ML20084M137

Summary Rept on Oyster Creek Control Room Design Review

ML20084M137
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	04/30/1984
From:	GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20084M118	List: ML20084M113 ML20084M137
References
NUDOCS 8405150223
Download: ML20084M137 (76)

Text

fr ,

i

~

10.1

SUMMARY

. REPORT ON THE OYSTER CREEK ,

. CONTROL ROOM. DESIGN REVIEW April 1984 I.? .

(,

t f _I.

.. .IO; f~

8405150223 040430 PDR ADOCK 05000219 PDR F

h TABLE OF CONTENTS N

SUMMARY

REPORT ON THE OYSTER CREEK

~A-(~/ - CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW I. Introduction and History EA. History and Schedule B. Structure of This Report i i

C. Integration of Other Projects into the -

Control Room Design Review II. Review Team Organization and Structure  !

III. Functions and Task Analysis r A. Analysis of Operator Functions and ,

Responsibilities B. Functions and Task Analysis for Emergency Operating Procedures O

IV. Summary of Conclusions V. Corrective Action Program; Resolution of Deficiencies ,,

t A. Corrective Actions for Importance Category A Deficiencies B. Importance Category.B Corrective Actions i

.C. Ir.portance Category C Items l~

t l

i i N

i i

l 5

i r

p-I. INTRODUCTTON

- f)

(y A. History and Schedule

'This report' describes-the results-of a review of the design of the. control room for the Oyster _ Creek Nuclear Generating Station.' .The review examines and evaluates the centrols,. displays, _and physical environment of the control-room,1as they^ affect the ability of the control room. staff tol operate:the plant.

An overview of: the schedule of the design review _

activity ~is shown in Figure I-1. The' review began in late

- -1980, 'with' .the construction of a control room mockup to facilitate the control room evaluation process, the mockup has also _been used .to assess the ef fect of plant mod--

ifications on-the control _ room and'to verify modifications-

propcsed_to correct-control room deficiencies. In early-

'1981,. guidelines and objectives were formulatad to provide _.a Sf ermal. basis for-the control room design revie.. The review

. process itself began in'mid-1981 with walkthroughs, in the mockup, of several plant operational evolutions.

Shortly afterlthe review began,. work on-the evaluation

~

of--the control room,as a whole.was temporarily deferred, and-

' (^y the-effort _was focused on the evaluation'of the human fac-

-tors of-about twenty modifications affecting plant co'ntrols and: displays,Dand planned, at that time, for implementation in the-near future.- Examples of modifications for'which' .

-human factors-evaluations were performed are listed in Table I-1.

. The most extensive modification planned was the replacetent of thef entire. plant alarm .=ystem, primarily to irpreve reliabil'ity and to provide sga;e for'the addition of new alarms. A-major review of>the alarm-system was-under-

~

taken, with .the - objective of ' adapting . the lessons learned t

.from'a similar review of :the TMI-l alarm system to the inpreverent of the Oyster Creek System. This effort was comple eg)in late-1981 and has been documented'in a_ separate re p o r t .' "

A substantial review effort has also been devoted to many of'the other planned changes - the inproved core spray (ib An Ecaluation o: r.r.e Oyster Creek Main Process Alarm Sys t en , . F.PR - 7 01, [4cetber 1981.

i /~N

[

I.1 O D

s . u .g n 6

0 e

~ - '

O

• R-1 .

o 0

n3,!!,$)1>.

I:

~

. y ]

lyin - -

5  ! -

R- jj!>M

(

y

= _

.. n o U .

%g ~% !*I> C0 - U 6 -

~0 l

.W -

a m

.a Dj i i!!>

' N '

y D 0

h-O O , .

k _ _ _

~ ~

g

' 6 .

(%

\ D' n h h h

tq kg E

E k 9 <.,

cu h IS, g=

k4 s 8  %

/

k Sc w w i gg3 .

) E 4 D<E t ae

@ $$@*l5{ E 3 9 l%

s n 4*dJ 3E*ll B 4. 5 ,

l 5w!b w

g ,h = t n m aq ~*-~ '

gig %ji?tesey E !! " E 1

s ubac d it !s s agl2 r .

.O- o L - e .. . .

rm 9 pump centrol logic, and the controls and displays for the

[3 modified' scram discharge volume vents and drains, for A' example.

The. continuing human factors effort on control room changes notwithstanding, it was decided early in the summer of 1992 to -resume the review of the control room as a whole. Work continued through 1982 and 19p}) A program plan was submitted to NRC in July of 1983. A significant  ;

.- effort,. also in 1983, undertook to analyze the tasks asso-ciated'with executing symptom oriented emergency operating procedures; this process was part of putting these pro-cedures i pla e at Oyster Creek, in accordance with NRC .

guidance.i3

'3. Structure of This Report In addition to defining improvements of control room human factors, this report and the review it describes are intended to fulfill the regulatory requirements for a con-trol roem review,'spe the requirements of NRC Generic Letter 82-33.ggjically,A comparison of the elements of this revieu and the requirements of Generic Letter 82-33tS3" well as the guidance applicable to human factors reviews ,

is ccatained in the program plan previously cited.- This

. program plan also describes, in detail, the responsibilities

. and qualifications of the members of the review team, the ,

(~)T x sources of information for the review, and the methods used in the review process. In the interest of brevity, all of this material will not be repeated here. However, an over-view of the structure of the review team and the basic division or responsibility is included in Section'II.

Section III describes the functions and task analysis used ir the Control Room Design Review. This analysis was conducted in two parts : (1) an evaluation of operator

() Letter P. S. Feidler, GPU Nuclear, to D. Eisenhut, NRC, dated July 1, 1983, forwarding " Program Plan for the Centrol Room Human Factors Review at-Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.

I ) SECY-E2-lll, Recuirements for Enercency Response Carability, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn, March 11, 1982.

(4I- SRC Generic Letter 82-33, Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737, 3 ("; cated December 17, 1982.

- w/ .

55) N'JREG 0700, Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews.

I.2

r-o functions and responsibilities as contained in the guide-lines and objectives for the' review (submitted with the program plan) and (2) a-review of-operator tasks as defined

{~N

~l in the_ symptom based Emergency Operating Procedures (developed fror generic BWR procedure guidelines).

The principal conclusions of the Oyster Creek Control Room Design ' Review are summarized in Section IV. Programs to correct the deficiences uncovered by this review are outlined in Section V. A table summarizing the findings, corrective actions -and schedule for implementation of the Design Review is also contained in Section V.

I Detailed findings are contained in other design review documentation not submitted with this report.

C. Integration of Other Projects into the Control Room Design Review This design review examined all the control hardware installed in the control room at the beginning of the review and was extended to cover all modifications made to the room or planned to be made during the 1983 refueling outage.

Also specifically of concern are future modifications that will be made to the control room. Important examples-include the Safety Paraneter Display System, instrument modifications for compliance to Regulatory Guide 1. 97 and I'T the Remote Shutdown Panel. In order to address this concern

# and to ensure that the high standards established d'uring the Control Room Design Review (CRDR) are maintained, GPUN has developed procedures which integrate Human Factors reviews into the design process. The procedures are supported by a full time Human Factors staf f, which was in place prior to the beginning of the CRDR.

The design process at GPUN is divided into a conceptual design phase and detailed design phase. Human Factors inputs to these phases include:

freli-ire F_nci eerine Desien Phase (1) Human Factors Standards for control room centrols, displays and alarms are contained in an engineering procedure for use by design engineers;

[v I.3

~

4 (2) Engineering procedures require a Human Factors section in the conceptual design  ;

i

(~}.

"u/ specification; (3) All-conceptual design documents are reviewed T by Human Factors staff who also participate in the Preliminary Design Review Meeting.

• - Detailed Design Phase (1) Engineering procedures require a Human Factors section in the Detailed Design Specification (System Design Description, .

Division-II).

(2). All Final Control Panel Layout Drawings require Human Factors signoff.

The scope of _the human factors review in the conceptual design phase includes considerations of control and display types, control-display relationships, physical location, labeling, demarcation, and alarm requirements. The review always includes a review of the panel layout drawing and usually includes a walkthrough of the preliminary layout with the experienced plant operators, using a draft system procedure.: The scope and method of the review is specified

. y^s; in the design documents.

.us This process has already been applied to the pre-liminary design of the Remote Shutdown panel and included, in this case, the construction of a mockup of the panel face. This was reviewed-using a draft remote shutdown i operating guideline in a walkthrough at the plant location

. - propcsed for the remote shutdown panel. An analogous process is presently being used for the SPDS.and Reg. Guide 1.97 modifications.

L In summary, the methods used in this review, the .

standards established, and the process for generating improvements will be maintained in the future by a well-defined process at GPUN. t f.

r E-

L_/

I.4

-_ - . s .

k Table I-l

. C'1 EXAMPLES L/

HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW AND ENHANCEMENT OTHER MODIFICATIONS s

REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ,

CONTAINMENT PRESSURE / TORUS LEVEL /H2 /02 MEASUREMENT SYSTEM

- SECOND SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME ADDITION, WITH

• INSTRUMENTATION RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MEASUREMENT VITAL INSTRUMENT POWER SUPPLY STATUS DISPLAY i.

• SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS CORE SPRAY LOGIC UPGRADE  ;

- FIRE JOCKEY PUMP ELIMINATION, POND PUMP ADDITION

, AND OTHER FIRE SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS  ;

• OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS  :

ALARM SYSTEM UPGRADE

' (^')

b' -

IRM RANGE 10 ADDITION . ,

i

- RECORDER UPGRADE; ADDITION OF DIGITAL READOUTS r

i e

I

[

f O:

I.5 eo w - w w ~ - , -v v ~e - - - - , ~ =

y-II. REVIEW TEAM STRUCTURE AND r"^, METHOD OF OPERATION LJ The Program Plan l identified the review taam members and included their resumes. It briefly discussed their responsibilities and. functions. A more detailed discussion of the review team structure and method of operation is proeided below.

In assembling a review team, the most significant consideration was, of course, the proper conduct of the

. control room design review. But there were other con-siderations in selecting the review team members and in '

developing a method of operation. First, it was GPUN's intent in performing the review not simply to satisfy a regulatory requirement -- there was none when the review

-started -- but to develop effective corrections for deficiencies identified by the review. In addition, GPUN structured the review so as to build skills and experience in the GPUN staff which could enable that staff to maintain high control room human factors standards in subsequent modifications to the plant and its controls.

Review Team Structure .

The review team was composed of members from GPUN, MPR (3 Associates, and human factors consultants. Table II-l

(,/ identifies the individuals who participated and staff' support, as well as the specialties that they contributed to the team.

The GPUN participation was intended to cover all areas required for conduct of the review and for subsequent eval-uaticns of modifications with control room human factors input.

"ethed cf C?eration Overall direction of the review was provided by GFUN.

In particular GPUN acted as contract manager for MPR and consultants, set the review schedule, integrated the control roca design review and corrective . actions with other plant activities and scheduled correction of deficiencies. The degree of GPUN involvement in specific review activities is summarized in Table II-2.

t 1 cp. Oit.

(% II.1

! .(_)

I 1

As indicated by the table, the GPUN team members rw participated in and contributed to all phases of the review

'(,/ ~ except the detailed panel review. This "close in" parti- -

cipation provided an opportunity for GPUN staff to learn the review process 1and understand the review guidelines and how to apply them in the future.

MPR Associates has brought experience to the review in integrated control system design and continues to perform design changes in nuclear power plants. They developed the framework of the review, coordinated each phase of the re- ,

view, drafted the detailed report findings and provided clerical and drafting support. ,

l The human factors consultants provided expertise in development of review guidelines; guidelines were necessary since the review commenced prior to the issue of guidelines ,

specifically applicable to nuclear power plants. The consultants also participated in the walkthroughs and in the evaluation of deficiencies.

A summary of MPR and consultant involvement in the re-view is contained in Table II-3.

r b

() II.2 4

E

Table-II-1 L o).

(- REVIEW TEAM ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

ORGANIZATION / PERSONNEL SPECIALTY GPUN TECHNICAL FUNCTIONS' P.S. WAL'SH - NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ENGRG

- PLANT ANALYSIS -

- PLANT OPERATIONS T.G. BROUGHTON - NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ENGRG

- PLANT ANALYSIS

- PLANT OPERATIONS

- PLANT SAFETY HUMAN FACTORS STAFF - HUMAN FACTORS

- PLANT ANALYSIS SYSTEM ENGRG/ SAFETY ANALYSIS STAFF AND DYNAMICS .

- SAFETY ANALYSIS 6 . PROJECT ENGRG - HARDWARE ENGRG

' () . - PROCUREMENT

- SCHEDULE

- PLANT DETAIL DESIGN DATA

-SHIFT TECHNICAL - PLANT OPERATIONS ADVISORS - SYSTEMS ENGINEERING OCNGS r

J. 'lCU!!G (SRO) - PLANT OPERATIONS

-. AND TRAINING OPERATING STAFF - PLANT OPERATIONS SROs ROs

, -TRAINING STAFF - PLANT OPERATIONS

- EOP TRAINING

- OPERATIONS TRAINING l-E::GINEERI!:G STAFF - PLANT OPERATIONS

- PLANT CONFIGURATION f\

v II.3

~. -- ,. . . , . - . - - ,-. __ ... - - -

s

- Table II-1, continued ,

m REVIEW TEAM _ ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

' ORGANIZATION / PERSONNEL SPECIALTY MPR .

H. ESTRADA - POWER PLANT i DYNAMICS AND CONTROL ,

- POWER PLANT OPERATIONS '

INSTRUMENTATION '

- HUMAN FACTORS

- CONTROL ROOM DESIGN  :

MPR STAFF - POWER PLANT ENGRG

- HUMAN FACTORS ,

- DRAFTING SUPPORT  ;

- CLERICAL SUPPORT ,

{} CONSULTANTS DR. T. SHERIDAN - HUMAN FACTORS

- MECHANICAL ENGINEERING '

- SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

- APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY DR. J. CHRISTENSEN - HUMAN FACTORS t - EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY t

t I

i l

l (^%

. \-) '

l II.4 b- _ . _ _ _

. Table II-2 REVIEW TEAM METHOD OF OPERATING GPUN

~'

i MANAGES CONTRACTS FOR MPR AND CONSULTANTS

• INTEGRATES CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW WITH OTHER PLANT

ACTIVITIES

• DEFINED PLANT SPECIFIC OPERATOR RESPONSIBILITIES

• APPROVED. GUIDELINES AND OBJECTIVES FIXED SCHEDULE AND SCOPE OF WALKTHROUGHS REVIEWED AND COMMENTED ON WALKTHROUGH SCENARIOS OBSERVED AND CRITIQUED WALKTHROUGHS

• PROVIDED FINDINGS TO MPR FOR COLLECTION / ORGANIZATION PROVIDES SUPPORTING DETAIL ON PLANT CONFIGURATION AND OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS

}

CONCURS IN FINDINGS AND RESOLUTION OF FINDINGS ANALYSIS OF-FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES DETAILED PANEL' REVIEW ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY FUNCTIONS AND TASK ANALYSIS OF EOPS

• URITES

SUMMARY

DORDR REPORT

• SETS SCHEDULE FOR IMPROVEMENTS

-4' l

h. -

i

i. (

II.5

~

Table II-3

/]

\- REVIEW TEAM METHOD OF OPERATING MPR  ;

CONSTRUCTED MOCKUP j DRAFTED GUIDELINES AND OBJECTIVES t

DEVISED WALKTHROUGH SCENARIOS

- Conducted Prebriefing .

Conducted Debriefing

• COLLECTED REVIEW TEAM' COMMENTS Walkthroughs

-Panels PERFORMED DETAILED PANEL REVIEW CONDUCTED ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEY

' DRAFTED DETAILED REPORT OF FINDINGS AND PROPO' SED RESOLUTIONS

( ): .

CONSULTANTS SUGGESTED GUIDELINES

• REVIEWED AND APPROVED ^ GUIDELINES AND OBJECTIVES PARTICIPATED ~IN WALKTHROUGHS AND PANEL REVIEWS' REVIEWED AND CONCURRED IN FINDINGS OF. REVIEW

(

II.6

- III. FUNCTIONS AND TASK ANALYSES Analyses of.the functions.and tasks that operators should be able to. carry out in the control room were performed as part of two elements.of this review:

• lThe analyses of operator functions and respon-sibilities in 1981 and 1982

• The analyses of the functions and task require-ments of the symptom-based emergency operating ,

procedures in 1983, as one of the initial steps of implementing these procedures.

A. Analysis of Operator Functions and Responsibilities The analysis of ope rator functions- and responsibilities was' based gg)the gram Plan.

guidelines and objectives of the Pro-These guidelines spell.out the specific technical and administative functions for which the plant management hold the operating staff responsible ,

for controlling at Oyster Creek. The technical func-tions include:

, f(N ~ Control.of the reactivity balance and the neutron x/ flux shape in the reactor core

• _ Control of-the core's thermal energy production, the transport of this energy, the conversion of l some of it to_ mechanical, then electrical energy

.in the turbine generator, and the rejection of the

, balance in the condenser  ;

• Control of the overall inventory of water in the plant, and the distribution of this inventory.

among the reactor system and its auxiliaries, the main, reheat and extraction steam systems,.and the feed, condensate, and heater drain systems Control of the thermodynamic state of the reactor fluid (1) cp.' cit.

III.1

• Control of the chemistry of the fluids throughout the plant

(~]

' Control of the temperature and chemistry of the plant effluent (by the dilution of circulating water, and other measures)

• Control of the inventory of radioactive material in all fluid systems for which control room operators are responsible

' Control of the quality and distribution of power

-- electric, hydraulic and pneumatic - for plant ,

auxiliaries

• Control of the purity, inventory, and thermo-dynamic state of the primary containment atmosphere

• Control of the readiness of the fire fighting system, detection of fire, and direction of fire fighting activities Among the administrative responsibilities of control room operators:

~

• Blocking and tagging -- the administrative k-)T control, for personnel and plant. safety reasons, of the removal of equipment from service for maintenance, and of the restora-tion of such equipment to service on comple-tion of maintenance

• Implementation of the appropriate level of the site emergency plan when the condition of

~

the. plant requires it.

• - Maintenance of required logs and-records of-daily plant activities The review team analyzed each of the technical-respon-sibilities listed in-the guidelines using a " control

-loop" approach, to establish the process variable measurements that are necessary to execute each respon-sibility, and the means by which changes to the process can be effected in response'to deviations of a process variable from its desired value.

3 (V III.2

• • .. p<

M ; ..

-e}

~ * '

3

~

- t

\t

-The review team'utilizeds l't's own knowledge of plant ih c l ' dynamics, as well as-piping and instrumentation dia-js)J . gram's, electrical'one-line diagrams, and other design

~ data to establish these requirements:for each area of responsibility.. The-process by,which requirements were established 11ncludes'notionly considerations of detecting.that a: variable has deviated'from its desired

.value, but-also,the sensitivity and speed with which E the processfrespondsito the_means the operator may use

~toscontrol it. Needs for.the detection of intermediate variables,;for_ stabilizing. feedback,-as a-means for-

? confirming-control actions,_ fall. naturally out of this -

- process, . as do requirements for the ' grouping of con- ,

itrols and displays.

The controls ~and: displays actually provided in the control room were then compared' against these require-

~

ments.. Knowledge of how operators presently use-the 1c'ontrols and displays to carry _out their respon--- -

sibilities - 'there are often alternatives -- were

, gained. fro 739xtensive walkthroughs of both operational evolutions.

normal and In the ' review of off-normal

-operator: functions and responsibilities, the review of

. plant experience (see the program plan)-was used,to formulate-certain of'the scenarios used for the otf-normal evolutions ~and was also used to-gain: insight as

,  ; -%7 to, particular. functions where existing controls and

~ displays might be' deficient. Operator interviews, l conducted as -arr adjunct to the walkthrough process

~

- were also used as sources of: information on control-problems.

The . review Jof operator functions and - responsibilities

-generated some 135 findings, many . involving multiple hardware.deficiences.

!B. Functions and TaskcAnalysis for Emergency Operating Procedures i- -Incearly 1983,1GPUN began'the ' process of implementation of symptem-oriented emergency operating procedures for Oyster Creek. -Generic. guidelines for these procedures l'

12 ); .It should be noted that the walkthroughs of off-normal

~

h evolutions for this review of operator functions and f <

resonsibilities utilized event-oriented, emergency ,

1 -procedures then in place (in 1981, 1982).

.O; 111.3 p -

had been-developed by a*BWR Owner's Group and approved by NRC. The generic guidelines were converted to plant

(')s x_ specific guidelines which, in turn, were translated into a first-cut set of' procedures. It is important to note that the translation of the guidelines into the ,

first-cut procedures dealt primarily with the elimina-tion of certain segments of the generic guidelines which were not applicable to Oyster Creek, because the fluid systems required by these segments are not incorporated at Oyster Creek (the use of a high pressure coolant injection system to restore reactor water level, for example; Oyster Creek has no such

• system). ,

2 In formulating ~the first-cut procedures, there was no effort to " tailor" the procedures, and particularly the process variables and controls called out by them, to displays and controls installed in the control room (and, in fact, several of the variables called for by the-procedures were not displayed in the control room).

Bywayofbackground,thesymptom-orientedprocygyresOne for BWRs are-currently divided into two groups.

group of procedures maintains a set of three key.

reactor variables (reactor power, water level, and pressure) in bounds, the second group -- there is only

. . \m/

f-] one-procedure in this group -- maintains a set of key containment variables (drywell temperature and-pressure, torus water temperature and level) in bounds. The top level procedure for the key reactor variables calls on certain contingency procedures if efforts to maintain the variables by "first line" means are unsuccessful.

The procedures are truly symptom-oriented -- one enters them on the basis of explicitly defined entry con-ditions generally related to the key process vari-ables. The procedures then guide the user as to the '

means he should use to restore. the variables to their normal range. The means are essentially independent of what caused the variable (s) to depart from established limits in the first place; for situations when one or more of the means are not effective, alternatives are

.always offered.

(3) A third group of procedures related to the control-of secondary containment is' contemplated. l

<x '

III,4

(._)

The first-cut procedures were used to define the func-e'y tions and tasks that the control room operators must

( .j ' perform under emergency conditions. The process of task definition involved two preliminary steps:

~

(1) A desk-top review of the procedures from an engineering and understandability viewpoint (2) Construction of logic diagrams I4) to ensure

-that_the procedures and the tasks implicit in them do not lead the operator to any " dead end" or_ trap him in an. infinite "do-loop."

After those initial steps, the first-cut procedures were walked through in the Oyster Creek Control Room Mockup, on May 19 and 20, 1983. In the walkthroughs, the'following measures were used to analyze the ability of the operators to understand and to perform the operations called _for b'y the first-cut procedure tasks.

(1) Each of the entry conditions fortpg)twotop and level procedures (re ,

containmentcontrolggyorcontrol

) was reviewed with

- the operators to determine whether the.condi- ,

tien was clearly and unambiguously displayed to them -in the control room.

l'\

( ,/ (2) The procedures themselves were talked-through

-- the two top level pr7geggjes,Asand the-contingency procedures has been stated, the procedures involve many. logical branches ("If ... then") and conditioned res-ponses. The talk-through process therefore i'nvolved compounding of conditions, not Because oof their symptom orientation, BWR emergency operating procedures involve many interactive and conditioned responses.

III EMG-3200.31, 3/23/83, RPV Control (6) EMG-3200.32, 4/21/82, Containment Control Procedure (7) EMG-3200.03, 3/10/83, Level Restoration

EMG-3200.34, 4/21/E3, Emergency RPV Depressurization

')

f8) -EMG-3200.05, 3/24/e3, Steam Cooling (10) EMG-3200.36, 3/23/83, Spray Cooling (11) .EMG-3200.07, 3/10/E3, Alternate Shutdown Cooling (12) E"G-3200.35, 5/ 2/53, RPV' Flooding III.5 1._)

L- -

4 necessarily mechanistically, to ensure that '

-~ each logical avenue was explored. For each

[_) - step, an assessment was made to determine:

• whether the operator understood the operation called for

'- whether the operator conditioned his response according to the conditional requirements of the procedure (s)

• whether the operator was capable of understanding and executing the step in .

combination with other steps in other

• procedures he was using at the same time

' whether the manning in the control room  ;

was sufficient in numbers and organization to carry out, simultaneously, all the steps that applied ,

• whether, if the operator's execution of a step were conditioned on specif,ic values of process variables, the information on those variables was  !

g~s displayed to him in appropriate units, I A_)- with appropriate precision, at a loca-tion where he would be able to see it whether controls or communications or both were provided in the control room,

~

as needed to execute the step in a timely. manner

'

• whether displays provided in the control room gave the operator necessary visual feedback on the success or failure of his control action.

- This process verifies that the controls and dis-plays provided in the control rrom effectively support the tasks required by the emergency operating procedures (or, as was the case for several tasks, specifically identifies needed displays.or controls which the control room does not have). The above process does not, however, validate the,. overal:. compatibility of procedures, manning, training, and control room -- that, in ,

real upsets, the operators can carry out'the tasks i

d,,. III.6 ,

1 i

L w -- - - - , -

of the ~ emergency procedures in a timely and ,

7-f. effective canner.

J To validate ' the ' precedures, two steps were taken:

(1) Walkthroughs of mechanistic opsets were walk-through, on a more or less-real-time basic, in the mock-up

, (2) Evaluations were made of operator responses in training. exercises for the procedures at the Dresden Simulator, in June 1983

~

In the walkthroughs of machanistic upsets, two full-length scenarios were walked through: ,

(a) a loss of off-site power with a number.of additional complications, and (b) a load rejection with a malfunction of the turbine bypass and subsequent sticking open of two reactor safety valves.

Several " mini scenarios" were also talked through to explore specific issues.(e.g., disagreement among water level instrunents)._ The mini-scenarios also included-t - s events.cf relatively high frequency, such as reactor f 1,) scrams evolving from feed system upsets, generator ,

. trips, etc. These scenarios were selected to generate symptoms requiring entry into the emergercy operating procedures (e.g. low reactor water leve;) in situations where the causefof the event and the appropriate response was obvious, or appeared to the operators to be obvious. The object was to ensure. that in such situations, the operators'could and would follow the new emergency operating procedures, and~that the

!. procedures Snd the displays and controls. called for by them would lead the operators to information and action appropriate to the situation.

The evaluaticr.s of the training exercises at the '

Dres'd en Simulator were based on observations of the operators' actions in responding to simulated upsets and on the comments of the operators themselves. The controls and displays of the Dresden Simulator are substantially different from those at Oyster Creek.

Consequently, one .ust draw conclusions from tuese

, observations with care. Table III-l is a checklist used to assist in this process.

i

' vI) III 7 F

s- e

i The analysis of the tasks associated with the

r'c symptom-oriented emergency operating procedures

(_) produced findings in three general categories:

(a) Findings related to the controls and displays and the control room itself --

similar in nature to the findings of the analysis of operator functions and re-sponsibilities, the findings of the detailed panel review, and the findings of the environmental survey.

(b) Findings related to the format and .

organization of the proceoures taem-selves, or to the manner in which the responsibilities implicit in the pro-cedures are assigned to control room operators -- findings of an editorial or administrative nature.

(c) Findings on the technical content of the procedures.

Items in the first category -- findings on control room hardware -- are clearly _within the purview of the detailed control room design review.

. - Q( /- Although items in the second category -- editorial and administrative findings -- are not so obvious-  :

ly a part of.this review, a summary of them has I also been included in this report; a major product t of this' analysis of the emergency operating pro- l cedures has been the improvement of the human f actors of' the procedures themselves.

Items in the third category -- technical findings related to the procedures -- are clearly outside the purview of the detailed _ control room design review and have been documented _in separate cor-respondence. It is important to emphasize, how-ever, that the analysis has identified no signif-icant technical deficiency. On the contrary, the

~ review team.found no hypothetical situation, how-ever compounded or subtle, that the procedures did' not effectively handle. The procedures are truly

-symptom-oriented. They effectively maintain the reactor and its containment within acceptable thermodynamic bounds, regardless of the upset or upsets that bring about their use. They.do not require Loiagnosis by the operator as to the cause n

U III.8 i

of_the upset _(though the operators,'being human, j"Y tend to expend some of their mental energy on Al ~

figuring out what's wrong while the upsets are occurring). The technical quality of the proce-

.dures is evidenced by the enthusiasm of the oper-ating staff-for them; their acceptance of these now and different procedures appears universal.

The analysis of emergency operating procedure tasks

. generated a total of thirty-three findings in the first two_ categories. The count could have been higher, but the analysis of operator functions and' responsibilities described in Section III.A above is somewhat redundant .

to,the emergency operating procedure task analysis.

The1 findings in the-latter_ category relate primarily to

' tasks unique to the-EOPS and not those originally con-

templated in the control of boiling water reactors.

They treat,:for example, problems in using containment' variables to trigger responses in the control of

, -reactor pressure. Also, obviously, findings relating to the format and presentation of the emergency -

procedures themselves were, and could only be,

. generated by the EOP task analysis.

/

d 0; 111.9

[

.. IV.

SUMMARY

OF CONCLUSIONS ,

a, yY, ' .

l. The Oyster Creek Control Room.has' a number of -

important strengths including:  ;

a. System controls are generally well defined as -

a group, and located sensibly with respect to one another. Displays are typically near related controls. The system arrangements j

-lead to a clear cut assignment of operator ,

g responsibilities during normal _and off-normal operations. Control room operator traffic H patterns are orderly and are not character-ized by crossing or other undesirable features. I

b. Most of the control hardware -- the switches, ,

controllers, indicator lights, and meters -- -

1 has been very reliable. Notable exceptions  ;

are recorders, some of which are now being replaced, and alarm annunciators, which are '

also being' replaced.

c. Meter scales typically are easily read and {

properly ranged; many of them comply with the 7"N. _. human factors guidelines.

• 3mf '

d. Communications from the control ~ room to and

~

from most or all operating stations within the plant are excellent.

e. The improved Plant Alarm System (installed while this review'was in progress) meets-applicable human factors standards. It. I possesses visual, audible and arrangement  ;

attributes that are expected to contribute ,to effective plant operation,.particularly under off-normal conditions.

'f. In addition to the alarm system upgrade, most of the plant modifications scheduled for per-

, formance during the 1983 refueling outage i have upgraded control room human factors.

Specific examples include:

Addition of controls for scram discharge volume vents and

~

drains in mimic format, _,

(_/ - IV.1 i

I

,.-p.-,*--g .-- ,, - - ,. . , , , , -.,-g-- . y,r,. -W,-

Displays'and controls-for core

('t spray control logic which will

' allow the operator easily to assimilate system status and effectively to control reactor water level by means of the ,

core-spray systems.

g. The new, symptom-oriented emergency operating

, procedures have been demonstrated in walk-throughs and in simulator training to be ou important contributor.to effective operations

'in the' control room. .

2.

The Oyster Creek Control Room'also has a number of deficiencies; the review generated roughly 1,000 findings of items which were or might be judged to be deficient from a human factors viewpoint. As was noted in the preceeding section, the two analyses of operator functions and tasks generated between them 168 findings. The preponderant majority of the remainder -- over 800 -- were uncovered by_the detailed review of-the inventory of control room hardware. -These deficiencies are

' summarized in Section V of this report where actions to correct them are also defined.

G "L/ Some of the generi'c deficiencies of the con ~ trol room include the following:-

i

a. Although controls and displays _are typically ,

well grouped by system, individual controls and displays within a system group are often

. confusingly arranged.

b. Many controls and displays are confusingly i labeled. Some are not labeled at all. Meter l- labels are particularly obscure. Label plates, which have white letters on black background, are. dirty.'- Letter size does not '

conform to the readability standard, and L lighting is marginal. Consequently, label plates are~ very difficult to read.

c. General Electric Type SB switch handles are used throughout the control room for the L control of pumps, valves, and circuit braakers, and for the se'lection of control modes. The same style switch handle is used on almost all SB switches (though different p

'J- IV.2 7

e styles-are available). To distinguish vis-(~) ually among these controls is difficult .

\' There are no tactual differences among them.

d. Protective covers are generally not employed.

For. example, controls for the generator field circuit breaker and the condenser vacuum breaker are not distinctive and could be activated inadvertently.

e. Operational limits and other informational aids are typically not provided. When they are, they are of ten of a temporary and potentially uncontrolled nature. Red and green bands are not used on meters.

f. Some controls and displays on vertical panels '

fail to meet anthropometric standards. Ex- ,

amples include test pushbuttons and operating switches for Main Steam Isolation Valves, Bypass Switches for certain containment functions, one of the recorders for drywell pressures.

g. As in most Boiling Water Reactors, the feed-back to the operators of information on the

> '/'l N/

change in neutron flux shape that results from a change in control rod positioh is deficient. Interpretation of flux' data re-quires computer analysis by a reactor engineer.

3. The control room also has some deficiencies in specific controls and displays:

i

a. There are no frequency displays for diesel generators. Such displays are necesaary to.

control diesel generator power effectively when the off-site power source has been lost.

b. Certain sump level indications needed to confirm a reactor leak are missing from the 1 t

control room;-to wit: reactor building sump' levels and the-torus room sump level.

c. There have been some difficulties associated i with the use of the intermediate range neutron' monitors during reactor start-up.

^

One of these difficulties -- an inadequate overlap between the intermediate range and O.

\_/ IV.3 b

.--y , ,e w . ,. ,,.

y 4 n m.,g+ g , ,,,,a w, 4 ,

4 ,

1r' I ^

. th'e powerDrange' mon'itors -- is being resolved byfa? system modification.

(

$)i-; _

~ ~

d., Some important displays are not readable by an; operator-standing at the controls asso-

'" ciatedEwith these displays:

f(l). The narrow range reactor. pressure recorder is not readable from the

. turbine-bypass controls

'(2) The reactor water level is difficult to

? ' read'from the-' cleanup system'let-down .

. valve control (which is used to control level during startup).- The level is

~ lso difficult to-read from the core a

spray system controls (which control

~1evel1when the core spray system is in operation).

~

4. Analyses ' of operations required by the newly installed Emergency Operating Procedures indicate:

a: number of shortcomings:

a. Average Torus Water Temperature and certain

~

'Drywell: Temperatures are.used~as entry con-

,;('j- .ditions for the procedure. . There are - four iss. torus-water temperat'ure indications; none.is clearly identified'as the average. The displayed'drywell temperatures are not representative of- the hottest drywell' tem--

'perature. In. addition, the alarms associated-with these variables are not accorded'ap-

-tm propriate status,'even'with'the' improved alarm system: arrangement. Also,' -the drywell

- . temperature alarm legend is poor.

(Miscellaneous Drywell Temperatures High).

b. ' Emergency operating procedures can require flooding of theldrywell to a' level as highLas 104 feet. The operator has no instrument by which'he can read this level.

c. The precedures call for reading the shell side pressure differential of'the containment spray coolers. This reading is available.

only locally. The operator might confuse the called-for reading with~the tube-to-shell.

side pressure differential, which is dis-played on~the panel.

p hj IV.4 1' .

d. The value of drywell pressure, following a

, r^1 high drywell pressure entry based on a 2 psig

.(_/ alarm, can only be confirmed by leaving the main control area to consult a back panel '

recorder. Trending of this variable also requires use of several back panel recorders. ,

e. Procedures call for lining up the core spray system to flood the drywell. The valve line up, if executed-in the wrong sequence, could lead to damage of the core spray pumps.

~ Appropriate warnings in the procedure and on the panel are needed. ,

5. Environmentally, the control room review generated 20 deficiencies. Among the most important:

a. The air conditioning is said to be unreli-able. When one of the units is out of service, operators say that the room becomes uncomfortably warm.and that the operation of some electronic systems is affected.

b. Dust accumulates in the room. ,

c. There is no humidity control, the room is said to be uncomfortably dry in the winter.

z(3-xj -

d. Normal lighting levels are below the minimum standards. As has been mentioned, this leads to difficulty in reading labels for controls and. displays. Lighting levels at the opera-tors desk, where procedures are generally used, are particularly low. It should be noted that lighting at the control panels is- '

maintained at a low level to reduce glare from the curved. face vertical meters (G.E.

Type 180) which are used throughout the  :

control room. The luminance of indicator lights is also too low . The state of these indicator lights (lit / unlit) would be very difficult to detect if room lighting levels were increased.

6. The arrangement of the overall control area (as opposed to the arrangement of the panels them-selves) has several deficiencies:

a. .The location of the Group Shift Super-

. visor's office tends to isolate the GSS

'G A_/ IV.5

=

I

^

.-5__-

fron-:theEcontrol area, penalizing his-1 ' role in of f = normal evolutions, and .

? I reducing his ability to control casual

' traffic into the control room proper.

b '. - .The practice of carrying out blocking.

and tagging from the control room operators' -desk in. front of panel 4F leads to= traffic by equipment operators

+

. and maintenance personnel into the center of the~ control room area.

.  : c. The. control room. operator's desk does- -

not provide. adequate space for storage

.or laydown of procedures.

D l

i'

{ '.

P 3xy g o

(

L_. .

f~l

\_/

- V. CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM; RESOLUTION OF DEFICIENCIES The deficiencies uncovered by this review vary in the degree to which they can affect the performance of the con-trol room operators in carrying out their jobs. For pur-poses of formulating a corrective action program, each deficiency has been classified according to its importance to the safe and efficient operation of the plant and has been assigned a schedule for correction. There are three importance categories, as follows:

Importance Category A The most serious deficiencies fall in this category.

A Category A deficiency may impair an operator's performance under off-normal conditions. These deficiencies often involve a failure to display in-formation that the operator needs to respond correctly in a particular off-normal situation, or a failure to provide the controls he needs for a timely response.

Not all of the deficiencies in this category are in hardware, however. A procedure may fail to guide the operator adequately as to the sequence in which he should perform a specified set of tasks, when failure to do so can lead to the loss of an important system.

(~}

\- And a test may be necessary to establish whether a system needed to respond to a specific off-normal condition will, in fact, respond in'the' desired manner. In such cases, the corrective measure is an administrative action rather than a control hardware modification.

Importance Category B This category is made up of deficiencies that clearly' violate one or more of the human factors guidelines -

used in the review.y but are unlikely to lead to an irreversible operator error in an off-normal situa-tion. Category B deficiencies may include items that could lead to operator error under normal conditions, however. The category also includes generic deficiencies that individually are not likely to 1

op. cit.

/~)

V V.1

degrade operator performance seriously but, taken together, can be significant. Again, some of the y

' e-)

,j - deficiencies in'this category are administrative in nature'rather.than involving control hardware.

Incortance-Catec_orv C Deficiencies which are unlikely to af fect operator .per-formance irreversibly under any condition or for which

. solutions ~are net clear-cut are placed in this category.

Clearly classifying the deficiencies as to importance ,

involves significant human factors and engineering judgment

-- the likelihoed of operator error must be assessed, as well as the impact of such error on the plant. The classification of deficiencies as to importance, .therefore, involved the review team as a whole; the final classifica-tion of each deficiency recresents the consensus of the team.

Scheduling- of the corrective action for each deficiency has been accomplished by placing it in one of four categories: .

Schedule Category 1: Accomplish at the earliest

,-( opportunity, but in no' i y case beyond the next refueling outage.

' Schedule Category 2: Accomplish by the end of the next reJueling outage (1985)

Schedule Category 3: Accomplish.by the end of the 1987 refueling outage

-Schedule Category 4: Accomplish as convenient, or after the 1987 re-fueling outage, or, if the need for corrective action is not established, take no action.

During the conduct of the review, a significant number of the.deficiences'uncevered'by it were corrected, as part of the human factors input to other control room modifica-tions. Where suen corrective actions have already been taken; the deficiency has been placed in a fifth schedule

-categcry: "Ccrre:ted."

• ; V. 2

.v h-m -

g

I

-Table V-1 summarizes the deficiencies found by this review as well as the actions which have been taken or are k_w) planned to correct them. Every deficiency is not listed in the Table; many of the findings of the detailed panel review have been combined and are listed generically. Also, it was not unusual for two different elements of the review --

the panel review and the functions and responsibilities analysis, for_ example -- to generate similar findings. Such findings-have been. merged and listed as a single item in the Table.

To assist in formulating a coordinated program of corrective actions, the deficiencies of Table V-1 are -

organized in seven groups, according to the nature of the action required to correct them. These groups are defined in Table V-2. The preponderant majorjty of deficiencies merit corrective actions involving changes or additions to control room hardware -- groups 2, 4, 5, and 6 of Table V-2. About 15 percent of the deficiencies require some administrative corrective action such as a test or procedural change (Group 3), while about 7 percent require further study or no action at all (Groups 1 and 7).

Included in the "no action" category are those deficiencies that have been corrected in the course of making other control. room modifications.

7s As noted above, a deficiency listed in Table V-1 may

()_

have been uncovered by one or more of the four main elements of this review -- (1) the review based on operator functions '

and responsibilities, (2) the detailed review of the inventory of control panel hardware, (3) the survey of the control room physical environment, and (4) the review of the functions and tasks implicit in Oyster Creek's new emergency operating procedures. Deficiencies uncovered by the review of Oyster Creek operating' experience, and in the walkthrough process have been documented under one of the four major elements, typically element (1), the review based on opera. tor functions and responsibilities.

The deficiencies of TabJe V-1 are also classified according to the three importance categories discussed above; the schedular category for each corrective action is also given. Obviously, deficiencies of Category A importance merit prompt corrective measures; generally, actions to correct, or at least to mitigate these deficiencies are given the first schedular priority.

Deficiencies in Importance Category B are for the most part, placed in the second and third schedular categories --

scheduled to be performed by the next refueling outage or the outage after thot. In prioritizing these corrective o

L) V.3 l

measures, the benefits of arr improvement relative to its

>A y costs were considered, as well as the ease with which the

(_j improvement can be dovetailed with other. modifications planned for the control room. The high benefit improvements include the correction of certain generic deficiencies.

The specifics of the corrective action program merits some discussion beyond that contained in Table V-1. This discussion follows.

A. Corrective Actions for Importance Category A Deficiencies The Category A deficiencies are relatively few, and unique. Actions to correct or to mitigate such deficiencies have been assigned to Schedule Category 1

-- the first priority. It should be pointed out that it is not possible to make the final and most desirable fixes for all Category A items on this schedule. Where this is the case, some interim corrective action will be (or has been) taken on a top priority schedule, while the engineering and procurement activities, as appropriate for the final corrective action, go for-ward. The corrective actions for these deficiencies include:

1. Addition of~ frequency meters for diesel generators y

(g) so that the quality of electric power to emergency

-busses can be effectively controlled during a loss of off-site power.

2 Coordinating the displays of the several reactor water level instruments, including these for the fuel zcne, so that

• a common approach to reactor water density ccmpensation is adopted the fuel zone instrument can be used effec-tively (to measure water separator pressure differential) during normal operations, to build operator confidence in this instrument

• the level instrument standpipe temperatures can be read out. The operators should be given clear instructions on when and how to ccrrect the instrument readings for these temperaturas, and at what temperatures and i

h V.4

l indicated levels the instrument reading be-cones invalid.

3.

Providing a clearly identified instrument or set of instruments on which to read drywell temper-

~

ature, as required for entry into the emergency operating procedures for containment control.

4.

Providing a clearly identified instrumenttorus or set of instruments on which to read averagefor entry into the water temperature, as required emergency operating procedure for containment .

control. 1 f (over the then-installed I

5. Providing improved meanswith which to read out vari-recorders) multipointables such as torus water temperature and contain-A modification to replace ment temperatures.

plant recorders has corrected this deficiency.

The new recorders are significantly more read-able.

In addition, digital readouts by means of which individual recorder points can be clearly read on a continuous basis, have been added. '

6.

Providing improved means for controlling the reactor water level after the core If spray the system core spray has been called into operation.

system capacity exceeds the outflow from theeven-leak

() which has caused it to operate, inflow must tually be controlled, to match outflow. time the As the core spray logic was implemented at the review thebegan, such control was extremely diffi-cult; operator would trip pumps off to limit level; then be unable to get them on again prorptly, because of an cnomaly in the pump con-trol logic. This deficiency was corrected by a Human modification performed during the review.

factors considerations led not only to morebut also to the straight-forward control logic,self-expanatory status provision of a complete and display for this important system.

7.

Several of the category A deficiencies are correctable by the addition of appropriate warning labels to the panel, or words to the appropriate procedure, or both:

V.5

~ - -

f. a

~ '

'(

s e;7

.Y+

' ~

, l- *'

!Instructions:toLwarn against starting a core

~

gse ,

spray booster.(i.e.1 topping) pump before a-

., q)~ '

core sprayfpump is operating,:and stopping a core: spray pump before stopping any-operating

--booster pump. Such. operation.could lead'to-

damagelof the booster pump.

'*' ' Instructions-to warn against..an1 incorrect sequenceLin_ lining up the suction valves for the core: spray: system.- The, sequence must be

~

'such-that'the core spray system, should it

-' start, is.not= deprived of water.

• LLabels, meterscales, or procedural visual,

~

aids _to correlate the reading of the' narrow

-range torus water level instruments (which

~

read in inches of water referenced to normal water level) to-the wide range torus water level- instruments (which read in feet oof .

water referenced to the bottom of the torus).

8. There are two . Category A deficiencies for which o -administrative actions are. appropriate (to estab-lish the . necessity and nature ~ of further :ac. tion,

=if any).-

• . A test'of in-plant communications when off-

'))

( site power has been lost. The repeaterfwhich enhances the signalcon the radio channel.

normally used for in-plant. communications:is-powered from"ainon-vital power _ source.

Transmission'and reception of the emergency

,-- channeli(which'does not'use'a repeater) have i not been' tested ~at all'~ locations at which this channel might be used..

• ~ - A test'to determine the maximum flow capacity

[

LC of both control rod' drive pumps operating together:(these-pumps are usedifor reactor

, makeup when off-site power-is lost)~. The

. test must'also determine a practical means

-for setting the flow,_if it is less-~than that t f obtained with wide open-discharge valves.

B.- ImportanceeCategory B Corrective Actions

, Many of the deficie~ncies in Importance Category B can.

, a be" fixed-byfa limited set of well-defined generic cor-

rective' actions.. These' generic corrective actions are l' tabulated

in' Table V-3. Tor each item of Table V-1 to L>.*

l:

L V.6

. o-

[ ,

m which.a generic corrective action applies, a generic corrective action program number (e.g., G-1), based on 73 Table V-3, is given. Many of the actions are rela-(,)

tively simple and straight forward -- they can be accomplished without major alterations to control panels.- The relabeling and demarcation program, the meter scale . improvements, replacement of lens caps, and renoval of unused er unnecessary hardware are examples.

The degree of dif ficulty of the other generic correc-tive action-prograts varies. All require some change

-to panel hardware ; the most substantial is probably the enhancement of infcrmation displays through the use of .

a plant computer. The plant computer facilities presently in use at Oyster Creek are very limited; the addition of a new computer represents a major change.

Accordingly, corrective actions requiring an upgraded computer are in a lower schedular category than most of the other category B deficiencies. It should be noted that a ccmputer upgrade is planned for Oyster Creek.

The major generic corrective actions for deficiencies in Importance Category B include:

~

1. Upgrading panel labeling and demarcation, co-ordinating this improvement with the new alarm

, system installed during the 1983 outage. Speci-(~j fically, the demarcation and labeling program should include:

• improved headings.and demarcation for control and display groups and subgroups upgraded label plates for individual controls and displays, to enhance readability and unde rs tandability

• information label plates, as appropriate,-to provide limits, set points, cautions and other inforration currently provided by tem-perary means.

2. Providing displays, readable from any location at the main panel (1F/2P through 9XF and from the cpera:crs ' desk ) of the following:

• narrcw and wide range reactor pressure

• reactor water level

/") V.7

%)

Coolant temperature rate-of-change of coolant temperature

(~}"

reacter power (from neutron monitors) 1

• drywell pressure (narrow and wide range, as appropriate)

• rate of change (or trend) of drywell pressare drywell temperature torus water level torus water temperature .

The purpose of this display-is to promote effec-tive display and control of key plant variables (including those required for entry into the emergency operating procedures) at any location at which they might be used, and, in particular, at the operator's desk.

3. Providing tactually different operating handles for the controls for valves, pumps, breakers and control mode selectors .

4. Replacing missing or incorrect label plates es

( ')

5. Replacing temporary operator aids with more perma-nent and approved operator aids

6. Generally upgrading panel appearance. For example: touching up chipped or scratched paint, refurbishing areas from which control hardware has previously been removed.

In addition to the generic corrective action programs, there are a number-of Category B deficiences which require unique corrective actions. For example:

Increasing the lighting level at the_oper-ators' desk to meet minimum illumination standards for reading

• Correcting turbine generator controls and displays that violate rules with respect to direction of motion -- meter indicators that go clockwise when controls are rotated counterclockwise, " raise" controls which require counterclockwise motion, etc.

{j V.8

.e

M y; +

T' ? .

- Incorrect operation of these controls can Nsj

-( lead to upsets.*

C. Importance Catecory C Items Generally, deficiencies in Importance Category C des-cribe situations that operators have demonstrated tneir ability to live with over the 15 years that Oyster Creek has operated. As stated before, in no case is a Category C

. deficiency likely to lead to an irreversible operator error or to affect plant safety. Some examples of category C-deficiencies include:

• The lack of a humidity control in the control room (as a result, the room is said to be dry during winter months)

Some local temperatures in the control room are higher than desirable (approaching 80*F). But operators do not need to spend a lot of time in these areas, and equipment life has generally been satisfactory.

• There is no consistent convention used in 1.ocating the " automatic" position of mode selector switches relative to the " manual" position. Operation of f3 such switches is' a deliberate action. Further-

_( )

~

more, an attempt to rotate the switches in'the wrong direction will be resisted by the switch detent.

L

• The most efficacious. approach to correcting turbine controls may be to await the replacement of the present ,

"E?R" pressure' regulating governing systam.

~

This -

hardware is growing obsolescent; when it is replaced, the new controls will be sufficiently different to correct present deficiencies without risking errors .

frca habits acquired with the present controls.

(

.o; V.9

o l

l l

l TABLE V-1 -

SUMMARY

OF REVIEW FINDINGS i

l l

l L .

I i

l

. O i

t f

I O

I

-e,,--- en,- o~,o-e-- m e - -r-mev -

h i

. [

t r

?

i f

l r

GROUP 1 ,

f i t i

i FURTHER EVALUATION REQUIRED ,

i

}

A e

l k

i i

+

t r

s i

h B

+

1 l

t 1

l.

A

?

t b

i 5

t r

f P

- , - , , . . , , . , , _ , . , , , . . , . _ ... - . ~ . . . , . -,.w,-.-y- , ,.__ry,___

(' f'% '

ka

~

b .

Pc9e I af 26 -

00RRtCilVI.

DI SCRIPT 10el 0F - SCHEDULE IMPORTANCE- ACT Iull CORRLCIIVE ACT1088~ CATEG0ftY CAltf0RY r.R0til' DLi~ICI4NCY Yarway and reactor prutection Icvel Instruments [ valuate removing density 1; A .I arc not density compensated causing unnecessary compensation from control level alae ms if density-comipensated recorder Is used - Instruments.

for control. ~

Evaluate making core region 1 A, I Lore region icvel lustruments are not used.

instruments operational when pumps are running. .

llegrade temperature instrumentation. 1 A 1 Need teuverature indications for elevations in drywell torus and il & V system.

I' valuate niking synchrosence. rotate 3 11 1

• . yte ho u. cope sycs ales spunter to lo kest ry ~

standorel. In standard direCLlon.

Measure temperatures if facades are 3 8 1 -

lhe added facaics miy aggravate the prohics of hlqh temperature in the sp.ites techlnd panels. Installed. CorreCL as necessary.

Evaluate use of present dp meter to 3 8 1 The dif ferential pressure instrument currently .

display needed information.

provided for the containment spray system measuses the difference between shellside and tubcside pressure anil has no functional use, lhe rw rgeox.y pro (c.here calls for a slic11 side difIcrential reading, which is only provided

> locally.

Displays associated with Rod Worth Minimizer are Consider relocating the electronics 3 C 1 i

distracting to operator. Rod Worth Minimirar (Note that a few of the indicator displays and controls are not needed on front lights are used and would remain),

panel.

3 C 1 1

Condensato return valve control lacks ability to Operators can work with present on-equilibrate heat removed by condenser and decay off control. Evaluate throttle heat from reactor, control.

90 i

e P

~ o -- e,, -

m e -.m. ~ -s,- w +-m .

.b 0

. /. ( vii tt -

i . l. loti s

n s

i f i t u I I I 1 I I I

. t r I

u

_ *s A

/ t'

_ e g

-a .

's I.

t v

. , . Nm A s. .

_ f

l t

C 0 C 0 C C C C

_ Cl P A.

1 I r t

. 'l v 4m 1

1 1

t 1 C 2' 3 3 3 3 3 3 l

l I _

7 I

1CA

$C

_ . e n .

.ta o l

. i o mseur r t r

.erl e e ar t n

_ l a i. s t co ishl vi ra it f a rc o

s v tcaI t a lle o i I.

n p" w d ny l io '. s t .r c o l a l pn ae . os o . .

s tl t ol i i

l f Rt r

rm r s s e

ainem m t a t t t i

~l p ct af s ie t i p edr t er nm e

n o

s ae s

a s h

t l i_

e ift" d C ser rr c l l i

t s

l c yro o

]1_

x l c i f .

i A l

g s c cf r e es a o el ram s oe f l e

l tr n n i a s l

./\ Ii P v' prs wna i dio tn e a a e

~

Il nl e i

om g n

i at ao mi l

c c c s

RI r

o (l v si r pt q a lum ) ot a a a c

M e. t st l ol men ulie r

c ff s oev t

se ac t m n n i s l

t y

e npic r a aol s o o a l m ' . yI ml i e eoa nl r ,d e e n e

r r d n ce o .

a eew o e

t a

ti V at leev i r a t t a

rn u ao yl u u t diu 'r. e uik t y f l d i sr l e l a l

f e l rtd l l a ad n np ag a l a e r

eunf > v osa ne v. v Anf I ap i lv_ (a l i t CI Ar I t T s

y e l el t

c imcy t o

a t r .

- p -

a- l l e t y

r p l a v m u

e f umr l a t e l e

d l.

e k e v .

p s

a <

c t

a t a sh e r .

i m ct eu t t r t

c u s

im f in ai u cp c o sp i ra t . c l

a e m a e e

- e cs c.

1 s t r v e t v t . t e i at s l l a n t y o V: hat r c. l o

u nn e g

i s

a w

n n *. c e

a 'a r e'. e c, iir n e e

r e t I

- o l e e s t

c n e

s t a s.

s i }n ts r

• c n i odr rs et c.

- i s ss a t 1

n s nr l l ee l e o o o er t t fi a en p p ue s a g e i e s v t. t p

o rl v w ien ee e o l d ar

.ti io ol al e n rl ta i c. n r vo pf tst le i I a e c it a p. t o t se

> im r

d ' ei n ee.. s s t

a l er i y a ct v ea

-s l o

l o o iy i l s I t s r

t e

i el in a o e r al o r o cr t , t n s i e t i.

ri ert v ns rd ae

-a. ei nt woe t l nr o l nr ot so e e o vr paea ia s e ar . r k r u e g

rl rs l ia -

a t es

,)/ -

l.

m ei s pn wosc. e.

c. nt

. e cc c o m n

o ma e ic

.,' 't i

OI t ut I s

? l *

s. C ss

• r .

i

?

)

t i

GROUP 2 b

RELABELING, DEMARCATING AND OTHER IMPROVEMENTS -

NOT REQUIRING MODIFICATIONS TO ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS -

t

, OR FLUID SYSTEM CONFIGURATION  ;

(Including Mimicing of Existing Arrangements)

CONTROLS / DISPLAYS l METER SCALES (Bands, Se tpoint 'e , simits.) l RECORDER SCALES l LENS CAPS (Colors, Legends)

NORMAL /OFF NORMAL STATUS  !

()

• SBM ESCUTCHEONS ,

9 P

e t

i h

i O

m f,, ' fy ,

Q Pa p ~J of-re.

l>l'IRIrlifW Ol' $Cil[DtR I. . lHrtmlA!!rl M.I Inti tit a 1 si ta y . :.smus s.l ivt Ar.IloN C All twitY . I AllfdHtY IJttMip

_.s.. .-- - . . , _ . . . . . . . . _ .

t!.. n.e nluy I t. l '. t e. pe rvent st.ii lup of ;*nd Add .nppropriate labels. (r.1 ) 1 A  ?

.l e c- (I w.t er) e in e .pe .sy pump twinic ist stage puet I . un .

.in villcr ro.1<lisplav or selector improved lai. cling and demarcation; 2 11 2 .

Ito e.4.ty mean

• asimi. In 1.lentity the go nup to whle h rc.nh rod len.luding possible temporary group

~ li . l.; rn a . . l .iu. .I. lahc's sluiuld altIgatc. (Gli improved lahcling and demarcation; 2 R 2-Ib. sud ell . play mimir is diffisult to i.orrelate ..

he. .uc.c ci si.c .36tserrn.c.in shape fri.m the rod . inrinding possihte temporary group

.eIr.

. t aims. . Iat.cIs should mitIgatc. (r.1 I t rv ; h ard t o improved imbcIlng and draurration; 2 8 7 isle s s. ult t o . . s ci al ..e ..~. er .yn m.d c .p Is k vi' sal e heit. of rod position. Including possthic temporary group tal cIs slwwld mitigate. (GI) improve Ialieling. (GI) 2 0 2 Ns.a. in lature Inc the locater - labels in the rod mial.- f or t he !.131.irtes tors and Istri acicctors is otr.a u re.

tabel and demarcate. (GI) 2 8 2 Indle ator Iigtits for IHits and Al* Nth are not clearly tied tu specific .hannels.

5 2 Labeling is not cicar for key operated " rod out Relabel (GI) 2

. promissive" sultch.

8 2 St.stus lights not i1carly labeled. Relabel. (GI) 2 2 8 2 Tushine steam flow recorder is mislabeled. Relabel.

Provide labcIlng and demarcation. 2 0 2 Rcheat and estraction steam displays are hard to pick out on panci 7F. ,(GI)

Relabel. Rearrangement not 2 0 2 Controls for air ejectors and related equipeent conIusInq1y arranqcd. recomunended. (GII Gland seal displays hard to sce among other Relabel. (GI) 2 l' 2 linlicators on K.

+

.4

(y ~

(m k,  ; .

l'a.p. 4 oi ;'t.

._ _ . . _ . . . . ~ . . . __. _

LtIRit! 0 l i VI lit MitIPIION Of ~ $tllflHR.E ' If1PURIANCL AtilDH I41 If 18 tY.T CUHitt CIIVI' ACIl0N CA1LGORY CAII GIHty . OR04tt' Provide consistent and leproved 2 'R 2

%=-=- levri arte <. have c onf usinti st ate divt.l.ms. 'arter scales. (G7)

Contiol systra w. iter Icvel signal recorder is Correct recorder scale. (G2) 2- R 2 4;41 st. rated in ters (versus Im hrs f or nearby -

se t en) .

~

Icvlsetpointsforalarmorprotktiveactions Provide appropriate red and green 2 5 2 are amt Inditated em Icvel nieters llwa.cives. hanels on icvel meters, cr other set point ellsplay. (G4)

Relal>cl. (GI) 2 R 2 Cor pray sysica latels lark -clarity.

. Relateel . (GB) 2 5  ?

S t.i t u . Il9 fit'. I. r t rittVs smt accurately lat cled.

Dif fluslt to correlate electrical disp' lays with Provide new labeling and 2 5 2 a controls on benchimard. demarcation. (Gl. G57) .

Provide new labeling and 2 8 2

' Sou= clectrical displays and controls are alrrir.fmaqrd rausing confusion. desarration. (Gl. GST)

Earrgency service water controls and displays Relabel. (GI) 2 B 2 are confusingly laimicd.

Ralabel and :ensider incorporation 2 8 2 Arrangement and lahcling of ventilation system controls is confusins. Itimic wouN %1p. of limited mimic. (G5)

- Upgrade jury-rigged recorder and . 2 8 2 Decause of design audifications many controls an<l displays are add.ons (such as recorder and meter scales. -(G2) .

sicter scales).

Relabel. (GI) 2 8 2 Controls for radioactive of f-gas are + . cure y _l labeled. }

Relabel.' (GI) 2 8 2 Dilution system controls obscurely tal.cled. ,

Label. (GI) 2 8 2 Chemical poison system pressure and flow meters .*

l are unlabeled.

1 .

4

,. . - r . . , , .._.y._.-.., . . , . . ,,, ,,..,,,g

.' ( \

. %/ -

v l'aye 's ni /f. -

t Oltits I:I nl IN '.l:RIPil001 Ol' SI:lillHit [ lill*lH(l AllCL ACIluta He i lt.Il lir.y :tmiti cilyl Ac gigel CAII GoltY L All t.f MtY f.ItHHP E lemh .il pul ..no sy .true leulis alor Ilyht s Relatic1. (GI) 7 11 7 e on t u . i nql y' I al.c Ir.l.

t al cl plates ul f le r delce.tlon sysicas dillitutt Relatiel. (GI) 2 8 7 s.. nea.1 an.l inleipict. ,.

Ilewor taluie f or flic p. oles;tinsi syste us tontrols Itelabel. (Gli 2 R 2-I n. ..u . l s t en t an.l e:cu lu . I nq.

Nu .rlpoints *r limill*. are los sa.sily in.m porated A.I.I rcil amt green range fianels or 2 H 7 ews oy .lcr I:s crt ell'. plays. sctpoint/llmits latsel plate. (Gil Isispl.nys .se r o .ss ely l at.c t r.1 wi lle a y s t ews stel l.cl. (GI) 7 Il 7 he.a.ll oys.

Relatiel. (Gl. 04) 2 6 7 Conlools u.r.1 uneler "ull-norm.il" con.litions arc .

ruet illstin(tively labeled.

8 2 Ina.le.rtent actuation of wrong (ontrol has Relalic1. (GI) 2 m e urs ret.

tabels not e.esy to s ca.1 - dirt. wear. Ictter ~ Relatici. (GI) 2 R 2 slic, etc.

1 Relabel. (GI) 2 8 2 1he litentifying compwient number is not engraved on munt label plates.

Addition of dcEnarcation If nes, 2 8 2 Dif ficisit to coordinate backboard displays with related benchtmard controls, system overview labels, and better individual labels will correct this Acficiency. (GI)

Inconsistency does not appear to 2 B 2 Displays on papel luckhnards have horizontal oriented progression whlic related controls on create significant operational adjacent lenchlioard have vertical progression. difficulties; relabeling and demarcation should alleviate this probico. (GI)

Correction of display meter scales 2 8 2 Snee meters have excessively fine scale graduations. is best handled on a case basis. ~

(G2)

=.

+

i \ {, ,T G .(J 'w/

l'aye h of 7s.

s f utiti e.l ivt S0lil lHit l' 1811'ilH l ANCf Al'. l listi D4 VRIPIlON (( GRufn' CIIRR10llVI. ACIlOff CAllGoltY t.All.WAY lill 64 li f1CY -

Corrected. R 2 Water level arters and tesorder have Correct scale unl s. use consistent inc.nc.lstent. units an.1 scru, icro for meters and recorder.

2 8 2 tt tcrs an not h.ive color bands nor limit Color bands should be added. (G4) .

mailrrs.

2 8 2 L vcial onter..in.1 rrenr.lcrs reploy o.14 scale Correct odd scales. (G2) divi .lons or musiti;illers.

2 R 2 "It. h. at" aint " Int er. cpt" valve po.ll ion . are Color conc. label plate and acter

.t i .p l ye.t .,n e .mmm .ina l .s alc wi er .. Ihc pointers.

In.tle tors . ire very c onf using an.3 should be color coded.

2 8 2 L== display scalc <iraduations and unit labels Scale graduations and label 4 should are 1.= small and .iltficult to rea.l. be improved, where practical.

(Gl. G2)

• 2 It 2 thv. c . ire suny s nu ames wieri e ..in i a ti.e s an.1 prelace au ter scales as necessary. '

technicians have hand-lettered meter scales. (G2) ,

2 8 2 LaticIs not casy to rea6; Ictter size criteria Relabel. (GI)

. not met.

2 8 2 Display labels are located below display, while When displays are relabeled. labels should be moved above respective control labels are above co E li.. displays. (GI) 2 8 2 Information on detector which drives the display Provide information on new labels.

is seldosa provided. (GI)-

2 B 2 Descriptive labels for individual r.icters are Relabel. (GI) confusing to read.

2 8 2 Control roo.a displays do not have limits and Correct as part of general meter setpoints in 4 (Icar unambiguous stanner. upgrading. (G41 ,

2 B 2' Ycitow color co+ has various au anings. Yellow indicators should be changed .

on a case basis.to the color com-

~

monly used in the utt11ty industry.

-(G6)

• " " ' ' ' * - - - " ' " w ,.m--,_,.- - , , , , _ _

V p

• 3, b

V' ,.

Pasp / nl /s.

4 of* e ilvi ,

til'.8 it11'Iluti 01 '.I til Dlli 1. Ifil'IlitI Afill AtIlief Cnititt ClIVt ACIloti a:All G0HV 4:All t.ultV t.HuHP Id i 16 il ut Y Al"tr. . .uil rni display labris aie onel orirnled Itrurient. '(GI) Cannpleted. Il 7.

l . 6 7..nl .il lv .

Provide improved scales. (C2) 2 R 7 Itri ni der .. air . are ollen ill f ili: ult to rc.id. .

Provide permanent label pl.ates. 2 Il 2 He.nr.lcr<. are .uppl6cd with b posary ilynotarc 1.il-1.. one al whleh in.lliales the ille number' (Gil ni n.e rr. o, .ti n s. ilm p o p.r.c ne ti.e ne twr inm.her I . unl uisn.

Itcplat.c scales. (G2) 2 Il 7 A med.cr ut e r. oi .ler a.. .eles anel variabics are h.i n. Ictirevd.

Itclaliel with color coded plates.  ? 0 7

-On a sumd.re ut 7 pen er.nr.lcr'. on p.incts 101' anil 1/ ut , the .nl..e .n.tr ni ihe re.or.Irr pens is not (Gil .

son clate.1 with the I.ahet plate that 1.len t i l les the variable.

2 Claec on lienihhoard laliel platr'.. If lahc1 plates are replaced, low 2 B glare black-on-white plates shonid he insed. IGI) i l

'Hcplace ol.1 and discolored Icns . 2. 3 R 7 Pump an+1 v.alve inelle .it ur light'. as c less than 10L brighter than their backgrounds. . caps. Evaluate solutions to Ilght

' variability problem.

2 S<me controls have temporary labeling. Relabel. (GI) 2 B Relabeling program should include 2 8 2 Triaporary aids slo not look professional.

the replacement of temporary operational aids. (G1) 8 2 The alarms which provide the first cue as to a Add unique identifiers for reactor 2 condition requiring entry into the escrgency and containment control emergency operating procedure slo not have unique operating procedures to alarm identifications and/or locations. pancis, and elsewhere as appropriate.

2 8 2 LahcIlng of the alanas for drywell temperature Relabel alarm tile. ..

hl.jh is lei.ipproprh.tc.

s e g.

x

+- --

y - .

'O n q

Y ). .

l' age 8 of 26 CORRICTIVE DESCRIPTI0el 0F- SCHEDULE IMPORTANCE ACi tott -

Dil~ lCII tlCY CORRLCTIVE ACT1001 ~ cal [ GORY CAIEG9RY GROUP 1he alarm currently labeled

• containment sprdy Relabel. 2 B 2-auto start disahled" is mislabeled.

The 3 indicator lights on the controllers for ' Relabel..(GL) 2 .B' 2 the 5 electromatic relief valees are labeled .

misleadingly. .

The contalinwnt spray system control currently . Relabel. (GI) 2 8 2 labeled " dynamic test

• ls misleadingly labeled.

It is not clear that the ananeters y vided for Relabel. (GI) 2 B 2 ,

the cantainment spray system apply to the emiergency scrvice pimps and not to the contaltunent spray pumps.

It'is not clear that the flow-meters provided Relabel. (GI) 2. B 2 f or the contalsunent spray system are total contalem=ut spray flow and not emergency service -

water finw.

Drywell vent asid luarge controls are located on a Relabel and demarcate. Consider 2, 3 8 2 1.ack panel and arr.in9ed in a co'nlusing way with rearran Ing to provide almic.

Inadequate lainllsig. (Gl. GS Control switc hes for valves in cleanup system Relabeling will mitigate; mimicing 2. 3 II, C 7 a ri? EonIssingly arranged. should be evaluated. (GI) (GS) -

~

Contruls on inntainamnt spray system are alrror- Rel.sheling will reduce chance for  ? II, C 7 Imaqc. error; control operations are 4 dcIlberate. (GI, GST) .

Relatici, evaluate rearrasujement 2, 3 B, C 2 ihe wndenser batLw. ash watrols are mirror lamp I. . and/or almicing. (Gl. GS)

Liectrical syste,n displays not well grouped. Laheling may mitigate. Consider 2, 3 II, C ,

2 selected rearrangeinents. (GI, GST)

. -l Consider rearrangement or 3 C 2 I A mimic would he useful in checking valve lineup (Con.len.cr Itae kw. ash 1:nntrols). mimicing. -(GS)

• O b

• v fm

.. v - \ .(/'

- I'.orge 9 of 71,

. t.tmitl CilVI

• IC.CRIPilull DF M.liLDUll. ' IMPtNtl ANtl ' - AClluft CimitLClivl' Acilool CAllCORY CAlt GHtY f.!!OHi*

lit t lCit tu.Y No universal autor apete Inr *nf f-nnimil" Where "off-nosmal" status is 3 C " 7

' con.Il t lon. operationally useful, employ yellow or maler solor, 19. )

4 C 7 tio . 6n lle a t i.we ..I *n... in.e l " l i ne,g. e.: valves and No gorret ive art lon recomem n lcel utleer s ont s'ul . f or c.e'.c of t ies-k ines (grotels1e lias Im liveel with). -

l ui a re t. sin nee.palar !=esilluess, line eweifle of time Consider erplausment of meter 4 C 7 GI a.ls tular cles.te le al secters can olisoire the sr.nlei. (G7) neemtier .s.llae real in the wale assik la idilets it is luil n t I n.l.

Improvements shenId be incorporated 3. 4 C 7 Hillerentes in unlis cal <.t lictween rate and '

Inic9ral ellsplays for fluist systria. istiere practical.. Ashlltional label-

• inq showing tank capacities will help.-

S o

' I t

t l

i 1

l-i I i GROUP 3 i i

ADMINISTRATIVE ,

, 1 MODIFY PROCEDURES (l'rovide visual aids) {

TRAINING l MAINTENANCE PRACTICES

• HOUSEKEEPING I TESTS e

o. .

(

5 I

c I

4 b

t I

r I

i 6

f 6

5

O .

I 5

l i,

-- m r ,g-m-vm, m-e <-m m, --n,-- - - - ,w r-g - m e m - -- w-g- ym n e w_m,m ,w y. _,-ww-w ww -www + w - ve,-m e.,w, v w ,-w- v

y- , . ~

y-i -( b v) .

-c v

( ,

Paek.Inof21, CilltRI CilW

~

l ,

DISCRIPilflIl Cl* SCEDEE IM ORIAIICE- AC11018 -

Oti ICit KY CtilaatClIVE ACIleft E.AILGMtf CAllGNtf CRtMW Single selectalle CBS finw control valve has llo haribsare change recemusceded at 1 A 3 limited capacity. . this time, lest of Can system as autrup source Is. recommended. ,

llo prote&ral spsidaare er test leasts f"or settleg 100 harelware change recemunended at 1 A 3

- austaman flew is.am Can gnsmps. this time. lest of CRA systas as .

eukrup seesrce Is recensmended.

l.

l treareers are smet laravily a.ed In suay of f. Symptom oriente.1 ruergency procc- Complete A 3 l mossul ruoluticais, dures are being developed for 8CIIr.5.

ured valve aumtrols, sasi ties peessure and total Russ CND mu&cesy test. Ibeveley plan I, J A lest J flaa ladia.itlen f ar CRio pumps. of anodifications, if M mecessary C, liardware av the test. ,

Witle-lalkle comumanications have not been fully Perform test.- Complete A 3 tested arm o rprater p.a-r Isas twen lost.

Het elevisass wieltle of the amatrists of the 4 Provide specific tastructlees. I A 3 l Instruncats sm auering torus water teneyerature l represents the I=stk avera.ge torus water te,mperatuse ereded for the tentalsament centrol

', proceslure. ,

Reactor everators appc4r to saisisiterpret time Training item. 1 A 3 "f allure is ur.mm* catry canditlusi to the

' rrector ausstrel pe es che r.

- Ihc casedittens ter esities the proce.hsres are Tralalog item. 1 A 3 unut emplicitly elettsied asul operators thlait they

c4m emit frima 4 specifle second level proceshere

! helore they can e=It frwm the proce & res as a whole.

Stansitaserenes leptreestatiums et the site Consider asslyslag directlen of the I A J Imergenay Plan with the ram-rgency operatleg emes p y plan to the director of pemachses plaers an emerssive leer. Ire as the operations or his sicsigusate, edne -

shift' superlatreatent. could be en call.-

• l t

l

1' , _

% .J -

' %/ .

. Page II of 26

- ColtRf CTIVE DE'4RIPI1848 SF SCIIESIR C IfqPORIAIICE ACIlON cal (GilRT git 0 IIP IK f'ICIIIICT - CORRICllVC ACileu CATEGARY The scale units and zeres en the newly-added. Provide esel scale lefemetten 1 A 3

'l wide ranje terms water level indicators are est la precedere (short.temel. . ,

consisteet with these for the narrow range level

ledicators. Also, the wide range lletts le the Provide deel scale lefemetten 2 8 '

,I

< proceesre are laconsistent with the narras range en etters and recorders. (G2) limits.

Appropriate warnleg regarding the conseeluences

• Include appropriate enrolog la' l' A 3 et Eteleg up the core spray system walves needed precedere and tralelag.

la the proceesre and ese the control panel.

• Add appropriate varslag labels.

2 8 SpeeJ/leaJ chaneer switch morts la apposite IIe actien mesomended because of Complete B 3 directlen empa ted. risIt if changed. Traleleg allows operators to adapt.

Present rug-scy plan feriaat is Sh to Provide m actice level estria. 2 5- 3 ese.

Control rus= eperators de sat carry a pass key hte keys avallaHe to aperater. I 5 3 te control ream.

A third cuatrol reen ayerator is destrahle. Se easy shifts one is proeided. 2 3 ~3 Ewaleate providleg ese se all shifts.

't it .I er.pstar t.slibe atlen prop am we th same upgrade calibeatten progree for , 2 N J lustruments. eensafety reletre c y lpment.

s. hart paper Is est terrrctly m. etched to scales Provide better stock af recorder 1 # A en 4 suss&cr el resorden, paper, appropriately ledened, and readily atenthie to sustrel teams agrratser%

8 liten were mot In pine at the tan saettlos. N ietale filters la place. I 5 J 9

_ 4 . m *

• i , .m . d ,ime ,,m e.eehi m,.ed t.hs., .i . J set .. e, ..tl .

dirly.

e

. e l'a9e !? uf Th ItP!!! C 1 i VI f4 VR1Pi1011 00 SCli! DUt[ IMPORTA!!CC ACT 1018

} CAllGORY Gt0*fP

! li l 18.11 LC Y CORRECIIVE ACil088 CAllGORY lt is alet ti ult to establish aceurately tie Provide appropriate training for Complete B

• 3 esistrm.- of powrr level aleve ? pers'rnt il the operators to use lateracdiate range attual p.wer level is the order et 2-5 percent instruments. ,

.in.1 tte reat tor etarratur uses the Average ruwer Ran y l'amitur e rs s+4ce s les s rad power leval.

the q,cratar ha . sus in.tru nt ty stilc h le can Add apprcipriate lastructions. Add I. 3 ft 3 dtrr<tly read ti.e Irvri s eas tw-i w:ern f loo. ling instrument, il anessary. (Consider tie ster w ll, use of .Is ywel l 3*s cuure insteumeest

- anil wide range torus water level TnTtrumcat.)

la rym y e. cratin : priac.kres saast 1.e stored la Provide storage space in'the control 1 a 3 the seat v; r = ==. rous.

k r.ur, muy s c .ul t i f q.cra tar incorrn tly Training compensates. Complete C 3 sul t(ta-s 1531 ran ;cs.

Ott .p . Iluw arsus. ore .e !!4 enut used inaasse of le alaiseg item. I C J 1.ask of ruperirn(c an.I t sun lc f.p.

L.cacrator g==.cr output onter is in.su urate. Calit> rate "nonsaf ety" lastruments Congslete C J o

• usare frequently. , ,

Chanrs in plant operating practice are smet Revise written procedures to reflect Complete C 3 rrIIctte.t in writtra psoce.fures. present plant status and practice.

%e== psos e.ba r, have suit t.crn revised to reflect Revise i.rltten procedures to reflect Complete C 3 prac tices stu=.a t o t=- ci t n t i ve. present plant status and practice. .

e l

l e

l l

. - .~ . _ -, _ . .

4 e

O GROUP 4 HARDWARE REMOVAL (Unused, non-functioning) l

• REARRANGEMENT / RELOCATION (Moters, Switches, etc.)

• MODIFICATION (Control Logic, Interlocks, etc.)  ;

• REPLACEMENT (Recorders, Switch Handles) l ADDITION (Integrated-Consolidated Display, etc. )

• FLUID SYSTEM CRANGE

() .

I i

e r

I L

( ,

) _

f os.-)

Paete 13 of /t, reikt:I C 1IV:

litSCRIPIloff (4 5 Clin litit[ IHp0RI ANI.t AC1if 48 litt IC et t:8. V tuttKICilVL AC11014 CAllt.ORY CAlt e. DRY t.RtKIP

. . _ . . . . . . ~ . _ - _ _ _ _ _

Deerateer is unabic to sentirm I,y sm ter seading Display output in terms different 1 A 4 the " triple-le=" water level. Iremeslowntemer water level or torrelate to other instfisments. .

tired ell . plays of irrepa su y f or dicscl erncrator. Prowl ete- fraturncy displays. I A 4 l os.el .te ywe ll t.sg.ce a tue es tie.at are e rs ene ded deed ro uvide spctillo instronnesets las  ! A 4

.elaemust in the s emele ol eenws as e the 'a lowpera- actrssaty) asal Instructions on whitti tures at tir t e ve .te ywell . micrs - near the do ywell to,uperateere slunsld lic uwel laittens et the drywell. as an entry fondition.

Ihces .ner supy d8 8 tre rn. c . anem.j the w.se lenas 8 s uviale e rf re cesse leg trayeraturc  ! A 4 e ra. Im water level in.t s umm ul . In Iceur, el the measurements an.1 clear instnsctions pe.e.cs. verlat. Irs t hey s c .p.m.t t ams ti.cf r en Iww ta ww them ta correct ,

scusttivity to tiec strywell troeperature. reactor water level measurement.

I s*K!1 Ie reeJ e re no Jer Is .r Wr u~d 8.w ecce ators. Remusc ectosJer. (t;10) 7 al 4 til.seit vert ical a= tcr on 4r bar*Feard Remove secter. (CIO)  ? Il 4 distrastimt.

Order et lent e uem nt s is met ' natural. Inteethamp steam flow and coautenser 2 Il 4 vatuum dlsplays.

Steam pe r. suer recorder suit easily seen on Provide latrejrated easily viewed 2 Il 4 (ontrol oaed. consolidated display. (Gll) liard to view pernure ectorale-r while using Provide consolidated display. (Cll) 2 11 4 tuolilac hyp.ess esmt rols.

Lad of reactor toolant lev rature intoemation Provide consolidatesi display. (G11) 2 B 4 em nysicr Ce ce t s amte el Imas'.t. Ad.8 satuallene temperature to Citi.

• Ulrce; tion of seetion el turtelne control switches Modify swits.hes. Consider change 4 11 4 west the oppusite way capected. when replacle>J pressure regulator.

Clrtular um ter pointer oseve opposite the motion Correct if control switches are 4 ft 4

)

of a*ssociated e untrol switch, modified. -

• hould lac a prutective tower on vacuum breaker

, Provide protective collar. 2 II 4 cont rol . .

Samm- (u.atrols are not used on generator section Remove unused (or disconnected) 2 B 4 et control Imaed. controls (G101

v

) )

/

Page 14 of 2(, .

CDERICilVF DESCRIPil0el 0F SCliElAILE IMPORIANCE AC f1084 10 1CIttiCY Cot 4RfCIIVL ACIl006 CAIIGORY CAltGORV fJt00P Remowe the " add-on" MVAR seter. 2 8 4 Question useiutness of seton.1 ItVAR meter. '

(GIO)

W. ster level indicators are not easily viewed Add consolidated display. (Gill 2 8 4 fram clean-up systens letdows: valve controls.

Na display or alors for reactor tuollding sumps Consider adding appropriate alarms 2 0 4 or torus rous samp in centrol room, or displays in control room.

Rcxter water level meters hard to read from Add consolidated display. (Gill 2 8 4 If/?f 3.here core spray controls are located.

Ndification to valve Interlocks and 2 B 4 As rangement of tontrol switthes for recirc. pump isolattosi and t.ypass valves confusing and i.ot control arrangeunent is plannee for same as used elsamhere. long ters.

Cor-ect anomaly in isolation valve 2 D 4 A complicated prote.kare required to taring -

cicanup system on line due to valve control control logic.

logic.

Valve to operate rectr(ulation valve is in high Nve valve operation switch to low 3 8 4 radiation done. radiation location or make system automatic as originally designed.

Provide leproved status information 3 5 4 No intoemation displayed f or vital 4t10VAC emotor '

tuntrol tralres. on vital power.

B 4 Controls an4 ellsplays inr cuerreyswy dicscl Rearrange (it may he necessary to 2, 3 .

generaturs are conf usin ily arrangcJ. operate controls under marginal ll.Ating cuewtitions). (GS)

Consider rewiring control to suke 3 n 4 The raise-lower control for illesel generators wos ts opposite way espected. correct.

layroved Status infosination on vital 3 p 4 Irw ludication. of status of vital low voltage (l?triAr_. In Vin:) gww r di .triteution .ystras. power was planneil lay amidification.

[

j Lune las twen provided t>y alas,n systra chan9es. Provide missing

• status inf oruution.

D

, [,f}. .-

f.

c ,r$, ..~.

e. ,% / \ * \

Q);

Parp. I' of ?f.

a. . . - - . . . . . - .. .--.._..:- -

. Comut C livl.

Dt 54.RIPil45 IN SCIElllEE . llW'lllll ANCE. Al.l ltill tu i lt.it hCT . tam at cIlvt aciloll CAlt uutV CAltGnRV (JNWF

. _ - . . - ,1 _.

mvly a.t&J lire pruire tisE sysica tuntrols Rearrange.-(GS) 2 3 4 kaphaeas dly as e an.t. d (p nd piamp 2 .nsed 8.aa tesp lire genuge). *

- Status Ilglets lac flec syst:1m Joa.try pasmp still, Remove. ' (GIG) 2 3 4 rrmeln. lleins.fi eenused.

, lice.1 aute-manual transicr control of cuadraser . Provide transfer functies in CR. 3 5 '4 hatwell enetrol. . >

Levy lastassers wlu se- di . plays sereded les snappos t . - llanelle est a case basis. 2. 3 5 4

.g.cra t teses in ol t - nala ma t s i t isa t t ens are sent anuventroitly Insaled.

• 4 Valve liasillose taillcators .p secrally follow'a Change Icas caps to appropriate- 2 N ,

tonventiose el rc.i lor sq.cn (llonsing) ased green celer. (GB) ter st.r .s (not s t. win.e1. Yalve pusltlases

-* - A change to the Setensity of 3 8 4 displayed on panel 10Xf. hansever, use audier for.

• tlic open positions. the isodicator lamp snar aise be steCessary.

~

art =raen as e ==.rliable. hard to read, wrd te m pix ceent es same smettipetet 2. 3 e 4 maintain. recorders is planned. [ valuate need

. for trend later wetten est res.sining' recorders (both multipoint and 2- -

pen). Provide replaceerst recersiers or ettner meases of allsplaying tresed in(eemillan (e.g. tanyester treed) ,

esIncre reepsired. (Gl. G91 Handle is ers sved trams the spare enciter gleid Reimeve this never-used device. 2 s 4 thes= . tat toistent oss panel M7T. (Glel Correct by coding (stre. shape. 2 B 4 Control sultth handles should be coded (slie.

shape, color). teleri switch leasedles. ,

' %=ne sentenis'.are not 4.h,paately identified seer mylaccernt of switch basedles with  ? 8 4 l

, prot'ccted. redundantly coded handles, e.g. ~.

l shape and color is recomumended.

l l reogressi.no ut osaltiple displays is lesiesisistent ~

C.in useselly be corrected by later- 2 3 4 with noemen acav.atiner. (Icit to ris nt e thaging tBee location of a f:es pengrissioni, displays. (0.51 ,

i l .

-___.__________._____._m.__

- - - - - - - w -

1%.,

K' V - (j Jv )-

Page 16 c f 26 -

.CURRfCiIVE

'IK50RIPil0Il CF SCIEDULE IfG'ORIAIICE - AC110Il Dff'ICIIHCY CORatCTIVE ACil0lf. cal [ GORY CATEG00tY GROUP ihere is sonne tiunce of misreading the 2-pen. Replace. (C3) Nett recorders shcald 3 '8 4 2-scale records rs used througkast tsee control - color code pens with labels, to rocia. facilitate identificatten of variables. .

4 Replacement of some multipeint 2 3 4 Design and operation of strip chart recorders is Inade.paate.

• recorders is complete. Evaluate need for trend Informatten on ressaining rccorders (both usitlpoint and 2-pen). Provide replacement .

recorders or other means of displaying trend Infersnation (e.g.

computer trend) odeere resquired.

(G3 C9)

' Replace recorders.- 2 8 4 Recorders are mechanically unreliable.

Replacement of some multipoint 2 3 4 Selection of time scale and recorder speed eften * '

ska not allow the rate of change information the recorders is complete. . Evaluate operator needs to le interred fross the need for trend information en recording. remaining recorders (botle ensitlpelat ,

and 2-pen). Provide replacement recoralers or other means of displaying trend information (e.g.

computer tresid) weiere reepstred.

(G3. G9) 9 ranel camsponcats la poor condition. Refurbish as resguired. I n 4 Locate carrow range airywell pressure 2 5 4 tilfi drywell prenure mant be confirmed 11 consulting a ti.e.L panel Indicator. . indicator on front panel er incoeve-rate in con.alid.sted display. (Cll)

Add wide range dryweIl pressGre re= 2 0 4 Rate and 4trastisH4 of LIMage ol dryweIl pressure over a wide ran9e omsst le read teien a somly- corder on front panel or lanceryorate 44 h d ImL panel actorder. rate of change inform.etten in consolidated display or een coupester display. (Gil C9) .

Investigate auans for ensuring 2 3 4 All tise tuon water Icwel Instrusuents utilize a unna.n ,tandpl i w. stamlpipe is full.

m

. g

K l . > < .;

G J 'J - ' .

' %,/ >

~

Page IIerf 7t, Cl*ftl Ci1Vf '

DrVRil'fl0li lif SCHilNil E IMPORIAIICI ACIloti la l'ICil ur.Y ~ toit:1Cityt. Atilpei ' , CAlluntV CAllGNtY Utottl*

u_.._. _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . . _

the senior operatur ami the hif t letipilcal Ad.1 con'.nlidateel display with fisP 7 H 4 adelwo- Isave die fisielty in visesally collecting . entry variables. .(Cll)

. the d.st4 ttwy swed to encrute their overscelmi * -

. responsibtItiles. .

pperator ausst santism the de-energliation of the . indicator lights shonald be pest on  ? 8 4 4

8 u ra.s salenoid. by a b. k ing the H In tirator front panel.

Ilyhts en une us it.c 4.a.k pancis. In ad.sition, -

taarned amt imiltalor Ilyht 1.ulbs can trad eg crat..r to suke 4 .cri..u. rrior, rontrol at the rRD immes is lost if power to pelnq corrected as part of another 2 R 4 modiiIcation.

panel 41 is lost.

4 C 4 Nater pressue e en tcrs do suit imili; ate presesete A fluid systrus umfification is ~ ~

or absen.c of uter in water l>ones. necessary to ensure that water bones are full. Remove present meters which are not uselest.

Consider renuoving eensaccessary  ? C 4 Rea tor pressume inditator is redundant to two heat culunpr pressure istdicators. . pressure moeter, or inake scales consistent, or replace with

consodilated display. (GIU) 4

ceiteels sur clrstrlt.stly us. crated rellet walves Rearrange. (C's )  ? C 4 (s tutvs) are lilogically arranged. .

(CS) 2 t; 4 Display f or tomiensate domineralizer lp is Itclocate to St/t,l'.

poorly located.

2 C 4 Distratting catrancous power information is Ivaluate seced for meters, reseve provided f or auny buws. ear.necessary meters. (GIO) llearrange. (GS) 2 C 4 Voltnieters .se e almve ansmeters for A 1 l' leatteries, helnw inc C battery.

Gruund detrs tims Indicator, voltmeters and Rearrange. (GS) 2 0 4

.smaneters insonsistent arrang.1 ment. ,

legirove labeling. Recorder sedf- Completed C 4 Recorder displ.syine; cler.c4 < noling water temperatures la reactor hullding in.schinery and fIcation, (planned 1963 cestage) may turbine Basild6m3 machinesy is confusin91 y enlunce readability of these

! 1414 Ir.t; truip.vature Inf.nmatf ans is disilault to .v.ariables. L ong tc 1m: consfeier rea.1; tlwrc are no Cru .elaims. . adding CCW alarms. -(G3) 4

. _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ . _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - _ _ ~

1. , tr- - 3,

. g_ #

e1

' Oc -

. J '~

Page lit of 26 Q. "~

i

~'

CONRLCIIVL

(

, DESCRIPTI0li 0F Stil((MEE . 110'018) Al*I ACTI0ll DEFICIENCY CORRECTIVE ACil0If CAi[G0ftf CATEG0ftY GROUP

[acessive reach' to valve controls and test i Relocate. '2 C 4.

buttons (too hlyh) on panel 11F.

IIced containsient purge and went controls and Evaluated incorhating displays in 2 'C 4 displays on front panel. Integrated display.  ;

A!With scatter ertis tulatlun pemge trip displays / Consider relotating.

• 2 C. 4 contaois are not needed on front panel.

Iwo-pese recorders fall as is and the absence of b replacement 2-pen recorders, 4 C 4 chart motion stay not be lammediately obgleus. consider use of "penser en* light.

(GJ) -

Controls diffiresit to reach. (A1WOS and 5 team Consider relocatten of steam line 4 C 1

-4 Ilse valve controls too high, others too lens). valve centrols, for others, no corrective actlen recesumended at this time.

Vacman pings controls on panel 132 are opposite Consider rearrangement, relabeling. . 2 C 4 the nursial left-to-right seepsence. (G5, GI)

Certain valve controls on panel 12XR are a t of ' Consider rearrasegement, 2

~

C 4 normal seepseme. relabeling. (G5,GI)

Control for the 3 fecenater pumps are in a Consider rearrangement, 2 C 4 hortsuntal . array. iAlle the controls f or time 3 relabeling. (GS,GI) i tundensate pimges that supply three are arranged l vrrtically.

IblV test Pushliattuns are hard to aqscrate. Nelocation of these pushbettens (to 4 C 4 a lower locattun) may layreve

~

operability. (r.5) - <

[

Un panels !IR. Icit and right, test selection Consider switch replacement. 3 C 4 l Sw i tt hes s ee- the selecat stup valves ase.I the l . Seles;turs for lie tuehinc lypass valves rotate

• l thrais9 te 14 4

'Ilo recommsended actless since actlen 4 C 4 t intonsistrat imitioninel of " auto

• or *nonsel" i os several sultates. 'is deliberate; consc w eeces are l - minor anil die me t af frct safety.

~

1he tuci zoni erat; tor Icvel recorder ls located Consider providing en consolidated 2, 3 - C 4 several lect away trtaa other reactor level- level display or en cenputer driven

^

l displays. . CRI. (Gil or G9) &

i

. . ~

l l

9

i O

6 0 .

{

GROUP 5 [

o COMPUTER SYSTEM ADDITION I

I

^

O' .M P

0 4

O .

y . _, _.- _ _._- -_-..-_ _ , .~__-,, _,____,._,,, _ _-, . . , ___ , -.- -- .

< = -- --

p ., .

)

I Page 19 af M . .

. . CostRECilVL i - DESCRIPiloil 0F- SCKBEC Ilr0RTAIICC ACilell .

DtflCILHCY CoeuttCIIVE ACileil CAltGORY

• cal [GeRY CAGUP Dispersion of controls and displays causes Provide coordinated displays en 3 5 5 dillituity la obtaining colierent picture of plant computer CRT. (G9). ,

' state of torus and drywell vari eles. . .

2-pen recorders do not display trend information Conslaler use of CRT display for > 3 s S ,

ettectively. needed trend. (G3,G9) ,

~Important variables are displayed only on Provide selectable computer drives 3 8 5 esaltipulat rivarder, idere they are dif ficult te readouts for operators. (G9) read.

the enorders used to display the easts.est of Iteplxe the secorders or display 3 8 5 ,

Indivlihaal radiation usanitors are unreadable. autput en computer drives Cti.

(G3. G9) operator cannot easily detevistne it change in Provide feeeack via Computer Driven Completed C 5 flua is that espected for red movement. .. Displays. .lG9)

Pertusbations la power alemand arise that result Provide feedback via Computer Driven Completed C 5 la reactivity respaires=1sts outside the range Displays. (G9) toreseen in the miglet orders. i i

Reactor engineers sur err.- calculattenelly er Provide feedback via Competer Ortsee Campleted C 5-l l

typographically, feew14 tin 9 night orders. afsplays. (69)

Reuter operatur sur err. reading nlyht orders Provide fecexk via Ceuyuter Delven Completed C 5 an.s transla:I I than late utines. Displays. (Gil Display average neutron power en 3 C b to slagte rem for penarr level Indicatten.

CRI. (G9)

~

r i

Display rire water trugscrature 3 C 6 l clea water ll.as asiJ mtlerr vari.able% met i J avallatile em temat paarls. differential, yemmy corrent and steam flew on plant comyster Cni. (G9) --

~

PeovlJe aan plant computer 3 C  %

Cleaulaties watry inirt inuperatus e saut l CRT display. (G9) displayed on to at panel.

( a l

l .

i

~

.[% (E, . _

Vl

, s

I O

Q )i -

Pase 70 of 76 -

l

- t.s*t<l CIIVt -

DLLCRIPilall 0F- $CIE DifLC = IIFGitIAllCC ACII0li ta l lt st an V tosterCIIVf ACilflII CAllCART CAlfCflitV (JtoteP

-_ , i -

.._ i Ilic autementle. aceite ol for two valves involved in Bo short tesa action recommensleI en 3 C 5 Seat sa-II truc t is emet .8 4e s entrol s e===. sua s ensit ral lew al lows. Prowlsic valve laditall a s.3 valve re.itions is displayed in . position record.nse plant compester.

rentrol rimes. .IG9) ,

Display com.hst.Livities (a plant 3 C i time.hettivitics displayed see ortorders ase

.Ill l is tel t te e ra t. remputer elriven CRT. IG9)

Voltare. latoestation is sparse - especially for Provide Bus Valtage displav from J C S the 4*l l. asses. plant (sampester. IG9) t title trayeratuse infuematless der wrvlar flisplay wrwire water temperature en -3 C 5 water. plant computer CRT. (G9) 880 splay tint Ecuperatsecs en plant J C 5 .

iso ccm r.p aty ses vite water temperatus es as e displayed. gter CRT. (G9)

Operators currently tese output 3 C 5 Malti-point recorders ~ lor radiatiest mesiltors are unrca.t.able. meters en pancis 1 and 2R. Provide radiatless amusit ter display est computer CRI. Remove recorders.

IC1)

Operators currently use output 3 C S o piatrists el lastrument hannels are displayed een meters seatside operator's lleId of view. mete.s use panels t ased 29t. Provide radiation muselter display en .

romputer rai. IC91 Replace 2-pen recorders or prowlsie 3 C S Iwo-pen resswdrrs for radiation ansaltors are eins cllatile and s repalee Is e*pernt smstretesiassie. seceded trend inforunatleen en comysster CRI.or lay other means. (G9)

Consister adding to computer CRI. 3 C S Igred semideve ite dage and varasian strae1 valve positions,as llaw rates.

Provide on (caputer CRI. (CS) 3 C S Onced (Io.cl .. Ilsig water system tisperature displays on f ount pasicI.

Provide ese computer CRI. (G9) 3 C S Isred displays lor Iscarla.l. windinej asul water tropes atsse e f or esala grierrator, reat tor retir-l enlatinsi puuge anI CRD *n treint guserl (en 4 massJ).

. -\ .

9 y~x - , ,-~ y

-i

\

'. 'u)

.. , ,(./

Page ZI of 76 CORRLCilvE DESCRIPil0II 0F -SCHEDULE IMPORTAIICE ACflON REFICIENCY CORREClIVE ACTICII CATLGORY. CAIErdlRV . Ot00P ,

9 Need radiation monitoring readouts on front Provide on computer CRT. (G9) 3 C 5 panel (on demand). .

Need turbine information to monitor operation of Provide en computer CRT. (G9) 3 C 5 machine on front panel (on demand).

Some reactor recirculation pump electrical Remove from front panel, provide en 3 C 5 displays are not needed en front paael. CRT. (G9,G10)

Some amalliary electric power displays are not Re*nove from front panel, provide en -3 C 5 needed on front panel. CRT. (G9,C10)

G B

e 9

0 s

io -

O ..

1 GROUP 6 l l 1 CONTROL ROOM ENVIRONMENT i

• REFURBISH PANEL FRONTS (i.e., Painting, etc.) ,

, LIGHTING  ;

• VENTILIATION c

l

NOISES l e

<

• ACCESS CONTROL i REARRANGEMENT  !

i b

O l

f I i

I t

t f

I i l =

l

. - l l

l f

C i

i f

I i

.O  :,

i l 'i t

L .

s ,, --.a l ..

r~y f); ,;V

-( ' bq . ~

V . . .

.Page 22 of 26

, ColtRf CIlyC KSC4IPT1011 0F Scie [DetC IMP 0ftiAIICE ACT1018 Dt fICII14CY ' . CORRfCII'IE ACTICII' CATEGGRV CATErART _ CR0tIP i

• 1 .

l-

- Pour uo:Launship on newly lastalled ' fire systeen Refurbish. 2 8 6 l .

i' r

suitches. .

p*odifications are not consistent with original Refurbish modificattens not- 2 8 6 arrangement codes. professionally done.

l Room is shssty and floor'Is gritty. Clean shocts, maintain filters. If 2 3 6' problem persists, provide dust removal in air intake. ,

Op:rators claim hief lu(kground sound noise Remove contineseus' air nonitor from Ceepleted B 6 -

Icvel, control room. Consider additlen of

. carpet.

Poor condition of paint on console benchboard. Repalet.  ! ,

3 6 Repainting of room is planned. I B 6 Palet on walls tus deteriorated. ..

.. A rearrangement of the desks la the 3 C f.

Lepelpaient operators an 1 insintenance technicians samiettmes interfere with the operators visten of centrol area is under consideretten.

s.e=t rol !=urit. Relocatten of Rlecking and Tagging to reduce this problem will be

-considered.

Relecate CSS office to roem 4 C 6 los.stion of G% ottice inhlhtts an ef ficient

.everwirw funs-tina. . currently occupied by Prime Cumpester.

' ee s ewit rols e en I.c Jars e.1 ty walk ing by. Itcarran.p- traf fic pattern by 1 0 8.

relocation GM of fice, Slecting and lagging desk.

theec l. = orans Iur 41.llag ur contanilla.1 Evaluate lastalling reliable -3 0 s.

lusaldity. hiamidiffer.

Air (unelltlonin.) systna is unrcllable. Install and mulatain filters, clean 3 -C b elints,auinLaIn retoods. I( retorels indicate omyscs'. ors a probice, rek i place and espqraile system. Centrol Rone habitahllity modificatten will

. . correct.

. __ m ..u, s.- . . ._.. ...

D -

O -

Page 23 af ?& , 2 UWtstt CIIVi

. i IESCRIPileIIlif 8,0 KINE E Iff0RIAIICf Arlines -

puttstilvC acisell Call rART, - CAlfr.nRV (JtfW tesicituct t

. . . . . . . . - - ~ . - - .~~ -

. - - . . . . . - ~ . . . . . - _ . . .

4 se liaret ta euntrol trat t le pulse and toaluslose in . Relocate tagging aperator's statten. 3 C tantaut o.am. ~ Reimate sliit t searcruiser's of fice

• to tantrol M(ets.

Relocate Gib office to reens 4 C en Present location et G W Gr2 etlice is esmable to prevent casual entry to control are a by curresilly occgid h Prim

. pers.n. ors =Ana leave s= e.-awee ser I.cles tairre. Canyester. .

i e

q

-_ - _., , _ _ - _- , , , - - - - _ --,_m. A. as -smm u--

s G

O GROUP 7 NO ACTION REQUIRED OR , l DEFICIENCY CORRECTED ,

i

. L

• i i

I 1

1 O -

I i

l t

7 I

i L

f t

r

'* I i

i 4

o T. . i, a i F49e 28 of 26 CrrIiCll:1 E4 M l?i10s K 3CM DEtt IMcRIAAICC #ff102 5tf14ttBC1 CEE21CII11 KIIGE CAftLatt CAlttJRf UttrX Care we,y melee emetsels caemst he swd to stadify castrels. Corretted A F tasettle slam.

stadsfy segfe. Co m ted A 7 latevyter es neeJer and mete start t.gst canyts44tes the mater kwel tantral eyevatten es emme w eg.

A.te stant leps tselo states terempletely Ibdify statas dlylay. Carrected A~ f

.aaw t ens 43,e ymm t .

a t ant ew v ms 6 m.al 'er b44 *1rmell teweere- 144 replacroret arcerdres. with Campleted A 7 tane ama hap terws gnawww *we mentres amat select. ate dssital readsets et arytaarerst sesmadres ne akeet ladleten.at esta potath Ect a tr1tst wmstletItes are an.%le ta aret Cerrreted by CFM 5ted "Rampe 18 Carretted 3 - 7 ryvete.narets tLet Anat un6ammels te en wale Aest tlem*.

Set.ww estes nog

• ram

• am ac.

1s sn e ntotty ma a4ter attes earles Amammalatars art teleg replaced. Completed S F v=vvely.

Imr condatt sest stat <=rmts leyesed en the Esternetlog si the procedores has Cmaple ted 8 7 eyesatsas avve,r4 emis este is LAe eri tts nl taeretted til h

..s 4 an.r y.. + n ma .me a essa sp s warm #eTed.

Reformating e8 the precadsars Ones canyleted 5 #

Emir t.a tes .4 matec Itawsgrs and euwe esta annard te dow=yt tse tsaarm.tten flee si the corrected this.

s <*=.s

%sser wenataars n ee At 8 kalty anytog mith Reformattog ei the procedures has Canyleted S 7 5 gsut nemman tenir ~18... therm

• stap es a smerested tats.

pom w+s e 1 dra n.aa.g =&w taurv ee amt te prom etJ ta tsar e.1 ster.

9B-e l

m

- - , - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - . - . - - - - - - - - - - - - -. m

5 a

r. %

ggi ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -- - - ,

.t.

i i=b I ll 3 3

3 2 1 3

2 I i l i i i i 1 5=3 II I B l

j ar 2 r 1

i e d' -

-i tz h 3 j ,1 i (j j

,, p l s 39 i e ,g 311=(n g 35s ..

g lm 'e ,

si 31.31p(l}

,i l1.i. < t 1  !! i S !iit a -

t  :

4  !

t  !

5,5 h, n t . lg  ! = 1- 33 ao "I.

j!n !i !  ;

j il ji u- xsi 3t l

El i*iasi f

p 3g2 ,;

1 p 1 i;

. . hk 33 .

_k A

2 2$ J J 21

, g 2.

ps hv si  !, ,i i I. 1]j

1. e i11 .; , =

I! 3*1

~

32 k j  :

t !mB3 J L jI{

8 a

'4 3h 3h 3

• I N j 5

                                                                              - j.-!al.iy s                     1 2 .,

25j I' 5 1 j* *a *

• j it i $

9 n a 33

                       .           l lj 1             y
                                                          ]l       o j1i   l
                                                                                            'y                                                                  ,

t E sg5 j:g 11! 3. Ig i ", I I f ji fc i sla il Glj ] 3: p

                  $5(
                   '[                                         3 11,ar '"2j. ;,hj3,1 fit ;) d :4 g

o 131 13 il il

                   #!!             jjj ~dg 51 I!I lit             us !!s 11 lal.!iil!!                .fi la ii}d D .ti !!

l

          >                                                                                  l x)                                                                                           -

• Est l j jie

            .t.                                                                      .
                     !5= !    o        o      o        o e

_g I l I I I . lna

                                               .i                          -

I is to, i j3 mI ,, j{e si J

                                ' I                .

fu i E~ t 8 l l l $5 bj 2 TI b B 3 1 l Au h 3

                                                        ;3 B.

I I i 6 2.p3,}

                                        *C - 1                                             -

3.11lsi.

                        !           1 4c :! a13 e                       3 a         1a an ir n        *15h>'1it     *- ef 1

j - 65, . o 3.

                                  ~

s, a

                                                   ,I                      -

1 t 64

                                  $1 j ! .! (! a ,f A1                  ,

c - _-.

r F i i f i. O i r T I i i I TABLE V-2 , i i l t GROUP CLASSIFICATIONS ACCORDING TO l NATURE OF CORRECTIVE ACTION i s n l I e

                                                                   . i o                                                           .           ;

i l e

                                                                         ?

f I  ! 9 e l i r i l i P i I I I

Table V-2

   /~T                    GROUP CLASSIFICATIONS ACCORDING TO

' \/ NATURE OF CORRECTIVE ACTION GROUP ACTION 1 FURTHER EVALUATION REQUIRED i 9 2 RELABELING, DEMARCATING AND OTHER IMPROVEMENTS NOT REQUIRING MODIFICATIONS TO ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS OR FLUID SYSTEM CONFIGURATION (Including Mimicing of Existing Arrangements) , l CONTROLS / DISPLAYS

• METER SCALES (Bands, Sotpoints, Limits)

RECORDER SCALES

• LENS CAPS (Colors, Legends )

NORMAL /OFF NORMAL STATUS SBM ESCUTCHEONS 3 ADMINISTRATIVE i MODIFY PROCEDURES (Provide visual aids) TRAINING MAINTENANCE PRACTICES

• HOUSEKEEPING

()

• TESTS ,

4 HARDWARE ,

• REMOVAL (Unused, Non-functioning)
• REARRANGEMENT / RELOCATION (Meters, Switches, etc.)'
• MODIFICATION (Control Logic, Interlocks, etc.)
• REPLACEMENT (Recorders,. Switch Handles)
• ADDITION (Integrated-Consolidated Display, etc.)

l FLUID SYSTEM CHANGE 5 COMPUTER SYSTEM ADDITION 6 CONTROL ROOM ENVIRONMENT (

• REFURBISH PANEL FRONTS (i.e. Painting, etc.)

l

• LIGHTING VENTILATION NOISE ACCESS CONTROL l REARRANGEMENT  ;

I 7 NO ACTION REQUIRED OR DEFICIENCY CORRECTED l I) V.10 i a

             -g%                                 -p p -

T- ,- w

i P i i l TABLE V-3 , I t GENERIC HARDWARE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAMS [ 6 E I h G I e

                                                                                                                                                                                       .      f e

e i f r ( I l

                                                                                                                                                                                              ?

f F i l i l-1 l l

                                                                                                                                                                                           -  t t

i I h I P k t i l e I

                                                                                                                                                                                             ?

Table V-3 GENERIC HARDWARE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAMS [dD x Number Action G1 Relabel and demarcate using group heading label plates where applicable (includes reference information label plates). G2 Replace meter scales where they are' deficient (multipliers, progression, readability, resolution). G3 Replace recorders. G4 Add red and green range bands to meters (or setpoint/ limits label plates). G5 Rearrange and/or add mimic (controls and/or displays). G6 - Indicate normal (or, off-normal,'if appropriate) operating position or status

    -                    (i.e. valve line-up, switch position).

G7 Replace selected switch escutcheons with relabeled escutcheons. G8 Replace lens caps 'on indicator lights. .

    . G9                 Enhance information display by upgrading l                        plant computer.

i

G10 Remove unused, inoperative, or unnecessary

• l hardware. j Gil Add a consolidated display of key reactor and containment variables.

l

  /'s L- D                                    V.11 l

l l _ _ _ . - _ . . _ . . ._. _ _ _ . .}}