ML20082B955

Prefiled Testimony of Wg Hairston on Diesel Generator Reporting Issues.* Related Correspondence

ML20082B955
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	04/04/1995
From:	Hairston W GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20082B958	List: ML20082B955 ML20082C012 ML20082C045 ML20082C092 ML20082C112 ML20082C137 ML20082C143 ML20082C146
References
CON-#295-16576 93-671-OLA-3, OLA-3, NUDOCS 9504060105
Download: ML20082B955 (21)

Text

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MLATED OORRESPONDENCE DOCKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  % APR -4 All :C6 BEFORE THE ATOMIC EAFETY AND LICENSING BOFhhflCE OF SECRETARY

))CKEllHG 1 ',tEllCt BRAliCH In the Matter of  :

Docket Nos. 50-424-OLA-3 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, 31 A1  : 50-425-OLA-3

Re: License Amendment (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, : (Transfer to Units 1 and 2)  : Southern Nuclear)

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ASLBP NO. 93-671-OLA-3 PREFILED TESTIMONY j OF

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W. GEORGE HAIRSTON, III i ON DIESEL GENERATOR REPORTING ISSUES i

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9504060105 950404 PDR ADOCK 05000424

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4 1 TESTIMONY OF W. GEORGE HAIRSTON, III 2 Q: WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT POSITION?

3 A: I am the Executive Vice President of Georgia Power Company, 4 responsible for nuclear operations at Plant Vogtle and Plant 5 Hatch, as well as President and Chief Operating Officer of 6 Southern Nuclear Operating Co. Southern Nuclear is the 7 licensed operator of the Farley Nuclear Plant owned by Alabama 8 Power Company. A summary of my professional qualifications is 9 attached hereto as Exhibit A.

10 Q: WHAT WAS YOUR POSITION IN GEORGIA POWER ON MARCH 20, 1990 AT 11 THE TIME OF THE VOGTLE UNIT 1 SITE AREA EMERGENCY?

12 A: I was Senior Vice President of Georgia Power, reporting to R.

13 Patrick Mcdonald, who was the Executive Vice President of 14 Georgia Power.

15 Q: WHAT WAS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE APRIL 9,1990 MEETING BETWEEN 16 GEORGIA POWER AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REGION 17 II, CONCERNING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE SITE AREA 18 EMERGENCY?

19 A: I attended the April 9, 1990 meeting. While I was not 20 involved in the detailed preparations for the meeting, either 21 on the morning of April 9 or late in the afternoon the day 22 before, I briefly looked over the overlays or " transparencies" 23 to be used in the presentation to Region II. Others in the l 24 Vogtle organization prepared the presentation.

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'if -Q: WHAT'IS YOUR' RECOLLECTION OF THE PRESENTATION TO'THE NRC?

2 A: . Mr. Ken McCoy, the Vice President of Vogtle, who reported to- -l 3- -me, probably opened the meeting. Thereafter, the General 4 Manager of Plant Vogtle, George Bockhold, basically used the 5 transparencies and gave the presentation. There were a number 6 of issues discussed during the meeting. For example,_one of 7 the issues that 'took up significant time related to vital 8 areas -- where vehicles could go within the Plant which might, 9 as was the case on March 20th, constitute a vulnerability _for 10 similar, future events. I recall my personal involvement in 11 - discussing a schedule for "long term" corrective action to be 12 submitted by May 15, 1990. ,

t 13 Q: WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE APRIL 9 MEETING, TO YOUR.

14 RECOLLECTION?

15 A: Georgia Power, as the licensee, was to address a number _of 16 issues that the NRC, in particular the Incident Investigation 17 Team ("IIT") which had studied the event and the Region, was 18 interested in; what we had done in terms of corrective actions 19 and some of the things that we were going to do in the future 20 to address the contributors to the event. Plant Vogtle had 21 been issued a confirmation of action letter by the NRC shortly 22 after the March 20 event, and the meeting was certainly one of 23 the steps along the way to restart of Unit 1.

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~1. ~ Q: WAS THE ~ ISSUE OF DIT.SEL GENERATOR TESTING AND ASSOCIATED 2- OPERABILITY AND RELIABILIN ' ADDRESSED IN THE APRIL. 9 MEETING?

l3 A: Yes. The issue of diesel rellanility and the diesel testing,

4 as well as the associated Calcon' switches (sensors), while not 5 a principal focus of the meeting, was addressed.- Most of the.

6 time spent in the meeting was talking about things'other than 7 testing of the. diesel or the switches, such,as vital areas, 8 which I have described before,: outage planning and related 9 issues, and personnel accountability following the Event.

10 The Unit 1, A-train diesel generator had failed to

' 11 - perform on March 20, 1990 and placed the plant in the site 12 area emergency condition. We were prepared and did address 13 the diesel testing and the Calcon switches.. The NRC's IIT' 14 team and Vogtle employees had been working together on a daily -

15 basis'at the Plant concerning the diesel generators. As I 16 viewed it, the diesel generator portion of the presentation 17 was to give an overall view on diesel testing and the Calcon 18 switches.

19 As I recall, part of that IIT team was on a conference

'20 call from another location and listened to our presentation to 21 Region II. So, unlike some other meetings with the NRC, the 22 NRC had studied this aspect of the event quite closely through 23 direct observation before the meeting. I also recall assuring 24 that the IIT team was obtaining the relevant information at 25 the site as they reviewed the event; my sense was that at the 26 April 9 meeting the NRC eventually acknowledged the .

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• i 1: cooperation which we gave the team. Later on July 20,-1990,

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-2 the' Regional. Administrator expressly acknowledged ~'that-13 -cooperation' as he lifted the last item of the NRC's  !

4 confirmation of action letter. Aga NRC's July 20, 1990 letter  !

'5 attached to Mr. McCoy's testimony as Exhibit 0-(GPC Exh. 17).

6- Q: WAS ' A LETTER. SENT BY GEORGIA POWER TO THE NRC ON APRIL 9, i

7 1990, RELATED TO THE~ MEETING? i 8' A: Yes. I signed ' a letter out that evening. The letter's 9 purpose was to communicate what-was said in the meeting and 10 the commitments which we had made.

t 11 Q: WAS THE INFORMATION PRESENTED TO THE NRC ON APRIL 9, 1990 IN ,

12 THE MEETING AND IN THE CONFIRMATION OF ACTION RESPONSE LETTER ,

13 ACCURATE AND COMPLETE IN ALL MATERIAL RESPECTS?

14 A: No. Both were inaccurate relative to the number of

15. successful, consecutive diesel starts with no problems.

l 16 Q: WHAT DO YOU THINK WAS MEANT BY THE "18" AND "19" SUCCESSFUL ,

17 STARTS ON THE DIESEL TESTING OVERLAY AND IN THE APRIL 9 18 LETTER?

19 A: I interpreted them both as indicating that there was a 20 significant number of successful starts as you go back from 21 April 9 -- 18 and 19 for diesels 1A and 1B, respectively --

22 and that these starts were consecutive. ,

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1 1 Q:- tWHAT WAS INACCURATE IN THE APRIL 9. LETTER?

- i 2' 'A: .We' stated that the IB diesel generatorJhad bee.n started 19 3' ' times-and that during these particular starts there were "no 4 failures or problems." In fact, we later determined that of 5 the.19s starts, three (3) of the' starts had problems either

~6 during the starting ' sequence or during the running of the ,

7 machine. Georgia Power made these statements to indicate that ,

8 the diesel generator was started successfully madh.' time in a.

9 number of consecutive start attempts. Such a representation 10 was supportive of Georgia Power Company's conclusion that the 11 diesel generators were operable and the likely cause of the 12 diesel. trips on March 20 had been determined. .

P 13 Q: WHAT WAS YOUR INVOLVEMENT, IF ANY, IN THE PREPARATION OF

14. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 90-006 OF APRIL 19, 1990.

15 A: Either on the afternoon of April 18 or early in the morning of .,

I 16 April 19th, I was provided with a draft of the Licensee Event 17 Report ("LER"). I reviewed the' draft LER relative to my.

18 personal knowledge about the event, which was based, in part, 19 on the April 9, 1990 meeting with the NRC. I do recall, i 20 although not in detail, several issues which I identified as 21 needing clarification:

22 (1) I had a question about the timing of the declaration of-23 the Site Area Emergency and subsequent notification ,

24 activity; -

25 (2) I had a question concerning Georgia Power's policy on ,

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1- class 2 drivers' licenses; "2- (3) I had a question about what the operator saw and did when

-3 he went to the diesel generator; and-4- (4)' I had a question about the' number of diesel starts. l

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5 .I recall that'I wanted-to-check the accuracy.of each of these  ;

6 statements. I believe I gave my questions to one of'my

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7 . licensing engineers. I think he/she was' Mr. Jack i 1

8 Stringfellow. l 9 Q: WHAT WAS YOUR QUESTION ABOUT THE NUMBER OF SUCCESSFUL STARTS? )

-10 A: The number of successful starts' designated in the draft LER 11 was greater than 20. I was aware.of the "18" and "19" 12 successful start data from April 9, and saw a difference.- So 13 I asked for this to be checked.

'14 Q: WERE YOUR QUESTIONS ANSWERED?

15- A: Yes, later, in the afternoon of April 19. In the morning of l 16 April 19 I went to Atlanta to a grievance proceeding and 17 returned to my Alabama office sometime after 12:00. noon -

t 18 Central Time. Later on the 19th, I recall a general consensus 19 in wording. I also remember successful start numbers proposed 20 for the LER which were well into the 20's. In the end, the 21 LER that was presented to me was represented as. being >

22 accurate, and included wording which said that subsequent to f 23 a comprehensive test program of the control systems of the  ;

24 diesels, each of the diesels had been " started at least 18

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1. times'each and no failures or problems had occurred duringlany.

2 of : these starts." I considered that this statement: was "3

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consistent with what was presented in Atlanta to NRC Region II j 4 and what was in the earlier April 9 letter. f 5 I.do not recall comparing the final. language in the LER .

l 6 as issued with the draft LER language.- In practice I would -

7 have taken the earlier draft and compared the wording .with.the 8 new revision or someone on my staff would have pointed out the 9 revised language which was responsive to my questions.

10- Q: WAS IT IMPORTANT TO YOU THAT THE NUMBERS IN THE APRIL 19 LER 11 SHOULD BE THE SAME AS THE NUMBERS THAT WERE IN THE APRIL 9 12 LETTER?

13 A: No, and I don't recall that being discussed. ;irnat

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14 important to me was assuring that the LER was accurate.  !

15 When I signed the LER out, and when I signed the April 9 16 letter out, I believed them both to be true and accurate.

17 Q: DO YOU RECALL BEING ON A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, LATE IN THE 18- AFTERNOON OF APRIL 19, 1990, IN WHICH THE LANGUAGE IN THE LER 19 CONCERNING DIESEL GENERATOR STARTS WAS FINALIZED?

20 A: No. I do not have a recollection on being involved in such a 21 conversation.

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1 Q: WAS THE LER ACCURATE -CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF SUCCESSFUL '

2' STARTS OF THE DIESEL GENERATORS WITHOUT PROBLEMS OR FAILURES? ,

z3 A: No. It- turns out that the phrase " comprehensive test program" .;

-4 of the diesel generator control systems introduced an.

~5 - ambiguity, not precision. In hindsight, I know that the 6 " comprehensive test program" phrase ("CTP") ' was reasonably l 7 subject to different interpretations which would result in' i i

8 different messages. More specifically, the connotation given t 9 to the phrase by the General Manager, George Bockhold, at the 10 time was after sensor calibration and logic testing - at least 11 with respect to the 1B diesel generator. There were at-least ,

12 18 consecutive-starts based on this. meaning. However,'there i 13 were only 12 consecutive successful' starts if the definition 14 of the CTP . phrase is " starting with and after the first

'15 surveillance test for operability." -

i 16 Q: DO YOU CONSIDER THE INACCURACY TO BE SIGNIFICANT? l 17 A: Yes, from the standpoint of Georgia Power's policy of assuring l

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18 all information provided to the NRC is complete and accurate.

19 However, I do not believe that the inaccuracy of the sentence 20 affects the primary message of the LER:. that the likely root 21 cause of the diesel trips on March 20 had been identified as l t

22 the Calcon high jacket water temperature sensors. One factor .

j 23 supportive of this correct root cause identification is that l 24 at least 18 consecutive, successfur starts have been' observed ,

i 25 after corrective action had been taken an the sensors. The j l

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f l' same conclusion would have been drawn from 12 consecutive 2 successful starts. In addition, I know that NRC 3 representatives were at the Vogtle site during the recovery 4' from the Site Area Emergency and observed our corrective 5 action related to the diesel generators.

6 Q: WHEN WERE YOU FIRST AWARE THAT THE LER 90-006 WAS INCORRECT?

7 A: In May, 1990 when either Ken McCoy or Bill Shipman mentioned 8 to me that the " number of starts" in the LER was incorrect.

9 I believe that I became aware of the LER's error after May 10 18th.

11. Q: WHY DO YOU RECALL THE DATE OF MAY 18?

12 A: I was in Miami, Florida during the week of May 15, 1990 and it -

13 was after returning to Birmingham that I became aware of the 14 error.

15 Q: WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION WHEN YOU LEARNED OF THE INACCURACY?

16 A: I was irritated by the performance of my staff, since Georgia 17 Power had stated tylga to the NRC that there had been at least 18 "18" consecutive successful starts. On May 24 I placed a call 19 to Mr. Stewart Ebneter, the Region II Administrator. I told 20 Mr. Ebneter that the number of successful starts in the LER .

1 21 for the Site Area Emergency was in error. I also conveyed to 22 him the " correct" numbers which had been supplied to me (I 23 believe 14 and 15 for the two diesels). I also told him that l

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il-  : Georgia Power planned to submit two revisions to the LER. The

'2 first revision would correct the diesel, generator start' count,  !

3 and the other, later, revision would document for the public >

4 record - the. conclusions derived from a test program being 5 conducted ' on ' the Calcon sensors by Wyle Laboratory, an i- '6. independent test lab.

7 Q: WHY DID YOU PLACE A CALL TO THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR?

81 A: I wanted the NRC to be' aware of the mistake. I do not like 4 9 errors in documents to the NRC. Georgia Power's process for 10 development and verification of LERs is designed to preclude ,

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. such errors since a licensee of the NRC like Georgia Power has t

12 an obligation to provide information which is accurate and 13 complete in all material respects.  ;

14 Q: ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY OTHER NOTIFICATION TO THE NRC THAT THE 15 LER WAS IN ERROR?

16 A: I recall that I directed Ken McCoy to call Ken Brockman about 17 this time and inform him of the LER " start count" error.

18 Given our established practice, I am sure that he did so. I 19 also recall that George Bockhold or. other managers at the 20 plant site were to inform the NRC Resident Inspector of the 21 error.

l 22 Q: DID GEORGIA POWER ISSUE THE LER REVISIONS?

23 A: Yes, in one document rather than two. In late May, 1990, I J l

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-1 asked. Ken McCoy or Bill Shipran about the-status of.the'.LER 2 revisions. I was told that the two revisions would be 3 combined into one and-that they were-waiting for.the test lab ~

4 data. I mentally noted that I had told Mr. Ebneter that the ,

5 two revisions would be forthcoming,-'and that I would have to 6 give him an explanation at some point in the future that one, 7 rather than two, LER revisions would be submitted. l 8 Q: WHEN WAS A DRAFT REVISION OF THE LER FIRST PRESENTED TO YOU?

9 A: On or about June 8, 1990 I was first provided with a draft of l

10 revision 1 to LER 90-006. As I recall, I arrived to work in 11 the morning and a draft of the revised LER was in my "in"  !

12 basket. I briefly reviewed it and noted that the diesel start

.13 -count data was different than the previous data from mid-May..

14 I became extremely irritated: the data was different and,

.15 more significantly, no one had flagged or highlighted the 16 issue for me or included an explanation in the transmittal .

17 letter of why the data was different. The draft cover letter 18 for the revised LER merely said, in effect, "here's the l 19 revision." I expected more than that. At a minimum, I 20 thought, both I and the NRC should be given an explanr#: ion of i 1

21 why the numbers were different. My attention was drawn to the  !

22 numbers, at the time because that was the specific data which 23 I had requested to be checked for the draft LER.

s 1 Q: WHAT WERE THE NUMBERS OF DIESEL STARTS IN THE FIRST DRAFT OF 2 REVISION 3 WHICH YOU WERE PRESENTED?

3 A:- I think there were 10'and 12, or 12 and 10, for the train A 4 and train B engines.

5 Q: WHAT ACTIONS, IF ANY, DID YOU TAKE?

6 A: First, I went to see Bill Shipman; I believe Mr. McCoy was in 7 Washington, D.C. Second, Bill and I called a Safety Audit and

'8 Engineering Review ("SAER") representative at the Plant Vogtle 9 site because his supervision was not available and I was very 10 specific in giving him my directions. I told him that the 11 number in the LER had changed, once again. I wanted to know 12 what the correct number was, and I wanted to know why we were 13 having trouble counting these starts. I requested him to give 14 me a report.

15 Third, I called Mr. Ebneter again -- on June 14th based 16 on the telephone billing reports. I told Mr. Ebneter that, 17 although he would find it hard to believe, the diesel 18 generator count numbers had changed once again and it was 19 different than the information which I had previously told him 20 on May 24th. I told him that only one revised LER would be 21 provided to the NRC, that I was sending out "QA" to conduct an 22 audit of the numbers and that the site Resident Inspector 23 would be provided a copy of the QA report. I may have 24 described QA's effort as an " independent audit" which would be 25 completed before the LER revision would be sent in. Mr.

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14 Ebneter and I reflected on the frustration-that higher level' 2 managers- within large organizations ~can. experienceL when

?3 relying on : statements or other 'information supplied by .

4 subordinates. In my conversations on May 24 and June 14 with 5 him, Mr. Ebneter never-indicated to me a problem nor sense of 6 urgency associated with the anticipated changes which I told 7 him would be coming to correct the LER information.

8 Fourth, at approximately the same time that I called Mr.

9 Ebneter, I instructed Ken McCoy to call Ke'n Brockman to inform 10 him of the revised " start count." On either June 15 or June 11 19 I checked with Bill Shipman to confirm that Mr. McCoy had 12 been able to contact Mr. Brockman. Mr. Shipman told me that  !

13 Mr. McCoy had delegated the contact to Brockman to him 14 (Shipman), and that he had not completed the call. I directed 15 Mr. Shipman' to place .the ' call post-haste either to  ;

i 16 Mr. Brockman or Mr. Al Herdt in the Region.

i 17- Q: DID YOU CONFIRM THAT CALL TOOK PLACE? '

18 A: Yes. I am sure I did.

19 Q: DID YOU RECEIVE THE REPORT FROM THE SAER GROUF?

20 A: Yes. Initially, on June 28, 1990 I received a number of data 21 sheets for the diesel generator starts from the SAER group.

22 These data sheets eventually were attnched to the group's 12 3 report. I wanted the SAER group te reach a hard conclusion as 24 to the correct number to be used in the revised LER, a desire

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l 1 which I thought I had expressed with Bill Shipman earlier that -

2 month.. The data sheets did-not do this, so'I requested a Y- 3- report.

4 Q: WHAT DID THE SAER GROUP'S REVIEW SHOW7 5 A: The next day, June 29, I received the SAER report (McCoy Exh.

6 M; GPC Exh. 15), containing much more analysis and detail,.

7~ from Ken McCoy. Ken McCoy and I sat down with the tables that 8' were attached to - the report. Other people - were with us, 9 possibly Mark Ajluni and/or Bill Shipman. They showed us_

10 where the and of the then defined " test program" was on the l 11 tables in the report. This and coincided with the first 12 surveillance test procedura on the diesel generators.

- Using 13 the report's tables, Ken and I counted together and confirmed ,

14 the start numbers used in the correspondence. )

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15 Q: OTHER THAN PERSONALLY VERIFYING THE START NUMBERS IN THE 16 CORRESPONDENCE WERE CORRECT FROM THE SAER DATA, DID YOU.

17- REQUEST YOUR STAFF TO PERFORM OTHER TASKS?

18 A: Yes.

19 Q: WHAT WERE THEY? ,

20- A: I requested that two things be done. First, I told my staff 21 to be sure that the Resident Inspector at the Vogtle site ,

22 received a copy of the SAER report. This, in my mind, would 23 complete the commitments which I had made to Mr. Ebneter. ,

p-r l1: Second,'I instructed my staff to prepara an explanation of. the-

'2 differences in the count numbers between the original LER and 3 'the revised LER and to set the explanation out ' in the -

4 transmittal letter for the revised LER.-

Several. suggested 5' revisions of this cover letter were prepared by my staff; I

'6 was not satisfied with them. So I told my staff that we 7 needed to explain'why the revision to the LER was written in. t 8 a different context: _ different time frames - (the data was j 9 through some time in June rather than April 1990), and different kind of starts which were counted (valid tests and 10 11 failures rather than " successful starts"). I also wanted to-

-12 try to explain -- if the " successful start" terminology had 13 been used for the now-defined beginning point -- what .the  ;

14 number in the April 19 LER would have been had we stated  !

15 everything correctly, i

16 Q: -ON JUNE 29, 1990, DID YOU UNDERSTAND ' THAT THE TRANSMITTAL 17 LETTER TO THE LER REVISION ACCURATELY REFLECTED THE BASIS FOR 18 THE CHANGES IN THE REVISED LER?

19 A: Yes. As I understood the situation, we had explained in the 20 letter the different time frames and the different definition l

21 of starts applied in the revised LER (i.e. valid tests). We j l

22 also had explained what the " successful start" number would 23 have been if the comprehensive test program definition set out 24 in the cover letter had been used. What I did not know on 25 June 29, was that the Unit Superintendent, Mr. Jimmy Paul

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Cash,.who'had counted'the original'18 and 19 start numbers, 2- included starts which had problems or trips in his count'. At-1

- -3' .the time -of my June 25, 1993 Office' of- Investigation, i

4 interview, I understood that Mr. Cash had missed a trip on the '

-5 1B somewhere in the.first part of'the-testing runs. Only 6 later, after June, 1993, was I provided a copy of Mr. Cash's 7 typed start list. This list indicates that Mr. Cash included 8 starts in his count which had problems or trips shortly after 9 the start signal. I 10 Q: ON JUNE 29, 1990, DID YOU UNDERSTAND THAT RECORDKEEPING 11 PRACTICES CONTRIBUTED TO ERRORS IN THE " START COUNT" NUMBERS 12 IN THE APRIL 19, 1990 LER? IF SO, WHY?

13 A: Yes. The SAER report identified that as a reason for the 14 mistakas. This made sense to me. My general impression from 15 April 19 was that Vogtle site representatives were going out 16 and recounting the starts, and that different people counted 17 the starts on April 19 than on April 9. So I thought on June )

l 18 29 that there had been a verification effort for the LER which ,

19 was separate from the April 9 effort. Both came up with the l 20 same raw data, I thought. l 21 Today, I know that my general impression on April 19 was 22 correct: site representatives had collated data from the 23 control logs on diesel starts in an effort to verify the LER

- 24 statements. In contrast to the earlier Unit Superintendent's 25 effort, however, their data included April 10 through April

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rl- 19L I also now understand that in June the SAER group on s'ite

.2- did not attempt;to recreate the events leading lto the April 9

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'3- statement'or-to the April 19th LER. As-a result, the SAER 4 report drew inferences from its review of' documentation and. l l

5 basically addressed why, over time, different counters came up- j

6 with different start counts. -One underlying- factual 7.- assumption of the report is that control room logs were an-I 8 inadequate source for accurate and complete data. With 9 enhanced improvements in recordkeeping practices by the 10 Operations (data sheet completion) and Engineering Departments i 11 (timely updating), the Engineering Department's diesel start 12 log today should be an adequate source of data.

5 13 Q: DID YOU REALIZE IN JUNE, 1990 FROM YOUR REVIEW OF THE SAER 14 REPORT OR OTHERWISE, THAT THE ERROR IN THE APRIL 9, 1990 I i

15 LETTER TO THE NRC WAS DIFFERENT THAN THE ERROR IN THE APRIL 19 16 LER?

17 A: No. From my review of the report in June, I believed that the 18 raw data used for the April 9 start count number and the site-19 ~ verified April 19 start count number were synonymous and came 20 from control room logs. The June 29, 1990 SAER audit tables, 21 based on multiple sources of documentation, showed over 18 22 starts in a row prior to April 9 as being " successful starts."

23. However, some of these starts did exhibit " problems." By  !

l 24 changing terminology from an undefined " successful start" '

25 basis to Regulatory Guidance definitions for the revised LER, j i

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• li I thought we were also clarifying the. April 9 statement.

'2 Q:- DID GEORGIA POWER FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS IN ITS COMMUNICATIONS'

'3 WITH THE NRC CONCERNING DIESEL GENERATOR " START COUNTS?"

4 A: No, and it.also failed to comply.with.our policies. We-have-5~ taken corrective . actions to assure that we fulfil our I

6. obligations in the future. I told all of ' Georgia Power's 1

.7 Nuclear Employees by a meno dated May 11, 1994:

8 all of us should consider it our personal 9 responsibility. that when called upon to 10 communicate with the Nuclear Regulatory 11 Commission or its staff, whether orally or in 12 writing, we will do our best to ensure that 13 the information is complete and accurate in 14 all material respects. This is our obligation 15 by law, this is our obligation by the terms of 16 our licenses, but more importantly, it is the 17 right thing to do.

18 We should all remember, and take seriously, 19 that the policy of Georgia Power Company is to 1 20 conduct its business affairs in an honest, 21 ethical manner and to comply with all laws and 22 regulations affecting the company. Important j 23 to our success as a company is our success in l 24 compliance with our legal obligations. l 25 I also told the employees that we had a " community of 26 interest" in full, open, complete and accurate communications l 27 with ourselves as fellow workers and with our regulatory 28 agencies. The Senior Vice President reinforced that message 29 with plant employees when he met with them on May 11, 1994.

30 He explained that an open and proactive sharing of all 31 relevant and significant information with the NRC is essential 32 -- even if goes beyond the scope of an information request.

33 These corrective actions validated earlier efforts, beginning I

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I 1- in the Summer of 1990, to strengthen internal communications 2 between the corporate office and the plant site - by, among 3 other things, holding manager team-building meetings. The 4 NRC's ' frank observations - to l Georgia - Power officers _ in May, 5 1990, concerning our operations contributed to the recognition 6 at that time of this communication weakness.

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L GPC EXHIBIT 19

- HAIRSTON EX. A -

,t Statement of Qualifications of- ,

W. GEORGE HAIRSTON. IH l

George Hairston is President' and Chief Executive Officer of Southern Nuclear ;

Operating Company and Executive Vice President of Georgia Power Company.  ;

i Hairston joined The Southern Company system in 1967 as a junior engineer at  ;

Alabama Power Company. In 1972, he 3 as assigned to the company's Farley Nuclear :

Plant as an operations supervisor where he held positions of mcreasmg responsibility. j In 1978 he was' named plant manager.  !

O In 1984 Hairston returned to Alabama Power's corporate headquarters as j manager of nuclear engineering and technical support. A year later he was named -

general manager of nuclear support. In 1987 Hairston was elected vice president of i nuclear generation. l In 1988, when The Southern Company announced plans to form Southern R

Nuclear, he was elected senior vice president of nuclear operations of both Alabama Power Company and Georgia Power Company. In 1990, when Southern Nuclear was -

incorporated, he was named senior vice president of that company. In 1992, he was .

named executive vice president of Southern Nuclear. In May 1993, he was elected to President and Chief Operating Officer at Southern Nuclear and in June 1993, he was-elected to his present position at Georgia Power Company. In December.1993, he received the additional position of Chief Executive Office at Southern Nuclear.

Hairston is chairman of both the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Nuclear Strategic Issues Advisory Committee and the NEI Nuclear Strategic Issues Steering  !

Group. He is also chairman of the National Nuclear Accrediting Board and is past  :

chairman of the Industry Review Group for the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations' (INPO) Evaluation and Assistance Division. Hairston also held a Nuclear Regulatory Commission senior reactor operator's license for eight years.

A native of Birmingham, Hairston received a bachelor's degree in industrial j engineering from Auburn University and a master's degree in nuclear engineering'from )

the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is'a veteran of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, having served in the United States and Viet Nam from 1968-1970.

l Hairston and his wife, Paula, have three children, Michael Ward, Kenneth Craig l and William George IV. j 8/94 I

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