ML030070400

Performance 12/18/2002 Meeting Handouts

ML030070400
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	12/18/2002
From:	Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML030070366	List: ML030070380 ML030070400
References
Download: ML030070400 (27)

Text

Agenda [ft:A]

• Introduction Bill Lagergren 0 Plant Performance Larry Bryant

• Performance Indicators Larry Bryant Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone Larry Bryant Initiating Events Cornerstone Tom Wallace/John Kammeyer/Jay Laughlin Mitigating Systems Cornerstone John Kammeyer/Nick Welch

• Site Focus Areas Larry Bryant

• Conclusion Bill Lagergren Bill Lagergren 2

Introduction 3

Bill Lagergren

Percent Rx Power 11/01/2001 11/12/2001 S11/23/2001 12/04/2001 12/15/2001 12/26/2001 01/06/2002 01/17/2002 01/28/2002 02/08/2002 02/19/2002 03/02/2002 03/13/2002 03/24/2002 04/04/2002 04/15/2002 04/26/2002 05/07/2002 05/18/2002 05/29/2002 0

06/09/2002 t-t 06/20/2002 07/01/2002 07/12/2002 07/23/2002 08/03/2002 08/14/2002 08125/2002 09/01/2002 09/16/2002 09/27/2002 10/08/2002 10/19/2002 10/30/20022 11/10/2002 11/21/2002

Performance Indicators WA INPO INDEX 3rd Quarter CY2002 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45

= C' Larry Bryant 5

Performance Indicators IM Reactor Safety Initiating *[Mitigating *[Barrier Emergency Occupational Public Radiation IRadiationL Events Systems Integrity Preparedness Safety sagfety Performance Indicators Unplanned Scrams (6)

Emcrgency AC power System Unavailability Reactor Coolant System Specific A fiity(G)

Drill Eserciw Perin mace (G)

Occupational LNposure Control Efectiencs (6)

RETSIODCM Radiolmucid Lffluem (G)

PnmodAe EqimenC Sc arms With l.oss 1 Of Normal Hear i Rcmoal (G)

High press ure Infection Sylle.

Una,.dability(G)

Reactor coolant System I'A.ge, (G) Ific I "lly ( 1)M FRO Drill participation (G) pesne Unplanned Prr,,c, [fear Remo,,al Alen and Changes (G) system Notification Unavailability(G) System (G)

Residual Hear Removal System Unaailability Safety System Functional failures (G)

Larry Bryant 6

Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone Dose Reduction Plan [M Occupational Exposure Control Effectivenes RETSIODCM Radiological Effluent N N N N N C -

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 a a N 0

N 0 0 0 0

N g 2 N 2

2 4.

6 a

10 12 14 "Thresholds: ,te> 2-0 Yefow > 5.0 Vnresholds Wbke>1.8 YefO,,>f3l 18 Month Rolling Awrage Collective Raclation EWpsure 810.000 5 70.000 - - - - -

roected Jan 03 40.000 " 1 I' ' f

• Larry Bryant 7

Initiating Events Cornerstone December 19, 2001 - Reactor Trip (LER 390/2001 - 004) IZ

" While placing hold order, an invalid AMSAC (anticipated transient without scram mitigation system actuation circuitry) signal was initiated resulting in Reactor Trip.

"* Tagout was to support modification to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump control instrumentation.

"* Clearance activities opened breakers which supply power to instrumentation.

"* The loss of power resulted in an invalid steam generator lo-lo level signal and satisfied the logic (3 out of 4 SGs less than 12% level) for the initiation of an AMSAC signal. *p ~*,cH, AMA iga.Unplaned Scrni per 7,00 Critica Hour

" Corrective actions -

- Review of open on-line clearances 0' S2.5 Z7

- Enhanced controls for tagging of 10.

low voltage equipment

- Establishment of a formal process '5 for senior management review of plant work activities for risk/trip sensitive actions. Wte>3M YOeMo>&0 Red> 2&.9 ThWreSbOldS 8

10111 W'allace

Initiating Events Cornerstone July 13, 2002 - Reactor Trip (LER 390/2002 - 003) IM

"*While in Mode 1 at 100 % power, an automatic turbine/reactor trip occurred.

"*Resulted from a bolted cable splice associated with a C-phase current transformer which came into contact with the current transformer junction box.

"*Shorted the differential relay protection circuit to ground.

"*Root cause determined to be inadequate work instructions that allow lower temperature rated tape to be used on a non-safety cable replacement and/or inadequate application of splice material.

"*Corrective actions included:

- Revision to TVA's engineering and maintenance procedures for high temperature jacketing material

- Training for those newly revised procedures

- Inspection and taping of similar vulnerable cable splices.

John Kammeyer 9

Initiating Events Cornerstone rnn September 27, 2002 - Loss of Offsite Power (LER 390/2002 - 005) L11

"* Watts Bar Hydro Plant Fire's Impact on Plant

- At 0824 EDT, while operating at 100% power, the 1A-A load stripping relay actuated.

- At 0842 EDT, the 1B-B load stripping relay actuated.

"* Previous Offsite Power Configuration

- Regulated power provided from 161kV feed from the Watts Bar Hydro Switchyard.

- Switching and relaying for switch yard controls were located in the Hydro Station.

- System load limitation of 32,033 MW and a minimum voltage of 153kV (11kV maximum voltage drop) 10 Jay Laughlin

Initiating Events Cornerstone September 27, 2002 - Loss of Offsite Power (LER 390/2002 - 005) L Fire at Hydro Plant

- Most probable cause is a ground resulting from long term fretting of the insulation against a metal grating located in a vertical cable shaft.

- The insulation on the cable was flammable and conducted the fire to the relay room and other areas in the Hydro Station.

- The fire in the relay room resulted in spurious actuations eventually resulting in loss of offsite power to the Watts Bar Station shutdown busses.

S_.T ... Li- 11 Jay Laugluin

Initiating Events Cornerstone September 27, 2002 - Loss of Offsite Power (LER 390/2002 - 005) lL Plant Response

- At 0852 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant declared a notification of unusual event (NOUE) due to the loss of both offsite 161kV preferred power sources.

- The Technical Support Center and the Operational Support Center were activated and fully operational at 0926 EDT. The plant remained at 100% power all four emergency diesel generators operating.

- Completed an analysis to qualify the system to a maximum loading of 25,000 MW. The two independent regulated offsite power sources were restored on September 28, 2002, at 0125 and 0300.

- The NOUE was terminated at 0308 on September 28, 2002.

Jay Laughlin 12

Initiating Events Cornerstone September 27, 2002 - Loss of Offsite Power (LER 390/2002 - 005) I

• 10 CFR 50.54(x) call

- Dispatched WBN Fire brigade to assist in Hydro Fire fighting - best method to restore preferred power to plant

- Onsite Fire Brigade staffing less than Fire Protection Report for longer than allowance of two hours - License Condition

• Impact on Diesel Generator Program

- Rescheduled Diesel Generator maintenance overhauls until offsite power configuration is restored to pre-fire configuration.

Jay Laughlin 13

Initiating Events Cornerstone win September 27, 2002 - Loss of Offsite Power (LER 390/2002 - 005) UIJ

• Current Offsite Power Configuration

- Transfer Trip/Fast Transfer capability installed for the Rockwood and Sequoyah feeds. It will require entry into a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO.

- System load limitations are 32,531MW. (Summer Peak is historically

<30,000MW.)

- Operating guides are in place to ensure communications with the Control Room for any impacts to the offsite power.

Jay Laughlin 14

Mitigating Systems Cornerstone PIVA Safety System Unavailability (SSU) - Emergency AC Power System Safety System Unavailability (SSU) - High Pressure Injection System

__, J i a

20,)

• tldiwli > 28% y0ow > 18%0

,*d 208%

Safety System Unavailability (SSU) - Residual Heat Removal Safety System Unavailability (SSU) - Heat Removal System 0%

i I I I S

20 2%

4%

6%

8%

(0%

12%

T0t.ds WWS >22% 0, 5% , 42.0%

Safety System Functional Failures (SSFF) i j i i i I I 0

'0 15 John Kammeyer Dn -. 5.0

Mitigating System/Barrier Integrity NRC Bulletin 2001 Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles

"*Resulted From Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Vessel Head Nozzle at Oconee

" WBN Susceptibility Ranking Greater Than 30 EFPY From Oconee Unit 3 Category

"*Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles Under Insulation Were Not Inspected During Cycle 4 Outage Due to:

- Low Susceptibility Ranking,

- Low Operating Temperatures, and

- Low EFPY of Operation 16 John Kammeyer

Mitigating System/Barrier Integrity NRC Bulletin 2001 Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles

" Cycle 4 Visual Inspection Included:

- CRDM Eyebolts on CRDM Seismic Support Platform

- Reactor Vessel Head Flange Insulation Before Removed

- Reactor Vessel Head Flange Surface After Insulation Removed

- Bolted Connections on Flange Area

- Lower Canopy Seal Welds - 100%

- Instrument Ports (Conoseals) - 100%

"*No Signs of Boric Acid Crystals, Active Leaks or Corrosion From Cycle 4 Inspections

"*Commitment to Perform a Remote Visual Inspection of Reactor Vessel Head during Cycle 5 Outage 17 John Kanimeyer

Mitigating System/Barrier Integrity NRC Bulletin 2002 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity Resulted From Reactor Vessel Head Degradation From Nozzle Leak at Davis Besse 15 Day Response

"* One Previous Canopy Seal Leak Resulted in Insulation Around Head Penetration Being Removed for Inspection

"* Two Other Canopy Seal Pinhole Leaks Cleaned/

Repaired

"* No Leaks Since March 1999

" Committed to Perform Remote Under Insulation Inspection of Vessel Head During Cycle 5 Outage

"* Committed to Revise Program to Include Limited Head Surface Examinations Each Outage and

"* Committed to Revise ISI Program to Include 100% REACTOR HEAD Head Surface Examinations Each 10-Year WATTS BAR UNIT 2 Inspection 18 J UlIhl KlamlmlH iy ci

Mitigating System/Barrier Integrity NRC Bulletin 2002 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity Resulted From Reactor Vessel Head Degradation From Nozzle Leak at Davis Besse 60 Day Response

"*Evaluated Boric Acid Corrosion Program Per GL 88-05

"*Response Included Materials Reliability Project (MRP)

Alloy 600 Issue Task Group Criteria Discussion

"*Procedures, Inspections, and Corrective Actions in Place to Provide Assurance of Compliance With Regulatory Requirements

"*Committed to Perform Self Assessment of Boric Acid Program by Fall 2003 to Identify Enhancements

"*Committed to Revise Procedure to Evaluate If Accumulated Boric Acid Is Not Removed From Component Surfaces Susceptible to Corrosion RAI Response (60 days, due 1/24/03)

"*Provide Technical Basis for Inspection Program for Alloy 600 and Alloy 82/182

"*Describe Boric Acid Control Program

"*Provide Basis for Concluding Program Complies with Tech Specs, 10CFR50.55a, ASME Code 19 John Kammeyer

Mitigating Systems Cornerstone Refueling Outage - Cycle 5 Preview H-ftA

• Major Work Scope

- Low Pressure Turbine 'B' Inspection - AFW Terry Turbine 6 Year Rebuild

- HP Turbine Gland Seal Repair - Pressurizer ISI and Reactor Head Inspection

- Main Feedpump Turbine 'A' Inspection

- 1B 6.9 Shutdown Board Outage

- Replace Bushing on CSST 'D'

- Ice Condenser Weighing and Servicing

- A RHR Pump Seal Replacement

- Equipment Upgrades to Support Tritium

- lA Charging Pump Seal Replacement Production

- RCP 1 and 4 Seal Replacement

- RCP 2 Motor Swap

- SG ECT/Sludge Lance/Tube Plugging

- Contingency Steam Generator Sleeving Nick Welch 20

Mitigating Systems Cornerstone Refueling Outage - Cycle 5 Preview Plant Safety Improvements

- Main Steam Isolation Valve maintenance and modification upgrades

- Replace obsolete Foxboro 0 - 5 V module for control rod drive speed and direction loop in auto mode.

- Replace piping due to flow accelerated corrosion evaluations

- Install taps for differential pressure measurement on Component Cooling heat exchangers A & C

- RCS elbow tap flow measurement (eliminate RCS flow calorimetric).

- Add flush connections on ERCW supply piping to the lA-A and 1B-B Containment Spray heat exchangers.

- Vital Inverter modification to connect Ul and U2 boards

- Upgrade Loose Parts Monitoring

- Replace analog Rod Position Indicator system

- Install Main Feedwater corrosion monitor

- Replace the DC Reliance motor on the Limitorque operator for AFW Trip & Throttle Valve with a Peerless motor.

- Replace Ronan annunciator system computers and software

- Upgrade Auxiliary Building Crane Nick Welch 21

Site Focus Areas Intolerance for Equipment Deficiencies go I Critical Success Factdr, Ipove po!er ibbltyto ntet astomer requtrerrnts WBN StrateglcO.1ectlve:. IS nt, unplanned power changes aunplanned acrand x, Th4PI* flVfl4IFaNT ACITlfON Pr AN Equipment Problem Tolerance Index I. Survey WVAN culture tolerance to equipment deficiencies.

Operational Challenges

1. Operator Worlaroands (Priority 1) *0.05 2 Generate an action plan to inplement ER

2. Operator Workaromds (Priorn, 2) cultural inpirovenrnts.

0.05ý 0.05

3. CR Panel Deficiencles (non-outage)

4. Unplanned Lit Annunciators 0.05 3. Address inadequate questioning of

5. AUO Round Deficiencies - avg. age 0.05 equipment condition, insufficient analysis and

6. Plant Appearance Indicator (ElP 0.05 troubleshooting of equipment problems.

Housekeeping grade sheet) 7 Fire Protection Impahlnents (mon-outage) 0.05

4. Confinv rnmntenance troubleshooting WOs have adequate control to effectively address MaintenancelBaclo I roduct4on1 equipment problems.

ve - oý 5. Address exceeding PM grace period.

& Review reconnndations from WBN

4. TtalCAverage<ge -ot 00 offssite, develop implementation schedule and

~0.05 roll out to all WBN employees.

c~i~&n~W USlbteis 00 911 Aeae Age (kotM out< g - <0.05 T CoAverage 6.P4- (n n-eo(utoaage))

Agert 'fl5

5. Open DCN Average Age 0.05 OverallIdex 1.00 DEFINfTrON:

!Equipment problem tolerance index as defined by the above operational challenges, maintenance backlogs, engineering and support backlogs.

Sponson J. C. Karnmeyer

Contact:

D. F. Helms Larry Bryant -I 22

en)

C14 on L.)

4-o W.

Site Focus Areas Excellence in Equipment Reliability Critical Success Factor Improve powier rellabillltyto amet customer requirements 1 IMPROVEMENT ACION PLAN WSN Strategic Objective: Eliminate unplanned scraraw and unplanned powier changes~*. Eliminate scrams and runbacks resulting from I I? ngle point failures WBN Unit I - Forced Loss Trend sU

.0% I1Rc'uir S of862zM%

60% MSIII....l M 624920 0.

2. Complete parameter monitoring on 35 systems.

4.oMss, of Con.d"ac 15%

3M0% *.n vital rFault in crnt 10% 3. Participate inNEI ER benchmarking project to at 0

2.M% ~Mrwivin determine and adopt the industry's best equipment contRpsrot3l l>L reliability programs and practices.

L

.. 2 2a. 90, a.

A Iu. 2 M" 5 (0 Z , J= < <

4. Develop integrated master PM schedule 1'20VDVial TOer ruCtur 10CS- F*/ .-49

• WCoolng - M$lV MhSteam

- RC*. ,Pc, 68.556 tkii ain eratee It. $HOT -- FtC** 15 I 5. BenchmarkTVAN's equipment reliability practices to AP-913 to Identify and Close Gaps.

WBN Unit I - FFIPFFIRPFFs - 24 Month Rolling Sum 6. Resolve Equipment Performance and Material (w/quarterly totals)

Condition.

S70 60.

a Chiller Reliability long range plan.

b. Safety review and configuration control of t40 WON 47 Temporary Alterations under WO's.

t1 Ipetttve Preventable Functional Failures 7. Perform a detailed review of equipment issues over the last 2 years to evaluate missed opportunities and common causes.

SFFs

• PFFs I lRPFFs - - -RPFFs -24 Mo mirling sum

. PFF - 24 Mo. rolling sm - FF - 24 Mo. rolling sum DEFINmTON:

Forced generating capability losses due to equipment performance aggregated by system and month; and trended over a rolling 18-month interval.

Maintenance rule functional and preventable functional failures aggregated by quarter Sponsor. J. C. Kammeyer Contact- D. F. Helms Larry Bryant 24

v-i c'1 4,

PENN rt4 g

Site Focus Areas Industrial Safety Im Days Since Last Personnel Injury (Including First Aids) 5'r*

4 O0/between injuries'I 3l0 S Average daysA 2q 1

0-010 Z;1 - 1 )0 ~ i 0 CQCM 0 0. OJ 0-010' W O OJ Or CU

. . .0U C 0 - 10. 010

-0000be000 00000 00 0 0 0 0-------re Recordables - Accident Free Trees 26 Larry Bryant

Conclusion IM 27