV N/A {
- 1AF-0227 VLV N/A j l 1AF-0228 VLV - N/A j l 1AF-0229 VLV N/A ;
1AF-0230 VLV N/A i j 1AF-0231 VLV N/A
- 1CC-0031 CCW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No Change t
1CC-0061 (1) CCW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No Change ; i 1CC-0646 RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV N/A j .' 1CC-0657 RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV N/A i 1CC-0687 RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV N/A 1CC-0694 RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV N/A 1CC 0713 U1 RCP CLR CCW SPLY HDR CHK VLV N/A i i 1CC-1075 RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV N/A l 1CC-1076 RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV N/A RC PMP 103 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV N/A l 1CC-1077 f 1CC-1078 RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV N/A > I 1CC-1079 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT N/A i 1CC-1080 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT N/A h }
- 1CC-1081 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT N/A I 1CC-1082 CIRCEL SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2 FNPT N/A
l 1Cl-0030 U1 INST AIR HDR TO U1 CNTMT CHK VLV N/A 1CS-8180 U1 IRC SL WTR RET CNMT ISOL BYP CHK VLV N/A { 1CS-8350A RC PMP 101 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV N/A i 1CS-83508 RC PMP 1-02 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV N/A l I 1CS-8350C RC PMP 1-03 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV N/A 1CS-83500 RC PMP 104 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV N/A N/A [ 1CS-8367A 1CS-8367B RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV RC PMP 102 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV N/A i I' 1CS-8367C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV N/A !
. 1CS-8367D RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV N/A ,
! 1CS-8368A RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV N/A , I 1CS-83688 RC PMP 102 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV N/A 1CS-8368C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV N/A
, 1CS-8368D RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV N/A !
1CS-8442 U1 EMER BORATE LN CHK VLV N/A l' 1CS-8473 BA PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV N/A , i 1CS-8487 BA PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV N/A l I' 1CT-0025 RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT CHK VLV WA 1CT-0042 CS PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV N/A l l 1CT-0047 CS PMP 104 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV N/A , l N/A ~ 1CT-0048 CS PMP 102 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV j 1CT-0063 CS PMP 1-03 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV N/A 1CT-0064 CS PMP 1-01 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV N/A 1CT-0065 CS PMP 103 DISCH CHK VLV N/A ; 4 '.CT-0077 RWST TO CSP 1-01/1-03 SUCT CHK VLV N/A 7 ^ 1CT-0094 CS PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV N/A N/A . indicates Symmetry Evaluation Was Not Required Table 4.1-2n Page 6 i'
Table 4.1-2a . ER-EA-009 . IPE Component Symmetry Evaluation m',i j r
/^ Sorted By Tag l
' * * * " '8 Component Description Ch nge To Symmetry i 1CT-0142 U1 CS TRN A HDR IRC CHK VLV N/A 1CT-0145 U1 CS TRN B HDR 1RC CHK VLV N/A 1CT-0148 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 CHK VLV N/A 1CT-0149 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 CHK VLV N/A 1D0-0004 DG 1-01 FO XREF PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV N/A 10 0-0005 DG 1-01 FO XREF PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV N/A 1DO-0016 DG 102 FO XFER PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV N/A 1DO-0017 DG 102 FO XFER PMP 1-04 DISCH CHK VLV N/A DG 1-01 FO DAY TK 1-01 XFER HDR CHK VLV No Change 1DO-0049 (1) 10 0-0050 DG 1-02 FO DAY TK 1-02 XFER HDR CHK VLV No Change 1FW-0076 SG 1-02 FW HOR CHK VLV N/A 1FW-0082 SG 1-01 FW HDR CHK VLV N/A 1FW 0088 SG 1-04 FW HDR CHK VLV N/A 1FW-0195 SG 104 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV N/A 1FW-0196 SG 1-01 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV N/A 1 FW-0197 SG 1-02 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV N/A-1FW-0198 SG 1-03 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV N/A 1FW-0199 SG 1-04 AFW NZL CHK VLV N/A 1FW-0200 SG 1-01 AFW NZL CHK VLV N/A 1FW-0201 SG 1-02 AFW NZL CHK VLV N/A 1FW-0202 SG 103 AFW NZL CHK VLV N/A 1MS-0026 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV N/A 1MS-0063 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV N/A 1MS-0098 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV N/A 1MS-0134 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV N/A 1MS-0142 MSL 104 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM CHK VLV N/A iMS-0143 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM CHK VLV N/A 1MS-0680 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV N/A 1MS-0681 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV N/A 1MS-0682 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV N/A 1MS-0683 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV N/A 1MS-0684 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV N/A ES-0685 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV N/A iMS-0686 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV N/A 1MS-0687 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV N/A i
RWST 1-01 TO St ISOL VLV N/A 1SI-0047 1SI-8819A Si TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV N/A Sl TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV N/A 1SI-8819B 1SI-8819C St TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV N/A Si TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV N/A 1S1-88190
' N/A 1SI-8900A CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV N/A 1SI-89008 1SI-8900C CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV N/A 1SI-89000 CCP 1-01/102 TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV N/A 1 SI-8905A St TO HL 1-01 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV N/A 1SI-8905B St TO HL 1-02 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV N/A SI TO HL 1-03 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV N/A 1SI-8905C IJ/A Indicates Symmetry Evaluation Was Not Required Table 4.1-2a Page 7
l Table 4.1-2a ER-EA-009 l IPE Component Symmetry Evaluation g(5 Sorted By Tag ) L f7 Risk Rank i Component Description Change Due To t Nu&r Symmetry [ 1SI-8905D Si TO HL 1-04 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV N/A 1SI-8919A St PMP 1-01 TO RWST CHK VLV N/A 1S1-8919B St PMP 1-02 TO RWST CHK VLV N/A , 3 1SW-0016 (3) U1 SSW TRN B SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV Decreased 1SW-0017 (3) U1 SSW TRN A SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV Decreased ; SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV N/A j 1SW-0373 [ ) 1SW-0374 SSW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV N/A l No Change CP1-AFAPMD-01 (1) MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 , MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-02 No Change
; CP1-AFAPMD-02 ,
CP1 AFAPTD-01 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 N/A ! CP1-CCAPCC-01 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1-01 N/A l CP1-CCAPCC-02 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1-02 N/A } No Change ! CP1-CHAPCP-05 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 1-05 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 1-06 increased l i CP1 CHAPCP-06 (2) N/A ! i CP1-CTAPCS-01 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-01 CP1-CTAPCS CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-02 N/A ; } CP1-CTAPCS-03 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-03 N/A { N/A
- CP1-CTAPCS-04 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-04 '
I- CP1-DOAPFT-01 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 N/A CP1-DOAPFT-02 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 N/A j CP1-DOAPFT 03 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-03 N/A DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-04 N/A i- CP1-DOAPFT-04 CP1 SWAPSW-01 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-01 No Change f No Change CP1 SWAPSW-02 (1) STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-02 TBX-CSAPBA-01 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 N/A 1 TBX-CSAPBA-02 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 N/A } CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-01 No Change TBX-CSAPCH-01 (1) TBX-CSAPCH-02 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-02 No Change RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-01 No Change TBX-RHAPRH-01 (1) TBX-RHAPRH-02 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-02 No Change SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-01 No Change TBX SIAPSI-01 (1) TBX-SIAPSI-02 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-02 No Change UPS A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV No Change . X-PCV-H116A (1) X-PCV-H1168 UPS A\C UNIT X-02 CCW RET PCV No Change f X-PV-3583 CR A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV N/A X-PV-3585 CR A\C UNIT X-03 CCW RET PCV N/A l (1) Component F-V/ RAW values have been assessed and should be associated with its sister valve. 4 CDF risk catergory does not change l (2) Component F-V/ RAW values have been assessed and should be associated with its sister valve. l CDF risk catergory for the component increases to match sister valve ; (3) Component F-V/ RAW values have been assessed and should be revised to j ) ' - CDF risk catergory "None" as valves intemals removed 4 J 1 1 N/A Indicates Symmetry Evaluation Was Not Required Table 4.1-2a Page 8 4
-, --m--, ,- - - e m -.e ,-- -, e - -
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page $ of $ _5
- 7) Table 4.1-3 Risk Ranking Changes For IST Componenets Considering Fire And Tornado External Events Component Tag Risk Rank Change Component Description Number Due To IPEEE Fire
- And Tornado 4
1-8110 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Dnstrm Miniflow Viv Increased -Medium 1 8111 Ccp 1-01/102 Upstrm Miniflow Viv increased -Medium a 1-8546 Rwst 1-01 To Chrg Pmp Suct Chk Viv increased -Medium 1-8806 Rwst 1-01 To St Pmps Suct Viv increased -Medium 1-8815 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Inj Chk Viv Increased -Medium 1-8835 SI Pmp 1-01/1-02 To Clinj lsol Viv increased -Medium 1-8923A SI Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv increased -Medium ~ 1-8923B S1 Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv increased -Medium 1 FCV-0610 RHR Pmp 1-01 Miniflo Viv increased -Medium 1-FCV-0611 RHR Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv increased -Medium 1-LCV-0112B VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112B Increased -Medium i 1-LCV-0112C VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112C increased -Medium 1-LCV-0112D RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112D increased -Medium i 1-LCV-0112E RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112E increased -Medium 1-PV-2325 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV Increased -Medium 1-PV-2326 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV Increased -Medium 1-PV-2327 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV Increased -Medium 1-PV-2328 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV Increased -Medium X-PCV-H116A UPS A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV increased -Medium X-PCV-H1168 UPS A\C UNIT X-02 CCW RET PCV Increased -Medium Table 4.1-3 Page 1
1 1 Table 4.1-3a ER-EA-009 IPEEE Fire And Tomado IST Component Evaluation j'vi5ih5 Sorted By Tag Risk Rank l
""E* "*
*P "*" "U Component Description Number IPEEE F,re i And Tornado 1-7136 Redt Pump Discharge ControlValve No change 1-8000A Przr 1-01 Porv 0455A Blk Viv No change 1-80008 Przr 1-01 Porv 0456 Blk Viv No change 1-8010A Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv A No change 1-8010B Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv 8 No change 1-8010C Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv C No change 1 8100 U1 Rcp SI Wtr Ret Isol Viv No change 1-8104 U1 Emer Borate Viv No change 1-8105 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt isol Vlv No change 1-8106 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt Isol Viv No change 1-8110 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Dnstrm Miniflow Viv increased . Medium Ccp 1-01/1-02 Upstrm Miniflow Viv increased . Medium 1-8111 1-8112 U1 RC Pmp Seal Wtr Ret isol Viv No change 1-8145 U1 Przr Aux Spr Vlv No change 1-8146 U1 RCS Loop 4 Chrg Viv No change i 1-8152 U1 LTDN CNTMT ORC ISOL VLV No change ;
1-8160 U1 LTDN CNTMT IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-8351 A RC Pmp 1-01 SI Wtr inj Viv No change 18351B RC Pmp 1-02 SI Wtr inj Viv No change 1-8351C RC Pmp 1-03 Si Wtr inj Viv No change 1-8351 D RC Pmp 1-04 Si Wtr inj Viv No change 1-8378A RCS Loop 1-04 Chrg Dnstrm Chk Viv No change 1-8378B RCS Loop 104 Chrg Upstrm Chk Viv No change 1-8381 Chrg Ln Irc Chk Viv No change 1-8481 A Ccp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No change 1-8481B Ccp 1-02 Disch Chk Viv No change 1-8497 Pd Pmp 1-01 Disch Chk Vlv No change l 1-8511 A Ccp 1-01 Alt Miniflo isol Viv No change 1-8511B Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo isol Viv No change 1-8512A Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo Isol Viv No change 1-8512B Ccp 1-01 Alt Miniflo isol Viv No change Rwst 1-01 To Chrg Pmp Suct Chk Viv increased -Medium 1-8546 1-8701A RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Recirc Omb Isol Viv No change 1-87018 RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recirc Omb isol Viv No change 18702A RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Reicrc Imb isol Viv No change 1-8702B RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recirc Imb isol Viv No change 1-8708A RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Rif Viv No change 1-87088 RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Rif Viv No change 1-8716A RHR Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv No change 1-87168 RHR Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv No change 1-8717 U1 RHR Pmps Disch To Rwst isol Viv No change 1-8730A RHR Hx 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No change l 1-87308 RHR Hx 1-02 Disch Chk Viv No change 1-8801 A Ccp 1-01/1-02 Si isol Viv 8801 A No change 1-8801B Ccp 1-01/1-02 Si isol Viv 88018 No change Table 4.13a Page 1
. - . - - - .. - . . - -- -. . - . _ - - . . - - - . ~ . . . .
Table 4.1-3a - ER-EA-009 ; Revisi IPEEE Fire And Tornado IST Component Evaluation g 5 l Sorted By Tag Risk Rank 4
* "*" '8 Component Description
*"I* "*
Number IPEEE Fire And Tornado ! 1-8802A St Pmp 101 To HI 2 & 3 Inj lsol Viv No change 8 1-8802B St Pmp 1-02 TarHI 1 & 4 Inj isol Viv No change . l 1-8804A RHR Pmp 1-01 To Ccp Suct Viv No change 1-8804B RHR Pmp 1-02 To S1 Pmps Suct Viv No change ; 1-8806 Rwst 1-01 To S1 Pmps Suct Viv increased Medium 18807A U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Viv 8807A No change ; 1-8807B U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Viv 8807B No change 1-8808A St Accum 1-01 Inj Viv No change l 1-8808B Si Accum 1-02 Inj Viv No change i 1-8808C Si Accum 1-03 inj Viv No change 1-8808D SI Accum 1-04 Inj Viv No change 18809A RHR To Cl 1-01/1-02 inj isol Viv No change 1-88098 RHR To Cl 1-03/1-04 inj isol Viv No change ; 1-8811 A Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct isol Viv No change i 1 88118 Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct isol Viv No change 1-8812A Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv No change ; 1-88128 Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv No change i 1-8813 S1 Pmp 1-01/102 Miniflo Ret Viv No change l 1-8814A S1 Pmp 1-01 Mintflo Viv No change , 1-88148 Sl Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv No enange - 1-8815 Ccp 101/1-02 Inj Chk Viv increased -Medium 1-8818A RHR Cl 1-01 inj Chk Viv No change 1-8818B RHR 1511-02 inj Chk Viv No change 18818C RHR Cl 1-03 inj Chk Viv No change 18818D RHR Cl 1-04 inj Chk Viv No change 1-8821 A S1 Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv No change - 1-8821B S1 Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv No change 1 8835 Sl Pmp 1-01/1-02 To Cl inj isol Viv increased -uedium 1-8840 RHR To HI 102/1-03 Inj lsol Viv No change 1-8841 A RHR To RCS HI 1-02 Upstrm Chk Viv No change 1-88418 RHR To RCS HI 103 Upstrm Chk Viv - No change 18875A St Accum 1-01 N2 SPLYNENT Viv No change 1-8875B SI Accum 1-02 N2 SPLYNENT Viv No change 1-8875C St Accum 1-03 N2 SPLYNENT Viv No change 1-8875D St Accum 1-04 N2 SPLYNENT Viv No change 1-8877A SI Accum 1-01 Tst Ln isol Viv No change 1-8877B Si Accum 1-02 Tat Ln Isol Viv No change 1-8877C St Accum 1-03 Tst Ln Isol Viv No change 1-8877D - St Accum 1-04 Tst Ln isol Viv No change 1-8878A SI Accum 1-01 Fill Viv No change 1-8878B St Accum 1-02 Fall Viv No change ; 1-8878C St Accum 1-03 Fill Viv l No chanJe - 1-88780 SI Accum 1-04 Fill Viv No change 18922A Sl Pmp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No change 1-8922B St Pmp 1-02 Disch Chk Viv No change j , 1-8923A St Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv increased -uedium Table 4.13a Page 2 j d 4v'. m-- - ..e, , _ , . .
f [ ~ Table 4.1-3a ER-EA-009 IPEEE Fire And Tornado IST Component Evaluation Revision 0 Page II(a or 295 i . A' ~ Sorted By Tag l1 l Risk Rank ! ! . Component Tag Change Dus To Component Description ! 4 Number IPEEE Fire And Tornado l 1-89238 St Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv increened -med6um i 1 8924- U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtte isol Viv No change ' l 1 8926 St Pmp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv No change t 1-8948A St Accum 1-01 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv No change { 18948B SI Accum 1-02 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv No change , 4 1-8948C - St Accum 1-03 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv No change 4 ' 1-8948D SI Accum 1-04 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv No change f 18949A RHR To Rep HI 1-01 Dnstrm Chk Viv No change ; 1-89498 RHR To Rep HI 1-02 Onstrm Chk Viv No change ! ) No change 1-8949C RHR To Rep HI 1-03 Dnstrm Chk Viv 18949D RHR To Rep HI 1-04 Dnstrm Chk Viv No change 1-8956A St Accum 1-01 Upstrm inj Chk Viv No change [ St Accum 1-02 Upstrm inj Chk Viv No change I 1 89568 i St Accum 103 Upstrm inj Chk Viv No change 1-8956C 1-8956D SI Accum 1-04 Upstrm inj Chk Viv No change jl 1-8958A Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-01 Chk Viv No change <
- 1-89588 Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-02 Chk Viv No change ;
- 1-896SA RHR To Ccp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv No change - l 1-89698 RHR To Si Pmp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv No change !
1
- RHR Pmp 1-01 Miniflo Viv increened -Medium 1-FCV 0610 RHR Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv increased -Med6um
- 1 FCV-0611 I 1-FCV-0618 RHR Hx 1-01 Byp Flo Ctrl Viv No change 1-FCV-0619 RHR Hx 102 Byp Flo Ctrl Viv No change 1-1-FV-2193 SG 101 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv No change j 1-FV-2196 SG 1-04 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv No change '
1-FV-4772-1 Cs Pmp 1-01 Recire Viv No change l 1-FV-4772-2 Cs Pmp 1-03 Recirc Viv No change 4 4 1-FV-47731 Cs Pmp 1-02 Rectre Viv No change 1 FV-4773-2 Cs Pmp 1-04 Recire Viv No change i 1-HCV-0606 RHR Hx 1-01 Flo Ctrl Viv No change 1-HCV-0607 RHR Hx 1-02 Flo Ctrl Viv No change , 1-HV-2134 SG 1-01 FW ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2135 SG 1-02 FW ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2136 SG 1-03 FW ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2137 SG 1-04 FW ISOL VLV No change l No change j 1-HV-2333A MSIV 1-01 1-HV-2334A MSIV 1-02 No change . 1-HV-2335A MSIV 1-03 No change . 1-HV-2336A MSIV 1-04 No change j 1-HV-2397 SG 101 BLDN ISOL VLV No change < 1-HV-2397A SG 1-01 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV No change 1-HV 2409 MSL 1-01 BEF MSIV D\ POT 1-25 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2410 MSL 1-02 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV No change 1 1-HV-2411 MSL 1-03 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2412 MSL 1-04 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV No change l I 1 HV-2452-1 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV No change
- Table 4.1-3a Page 3 1
3
i Table 4.1-3a ER-EA-009 l J R IPEEE Fire And Tornado IST Component Evaluation H] vision 0 r**% I Sorted By Tag Risk Rank
*P "*" *E ""E* * , Component Description .
Number IPEEE Fire And Tornado j 1-HV-2452-2 MSL 1-04 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV No change 1-HV-2459 TD AFW PMP T-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV No change 1-HV-2460 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 FCV No change 1-HV-2461 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 FLO CTRL VLV No change 1-HV-2462 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 FLO CTRL VLV No change 1-HV-2491 A TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 ISOL VLV No change 1 HV-2491B MD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-01 ISOL VLV No change 1 HV-2492A TO AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2492B MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2493A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 ISOL VLV No change 4 1 HV-24938 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2494A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV 2494B TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 ISOL VLV No change 1 HV-3487 U1 CNTMT INST AIR HDR ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4171 ACCUM 1-01 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4172 ACCUM 1-02 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN 1RC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4173 ACCUM 1-03 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4174 ACCUM 1-04 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4286 SSW PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV No change 1-HV-4287 SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH VLV No change 1-HV-4393 DG 1-01 JKT WTR CLR cRW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4394 DG 1-02 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4512 U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4513 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW RET VLV No change 1 1-HV-4514 U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW SPLY VLV No change 1-HV-4515 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW SPLY VLV No change 1-HV-4524 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM RET VLV No change 1-HV-4525 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM RET VLV No change 1-HV-4526 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM SPLY VLV No change 1-HV-4527 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM SPLY VLV No change 1-HV-4572 RHR HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV No change _ 1-HV-4573 RHR HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4574 CS HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV No change , 1-HV-4575 CS HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV No change 1 HV-4696 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4699 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4700 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC DNSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4701 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4708 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV No change j 1 HV-4709 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV No change ; 1-HV-4725 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4726 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 ORC ISOL VLV No change 1 HV-4758 RWST TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT VLV No change 1-HV 4759 RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT VLV No change 1-HV-4776 CS HX 1-01 OUT VLV No change 1-HV-4777 CS HX 1-02 OUT VLV No change 1 Table 4.13a Page 4
l
-l Table 4.1-3a ER-EA-009 Revis IPEEE Fire And Tornado IST Component Evaluation Ug p., '
Sorted By Tag Risk Rank Component Tag Change Due To Component Description IPEEE Fire And l Tornado - l 1-HV-4782 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT ISOL VLV No change CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4783 , RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 DISCH HDR ORC ISOL VLV No change l 1-HV-5157 RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 DISCH HDR 1RC iSOL VLV No change l 1 HV-5158 U1 CNTMT PRESS RLF SYS ORC ISOL VLV No change ; 1 HV-5548 1 HV-5549 U1 CNTMT PRESS RLF SYS IRC ISOL VLV No change l l 1-HV-8220 U1 CHARGE PMP SUCT Hi PNT VNT VLV 8220 No change U1 CHARGE PMP HI PNT VNT VLV 8221 No change ; 1-HV-8221 ' VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112B increased -Medium 1-LCV-01128 VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112C increased -Medium 1-LCV-0112C ' RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112D increased -Medium 1-LCV-0112D increased -Medium I 1-LCV-0112E RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112E LWPS RCOT 101 LVL CTRL VLV No change . 1-LCV 1003 ' PRZR 1-01 PORV 0455A No change 1-PCV-0455A PRZR PWR OPERATED RELIEF VLV No change 1 PCV-0456 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV increased -Medium 1-PV-2325 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV increased -Medium 1-PV 2326 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV increased -Medium ; 1-PV-2327 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV increased -Medium 1-PV 2328 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV No change 1 PV-2453A MD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CTRL VLV No change 1-PV-2453B MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CTRL VLV No change 1-PV 2454A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CTRL VLV No change 1 PV-2454B SFTY CHLR 1-05 CCW RET PCV No change j 1-PV-4552 SFTY CHLR 1-06 CCW RET PCV No change 1-PV-4553 CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-01 SUCT CHK VLV No change l 1 AF-0014 CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-02 SUCT CHK VLV No change l 1AF-0024 I CST 1-01 TO TD AFW PMP CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0032 1AF-0038 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0041 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV No change 1AF-0051 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1AF-0054 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH ISOL VLV No change 1AF-0065 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1AF-0066 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV No change 1AF-0075 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 CHK VLV No change l TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 CHK VLV No change 1 1AF 0078 1AF 0083 MD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CHK VLV No change 1AF-0086 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 102 CHK VLV No change ! 1AF-0093 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CHK VLV No change 1AF 0098 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CHK VLV No change 1 1 AF-0101 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CHK VLV No change I 1 AF-0106 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0215 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF 0216 MD AFW PMP 101 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 AF 0217 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change Table 4.13a Page 5
Table 4.1-3a ER-EA-009 IPEEE Fire And Tornado IST Component Evaluation gvisigo ( Sorted By Tag ;
- Risk Rank j mp nen og ""9*
- Component Description Number IPEEE F. ire And Tornado 1 AF-0218 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 102 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0219 MD AFW PMP i-02 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0220 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change i 1AF-0221 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change !
1AF-0222 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change ! 1AF-0223 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0224 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0226 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0227 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0228 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0229 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0230 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0231 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1CC-0031 CCW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1CC-0061 CCW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1CC-0646 RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-0657 RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-0687 RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-0694 RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-0713 U1 RCP CLR CCW SPLY HDR CHK VLV No change 1CC-1075 RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-1076 RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No change i 1CC-1077 RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-1078 RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-1079 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT No change 1CC-1080 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT No change 1CC-1081 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT No change l 1CC-1082 CIRCEL SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2 FNPT No change j 1 Cl-0030 U1 INST AIR HDR TO U1 CNTMT CHK VLV No change 1CS-8180 U1 IRC SL WTR RET CNMT ISOL BYP CHK VLV No change 1CS-8350A RC PMP 1-01 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No change j I 1CS-83508 RC PMP 1-02 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No change 1CS-8350C RC PMP 1-03 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No change 1CS-8350D RC PMP 1-04 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No change No change ! 1CS-8367A RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV 1CS-83678 RC PMP 1-02 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No change 1CS-8367C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No change 1CS-8367D RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No change 1CS-8368A RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No change 1CS-83688 RC PMP 102 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No change j l 1CS-8368C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No change 1CS-8368D RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No change 1CS-8442 U1 EMER BORATE LN CHK VLV No change j 1CS-8473 BA PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1 1CS-8487 BA PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change l Table 4.1-3a Pager I
Table 4.1-3a ER-EA-009 IPEEE Fire And Tornado IST Component Evaluation yy[5g Sorted By Tag Risk Rank E" ange N e h Component Description Number IPEEE Fire And Tornado 1CT-0025 RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT CHK VLV No change 1CT-0042 CS PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1CT-0047 CS PMP 1-04 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No change 1CT-0048 CS PMP 1-02 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No change 1CT 0063 CS PMP 1-03 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No change 1CT-0064 CS PMP 1-01 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No change 1CT-0065 CS PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1CT-0077 RWST TO CSP 1-01/1-03 SUCT CHK VLV No change 1CT-0094 CS PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1CT-0142 U1 CS TRN A HDR 1RC CHK VLV No change 1 CT-0145 U1 CS TRN B HDR 1RC CHK VLV No change 1CT-0148 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 CHK VLV No change 1 CT-0149 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 CHK VLV No change 10 0-0004 DG 1-01 FO XREF PMP 1-Si DISCH CHK VLV No change 10 0-0005 DG 1-01 FO XREF PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1 DO-0016 DG 1-02 FO XFER PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1 D0-0017 DG 1-02 FO XFER PMP 1-04 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1 DO-0049 DG 1-01 FO DAY TK 1-01 XFER HDR CHK VLV No change 1 DO-0050 DG 1-02 FO DAY TK 1-02 XFER HDR CHK VLV No change j 1 FW-0076 SG 1-02 FW HDR CHK VLV No change 1FW-0082 SG 1-01 FW HDR CHK VLV No change 1 FW-0088 SG 1-04 FW HDR CHK VLV No change 1FW-0195 SG 1-04 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV No change 1 FW-0196 SG 1-01 FW PREHTR BYP 1RC CHK VLV No change 1 FW-0197 SG 1-02 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV No change , No change I 1 FW-0198 SG 1-03 FW PREHTR BYP lRC CHK VLV 1FW-0199 SG 1-04 AFW NZL CHK VLV No change 1 FW-0200 SG 1-01 AFW NZL CHK VLV No change 1 FW-0201 SG 1-02 AFW NZL CHK VLV No change I 1FW-0202 SG 1-03 AFW NZL CHK VLV No change l 1MS-0026 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1 1MS-0063 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1 MS-0098 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1MS-0134 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM iSOL VLV No change 1MS-0142 MSL 1-04 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1MS-0143 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1MS-0680 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 MS-0681 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 MS-0682 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change j 1MS-0683 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change j 1 MS-0684 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 MS-0685 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SNLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1MS-0686 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1MS-0687 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 SI-0047 RWST 1-01 TO St ISOL VLV No change l 1SI-8819A SI TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV No change Table 4.1-3a Page 7
Table 4.1-3a ER-EA-009 Revis IPEEE Fire And Tornado IST Component Evaluation g 1 'R Sorted By Tag Risk Rank Component Tag Component Description "E*
- Number IPEEE F. ire And Tornado 1SI-88198 St TO CL 102 CHK VLV No change ,
1SI-8819C Si TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV No change l 1SI-88190 Si TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV No change 1SI-8900A CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV No change 1SI-89008 CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV No change 1SI-8900C CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV No change 1SI-8900D CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV No change ; No change 1SI-8905A Si TO HL 1-01 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV .) 1SI-89058 St TO HL 1-02 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No change ; 1SI-8905C Si TO HL 1-03 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No change l 1SI-8905D Si TO HL 1-04 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No change l 1SI8919A St PMP 1-01 TO RWST CHK VLV No change 1SI-8919B St PMP 1-02 TO RWST CHK VLV No change 1SW-0016 U1 SSW TRN B SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV No change 1 SW-0017 U1 SSW TRN A SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV No change iSW-0373 SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1SW-0374 SSW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change CP1-AFAPMD-01 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 No change CP1-AFAPMD-02 MOTOR DR!VEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-02 No change CP1-AFAPTD-01 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 No change CP1-CCAPCC-01 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1-01 No change CP1-CCAPCC-02 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1-02 No change CP1-CHAPCP-05 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 1-05 No change l CP1-CHAPCP-06 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 1-06 No change j CP1-CTAPCS-01 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-01 No change l CP1-CTAPCS-02 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-02 No change i CP1-CTAPCS-03 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-03 No change CP1-CTAPCS-04 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-04 No change ! CP1-DOAPFT-01 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 No change l ' No change l CP1-DOAPFT-02 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OlL TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 CP1-DOAPFT-03 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-03 No change CP1-DOAPFT-04 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-04 No Mange ! CP1-SWAPSW-01 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-01 No change CP1-SWAPSW-02 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-02 No change j TBX-CSAPBA-01 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 No change TBX-CSAPBA-02 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 No change TBX-CSAPCH-01 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-01 No change TBX-CSAPCH-02 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 102 No change TBX-RHAPRH-01 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-01 No change TBX-RHAPRH-02 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-02 No change TBX-SIAPSI-01 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-01 No change TBX-SIAPSI-02 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-02 No change X-PCV-H116A UPS A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV increased -Medium X-PCV-H116B UPS A\C UNIT X-02 CCW RET PCV increased -Medium X-PV-3583 CR A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV No change X-PV-3585 CR A\C UNIT X-03 CCW RET PCV No change Table 4.1-3a Page 8
ER-EA-009 Revision 0
** l Table 4.1-4 IPE/IST Component Ranking Changes Due To Evaluation Of Shutdown Considerations l Risk Rank Changes Component Tag Due To Shutdown Component Description hh Considerations 1-8701A RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Recirc Omb Isol Viv Category 2 1-87018 RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recirc Omb isol Viv Category 2 1-8702A RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Reiere imb isol Viv Category 2 1-87028 RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recire Imb ! sol Viv Category 2 1-8708A RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Rif Vlv Category 1 1-8708B RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Rif Viv Category 1 1-8809A RHR To Cl 1-01/1-02 Inj lsol Viv Category 1 1-8809B RHR To Cl 143/1-04 Inj isol Viv Category 1 1-8812A Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv Category 1 1-8812B Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv Category 1 1-8835 S1 Pmp 1-01/1-02 To ClInj isol Viv Category 1 1-HCV-0606 RHR Hx 1-01 Flo Ctrl Viv Category 1 1-HCV-0607 RHR Hx 1-02 Flo CtrlViv Category 1 1-PCV-0455A PRZR 1-01 PORV 0455A Category 1 1-PCV-0456 PRZR PWR OPERATED RELIEF VLV Category 1 Table 4.1-4 Page 1
ER-EA-009 Table 4.1-4a Revision 0 PageI D of M IPE/IST Component Evaluation For Shutdown Considerations Sorted By Tag Component Tag Risk Rank Due To Component Desen.p tion Shutdown Considerations 1 7136 Redt Pump Discharge Control Valve No change 1-8000A Przr 1-01 Porv 0455A Blk Viv No change 1 80008 Przr 1-01 Porv 0456 Bik Viv No change 1-8010A Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv A No change 1-80108 Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv B No change 1-8010C Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv C No change 1-8100 U1 Rep St Wtr Ret Isol Viv No change i 1 8104 U1 Emer Borate Viv No change . 1-8105 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt Isol Viv No change 1 8106 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt isol Viv No change 2 1-8110 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Dnstrm Miniflow Viv No change i 1-8111 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Upstrm Miniflow Viv No change 4 1-8112 U1 RC Pmp Seal Wtr Ret isol Viv No change i 1-8145 U1 Przr Aux Spr Viv No change, j 1-8146 U1 RCS Loop 4 Chrg Viv No change 1-8152 U1 LTDN CNTMT ORC ISOL VLV No change ' 1-8160 U1 LTDN CNTMT IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-8351 A RC Pmp 1-01 St Wtr inj Viv No change' 1-8351B RC Pmp 1-02 Si Wtr inj Viv No change . 1-8351C RC Pmp 1-03 St Wtr inj Viv No change 1-8351D RC Pmp 1-04 St Wtr inj Viv No change 1-8378A RCS Loop 1-04 Chrg Dnstrm Chk Viv No change 1-83788 RCS Loop 1-04 Chrg Upstrm Chk Viv No change 1-8381 Chrg Ln irc Chk Viv No change 1 8481A Ccp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No change 1-8481 B Ccp 1-02 Disch Chk Viv No change 1-8497 Pd Pmp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No change 1-8511 A Ccp 1-01 Alt Miniflo Isol Viv No change l 1-8511B Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo Isol Viv No change 1-8512A Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo isol Viv No change l 1-85128 Ccp 1-01 Att Miniflo Isol Viv No change l 1-8546 Rwst 1-01 To Chrg Pmp Suct Chk Viv No change 1-8701 A RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 101 Recirc Omb isol Viv Category 2 1-8701B RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recire Omb isol Viv Category 2 1-8702A RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Reiere Imb isol Viv Categg 2 l 1-8702B RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recire Imb isol Viv Category 2 4 1-8708A RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Rif Viv Category 1 1-8708B RHR Pmp 102 Suct Rif Viv Category 1 No change I
- 1-8716A RHR Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv 1-87168 RHR Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv No change 1-8717 U1 RHR Pmps Disch To Rwst Isol Viv No change 1-8730A RHR Hx 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No change _
i 1-8730B RHR Hx 1-02 Disch Chk Viv No change 1-8801 A Ccp 1-01/1-02 Sl isol Viv 8801 A No change 18801B Ccp 1-01/1-02 Si isol Viv 88018 No change Table 4.1-4a Page 1 l
g : ER-EA-009 Table 4.1-4a Revision 0 f f Page 12&of 7.95 ;
; IPE/IST Component Evaluation For Shutdown Considerations j
. Sorted By Tag l
' i 1 Component Tag Risk Rank Due To .!
mponent Desc@on Number Shutdown j Consider tion. ; j 1-8802A S1 Pmp 1-01 To HI 2 & 3 inj isol Viv No change 4 1 88028 S1 Pmp 1-02 To HI 1 & 4 Inj lsol Viv No change , j 1-8804A RHR Pmp 101 To Ccp Suct Viv No change
; 18804B RHR Pmp 1-02 To S1 Pmps Suct Viv No change ? ). 1-8808 Rwst 1-01 To Si Pmps Suct Viv No change !
18807A U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Viv 8807A No change ( l
- 1-88078 U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Viv 88078 No change 3 18808A St Accum 1-01 inj Viv Low 1-88088 Si Accum 1-02 Inj Viv Low .
} 1-8808C St Accum 1-03 inj Viv Low l 1-8808D SI Accum 1-04 inj Viv Low l 1 18809A RHR To Cl 1-01/1-02 inj isol Viv Category 1 ; I 1-88098 RHR To Cl 1-03/1-04 Inj isol Viv Category 1 ! i 18811 A Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct isol V!v No change ! ! 1-8811B Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Isol Viv No change i I 18812A Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv Category 1 l 18812B Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv Category 1 i 1-8813 Si Pmp 1-01/1-02 Miniflo Ret Viv No change. 1-8814A St Pmp 1-01 Minrflo Viv No change ; l j , 1-88148 Sl Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv No change { l 1-8815 Ccp 101/1-02 inj Chk Viv No change l 1-8818A RHR Cl 1-01 Inj Chk Viv No change , 1-88188 RHR Cl 102 inj Chk Viv No change i 1-8818C RHR Cl 1-03 inj Chk Viv No change ; i 1-88180 RHR Cl 104 inj Chk Viv No change l l 1-8821 A S1 Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv No change 1-8821B St Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv No change 1-8835 St Pmp 1-01/1-02 To Cl inj isol Viv Category 1
- 1 8840 RHR To HI 1-02/1-03 inj isol Viv No change !
RHR To RCS HI 1-02 Upstrm Chk Viv No change [ 1-8841 A RHR To RCS HI 1-03 Upstrm Chk Viv No change i 18841B i 1-8875A SI Accum 1-01 N2 SPLY/ VENT Viv No change i 1-8875B SI Accum 102 N2 SPLY/ VENT Viv No change i
- j. 1-8875C SI Accum 103 N2 SPLY/ VENT Viv No change j 1-8875D SI Accum 104 N2 SPLY/ VENT Viv No change l l 18877A St Accum 1-01 Tst Ln isol Viv No change
- 1-8877B Si Accum 1-02 Tst Ln isol Viv No change 1-8877C St Accum 1-03 Tat Ln isol Viv No change l
1-8877D St Accum 104 Tot Ln isol Viv No change 1-8878A SI Accum 101 Fill Viv No change l 1-8878B St Accum 1-02 Fill Viv No change
- 1-8878C SI Accum 1-03 Fill Viv No change I
) 1-8878D SI Accum 1-04 FiH Viv No change ! 1-8922A St Pmp 101 Disch Chk Viv No change 18922B Si Pmp 1-02 Disch Chk Viv No change 1-8923A St Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv No change { l Table 4.1-4a Page 2 i
,. _ - - . - .- - . . . - .-. = - . . - I ER-EA-009 ) Revision 0 l i- Table 4.1-4a - I ! i Pase LSof]3h
; IPE/IST Component Evaluation For Shutdown Considerations i Sorted By Tag
_ Component Tag Riek Rank Due To
**P'"*" ** "
Numtwr Shutdown l Considerations 1-89238 St Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv No change 1 i- 1 8924 U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie isol Viv No change i 1-8926 Si Pmp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv - No change } j 18948A St Accum 1-01 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv No change ! 1-8948B SI Accum 1-02 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv No change j 1-8948C SI Accum 103 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv No change i 18948D St Accum 1-04 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv No change :
- 18949A RHR To Rep HI 101 Dnstrm Chk Viv No change l
- 1-89498 RHR To Rcp HI 102 Dnstrm Chk Viv No change 1-8949C RHR To Rcp HI 1-03 Dnstrm Chk Viv No change j 1 89490 RHR To Rep HI 1-04 Dnstrm Chk Viv No change 1-8956A St Accum 1-01 Upstrm inj Chk Viv No change l
} No change : 18956B St Accum 1-02 Upstrm inj Chk Viv l No change 18956C St Accum 1-03 Upstrm inj Chk Viv i 1-8956D SI Accum 1-04 U'pstrm Inj Chk Viv No change' 1-8958A Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-01 Chk Viv No change f' 1 89588 Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-02 Chk Viv No change ) ! 1-8989A RHR To Ccp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv No change. ' RHR To S1 Pmp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv No change 1-8969B
- 1-FCV-0610 RHR Pmp 1-01 Miniflo Viv No change 1-FCV-0611 RHR Pmp 1-02 Minrflo Viv No change I
1-FCV-0618 RHR Hx 1-01 Byp Flo Ctrl Viv Low
- 1-FCV-0619 - RHR Hx 1-02 Byp Flo Ctri Viv Low i 1 FV 2193 SG 1-01 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv No change F 1 FV 2196 SG 1-04 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv No change 1-FV-4772-1 Cs Pmp 1-01 Recire Viv No change l
1 FV-4772-2 Cs Pmp 1-03 Recirc Viv No change 1 FV-4773-1 Cs Pmp 1-02 Recire Viv No change f 1-FV 4773-2 Cs Pmp 1-04 Recite Viv No change l 1 -0 1 j 1-HV-2134 SG 1-01 FW ISOL VLV No change i i-HV-2135 SG 1-02 FW ISOL VLV No change 1 HV 2136 SG 1-03 FW ISOL VLV No change ' No change 1 HV 2137 SG 1-04 FW ISOL VLV
- 1 HV-2333A MSIV 1-01 No change i- 1-HV-2334A MSIV 1-02 No change 1-HV-2335A MSlV 1-03 No change 1-HV-2336A MSIV 104 No change
. 1-HV-2397 SG 1-01 BLDN ISOL VLV No change ! 1-HV-2397A SG 1-01 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV No change ! 1 HV-2409 MSL 1-01 BEF MSlV D\ POT 125 ISOL VLV No change 1 l 1-HV-2410 MSL 1-02 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2411 MSL 1-03 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV No change ! 1-HV-2412 MSL 1-04 BEF MSIV D) POT ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2452 1 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV No change Table 4.1-4a Page 3 1 _ _ , , .a ~_, _ .I
ER-EA-009 Table 4.1-4a Revision 0 Page M or 7. YJ IPE/IST Component Evaluation For Shutdown Considerations Sorted By Tag j I
*E "*"' '8 Component Description Number Shutdown '
Considerations 1-HV-2452-2 MSL 1-04 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV No change 1 HV-2459 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV Low i 1-HV-2460 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 102 FCV Low 1-HV-2461 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 FLO CTRL VLV Low 1-HV-2462 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 FLO CTRL VLV Low 1-HV-2491 A TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 ISOL VLV No change 1 HV-2491B MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2492A TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-24928 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 ISOL VLV No change 1 HV-2493A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2493B TO AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2494A MD AFW PMP 102 DISCH TO SG 1-04 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-24948 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-3487 U1 CNTMT INST AIR HDR ISOL VLV No change 4 1-HV-4171 ACCUM 1-01 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4172 ACCUM 1-02 LIO SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4173 ACCUM 1-03 LlO SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4174 ACCUM 1-04 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV No change. 1-HV-4286 SSW PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV No change 1-HV-4287 SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH VLV No change 1-HV-4393 DG 1-01 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV No change 1 HV-4394 DG 1-02 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4512 U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4513 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4514 U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW SPLY VLV No change
- 1-HV-4515 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW SPLY VLV No change
- 1-HV-4524 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM RET VLV No change
! 1-HV-4525 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM RET VLV No change 1 HV-4526 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM SPLY VLV No change 1-HV-4527 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM SPLY VLV No change 1-HV-4572 RHR HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4573 RHR HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV No change 1 HV-4574 CS HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV No change
- 1-HV-4575 CS HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV No change
. 1-HV-4696 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4699 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4700 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC DNSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4701 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4708 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4709 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4725 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4726 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 ORC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4758 RWST TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT VLV No change 1WV-4759 RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT VLV Noenange 1-HV-4776 CS HX 1-01 OUT VLV No change 1-HV-4 777 CS HX 1-02 OUT VLV No change Table 4.1-4a Page 4 (
. - . - . . .- . - . - - . - . . -- -. ~ -. _ _ _ _ - --- - - - .. . - . . .
I i ER EA-009 < I Table 4.1-4a Revision 0
) IPE/IST Component Evaluation For Shutdown Considerations Sorted By Tag Component Tag Risk Rank Due To Number CW hW Shutdown .
Considerations 1 HV-4782 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT ISOL VLV No change l . 1-HV-4783 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT ISOL VLV No change i 1-HV 5157 RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 DISCH HDR ORC ISOL VLV No change j 1-HV-5155 RA CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 DisGM MDR IRG ISOL VLV No change j 1-HV-5548 U1 CNTMT PRESS RLF SYS ORC ISOL VLV No change ! 1-HV-5549 U1 CNTMT PRESS RLF SYS IRC ISOL VLV No change l l 1 HV-8220 U1 CHARGE PMP SUCT Hi PNT VNT VLV 8220 No change 1-HV-8221 U1 CHARGE PMP Hi PNT VNT VLV 8221 No change 1-LCV-01128 VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112B No change i 1 LCV-0112C VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112C No change j 1-LCV-0112D RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112D No change ! 1 LCV-0112E RWST 101 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112E No change i 1-LCV 1003 LWPS RCDT 101 LVL CTRL VLV No change 1-PCV-0455A PRZR 1-01 PORV 0455A Category 1 l j 1 PCV-0456 PRZR PWR OPERATED RELIEF VLV Categoff f
- 1-PV-2325 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV No change l 1-PV-2326 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV No change j 1 PV-2327 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV No change, j 1 PV-2328 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV No change l 1 PV 2453A MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV Low j 1 PV-2453B MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CTRL VLV Low l
! 1-PV-2454A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CTRL VLV Low 1 PV-24548 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CTRL VLV Low l No change 1-PV-4552 SFTY CHLR 1-05 CCW RET PCV 1-PV-4553 SFTY CHLR 1-06 CCW RET PCV No change ' 1AF-0014 CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-01 SUCT CHK VLV No change I f 1AF-0024 CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-02 SU'CT CHK VLV No change j 1AF-0032 CST 1-01 TO TD AFW PMP CHK VLV No change I l 1AF-0038 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change j 1 AF-0041 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV No change i 1AF-0051 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change l 1AF-0054 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH ISOL VLV No change . 1AF-0065 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1AF-0066 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV No change l l 1AF-0075 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 CHK VLV No change i l 1AF-0078 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 CHK VLV No change 4 1AF-0083 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CHK VLV No change . 1AF-0086 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CHK VLV No change 1AF-0093 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CHK VLV No change l ! 1AF 0098 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CHK VLV No change l 1 AF-0101 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CHK VLV No change , 1 AF-0106 TD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0215 MD AFW PMP 101 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change i 1AF-0216 MD AFW PMP 101 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change f 1 AF-0217 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change ! 1 AF-0218 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change
)
Table 4.1-4a Page 5 V
l l ER-EA-009 Table 4.1-4a R' vision 0 ' ras.128 or215 IPE/IST Component Evaluation For Shutdown Considerations J Sorted By Tag Component Tag Risk Rank Due To Component Description Shutdown i Considerations i 1AF-0219 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change l 1AF-0220 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 1AF 0221 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change . 1AF-0222 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change
- 1AF-0223 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0224 TD AFW PMP 101 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0226 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 AF 0227 TD AFW PMP 101 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change ]
j 1AF-0228 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change j
- 1 AF 0229 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change
{ 1AF-0230 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 104 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0231 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change j j 1CC-0031 ~ CCW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1CC-0061 CCW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change _ j 1CC 0646 RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No change l l 1CC-0657 RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No change
' l l 1CC-0687 RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC 0694 RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No change-l i 1CC-0713 U1 RCP CLR CCW SPLY HDR CHK VLV No change 1CC-1075 RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No change
{ . j 1CC 1076 RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No change j 1CC-1077 RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-1078 RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No change l ~ 1CC-1079 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT No change 1 1 1CC-1080 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT No change
- 1CC-1081 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT No change
! 1CC-1082 CIRCEL SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2 FNPT No change , 1Cl-0030 U1 INST AIR HDR TO U1 CNTMT CHK VLV No change l 1CS-8180 U1 IRC SL WTR RET CNMT ISOL BYP CHK VLV No change i 1CS-8350A RC PMP 1-01 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No change l 1CS-83508 RC PMP 1-02 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No change } 1CS-8350C RC PMP 1-03 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No change l 1CS-8350D RC PMP 1-04 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No change
- 1CS-8367A RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No change 1CS-8367B RC PMP 1-02 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No change 1CS-8367C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No change
! 1CS-8367D RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IMB CHK Vi.V No change ! 1CS-8368A RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No change ! 1CS-83688 RC PMP 1-02 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No change I 1CS-8368C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No change 1CS-8368D RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No change l 1CS-6442 U1 EMER BORATE LN CHK VLV No change l 1CS-8473 BA PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change ! 1CS-8487 BA PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No Oange j 1CT-0025 RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT CHK VLV 3v3 ange 1CT-0042 CS PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change , Table 4.1-4a Page 6 j
i ! ER-EA-009 Table 4.1-4a Revision 0 e.,119 a'2M5 IPE/IST Component Evaluation For Shutdown Considerations Sorted By Tag Component Tag Risk Rank Due To j l Number Shutdown
- Considerations l 1CT 0047 CS PMP 1-04 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No change 1CT-0048 CS PMP 1-02 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No change
[ 1CT 0063 CS PMP 1-03 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No change i 1CT-0064 CS PMP 1-01 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No change 1CT-0065 CS PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV No change j 1CT 0077 RWST TO CSP 1-01/1-03 SUCT CHK VLV No change 1CT-0094 CS PMP 101 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1CT-0142 U1 CS TRN A HDR 1RC CHK VLV No change i 1CT-0145 U1 CS TRN B HDR 1RC CHK VLV No change l 1CT-0148 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 CHK VLV No change l 1CT-0149 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 CHK VLV No change 1 1DO-0004 DG 1-01 FO XREF PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change l 10 0-0005 DG 1-01 FO XREF PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change 10 0-0016 DG 1-02 FO XFER PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV No change i j 10 0-0017- DG 1-02 FO XFER PMP 1-04 DISCH CHK VLV No change'" i 1D0-0049 DG 1-01 FO DAY TK 101 XFER HDR CHK VLV No change i 1D0-0050 DG 1-02 FO DAY TK 102 XFER HDR CHK VLV No change i 1FW-0076 SG 1-02 FW HDR CHK VLV No change, i 1FW-0082 SG 1-01 FW HDR CHK VLV No change ; 1 1FW-0088 SG 1-04 FW HDR CHK VLV No change l I 1FW-0195 SG 1-04 FW PREHTR BYP 1RC CHK VLV No change i 1FW-0196 SG 1-01 FW PREHTR BYP 1RC CHK VLV No change i- 1FW-0197 SG 1-02 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV No change
- 1FW-0198 SG 1-03 FW PREHTR BYP 1RC CHK VLV No change
) 1FW-0199 SG 1-04 AFW NZL CHK VLV No change 1 FW-0200 SG 1-01 AFW NZL CHK VLV No change l
- 1FW-0201 SG 102 AFW NZL CHK VLV No change I 1FW-0202 SG 1-03 AFW NZL CHK VLV No change 2 1MS-0026 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change ~
1MS-0063 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change f f 1MS-0098 SG 103 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change ! iMS-0134 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No chango l 1MS-0142 MSL 1-04 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1MS-0143 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1MS-0680 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1MS-0681 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change j 1MS 0682 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1MS-0683 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change j 1MS-0684 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change l 1MS-0685 SG 103 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change l l 1MS-0686 - SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change i ? 1MS-0687 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change l 1SI-0047 RWST 1-01 TO St ISOL VLV No change i- 1Sl4819A St TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV No change i 1SI-88198 Si TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV No change 1SI-8819C Si TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV No change 4 Table 4.14a Page 7
-- 1
ER-EA-009 Table 4.1-4a gi5ig0g IPE/IST Component Evaluation For Shutdown Considerations Sorted By Tag
*P "*" "U Component Description Number Shutdown
- Considerations 1SI-8819D Si TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV No change 1 SI-8900A CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV No change 1SI-89008 CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV No change 1SI-8900C CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV No change 1SI-8900D CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV No change 1SI-8905A St TO HL 1-01 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1SI-8905B Si TO HL 1-02 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 SI-8905C Si TO HL 1-03 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1SI-8905D Si TO HL 104 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1SI-8919A S1 PMP 1-01 TO RWST CHK VLV No change 1SI-8919B Sl PMP 1-02 TO RWST CHK VLV No change 1 SW-0016 U1 SSW TRN B SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV No change 1 SW-0017 U1 SSW TRN A SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV No change
; 1 SW-0373 SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1 SW-0374 SSW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change ~
CP1-AFAPMD-01 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 No change CP1-AFAPMD-02 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-02 No change CP1-AFAPTD-01 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 No change. 1 CP1-CCAPCC-01 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1-01 No chance j CP1-CCAPCC-02 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1-02 No change i CP1-CHAPCP-05 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 1-05 No change j 4 CP1-CHAPCP-06 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 1-06 No change _ CP1-CTAPCS-01 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-01 No change
- CP1-CTAPCS-02 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-02 No change CP1-CTAPCS-03 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-03 No change CP1-CTAPCS-04 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-04 No change CP1-DOAPFT-01 DIESEL GENERATOR 101 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 No change CP1-DOAPFT-02 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 No change
- CP1-DOAPFT-03 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-03 No change CP1-DOAPFT-04 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-04 No change CP1 SWAPSW-01 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-01 ~ No change i
- CP1 SWAPSW-02 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-02 two change I TBX-CSAPBA-01 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 No change TBX-CSAPBA-02 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 No change TBX-CSAPCH-01 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-01 No change TBX-CSAPCH-02 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-02 No change TBX-RHAPRH-01 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-01 No change TBX-RHAPRH-02 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-02 No change TBX-SIAPSI-01 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-01 No change TBX SIAPSI-02 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 102 No change X-PCV-H116A UPS A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV No change X-PCV-H1168 UPS A\C UNIT X-02 CCW RET PCV No change X-PV 3583 CR A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV No change X-PV-3585 CR A\C UNIT X-03 CCW RET PCV No change Table 4.1-4a Page 8 i
p ER-EA-009 ! - Revision 0 l
- c,.~
Table 4.1-5 List of High/ Medium Risk Components Due to Back-End Considerations -I Changes Only - 1 ' l Risk Ranking Due To Component Tag . Large, Early Release Component DesCnption l Number . Evaluations . 1-7136 Redt Pump Discharge Control Valve Medium Civ ; l i-T-8152 - U1 LTDN CNTMT ORC ISOL VLV Medium Civ I 1-8160 U1 LTDN CNTMT IRC iSOL VLV ' Medium Civ , 1-1-8701A RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Recirc Omb Isol Viv Medium ISLOCA , RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recirc Omb isol Viv Medium ISLOCA ; 1-8701B RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Reierc Imb isol Viv Medium ISLOCA 1-8702A RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recirc Imb isol Viv Medium ISLOCA f 1-8702B U1 RHR Pmps Disch To Rwst isolViv Medium ISLOCA i 1-8717 Rwst 1-01 To St Pmps Suct Viv Medium LER ! 1-8806 ! RHR Cl 1-01 Inj Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA 1-8818A - RHR Cl 1-02 Inj Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA 1-8818B RHR Cl 1-03 Inj Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA i 1-8818C I 1-8818D RHR Cl 1-04 inj Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA ~ S1 Pmp 1-01/1-02 To Clinj isol Viv Medium LER .) 1-8835 St Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv Medium LER ; 1-5923A S1 Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv Medium LER i 1-8923B S1 Pmp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Vlv Medium LER
- 1-8926
- 1-8948A SI Accum 1-01 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA St Accum 1-02 Dnstrm Inj Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA ;
1-8948B SI ACeum 1-03 Dnstrm In) Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA 1-8948C 1-8948D SI Accum 1-04 Dnstrm inj Chk Vlv Medium ISLOCA 1-HV-4725 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 IRC ISOL VLV Medium Civ 1-HV-4726 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 ORC ISOL VLV Medium Civ +' RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 DISCH HDR ORC ISOL VLV Medium Ctv $. 1-HV-5157 RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 DISCH HDR IRC ISOL VLV Medium Civ 1-HV-5158 LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV Medium CIV j 1-LCV-1003 - l iSI-8819A St TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV Medium ISLOCA 1SI-8819B Si TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV Medium ISLOCA Medium ISLOCA f
- 1SI8819C St TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV
- dL 1SI-8819D SI TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV Medium ISLOCA X-PCV-H116A UPS A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV Medium LER
[ X-PCV-H1168 UPS A\C UNIT X-02 CCW RET PCV Medium LER e
- ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Table 4.1-Sa IPE/IST Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Back-end Considerations Sorted By Tag Component Tag sk RanMng Due To Component Description Number Large, Early Release Evaluations 1 7136 Redt Pump Discharge Control Valve Medium Civ 18000A Przr 1-01 Porv 0455A Blk Viv No change 1-80008 Przr 1-01 Porv 0456 Blk Viv No change 1-8010A Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv A No change 18010B Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv B No change 1-8010C Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv C No change 1 8100 U1 Rcp SI Wtr Ret isol Viv No change 1 8104 U1 Emer Borate Viv No change 1-8105 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt Isol Viv No change 1-8106 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmlisol Vlv No change 1-8110 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Dnstrm Miniflow Viv No change 1-8111 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Upstrm Miniflow Viv No change 1 8112 U1 RC Pmp Seal Wtr Ret Isol Viv No change 1-8145 U1 Przr Aux Spr Viv No change 18146 U1 RCS Loop 4 Chrg Viv No change U1 LTDN CNTMT ORC ISOL,VLV Medium Civ 1-8152 _
U1 LTDN CNTMT 1RC ISOL iJ Medium Civ 1-8160 18351 A RC Pmp 1-01 SI Wtr Inj Viv No change 1-8351B RC Pmp 1-02 St Wtr Inj Viv No change 1-8351 C RC Pmp 1-03 SI Wtr inj Viv No change 1-8351D RC Pmp 1-04 SI Wtr inj Viv No change 18378A RCS Loop 1-04 Chrg Dnstrm Chk Viv No change 1-83788 RCS Loop 1-04 Chrg Upstrm Chk Viv No change 1-8381 Chrg Ln Irc Chk Viv No change 1-8481 A Ccp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No change 1-PA81 B Ccp 1-02 Disch Chk Vlv No change 58'197 Pd Pmp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No change 1-8511 A Ccp 1-01 Alt Miniflo isol Viv No change 1-8511B Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo Isol Viv No change 1-8512A Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo isol Viv No change 1-8512B Ccp 1-01 Alt Miniflo isol Viv No change 1-8546 Rwst 1-01 To Chrg Pmp Suct Chk Viv Medium LER 1-8701 A RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Recirc Omb isol Viv Medium ISLOCA 1-8701 B RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recirc Omb isol Viv Medium ISLOCA 1-8702A RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Reiere Imb isol Vlv Medium ISLOCA 1-8702B RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recire Imb isol Viv Medium ISLOCA 1-8708A RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Rif Viv No change 1-8708B RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Rif Viv No change 1-8716A RHR Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv No change 1-8716B RHR Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv No change 1-8717 U1 RHR Pmps Disch To Rwst isol Viv Medium ISLOCA Table 4.1-Sa Page 1
i I I ER-EA-009 l Revision 0
.. Table 4.1-Sa IPE/IST Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Back-end Considerations Sorted By Tag Component Tag Risk Ranking Due To Component Description Number Large, Early Release
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Evaluations 1-8730A - RHR Hx 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No change ! 1-8730B RHR Hx 1-02 Disch Chk Viv No change 1-8801A Ccp 1-01/1-02 Si isol Viv 8801A No change 1-88018 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Si isol Viv 8801B No change 1-8802A S1 Pmp 1-01 To HI 2 & 3 Inj isol Viv No change 1-88028 St Pmp 1-02 To HI 1 & 4 Inj lsol Viv 4 No change 18804A RHR Pmp 1-01 To Ccp Suct Viv No change 18804B RHR Pmp 1-02 To S1 Pmps Suct Viv No change 1-8806 Rwst 1-01 To Si Pmps Suct Viv Medium LER I 1-8807A U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Viv 8807A No change 1-8807B U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Viv E,8078 No change 4 1-8808A St Accum 1-01 Inj Viv No change 1-8808B St Accum 1-02 Inj Vlv No change 1-8806C St Accum 1-03 inj Viv No change 1-8808D St Accum 1-04 inj Viv No change 9-8809A RHR To Cl 1-01/1-02 inj isol Viv No change 1-88098 RHR To Cl 1-03/1-04 Inj lsol Viv No change 1-8811 A Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Isol Viv No change . 1-8811B Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 102 Suct Isol Viv No change l 1-8812A Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv No change l l 18812B Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv No change f 1-8813 St Pmp 1-01/1-02 Miniflo Ret Viv No change j 1-8814A St Pmp 1-C1 Miniflo Viv No change i 1-8814B S1 Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv No change a 1-8815 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Inj Chk Viv Medium LER 1-8818A RHR Cl 1-01 Inj Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA 1-8818B RHR Cl 1-02 inj Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA 1-8818C RHR Cl 1-03 Inj Chk Viv Medium lSLOCA j RHR Cl 1-04 Inj Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA ! 1-8818D 1-8821 A St Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv No change 1-8821B S1 Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv No change l 1-8835 S1 Pmp 1-01/1-02 To Cl Inj isol Viv Medium LER l 1-8840 RHR To HI 1-02/1-03 inj isol Viv No change ; 1-8841 A RHR To RCS HI 1-02 Upstrm Chk Viv No change j 1-8841 B RHR To RCS HI 1-03 Upstrm Chk Viv No change ! l 1-8875A St Accum 1-01 N2 SPLYNENT Viv No change 1-8875B SI Accum 1-02 N2 SPLYNENT Viv No change 1-8875C SI Accum 1-03 N2 SPLYNENT Viv No change 1-8875D SI Accum 1-04 N2 SPLYNENT Viv No change 1-8877A Sl Accum 1-01 Tst Ln isol Viv No change 1-8877B St Accum 1-02 Tst Ln Isol Viv No change 1-8877C SI Accum 1-03 Tst Ln isol Viv No change 1-8877D SI Accum 1-04 Tst Ln Isol Viv No change 1-8878A SI Accum 1-01 Fill Viv No change Table 4.1-Sa Page 2
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 i Page IM or 195 ;
,--, Table 4.1-5a j IPlu!ST Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Back-end Considerations - ,
i Sorted By Tag
*P""* '8 Risk Ranking Due To l Component Description Number Large, Early Release t Evaluations 1-88788 SI Accum 1-02 Fill Viv No change 1-8878C SI Accum 1-03 Fill Viv No change {
1-8878D St Accum 1-04 Fill Viv No change l 1-8922A Si Pmp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No change 18922B S1 Pmp 1-02 Disch Chk Viv No change ? 1-8923A S1 Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv Medium LER .l S1 Pmp 1-02 Suct Vlv Medium LER ; 1-8923B 1-8924 U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Isol Viv No change I St Pmp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv Medium LER 1-8926 SI Accum 1-01 Dnstrm Inj Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA j 1-8948A # St Accum 1-02 Dnstrm Inj Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA 1-89488 Si Accum 1-03 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv Medium ISLOCA ! 1-8948C 1-8948D SI Accum 1-04 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv - Medium ISLOCA l 1-8949A RHR To Rcp Hi 1-01 Dnstrm Chk Viv No change 1-89498 RHR To Rep HI 1-02 Dnstrm Chk Viv No change ; 1-8949C RHR To Rep HI 1-03 Dnstrm Chk Viv No change j 1-89490 RHR To Rep HI 1-04 Dnstrm Chk Viv No change 1-8956A SI Accum 1-01 Upstrm inj Chk Viv No change ; 1-8956B Si /.ccum 1-02 Upstrm inj Chk Viv No change 18956C St Accum 103 Upstrm Inj Chk Viv No change
-8956D Si Accum 1-04 Upstrm inj Chk Viv No change .
I-8958A Rwst 101 To RHR Pmp 1-01 Chk Viv No change { 1-80588 Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-02 Chk Viv No change ; 1-8969A RHR To Ccp 101/1-02 Suct Chk Viv No change 1-8969B RHR To Sl Pmp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv No change 1 FCV-0610 RHR Pmp 1-01 Miniflo Viv No change 1 FCV-0611 RHR Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv No change 1 FCV-0618 RHR Hx 1-01 Byp Flo Ctrl Viv No change , I 1-FCV-0619 RHR Hx 1-02 Byp Flo Ctrl Viv No change 1 FV-2193 SG 1-01 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv Mo change l 1 FV-2196 SG 104 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv No change , 1 FV-47721 Cs Pmp 1-01 Recirc Viv No change ; 1 FV-4772-2 Cs Pmp 1-03 Recire Viv No change 1 FV-4773-1 Cs Pmp 1-02 Recire Viv No change 1-FV-4773-2 Cs Pmp 1-04 Recire Viv No change : 1-HCV-0606 RHR Hx 1-01 Flo Ctrl Viv No change l 1 HCV-0607 RHR Hx 1-02 Flo Ctrl Viv No change j 1 HV-2134 SG 101 FW ISOL VLV . No change : 1-HV-2135 SG 1-02 FW ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2136 SG 1-03 FW ISOL VLV No change , 1-HV-2137 SG 1-04 FW ISOL VLV No change { 1-HV-2333A MSIV 1-01 Low SGTR-CIV l I' 1-HV-2334A MSIV 1-02 Low SGTR-CIV i ' i 1 Table 4.1 Sa Page 3 l l
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 - Table 4.1-Sa IPE/IST Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Back-end Considerations Sorted By Tag Component Tag Risk Renking Due To Component Description Number Large, Early Release Evaluations 1-HV-2335A MSIV 1-03 Low SGTR-CIV 1-HV-2336A MSIV 1-04 Low SGTR-CIV 1-HV-2397 SG 1-01.8LDN ISOL VLV Low SGTR-CIV 1-HV-2397A SG 1-01 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV Low SGTR-CIV 1-HV-2409 MSL 1-01 BEF MSIV D\ POT 1-25 ISOL VLV Low SGTR-CIV 1-HV-2410 MSL 1-02 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV Low SGTR-CIV 1-HV-2411 MSL 1-03 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV Low SGTR-CIV 1-HV 2412 MSL 1-04 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV Low SGTR-CIV 1-HV-2452-1 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV Low SGTR-CIV 1-HV-2452-2 MSL 1-04 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV Low SGTR-CIV 1-HV 2459 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV No change 1-HV-2460 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 FCV No change 1-HV-2461 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 FLO CTRL VLV No change 1-HV-2462 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 FLO CTRL VLV No change 1-HV-2491 A TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2491 B MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2492A TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-24928 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2493A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2493B TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2494A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-2494B TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-3487 U1 CNTMT INST AIR HDR ISOL VLV Low SGTR CIV 1-HV-4171 ACCUM 1-01 LIO SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4172 ACCUM 1-02 LIO SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4173 ACCUM 1-03 LIO SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV No change 1 HV-4174 ACCUM 104 LIO SPACE SMPL LN 1RC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4286 SSW PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV No change 1-HV-4287 SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH VLV No change 1-HV-4393 DG 1-01 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4394 DG 1-02 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4512 U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4513 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4514 U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW SPLY VLV No change 1-HV-4515 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW SPLY VLV No change 1-HV-4524 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM RET VLV No change 1-HV-4525 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM RET VLV No change 1-HV-4526 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM SPLY VLV No change 1-HV-4527 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM SPLY VLV No change 1 HV-4572 RHR HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4573 RHR HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4574 CS HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV No change 1-HV-4575 CS HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV No change Table 4.1-$a Page 4
ER-EA-009 I Revision 0 Page I D of M Table 4.1-5a IPE/IST Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Back-end Considerations Sorted By Tag Component Tag Risk Ranking Due To Component Desenption Number
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Evaluations 1 1-HV-4696 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV No change j 1-HV-4699 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1 HV-4700 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC DNSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4701 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4708 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4709 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV No change 1 HV-4725 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 IRC ISOL VLV Medium Civ 1-HV-4726 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 ORC ISOL VLV Medium Civ i 1-HV-4758 RWST TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT VLV No change 1 HV-4759 RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT VLV No change
- 1-HV-4776 CS HX 1-01 OUT VLV No change 1-HV-4777 CS HX 1-02 OUT VLV No change 1-HV-4782 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-4783 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT ISOL VLV No change 1-HV-5157 RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 DISCH HDR ORC ISOL VLV Medium CIV 1-HV-5158 RX GAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1 01/1-02 DISCH HDR IRC 150L VLV Medium Civ 1-HV-5548 U1 CNTMT PRESS RLF SYS ORC ISOL VLV Low CIV 1-HV 5549 U1 CNTMT PRESS RLF SYS lRC ISOL VLV Low CIV
]
1-HV-8220 U1 CHARGE PMP SUCT HI PNT VNT VLV 8220 No change 1-HV-8221 U1 CHARGE PMP Hi PNT VNT VLV 8221 No change 1-LCV-0112B VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 01128 No change 1-LCV-0112C VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112C No change 1-LCV-0112D RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112D No change , 1-LCV-0112E RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112E No change 1-LCV-1003 LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV Medium Civ , 1-PCV-0455A PRZR 101 PORV 0455A No change 1-PCV-0456 PRZR PWR OPERATED RELIEF VLV No change i 1-PV-2325 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV Low SGTR-CIV 1-PV-2326 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV Low SGTRCIV 1-PV-2327 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV Low SGTR-CIV 1-PV-2328 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV Low SGTR-CIV 1-PV-2453A MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV No change 1-PV-2453B MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CTRL VLV No change 1-PV-2454A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CTRL VLV No change 1-PV-24548 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CTRL VLV No change 1-PV-4552 SFTY CHLR 1-05 CCW RET PCV No change l 1-PV-4553 SFTY CHLR 1-06 CCW RET PCV No change 1AF-0014 CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-01 SUCT CHK VLV No change 1AF-0024 CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-02 SUCT CHK VLV No change 1AF-0032 CST 1-01 TO TD AFW PMP CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0038 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1AF-0041 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV No change 1AF-0051 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1AF-0054 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH ISOL VLV No change i Table 4.1 Sa Page 5 ! l l 1
l ER-EA-009 Revision 0 ! Page M of 1 6 Table 4.1-5a IPE/IST Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Back-end Considerations Sorted By Tag i Component Tag Risk Ranking Due To Component Description Number Large, Early Release
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Evaluations MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1AF-0065 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV No change 1AF-0066 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 CHK VLV No change 1AF-0075 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 CHK VLV No change 1AF-0078 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CHK VLV No change 1AF-0083 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CHK VLV No change 1AF-0086 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CHK VLV No change 1AF-0093 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CHK VLV No change 1AF-0098 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CHK VLV No change ; 1 AF-0101 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0106 l MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0215 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0216 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change , 1 AF-0217 l MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0218 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0219 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0220 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change l 1 AF-0221 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change I 1AF-0222 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0223 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0224 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0226 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change , 1AF-0227 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0228 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1AF-0229 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0230 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 AF-0231 CCW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1CC-0031 CCW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1 CC-0061 RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-0646 RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR C.;W SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-0657 RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR COW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-0687 RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-0694 U1 RCP CLR CCW SPLY HDR CHK VLV No change 1CC-0713 RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-1075 RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-1076 RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-1077 RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No change 1CC-1078 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT No change 1CC-1079 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT No change 1CC-1080 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT No change 1CC-1081 , CIRCEL SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2 FNPT No change 1CC-1082 U1 INST AIR HDR TO U1 CNTMT CHK VLV Low SGTR4tV 1Cl-0030 1CS-8180 U1 IRC SL WTR RET CNMT ISOL BYP CHK VLV No change 1CS-8350A RC PMP 1-01 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No change Table 4.1-Sa Page 6
i ER-EA-009 ' Revision 0
. Table 4.1-5a j IPE/IST Component Evaluation for Risk Importece Due to Back-end Considerations j i Sorted By Tag Component Tag Risk Ranking Due To l' Component Description Large, Early Release Number l Evaluations i 1CS-8350B RC PMP 1-02 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No change 1CS-8350C RC PMP 1-03 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No change
] i 1CS-8350D RC PMP 1-04 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No change 1CS-8367A RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No change ] 1CS-8367B RC PMP 1-02 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No change ] No change l l 1CS-8367C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV
!' 1CS-8367D RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No change 1CS-8368A RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No change 1CS-8368B RC PMP 1-02 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No change l 1CS-8368C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No change :
' RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No change 1CS-8368D 1CS-8442 U1 EMER BORATE LN CHK VLV No change ! 1CS-8473 BA PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change - l 4 1CS-8487 BA PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change I 1CT-0025 RWST TO CS PMP 102/1-04 SUCT CHK VLV No change b 1CT-0042 CS PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change
- 1CT-0047 CS PMP 1-04 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No change j 1CT-0048 CS PMP 1-02 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No change 1CT-0063 CS PMP 1-03 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No change 1CT-0064 CS PMP 1-01 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No change
, 1CT-0065 CS PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1CT-0077 RWST TO CSP 1-01/1-03 SUCT CHK VLV No change . l ' 1CT-0094 CS PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change ! 1CT-0142 U1 CS TRN A HDR 1RC CHK VLV No change { No change 1CT-0145 U1 CS TRN B HDR 1RC CHK VLV > 1CT-0148 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 CHK VLV No change 1CT-0149 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 CHK VLV No change ; No change ; [ 10 0-0004 DG 1-01 FO XREF PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change ! 1 DO-0005 DG 101 FO XREF PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV 1DO-0016 DG 1-02 FO XFER PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV No change 10 0-0017 DG 1-02 FO XFER PMP 1-04 DISCH CHK VLV No change + 1 DO-0049 DG 1-01 FO DAY TK 1-01 XFER HDR CHK VLV No change l 1- 1DO-0050 DG 1-02 FO DAY TK 1-02 XFER HDR CHK VLV No change 1FW-0076 SG 1-02 FW HDR CHK VLV No change No change ) 1FW-0082 SG 1-01 FW HDR CHK VLV 1 1FW-0088 SG 1-04 FW HDR CHK VLV No change { 1FW-0195 SG 1-04 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV No change 1FW-0196 SG 1-01 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV No change i I 1FW-0197 SG 1-02 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV No change 1FW-0198 SG 1-03 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV No change 1FW-0199 SG 1-04 AFW NZL CHK VLV No change l No change 2 1FW-0200 SG 1-01 AFW NZL CHK VLV . 1FW-0201 - SG 1-02 AFW NZL CHK VLV No change 1FW-0202 SG 1-03 AFW NZL CHK VLV No change Table 4.1-Sa Page 7
l l ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page M or M 5 ! Table 4.1-Sa l I IPE/IST Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Back-end Considerations Sorted By Tag
*E "*" "I Risk Ranking Due To Component Description Number Large, Early Release Evaluations 1MS-0026 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1MS-0063 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1MS-0098 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1MS-0134 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No change 1MS-0142 MSL 1-04 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1MS-0143 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1MS-0680 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change iMS-0681 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1MS-0682 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1MS-0683 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 MS-0684 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 MS-0685 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 MS-0686 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1 MS-0687 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No change 1SI-0047 RWST 1-01 TO S1 ISOL VLV No change S SI-8819A SI TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV Medium lSLOCA 1SI-8819B Si TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV Medium ISLOCA ,
l 1SI-8819C SI TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV Medium lSLOCA 1SI-8819D Si TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV Medium ISLOCA 1SI-8900A CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV No change SSI-89008 CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV No change 1SI-8900C CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV No change 1 SI-8900D CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV No change S SI-8905A SI TO HL 1-01 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1S1-8905B St TO HL 1-02 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No change 1SI-8905C Si TO HL 1-03 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No change SSt-8905D St TO HL 1-04 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No chango 1SI-8919A S1 PMP 1-01 TO RWST CHK VLV No change 1SI-8919B S1 PMP 1-02 TO RWST CHK VLV No change S SW-0016 U1 SSW TRN B SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV No change 1 SW-0017 U1 SSW TRN A SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV No change 1 SW-0373 SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No change 1SW-0374 SSW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No change CP1-AFAPMD-01 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 No change CP1 AFAPMD-02 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-02 No change CP1-AFAPTD-01 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 No change CP1-CCAPCC-01 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1-01 No change CP1-CCAPCC-02 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1-02 No change CP1-CHAPCP-05 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 1-05 No change CP1-CHAPCP-06 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 1-06 No change CP1-CTAPCS-01 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-01 No change CP1-CTAPCS-02 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-02 No change CP1-CTAPCS-03 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-03 No change CP1-CTAPCS-04 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-04 No change Table 4.1-Sa Page 8
_ - _. _ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ , _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ ER EA-009 Revision 0 3, s Table 4.1-Sa
- IPE/IST Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Back-end Considerations Sorted By Tag
*E "*" "I Risk Ranking Due To Component Description Number Large, Early Release
- Evaluations CP1-DOAPFT-01 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 No change CP1-DOAPFT-02 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 No change CP1 DOAPFT 03 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-03 No change CP1 DOAPFT-04 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-04 No change ,
CP1-SWAPSW-01 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-01 No change CP1 SWAPSW-02 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-02 No change TBX-CSAPBA-01 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 No change TBX-CSAPBA-02 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 No change , TBX-CSAPCH-01 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 101 No change TBX-CSAPCH-02 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-02 No change *
- TBX-RHAPRH-01 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-01 No change j' TBX-RHAPRH-02 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-02 No change TBX SIAPSI-01 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 101 No change TBX SIAPSI-02 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-02 No change X-PCV-H116A UPS A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV Medium LER
~j UPS A\C UNIT X-02 CCW RET PCV Medium t.ER X-PCV-H1168 X-PV-3583 CR A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV No change X-PV-3585 CR A\C UNIT X-03 CCW RET PCV No change s i I i T I i I i l l l
^
Table 4.1-$a Page 9
l RE-EA-009 Revision Table 4.1-6 Page M of d List ofIST Components Not In IPE Sorted By Tag I
* " "*"' #8 Component Description Number Disposition !
1-7126 LWPS RCDT 1-01 VNT HDR 1RC DNSTRM ISOL VLV Low 1-7135 LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV BYP VLV Low 1-7150 LWPS RCDT 1-01 VNT HDR ORC ISOL VLV Low j 1-8026 PRT 1-01 VNT IRC ISOL VLV Low 1-8027 PRT 1-01 VNT ORC ISOL VLV Low 1-8046 RMUW TO PRT 1-01 SPLY IRC CHK VLV Low 1-8047 RMUW TO PRT 1-01/CNTMT SPLY ORC ISOL VLV Low l 1-8109 PD CHRG PMP 1-01 RECIRC VLV Low 1-8147 U1 RCS LOOP 1 CHRG VLV Low 1-8153 U1 XS LTDN ISOL VLV 8153 Low ; 1-8154 U1 XS LTDN ISOL VLV 8154 Low 1-8202A PD CHRG PMP 1-01 SUCT STAB DNSTRM VNT VLV Low 1-82028 PD CHRG PMP 1-01 SUCT STAB UPSTRM VNT VLV Low 1-8210A PD CHRG PMP 1-01 SUCT STAB H2/N2 SPLY VLV 8210A Low 1-8210B PD CHRG PMP 1-01 SUCT STAB H2/N2 SPLY VLV 82108 Low 1-8379A RCS LOOP 1-01 CHRG LN DNSTRM CHK VLV Low 1-8379B RCS LOOP 1-01 CHRG LN UPSTRM CHK VLV Low 1-8510A CCP 1-01 ALT MINIFLO RLF VLV Low 1-8510B CCP 1-02 ALT MINIFLO RLF VLV Low 1-8800A RWST 1-01 TO SFPCS PMP DNSTRM DRN VLV Low 1-88008 RWST 1-01 TO SFPCS PMP UPSTRM DRN VLV Low i 1-8823 U1 Si TO CL TST ISOL VLV Low 1-8824 St TO HL 1-01/1-04 TST ISOL VLV Low 1-8825 RHR TO HL 1-02/1-03 TST ISOL VLV Low l 1-8843 CCP 1-01/1-02 INJ HDR CHK VLV UPSTRM TST VLV Low 1-8871 U1 Sl TST HDR RET IRC iSOL VLV Low 1-8879A RHR TO CL 1-01 TST VLV Low 1-88798 RHR TO CL 1-02 TST VLV Low 1-8879C RHR TO CL 1-03 TST VLV . Low 1-8879D RHR TO CL 1-04 TST VLV low i 1-8880 U1 Sl/PORV ACCUM N2 SPLY ORC ISOL VLV Low [ 1-8881 Si TO HL 1-02/1-03 TST ISOL VLV Low ( 1-8882 CCP 1-01/1-02 INJ HDR CHK VLV DNSTRM TST VLV Low t 1-8888 U1 SI ACCUM FILL LN ISOL VLV Low 1-8889A St TO HL 1-01 TST LN VLV Low 1-88898 SI TO HL 1-02 TST LN VLV Low 1-8889C Si TO HL 1-03 TST LN VLV Low 1-8889D Si TO HL 1-04 TST LN VLV Low 1-8890A RHR TO CL 1-01/1-02 TST VLV Low 1-88908 RHR TO CL 1-03/1-04 TST VLV Low 1-8964 U1 SI TEST HDR RET ORC ISOL VLV Low 1-FCV-0110B U1 RCS MU TO CHRG PMP FLO CTRL VLV Low 1-FCV-0111 A RMUW TO CVCS BA BLNDR 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV Low ! 1-FCV-01118 RCS MU TO VCT 1-01 ISOL VLV Low i 1-FV-2181 SG 1-01 FW SPLIT FLO BYP VLV Low , 1-FV 2182 SG 1-02 FW SPLIT FLO BYP VLV Low l 1-FV-2183 SG 1-03 FW SPLIT FLO BYP VLV Low l 1-FV-2184 SG 1-04 FW SPLIT FLO BYP VLV Low i 1-FV-2194 SG 1-02 FW PREHTR BYP VLV Low ' 1-FV-2195 SG 1-03 FW PREHTR BYP VLV Low i Table 4.16 Page 1 )
RE-EA-009 Revision 0 Table 4.1-6 Page $1of 295 List ofIST Components Not In IPE Sorted By Tag
*E "*" "U Component Description Number Disposition 1-FV-2456 MD AFW PMP 1-01 TO CST RECIRC FLO VLV Low 1-FV-2457 MD AFW PMP 1-02 TO CST REClRC FLO VLV Low 1-FV-4536 CCW PMP 1-01 RECIRC FLO VLV High 1-FV-4537 CCW PMP 1-02 RECIRC FLO VLV High 1 FV-4650A VENT CHLR U1 CCW SPLY VLV Low 1-FV-46508 VENT CHLR U1 CCW RET VLV Low 1-HV-2154 FW LN 1-01 SEC SMPL VLV Low 1-HV-2155 FW LN 1-02 SEC SMPL VLV Low 1-HV-2185 SG 1-01 FW ISOL BYP VLV Low 1-HV-2186 SG 1-02 FW ISOL BYP VLV Low 1-HV-2187 SG 1-03 FW ISOL BYP VLV Low 1-HV-2188 SG 1-04 FW ISOL BYP VLV Low 1-HV-2333B MSIV 1-01 BYP VLV Low 1-HV-2334B MSIV 1-02 BYP VLV Low 1-HV-23358 MSIV 1-03 BYP VLV Low ,
1-HV-2336B MSIV 1-04 BYP VLV Low 1-HV-2398 SG 1-02 BLDN ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2398A SG 1-02 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2399 SG 1-03 BLDN ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2399A SG 1-03 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2400 SG 1-04 BLDN ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2400A SG 1-04 BLON HELB iSOL VLV Low 1-HV-2401 A , SG 1-01 DRUM SMPL ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2401 B SG 1-01 BLDN SMPL ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2402A SG 1-02 DRUM SMPL ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-24028 SG 1-02 BLDN SMPL ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2403A SG 1-03 DRUM SMPL ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2403B SG 1-03 BLDN SMPL ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2404A SG 1-04 DRUM SMPL ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-24048 SG 1-04 BLDN SMPL ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2405 SG 1-01 SMPL ISOL VLV Low 1 HV-2406 SG 1-02 SMPL ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2407 SG 1-03 SMPL ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2408 SG 1-04 SMPL ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2410 MSL 1-02 BEF MSIV D\ POT 1-24 ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2411 MSL 1-03 BEF MSIV D\ POT 1-23 ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2412 MSL 1-04 BEF MSIV DiPOT 1-26 ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2480 MD AFW PMP 1-01 SSW SUCT ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2481 MD AFW PMP 1-02 SSW SUCT ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2482 TD AFW PMP 1-01 SSW SUCT ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-2484 CST 1-01 DISCH VLV 2484 Low 1-HV-2485 CST 1-01 DISCH VLV 2485 Low 1-HV-3480 U1 CNTMT SERV AIR ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-3607 RV 1-01 HEAD UPSTRM VNT VLV Low 1-HV-3608 RV 1-01 HEAD DNSTRM VNT VLV Low 1-HV-3609 PRZR 1-01 UPSTRM VNT VLV Low 1-HV-3610 PRZR 1-01 DNSTRM VNT VLV Low 1-HV-40758 U1 CNTMT FP HDR ORC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4075C U1 CNTMT FP HDR IRC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4165 PRZR 1-01 STM SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV Low Table 4.1-6 Page 2 1
RE-EA-009 Revision 0 Table 4.1-6 Pagebor M6 List ofIST Components Not In IPE Sorted By Tag Expert Panel rnment 80 Component Description Number Disposition 1-HV[4166 PRZR 1-01 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4167 PRZR 1-01 LIQ SFACE SMPL LN ORC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4168 RC LOOP 1-01 HOT LEG SMPL LN 1RC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4169 RC LOOP 1-04 HOT LEG SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4170 RC LOOP 1-01 & 1-04 HOT LEG SMPL LN ORC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4175 U1 ACCUM LlO SPACE SMPL LN ORC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4176 PRZR 1-01 STM SPACE SMPL LN ORC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4178 U1 RHR TRN A SMPL LN ORC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4179 U1 RHR TRN B SMPL LN ORC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4182 RHR TO RC PASS FLSH AND DIVERT MNFLD 1-07A LN ISOL VLV Low SSW TRN A TO U1 AFW PMP SUCT VLV Low 1-HV-4395 SSW TRN B TO U1 AFW PMP SUCT VLV Low 1-HV-4396 1-HV-4631 A U1 PSS CCW SPLY HDR ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4631 B U1 PSS CCW RET HOR ISOL VLV Low U1 XS LTDN/RCDT HX CCW SPLY ORC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-4710 1-HV-4711 U1 XS LTDN/RCDT HX CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-5365 U1 CNTMT DEMIN/RMUW SPLY ORC ISOL VLV Low U1 CNT MT DEMIN/RMUW SPLY IRC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-5366 1-HV-5536 U1 CNTMT AIR PRG SPLY ORC ISOL DMPR AO Low 1-HV-5537 U1 CNTMT AIR PRG SPLY IRC ISOL DMPR AO Low 1-HV-5538 U1 CNTMT AIR PRG EXH ORC ISOL DMPR AO Low 1-HV-5539 U1 CNTMT AIR PRG E7.H IRC ISOL DMPR AO Low 1 HV-5540 U1 CNTMT H2 PRG EXH ORC ISOL DMPR Low 1-HV-5541 U1 CNTMT H2 PRG EXH 1RC ISOL DMPR Low 1-HV-5542 U1 CNTMT H2 PRG SPLY ORC ISOL DMPR Low 1-HV-5543 U1 CNTMT H2 PRG SPLY IRC ISOL DMPR Low , 1-HV-5544 U1 CNTMT AIR PIG RAD DET UNIT 5502/03/66 SMPL IN ORC ISOL VLV Low I l 1-HV-5545 U1 CNTMT AIR PIG RAD DET UNIT 5502/03/66 SMPL IN IRC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-5546 U1 CNTMT AIR PIG RAD DET UNIT 5502/03/66 SMPL OUT ORC ISOL VL Low I 1-HV-5547 U1 CNTMT AIR PIG RAD DET UNIT 5502/03/66 SMPL OUT IRC ISOL VL Low 1-HV-5556 U1 CNTMT AIR PASS SMPL RET LN ORC ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-5557 U1 CNTMT AIR PASS SMPL RET LN IRC ISOL VLV Low 1 HV-5558 U1 CNTMT AIR PASS SMPL SPLY LN ORC ISOL VLV 5558 Low 1-HV 5559 U1 CNTMT AIR PASS SMPL SPLY LN IRC ISOL VLV 5559 Low 1-HV-5560 U1 CNTMT AIR PASS SMPL SPLY LN ORC ISOL VLV 5560 Low 1-HV-5561 U1 CNTMT AIR PASS SMPL SPLY LN 1RC ISOL VLV 5561 Low 1-HV-5562 U1 CNTMT PRG EXH IRC ISOL DMPR BYP DMPR Low 1-HV-5563 U1 CNTMT H2 PRG SPLY IRC ISOL DMPR Low 1-HV-6082 U1 VENT CH WTR SPLY ORC UPSTRM ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-6083 U1 VENT CH WTR RET IRC DNSTRM ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-6084 U1 VENT CH WTR SPLY ORC ONSTRM ISOL VLV Low 1-HV-6720 SFTY CH WTR SRG TK 1-01 RMUW SPLY VLV Low 1-HV-7311 RC PASS SMPL MODULE 1-04 TO RCDT 1-01 RET LN ORC ISOL VLV Low l 1-HV-7312 RC PASS SMPL MODULE 1-04 TO RCDT 1-01 RET LN IRC ISOL VLV Low f 1-LCV-0459 U1 LTDN ISOL VLV 0459 High i 1-LCV-0460 U1 LTDN ISOL VLV 0460 High i 1-LV-2478 DEMIN WTR TO CST 1-01 MU VLV Low l 1-LV-4500 CCW SRG TK 1-01 MU VLV 4500 Low ( 1-LV-4500-1 CCW SRG TK 1-01 RMUW SPLY VLV Low 1-LV-4501 CCW SRG TK 1-01 MU VLV 4501 Low Table 1.1-6 Page 3
RE-EA-009 Revision 0 Table 4.1-6 Page I N of M List ofIST Components Not In IPE Sorted By Tag Component Tn9 Expert Panel Component Description Number Disposition 1-LV-4754 CS CHEM ADD TK 1-01 DISCH VLV 4754 Low 1-LV-4755 CS CHEM ADD TK 1-01 DISCH VLV 4755 Low 1AF-0009 DEMIN WTR TO CST 1-01 MU LN CHK VLV Low 1 AF-0042 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TST ISOL VLV Low 1 AF-0045 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH RECIRC CHK VLV Low 1AF-0055 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TST ISOL VLV Low 1AF-0057 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH RECIRC CHK VLV Low 1 AF-0067 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TST ISOL VLV Low 1AF-0069 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH RECIRC CHK VLV Low 1 AF-0167 U1 AFW PMPS DISCH RECiRC TO CST CHK VLV High 1 AF-0232 AFWPT 1-01 STM SPLY VLV 2452-1 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV Low 1AF-0233 AFWPT 1-01 STM SPLY VLV 2452-1 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV Low 1 AF-0234 AFWPT 104 STM SPLY VLV 2452-2 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV Low 1 AF-0235 AFWPT 1-01 STM SPLY VLV 2452-2 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV Low 1 BS-0015 CNTMT PERS AIRLOCK 101 EXT DOOR MAN EQUAL VLV 0015 Low 1 BS-0025 CNTMT PERS AIRLOCK 1-01 EXT DOOR AUTO EQUAL VLV Low 1 BS-0026 CNTMT PERS AIRLOCK 1-01 EXT DOOR MAN EQUAL VLV 0029 Low 1 BS-0030 CNTMT PERS AIRLOCK 1-01 INT DOOR AUTO EQUAL VLV Low 1 BS-0044 CNTMT PERS AIRLOCK 1-01 INT DOOR MAN EQUAL VLV 0044 Low 1BS-0056 CNTMT PERS AIRLOCK 1-01 INT DOOR MAN EQUAL VLV 0056 Low 1 BS-0202 U1 CNTMT PERS EMER AIRLOCK INT DOOR MAN EQUAL VLV Low 1 BS-0203 U1 CNTMT PERS EMER AIRLOCK EXT DOOR MAN EQUAL VLV Low 1CA-0016 U1 CNTMT SERV AIR HDR CHK VLV Low 1CC-0003 CCW SRG TK 1-01 RMUW SPLY CHK VLV Low 1CC-0004 CCW SRG TK 1-01 DEMIN WTR SPLY CHK VLV Low 1CC-0611 XS LTDN HX 1-01 CCW SPLY RLF VLV Low 1CC-0618 RCDT HX 1-01 CCW SPLY RLF VLV Low i 1CC-0629 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET HDR CHK VLV Low 1CC-0831 U1 RC PMP THBR CLR CCW RET HDR RLF CHK VLV Low l 1CC-1067 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 RET HDR RLF VLV Low 1CH-0024 U1 VENT CH WTR SPLY IRC CHK VLV Low 1CH-0271 U1 CNTMT VENT CH WTR SPLY HDR ORC PRESS RLF VLV Low 1 CH-0272 U1 CNTMT VENT CH WTR RET HDR ORC PRESS RLF VLV Low 1CH-0300 SFTY CH WTR SRG TK 1-01 RMUW SPLY CHK VLV Low 1CH-0301 SFTY CH WTR SRG TK 1-01 DEMIN WTR SPLY CHK VLV Low 1CH-0302 SFTY CH WTR SRG TK 1-01 MU LVL VLV 6712 BYP VLV Low , 1CH-0305 SFTY CH WTR SRG TK 1-01 MU LVL VLV 6713 BYP VLV Low l 1C1-0644 CR A\C ACCUM X-01 INST AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV High High 1Cl-0645 CR A\C ACCUM X-01 INST AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV 1Cl-0646 CR A\C ACCUM X-02 INST AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV High 1Cl-0647 CR A\C ACCUM X-02 INST AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV High 1CS-8377 U1 RCS AUX SPR LN TO PRZR 1-01 CHK VLV Low 1CS-8480A CCP 1-01 RECIRC CHK VLV Low 1CS-84808 CCP 1-02 RECIRC CHK VLV Low 1CT-0013 CS PMP 1-04 DISCH CHK VLV Low l 1CT-0020 CS PMP 1-04 EDUCT SUCT CHK VLV Low 1CT-0031 CS PMP 1-02 EDUCT SUCT CHK VLV Low 1CT-0072 CS PMP 1-03 EDUCT SUCT CHK VLV Low 1CT-0082 CS PMP 1-01 EDUCT SUCT CHK VLV Low 1CT-0309 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT ISOL VLV BONNET RLF VLV Low Table 4.1-6 Page 4 l
RE-EA-CD9 Revision 0 Table 4.1-6 Page M of D List ofIST Components Not In IPE Sorted By Tag
"*" #8 Component Description Number Disposition 1CT-0310 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT ISOL VLV BONNET RLF VLV Low 10 0-0006 RMUWST 1-01 IN UPSTRM CHK VLV Low 1DD-0016 RMUW PMP 1-01 RECIRC CHK VLV Low 1D0-0018 RMUW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV Low 1DD-0020 RMUW PMP 1-01 TO RMUW HDR ISOL VLV Low 1DD-0064 RMUWST 1-01 RET UPSTRM CHK VLV Low 1DD-0065 RMUWST 1-01 IN DNSTRM CHK VLV Low 1 DD-0066 RMUWST 1-01 RET DNSTRM CHK VLV Low 1DD-0430 U1 DEMlN/RMUW CNTMT PENET ORC RLF VLV Low 1DO-0058 DG 1-01 START AIR RCVR 1-01 IN CHK VLV Low 1DO-0059 DG 1-01 START AIR RCVR 1-02 IN CHK VLV Low 10 0-0060 DG 1-02 START AIR RCVR 1-03 IN CHK VLV Low 10 0-0061 DG 1-02 START AIR RCVR 1-04 IN CHK VLV Low 1D0-0062 DG 1-01 AIR DRYR 1-02 OUT DNSTRM CHK VLV Low 10 0-0063 DG 1-01 AIR DRYR 1-01 OUT DNSTRM CHK VLV Low 1DO-0064 DG 1-02 AIR DRYR 1-04 OUT DNSTRM CHK VLV Low 10 0-0065 DG 1-02 AIR DRYR 1-03 OUT DNSTRM CHK VLV Low 1D0-0104 DG 1-01 JKT WTR KWP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV Low 1DO-0107 DG 1-01 JKT WTR TEMP CTRL VLV Low 10 0-0157 DG 1-01 ENGN L\O PMP 1-01 SUCT CHK VLV Low 1DO-0158 DG 1-01 AUX L\O PMP 1-02 SUCT CHK VLV Low 10 0-0204 DG 1-02 JW KWP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV Low 1D0-0207 DG 1-02 JW TEMP CTRL VLV Low 1D0-0257 DG 1-02 ENGN L\O PMP 1-03 SUCT CHK VLV Low 1DO-0258 DG 1-02 AUX L\O PMP 1-04 SUCT CHK VLV Low 1 FW-0070 SG 1-03 FW HDR CHK VLV Low 1FW-0076 SG 1-02 FW HDR CHK VLV Low 1FW-0082 SG 1-01 FW HDR CHK VLV Low 1FW-0088 SG 1-04 FW HDR CHK VLV Low 1FW-0191 SG 1-04 FW PREHTR BYP ORC CHK VLV Low l I
1FW-0192 SG 1-01 FW PREHTR BYP ORC CHK VLV Low 1FW-0193 SG 1-02 FW PREHTR BYP ORC CHK VLV Low 1FW-0194 SG 1-03 FW PREHTR BYP ORC CHK VLV Low 1MS-0021 SG 1-01 SFTY VLV 0021 Low l 1MS-0022 SG 1-01 SFTY VLV 0022 Low 1MS-0023 SG 1-01 SFTY VLV 0023 Low 1MS-0024 SG 101 SFTY VLV 0024 Low iMS-0025 SG 1-01 SFTY VLV 0025 Low 1MS-0058 SG 1-02 SFTY VLV 0058 Low 1MS-0059 SG 1-02 SFTY VLV 0059 Low 1MS-0060 SG 1-02 SFTY VLV 0060 Low 1MS-0061 SG 1-02 SFTY VLV 0061 Low 1MS-0062 SG 1-02 SFTY VLV 0062 Low 1MS-0093 SG 1-03 SFTY VLV 0093 Low 1MS-0094 SG 1-03 SFTY VLV 0094 Low 1MS-0095 SG 1-03 SFTY VLV 0095 Low 1MS-0096 SG 1-03 SFTY VLV 0096 Low 1MS-0097 SG 1-03 SFTY VLV 0097 Low 1MS-0129 SG 1-04 SFTY VLV 0129 Low 1MS-0130 SG 1-04 SFTY VLV 0130 Low i Table 4.1-6 Page 5
i RE-EA-009 i Revision 0 l Table 4.1-6 Page N fo of N 5 List ofIST Components Not In IPE Sorted By Tag
*E "*" '8 Component Description Number Disposition 1 MS-0131 SG 1-04 SFTY VLV 0131 Low 1MS-0132 SG 1-04 SFTY VLV 0132 Low 1MS-0133 SG 1-04 SFTY VLV 0_33 1 Low ;
1RC-0036 RMUW TO PRT 1-01/CNTMT ORC RLF VLV Low 1 1-PS-0500 U1 ACCUM LIQ SPACE SMPL LN ORC RLF VLV Low 1-PS-0501 PRZR 1-01 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN ORC RLF VLV Low 1-PS-0502 PRZR 1-01 STM SPACE SMPL LN ORC RLF VLV Low _ 1-PS-0503 RC LOOP 1-01/1-04 HL SMPL LN ORC RLF VLV Low 1SF-0011 U1 REFUEL CAV PURIF LOOP HDR UPSTRM ISOL VLV Low 1SF-0012 U1 REFUEL CAV PURIF LOOP HDR DNSTRM ISOL VLV Low 1 SF-0021 U1 REFUEL CAV DRN TO REFUEL WTR PURIF PMP HDR UPSTRM ISOL VLV Low 1SF-0022 U1 REFUEL CAV DRN TO REFUEL WTR PURIF PMP HDR DNSTRM ISOL VLV Low 1SF-0053 REFUEL CAV SKM PMP 1-01 IRC DISCH VLV Low 1SF-0054 REFUEL CAV SKM PMP 1-01 ORC DISCH VLV Low 1SI-0166 PRZR 1-01 PORV 0455A N2 ACCUM 1-02 UPSTRM IN CHK VLV High 1 SI-0167 PRZR 1-01 PORV 0455A N2 ACCUM 1-02 DNSTRM IN CHK VLV High 1SI-0168 PRZR 1-01 PORV 0456 N2 ACCUM 1-01 UPSTRM IN CHK VLV High 1SI-0169 PRZR 1-01 PORV 0456 N2 ACCUM 1-01 DNSTRM IN CHK VLV High 1SI-0182 BONNET RELIEF VALVE FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 1-8811 A High 1S1-0183 BONNET RELIEF VALVE FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 1-88118 High 1S1-8968 St N2 SPLY HDR 1-01/1-02 CHK VLV Low 1S1-8972 U1 Si TST HDR RLF VLV Low 1VD-0907 RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 DISCH HDR PRESS RLF VLV Low VD-0003 SFGD BLDG SMP 1-01 PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV Low VD-0004 SFGD BLDG SMP 1-01 PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV Low VD-0011 SFGD BLDG SMP 1-02 PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV Low VD-0012 SFGD BLDG SMP 1-02 PMP 1-04 DISCH CHK VLV Low 1WP-7176 LWPS RCDT 1-01 DRN HDR RLF VLV Low 1WP-7177 RC PASS SMPL RET TO RCDT 1-01 RLF VLV Low X-PV-3584 CTRL RM A\C UNIT X-02 REFRIG CNDSR CCW RET PRESS CTRL VLV Low X-PV 3586 CTRL RM A\C UNIT X-04 REFRIG CNDSR CCW RET PRESS CTRL VLV Low XCS-0037 BA PMP 1-01 MINIFLO CHK VLV Low XCS-0039 BA PMP 2-01 MINIFLO CHK VLV Low ; XCS-0041 BA PMP 1-02 MINIFLO CHK VLV Low ' XCS-0044 BA PMP 2-02 MIN 1FLO CHK VLV Low XDD-0044 RMUW PMP X-01 MINIFLO RECIRC CHK VLV Low XDD-0048 RMUW PMP X-01 DISCH CHK VLV Low XDD-0103 RMUW PMP 2-01 TO RMUW HDR ISOL VLV Low XSF-0003 SFP CLG WTR PMP X-01 DISCH CHK VLV Low XSF-0004 SFP CLG WTR PMP X-02 DISCH CHK VLV Low XSF-0160 U1 RMUW TO SFPCS CHK VLV Low XSF-0161 U1 RMUW TO SFPCS ISOL VLV Low f XSF-0179 U2 RMUW TO SFPCS ISOL VLV Low XSF-0180 U2 RMUW TO SFPCS CHK VLV Low CP1-DDAPRM-01 REACTOR MAKEUP WATER PUMP 1-01 Low CP1-WPAPSS-01 SAFEGUARD BUILDING SUMP 1-01 PUMP 1-01 Low CP1-WPAPSS-02 SAFEGUARD BUILDING SUMP 1-01 PUMP 1-02 Low CP1-WPAPSS-03 SAFEGUARD BUILDING SUMP 1-02 PUMP 1-03 Low CP1-WPAPSS-04 SAFEGUARD BUILDING SUMP 1-02 PUMP 1-04 Low CPX-DDAPRM-01 REACTOR MAKEUP WATER PUMP X-01 Low Table 4.1-6 Page 6
RE-EA-009 Revision 0 Table 4.1-6
- List ofIST Components Not inIPE
8'E dN Sorted By Tag Component Tag Expert Panel Number Disposition CPX-SFAPSF-01 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING WATER PUMP X-01 Low CPX-SFAPSF-02 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING WATER PUMP X-02 Low i CTVBCA-01 CHEMICAL ADDITIV5 TANK VENTPATH Low CTVBCA-02 CHEMICAL ADDITIVE TANK VENTPATH Low SWVAVB-01 High VENT PAT _H FORWATER HAMMER PROTECTION SWVAVB-02 VENT PATH FORWATER HAMMER PROTECTION High SWVAVB-03 VENT PATH FORWATER HAMMER PROTECTION High SWVAVB-04 VENT PATH FORWATER HAMMER PROTECTION High i
1 1 l l Table 4.1-6 Page 7
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. ER-EA-009 Revisson 0 Table 4.1-6a . .:
' Pacelii9.or.E5 IST Funct. ion Table 1
+
IST Function Type IST Function E::4^ls (System) - Lube Oil Flowpath Boundary (DO) TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Flowpath (MS) TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Flowpath Boundary (MS) , Safety-Related Air Accumulator to Non-Safety Air Supply isolabon (CC, MS, Cl AF) RHR System to Non-Safety Process (Post-Acculent) Samphng System isolabon (RHR,PS) Spent Fuel Pool Emergency Makeup Isolabon (SF) - 8811 A(B) Bonnet Overpressure Relief (SI) . RWST to Non-Safety Purificabon System isolation (SI) . ECCS Flowpath Boundary (during Recirculation with Loss of RHR A(B))(SI) ' Backflow Prevention (to facchtate pump restart (SW) AFW Pump Emergency Supply Flowpath (SW, AF) i- Vent Path (for water hammer prevention (SW) ' ~ AFW to Faulted SG Flow isolabon (AF) - ~ ' Condensate System to CST isolabon to Preclude Over-pressurization Tank (AF) Surge Tank Emergency Makeup Isolabon (CC, CH) Train A to Train B Crosstie isolation (CC) .
.l i
Table 4.1-6a Page 3 i
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ER-EA-009 Table 4.1-6 b Revision 0 Page 15l or g Comparison ofIPE and IST F, unctions System IPE Function (IST Function) IPE Success Criteria Applicable to IST peration of one of three AF pumps delivering flow to at least AF Provide 300 GPM to Steam Generators (AFW to SG) one steam generator Provide 900 GPM to the Steam Generators (None) N/A Provide full AF flow to the Steam Generators (None) N/A Provide CCW flow (CCW, RHR Heat Exchanger Cooling Containment Spray, Heat Exchanger Cooling, Safety-Chilled Water Provide cooling via CCW safeguards Loops A and B Provide CC cooling via CCW non-safeguards loop Condenser Cooling, UPS NC Condenser Cooling Flow, Control ' Room A/C Condenser Cooling Provide RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling (None) N/A CHS Provide CHS flow (Safety Chilled Water Condenser Cooling) Provide cooling via safety-chilled water trains A and B Cl Provide Cl air flow (None) N/A CO/FW Main Feedwater system restored after loss of AF (None) N/A Main Feedwater system provides flow daring ATWS (None) N/A
~
CS Provide RCP SealInjection (None) NTA Provide High Head injection flow to the RCS Cold Legs (ECCS, Operation of one of two CCPs delivering flow to two of four ECCS Injection) RCS cold legs Provide High Head Recirculation flow to the RCS Cold Legs Operation of one of two CCPs delivering flow to two of four (ECCS) RCS cold legs Operation of one of two BATPs delivering flow to the charging Provide emergency boration of the RCS (Boration) pump header and then one of two charging pumps delivering flow to the RCS via the normal charging flowpath Table 4.1-6 b Page I
l .ll ER-EA-009 Table 4.1-6 b Revision 0
. PageMofM Comparison ofIPE and IST Functions System IPE Function (IST Function) IPE Success Criteria Applicable to IST Containment pressure is maintained within its design limit during Operation of one of two trains of two CT pumps delivering flow CT the injection and recirculation of ECCS (CS, CSI, Sump ,
Recirculation, Chemical Additive) EPA Provide 6.9 kV power (Fuel Oil, Pump Discharge) Provide power at 6.9 kV Bus 1EA1 Provide 6.9 kV power (Fuel Oil, Pump Discharge) Provide power at 6.9 kV Bus 1EA2 EPB Provide 480V power (None) N/A EPD Provide DC power (None) NW EPl Provide instrument power (None) NW ES Breakers Open on Manual Remote Trip, both switches (None) N/A MS Provide main turbine trip (None) N/A Provide Controlled Depressurization via the ARVs (None) N/A Steam Dump System Available (None) N/A 4 Operation of one of two PORVs or two of three SRVs. PORVs provide automatic pressure relief on high RCS pressure Operation is defined as opening when RCS pressure reaches RC the valves' respective setpoint and closing when pressure is (Overpressure Protection, Steam Vent Flowpath for RHR) less than setpoint. PORVs open on manual actuation (Post-Accident Vent Path) One of two PORVs opens on manual open signal PORV recloses after opening (RCS Pressure Boundary) Both PORVs close after both have been demanded open SRVs open on high pressure (Overpressure Protection) Two safety valves open on high RCS pressure Table 4.1-6 b Page 2
ER-EA-009 Table 4.1-6 b Revision O Page I53 of A95 Comparison ofIPE and IST Functions System IPE Function (IST Function) IPE Success Criteria Applicable to IST Any safety relief valve opens on high pressure (Overpressure RC One of three safety valves opens on high RCS pressure Protection) All RCS safety relief valves close after opening on high RCS SRVs close after pressure relief (RCS Pressure Boundary) pressure ne o s opens on manual aWadon hm me 1 of 2 PORVs opens on manual actuation for SGTR control room Operation of one of two RH pump trains providing injection RH Provide adequate RHR flow to RCS cold legs -injection (ECCS) flow to one of four RCS cold legs during injection Provide adequate cooling from RHR to RCS cold legs - Operation of one of two RH pump trains providing cold leg recirculation (ECCS) recirculation to one intact loop Provide adequate cooling from RHR to RCS hot legs - recirculation Operation of one of two RH pump trains providing injection (ECCS) flow to one of four hot legs during hot leg recirculation RP Provide ESFAS actuation (None) N\A Provide Intermediate Head Safety injection flow to the RCS cold Operation of one of two Si pumps providing injection flow to St legs (ECCS, ECCS Injection ECCS to Cold Legs) two of four RCS cold legs Provide Intermediate Head recirculation flow to the RC cold legs Operation of one of two Si pumps providing cold leg (ECCS Recirculation) recirculation to two of four RCS loops Provide Intermediate Head recirculation flow to the RCS hot legs Operation of one of two Si pumps to provide intermediate head (ECCS to Hot Legs) RCS hot leg injection flow 2 Accumulators provide discharge on demand (ECCS from Two of four accumulators discharge to the RCS when RCS accumulators to cold legs) pressure falls below accumulator pressure SW Provide SSW flow (Service Water) Provide flow to SW Train 1 A Group 1 loads Table 4.1-6 b Page 3
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ER-EA-009 Table 4.1-6 b . Revmon 0 Pag.15V org - Comparison ofIPE and IST Functions i System IPE Function (IST Function) IPE Success Critoria Applicattle to IST-- SW Provide SSW flow (Sennce Water) Provide flow to SW Train 1 A Group 2 loads Provide SSW flow (Service Water) Provide flow to SW Train 1 A Group 3 loads , Provide SSW flow (Sennce Water) Provide flow to SW Train 1B Group 1 loads Provide SSW flow (Service Water) Provide flow to SW Train 1B Group 2 loads t
.~
t Provide SSW flow (Service Water) Provide flow to SW Train 1B Group 3 loads - 1 4 Table 4.1-6 b. Page 4 -
. . . . ,. _ , . , . _ _ . . . . . ~ _ . . _ . . , . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . _ _ - . _ , . . _ . . . - . ._ ; , - - . . . - ... -:_.,, - .. .._._,......a_.._..,_-....
ER-EA-009 Revision 0
-s Table 4.1-7 Page $55 of Nb High - Risk IPE Components Not In The IST Component Equivoient Risk Component Description Fussell-Vesely RMg @m lST Components INST AIR DRYR X-01 RLF VLV O.01000 High XCl-0681 (1)
O.01000 High XCl-0683 (1) INST AIR DRYR X-01 RLF VLV CST 1-01 TO TD AFW PMP 1-01 ISOL VLV 0.00138 Medium 1 AF-0006 CST 101 TO MD AFW PMP 1 01/1-02 ISOL VLV 0.00166 Medium 1 AF-0007 MAIN STM DMP TO CNDSR 101 VLV 2370A O.00153 Medium 1 TV-2370A MAIN STM DMP TO CNDSR 1-01 VLV 2370B 0.00153 Medium 1 TV 2370B MAIN STM DMP TO CNDSR 1-01 VLV 2370C 0.00153 Medium 1-TV 2370C MAIN STM DMP TO CNDSR 101 VLV 2370D 0.00153 Medium 1 TV-2370D MAIN STM DMP TO CNDSR 1-01 VLV 2370E 0.00153 Medium 1 TV-2370E MAIN STM DMP TO CNDSR 1-01 VLV 2370F 0.00153 Medium 1 TV-2370F MAIN STM DMP TO CNDSR 1-01 VLV 2370G 0.00153 Medium 1-TV 23700 MAIN STM DMP TO CNDSR 1-01 VLV 2370H 0.00153 Medium 1 TV-2370H MAIN STM DMP TO CNDSR 1-01 VLV 2370J 0.00153 Medium 1 TV 2370J 0.00176 Medium 1 FCV 0510 (2) SG 1-01 Fw Flo Ctrl Viv SG 1-04 Fw Flo Ctrl Viv O.00176 Medium 1-FCV-0540 (2) 0.00102 Medium 1-8341 U1 Pd PMP/CCP Suct Xtie Viv X-PSV-3475A (1) INST AIR RCVR X-01 PRESS RLV VLV 0.00085 Treat As Medium (1) Non-Operating Train (s) Components To Be Treated As Operating Train Components 1Cl0749 INST AIR DRYR 102 RLF VLV 1Cl0750 INST AIR DRYR 1-02 RLF VLV 1 Cl-0063 INST AIR DRYR 1-01 RLF VLV 1Cl0072 INST AIR DRYR 101 RLF VLV 1-PSV-3475 A INST AIR RCVR 1-02 PRESS RLV VLV 1Cl-0055 INST AIR RCVR 101 PRESS RLV VLV (2) Flow Paths to Steam Generators 2 and 3 To Be Treated As Modeled Flow Paths To Steam Generators 1 and 4 1 FCV-0520 SG 102 Fw Flo Ctrl Viv 1 FCV-0530 SG 103 Fw Flo Ctrl Viv Table 4.1-7 Page I
~ '
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Table 4.2-1 rase l56 orin Truncated Components System Truncated Components Auxiliary , Feedwater and check valves and flow control valves in paths to the steam generators (4 Main Steam to 8 paths available) check valves in a recoverable path to one of the motor driven pumps redundant check valves in diversion path to a single air operator atmospheric dump valves on steam generators not associated with TDAFW pump steam supply Component Cooling Water normally open MOVs in redundant paths components supporting long term operation of the containment spray system (see comments below) Charging and open check valves and MOVs in normally operating flowpaths for RCP CVCS sealinjection check valves on cold leg injection lines i check valves in redundant paths for emergency boration closed MOVs in a triply redundant paths for emergency boration redundant valves in flowpath boundaries Containment Spray all valves since system is not required for CD and not significant for LER J Residual Heat redundant check valves in recoverable paths when the system is used Removal for high pressure recirculation check valves on hot leg and cold leg injection lines normally open MOVs in redundant paths ; normally closed MOVs on the hot leg retum for RHR cooling (not needed for IPE, normally open for shutdown cooling) Table 4.2-1 Page1
ER-EA-009 9 Revision 0 Table 4.2-1 Page IS'l or 395 Truncated Components System Truncated Components Safety injection check valv,es on hot leg and cold leg injection lines normally open MOVs in redundant paths normally closed MOVs in redundant hot leg injection paths (cold leg 2 injection is the preferred path and is normally open) check valves in flowpath boundaries that have two altemate sources of flow isolation most accumulator valves (note however, that only the check valves 4 have to change state) i Service Water System normally open MOVs in a supply header NOTE: For the injection lines in Si and RHR and other interfacing systems LOCAs (ISL) susceptibb paths, valves were not truncated for their potential role in ISL initiators. l 1 i I i l i Table 4.2-1 Page 2 ,
l ER-EA-009 I
~
Revision 0 l I Page d of A D 1 Table 4.2-2 Accident Initiaitors With Initiating Event Frequency and Conditional Core Damage Probability
. EVENT CONTRIBUTION INITIATING TO IPE INTERNAL EVENT EVENTS CORE CONDITIONAL Initiating FREQUENCY DAMAGE CORE DAMAGE Event Event Description (EVENTSlYR) FREQUENCY PROBABILITY
%XL Excessive LOCA (RV Breach) 2.66E-07 2.66E-07 1.00E+00 Large Break LOCA ( >6"
%A 0.0002 2.85E-06 1.43E-02 Diameter)
Medium Break LOCA (4* to 6"
%M Diameter) 0.00047 1.02E-06 2.17E-03
%X3 Loss of Offsite Power 0.035 1.59E-05 4.54E-04
%VS Very Small Break LOCA 0.0126 3.76E-06 2.98E-04
%S Small Break LOCA (2" to 4") 0.00583 1.65E-06 2.83E-04
%X7 Loss of SSW 0.00479 6.04E-07 1.26E-04
%R Steam Generator Tube Rupture 0.0284 3.54E-06 1.25E-04
%X1 Loss of a DC Bus 0.0335 2.17E-06 6.48E-05
%XS Loss of CCW 0.0153 9.03E-07 5.90E-05 I
%X2 Loss of HVAC 0.0731 7.55E-07 1.03E-05 j e %T4 Main Steam Line Break 0.00604 5.48E-08 9.07E-06
%CV Loss of Condenser Vacuum 0.118 5.84E-07 4.95E-06
%T6 Loss of Main Feedwater 1.29 5.03E-06 3.90E-06
%T3 Inadvertant SI Actuation 0.0299 5.96E-08 1.99E-06
%T1 Reactor Trip-Reactor Trip 2.9 4.56E-06 1.57E-06 i
%X4 Loss of a non-vital AC Bus 0.0823 7.60E-08 9.23E-07 Loss of a Safeguards
%XS Bus (Protection Channel) 0.0836 4.86E-08 5.81 E-07 l l
Table 4.2 2 Page 1 i I
-l ER-EA-009 I . Revision 0
/' Table 4.2-3
** I Table of Risk Importances With and Without Common Cause Failures !
4 Component Tag Risk Importance - Risk Importance Component Description 1 Number Measure Ranking Measure Ranking I - with CCF Change w/out CCF Low None ) 1-8105 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt 18o1 Viv Low None 1-8106 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt isol Viv j 1-8511 A Ccp 1-01 Alt Miniflo IsolV!v Medium None i 18511B Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo isol Viv Medium None 18512A Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo Isol Viv Medium None 1-8512B Ccp 1-01 Alt Miniflo Isol Viv Medium None 4 a 1-8716A RHR Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv Medium Low j 1-87168 RHR Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv Medium Low j 1-8801A Ccp 1-01/1-02 S1 Isol Viv 8801 A Low None l 1-8801B Ccp 1-01/1-02 Sl isol Viv 8801B Low None Low i 1-8809A RHR To Cl 1-01/1-02 Inj lsol Viv Medium Low 1 1-88098 RHR To Cl 1-03/1-04 inj lsol Viv Medium 1-8809A RHR To Cl 1-01/1-02 inj lsol Viv Medium Low l 1-88098 RHR To Cl 1-03/1-04 Inj isol Viv Medium Low 1-8809A RHR To Cl 1-01/1-02 inj lsol Viv Medium Low 1-8809B RHR To Cl 1-03/1-04 inj isol Viv Medium Low i 1-FCV-0610 RHR Pmp 1-01 Miniflo Viv Low None ' Low None 1-FCV-0611 RHR Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv , 1-HV-2333A MSIV 1-01 Low None 1-HV-2334A MSIV 1-02 Low None 1-HV-2335A - MSIV 1-03 Low None 1-HV-2336A MSIV 1-04 Low None - 1- 1-HV-4513 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW RET VLV Medium None 1-HV-4515 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW SPLY VLV Medium None f . U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM RET 1-HV-4524 VLV Medium None U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM RET [ 1-HV-4525 VLV Medium None : U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM SPLY 1-HV-4526 - VLV Medium None U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM SPLY
- t. Medium None 1-HV-4527 VLV 1-HV-4572 RHR HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV Medium Low -l 1-HV-4573 RHR HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV Medium Low i
+
.I i-Table 4.2 3 Page 1 d
y ., -- - - .
ER-EA 009 ' Table 4.2 3a R IST/IPE Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Common Cause Sorted By Tag Risk importonce C__ .- Tag Risk lc;:.^_.__2e R8eesure Ranking C:- ;:x.4 Description Ideasure Ranking Change Wout with CCF CCF 1 7136 Redt Pump Discharge Control Valve - -None n/a 14000A Przr 101 Porv 0455A Sk Viv High High 1-80008 Przr 1-01 Porv 0456 Sik Viv High High 14010A Przr 1-01 Sfty VIv A Medium Medium 140108 Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv 8 Medium Medium 14010C Przr 141 Sfty Viv C Modeum Medium 14100 U1 Rep $1 Wtr Ret isol Viv None n/a 14104 U1 Emer Borate Viv None n/a 14105 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt isol Vhr Low None 14106 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt laci Viv Low None 14110 Ccp 101/1-02 Dnstrm Menellow Viv Low Low 14111 Ccp 101/1-02 Upstrm Mansflow Viv Low Low 14112 U1 RC Pmp Seal Wtr Ret isol Viv None n/a 14145 U1 Przr Aux Spr Vhr None n/a 1-8146 U1 RCS Loop 4 Chrg Viv None n/a 14152 U t LTDN CNTMT ORC ISOL VLV None n/a - 14160 U1 LTDN CNTMT IRC ISOL VLV None n/a 14351A RC Pmp 1-01 Si Wtr inj Viv None n/a 14351B RC Pmp 102 St Wtr inj Viv None n/a 14351C RC Pmp 1-03 Si Wtr inj Viv None n/a . I 143510 RC Pmp 1-04 Si Wtr inj Viv None n/a 14378A RCS Loop 1-04 Chrg Dnstrm Chk Viv None n/a ]'* 143788 RCS Loop 104 Chrg Upstrm Chk Viv None n/a 14381 Chrg Ln irc Chk Viv None n/a , 14481A Ccp 1-01 Desch Chk VIv Low Low . 144818 Ccp 102 Disch Chk W Low Low
- 1-8497 Pd Pmp 101 Doch Chk Viv None n/a f' 14511 A Ccp 1-01 Alt Mensflo isol Viv Medium None 145118 Ccp 1-02 Alt Mansflo isol Viv Medium None j 14512A Ccp 1-02 Alt Meniflo isol Viv Medium None i 145128 Ccp 1-01 Alt Minsflo isoi Viv Medium None
, 14546 Rwst 1-01 To Chrg Pmp Suct Chk Viv Low Low ' None n/a 14701A RHR Pmp 1-01 Hi 1-01 Recare Omb isol Viv 147018 RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 104 Recere Omb isol Viv None n/a i 1-8702A RHR Pmp 1-01 He 101 Reiere imb leol Viv None n/a 147028 RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 104 Recwe imb isol Viv None n/a 14708A RHR Pmp 101 Suct RN Viv None n/a l 147008 RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct RN Viv None n/a
- 14716A RHR Pmp 1-01 Xte Viv Medium Low RHR Pmp 102 Xtie Viv Medium Low
~ 147168
- 14717 U1 RHR Pmps Disch To Rwet tool Viv Low Low 14730A RHR Hx 1-01 Disch Chk Viv None n/a 4 147308 RHR Hz 102 Disch Chk Viv None n/a
. 1-8001 A Ccp 101/1-02 Si isol Viv 8801 A Low None 148018 Ccp 101/1-02 Sileol Viv 88018 Low None 1-8002A Si Pmp 1-01 To HI 2 & 3 inj leol Viv None n/a ! 148028 St Pmp 1-02 To HI 1 & 4 Irq loot Viv None n/a ! 1-8804A RHR Pmp 1-01 To Ccp Suct Viv Medium Medium 1-80048 RHR Pmp 1-02 To Si Pmps Suct Viv Medium Medium 1-8006 Rwet 1-01 To S1 Pmps Suct Viv Low Low
- 14807A U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Vhr 8007A None n/a 1-80078 U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xte Viv 80078 None n/a
[ 1-8808A St Accum 1-01 inj Viv None n/a 1-88088 St Accum 1-02 frq Viv None n/a Table 4.2 3a Page I L , _ _. _ u u.. ._ _._. _ . - _ - _ __ ___ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _
ER-EA 009 Revision Table 4.2-3a IST/IPE Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Common Cause Sorted By Tag mPortance ComponentTag hk Importance Measum Ranking ComponeM Nc@n Number Measure Ranking Change w/out with CCF CCF 14808C Si Accum 1-03 ini Viv None n/a 1-8808D SI Accum 1-04 ini Viv None n/a i8809A RHR To Cl 1-01/1-02 in) (sol Viv Medium Low 148098 RHR To Cl 1-03/104 inj lol Viv Medium Low 10811 A Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 101 Suct isol Viv Medium Medium 148118 Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct isol Vtv Medium Medium 14809A RHR To Cl 101/1-02 inj isol Viv Medium Low 1-88098 RHR To Cl 1-03/104 in) Isol Viv Medium Low 1-8813 Si Pmp 101/1-02 Miniflo Ret Viv Medium Medium 18814A S1 Pmp 1-01 Minific Viv Medium Medium 1-8814B St Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv Medium Medium 1-8815 Cco 1-01/1-02 inj Chk Viv Low Low 1-8818A RHR Cl 101 inj Chk Viv None n/a 1-88188 RHR Cl 1-02 Inj Chk Viv None n/a 1-8818C RHR Cl 1-03 In) Chk Viv None n/a 1-8818D RHR Cl 1-04 in) Chk Viv N me n/a 3 18821A S1 Pmp 101 Xte Viv None n/a 14821B S1 Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv None n/a 1-8835 Si f'mp 101/1-02 To Cl Inj lect Viv Low Low 1-8840 RHR To HI 1-02/103 inj 1601 Viv High High 1-8841 A RHR To RCS HI 142 Upstrm Chk Viv None n/a 1-8841 B RHR To RCS HI 1-03 Upstrm Chk Viv None n/a 14875A Si Accum 1-01 N2 SPLY/ VENT Viv None n/a 1-88758 St Accum 1-02 N2 SPLY/ VENT Viv None n/a ) 14875C St Accum 1-03 N2 SPLY/ VENT Viv None n/a 1-88750 St Accum 1-04 N2 SPLY/ VENT Viv None n/a 14877A St Accum 1-01 Tat Ln lool Viv None n/a 1-88778 St Accum 1-02 Tat Ln isol VIv None n/a None n/a 1-8877C SI Accum 103 Tat Ln isol Viv ) 1-8877D Sl Accum 1-04 Tat Ln isol Viv None n/a 14878A SI Accum 101 Fill Viv None n/a 14878B St Accum 1-02 Fill Vtv None n/a 14878C St Accum 1-03 Fill Viv None n/a 1-8878D St Accum 1-04 Fill Viv None n/a 1-8922A St Pmp 1-01 Disch Chk Vtv Low Low Low I 1-8922B S1 Pmp 102 Disch Chk Viv Low 1-8923A Si Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv None None 1-8923B St Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv None None 1-8924 U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xte isol Viv None None 1-8928 S1 Pmp 1-01/102 Suct Chk Vtv Low Low 1-8948A St Accum 1-01 Dnstrm inj Chk Vtv None n/a 1-8948B SI Accum 1-02 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv None n/a 1-8948C St Accum 103 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv None n/a 189480 St Accum 1-04 Dnstrm in) Chk Viv None n/a j 14949A RHR To Rcp HI 1-01 Dnstrm Chk Viv None n/a 1-89498 RHR To Rep HI 1-02 Dnstrm Chk Vtv None n/a 1-8949C RHR To Rep HI 1-03 Dnstm1 Chk Viv None n/a 1-89490 RHR To Rcp HI 104 Dnstrm Chk Viv None n/a 1-8958A St Accum 1-01 Upstrm inj Chk Vtv None n/a 1-8958B St Accum 102 Upstrm inj Chk Viv None n/a 14958C St Accum 1-03 Upstrm int Chk Viv None n/a 1-89580 SI Accum 1-04 Upstrm inj Chk Vtv None n/a i i 1-8958A Rwat 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-01 Chk Viv None n,a Rwst 101 To RHR Pmp 1-02 Chk Viv None n, a 1-8958B 1-8989A RHR To Ccp 101/1-02 Suct Chk Viv None n. a j l Tabic 4.2-3s Page 2
I l I ER-EA-009 Table 4.2 3a IST/IPE Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Common Cause fevision 0 Sorted By Tag Risk importance
*P "*" "U Component Description Risk importance Measure Ranking Number Measure Ranking Change wIout I with CCF CCF l 1-89698 RHR To S1 Pmp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv None None )
1-FCV-0610 RHR Pmp 1-01 Miniflo Viv Low None i 1-FCV-0611 RHR Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv Low Wone 1-FCV-0618 RHR Hz 1-01 Byp Flo Ctrl Viv None n/a 1-FCV 0619 RHR Hz 1-02 Byp Flo Ctrl V!v None n/a 1.FV-2193 SG 1-01 Fw Prehtr Byp VN None n/a 1-FV 2196 SG 104 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv None n/a 1.FV-4772-1 Cs Pmp 101 Rectre VN None n/a l 1-FV-4772-2 Ca Pmp 1-03 Recirc Viv None n/a j 1.FV-4773-1 Cs Pmp 1-02 Recirc Viv None n/a 1-FV-4773-2 Cs Pmp 104 Recarc Viv None n/a ) 1-HCV-0606 RHR Hz 1-01 Flo Ctrl Viv None n/a 1-HCV-0607 ~ ' HR Hz 1-02 Flo Ctrl Viv None n/a 1-HV-2134 4101 FW ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-2135 SG 1-02 FW ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV 2136 SG 1-03 FW ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-2137 SG 104 FW ISOL VLV None n/a 1 HV-2333A MSIV 1-01 Low None 1-HV-2334A MSIV 1-02 Low None 1-HV-2335A MSIV 1-03 Low None 4 1-HV-2336A MSIV 1-04 Low None 1-HV-2397 SG 101 BLDN ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-2397A SG 1-01 BLDN HELB iSOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-2409 MSL 1-01 BEF MSIV DPOT 1-25 ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-2410 MSL 102 BEF MSIV DPOT ISOL VLV None n/a j n/a ; 1-HV-2411 MSL 1-03 BEF MSIV DPOT ISOL VLV None 1-HV-2412 MSL 1-04 BEF MSIV DPOT ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-2452-1 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV None None 1-HV-2452-2 MSL 1-04 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV None None 1-HV 2459 TO AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV None n/a 1-HV-2460 TD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-02 FCV None n/a , UIV-2461 TD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-03 FLO CTRL VLV None None 1-HV-2462 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 FLO CTRL VLV None None 1-HV-2491 A TD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-01 ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-24918 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 ISOL VLV None n/a l 1-HV-2492A TD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-02 ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-24928 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 102 ISOL VLV None n/a l 1-HV-2493A MD AFW PMP 14)2 DISCH TO SG 1-03 ISOL VLV None n/a 1 1-HV-2493B TD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 103 ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-2494A MD AFW PMP 102 DISCH TO SG 1-04 ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-24948 TD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-04 ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-3487 U1 CNTMT INST AIR HDR ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-4171 ACCUM 1-01 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC iSOL VLV None n/a 1-HV 4172 ACCUM 1-02 LIO SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-4173 ACCUM 1-03 LIO SPACE SMPL LN 1RC tSOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-4174 ACCUM 1-04 LIO SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-4286 SSW PMP 101 DISCH VLV Medium Medium 1-HV 4287 SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH VLV Medium Medium j 1-HV-4393 DG 1-01 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV None n/a ' 1-HV-4394 DG 1-02 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV None n/a 1-HV 4512 U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW RET VLV Medium Medium 1-HV 4513 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW RET VLV Medium None 1-HV-4514 U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW SPLY VLV Medium Medium 1-HV-4515 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW SPLY VLV Medium None 1-HV-4524 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM RET VLV Medium None Table 4.2 3a Page 3 l l l
. _ _ . - . _ . . ._ .~_- . _ _ _ . - . . _
i i ER-EA-009 l Table 4.2-3a IST/IPE Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Common Cause fevisb]n l Sorted By Tag ; i Risk Importance
** "* "8 Component Description Riskimportance Measure Ranking Measure Ranking Change wiout !
with CCF CCF 1-HV-4525 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM RET VLV Modun None 1 HV-4526 U1 NON SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM SPLY VLV Medium None ' 1-HV 4527 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM SPLY VLV Medium None 1-HV-4572 RHR HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV Modun Low 1-HV-4573 RHR HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV Medium Low ; 1 HV-4574 CS HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV None n/a 1-HV 4575 CS MX 1-02 CCW RET VLV None n/a 1-HV-4696 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV None None 1-HV-4699 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC UPSTRM ISOL VLV None None 1-HV-4700 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC DNSTRM ISOL VLV None None , 1-HV-4701 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-4708 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-4709 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV None None 1-HV-4725 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 IRC ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-4726 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 ORC iSOL VLV None n/a 1 HV-4758 RWST TO CS PMP 101/1-03 SUCT VLV None n/a _ 1-HV-4759 RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT VLV None n/a 1-HV-4776 CS HX 1-01 OUT VLV None n/a 1-HV-4777 CS HX 1-02 OUT VLV None n/a - 1-HV-4782 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-4783 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT ISOL VLV None n/a ; 1-HV-5157 RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 DISCH HDR ORC ISOL VLV None n/a
, 1-HV-5158 RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 OlSCH HDR 1RC ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-5548 U1 CNTMT F R'ESS RLF SYS ORC ISOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-5549 U1 CNTMT ORESS RLF SYS IRC iSOL VLV None n/a 1-HV-8220 U1 CHARGli PMP SUCT HI PNT VNT VLV 8220 None n/a 5
1-HV 8221 U1 CHARGE PMP Hi PNT VNT VLV 8221 None n/a 1-LCV 01128 VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112B Low Low 1-LCV-0112C VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112C Low Low 1-LCV-0112D RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 01120 Low Low I 1-LCV-0112E RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112E Low Low 1-LCV 1003 LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV None n/a 1-LCV-1003 RCDT LEVEL CONTROL VALVE None n/a 1-PCV-0456 PRZR PWR OPERATED RELIEF VLV Hegh High 1-PV-2325 SG 101 ATMOS RLF VLV , Low Low i 1-PV-2326 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV n/a n/a 1-PV-2327 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV n/a n/a 1-PV 2328 SG 104 ATMOS RLF VLV Low Low 1-PV-2453A MD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV None n/a 1 PV-2453B MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 102 CTRL VLV None n/a 1-PV-2454A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CTRL VLV None None 1-PV-2454B MD AFW PMP 102 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CTRL VLV None None 1-PV 4552 SFTY CHLR 1-05 CCW RET PCV None None 1-PV-4553 SFTY CHLR 1-06 CCW RET PCV None None 1 AF 0014 CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-01 SUCT CHK VLV None n/a 1AF-0024 CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-02 SUCT CHK VLV None n/a , 1AF-0032 CST 1-01 TO TD AFW PMP CHK VLV Low Low 1 AF-0038 TD AFW PMP 101 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low i 1AF-0041 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV Low Low 1 AF-0051 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low 1 AF 0054 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH ISOL VLV Low Low 1AF-0085 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low 1AF-0086 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV Low Low l 1AF-0075 MD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 101 CHK VLV None n/a IAF-0078 TD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-01 CHK VLV None n/a Tabic 4.2-3a Page 4 l
I l l ER-EA 0C3 i Table 4.2-3a l N'gision o IST/IPE Component Evaluation for Risk importance Due to Common Cause Sorted By Tag l Risk importance I Component Tag Risk Importance Measure Ranking Component Description Number Measure Ranking Change w/out with CCF CCF j 1AF-0083 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CHK VLV None n/a 1 1 AF 0086 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 102 CHK VLV None n/a 1AF-0093 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 103 CHK VLV None n/a ; 1AF-0098 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CHK VLV None n/a 1 AF-0101 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CHK VLV None n/a 1 AF-0106 TD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CHK VLV None n/a 1 AF-0215 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1AF 0216 MD AFW PMF 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-0 4 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1 AF-0217 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV None n/a 1 AF-0218 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV None n/a 1 AF-0219 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 103 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV None n/a 1AF-0220 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV None n/a 1 AF-0221 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1AF-0222 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY ONSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1 AF-0223 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1AF-0224 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1 AF-0220 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV None n/a 1 AF-0227 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV None n/a 1 AF-0228 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV None n/a 1 AF-0229 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 103 AIR SPLY ONSTRM CHK VLV None n/a 1 AF-0230 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1 AF-0231 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1CC-0031 CCW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low l 1CC-0061 CCW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low j ICC-0646 RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV None None l 1CC-0657 RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV None None l 1CC-0687 RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV None None ICC-0694 RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV None None ) 1CC-0713 U1 RCP CLR CCW SPLY HDR CHK VLV None None ; 1CC-1075 RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV None None 1CC-1076 RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV None None 1CC-1077 RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV None None 1CC-1078 RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV None None ICC-1079 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT None n/a 1CC-1080 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT None n/a 1CC-1081 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT None n/a 1CC-1082 CIRCEL SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2 FNPT None n/a 1Cl-0030 U1 INST AIR HDR TO U1 CNTMT CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-8180 U1 IRC SL WTR RET CNMT ISOL BYP CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-8350A RC PMP 1-01 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV None n/a ICS-83508 RC PMP 1-02 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV None n/a , 1CS-8350C RC PMP 1-03 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV None n/a l l 1CS-83500 RC PMP 1-04 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-8367A RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-8367B RC PMP 1-02 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-8367C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-8367D P.C PMP 1-04 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-8368A RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-83688 RC PMP 102 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-8368C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-83680 RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-8442 U1 EMER BORATE LN CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-8473 BA PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV None n/a 1CS-8487 BA PMP 101 DISCH CHK VLV None n/a 1CT-0025 RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/104 SUCT CHK VLV None n/a l Table 4.2-3a Page 5 l
ER-EA 009 Table 4.2-3a Revision 0 IST/IPE Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Common Cause a.dW215 sorted By Tag . I Risk importance Comp ce tTag Component Description Risk importance Measure Ranking Measure Ranking Change w/out with CCF CCF ) 1CT 0042 CS PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV None n/a 1CT-0047 CS PMP 1-04 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV None n/a l 1CT-0048 CS PMP 1-02 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV None n/a l ICT-0063 CS PMP 1-03 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV None n/a l 1CT-0064 CS PMP 1-01 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV NoN n/a 1CT-0065 CS PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV None n/a 1CT-0077 RWST TO CSP 101/1-03 SUCT CHK VLV None n/a 1CT-0094 CS PMP 101 DISCH CHK VLV None n/a 1CT-0142 U1 CS TRN A HDR 1RC CHK VLV None n/a . 1CT-0145 U1 CS TRN B HDR 1RC CHK VLV None n/a I 1CT-0148 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 102/1-04 CHK VLV None n/a 1 1CT 0149 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 101/1-03 CHK VLV None n/a l 10 0-0004 DG 101 FO XREF PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV None n/a ) 1DO-0005 DG 1-01 FO XREF PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV None n/a 10 0-0016 DG 1-02 FO XFER PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV None n/a 1DO-0017 DG 1-02 FO XFER PMP 104 DISCH CHK VLV None n/a
~
1D0-0049 DG 1-01 FO DAY TK 101 XFER HDR CHK VLV Low Low l 100-0050 DG 102 FO DAY TK 102 XFER HDR CHK VLV Low Low l 1FW-0076 SG 1-02 FW HDR CHK VLV None n/a 1FW-0082 SG 1-01 FW HDR CHK VLV None n/a 1FW-0088 SG 1-04 FW HDR CHK VLV None n/a 1FW-0195 SG 1-04 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV None n/a 1 1FW4196 SG 1-01 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV None n/a l 1FW-0197 SG 1-02 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV None n/a 1FW-0198 SG 103 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV None n/a 1FW-0199 SG 104 AFW NZL CHK VLV None n/a 1FW-0200 SG 101 AFW NZL CHK VLV None n/a 1FW-0201 SG 1-02 AFW NZL CHK VLV None n/a 1FW-0202 SG 1-03 AFW NZL CHK VLV None n/a 1MS-0026 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV None n/a IMS-0063 SG 102 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV None n/a 1MS-0098 SG 103 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM iSOL VLV None n/a 1MS-0134 SG 104 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV None n/a 1MS-0142 MSL 104 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM CHK VLV None None l 1MS-0143 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM CHK VLV None None 1 1MS-0680 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV None n/a l IMS-0681 SG 101 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV None n/a l None n/a l 1MS 0682 SG 102 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV 1MS-0683 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV None n/a I 1MS-0684 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV None n/a IMS-0685 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV None n/a 1MS-0686 SG 104 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV None n/a _ l 1MS-0687 SG 104 ATMOS RLT VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV None n/a ' 1SI-0047 RWST 1-01 TO St ISOL VLV Medium Medium 1SI-8819A S1 TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV None n/a 1SI-8819B Si TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV None n/a 1SI-8819C St TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV None n/a 1Sl4819D Si TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV None n/a ISI-8900A CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV None n/a 1SI-8900B CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 102 CHK VLV None n/a ISI-8900C CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 103 CHK VLV Ncne n/a l 1SI-89000 CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV None n/a 1SI-8905A Si TO HL 1-01 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV None n/a 1SI-8905B Si TO HL 1-02 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV None n/a 1SI-8905C Si TO HL 1-03 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV None n/a Table 4.2-3a Page 6 l
ER-EA-009 Table 4.2-3a Revision 0 IST/IPE Component Evaluation for Risk Importance Due to Common Cause Sorted By Tag i Sk ImPortance Component Tag Risk Importance Measure Ranking Component Description Number Measure Ranking Change w/out with CCF CCF 1 SI-8905D Si TO HL 1-04 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV None n/a 1 SI-8919A S1 PMP 1-01 TO RWST CHK VLV None n/a 1SI-89198 S1 PMP 1-02 TO RWST CHK VLV None n/a 1SW-0016 U1 SSW TRN B SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV None None 1SW-0017 U1 SSW TRN A SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV Nr.no None I SW-0373 SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV Medium Medium ISW 0374 SSW PMP 101 DISCH CHK VLV Medium Medium CP1-AFAPMD-01 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 Hgh High CP1-AFAPMD-02 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXtLIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-02 Hgh Hgh CP1-AFAPTD-01 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 High Hgh CP1 CCAPCC-01 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1-01 Hgh Hgh CP1 CCAPCC-02 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1-02 Hgh Hgh CP1 CHAPCP-05 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 105 Medium Medium CP1 CHAPCP-06 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 1-06 Medium Medium CP1-CTAPCS-01 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-01 None n/a CP1-CTAPCS-02 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-02 None n/a CP1-CTAPCS-03 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-03 None n/a CP1-CTAPCS-04 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-04 None n/a CP1-DOAPFT-01 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OlL TRANSFER PUMP 101 Hgh None CP1-DOAPFT-02 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 Hgh None CP1-DOAPFT-03 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 103 Hgh Nor.e CP1 DOAPFT-04 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-04 Hgh None cpi-SWAPSW-01 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 101 Hgh High cpi-SWAPSW-02 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-02 Hgh High TBX-CSAPBA-01 BORIC ACIO TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 None n/a TBX-CSAPBA-02 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 102 None n/a TBX-CSAPCH-01 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-01 Hgh High TBX-CSAPCH-02 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-02 Hgh Hgh TBX-RHAPRH-01 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-01 Medium Medium TBX-RHAPRH-02 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-02 Medium Medium TBX SIAPSI-01 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-01 Hgh High TBX-SIAPSI-02 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-02 Hgh High X-PCV-H116A UPS A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV Low Low X-PCV-H1168 UPS A\C UNIT X-02 CCW RET PCV Low Low X-PV-3583 CR A\C UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV None n/a X-PV-3585 CR A\C UNIT X-03 CCW RET PCV None n/a Table 4.2 3a Page 7
o -j EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (AF) Page /67 of 195 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / - Panel Basis Compensatory Action Comments Category Disposition - AF-0014 & Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Reverse flow will not affect AF-0024 redundant trains. AF-0032 Low, but Low IPE basis confirmed. Tested for opening during Reverse flow will not affect moderate quarterly tech spec test. redundant trains. RAW Moderate RAW with compensatory action. , AF-0041, Low, but Low IPE basis confirrned. Locked valve program Locked valve program and ease of AF-0054 & moderate recovery if valve left closed makes AF-0066 RAW the latent human error risk insignificant. AF-0038, Low, but Low IPE basis confirmed. Tested for opening during Reverse flow will not affect AF-0051 & moderate quarterly tech spec test. redundant trains. AF-0065 RAW Moderate RAW with compensatory action. AF-0075 Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA AF-0078, AF-0083 & AF-0086, AF-0093 & AF-0098 and AF-0101 & AF-0106 Table 4.4-1 Page 1
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (AF) Page /68 of #95 Component IPE Risk Panet Decision / Panet Basis . Compensatory Action Coniments Category Disposition I AF-0215 & Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Panel established importance of I AF-0216, check valves for instrument air 1 AF-0217 & based primarily on the importance 1 AF-0218, of the valve served, e.g.,1-PV-1 AF-0219 & 2453A, etc. I AF-0220, , and l AF-0221 & 1 AF -0222 AF-0223 & Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Panel established importance of AF-0224, check valves for instrument air AF-0226 & based primarily on the importance AF-0227, of the valve served, e.g., I-IIV-AF-0228 & 2459, etc. AF-0229, and AF-0230 & AF-0231 2AF-0236 & Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Panel established importance of 2AF-0291, check valves for instrument air 2AF-0237 & based primarly on the importance 2AF-0238, of the valve served (e.g.,2-PV-2AF-0239 & 2453 A, etc.) 2AF-0240 and 2AF-0221 & 2AF-0222 Table 4.4-1 Page 2
_ m N l EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (AF) Page /97 of /95 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panet Basis Compensatory Action Comments Category Disposition AF-0232, Low Low IPE basis confirmed NA Panel established importance of AF-0233, check valves for instrument air AF-0234, & based primarily on the importance AF-0235 of the valve served, i.e., IIV-2452-1 & -2. IST does not address IPE function because it is not an active compo-nent ftmetion, (e.g., IPE models valve transfers closed). PV-2453A Low, but Low IPE basis confirmed. No compensatory action RAW is conservative because the and moderate required by expert panel. IPE did not credit that operators PV-2454B RAW Moderate RAW is See comments. will use manual valves to control conservative. flow and other means ofisolation are available. PV-2453B Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA and PV-2454A IIV-2459, Low, but Low IPE basis confirmed. No compensatory action The IPE calculated RAW is llV-2460, moderate required by Expert Panel. conservative. IPE did not model IIV-2461, RAW RAW on low end of See comments. maintaining flow control after and moderate range and control valve failure by controlling IIV-2462 conservative. TD pump speed. Table 4.4-1 Page 3
N., . EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM Resision 0 - TABLE 4.4-1 (AF) Page /7o of #95 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Pane! Basis Compensatory Action Comments Category Disposition liv-2491 A & Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA B, IIV-2492A & B, IIV-2493A & B,and . IIV-2494A & B Table 4.4-1 Page 4
T EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Revision 0 l TABLE 4.4-1 (CC) Page /7/ of195 Component IPE Itisk Panel Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory Action Comments Category Disposition liigh risk liigh liigh IPE basis NA Note that each of these valves category confirmed. are high solely because of valves: common cause failure (CCF). IIV-4512, IIV-4513, llV-4514 , ilV-4515, IIV-4524, IIV-4525, IIV-4526 IIV-4527, IIV-4572 & ilV-4573 IIV-4574 and Low Low IPE basis NA Needed for containment IIV-4575 confirmed. function only when in recirculation. IPE indicates that containment spray function will not be available for most risk significant severe accidents, e.g., station blackout. Importance ofcontainment function addressed adequately by CT system, compensatory measures, including the CT IST pump test. Table 4.4-1 Page 5 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _._ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _=___.m_.______
1
- /
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (CC) Page (71 of .#95 l Component . IPE Risk . Panel Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory Action Comments Category - Disposition llV-4696 & Low, for Low IPE basis confirmed NA for IST. IST failure mode insignificant. IIV-4709 close (IST for both IPE and See discussion below for ICC-failure mode) IST failure modes. No compensatory action 0646. required by expert panel for IST does not check IPE failure Low for open, IPE failure mode. See mode. Valves are routinely but moderate comments. stroked during refyeling outages RAW (IPE for maintenance work on the failure mode) system. IIV-4699 & Low, for Low IPE basis confirmed NA for IST. IST failure mode is IIV-4700 close (IST for both IPE and insignificant. See discussion failure mode) IST failure modes. No compensatory action below for ICC-0713. required by expert panel for Low for open, IPE failure mode. See IST does not check IPE failure but high comments. mode. Valves are routinely RAW (IPE stroked during refueling outages failure mode) for maintenance work on the system. IIV-4701 & Low Low IPE basis confirmed NA IST does not check IPE failure IIV-4708 mode. InsignificantIST failure mode. Similar to discussion below for ICC-0713. IIV-4725 & Figh IPE basis confirmed NA IIV-4726 Iligh for Accident mitigation accident basis confirmed mitigation Table 4.4-1 Page 6
l^ i EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 - FOR COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Revision 0 l TABLE 4.4-1 (CC) Page /73 of A95 Component IPE Risk . Panet Decision / Panet Basis- Compensatory Action Comments . Category Disposition PV-4552 & Low Low IPE basis confirmed NA PV-4553 CC-0031 and Low for open Low IPE basis Each train runs periodically. CC-0061 confirmed. Reverse flow would cause , Moderate RAW observable flow problems Low for close, with compensatory immediately after the pump but high action swap and during the normal RAW running condition. Table 4.4-1 Page 7
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EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (CC) Page /74 of 895 Component IPE Risk Panet Decision / Panet Basis Compensatory Action Comments Categon Disposition CC-0646, Low, but Low Moderate RAW Degradation during operation These CVs, isolation valves, CC-0657, moderate with compensatory would be detectable by and ICC-713 help prevent a CC-0687, RAW for IPE measure. thermal barrier alarms (i.e., containment bypass scenario. CC-0694 and failure. Iow flow and high The scenario could result if an ICC-1075 temperature). RCP thermal barrier tube thru rupture (guillotine, break) 1CC-1078 and occurred and it subsequently 2CC-0371 NA caused a CCW pipe rupture and through Previous problems these CVs and the other CVs all 2CC-0374 Low for IST Low with the valves failed. This scenario was failure. sticking open have judged by the original PRA to been corrected. be risk insignificant. This judgment was confirmed by the panel. He panel also confirmed with Westinghouse that there had net been any RCP thermal barrier tube ruptures at W plants. 1CC-713 Low, for Low IPE basis NA IST program tests for reverse close (IST confirmed. flow. Hat failure mode is not in failure mode) the IPE because it is part of an extremely unlikely accident Low for open, Low Degradation during operation scenario. See ICC-0646. but high liigh RAW with would be detectable by RAW (IPE compensatory thermal barrier alarms (i.e., failure mode) action. Not IST low flow and high failure mode. temperature). 3 i l Table 4.4-1 Page 8 i i _ _ _ _ _ - _ ___ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _____m______ __ ___ __-________m u --__r_ - _ _ _ _ _ - a -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
?
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (CC) Page (15 of A95 Component IPE Risk Panet Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory Action Comments Category Disposition 1CC-1079 Low Low Low because the NA thru valves they supply ICC-1082 and air to are low (1-2CC-1091 PV-4553 and - through 4552). 2CC-1094 , X-PCV- liigh for liigh Accident mitigation NA These components are only lil16A & accident and fire basis important when the lake X-PCV- mitigation and confirmed. temperature is such that they til16B fire have to be throttled. Design modification in progress may change in ranking. XPV-3484, Low Low IPE basis NA Exempt from in-service testing XPV-3485, confirmed. per IST program plan. XPV-3583 & XPV-3585 Table 4.4-1 Page 9
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR MISCELLANEOUS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (CIV) Page I?(o of 195 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory Actions . . Comments Category Disposition llV-5157, liigh for liigh IPE basis confirmed. NA IIV-5158, accident 7136,and mitigation Accident mitigation LCV-1003 basis confirmed. All other Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA miscellaneous , containment Accident mitigation isolation basis confirmed. valves Table 4.4-1 Page 10
s EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR CIIEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (CS) ' Page l'77 of #95 - Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory Actions Comments Category Disposition liigh risk liigh liigh IPE basis NA Note that these valves are high solely category confirmed. because ofcommon cause failure valves: (CCF). 8511A, 851iB, 8512A & , 8512B LCV-112B, liigh for fligh Panel ranked high LCV-112C, fire. for IPE because LCV-112D both Fussel-Vesely and and RAW are near LCV-ll2E borderline. Fire basis confirmed. 8100 Low Low IPE basis NA IPE function is to remain open for confirmed. seal water return. 8104 Low Low IPE basis NA Many recovery paths not modeled in confirmed. the IPE make this valve even less important than represented by the IPE. 8105 Low Low IPE basis NA confirmed. 8106 Low Low IPE basis NA confirmed. Table 4.4-1 Page 11
l EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR CIIEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Revision 0 l TABLE 4.4-1 (CS) Page /77 of MS l 1 Component IPE Risk Panet Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory Actions Comments Category Disposition 8110 and liigh for fire liigh IPE and fire basis NA 8111 confirmed. 8112 Low Low IPE basis NA IPE function is to remain open for confirmed. seal water return. , 8145 Low Low IPE basis NA confirmed 8146 and Low Low IPE basis NA 8147 confirmed. 8152 and liigh for liigh IPE basis NA Valves must close for containment 8160 accident confirmed isolation. mitigation. Accident mitigation basis confirmed. CS-8180 Low Low IPE basis NA IPE function is to remain open for confirmed. seal water return. IIV-8220 and Low Low IPE basis NA liv-8221 confirmed. Gas binding problem in past has been corrected by new valves Table 4.4-1 Page 12
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EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR CIIEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (CS) Page /79 of 296 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory Actions Comments Category Disposition CS-8350A Low Low IPE basis IPE models fails to open for seal thru confirmed. injection. CS-8350D IST addresses fails to close. This failure mode is insignificant for both bypass and LOCA, scenarios because of additional check valves and isolation valves in line. 8351 A thru Low Low IPE basis NA IPE models fails to open for seal 8351D confirmed. injection. IST addresses fails to close. This failure mode is insignificant for both bypass and LOCA scenarios because of additional check valves and , isolation valves in line. CS-8367A Low Low IPE basis NA IPE models fails to open for seal thru confirmed. injection. CS-8367D IST addresses fails to close. 'Ihis failure mode is insignificant for both bypass and LOCA scenarios because of additional check valves and isolation valves in line. Table 4.4-1 Page 13
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EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR CllEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Revision 0 l TABLE 4.4-1 (CS) Page /fo of 295 l Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory Actions Comments !' Category - Disposition CS-8368A Low Low IPE basis NA IPE models fails to open for seal j thru confirmed. injection. CS-8368D IST addresses fails to close. His failure mode is insignificant for both bypass and LOCA scenarios because of additional check valves and i isolation valves in line. 8378A & Low Low IPE basis NA 8378B confirmed 8381 Low Low IPE basis NA confirmed. CS-8442 Low Low IPE basis NA Many recovery paths not modeled in confirmed. the IPE make this valve even less important than represented by the IPE. CS-8473 Low Low IPE basis NA Many recovery paths not modeled in confirmed. the IPE make this valve even less important than represented by the IPE. Reverse flow does not cause failure of redundant trains. Table 4.4-1 Page 14 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ . - _ _a _. + - -~-: vm +e
I ,
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EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 - FOR CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (CS) Page /fI of 295 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory Actions Comments Category Disposition 8481A & Low for fails Low Moderate RAW IST pump operability test Similar to CCW pump discharge to open but with compensatory check valves, but alternate flow 8481B moderate action paths make FV and RAW lower. RAW Low for fails , to close CS-8487 Low Low IPE basis NA Many recovery paths not modeled in confirmed. the IPE make this valve even less important than represented by the IPE. Reverse flow does not cause failure of redundant trains. 8497 Low Low IPE basis NA Similar to 8481 A & B, except also confirmed. recoverable by closing 1-8358. 8546 liigh for fire liigh Fire and accident NA Reverse flow not a problem because and accident mitigation bases 1-LCV-Il2D & E can still be closed mitigation confirmed. Low for IPE basis accident confirmed. prevention Table 4.4-1 Page 15
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (CT) Page IfA of A95 Component - IPE Risk - Panel Decision / Panet Basis Compensatory Actions. Comments Category Disposition I-FV-4772-1 Low Low IPE basis confirmed. Tech spec slave relay test
& Panel concluded a (K643A/B tested in -
1-FV-4772-2 compensatory action OPT 452A and 475A). and was required because 1-FV-4773-1 the valves are
& important for a ,
1-FV-4773-2 radiological release not modeled in IPE, i.e., diversion to RWST duting recirculation from the sump. All other Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Note that the MOVs which must modeled CT change state for injection mode valves ofcontainment spray each have a slave relay test. l Table 4.4-1 Page 16
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EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR DIESEL GENERATOR AUXILIARIES Revision 0 l TABLE 4.4-1 (DO) Page ... /g3 of A95 l l Component . IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory Actions Comments Category Disposition DO-0049 & Low, but Low IPE basis continned. Monthly tech spec pump run DO-0050 and moderate Moderate RAW with (4.8.1.1.2a3). 2DO-0049 & RAW compensatory action. 2DO-0052 DO-0004, Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Reverse flow not a concern DO-0005, because ofdigsel fuel oil pump DO-0016 & design. DO-0017 Table 4.4-1 Page 17
s EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR FEEDWATER SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (FW) Page 184 of 295 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision /. Panel Basis Compensatory Actions Comments Category Disposition ' IIV-2134 Low liigh IPE basis confirmed. NA thru Panel concluded to IIV-2137 leave valves in the IST program as is because of plant-specific perfonnance , issues. FW-0195, Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA No plant-specific performance FW-0196, concerns. FW-0197, FW-0198, FW-0199, FW-0200, FW-0201 & FW-0202 FV-2193 & Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA These valves have an IPE FV-2196 function and were modeled. His IPE function is not an IST function. Table 4.4-1 Page 18
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR MAIN STEAM SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (MS) Page is5 of M6 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory Actions ' Comments Category Disposition Safety relief Low liigh IPE basis confirmed - NA valves: numerous means to MS-0021 thru relieve pressure. MS-0025, MS-0058 thru Leave testing as is MS-0062, because ofinsurance
- MS-0093 thru requirements.
MS-0097 and MS-0129 thru MS-0133 , MS-0026, Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA MS-0063, MS-0098 and MS-0134 MS-0142 and Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Reverse flow can be isolated by MS-0143 closing 1-ilV-2452-1 & -2 or by closing manual valve. IMS-0680 Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Fail to close is the important thru failure mode of valves 1-PV-1MS-0687 2325 thru-2328. Valve will close on loss of air. 2MS-0663 Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Fail to close is the important thru failure mode of valves 2-PV-2MS-0665 & 2325 thru 2-PV-2328. Valve 2MS-0667 will close on loss of air. thru 2MS-0670 Table 4.4-1 Page 19
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EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR MAIN STEAM SYSTEM Revision 0 - TABLE 4.4-1 (MS) Page ISto of A95 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panet Basis Compensatory Actions Comments Category Disposition PV-2325, Low for fails Ifigh IPE basis for fails to NA Moderate RAW for IPE and sig-PV-2326, to open close changed because nificance to a potentially large PV-2327, & recovery actions were but late release is not PV-2328 Low with not credited in the IPE. appropriate because block moderate valves could be used to isolate RAW for IPEEE Fire basis the steam geperator tube fails to close confirmed. rupture. Recovery actions were not credited in the IPE. Applies Iligh for Fire to both accident prevention and containment isolation. IIV-2333 A, Low for IPE basis confirmed. No compensatory acisen Compensatory action for llV-2334A, accident Moderate RAW is required by expert panel. accident mitigation (potentially llV-2335A, prevention conservative. See comments. large,but late release) not and with required because leak path can IIV-2336A moderate Accident mitigation be isolated after a steam RAW. basis confirmed. generator tube rupture. RAW is conservative because recovery Low for actions were not credited in the accident IPE(either before or after core mitigation. damage). Table 4.4-1 Page 20
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR MAIN STEAM SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (MS) Page 187 of 295 Component . -IPE Risk _ _ Panel Decision /. Panel Basis Compensatory Actions Comments Category . Disposition - IIV-2397 & Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA IIV-2397A, IIV-2398 & Accident mitigation llV-2398A, basis confirmed. IIV-2399 & ilV-2399A, , and ilV-2400 & ilV-2400A IIV-2409 thru Low for Low, but com- IPE basis confirmed. Stroked on slave relay tests IPE modeled only the valve on IIV-2412 accident pensatory action (for -2409 relays K634A & - the SG assumed to have tube prevention required for acci- Accident mitigation B in OPTS 456A and 479A). rupture (1-ilV-2409). Results dent mitigation basis confirmed. for other valves should be Low for (i.e., potentially similar. accident large but late re-mitigation lease because of containment iso-lation failure after tube rupture). Table 4.4-1 Page 21 w
s EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR MAIN STEAM SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (MS) Page lff of 295 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / . Panet Basis Compensatory Actions . Comments Category Disposition llV-2452-1 & Low for Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Compensatory action for ilV-2452-2 accident accident mitigation (potentially prevention Accident mitigation large but late release) not basis confirmed. required because leak path can Low for be isolated after steam generator accident tube rupture, Recovery action mitigation to isolate generator not credited by IPE(either before or after core damage). Table 4.4-1 Page 22
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)
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR PUMPS Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (PUMPS) Page 189 of 495 Component IPE Risk Panel Panet Basis Compensatory Action Comments Category Decision / Disposition liigh pumps (other liigh liigh IPE basis confirmed NA Safety chilled water recirc pump than diesel fuel oil 1-06 was upgraded from low to pumps) medium due to symmetry with CPI-AFAPMD-01, pump 1-05. That is,1-06 CPI-AFAPMD-02, performed a similar function and CP2-AFAPMD-01, experienced a similar duty cycle. CP2-AFAPMD-02, Its low ranking resulted from a CPI-AFAPTD-01. simplifying modeling CP2-AFAPTD-01, assumption in the IPE. CPI-CCAPCC-01, CPI-CCAPCC-02, CP2-CCAPCC-0l, CP2-CCAPCC-02, cpl-CIIAPCP-05, CPI-ClIAPCP-06, CP2-CllAPCP-05, CP2-CIIAPCP-06, TBX-CSAPCil-01, TBX-CSAPCll-02, TCX-CSAPCil-01, TCX-CSAPCil-02, TBX-RilAPRil-01, TBX-RilAPRil-02, TCX-RIIAPRil-01, TCX-RilAPRil-02, TBX-SIAPSI-01, TBX-SIAPSI-02. Table 4.4-1 Page 23
l EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR PUMPS Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (PUMPS) Page l90 of .445 Component IPE Risk Panet Panet Basis Compensatory Action Comments Category Decision / Disposition Diesel fuel oil Low, but Low PE basis confirmed Monthly tech spec pump run. pumps moderate (4.8.1.1.2 3) cpi-DOAPFT-01, RAW Modente RAW with CPI-DOAPIT-02, compensabry action CPI-DOAPFT-03, , CPI-DOAPFT-04, CP2-DOAPFT-01, CP2-DOAPFT-02, CP2-DOAPFT-03 and CP2-DOAPFT-04 CT pumps Low liigh IPE basis confirmed. NA CPI-CTAPCS-01, CPI-CTAPCS-02, Retain in program CPI-CTAPCS-03, because IST CPI-CTAPCS-04, evaluates pump CP2-CTAPCS-01, vibration and system CP2-CTAPCS-02, has experienced CP2-CTAPCS-03 vibration problems. and CP2-CTAPCS-04 Table 4.4-1 Page 24
i EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR PUMPS Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (PUMPS) Page 14 l of 295 Component IPE Risk Panet Panel Basis Compensatory Action Comments Category Decision / Disposition BAT pumps Low liigh IPE basis confirmed. NA BAT pump degradation is TBX-CSAPBA-01, caused by steady and gradual TBX-CSAPBA-02, Retain in program to wear of the carbon bearings TCX-CSAPBA-01 help maintain . which requires action at least as and reliability of the frequently as,that required by TCX-CSAPBA-02 pump for normal IST. operations. Pump degradation does not result in pump failure per the IPE definition. Hat is, when IST program enters into alert due to pump degradation, the pump will still perform its safety function for emergency boration. Reactor makeup Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA cpl-DDAPRM-01, CPX-DDAPRM-01 and CP2-DDAPRM-01 Table 4.4-1 Page 25
)
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR PUMPS Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (PUMPS) Page 191 of 295 Component I IPE Risk Panei Panel Basis Compensatory Action Comments Category Decision / Disposition Safeguards sump Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Pumps are only for detection of pumps flooding. Long time to failure CPI-WPAPSS-01, and li.nited impact from leaks. CPI-WPAPSS-02, CPI-WPAPSS-03, , CPI-WPAPSS-04, CP2-WPAPSS-01, CP2-WPAPSS-02, CP2-WPAPSS-03, and CP2-WPAPSS-04, Spent fuel pumps Low liigh Retain in program as NA Recovery to prevent core CPX-SFAPSF-01 is due to risk of damage is relatively easy by and boiling in pool. using fire water. Boiling is more CPX-SFAPSF-02 likely, but will only lead to release of noble gases (i.e., a so-called gap release). l Table 4.4-1 Page 26
~
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (RC) Page (93 of 295 Component - IPE Risk - Panel Decision / . Panel Basit Compensatory Action Comments Category Disposition liigh risk liigh liigh IPE basis confirmed. NA Note that these valves are high category regardless of the contribution of valves: CCF. 8000A & B, 8010A, B & C, , PCV-0455A PCV-0456 Table 4.4-1 Page 27
)
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR RESIDUAL IIEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (RII) Page 19t/ of A95 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panet Basis Compensatory Action Coniments Category Disposition fligh risk liigh fligh IPE basis confirmed. NA Note that these valves are high category solely because of common cause valves: failure (CCF). 8716A & B llCV-0606 liigh for liigh IPE basis confirmed. NA and outage , llCV-0607 FCV-0610 liigh for fire liigh IPE basis confirmed. NA and FCV-0611 Fire basis confirmed. FCV-0618 Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA and FCV-0619 8701 A & B Iligh for Iligh IPE basis confirmed. NA and 8702A & accident B mitigation Accident mitigation basis confirmed. 8708A & B Low liigh IPE basis confirmed. NA Retain test due to insurance and liability concerns. 8717 liigh for liigh IPE basis confirmed. NA accident mitigation Accident mitigation basis confirmed. 8730A & B Low Low IPE basis confirmed NA Reverse flow will not affect redundant trains. Table 4.4-1 Page 28
T l EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 , FOR SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM - Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (SI) Page l45 of 295 Component IPE Risk Panet Decision / Panet Basis Compensatory Action Comments . Category Disposition liigh risk liigh liigh IPE basis confirmed. NA Note that, except for ISI-0047 category and 1-8840, these valves are high valves: solely because of common cause 1SI-0047 and failure (CCF).- 1-8840 plus 8804A & B, - , 8809A & B, 8811 A & B, 8812A & B,- 8813,and 8814A & B 8801A & B Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA 8802A & B Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA 8806 liigh for fire fligh Fire and accident NA and accident mitigation basis mitigation confirmed. IPE basis confirmed. 8807A & B Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA 8808A thru Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA D 8815 Iligh for fire High Fire and accident NA and accident mitigation basis mitigation confirmed. IPE basis confirmed. 4 Table 4.4-1 Page 29
\
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (SI) Page /% of 295 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory Action Comments Category Disposition 8818A thru Ifigh fligh IPE basis confirmed. NA D Accident mitigation basis confirmed. SI-8819A liigh Iligh IPE basis confirmed. NA l thru D Accident mitigation basis confirmed. , 8821A & B Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA 8835 Iligh for fire liigh Fire basis confirmed. NA IPE basis confirmed. 8841 A & B Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA 8875A thru Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA D 8877A thru Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA D 8878A thru Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA D SI-8900A Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA thru D SI-8905A Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA thru D SI-8919A & liigh for Iligh IPE basis confirmed. NA Reverse flow will not affect B accident redundant trains. mitigation Accident mitigation basis confirmed. i I i l Table 4.4-1 Page 30 l i
, .t EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (SI) Page /91 of MS Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panel Basis . Compensatory Action Comments Category Disposition 8922A & B Low Low IPE basis confirmed. IST pump operability test. Reverse flow will not affect redundant trains.
Compensatory action added due to results on intra-system common-cause failure. 8923A & B liigh for fire liigh Fire and accident NA and accident mitigation basis mitigation confirmed. IPE basis confirmed. 8924 Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA 8926 liigh for liigh Accident mitigation NA accident basis confirmed. mitigation. IPE basis confirmed. 8948A thru liigh for liigh IPE basis confirmed. NA Regardless of ranking, leave in D accident program because of operational mitigation Accident mitigation concerns. Back leakage can basis confirmed. cause entry into tech spec LCO. 8949A thru Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA D Table 4.4-1 Page 31
]
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (SI) Page /98 of MS Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panet Basis. Compensatory Action :. Comments ' Category Disposition 8956A thru Low High IPE basis confirmed. NA D Leave in program , because of operational concerns. Back leakage can , cause entry into tech spec LCO. 8958A & B Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Reverse flow not important because redundant trains are not affected and backflow to the RWST can be prevented by closing 1-8812. 8969A & B Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA Table 4.4-1 Page 32
4 EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES ER-EA-009 FOR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-1 (SW) Page /99 of 'M5 Component IPE Risk Panel Decision / Panel Basis _ Compensatory Action . Coniments s Category - Disposition - - liigh risk fligh liigh IPE basis confirmed. NA Note that these valves are high category regardless of the contribution of valves: CCF. IIV-4286 & IIV-4287 and SW-0373 & SW-0374 IIV-4393 & Low Low IPE basis confirmed. NA IIV-4394 Table 4.4-1 Page 33
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Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 l Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - AFW System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (AF) Page Roo of J95 Component tl }ISR fanel Decision /j PanelBasisW - :
- Comments g y ._
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AF-0009 Non-Safety Low Low probability of NA Makeup AFW system Line failure. Failure Isolation requires line break, reverse flow in AF-0009, LV-2478 fails to close and SW backup not available. AF-0042, APN Low Moderate RAW Locked valve program Similar in consequence to AF-0055 and Flowpath with compensatory valve with low FV and AF-0067 Boundary measure. Failure of moderate RAW, e.g., AF- - these valves would 0038. fail train. Table 4.4-2 Page 1 i t
-,,r -- - - --, ,-----.- - - - , ,-e ,,,, -- . . , - - - - - , - - - - - , , - - - - , - - - - - .-,-,--v - -------n--- , , - - . - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - , . - - - - -n . . , . - - - , .,. ...n.-
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - AFW System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (AF) Page doi of 395 Component; ,ISTg : Panel Decision /: Panel Basis? Compensatory Actioni Commentsa P Functions ( .. .Dispositioni not modeled -
~ explicitly:ini s c
the IPE' AF-0075, AFW Low Two check valves NA Steam binding is modeled in AF-0078, Flowpath prevent flow the IPE, but IST tests for AF-0083, Boundary diversion, e.g., also reverse flow'ofliquid, not AF-0086, AF-0038 on TD steam. Valve performance for AF-0093, pump train. steam binding is monitored AF-0098, shiftly per procedure OWI-AF-0101 and 104. AF-0106 AF-0075, AFW Line Low Design prevents NA AF-0078, Break complete failure of AF-0083, Mitigation / FW even if these AF-0086, valves fail. Line AF-0093, break is an unlikely AF-0098, cause of single train AF-0101 and failure. AF-0106 l 1 Table 4.4-2 Page 2 l l
l Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - AFW System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (AF) Page 101 of .24 5 Componentt
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' ' ~ ~ "'~
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explicitlyint x the IPE ! - , AF-0075, FW Low Will not startup in NA AF-0078, Backflow this condition, AF-0083, Prevention therefore, not a core AF-0086, During damage prevention AF-0093, Startup function. AF-0098, AF-0101 and AF-0106 AF-0167 Pump 11igh Failure could affect NA Miniflow operation of Path redundant trains for a period of time. AF-0232, - Safety- Low Same as modeled NA 0233,-0234 Related Air components HV-l and -0235 Accumulato 2452-1 and -2. r to Non-Safety Air Supply Isolation Table 4.4-2 Page 3
. = _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ . . _ _ - , _ . _ _ _ _ _
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - AFW System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (AF) Page 203 of 245 Components JST9 ,. Panel Decision /i Panel Basist ;CPMx s Comments} ,
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N '< ^ -T PV-2453A, AFW to Low Backup capability NA PV-2453B, Faulted SG available in HV- ; PV-2454A Flow 2491B, -2492B, - and- Isolation 2493A and -2494A f PV-2454B respectively. IIV-2459, AFW to Low Backup capability NA , IIV-2460, Faulted SG available in IIV- , IIV-2461 and Flow 2491 A, -2492A, - IIV-2462 Isolation 2493B and -2494B - respectively. FV-2456 and Pump Low Same as moderate IST pump test Fails only one pump train. FV-2457 Miniflow RAW with Similarin consequence to Path compensatory valve with low FV and measure. moderate RAW, e.g., AF-0038. FV-2456 and AFW Low Same as moderate IST pump test Fails only one pump train. FV-2457 Flowpath RAW with Similar in consequence to - Boundary compensatory valve with low FV and measure. moderate RAW, e.g., AF-0038. b Table 4.4-2 Page 4
.\
i Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - AFW System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (AF) Page 30t/ of 495 Components ISTd Panel Decision /s Panel Basis / : Compensatory Action ( Commentsr 4~ , Functions : DispositionL " ', < ~,
- 'not mbdelAll explicitly in ~ ,
the IPEi '. LV-2478 Non-Safety Low Low probability of NA Makeup AFW system Line failure. Failure Isolation requires line break, reverse flow in AF-0009, LV-2478 fails to close and SW backup not available. IIV-2480 and AFW Pump Low Flowpath is backup Failure equivalent to AF-0014 IIV-2481 Emergency to a reliable path, and -0024 respectively. Supply Flowpath IIV-2482 AFW Pump Low Flowpath is not i Emergency available when TD j Supply pump is most Flowpath needed, e.g., SBO. At other times the i flowpath is a backup to a reliable path. l Table 4.4-2 Page 5 l
i Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions - ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - AFW System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (AF) Page 205 of A'IS Components ISTE Panel Decision /j- Panel Basisj Compensatory Actioni
~ ' ' ' ' '
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IIV-2484 and Condensate Low Low probability of NA IIV-2485 System to AFW system Condensate failure. Ifexcessive Storage condensate reject Tank occurs, both valves Isolation to must fail to close Preclude before the CST Tank mptures, and SW Overpressur backup must fail. ization llV-2491 A, AFW to Low Backup capability NA IIV-2492A, Faulted SG available in HV-IIV-2493B Flow 2459,-2460,-2461 and Isolation and -2462 IIV-2494B respectively. IIV-2491 B, AFW to Low Backup capability NA HV-2492B, Faulted SG available in PV-IIV-2493A Flow 2453A, -2453 B, - and Isolation 2454A and -2454B IIV-2494A respectively. Table 4.4-2 Page 6
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions - ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - CCW System Revision 0 , TABLE 4.4-2 (CC) Page .20e of 295 i Component; 1ST& Panel Decision / : Panel Basis -
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i l l Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 l l Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - CCW System Revision 0 l TABLE 4.4-2 (CC) Page 209 of R95 ComponentH IST( , Panet Decision / Panel Basis ? g; Compensatory Action.3 Commments; Functions notj ' Disposition L. l ' modeled ? -
; explicitly inJ .,; < -
the IPE FV-4650A & Non-Safety Low When needed, other NA B Flowpath means ofisolation. Isolation , (Ventilation Chillers, Letdown Chiller) IIV-4696 Containment Low Accident mitigation NA Retain leak testing per Isolation basis confirmed. perfon.iance based Appendix J program IIV-4696 RCP Thermal Low Accident mitigation NA Not modeled in IPE, but covered Barrier basis confirmed. by previous expert panel notes. Rupture Isolation llV-4699 Passive Pipe Low Accident mitigation NA Not modeled in IPE, but covered Break basis confirmed. by previous expert panel notes. Isolation (inside Containment) llV-4700 Containment Low Accident mitigation NA Retain leak testing per Isolation basis confirmed. performance based Appendix J program Table 4.4-2 Page 10
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - CCW System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (CC) Page 2IO of J45 Component 7 IST-t Panel. Decision /t Panet Basis Cosapensatory Action? , Cosmotests J
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64 * ' ilV-4700 Passive Pipe Low Accident mitigation NA Not modeled in IPE, but covered Break Iso- basis confirmed. by previous expert panel notes. lation (inside , Containment) IIV-4701 & Containment Low Accident mitigation NA Retain leak testing per ilV-4708 Isolation basis confirmed. performance based Appendix J program IIV-4709 Containment Low Accident mitigation NA Retain leak testing per Isolation basis confirmed. performance based Appendix J program IIV-4709 RCP Thermal Low Accident mitigation NA Not modeled in IPE, but covered Barrier basis confirmed. by previous expert panel notes. ; Rupture Isolation llV-4710 & Containment Low Accident mitigation NA Retain leak testing per ( IIV-4711 Isolation basis confirmed. performance based Appendix J program IIV-4725 & Containment liigh for accident Accident mitigation NA IIV-4726 Isolation mitigation basis confirmed. Table 4.4-2 Page 11
l Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Chilled Water System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (CH) Page .2iI of M5 Pamel Decision / Consments '
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~s ER Cll-0300 Surge Tank Low Not likely to be NA Makeup occurs between once l Emergency needed during an every week and month. Two Makeup accident. Ifneeded, makeup soure,es available are -
Flowpath redundant sources Reactor Makeup Water and available. Demineralized Water. Cil-0301 Surge Tank . Low Not likely to be NA Makeup occurs between once Emergency needed during an every week and month. Two Makeup accident. If needed, makeup sources available are Flowpath redundant sources Reactor Makeup Water and Boundary available. Demineralized Water. Cll-0302 Surge Tank Low Not likely to be NA Makeup occurs between once Emergency needed during an every week and month. Two Makeup accident. If needed, makeup sources available are Flowpath/ redundant sources Reactor Makeup Water and - Isolation available. Demineralized Water. Cil-0305 Surge Tank Low Not likely to be NA Makeup occurs between once Emergency needed during an every week and month. Two Makeup accident. If needed, makeup sources available are Flowpath/ redundant sources Reactor Makeup Water and Isolation available. Demineralized Water. t i ilV-6720 Surge Tank Low Not likely to be NA Makeup occurs between once Emergency needed during an every week and month. Two Makeup accident. If needed, makeup sources available are Flowpath redundant sources Reactor Makeup Water and Boundary available. Demineralized Water. Table 4.4-2 Page 12
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Expert Panet Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - CVCS System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (CS) Page Al3 of 395 Cosapement ISTr Panel- . Panet Basisy Compensatory Acties Comanseats; '.
' ~
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Functions: Decision /i , w not isodildd Disposition:
~
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~
pp , theIPEi "/ , LCV-0459 & Reactor liigh Needed for NA LCV-0460 Coolant preventing a small Pressure LOCA path after - Boundary closure of downstream containment isolation valve. 8100 & 8105 Containment Low Accident mitigation NA Retain leak testing per performance Isolation basis confirmed. based Appendix J program 8109 ECCS Low Diversion path to Flowpath CCPs protected by Boundary check valves. PDP path rarely open. 8112 Containment Low Accident mitigation NA Retain leak testing per performance Isolation basis confirmcd. based Appendix J program 8145 Reactor Low Probability of t mall NA Valve is normally closed and fails Coolant LOCA is much closed. Upstream check valve also Pressure lower than other prevents LOCA. Boundary sources, e.g., RCP . seal failure. l l Table 4.4-2 Page t4 1 1
/
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE- CVCS System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (CS) Page QIV of 295 Component: IST : Panet Basis t Compensatory Action .Comunents ; ; P.amel u.. _ , Functions ! Decision /l - i@ 'j " s
- E '
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. - ~' m 8152 and Containment liigh for Accident mitigation NA 8160 Isolation accident basis confirmed.
mitigation 8153,8154 Reactor Low Probability of small NA These valves are in series and both Coolant LOCA is much are normally closed and fait closed. Pressure lower than other Boundary sources, e.g., RCP seal failure. CS-8180 Containment Low Accident mitigation NA To cause a release path to the Penetration basis confirmed. environment, this type ofcheck Thermal valve must fail open in conjunction Relief /Contai with a pipe break inside nment containment and a containment Isolation isolation valve failure outside the t containment boundary. 0
i Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - CVCS System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (CS) Page 3(5 of.995 Component s IST/ Panel: Panet Basis l _ Conapensatory. Action .Comunentsf Functions Decisiod -
,s not'modeled Dispositan ? e explicitlyjin? ~ .J ,
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4** theIPEJ . - - - 8202A & B ECCS Low Low probability of NA The PDP is not normally used. and 8210A & Flowpath failure whether When the PDP is not used,2 or 3 B Boundary PDP is operating or valves in series must fail. Each not. valve is normally closed and fails closed. If the PDP is operating, the valves are open. In this case, the VCT level switch must fail and the charging pumps must draw in cover gases and fait prior to operator intervention. The PDP would fail prior to charging and it would be diagnosable and an warning of the potential for charging pump failure. ,_ Table 4.4-2 Page 16 t
1 i E2 pert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions liR-l: A-tW r> l Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - CVCS System Revision 0 l TABLE 4.4-2 (CS) Page 9f(o of 195 i Component, .ISTc Panel .Panet Basis e Compensatory Action , Comments? ,
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cg s We'IPEJ * " ' 8202A & B Isolation of Low Low probability of NA The PDP is not normally used. and 8210A & VCT Cover failure whether When the PDP is not used,2 or 3 B Gas (or PD PDP is operating or valves in series must fail. Each Pump not. valve is normally closed and fails - Suction closed. Stabilizer . If the PDP is operating, the valves Gas Supply) , are open. De VCT level switch from must fait and the charging pumps Charging must draw in cover gases and fail Pumps' prior to operatorintervention. The Suction " PDP would fail prior to charging i lleader - and it would be diagnosable and an warning of the potential for charging pump failure. CS-8350A, Reactor Low Probability of small NA LOCAs need a pipe break, multiple CS-8350B, Coolant LOCA is much CVs failing to close, and failure to CS-8350C & Pressure lower than other isolate (by closing 8351 A). CS-8350D Boundary sources, e.g., RCP seal failure. Table 4.4-2 Page 17
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the 1PE - CVCS System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (CS) Page 917 of M5 Componentj IST;- Panel ? Panet Basis Compensatory Action ComamentsE ' g .- Functions .Decisies/1 , i^ ?' l, ' la 1..
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the IPE s - 8351A, Containment Low Probability of NA Containmeat isolation failure needs 8351B, Isolation containment a pipe break, multiple CVs failing 8351C & isolation is much to close, and failure to isolate (by 8351D lower than other closing 8351 A). sources. CS-8367A, Reactor Low Probability of small NA LOCAs need a pipe break, multiple CS-8367B, Coolant LOCA is much CVs failing to close, and failure to CS-8367C & Pressure lower than other isolate (by closing 8351 A). CS-8367D Boundary sources, e.g., RCP seal failure. CS-8368A, Containment Low Probability of NA Containment isolation failure needs CS-8368B, Isolation containment a pipe break, multiple CVs failing CS-8368C & isolation is much to close, and failure to isolate (by CS-8368D lown than other closing 8351 A). sources. CS-8377 Reactor Low Probability of small NA Upstream valve (8145)is nonnally Coolant LOCA is much closed and fails closed. Pressure lower than other Boundary sources, e.g., RCP seal failure. l Table 4.4-2 Page 18
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 ' Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - CVCS System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (CS) Page at8 of A95 Component ; IST; Panel ~ Panel Basis 3 . Compensatory _ Active Comments; ^
~
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8378A & Reactor Low Probability of small NA Two other CVs in series (including 8378B Coolant LOCA is much 8381). Easily diagnosable if Pressure lower than other reverse flow occurs and leak path is Boundary sources, e.g., RCP isolable by closing 8105 or 8106. seal failure. 8378A & Boration Low Normal boration NA 8378B Flowpath function not needed for core damage i prevention. 8379A & Boration Low Normal boration NA 8379B Flowpath function not needed for core damage prevention. 8379A & Reactor Low Probability ofsmall NA Upstream valve (8147)is normally 8379B Coolant LOCA is much closed and two other CVs in series Pressure lower than other (including 8381). Easily diagnos-Boundary sources, e.g., RCP able ifreverse flow occurs and leak seal failure. path is iso!able by closing 8105 or 8106. , Table 4.4-2 Page 19
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Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - CVCS System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (CS) Page 214 of FI5 Component . IST . Panel; . Panet Basis : Conspensatory Action Comments:s m Functions; Decision /' . c. .. not modeled - Disposition: +
, , a:
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CS-8473 & Boration Low Reverse flow does NA CS-8487 Flowpath not cause failure of Boundary redundant trains. . CS-8480A & ECCS Low Not functionally NA Valve failure only causes a loss of ' CS-8480B Flowpath required chemistry control; flow which is Boundary not significant during accident. 8481A & Horation Low Normal boration NA 8481B Flowpath function not needed for core damage prevention 8510A & lillSI Pump Low Minillow path not NA 8510B Minillow needed to protect Path pump. 8510A & ECCS Low Flow diversion NA Diversion path isolable by either of 8510B Recirculation affects only one two valves. Flowpath train and is easily Boundary recoverable. Table 4.4-2 Page 20
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - DD System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (DD) Page 3M of #95 Component: .IST : Panet Panet Basis.; Compensatory Acties Counmentsi Decision /L:
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9?u all valves in all Low Makeup is unlikely NA DD to be needed in an accident. Ifneeded, . many alternatives are available. Table 4.4-2 Page 21
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions liR-l?A.tHN Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE- Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Resision U TABLE 4.4-2 (DO) Page 221 of 395 Component . IST Functions . Panel Decision / Panel Basis Compensatory.: Action . Comments :
- N not modeled Disposition . ..
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~
W ' w~' DO-0004, Fuel Oil Low Reverse flow not a NA DO-0005, Flowpath concern because of DO-0016 & Doundary pump design. DO-0017 DO-0058, Safety-Related Low Low probability of NA Two CV s in series must fail to DO-0059, Air Receiver to air loss. remain closed to fail one air receiver. DO-0060 & Non-Safety Air Two air receivers must fail to fail DG DO-0061 Supply starting air for one diesel. Isolation I DO-0062, Safety-Related Low Low probability of NA Two CV s in series must fail to I DO-0063, Air Receiver to air loss. remain closed to fail one air receiver. 1D 0-0064 & Non-Safety Air Two air receivers must fail to fail DG 1 DO-0065 Supply starting air for one diesel. and Isolation 2DO-0074, 2DO-0075, 2DO-0076 & 2DO-0077 DO-0104 & Jacket Water Low insufIicient flow NA Boundary to one inch diversion on a DO-0204 Flowpath diversion six inch line. No mass loss since Boundary diversion returned to system. IX)-0107 & NA NA NA NA Valves are exempt from in-service DO-0207 testing per the IST plan. 1 I ( Table 4.4-2 Page 22 _- - _-__ -__ - - _- __-__-- __-__ _-_____ _ __________________ - _ - ___ - _ ___ _ = . .- - - - - .
y s Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (DO) Page 221 of 295 - DO-0157 & Lube Oil Low, but implicit basis in IPE Monthly tech spec diesel DO-0257 Flowpath moderate RAW confirmed. test Equivalent to moderate RAW with compensatory measure. DO-0158 & Lube Oil Low, but implicit basis in IPE Monthly tech spec diesel . DO-0258 Flowpath moderate RAW confirmed. test Boundary Equivalent to moderate RAW with compensatory measure. Table 4.4-2 Page 23
. _ . - _ . . _ _ . . . _ . . . _ . _ . . . _ ~ . . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ .
i i Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions - . ER-EA-009 i Revision 0 ' Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Feedwater System ' TABLE 4.4-2 (FW) ' Page23 of 245 - 3 t Componeet; .ISTFunctions Pneet Decistos/ PanelBasisfy $empeesmeeryAction - Comuments pe sgggg ' .
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'- M MM FW-0070,- Main Feedline Low AFW is not affected.' NA FW-0076, Break Isolation Other means of .;
FW-0082 & isolating a main FW-0088 feedline break. , FW-0191, AFW Flowpath Low Low probability of NA. FW-0192, Boundary affecting AFW. Two FW-0193 & normally-closed FW-0194 valves upstream of .; the diversion path. IIV-2154 & Containment Low Accident mitigation NA ; ilV-2155 Isolation basis confirmed. FV-2181, AFW Flowpath Low AFW function not NA If valve fails open, AFW still goes FV-2182, Boundary affected. to the steam generator, but through FV-2183 & a different nozzle. .; PV-2184 ; IIV-2185, Feedwater Low Valve failure affects NA Valve is normally closed and inter- j ilV-2186, Isolation only one train of locked. Feedwater can be isolated - t IIV-2187 & AFW and is by other means including closing i liv-2188 recoverable. the manual isolation valve or .I tripping the MFW pumps. l IIV-2185, Containment Low Accident mitigation NA ilV-2186, Isolation basis confirmed.
- IIV-2187 &
l ilV-2188 ' i l 1 l Table 4.4-2 Page 24 i t
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Feedwater System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (FW) Page J24 of 395 Component: IST Fumetions-- Penet Decision / Panet Basis Compensatory Aetloa yn - Comaments :s s Disposition - J > * * - 1 not unodeled, - , . - explicitlyin:- * - '
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g as the IPEt - +K - ~ s - FV-2194 & Feedwater Low Valve failure alTects NA Valve is normally closed and inter-FV-2195 Isolation only one train of locked. Feedwater can be isolated AFW and is by other means including closing recoverable. the manualisolation valve or tripping the MiiW pumps. FV-2193, Containment Low Accident mitigation NA FV-2194, Isolation basis confirmed. FV-2195 & FV-2196 Table 4.4-2 Page 25
b Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE- Main Steam System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (MS) Page M5 of 395 Component IST Functions . Panel Decision / .Pamel Basis Compensatory Aeties ; Counments; , . , . 1^ not modeled J Dispositionj My . ?!
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N the IPE - - TDAFW Pump Low Flow diversion NA Need a faulted steam generator for MS-0142 & MS-0143 Steam Supply conditions unlikely flow diversion to be possible. If Flowpath and recoverable. reverse flow in CV occurs , Boundary diversion flow can be isolated by closing 245211 or -2. IIV-2333B, Containment Low, but implicit basis in IPE Locked valve program IIV-2334B, Isolation moderate RAW confirmed. IIV-2335B & Equivalent to low IIV-2336B RAW with compensatory measure. IIV-2333D, Steam Line Low, but Implicit basis in IPE Locked valve program IIV-2334B, Isolation moderate RAW confirmed. IIV-2335B & Equivalent to low IIV-233611 RAW with compensatory measure. IIV-2397, Containment Low Accident mitigation NA IIV-2398, Isolation basis confirmed. IIV-2399, and IIV-2400 Table 4.4-2 Page 26 - - - . _ - - - - - _ _ - - , - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ - - - . _ - - - - _ - - - . - - - - _ - _ _ _ ___ - _ - - - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - ' er '-:s- - - - - -
4Ja* C .% a 4 7 .- - - - - - Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions lilt-1:A-tm Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Main Steam System itevision u TABLE 4.4-2 (MS) Page 2% or 395 Componest . IST Fumettoes Panel Decision / Panel Basis Conspensatory Action g. Counments : . m met wwdeled Disposition t W ci , explicitly in ? , s,y s c' s se
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ilV-2397, llELB Low Low probability of NA Two valves m senes must both fail ilV-2397A, Isolation accident scenario open and remain open together liv-2398, and recoverable. with pipe break to cause llELB IIV-2398A, conditions.. IIV-2399, 1IV-2399A, IIV-2400 & IIV-2400A IIV-2397, AFW Flowpath Low AFW function not NA AFW goes to steam generator - IIV-2397A, Boundary afTected. regardless of failure. Failure can llV-2398, be recovered by closing another llV-2398A, valve. IIV-2399, IIV-2399A, iIV-2400 & ilV-2400A IIV-2401 A & AFW Flowpath Low Insufficient flow NA Failure also can be recovered by B, Boundary diversion. closing another valve. IIV-2402A & B, ilV-2403A & B, llV-2404A & B Table 4.4-2 Page 27
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Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Reactor Coolant System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (RC) Page 229 of J95 Consposeet. . IST Functions; Panet Decision / Pseel Basis _Conspensatory Acties -CommunestsJ - mot needeled; ' Disposition j s W . explieltlyin?
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RC-0036 Containment Low Accident mitigation NA Generally these thermal relief Penetration basis confirmed. valves relieve to the containment Thermal and do not provide a release path to Relief / Con- the environment. For the few that tainment relieve outsidetontainment, a pipe Isolation break inside containment must occur together with reliefvalve failure to cause a release path. Such a path is an insignificant contributor to large, early releases and not important for accident mitigation. SI-0166, Safety-Related liigh Operational NA Two CVs in series must fail to l SI-0167, Nitrogen concerns remain closed and the normally ; SI-0168 & Accumulator to isolated N2supply must be open. . SI-0169 Non-Safety j Nitrogen Supply , Isolation l IIV-3607, Post Accident Low Vent path is backup NA i IIV-3608, Vent Path to a reliable path. l IIV-3609 & . l 1IV-3610 I l l l l l Table 4.4-2 Page 29 {
. ~ _ . . .. Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Reactor Coolant System Revision 0 TABLE _4.4-2 (RC) Page .2M of M5 IIV-3607, Vent Path Low Low probability of NA Two normally closed fails closed IIV-3608, Isolation failure and within valves in series. IIV-3609 & normal charging IIV-3610 capability. 8026,8027, Containment Low Accident mitigation NA 8046 & 8047 Isolation basis confirmed. I f Table 4.4-2 Page 30
. ~ _ _ _ . , ~ _ _, _ _ . .
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Residual llent Removal System . . Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (Ril) Page #30 of 245 Consponent < IST Functions ?seel Decision /, Panet Basis Compensatory Actical Comumentsf'N @
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l / ' 2 '; ' N' ilV-4178, RilR System Lew Insufficient flow NA EITects limited to a single train. IIV-4179 and to Non-Safety diversion. Also isolable downstream by llV-4182 Process manual valve. Sampling System Isolation Table 4.4-2 Page 31 a~.- , ---_> --___. _
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions liR-l:A-tHN Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Safety Injection System Revision il TABLE 4.4-2 (SI) Page 23I of 295 Component . IST Functions . Panel Decision /. Panel Basis; Counpensatory Actioni ;Communents ? :
,g p. ; w ,
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~s SI-0182 & 8811 A Ilonnet liigh Operational NA SI-0183 Overpressure concerns.
Relief / Contain-ment Isolation 8800A & RWST to Non- Low Low probability of NA Two valves in' series must fail and 88000 Safety flow diversion. other means ofisolation are Purification available. System Isolation 8801A & Containment Low Accident mitigation NA 880iB Isolation basis confirmed. 8801A & Passive Pipe Low Low probability of NA Scenario requires pipe break plus 880lB Break Isolation accident scenario. reverse flow in two CVs. 8802A & Containment Low Accident mitigation NA 8802B Isolation basis confirmed. 8802A & Passive Pipe Low Low probability of NA Scenario requires pipe break plus 8802B Break Isolation accident scenario. reverse flow in at least two CVs. 8821A & Passive Pipe Low Low probability of NA Pipe break must occur together 8821B Break isolation either SI system with another MOV or CV failure. failure or accident scenario. 8823,8824 & Containment Low Accident mitigation NA 8825 Isolation basis confirmed. 8823 and ECCS Flowpath Low Insuflicient flow NA 8824 Boundary diversion Table 4.4-2 Page 32
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Safety Injection System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (SI) Page 23:2 of MS Componeet, IST Functions Panet Deelsion/g Pseel Basis .Conspensatory Aestem .Comunents; ~
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- x 8843 Containment Low Accident mitigation NA isolation basis confirmed.
8843 Flowpath Iow Insumcient flow NA Boundary diversion 8871 Containment Low Accident mitigation NA lsolation basis confirmed. 8879A, ECCS Flowpath Low Insumcient flow NA 8879B, Boundary diversion 8879C & 8879D 8580 Containment Low Accident mitigation NA isolation basis confirmed. 8881 & 8888 Containment Low Accident mitigation NA Isolation basis confirmed. 8881,8882 ECCS Flowpath Low Insumcient flow NA and 8888 Boundary diversion 8889A, ECCS Flowpath Low Insumcient flow NA 8889B, Boundary diversion 8889C & 8889D I Table 4.4-2 Page 33
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Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Safety Injection System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (SI) Page J3V of MS Component : IST Functions -:. Panet Decision /c Panet Basis; Cesapensatory ActionL Comuments r ,
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1S1-8972 Containment Low Accident mitigation NA Generally these thermal relief and Penetration basis confirmed. valves relieve to the containment 2SI-8983 Thermal and do not provide a release path Relief / Con- to the environment. For the few tainment that relieve otitside containment, Isolation a pipe break inside containment must occur together with relief valve failure to cause a release path. Such a path is an insignificant contributor to large, early releases and not important for accident mitigation. Table 4.4-2 Page 35
Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE- Service Water System Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (SW) Page135 of 395 Component; IST Func- . Panet Decision /; Panel. Basis: Conspensatory Action "
~
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IIV-4395 & AFW Pump Low Flowpath is NA Failure equivalent to AF-0014 IIV-4396 Emergency backup to a and AF-0024 respectively. Supply reliable path. . Flowpath SWVAVB-01, Vent Path (for Iligh Water hammer NA SWVAVB-02, water hammer can afTect SWVAVB-03 prevention)/ redundant and Flowpath trains SWVAVB-04 Boundary l Table 4.4-2 Page 36 .
i Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions I R-l:A-INW Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Ventilation (Control Room AC) System Resision o TABLE 4.4-2 (VA) Page 23/o of 295 Component IST Func Panet Decision /f Panel Basis, Compensatory Action
.Commentsi tiens not; Disposition ; '
y ^ modeled .
~x explicitly in~- '
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~
ICl-0644, Safety- liigh Important for NA Valves provide air for ICI-0645, Related Air maintaining operating Control Room iCl-0646 and Accumulator control room dampers on Control Room 1Cl-0647 to Non-Safety environment IIVAC. CR environment Air Supply important for electronics and Isolation habitability. Table 4.4-2 Page 37
.- .- - . . - - . . _ . -= __ Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009 Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Vents and Drains Revision 0 TABLE 4.4-2 (VD) Page A37 of 395 Componenti IST Functions Panet . Panel Basis) Compensatory Action Comments j -
~
~
set modeled: Decision / n : ' Ay s explicitly ini Disposition 1 [- g -~ o % ~ theIPE: < - VD-0003, Sump Low Long time to NA VD-0004, Discharge failure and VD-0011 & Flowpath limited impact VD-0012 from leaks. . VD-0003, Sump Low Long time to NA VD-0004, Discharge failure and VD-0011 & Flowpath limited impact VD-0012 Boundary from leaks. IVD-0907 & Containment Low Accident NA Generally these thermal relief 2VD-0896 Penetration mitigation valves relieve to the containment Thermal basis and do not provide a release path to Relief / Con- confirmed. the environment. For the few that i tainment relieve outside containment, a pipe isolation break inside containment must occur together with reliefvalve failure to cause a release path. Such a path is an insignificant contributor to large, early releases and not important for accident mitigation. Table 4.4-2 Page 38
l i Expert Panel Meeting Minutes for Component Functions ER-EA-009
. Not Explicitly Modeled by the IPE - Vents and Drains Revision 0 l TABLE 4.4-2 (VD) Page 239 of 395 l
Component c- IST Functions! Panel: Panel Basis;l Compensatory Action ; Comments);;
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llV-5157 & Containment Iligh Accident NA IIV-5158 Isolation mitigation basis confirmed. . i i 4 Table 4.4-2 Page 39
r EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES - FOR HIGli RANK IPE COMPONENTS NOT IN THE EST PROGRAM ER-EA-009 TABLE 4.4-2a Revision 0 ' Page A3'l of 495 Comeponent IPE Risk . Panet Panet Basis Conepensatory Communents Category Decision / Actions Disposition , Allinstrument air relief Iligh Iligh IPE basis EquivelentIST _ An evaluation will be valves not protected by confirmed, but relief test stratagy performed to determine the check valves that can see comments (Proposed) appropriate equivelent IST depressurize the regarding compensatory acti9ns for the common header op6rator IPE failure mode (s). , recovery. (includes -0681, etc The IPE did not credit plus X-PSV-3475A, etc operator recovery by isolating
- the affected air line from the .;
system common header. AF-0006 and AF-0007 liigh liigh IPE basis No applicable in- Current plant programs are confirmed, but service test for adequate to maintain alow see comments normally open failure probability. regarding manual valves operator without remote Programs include the recovery. position indication. quarterly IST pump test which will verify position is open and either the locked valve program or position surveillances very 30 days per
~
technical specifications. ~ The IPE did not credit operator recovery by opening the valve ifit was left closed. Table 4.4-2a Page I _. ,_ _ ,. . ._ _- ~_ . . . _ - . __ _. ._ _ . . _ __
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES
- FOR HIGH RANK IPE COMPONENTS NOT IN THE IST PROGRAM ER-EA-009 '
- TABLE 4.4-2a Revmon 0 Page 240 of 245 Cesaponest - IPE Risk Panel Panel Bases Counpensatory - Cosmanents ?
Category - Decision / Actions , Disposition TV-2370A thru liigh Iligh IPE basis To be determined. An evaluation will be . TV-2370J confirmed. performed to determine the j appropriate compensatory actions for the IPE, failure
- mode (s).
i ! FCV-510 and liigh Iligh IPE basis To be determined. An evaluation will be FCV-540 confirmed. performed to determine the appropriate compensatory actions for the IPE failure I mode (s). FCV-520 and Low liigh IPE basis To be determined. 'Ihese valves are not as risk - FCV-530 confirmed. significant because they do not affect the steam supply These valves from steam generators 1 & 4 i added to ensure to the turbine driven AFW administrative pump. consistency. i l Table 4.4-2a Page 2
.- . . . -.- -. ~ .:
EXPERT PANEL MEETING MINUTES FOR IIIGli RANK IPE COMPONENTS NOT IN TIIE IST PROGRAM ER-EA-009 TABLE 4.4-2a Revision 0 Page_241 of 295 Component , IPE Risk Panel Panet Basis Compensatory Comments Category Decision / Actions Disposition 8341 liigh fligh IPE basis No applicable in- Current plant programs are confirmed, but service test for adequate to maintain a low see comments normally open failure probability. regarding manual valves , operator without remote Programs include the recovery. position indication. quarterly IST pump test which will verify position is open and either the locked valve program or position surveillances very 30 days per technical specifications.
'Ihe IPE did not credit operator recovery by opening the valve ifit was left closed.
{ \ l Table 4.4-2a Page 3
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Table 4.4-3 j' y'~~" Results of Expert Panel Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components Sorted By Tag Ranking' Final Ranking Component Description Changes Due To Based On IST NW Exped Panel Study 97126 LWPS RCDT 1-01 VNT HDR 1RC DNSTRM ISOL VLV Low Low 1 7135 LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRLYLV BYP VLV Low Low Rcdt Pump Descharge Control Valve No Change High 1-7136 LWPS RCDT 1-01 VNT HDR ORC ISOL VLV Low Low 1 7150 No Change High 1-8000A Przr 101 Porv 0455A Bik Viv No Change High 1-80008 Przr 1-01 Porv 0458 Bik Viv Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv A No Change High 1-8010A Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv 8 No Change High 140108 Przr 1-01 Sfty Viv C No Change High 1-8010C Low Low 1.anM PRT 1-01 VNT 1RC ISOL VLV PRT 1-01 k NT ORC ISOL VLV Low Low 8027 RMUW TO PRT 1-01 SPLY IRC CHK VLV Low Low 1-8046 RMUW TO PRT 1-01/CNTMT SPLY ORC ISOL VLV Low Low 1-8047 U1 Rcp St Wtr Ret isol Viv No Change -Low 1-8100 U1 Emer Borste viv - No Change Low 14104 US Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt Isol Viv No Change - Low 1-8105 U1 Chrg Pmp To RCS Cntmt isol Viv No Change Low 14106 Low Low 1-8109 PD CHRG PMP 1-01 RECIRC VLV Ccp 1-01/1-02 Onstrm f.1:niflow Viv No Change High 14110 Ccp 1-01/1-02 Upstrm Maniflow Viv No Change High 14111 U1 RC Pmp SealWtr Ret isol Viv No Change Low 14112 U1 Przr Aux Spr Viv No Change Low 1-8145 U1 RCS Loop 4 Chrg Viv No Change Low 14146 Low Low 94147 U1 RCS LOOP 1 CHRG VLV No Change High 14152 U1 LTDN CNTMT ORC ISOL VLV Low Low 94153 U1 XS LTDN ISOL VLV 8153 Low Low 14154 U1 XS LTDN ISOL VLV 8154 I No Change High 94160 U1 LTON CNTMT IRC ISOL VLV Low- Low l- 14202A PD CHRG PMP 1-01 SUCT STAB DNSTRM VNT VLV Low Low i 1-8202B PD CHRG PMP 1-01 SUCT STAB UPSTRM VNT VLV Low Low 9-8210A PD CHRG PMP 1-01 SUCT STAB H2/N2 SPLY VLV 8210A ; l- Low Low j 9-8210B PD CHRG PMP 1-01 SUCT STAB H2/N2 SPLY VLV 8210B . ' RC Pmp 1-01 SI Wtr inj Viv No Change Low [ 9-8351A RC Pmp 1-02 Si Wtr inj Viv No Change Low s ,, 9-83518 RC Pmp 1-03 SI Wtr inj Viv No Change Low l' 14351C RC Pmp 1-04 SI Wtr inj Viv No Change Low ; , 1-8351D RCS Loop 1-04 Chrg Onstrm Chk Viv No Change Low 1-8378A RCS Loop 1-04 Chrg Upstrm Chk Viv No Change Low ! 1-83788 Low Low 14379A RCS LOOP 1-01 CHRG LN DNSTRM CHK VLV Low Low i-
~
14379B RCS LOOP 1-01 CHRG LN UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 14381 Chrg Ln irc Chk Viv Ccp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No Change Low 14481 A - Ccp 1-02 Disch Chk Viv No Change Low 14481B 1-84g7 Pd Pmp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv % No Change Low CCP 1-01 ALT MINIFLO RLF VLV Low Low
- 14510A -
CCP 1-02 ALT MINIFLO RLF VLV Low Low f l ., 14510B Ccp 1-01 Alt Minsflo isol Viv - No Change High ? 14511 A No Change High Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo isol Viv 1-8511B Ccp 1-02 Alt Miniflo isol Viv No Change High 14512A L Ccp 1-01 Alt Miniflo isol Viv No Change High 14512B [ i Table 4.4 3 Page I s L
ER-EA-009 Revision 0
- Table 4.4-3 Results of Expert Panel Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components Sorted By Tag
* "9 "'I *" "9 Component Tag Component Description Changes Due To Based On IST Number Expert Panel Study Rwst 1-01 To Chrg Pmp Suct Chk Vlv No Change High b8548 RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Recirc Omb isol Viv No Change High 18701 A RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recire Omb isol Viv No Change High 1-8701 B RHR Pmp 1-01 HI 1-01 Reiere imb isol Viv No Change High 1-8702A RHR Pmp 1-02 HI 1-04 Recirc Imb isol Viv No Change High 1-8702B RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct Rif Viv No Change High 1-8708A RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct Rif Viv No Change High 1-8708B RHR Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv No Change High 1-8716A RHR Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv No Change High 1-87168 U1 RHR Pmps Disch To Rwst isol Viv No Change High 1-8717 No Change Low 1-8730A RHR Hx 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No Change Low 1-87308 RHR Hx 1-02 Disch Chk Viv Low Low 1-8800A RWST 1-01 TO SFPCS PMP DNSTRM DRN VLV Low Low 1-88000 RWST 1-01 TO SFPCS PMP UPSTRM DRN VLV Ccp 1-01/1-02 Si isol Viv 8801 A No Change Low 1-8801 A Ccp 1-01/1-02 Si isol Viv 88018 No Change Low 1-8801 B St Pmp 1-01 To HI 2 & 3 Inj lsol Viv No Cnange Low 1-8802A St Pmp 1-02 To HI 1 & 4 ini isol Viv No Change Low 1-88028 No Change High 1-8804A RHR Pmp 1-01 To Ccp Suct Viv RHR Pmp 1-02 To Si Pmps Suct Viv No Change High 1-88048 Rwst 1-01 To St Pmps Suct Viv No Change High 1-8806 No Change Low 1-8807A U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Viv 8807A No Change Low 18807B U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Viv 8807B No Change Low 1-Ba08A Si Accum 1-01 In) Viv No Change Low 1-88088 St Accum 1-02 in) Viv St Accum 1-03 Inj Viv No Change Low 1-8808C No Change Low 1-8808D SI Accum 1-04 ini Viv RHR To Cl 1-01/1-02 Inj isol Viv No Change High 1-8809A RHR To Cl 1-01/1-02 inj isol Viv No Change High 1-8809A No Change High 1-8809B RHR To Cl 1-03/1-04 in) Isol Viv No Change High 1-8809B RHR To Cl 1-03/1-04 In) Isot Vlv Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 1-01 Suct isol Viv No Change High 1-8811 A Cntmt Smp To RHR Pmp 1-02 Suct isol Viv No Change High 1-8811 B St Pmp 1-01/1-02 Miniflo Ret Viv No Change High 1-8813 Si Pmp 1-01 Miniflo Viv No Change High 1-8814A Si Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv No Change High 1-8814B Ccp 1-01/1-02 Inl Chk Viv No Change High 1-8815 RHR Cl 1-01 Inj Chk Viv No Change High 1-8818A No Change High 1-8818B RHR Cl 1-02 In) Chk Viv RHR Cl 1-03 inj Chk Vlv No Change High 1-8818C No Change High 1-8818D RHR Cl 1-04 Inl Chk Viv St Pmp 1-01 Xtie Viv No Change Low 18821 A St Pmp 1-02 Xtie Viv No Change Low 1-8821B Low Low 1-8823 U1 Si TO CL TST ISOL VLV Si TO HL 1-01/1-04 TST ISOL VLV Low Low 1-8824 Low Low 1-8825 RHR TO HL 1-02/1-03 TST ISOL VLV S1 Pmp 101/1-02 To Cl in) isol Viv No Change High 1-8835 No Change High 1-8840 RHR To HI 1-02/1-03 in} lsol V!v RHR To RCS Hi 1-02 Upstrm Chk Viv No Change Low 1-8841 A RHR To RCS HI 1-03 Upstrm Chk Viv No Change Low 1-8841 B Table 4.4-3 Page 2 !
l l
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Table 4.4-3 Results of Expert Panel Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components Sorted By Tag
*" "U "*I *" "8 Component Tag Changes Due To Based On IST Component Description Number Expert Panel Study i 1-8843 CCP 1-01/1-02 INJ HDR CHK VLV UPSTRM TST VLV Low Low 1-8871 U1 St TST HDR RET IRC ISOL VLV Low Low 1-8875A SI Accum 1-01 N2 SPLYNENT Viv No Change Low 1-8875B Si Accum 1-02 N2 SPLYNENT Viv No Change Low 1-8875C St Accum 1-03 N2 SPLYNENT Viv No Change Low 1-8875D Si Accum 1-04 N2 SPLYNENT Viv No Change Low 1-8877A Si Accum 1-01 Tst Ln Isol Viv No Change Low 1-8877B Si Accum 1-02 Tat Ln isol Viv No Change Low 1-8877C Si Accum 1-03 Tat Ln isol Viv No Change Low 1-8877D Si Accum 1-04 Tst Ln isol Viv No Change Low 1-8878A Si Accum 1-01 Fill Viv No Change Low 1-88788 SI Accum 1-02 Fill Viv No Change Low 1-8878C SI Accum 1-03 Fill Viv No Change Low 1-8878D SI Accum 1-04 Fill Viv No Change Low 1-8879A RHR TO CL 1-01 TST VLV Low Low 1-8879B RHR TO CL 1-02 TST VLV Low Low 8879C RHR TO CL 1-03 TST VLV Low Low i-8879D RHR TO CL 1-04 TST VLV Low Low 1-8880 U1 SI/PORV ACCUM N2 SPLY ORC ISOL VLV Low Low 1-8881 Si TO HL 1-02/1-03 TST ISOL VLV Low Low 1-8882 CCP 1-01/1-02 INJ HDR CHK VLV DNSTRM TST VLV Low Low 1-8888 U1 St ACCUM FILL LN ISOL VLV Low Lc.v ,
1-8889A Si TO HL 1-01 TST LN VLV Low Low ! 1-8889B Si TO HL 1-02 TST LN VLV Low Low 1 1-8889C St TO HL 1-03 TST LN VLV Low Low ] 1-8889D Si TO HL 1-04 TST LN VLV Low Low 1-8890A RHR TO CL 1-01/1-02 TST VLV Low Low 1-88908 RHR TO CL 1-03/1-04 TST VLV Low Low J 1-8922A Si Pmp 1-01 Disch Chk Viv No Change Low l 9-89228 S1 Pmp 1-02 Disch Chk Viv No Change Low j 9-8923A St Pmp 1-01 Suct Viv No Change High ( l + 1-8923B St Pmp 1-02 Suct Viv No Change High 1-8924 U1 SIP /CCP Suct Hdr Xtie Isol Viv High High High I 1-8926 St Pmp 1-01/1-02 Sect Chk Viv No Change 1-8948A St Accum 1-01 Dnstrm in) Chk Viv No Change High 1-89488 SI Accum 1-02 Dnstrm in; Chk Viv No Change High 1-8948C SI Accum 1-03 Dnstrm inj Chk Viv No Change High 1-8948D No Change High St Accum 1-04 Dnstrm ini Chk Viv 1-8949A RHR To Rep HI 1-01 Dnstrm Chk Viv No Change Low 1-8949B RHR To Rep HI 1-02 Dnstrm Chk Viv No Change Low 1-8949C RHR To Rep HI 1-03 Onstrm Chk Viv No Change Low 1-89490 RHR To Rep HI 1-04 Dnstrm Chk Viv No Change Low I S-8956A St Accum 1-01 Upstrm In; Chk Viv increased High 1 1-89568 SI Accum 1-02 Upstrm in) Chk Viv Increased High 1-8956C Si Accum 1-03 Upstrm in: Chk Viv increased H;gh 1-8956D Si Accum 1-04 Upstrm ini Chk Viv increased High 9-8958A Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmp 1-01 Chk Viv No Change Low 1-8958B Rwst 1-01 To RHR Pmo 1-02 Chk Viv No Change Low S-8964 U1 Si TEST HDR RET ORC ISOL VLV Low Low 1-8969A RHR To Cco 101/1-02 Suct Chk Viv No Change Low Table 4.4 3 Page 3
l ER EA-009 l Revision 0 Table 4.4-3 Results of Expert Panet Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components j Sorted By Tag Ranking Final Ranking p t "I'g Component Description Changes Due To Based On IST j Number Expert Panel Study l RHR To St Pmp 1-01/1-02 Suct Chk Viv No Change Low 1-8969B U1 RCS MU TO CHRG PMP FLO CTRL VLV Low Low 1-FCV-0110B RMUW TO CVCS BA BLNDR 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV Low Low i 1 FCV-0111A RCS MU TO VCT 1-01 ISOL VLV Low Low 1 1-FCV-0111 B RHR Pmp 1-01 Mintflo Viv No Change High 1-FCV-0610 RHR Pmp 1-02 Miniflo Viv No Change High 1-FCV-0611 RHR Hx 1-01 Byp Flo Ctrl Viv No Change Low i-FCV-0618 S-FCV-0619 RHR Hx 1-02 Byp Flo Ctrl Viv No Change Low 1-FV-2181 SG 1-01 FW SPLIT FLO BYP VLV Low Low SG 1-02 FW SPLIT FLO BYP VLV Low Low 1-FV-2182 SG 1-03 FW SPLIT FLO BYP VLV Low Low 1-FV-2183 SG 1-04 FW SPLIT FLO BYP VLV Low Low 1-FV-2184 1-FV-2193 SG 1-01 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv No Change Low i SG 1-02 FW PREHTR BYP VLV Low Low 1-FV-2194 SG 1-03 FW PREHTR BYP VLV Low Low 1-FV-2195 1-FV-2196 SG 1-04 Fw Prehtr Byp Viv No Change Low MD AFW PMP 1-01 TO CST RECIRC FLO VLV Low Low 1-FV-2456 i-FV-2457 MD AFW PMP 1-02 TO CST RECIRC FLO VLV Low Low CCW PMP 1-01 RECIRC FLO VLV High High 1-FV-4536 High High 1-FV-4537 CCW PMP 1-02 RECIRC FLO VLV 1-FV-4650A VENT CHLR U1 CCW SFLY VLV Low Low VENT CHLR U1 CCW RET VLV Low Low 1-FV-46508 K$. Change Low I S-FV-4772-1 Cs Pmo 1-01 Recire Viv i-FV-4772-2 Cs Pmp 1-03 Recirc Viv No Change Low f 1-FV4773-1 Cs Pmp 1-02 Recirc Viv No Change Low ) 1-FV-4773-2 Cs Pmp 1-04 Recirc Vw No Chango Low RHR Hx 1-01 Flo Ctrl Viv No Change High i 1-HCV-0606 RHR Hx 1-02 Flo Ctrl Viv No Chango High i S-HCV-0607 S-HV-2134 SG 1-01 FW ISOL VLV High High 1-HV-2135 SG 1-02 FW ISOL VLV High High J i-HV-2136 SG 1-03 FW ISOL VLV High High l 1-HV-2137 SG 1-04 FW ISOL VLV High High 1-HV-2154 FW LN 1-01 SEC SMPL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2155 FW LN 1-02 SEC SMPL VLV Low Low I-HV-2185 SG 1-01 FW ISOL BYP VLV Low Low 1-HV-2186 SG 1-02 FW ISOL BYP VLV Low Low 1-HV-2187 SG 1-03 FW ISOL BYP VLV Low Low 1-HV-2188 SG 1-04 FW ISOL BYP VLV Low Low 1-HV-2333A MStV 1-01 No Change Low 1-HV-2333B MSIV 1-01 BYP VLV Low Low f 1-HV-2334A MSIV 1-02 No Change Low l 1-HV-2334B MSIV 1-02 BYP VLV Low Low 1-HV-2335A MSIV 1-03 No Change Low 9-HV-2335B MSIV 1-03 BYP VLV Low Low 1-HV-2336A MSIV 1-04 No Change Low 1-HV-2336B MSIV 1-04 BYP VLV Low Low i-HV-2397 SG 1-01 BLDN ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2397A SG 1-01 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV Low Low l 1-HV-2398 SG 1-02 BLDN ISOL VLV Low Low l S-HV-2398A SG 1-02 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV Low Low I Table 4.4-3 Page 4 l
-]
ER EA-009 Revisio O Table 4.4-3 Results of Expert Pane! Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components Sorted By Tag
*" "U "*' *" "I Component Tag Component Description Changes Due To Based On IST Number Expert Panel Study 1-HV-2399 SG 1-03 BLDN ISOL VLV Low Low SG 1-03 BLDN HELB iSOL VLV Low Low S-HV-2399A SG 1-04 BLDN ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2400 SG 1-04 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2400A SG 1-01 DRUM SMPL ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2401 A SG 1-01 BLDN SMPL ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2401 B SG 1-02 DRUM SMPL ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2402A SG 1-02 BLDN SMPL ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2402B SG 1-03 DRUM SMPL ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2403A SG 1-03 BLDN SMPL ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2403B SG 1-04 DRUM SMPL ISOL VLV Low Low 1 HV-2404A SG 1-04 BLDN SMPL ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2404B SG 1-01 SMPL ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2405 SG 1-02 SMPL ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2406 SG 1-03 SMPL ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2407 SG 1-04 SMPL ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2408 MSL 1-01 BEF MSIV D\ POT 1-25 ISOL VLV No Change Low 1-HV-2409 MSL 1-02 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV No Change Low i-HV-2410 MSL 1-02 BEF MSIV D\ POT 1-24 ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2410 MSL 1-03 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV No Change Low 9-HV-2411 MSL 1-03 BEF MSIV D\ POT 1-23 ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2411 MSL 1-04 BEF MSIV D\ POT ISOL VLV No Change Low 1-HV-2412 MSL 104 BEF MSIV DiPOT 1-26 ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2412 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV No Change Low 1-HV-2452-1 MSL 1-04 TO AFWPT STM SPLY VLV No Change Low S-HV-2452-2 No Change Low 1-HV-2459 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 FCV No Change Low 1-HV-2460 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 FLO CTRL VLV No Change Low 1-HV-2461 TD AFW PMP 1-01 OtSCH TO SG 1-04 FLO CTRL VLV No Change Low 1-HV-2462 MD AFW PMP 1-01 SSW SUCT ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2480 MD AFW PMP 1-02 SbW SUCT ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2481 1-HV-2482 TD AFW PMP 1-01 SSW SUCT ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-2484 CST 1-01 DISCH VLV 2484 Low Low 1-HV-2485 CST 1-01 DISCH VLV 2485 Low Low 1-HV-2491 A TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 ISOL VLV No Change Low 1-HV-24918 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 ISOL VLV No Change Low 1-HV-2492A TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 ISOL VLV No Change Low 1-HV-24928 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 ISOL VLV No Change Low 1-HV-2493A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 ISOL VLV No Change Low 1-HV-24938 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 ISOL VLV No Change Low 1-HV-2494A MD AFW PMP T-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 ISOL VLV No Change Low 9-HV-24948 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 ISOL VLV No Change Low l 1-HV-3486 U1 CNTMT SERV AIR ISOL VLV Low Low l 1-HV-3487 U1 CNTMT INST AIR HDR ISOL VLV No Change Low 1-HV-3607 RV 1-01 HEAD UPSTRM VNT VLV Low Low RV 1-01 HEAD DNSTRM VNT VLV Low Low ~1-HV-3608 ~
Low 1-HV-3609 PRZR 1-01 UFSTRM VNT VLV Low 1-HV-3610 PRZR 1-01 DNSTRM VNT VLV Low Low S-HV-4075B U1 CNTMT FP HDR ORC ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-4075C U1 CNTMT FP HDR 1RC ISOL VLV Low Low l Table 4.4-3 Page 5 i
. . - . . . . . . - . . . - - . . . ~ . . . . . - .. . - . . - - . . .. - -- - - . - -.. - .. . . - - - -
i
;; ER EA-009
~ Revision 0 Table 4.4-3
- Results of Expert Panel Evaluation oflPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components
... Soried By Tag a
$' Ranking Final Ranking I- 88 Component Description Changes Due To Based On IST Expert Panel Study .a 1-HV-4165 PRZR 1-01 STM SPACE SMPL LN IRC iSOL VLV - Low Low 4 i- 1-HV-4166 - PRZR 1-01 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-4167 PRZR 1-01 LIO SPACE SMPL LN ORC ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-4168 RC LOOP 1-01 HOT LEG SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV - Low Low l- , 1-HV-4169 RC LOOP 1-04 HOT LEG SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV Low Low ! d 1-HV-4170 RC LOOP 1-01 & 1-04 HOT LEG SMPL LN ORC ISOL VLV Low Low.
- 1 HV-4171 ACCUM 1-01 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN 1RC iSOL VLV - No Change Low ]
1-HV-4172 - ACCUM 1-02 LlO SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV No Change Low l 4 1-HV-4173 ACCUM 1-03 LlO SPACE SMPL LN IRC ISOL VLV - No Changa Low- ] 1-HV-4174 - ACCUM 1-04 LIQ SPACE SMPL LN lRC ISOL VLV No Chan!,e Low l l 1-HV 4175 U1 ACCUM LIQ SPACE SMPL LN ORC ISOL VLV Low Low l 1-HV-4176 PRZR 1-01 STM SPACE SMPL LN ORC ISOL VLV Low Low- l !' 1 HV-4178 U1 RHR TRN A SMPL LN ORC (SOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-4179 U1 RHR TRN B SMPL LN ORC ISOL VLV Low Low [ { i 1-HV-4182 RHR TO RC PASS FLSH AND DIVERT MNFLD 1-07A LN ISOL VLV Low Low i l 1-HV-4286 SSW PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV No Change Hsh-1-HV-4287 - SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH VLV No Change Heh } 1-HV-4393 DG 1-01 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV - No Change Low 1-HV-4394 DG 1-02 JKT WTR CLR SSW RET VLV No Change Low I- 1-HV-4395 SSW TRN A TO U1 AFW PMP SUCT VLV Low Low p 1-HV-4396 SSW TRN B TO U1 AFW PMP SUCT VLV Low Low j 1-HV-4512 U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW RET VLV - No Change Heh No Change High '
- 1-HV-4513 U1 SFGD LOOP B CCW RET VLV *
- 1-HV-4514 U1 SFGD LOOP A CCW SPLY VLV No Change Heh 9 HV-4515 IJ1 SFGD LOOP B CCW SPLY VLV No Change Hgh 1-HV-4524 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW DNSTRM RET VLV No Change Heh j 1-HV-4525 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM RET VLV No Change Heh i
' No Change i-HV-4526 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP CCW UPSTRM SPLY VLV Hsh i 1-HV-4527 U1 NON-SFGD LOOP OCW DNSTRM SDLY VLV No Change No Change Heh Hgh p 9-HV-4572 RHR HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV i' 1-HV-4573 RHR HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV No Change High
- 1-HV-4574 CS HX 1-01 CCW RET VLV No Change Low f 1-HV-4575 CS HX 1-02 CCW RET VLV No Change Low I 9-HV-4631A U1 PSS CCW SPLY HDR ISOL VLV Low Low l j 9-HV-46318 U1 PSS CCW RET HDR ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-4696 U1 THBR CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV No Change Low .
1-HV-4699 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC UPSTRM ISOL VLV No Change Low [. i 1-HV 4700 U1 RCP/THBR CLR CCW SPLY ORC DNSTRM ISOL VLV No Change Low ! = 1-HV-4701 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET IRC ISOL VLV No Change Low 1-HV-4708 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV No Change Low
- 1-HV-4709 U1 THBR CLR,CCW RET ORC iSOL VLV No Change Low .!
! 1-HV 4710 U1 XS LTWRLOT HX CCW SPLY ORC iSOL VLV Low Low 4 1-HV-4711 U1 XS LTi.ItII2)T HX CCW RET ORC ISOL VLV Low Low ; 1-HV-4725 CNTMT CC3ORN TK 1-02 IRC ISOL VLV No Change High ! { 1-HV-4726 CNTMT CCW ORN TK 102 ORC ISOL VLV No Change Hgh j G 1-HV-4758 - RWST TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT VLV No Change Low ! 1-HV-4759 RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT VLV No Change Low [ 1 HV-4776 CS HX 1-01 OUT VLV . No Change Low l j' 1-HV-4777 CS HX 1-02 OUT VLV No Change Low , 1-HV-4782 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/103 SUCT ISOL VLV No Change Low j V e . Table 4.4-3 Page 6 l 4 :
, _. a _ .._. _ _ . - .. --.s . _ _. __ ._ __ _ _ _
l l. ER-EA-009 j '~ Page bgeesion 0ofM Table 4.4-3 2 e Results of Exput Par.at Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components Sorted By Tag Ranking Final Ranking Component Tag Component Description Changes Due To Based On IST j i Number Expert Panel Study 1 HV-4783 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT ISOL VLV No Change Low 1 HV-5157 RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP1-01/1-02 DISCH HDR ORC ISOL VLV No Change High 1-HV-5158 RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 DISCH HDR 1RC ISOL VLV No Change Hegn 1-HV-5365 U1 CNTMT DEMIN/RMUW SPLY ORC ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-5366 U1 CNTMT DEMIN/RMUW SPLY IRC ISOL VLV Low Low ! 1-HV-5536 U1 CNTMT AIR PRG SPLY ORC ISOL DMPR AO Low Low ] 9-HV-5537 U1 CNTMT AIR PRG SPLY 1RC iSOL DMPR AO Low Low j 1-HV-5538 U1 CNTMT AIR PRG EXH ORC ISOL DMPR AO Low Low j 1-HV-5539 U1 CNTMT AIR PRG EXH IRC iSOL DMPR AO Low Low I Low Low 4 1 HV-5540 U1 CNTMT H2 PRG EXH ORC ISOL DMPR { 1-HV-5541 U1 CNTMT H2 PRG EXH 1RC ISOL DMPR Low Low l 1-HV-5542 U1 CNTMT H2 PRG SPLY ORC ISOL DMPR Low Low j U1 CNTMT H2 PRG SPLY IRC iSOL DMPR Low Low 1-HV-5543 U1 CNTMT AIR PIG RAD DET UNIT 5502/03/66 SMPL IN ORC ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-5544 U1 CNTMT AIR PIG RAD DET UNIT 5502/03/66 SMPL IN IRC ISOL VLV Low Low I 1-HV-5545 U1 CNTMT AIR PIG RAD DET UNIT 5502/03/66 SMPL OUT ORC ISOL VL Low Low 1-HV-5546 U1 CNTMT AIR PlG RAD DET UNIT 5502/03/66 SMPL OUT IRC ISOL VL Low Low 1-HV-5547 U1 CNTMT PRESS RLF SYS ORC ISOL VLV No Change Low S-HV-5548 U1 CNTMT PRESS RLF SYS IRC ISOL VLV No Change Low { 9-HV-5549 U1 CNTMT AIR PASS SMPL RET LN ORC ISOL VLV Low Low ' 1-HV-5556 U1 CNTMT AIR PASS SMPL RET LN 1RC ISOL VLV Lcw Low 1-HV-5557 U1 CNTMT AIR PASS SMPL SPLY LN ORC ISOL VLV 5558 Low Low 1-HV-5558 U1 CNTMT AIR PASS SMPL SPLY LN IRC iSOL VLV 5559 Low Low 1-HV-5559 U1 CNTMT AIR PASS SMPL SPLY LN ORC ISOL VLV 5560 Low Low 1-HV-5560 U1 CNTMT AIR PASS SMPL SPLY LN IRC ISOL VLV 5561 Low Low S HV-5561 U1 CNTMT PRG EXH 1RC ISOL DMPR BYP DMPR Low Low 1-HV-5562 U1 CNTMT H2 PRG SPLY IRC ISOL DMPR Low Low
, 1-HV-5563 U1 VENT CH WTR SPLY ORC UPSTRM ISOL VLV Low Low 1 HV-6082 1-HV-6083 U1 VENT CH WTR RET IRC DNSTRM ISOL VLV Low Low U1 VENT CH WTR SPLY ORC DNSTRM ISOL VLV Low Low 1-HV-6084 SFTY CH WTR SRG TK 1-01 RMUW SPLY VLV Low Low 1-HV-6720 1-HV-7311 RC PASS SMPL MODULE 1-04 TO RCDT 1-01 RET LN ORC ISOL VLV Low Low RC PASS SMPL MODULE 1-04 TO RCDT 1-01 RET LN IRC ISOL VLV Low Low
. 1-HV-7312 i-HV-8220 U1 CHARGE PMP SUCT Hi PNT VNT VLV 8220 No Change Low 1-HV-8221 U1 CHARGE PMP HI PNT VNT VLV 8221 No Change Low 1-LCV-0112B VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 01128 increased High S-LCV-0112C VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112C increased High 1-LCV-0112D RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112D increased High 1-LCV-0112E RWST 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV 0112E increased thgh 1 LCV-0459 U1 LTDN ISOL VLV 0459 increased High i-LCV-0460 U1 LTDN ISOL VLV 0460 increased High LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV increased High 1-LCV-1003 1-LV-2478 DEMIN WTR TO CST 1-01 MU VLV Low Low 1 1-LV-4500 CCW SRG TK 1-01 MU VLV 4500 _ _ _ Low Low 1-LV-4500-1 CCW SRG TK 1-01 RMUW SPLY VLV Low Low 1-LV-4501 CCW SRG TK 1-01 MU VLV 4501 Low Low 1-LV-4754 CS CHEM ADD TK 1-01 DISCH VLV 4754 Low Low 1-LV-4755 CS CHEM ADD TK 1-01 DISCH VLV 4755 Low Low 1-PCV-0455A PRZR 1-01 PortV 0455A No Change High 1-PCV-0456 PRZR PWR OPERATED RELIEF VLV No Change High Table 4.4 3 Page 7
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Page hofh 4 Table 4.4-3 Results of Expert Panel Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components Sorted By Tag Ranking Final Ranking Component Description Changes Due To Based On IST Number Expert Panel Study 1-PS-0500 U1 ACCUM LIQ SPACE SMPL LN ORC RLF VLV Low Low 1-PS-0501 PRZR 1-01 LIQ SPACE SMPt LN ORC RLF VLV Low Low 1-PS-0502 PRZR 1-01 STM SPACE SMPL LN ORC RLF VLV Low Low 1-PS-0503 RC LOOP 1-01/1-04 HL SMPL LN ORC RLF VLV Low Low 1-PV-2325 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV No Change High 1-PV-2326 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV No Change High 1-PV-2327 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV No Change High 1-PV-2328 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV No Change High 1-PV-2453A MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 FLO CTRL VLV No Change Low j 1-PV-2453B MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CTRL VLV No Change Low l 1-PV-2454A MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CTRL VLV No Change Low 1-PV-24548 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CTRL VLV No Change Low 1-PV-4552 SFTY CHLR 1-05 CCW RET PCV No Change Low 1-PV-4553 SFTY CHLR 1-06 CCW RET PCV No Charge Low 1AF-0009 DEMIN WTR TO CST 1-01 MU LN CHK VLV Low Low 1 AF-0014 CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-01 SUCT CHK VLV No Change Low 1AF-0024 CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-02 SUCT CHK VLV No Change Low 1AF-0032 CST 1-01 TO TD AFW PMP CHK VLV No Change Low iAF-0038 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No Change Low 1 AF-0041 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV No Change Low 1 AF-0042 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH 1ST ISOL VLV Low Low 1AF-0045 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH RECIRC CHK VLV Low Low 1 AF-0051 MD AFW PMP 1-02 D!SCH CHK VLV No Change Low 1AF-0054 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH ISOL VLV No Change Low 1AF-0055 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TST ISOL VLV Low Low 1AF-0057 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH RECIRC CHK VLV Low Low 1AF-0065 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No Change Low l 1AF-0066 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH ISOL VLV No Change Low 1AF-0067 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TST ISOL VLV Law Low 1AF-0069 MD AFW PMF 1-01 DISCH RECIRC CHK VLV Low Low 1AF-0075 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 CHK VLV No Change Low 1AF-0078 TD AFW PMP 101 DISCH TO SG 1-01 CHK VLV No Change Low 1AF-0083 MD AFW PMP 1,11 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CHK VLV No Change Low 1AF-0086 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 CHK VLV No Change Low 1AF-0093 MD AFW PMP 1 12 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CHK VLV No Change Low 1 AF-0098 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CHK VLV No Change Low 1 AF-0101 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DiSCH TO SG 1-04 CHK VLV No Change Low 1 AF-0106 TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 CHK VLV No Change Low 1 AF-0167 U1 AFW PMPS DISCH RECIRC TO CST CHK VLV High High 1 AF-0215 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1 AF-0216 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1 AF-0217 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1 AF-0218 MD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1 AF-0219 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1 AF-0220 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 103 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1 AF-0221 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 104 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low
]
~
1AF-0222 MD AFW PMP 1-02 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1AF-0223 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low , 1 AF-0224 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-01 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No Cnange Low j 1AF-0226 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low j Table 4.4-3 Page 8
l l l ER-EA-009 ' f 1 Revision 0 Table 4.4 3
~
Results of Expert Panel Evaluation of!PE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components Sorted By Tag Ranking Final Ranking
* "U Component Description Changes Due To Based On IST Expert Panel Study TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-02 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low
$AF-0227 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low SAF-0228 No Change Low 1AF-0229 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-03 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1AF-0230 TD AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 4 1AF-0231 TO AFW PMP 1-01 FCV TO SG 1-04 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1AF-0232 AFWPT 1-01 STM SPLY VLV 2452-1 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV
' AFWPT 1-01 STM SPLY VLV 2452-1 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1AF-0233 AFWPT 1-04 STM SPLY VLV 2452-2 AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1AF-0234 Low Low 1AF-0235 AFWPT 1-01 STM SPLY VLV 2452-2 AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1BS-0015 CNTMT PERS AIRLOCK 1-01 EXT DOOR MAN EQUAL VLV 0015 Low Low 1BS-0025 CNTMT PERS AIRLOCK 1-01 EXT DOOR AUTO EQUAL VLV Low Low 1BS-0029 CNTMT PERS AIRLOCK 1-01 EXT DOOR MAN EQUAL VLV 0029 Low Low 1BS-0030 CNTMT PERS AIRLOCK 1-01 INT DOOR AUTO EQUAL VLV Low Low 1BS-0044 CNTMT PERS AIRLOCK 1-01 INT DOOR MAN EQUAL VLV 0044 Low Low 1BS-0056 CNTMT PERS AIRLOCK 1-01 (NT DOOR MAN EQUAL VLV 0056 Low Low 1BS-0202 U1 CNTMT PERS EMER AIRLOCK INT DOOR MAN EQUAL VLV Low Low 1BS-0203 U1 CNTMT PERS EMER AIRLOCK EXT DOOR MAN EQUAL VLV Low Low 1CA-0016 U1 CNTMT SERV AIR HDR CHK VLV Low Low 1CC-0003 CCW SRG TK 1-01 RMUW SPLY CHK VLV Low Low 1CC-0004 CCW SRG TK 1-01 DEMIN WTR SPLY CHK VLV No Change Low 1CC-0031 CCW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No Change Low 1CC-0061 CCW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low 1CC-0611 XS LTDN HX 1-01 CCW SPLY RLF VLV RCDT HX 1-01 CCW SPLY RLF VLV Low Low 1CC-0618 U1 RCP CLR CCW RET HDR CHK VLV Low Low ! 1CC 0629 RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No Change Low l SCC-0646 ' RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No Change Low 1CC-0657 RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No Change Low 1CC-0687 RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY UPSTRM STOP CHK VLV No Change Low l iCC-0694 U1 RCP CLR CCW SPLY HDR CHK VLV No Change Low 1 1CC-0713 U1 RC PMP THBR CLR CCW RET HOR RLF CHK VLV Low Low l 1CC-0831 1CC-1067 CNTMT CCW DRN TK 1-02 RET HDR RLF VLV Low Low SCC-1075 RC PMP 1-01 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No Change Low RC PMP 1-02 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No Change Low 1CC-1076 1CC-1077 RC PMP 1-03 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No Change Low RC PMP 1-04 THBR CLR CCW SPLY STOP CHK VLV No Change Low 1CC-1078 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT No Change Low 1CC-1079 1CC-1080 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT No Change Low 1CC-1081 CIRCLE SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2" FNPT No Change Low , 1CC-1082 CIRCEL SEAL CHECK VALVE 1/2 FNPT No Change Low 1CH-0024 U1 VENT CH WTR SPLY IRC CHK VLV Low Low iCH-0271 U1 CNTMT VENT CH WTR SPLY HDR ORC PRESS RLF VLV Low Low 1CH-0272 U1 CNTMT VENT CH WTR RET HDR ORC PRESS RLF VLV Low Low 1CH-0300 SFTY CH WTR SRG TK 1-01 DEMIN WTR SPLY CHK VLV Low Low 1CH-0301 SFTY CH WTR SRG TK 1-01 DEMIN WTR SPLY CHK VLV Low Low 1CH 0302 SFTY CH WTR SRG TK 1-01 MU LVL VLV 6712 BYP VLV Low Low SCH-0305 SFTY CH WTR SRG TK 101 MU LVL VLV 6713 BYP VLV Low Low 1Cl-0030 U1 INST AIR HDR TO U1 CNTMT CHK VLV No Change Low SCl-0644 CR A\C ACCUM X-01 INST AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV High High 1Cl-0645 CR A\C ACCUM X-01 INST AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV High High Table 4.4-3 Page 9 ) 1
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Table 4.4-3 Results of Expert Panel Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components l Sorted By Tag Ranking Final Ranking Component Tag Component Description Changes Due To Based On IST Expert Panel Study
; 1Cl-0646 CR A\C ACCUM X-02 INST AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV High High 1Cl-0647 CR A\C ACCUM X-02 INST A1R SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV High High iCS-8180 U11RC SL WTR RET CNMT ISOL BYP CHK VLV No Change Low 1 ICS-8350A RC PMP 1-01 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No Change Low i 1CS-8350B RC PMP 1-02 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No Change Low )
1CS-8350C RC PMP 1-03 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No Change Low 1CS-8350D RC PMP 1-04 SL WTR INJ CHK VLV No Change Low 1CS-8367A RC PMP 1-01 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No Change Low-1CS-83678 RC PMP 1-02 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No Change Low i iCS-8367C RC PMP 103 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No Change Low l 1CS-8367D RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IMB CHK VLV No Change Low ] SCS-8368A RC PMP 101 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No Change Low j 1CS-8368B RC PMP 1-02 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No Change Low l 1CS-8368C RC PMP 1-03 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No Change Low 1CS-8368D RC PMP 1-04 SL INJ IRC CHK VLV No Change Low 1CS-8377 U1 RCS AUX SPR LN TO PRZR 1-01 CHK VLV Low Low SCS-8442 U1 EMER BORATE LN CHK VLV No Change Low 1CS-8473 BA PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No Change Low 1CS-8480A CCP 1-01 REClRC CHK VLV Low Low 1CS-84808 CCP 1-02 RECIRC CHK VLV Low Low 1CS-8487 BA PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No Change Low 1CT-0013 CS PMP 104 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low I 1CT-0020 CS PMP 1-04 EDUCT SUCT CHK VLV Low Low 1CT-0025 RWST TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT CHK VLV No Change Low 1CT-0031 CS PMP 1-02 EDUCT SUCT CHK VLV Low Low 1CT-0042 CS PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No Change Low SCT-0047 CS PMP 1-04 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No Change Low < 1CT-0048 CS PMP 1-02 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No Change Low 1CT-0063 CS PMP 1-03 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No Change Low 1CT-0064 CS PMP 1-01 MINIFLO LN CHK VLV No Change Low SCT-0065 CS PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV No Change Low S CT-0072 CS PMP 1-03 EDUCT SUCT CHK VLV Low Low 1CT-0077 RWST TO CSP 1-01/1-03 SUCT CHK VLV No Change Low 1CT-0082 CS PMP 1-01 EDUCT SUCT CHK VLV Low Low 1CT-0094 CS PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No Change Low iCT-0142 U1 CS TRN A HDR 1RC CHK VLV No Change Low 1CT-0145 U1 CS TRN 8 HDR 1RC CHK VLV No Change Low S CT-0148 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 102/1-04 CHK VLV No Change Low 1CT-0149 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 CHK VLV No Change Low SCT-0309 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-01/1-03 SUCT ISOL VLV BONNET RLF VLV Low Low S CT-0310 CNTMT SMP TO CS PMP 1-02/1-04 SUCT ISOL VLV BONNET RLF VLV Low Low 1D0-0006 RMUWST 1-01 IN UPSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1DD-0016 RMUW PMP 1-01 RECIRC CHK VLV Low Low 1DD-0018 RMUW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low 1DD-0020 RMUW PMP 1-01 TO RMUW HDR ISOL VLV Low Low S DD-0064 RMUWST 1-01 RET UPSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1D0-0065 RMUWST 1-01 IN DNSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 10 0-0066 RMUWST 1-01 RET DNSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1D0-0430 U1 DEMIN/RMUW CNTMT PENET ORC RLF VLV Low Low S DO-0004 DG 1-01 FO XREF PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No Change Low Table 4.4-3 Page 10
ER EA-009 Revision 0 Page Mo(M Table 4.4-3
^ Results of Expert Panel Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components Sorted By Tag RanMng Rnal RanMng Component Tag Component Description Changes Due To Based On IST Number Expert Panel Study iDO-0005 DG 1-01 FO XREF PMP 1-02 OlSCH CHK VLV No Change Low 1DO-0016 DG 1-02 FO XFER PMP 1-03-DISCH CHK VLV No Change Low 10 0-0017 DG 1-02 FO XFER PMP 1-04 DISCH CHK VLV No Change Low iDO-0049 DG 1-01 FO DAY TK 1-01 XFER HDR CHK VLV No Change Low 1 DO-0050 DG 1-02 FO DAY TK 1-02 XFER HDR CHK VLV No Change Low 1DO-0058 DG 1-01 START AIR RCVR 1-01 IN CHK VLV Low Low 1DO-0059 DG 1-01 START AIR RCVR 1-02 IN CHK VLV Low Low 10 0-0060 DG 1-02 START AIR RCVR 1-03 IN CHK VLV Low Low 1 D0-0061 DG 1-02 START AIR RCVR 1-04 IN CHK VLV Low Low 1004062 DG 1-01 AIR DRYR 1-02 OUT DNSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 100-0063 DG 1-01 AIR DRYR 1-01 OUT DNSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 1DO-0064 DG 1-02 AIR DRYR 1-04 OUT DNSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 100-0065 DG 1-02 AIR DRYR 1-03 OUT DNSTRM CHK VLV Low Low 10 0-0104 DG 1-01 JKT WTR KWP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low ,
DG 1-01 JKT WTR TEMP CTRL VLV Low Low 10 0-0107 l 1D0-0157 DG 1-01 ENGN L\O PMP 1-01 SUCT CHK VLV Low Low 1 DO-0158 DG 1-01 AUX L\O PMP 1-02 SUCT CHK VLV Low Low 10 0-0204 DG 1-02 JW KWP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low 20 0-0207 DG 1-02 JW TEMP CTRL VLV Low Low 1DO-0257 DG 1-02 ENGN L\0 PMP 1-03 SUCT CHK VLV Low Low 1D0-0258 DG 1-02 AUX L\0 PMP 1-04 SUCT CHK VLV Low Low 1FW-0070 SG 1-03 FW HDR CHK Vil/ No Change Low l 1FW-0076 SG 1-02 FW HDR CHK VLV No Change Low f 1FW-0082 SG 1-01 FW HDR CHK VLV No Change Low 1FW-0088 SG 1-04 FW HDR CHK VLV No Change Low 1 FW-0191 SG 1-04 FW PREHTR BYP ORC CHK VLV Low Low 1FW-0192 SG 1-01 FW PREHTR BYP ORC CHK VLV Low Low 1 FW-0193 SG 1-02 FW PREHTR BYP ORC CHK VLV Low Low 1 FW-0194 SG 1-03 FW PREHTR BYP ORC CHK VLV Low Low S FW-0195 SG 1-04 FW PREHTR BYP IRC ChK VLV No Change Low 1FW-0196 SG 1-01 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV No Change Low 1FW-0197 SG 1-02 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV No Change Low 1 FW-0198 SG 1-03 FW PREHTR BYP IRC CHK VLV No Change Low - 1FVW-0199 SG 1-04 AFW NZL CHK VLV No Change Low 1FW-0200 SG 1-01 AFW NZL CHK VLV No Change Low 1FW-0201 SG 1-02 AFW NZL CHK VLV No Change Low 1 FW-0202 SG 1-03 AFW NZL CHK VLV No Change Low 1MS-0021 SG 1-01 SFT( VLV 0021 Low Low iMS-0022 SG 1-01 SFTY VLV 0022 Low Low 1MS-0023 SG 1-01 SFTY VLV 0023 Low Low 1 MS-0024 SG 1-01 SFTY VLV 0024 Low Low 1MS-0025 SG 1-01 SFTY VLV 0025 Low Low 1MS-0026 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No Change Low i MS-0058 SG 1-02 SFTY VLV 0058 Low Low 1 MS-0059 SG 1-02 SFTY VLV 0059 Low Low 1MS-0060 SG 1-02 SFTY VLV 0060 Low Low 1 MS-0061 SG 1-02 SFTY VLV 0061 Lov' Low iMS-0062 SG 1-02 SFTY VLV 0062 Low Low iMS-0063 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No Change Low iMS-0093 SG 1-03 SFTY VLV 0093 Low Low Table 4.4-3 Page 11
ER-EA-009 4 Revision 0 Table 4.4-3 Results of Expert Panel Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components Sorted By Tag
" "U "*' " "U Component Tag Changes Due To Based On IST g Component Description Expert Panel Study 1MS-0094 - SG 1-03 SFTY VLV 0094 Low Low 1MS-0095 SG 1-03 SFTY VLV 0095 -
Low Low 1MS-0096 SG 1-03 SFTY VLV 0096 Low Low 1MS-0097 SG 1-03 SFTY VLV 0097 Low Low 1MS-0098 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM ISOL VLV No Change Low 1MS-0129 SG 1-04 SFTY VLV 0129 Low Low 4 1MS-0130 SG 1-04 SFTY VLV 0130 Low Low 1MS-0131 SG 1-04 SFTY VLV 0131 Low Low 1MS-0132 SG 1-04 SFTY VLV 0132 Low Low 1MS-0133 SG 1-04 SFTY VLV 0133 Low Low 1MS-0134 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV UPSTRM iSOL VLV No Change Low 1MS-0142 MSL 1-04 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1MS-0143 MSL 1-01 TO AFWPT SPLY VLV DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1MS-0680 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1MS-0681 SG 1-01 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1MS-0682 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low i 1MS-0683 SG 1-02 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1 MS-0684 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1MS-0685 SG 1-03 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1MS-0686 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1 MS-0687 SG 1-04 ATMOS RLF VLV AIR SPLY DNSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1RC-0036 RMUW TO PRT 1-01/CNTMT ORC RLF VLV Low Low 1SF-0011 U1 REFUEL CAV PURIF LOOP HDR UPSTRM ISOL VLV Low Low 1SF-0012 U1 REFUEL CAV PURIF LOOP HDR DNSTRM ISOL VLV Low Low , 1SF-0021 U1 REFUEL CAV DRN TO REFUEL WTR PURIF PMP HDR UPSTRM iSOL VLV Low Low 1SF-0022 U1 REFUEL CAV DRN TO REFUEL *NTR PURIF PMP HDR DNSTRM ISOL VLV Low Low 1SF-0053 REFUEL CAV SKM PMP 101 IRC [+1SCH VLV Low Low 1SF-0054 REFUEL CAV SKM PMP 1-01 ORC DISCH VLV Low Low 1SI-0047 RWST 1-01 TO S1 ISOL VLV No Change High 1SI-0166 PRZR 1-01 PORV 0455A N2 ACCUM 1-02 UPSTRM IN CHK VLV High High 1SI-0167 PRZR 1-01 PORV 0455A N2 ACCUM 1-02 DNSTRM IN CHK VLV High High 1SI-0168 PRZR 1-01 PORV 0456 N2 ACJUM 1-01 UPSTRM IN CHK VLV High High S SI-0169 PRZR 1-01 PORV 0456 h2 ACCUM 1-01 DNSTRM IN CHK VLV High High I 1S1-0182 BONNET RELIEF VAlt E FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 1-8811 A High High 1SI-0183 BONNET RELIEF VALVE FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 1-8811B High High i 1SI-8819A Si TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV No Change High + SSI-8819B Si TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV No Change High ' No Change High 1SI-8819C SI TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV 1SI-8819D Si TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV No Change High 1SI-8900A CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-01 CHK VLV No Changa Low 1SI-8900B CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-02 CHK VLV No Change Low 1SI-8900C CCP 1-01/1-02 TO CL 1-03 CHK VLV No Change Low 1SI-8900D CCP 1-01/1~2 TO CL 1-04 CHK VLV No Change Low 1SI-8905A Si TO HL 1-01 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1SI-8905B Si TO HL 1-02 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low iSIP,905C Si TO HL 1-03 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low 1 5-89050 St TO HL 1-04 INJ UPSTRM CHK VLV No Change Low [1SI-8919A St PMP 1-01 TO RWST CHK VLV No Change Low 1SI-89198 St PMP 1-02 TO RWST CHK VLV No Change Low 1SI-8968 St N2 SPLY HDR 1-01/1-02 CHK VLV Low Low 4 Table 4.4-3 Page 12
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Table 4.4-3
^ Results of Expert Panel Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components Sorted By Tag Ranking Final Ranking Component Description Changes Due To Based On IST Number Expert Panel Study ;
1S18972 U1 Si TST HDR RLF VLV Low Low 9 SW-0016 U1 SSW TRN B SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV No Change Low i SW-0017 U1 SSW TRN A SPLY HDR IN CHK VLV No Change Low 1SW-0373 SSW PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV No Change High 1SW-0374 SSW PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV No Change High 1VD-0907 RX CAV SMP & CNTMT SMP 1-01/1-02 DISCH HDR PRESS RLF VLV Low Low j 1WP-7176 LWPS RCOT 1-01 DRN HDR RLF VLV Low Low l 1WP-7177 RC PASS SMPL RET TO RCDT 1-01 RLF VLV Low Low l CP1-AFAPMD dl MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 No Change High CP1-AFAPMD-02 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-02 No Change High j CP1-AFAPTD-01 TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 No Change High 1 CP1-CCAPCC-01 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1-01 No Change High CP1-CCAPCC-02 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1-02 No Change High CP1-CHAPCP-05 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 1-05 No Change High CP1-CHAPCP-06 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECIRC PUMP 1-06 No Change High CP1-CTAPCS-01 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-01 No Change High CP1-CTAPCS-02 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-02 No Change High CP1-CTAPCS-03 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-03 No Change High CP1-CTAPCS-04 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-04 No Change High CP1-DDAPRM-01 REACTOR MAKEUP WATER PUMP 1-01 Low Low CP1-DOAPFT-01 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 Decreased Low CP1-DOAPFT-02 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 Decreased Low CP1-DOAPFT-03 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-03 Decreased Low CP1 DOAPFT-04 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP 1-04 Decreased Low CP1-SWAPSW-01 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-01 No Change High CP1-SWAPSW-02 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-02 No Change High CP1-WPAPSS-01 SAFEGUARD BUILDING SUMP 1-01 PUMP 1-01 Low Low CP1-WPAPSS-02 SAFEGUARD BUILDING SUMP 1-01 PUMP 1-02 Low Low CP1-WPAPSS-03 SAFEGUARD BUILDING SUMP 1-02 PUMP 1-03 Low Low CP1-WPAPSS-04 SAFEGUARD BUILDING SUMP 1-02 PUMP 1-04 Low Low CPX-DDAPRM-01 REACTOR MAKEUP WATER PUMP X-01 Low Low CPX-SFAPSF-01 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING WATER PUMP X-01 Low Low CPX-SFAPSF-02 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING WATER PUMP X-02 Low Low CTVBCA-01 CHEMICAL ADDITIVE TANK VENTPATH Low Low CTVBCA-02 CHEMICAL ADDITIVE TANK VENTPATH Low Low SWVAVB-01 VENT PATH FORWATER HAMMER PROTECTION High High SWVAVB-02 VENT PATH FORWATER HAMMER PROTECTION High High StWAVB-03 VENT PATH FORWATER HAMMER PROTECTION High High SWVAVB-04 VENT PATH FORWATER HAMMER PROTECTION High High TBX-CSAPBA-01 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 No Change High TBX-CSAPBA-02 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 No Change High TBX-CSAPCH-01 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-01 No Change High TBX-CSAPCH-02 CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-02 No Change High TBX-RHAPRH-01 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-01 No Change High TBX-RHAPRH-02 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-02 No Change High TBX-SIAPSI-01 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-01 No Change High TBX-31APSI-02 SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-02 No Change High l UD-0003 SFGD BLOG SMP 1-01 PMP 1-01 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low VD-0004 SFGD BLDG SMP 1-01 PMP 1-02 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low VD-0011 SFGD BLDG SMP 1-02 PMP 1-03 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low I l Table 4.4 3 Page 13
~ _ __
ER-EA-009 Revision 0 Table 4.4-3
^ Results of Expert Panel Evaluation ofIPE/IST Components and the Final Ranking of All IST Components Sorted By Tag Ranking Final Ranking Component Tag Component Description Changes Due To Based On IST Nuhr Expert Panel Study SFGD BLDG SMP 1-02 PMP 1-04 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low VD-0012 No Change High X-PCV-H116A UPS AC UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV X-PCV-H1168 UPS AC UNIT X-02 CCW RET PCV No Change Hgh CR AC UNIT X-01 CCW RET PCV No CNenge Low X PV-3583 Low Low 2
X-PV-3584 CTRL RM AC UNIT X-02 REFRIG CNDSR CCW RET PRESS CTRL VLV No Change Low X-PV-3585 CR AC UNIT X-03 CCW RET PCV Low Low X-PV-3580 CTRL RM AC UNIT X-04 REFRIG CNDSR CCW RET PRESS CTRL VLV Low Low XCS-0037 BA PMP 1-01 MINIFLO CHK VLV Low Low XCS-0039 BA PMP 2-01 MINIFLO CHK VLV Low Low XCS-0041 BA PMP 1-02 MINIFLO CHK VLV BA PMP 2-02 MINIFLO CHK VLV Low Low XCS-0044 Low Low XDD-0044 RMUW PMP X-01 MINIFLO RECIRC CHK VLV RMUW PMP X-01 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low XDD-0048 Low Low XDD-0103 RMUW PMP 2-01 TO RMUW HDR ISOL VLV Low Low XSF-0003 SFP CLG WTR PMP X-01 DISCH CHK VLV SFP CLG WTR PMP X-02 DISCH CHK VLV Low Low XSF-0004 Low Low r XSF-0160 U1 RMUW TO SFPCS CHK VLV Low Low XSF-0161 U1 RMUW TO SFPCS ISOL VLV Low Low XSF-0179 U2 RMUW TO SFPCS ISOL VLV Low Low XSF-0180 U2 RMUW TO SFPCS CHK VLV 4 i i t Table 4.4-3 Page 14
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/
Table 5-1 ER-EA409 Summary of Risk Ranking Results for IST C0mponents j Sorted By IST Plan Riek initial PE Outage Risk Solemic Risk Final Ranking Table Component Tag *" Component Description FussetI-Veeely
- Achievernent Ranking Saeed Ranking Ranking Baeed On IST Number Nunter Worth
- on FV" *"'"' Changee ""'"' Changes *""' ' Stedy Changee Changes wrout CCF Panet Review MOTOR DRIVEN AU)ullARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 0 0282 2 8296 Mgh No change No change No chan0e Nocha go Ngh No Change Hgh Tabee O CP1MAPMD41 (1)
MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY Tatse O CP1MAPMD-02 FEEDWATER PUMP 1-02 0 0394 3.3020 High No change No change No dange No change High No Change Ngh TURBINE DRIVEN AUX 1LIARY TaNe O CP1-AFAPTD-01 FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 0 2351 12 9035 High No change No change No change No change High No Change Hgh COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1 01 0 0366 4 8323 High No change No change No change No change High No Change Hegh TaNo O CP14CAPCC-01 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP 1 02 0 0303 38 5384 High No change No change No change No change High No Change High Tat:le O CP1-CCAPCC-02 SAFETY CHILLED WATER RECtRC PUMP TaNe O CP1-CHAPCP-05 1-05 0 0080 1 7278 Medourn No change No change No change No change Mednarn No Change Hgh SAFETY CHtLLED WATER RECtRC PUMP 0 0003 1 3459 Medium No change No change No change No change Modern No Change High TaNe O CP1 CHAPCP-06 (2X4 1-06 Table O CP1-CTAPCS41 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-01 Wa n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Hgn Vabie O CP1-CTAPCS-02 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-02 Wa n/a None No change No change No change No change Wa No Ci v. Hegh Table O CP1-CTAPCS43 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-03 Wa Wa None No change No change No change No change da No Change Hgh CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP 1-04 Wa n/a None No change No change No change NoJ.-v. Na No Change High TaNe O CP1-CTAPCS-04 REACTOR MAKEUP WATER PUMP 1-01 n/a rua Wa Wa n/a rVa No change Wa Low Low Tatte O CP1-DDAPRM41 DIESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL OtL Table O cpl-DOAPFT-01 TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 0 0478 140 0000 High No change No change No change No change None Decreased Low DsESEL GENERATOR 1-01 FUEL O4L TaNe O CP1-DOAPFT-02 TRANSFER PUMP 1-02 0 0478 140 0000 Hgh No change No change No change No change None Decreased Low DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OtL TaNeO CP1-DOAPFT-03 TRANSFER PUMP 1-03 0 0478 140 0000 High No change No change No change No change None Decreased Low DIESEL GENERATOR 1-02 FUEL OtL TaNeO CP1-DOAPFT-04 TRANSFER PUMP 144 0 0478 140 0000 Hig* No change No dange No change No change None Decreated Low TaNeO CP1-SWAPSW-01 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-01 0 0969 77 6709 High No change No change No change No change Hgh No Change Hgh TaNe O CP1-SWAPSW-02 (1) STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP 1-02 0 0386 107 0000 High No change No change No change No change Hagh No CnanGe High SAFEGUARD BUtLDING SUMP 1-01 TaNoO CP1-WPAPSS-01 PUMP 1-01 We n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a Lor, Low SAFEGUARD ButLDING SUMP 141 Table O CP1-WPAPSS-02 PUMP 1-02 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a low Low SAFEGUARD BUILDING SUMP 1-02 Table O CP1-WPAPSS-03 PUMP 1-03 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a low Low SAFEGUARD BUILDING SUMP 1-02 Table O CP1-WPAPSS-04 PUMP 1-04 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n'a No change n/a low Low Table O CPX-DDAPRM41 REACTOR MAKEUP WATER PUMP X-01 n/a n/a n/a Wa n/a n/a No change rVa low Low SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING WATER Table O CPX-SFAPSF-01 PUMP X-01 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a Low Low SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING WATER Table O CPX-SFAPSF-02 PUMP X-02 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a low Low
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** Th. mal IPE sudas haud as FV erous dw amLass of es agemman e+= Tatde 5-1 Page I
Tabic 5-1 ER-EA-EM - Summary of Risk Raalung Results for IST Components g Soned avIST Pian punk insies iPE N Rre & Outage fusk M Setuultlusk Rees RenMag Temes e- --- Tag Tornede Fv Rosones FV RanMme Changen Due
,. ,, . i Nwaher Number RanMag RenMag Chengue . To Espost
- m. ,, py Chemges udout CCF Poesi Review
, Cheases ' TeMe 0 TBX-CSAPBA41 BORIC AOD TRANSFER PUMP 1-01 We We None No dience No change No chen0s No change We No Change Ngh TeMe 0 Tax-CSAPBA42 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 142 nre rue None No change No change Nochange No change n/a No Change Ngh - TeMe 0 TBX(SAPCH-01 (1) CENTRIFUGAL CHARGNG PUMP 1-01 0 0125 1 5301 Hgh No change No change No dien0s No change Hgh No Change 94gh TeMe 0 TBX-CSAPCH-02 CENTRtFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 1-02 0C271 2 1861 Hgh No change No change No dienge No change - Hgh No Change Hgh - TeMe 0 TEX-RHAPRH-01 (t) RESIOUAL HEAT PEMOVAL PUMP 1-01 0 0050 1.3488 hm No change Nochenes No change No change Modun No Change Ngh TeMe 0 - tex-RHAPRH-02 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 1-02 0 0088 1G201 Medmen No change No chenen No change No changs ' Modune No Chen0s Hgh TeMe 0 - TBX-SIAPSt-01 (1)~ SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1-01 0 0146 1 2559 Hgh No change No change No change No change Hgh No Change Hqph TeMe 0 ~ TBX-StAPSt-02 SAFETV INJECTION PUMP 1-02 0 0257 1 4500 High No change No change No dience No change Ngh No Change Heh l i l l l-i !
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- l. ** the munal IPE adme based on FV seen se enames eres , Tame 5-l Page 2 l
l L
I Tabic 5-1 ID-EA-006 Summary of Risk Ranking Results for IST C~-W
- Sorted By IST Plan
' IPEEE Fire & Lasgo, Eady COF Ranking ,,,g ni,a i,,,,, ,g Outage funk g,,,,,,,, Tabee &- 2 Tag Torname FV notossa FV RanMag Changes Duo c_ ; g,,, ,,,,,,_y,,,,,, On M Muniber Numinor
"'""'"E """"E *'"8'"
- I Worth
- on FV ** Chasigne Changes - Study '
Changes Changes udent CCF Panel flowlser L MD AFW PMP 1-01 TO CST RECtRC FLO Table 1 1-FV-2456 VLV n/a Wa n/a n/a n/a n/a No change Wa Law Low MD AFW PMP 1-02 TO CST RECIRC FLO Tame 1 1-FV-2457 VLV We n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change We Low Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 OtSCH TO SG 1-01 ! Tatdo 1 1-HV-2459 FLO CTRL WV n/a n/a None No change Low - No change No change We No Chan0s low ! l TO AFW PMP t-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 Table 1 1-HV-2460 FCV Wa n/a None No change Low No change No change n/a No Change Low i TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 Table 1 1-HV-2461 (1) FLO CTRL WV n/a n/a None No change Low No chan0s ' No change None No Change Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 Tatde 1 1-HV-2462 FLO CTRL VLV O0000 1 9356 None No change Low No change No change None No Change LD* , t Tatde 1 1-HV-2480 MD AFW PMP 1-01 SSW SUCT ISOL VLV n/a n/a Wa n/a n/a n/a No change n/a Low Low Tatde 1 1-HV-2481 MD AFW PMP 102 SSW SUCT ISOL WV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change We Low ' Low , Tatdo 1 14tV-2482 TD AFW PMP 1-01 SSW SUCT ISOL VLV n/a n/a n/a We n/a n/a No dienge Wa low Low Tatde 1 1-HV-2484 CST 1-01 DeSCH VLV 2484 n/a n/a n/a We n/a n/a No change n/a Low Low Tatde t 1-HV-2485 CST 1-Ol DISCH EV 2485 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a Low Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 OtSCH TO SG 1-01 , Table 1 1-HV-2491A ISOL WV n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change Wa No Change Low > MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 Vatde 1 1-HV-24918 ISOL VLV We n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 fatda 1 1-HV-2492A ISOL VLV n/a n/a None No change No chan0s No dien0s No change n/a No Change Low ? MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 I Table 1 1-HV-24928 tSOL VLV We n/a None No chen0e No change No change No change We No Change Low MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 Table 1 1-HV-2493A ISOL VLV n/a n/a None No change No change No dienge No change We No Change Low TO AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-03 Table 1 1-HV-24938 LSOL VLV n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low l MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 Tabes i 1-HV-2494A ISOL VLV n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low I TD AFW PMP 1-01 OtSCH TO SG 1-04 Table 1 1-HV-24948 ISOL WV n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change We No Change Lew l l Table 1 1-LV-24T8 DEMIN WTR TO CST 1-01 MU VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a We No change n/a Low Low l MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 l Table 1 1-PV-2453A FLO CTRL VLV n/a n/a None Noc" N Low No change No change n/a No Change Los l MD AFW PMP 1-Gl DeSCH TO SG 1-02 i Table 1 1-PV-24538 CTRL VLV n/a Wa None Nocf j Low No change No change n/a No Change Low i MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-03 CTRL VLV n/a We None No change Low No change No change None No Change Low ! Tatdo 1 1-PV-2454A (1)
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Tabic 5-I ER-E6009 Summary of Risk Ranking Results for IST Components ( Soned By IST Plan Risk butlaiIPE Outage Risk Seiende Risk Final Ranking
* '" '8 Cofnponent Description Fussell-Vesely
- Achievement Ra Based king On IST Changee Changee wrout CCF Panel Rev6ew MO AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 TaNe 1 1-PV-24548 CTRL VLV O0000 2 8715 None No change Low No change No change None No Change Low DEMIN WTR TO CST 141 MU LN CHK TaNe 1 1AF-0009 VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a Low Low CST TO MD AFW PMP 1-01 SUCT CHK TaNe1 1AF-0014 VLV 00003 2 0232 Low No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low CST TO MD AFW PMP 142 SUCT CHK Table 1 1AF-0024 VLV O0004 2 4741 Low No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low TaNe1 1AF-0032 CST 1-01 TO TD AFW PMP CHK VLV O0003 2 0581 Low No change No change No change No change Low No Change Low Table 1 1AF-0038 TO AFW PMP 141 DiSCH CHK VLV O0003 2 0581 Low No change No change No change N3 change Low No Change Low Table 1 1 AF-0041 TO AFW PMP i-01 DISCH ISOL VLV O0002 2 0582 Low No dange No change No change No change Low No Change Low TaNe 1 1AF-0042 TO AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TST ISOL VLV Wa n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a low Low TD AFW PMP 141 DISCH RECIRC CHK TaWe 1 1AF-0045 VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a low Low iaNe 1 1 AF-0051 MO AFW PMP 1-02 DiSCH CHK VLV O0004 2 4741 Low No change No change No change No ; p Low No Change Low Table 1 1AF-0054 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH tSOL VLV O0003 2 4741 Low No change No change No change No change Low No Change Low 1AF-0055 MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TST ISOL VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a low Low Table 1 MD AFW PMP 142 DISCH RECIRC CHK Table 1 1AF-0057 VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a Na n/a No change We Low Low Tabie 1 MD AFW PMP 1-01 OtSCH CHK VLV O0003 2 0232 Low No change No change No change No dange Low No Change Low 1AF-0065 (1)
Table 1 MD AFW PMP 1-01 OtSCH ISOL WV 00002 2.0232 Low No change No dange No chanQe No change Low No Change Low 1AF-0066 (1) TaNe 1 1AF-0067 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DtSCH TST ISOL VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n'a low Low MD AFW PMP 1-01 DiSCH RECtRC CHK 1 AF-0069 VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a Low Low
-Vable 1 MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 TaNe 1 1AF-0075 CHK VLV n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Los TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-01 Table 1 1AF-0078 CHK VLV n/a n/a None No dange No change No change No change n/a No Change Low MD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-02 Table 1 1AF-0083 CHK VLV n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Los TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 142 Table 1 1AF-0086 CHK VLV n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 143 Table 1 1AF-0093 CHK VLV n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change Wa No Change Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 DtSCH TO SG 1-03 TaNe 1 1AF-0098 CHK VLV n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low MD AFW PMP 1-02 DISCH TO SG 1-04 Table 1 1AF-0101 CHK VLV n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low TD AFW PMP 1-01 DISCH TO SG 1-04 TaNo 1 1AF-0106 CHK VLV n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low
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~. _ . _ _ . - - - ._ . - . . . ~ , - _ - - . ._- _. .- . .
't Table 5-1 ER-EA-009 ,
Summary of Risk Ranking Results for IST Components Scted By tST Plan 4 IPEEE Fire & Lage Early CDF RanMng
,,,, m ip, Tam Component Tag Fuesea-voseer
- Achievement RanMng sh==-,
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n W n n n /n /n /n t s n W o /n n /n n /n n n in WCW e N N L L k s e e e e e e e e s e e e e e e e e s e g e g ie gs g g
; g g g g g g g 0 g g g g g g n
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g n e g n e 0 n e e 0 n e e m u m a m e g n a e g n a e g n a a e g n a a a e g n a e /a /a a g n a g n a e g n a a a h / h hc h o na n h h hc hc W id e d hc h h c /n h c /n /n c W n n n c c ? C T "Mg ah RC N c o N c o N o N o M M e N o N c o N o N o N o N o .o N N o S I I r fo s ! e ! ts Ema e e e e e g 1- lu Pn.y e e r e e e a e e n e a a a n n n a s l n n w u a w w o n n n n /a o o o o P 5 e le gp o o o o /n o o o o /n o d n N W /n /n /n N N N icR tt inki, n, N N L L L L N N N N 1 5 ba g n i n a le Ti k R b a n T a t R k s n. e m 0 0 0 8 5 a a a a a a a a a a i k se a a 4 4
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4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 n" l b 4 4 ' 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 d e e e o e le le le t e ba m e ib e Ma le le d o lb e le b le b le b lb le b le b l b b le le b is b l b dt lb b b b r o T N u a b a b a t a a a a a a a a a a a a a e a a T a T a T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T S T re
Table 5-1 ER-IM409 Re Summary of Risk Ranking Results for IST O=:-m, 7 Scted By IST Plan Risk initialIPE Outage Risk Selandc Risk Final Ranking Ta m Component Tag *** Component Description Fuseett-Vesely
- Achievement Ranking Based Ranking Ranking Based On IST Number *" "" *"8**
- Number Worth
- on FV " Changee Changee Study Changes Changes w/out CCF Panet Review Table 4 1-8351D RC Pmp 1-04 Si Wtr inj W n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low 1-8378A RCS Loop 144 Chrg Dnstrm Chk W n/a n/a None No change No change No change No eange n/a No Change Low Table 4 RCS Loop 1-04 Chrg Upstrm Chk W n/a n/a Hone No change No dange No change No dange n/a No Change Low Table 4 1-83788 RCS LOOP 141 CHRG LN DNSTRM CHK 1-8379A VLV n/a Wa n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a low Low Table 4 RC4 LOOP 1-01 CHRG LN OPSTRM CHK 1-83798 VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a low Low Table 4 1-8381 Chrg Ln Orc Chk Viv n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low Table 4 Table 4 Ccp 141 Disch Cbk Vhr 0 0001 1 5050 Low No change No change No change No change Low No Change Low 1-8481 A (1)
Table 4 1-8481B Ccp 142 Disch Chk W 00003 2 0913 Low No change No change No changh No change Lcnne No Change Low 1-8497 Pd Pmp 141 Disch Chk W n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low Table 4 Table 4 1-8510A CCP 1-01 ALT MINIFLO RLF VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a low Low Table 4 1-8510B CCP 1-02 ALT MINIFLO RLF VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No dange n/a low Low Table 4 14511 A Ccp 1-01 Alt Mwuno tsoi Vht 00012 4 8723 Medaam No char:ge No change No change No change None No Change Ngh Table 4 1-85118 Ccp 1-02 An Medio isol Viv 00012 4 8723 Medmarn No change No mange No change No change None No Change Ngh Table 4 1-8512A Ccp 1-02 A:t Modlo tsoi W 00012 4 8723 Meduan No change No change No change No change None No Change Hgh Table 4 1-85128 Ccp 1-01 Alt Mmdlo isol Viv 00012 4 8723 Medum No change No change No change No change None No Change Hgh Table 4 1-8546 Rwst 1-01 To Chrg Pmp Suct Chk Vhr 00002 1 7840 Low Medum No change Modum No change Low No Change Ngh U1 RCS MU TO CHRG PMP FLO CTRL Table 4 1-FCV-01100 VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n'a low Low RMUW TO CVCS BA BLNDR 1-01 FLO Table 4 1-FCV4111 A CTRL VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a low Low Table 4 1-FCV-0111B RCS MU TO VCT 1-01 ISOL VLV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a No change n/a Low Low U1 CHARGE PMP SUCT Hi PNT VNT VLV Table 4 1-HV-8220 8220 n/a n/a None No change No change No dange No change n/a No Change Low Table 4 1-HV-8221 U1 CHARGE PMP Hi PNT VNT VLV 8221 n/a n/a None No change No change No change No change n/a No Change Low VCT 1-01 TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV Table 4 1-LCV-01128 (1)(4) 01128 0 0002 1 7841 Low Medom No change No dange No change Low increesed Hgh a m ad - . - u.a.mu saw.e dass sai masca dw eralis of es symauen om Table 5-I Page 12
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