ML20077Q513

From kanterella
Revision as of 09:59, 25 April 2020 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Interim Deficiency Rept NY-QA-5 Re Main Steam & Feedwater Penetration Anchors.Initially Reported on 830609.Pipe Rupture Analysis & Seismic Analyses Conducted.Final Rept Expected by 830915
ML20077Q513
Person / Time
Site: Satsop
Issue date: 08/01/1983
From: Dobson D
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To: Sternberg D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, GO3-83-612, NY-QA-5, NUDOCS 8309160133
Download: ML20077Q513 (2)


Text

.

= .

?jWn Washington Public Power Box 1223 Elma Washington Supply System'fy,',' '/

98541 (206)482-4428 f Docket No. 50-508 /2' Pg NGp.;,,i e August 1, 1983 G03-83-612 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V Office of Inspection and Enforcement 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 260 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. D. M. Sternberg, Chief Reactor Projects Branch No. 1

Subject:

POTENTIAL 10CFR50.55(e) DEFICIENCY MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER PENETRATION ANCHORS (D/N N0. NY-QA-5)

Reference:

a) Letter, G03-83-466, R. S. Leddick to D. M. Sternberg, same subject, dated June 9, 1983.

Reference a) transmitted an Interim Report concerning the subject condi-tion. In order to determine the safety significance of this incident, additional analyses must be performed. Attached is a Supply System Interim Report describing the progress of the analyses.

It is anticipated that a final report will be provided to your office by September 15, 1983. Should you have any questions or desire further information, please contact me directly.

MR _

D. E. Dobson (760)

Acting Program Director, WNP-3/5 JAV:nj Attachment cc: J. Adams - NESCO D. Smithpeter - BPA Ebasco - New York WNP-3 Files - Richland R. D. Hill - Puget Sound Power & Light Company P. Inman - Washington Water Power Company B. D. Withers - Portland General Electric Company L. D. Weislogel - Pacific Power & Light Company 8309160133 830801 PDR ADOCK 05000508 S PDR II q

-p /

t

WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 3 (DOCKET NO. 50-508)

POTENTIAL 10CFR50.55(e) DEFICIENCY INTERIM REPORT MAIN STEAM AND FEEDWATER PENETRATION ANCHORS (D/N NO. NY-QA-5)

Description of Deficiency The stress analyses of the Main Steam and Feedwater lines include an anchor point at the outboard end of the containment penetrations.

It is assumed, per Ebasco practice, that the anchoring structure provides a gap (between the flued head trunnion and structural element) of 1/16 inch (maximum). However, during investigation of an as-built discre-pancy, it was found that 1/4 inch gaps were provided as specified on two Ebasco drawings. Further investigation disclosed that the Ebasco Civil Group had provided the 1/4 inch gap in order to facilitate instal-lation, but had not obtained approval for this gap magnitude from the Stress Analysis Group. These larger gaps are considered a potential problem because the additional clearances in the anchoring structure may allow stresses in the affected piping to exceed allowable levels.

Corrective Actions The following actions have been/are being taken to resolve the problem:

1) The Engineer has conducted pipe rupture analysis to determine that all criteria are met with the 1/4 inch gaps at the anchor lugs and seismic analyses to show compliance with the pipe stress criteria.
2) The results of the pipe rupture analyses, as reported by the Engineer, indicate that all criteria will be met with the 1/4 inch gap at the anchor lugs.
3) The results of the seismic analyses, as reported by the Engineer, show compliance with the pipe stress criteria with the excaption of a support failure. Additional analysis omitting this support is being performed to show that such a failure will not prevent compliance with pipe stress criteria.
4) Upon receipt of the final report, the Supply System will review the actual results of the analyses and evaluate the Engineer's final report.

Reason Why The Final Report Will Be Delayed In order to determine safety significance, additional analyses must be performed. Further time is required for their completion and evaluation. It is anticipated that a final report will be provided by September 15, 1983.