ML20011D478
| ML20011D478 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1989 |
| From: | Peltola D ABB IMPELL CORP. (FORMERLY IMPELL CORP.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011D474 | List: |
| References | |
| 03-0920-1186, 03-0920-1186-R01, 3-920-1186, 3-920-1186-R1, NUDOCS 8912270303 | |
| Download: ML20011D478 (48) | |
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$ ) FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION FDPE RUPTURE ANALY303 CROVER0A
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CRYSTAL ROVER UM07 3 l Prepared for: FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION i L l l l Prepored by: l IMPELL CORPORATION i l Impell Report: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 December,1989 l Os l l LUP_ ELL1 r RA2228s!MA8AL P PDC. l i _ , + , , , , , . . ... ,_., .. _ ......- _,____,, ,,,-. _. ,. ,_,..,_ ,,_.. .. .-. , ..... _.... ._, .,.._ _.,,.._ .,_ ... . ,. . . _ __.. ,,_,__
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- n. j PIPE RUPTURE ANALYSIS CRITERIA ,
OUTSIDE THE REACTOR BUILDING CRYSTAL RIVER-UNIT 3 f t Prepared for: Florida Power Corporation !- 3201 Thirty-Fourtn St. South
- P. O. Box 14042 l St. Petersburg, FL 33733 L
r Prepared by: 1 :. g.. Impell. Corporation 333 Research Court Technology Park / Atlanta l Norcross, GA 30092 l-J Job Number: 0920-125 1 Impell Report: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 l. December 1989 ; l l 1 wo 1 1 1
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REPORT APPROVAL COVER SHEET FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION g.T ._ u n ainment , PROJECT: . 0920-125 JO4 WMBER(S): __ Pipe Rupture Analysis Criteria Outside the Reactor Building . NRT N: Crystal River, Unit 3 REPORT NUMBER: 03-0920-1186 l-. REVISION RECORD REY. PREFARED VERDIED REVIEYrED APPROYED DATE LO MAM- 7/2/9p' Am &(~ neg;,27, kW 4 l e IO . Essanw obs8
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l O Report Number: 03-0920-1186 t Revision 1 i
f APPENDIX A 4 ALL PAGES RENAIN AT REVISION- LEVEL 0 , D s APPENDIX B PAGE'NO. E PAGE NO. E PAGE NO. E 0 B-3 0 B-5 0 B-1 B-4 0 B 0 B-2' O
-APPENDIX C (f
PAGE NO. E PAGE NO. E PAGE NO. E C-1 0 C-9 1 C-17 1 C-2 1 C-10 1 C-18 1 C-11 1 C-19 1 C-3 1 C-4 1 C-12 1 C-20 1 C-13 1 C-21 1 C-5 1 C-6 1 C-14 1 ()l C-7 1 C-15 1 C-8 1- C-16 1 APPENDIX 0 ALL PAGES REMAIN AT REVISION LEVEL 0 APPENDIX f, ALL'PAGES REMAIN AT REVISION LEVEL 0 APPENDIX F PAGE NO. E PAGE NO. E PAGE NO. E F-1 1 F-2 1 F-3 1 n o Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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PAge Section I1111 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
'AND SCOPE 3 2.0 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 8 3.0 PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS 19 4.0 POSTULATED RUPTURE LOCATIONS AND CONFIGURATIONS 28 5.0. EVALUATION.0F PIPE WHIP EFFECTS 35 6.0- EVALUATION OF JET IMPINGEMENT EFFECTS 41 7.0 EVALUATION OF COMPARTMENT PRESSURIZATION 43 8.0 EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
'47 9.0 EVALUATION OF FLOODING EFFECTS 48
10.0 REFERENCES
]
APPENDICES-A - Applicable GAI Report Number 1811 Data A-1 through A-142 B - CR-3 Outside Containment High Energy Line List B-1 thr'ough B-6 l C - CR-3 Outside Containment Final C-1 through C-21 l Break / Crack Locations 0-i through o-2 O o - raiiure Nazards rio cnart E-1 through E-2 E - Jet and Whip Evaluation Flowchart F - Break, Crack and Environmental Zone Matrix F-1 through F-3 LIST OF FIGURES 26 4-1 30 f 5-1 37 6-1 39 6-2 ; LIST OF TABLES Table 1-1: Criteria Applicability based on Operating Temperature / Pressure Limits 3 0 ' iii Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1
L; :. 1.2 Scope . This- report describes the updated methods and general criteria used to postulate and protect pipe rupture effects outside containment at CR-3. It provides an integrated set of design bases (between existing and-updated methods) for the protection of plant structures and equipment vital for public health and safety from the potentially adverse effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, compartment pressurization, environmental ' influences of steam and water spray, and flooding associated with a postulated pipe rupture. The criteria for postulating break locations and providing protection methods for Reactor Coolant System primary piping or other piping inside the containment structure are not within the scope of this report. In addition, the methods defined for plant protection against missiles is . also outside the technical scope of this report. This criteria documents the updated methods used for the postulation-and protection of high-energy pipe rupture events for all plant operating - modes.from power operation (Mode 1) to the Safe Shutdown condition , (Mode 3). This is consistent with the existing plant design basis accident analysis which considers HELB effects on plant operation in modes 1, 2 and 3. The moderate energy Decay Heat System, which is in operation during modes 4, 5 and 6 and the Auxiliary Steam System to the waste evaporators, which is restricted to operation in modes 5 and 6, need not have cracks postulated nor protection provided from the these cracks. FPC shares the NRC concern that a loss of decay heat removal-function is an event to be avoided. The programmatic enhancements L U q discussed in Generic Letter 88-17. Loss of Decay Heat Re:noval, and FPC's L -response dated January 4, 1989 will be followed as an added measure to ensure that the decay heat removal function is maintained for CR3. In addition, this criteria has retained unaltered sections of the original plant licensing basis presented in GAI Report Number 1811-(Reference l l- 1.0). Due to the technical differences of these two methodologies, i: the criteria is applied on a line-by-line basis, as detailed in the ! following paragraphs. , Methods are used which meet the intent of the SRPs for postulation and protection requirements for the following high energy systems outside containment:
- Main Steam . Main Feedwater
. Steam Generator Blowdown . Emergency Feedwater*
- Makeup ik Purification . Auxilikry Steam **
. Liquid Sampling
- From containment out to the first isolation / check valve only.
** From the main steam connection to the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump inlet.
Original licensing basis methods are used for the remaining moderate I energy systems outside containment defined by D in Table 1-1 (next page). Under the SRP methods high energy linet are defined by operating conditions A, B, and C in Table 1-1. They are protected from full break I effects (including pipe whip, jet impingement, pressurization, flooding O Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 i Page 2 of 48 i,, _ _ ... __ _ .._ ._ __ _. _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
g , and environmental effects) based on analyzed piping stresses. Moderate h Energy Piping (rr a line thet meets operating condition D) is protectedfromcrackeffr. stresses. Table 1-1 Criteria ADD 11cability Based on Ooeratina Temoerature/ Pressure Limits Operating Temperature Pressure fap'.fi tion 1 Degrees F) (PSIG) A Greater than 200 Greater than 275 B Greater than 200 Less than or Equal to 275 C Less than or Equal to 200 Greater than 275 D Less than or Equal to 200 Less than or Equal to 275 For systems which remain under the original licensing basis methods, lines as defined by operating condition A, in Table 1-1, above, are protected from full break effects (pipe whip, jet impingement, pressurization, flooding and environmental effects), based on the analyzed piping stresses. For piping whose operating condition is g- defined by A, B, and C in Tabla 1-1, protection is provided from the effects of cracks (including jet impingement, flooding and environmental conditions) at the most adverse locations for all pipes. For lines defined by operating condition D, above, no protection for postulated rupture effects is considered. All of the systems identified as being under the original licensing basis fall into this category, with the exception of portions of the Auxiliary Steam System connected to the miscellaneous waste evaporators. In addition to the break postulation criteria, Sections 4.2 through 6.5 of the GAI 1811 Report are also retained as Appendix A to this report, since they represent the original documented methods and results for rupture protection for CR-3. FPC's position is that, in general, the methods and results are adequate and correct, and should be retained for reference and documentation purposes. 2.0 DEFIhfTIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 2.1 Abbreviations ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers. ESAR - Final Safety Analysis Report HDB - National Electrical Manufacturer's Association 10CFR - Code of Federal Regulations. Title 10. O Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Page 3 of 48 l 1
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Main Run - Piping interconnecting terminal ends. All branch lines from the main run are considered branch runst except that all branch lines which 1) are included within the main run piping in the stress analysis computer mathematical model and are shown to have a - significant effect on.the main run behavior, and 2) free ended branches of the main run throughout which there is no significant restraint to thermal expansion, may be considered part of the main run. tktderate Enerav Fluid System - A class of systems in operation ; during normal plant conditions whose maximum operating temperature is 200'F or less and where maximum operating pressure is 275 psig or less. Protection requirements for this class of systems is based on GAI Report Number 1811. Normal Plant Conditions - Frequent plant operating conditions to include plant startup, operation at power and the hot standby condition. For high energy piping systems which are normally pressurized only during plant conditions other than 100% power, the . thermodynamic state and associated operating conditions shall be determined using the most severe mode. Test conditiens are excluded. , l' l' The position (i.e., open or closed) of valves during normal plant L operation is used to determine appropriate boundaries for the pipe l rupture analysis. ' Ooeratina Basis Earthauake (OBE) - The earthquake that, based on L pd regional and local geology and seismology and specific ' t characteristics of local subsurface material, could reasonably be expected to affect the plant site during the generating life of the plant. It contains the vibratory ground mothn for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for continued ' operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public are designed to remain functional. The CR-3 FSAR identifies this seismic condition as the plant Design" acceleration. . Pine Ruoture (or Pine Break) - The loss of pressure integrity of a pipe. Pipe ruptures include circumferential breaks, longitudinal breaks, and through-wall cracks. When used without qualifying phrases, the term " pipe rupture" includes all three types. l Pinina Run - A main or branch run which is bounded by terminal ends. [ Pine Whio - The unrestrained movement of a pipe caused by the , blowdown resulting from a high-energy pipe rupture. Protective Device - A device to prevent unacceptable damage as a result of pipe rupture. The protective devices used in the analysis are rupture restraints and jet shields. lO Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Page 6 of 48
3.2.1 Hich-Enerav Pinino Systems ; O High-energy piping systems are those systems, or portions of systems, that during normal plant conditions are either in operation or maintained pressurized under conditions where either or both of : the following are met: l 1 a) Maximum operating temperature exceeds 200'F, or l b) Maximum operating pressure exceeds 275 psis. Leakage past a normally closed valve that will support full break or ) crack effects is not considered a credible failure. Mhere a pressurized piping boundary is set at a check valve, or normally , closed gate type valve, the high-energy boundary shall be 1 established at the first valve. The portion of piping past the ' l first valve, does not require further rupture protection considerations. Systems are classified as moderate energy if the total time that i either of the above conditions a) or b) are met is less than two percent of the time period required to accomplish its system design function. . The 21 rule is to be used for systems which function as a high energy line for only a portion of its design operation. Due to , their infrequent operation, only system " normal" modes and valve O alignments are used to evaluate rupture consequences for these systems. Thus, all "off-normal" (e.g. cross-train operation) system l configurations are considered incredible system conditions from which to postulate rupture events. l 3.2.2 Moderate-Enerav Pinino Systems t Moderate Energy Piping Systems are those systems, or portions of ' systems, that during normal plant conditions are either in operation or maintained pressurized (above atmospheric pressure) under conditions where both of the following are met: a) Maximum operating temperature is 200*F or less and b) Maximum operating pressure is 275 psig or less. Piping which meets the operating temperature and pressure limits of this section, require no protection, based on the original CR-3 licensing basis. The definition here is provided for consistency with current pipe rupture criteria. l O Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Page 9 of 48
e L 3.3.2 Hiah-Enerav Pinino Systems Enclosed Within Structures (] (See Section 3.1(b)) For the purpose of assuring compliance with the requirements of r Section 3.1 for piping systems within enclosures, breaks shall be postulated in accordance with Section 4.0; and it shall be demonstrated by analysis that such enclosure is adequately designed to prevent unacceptable damage to essential components and systems from'the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, pressurization of the enclosure compartment, environmental conditions, and flooding associated with the escape of the contained fluid. Piping rupture restraints or jet shields within the enclosure may be accounted for in limiting the effects of the postulated pipe rupture. The assumptions of Section 3.3.1 shall be utilized in the analysis of damage to essential components and systems. 3.3.3 Other Hich-Enerov Pinina Systems (See Sections 3.1(c).(d).(e)) For the purpose of assuring compliance with the requirements of Section 3.1 for piping systems neither physically separated from essential components and systems nor enclosed, breaks shall be postulated in accordance with Section 4.0; and it shall be demonstrated by analysis and confirmed by field walkdown that the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, compartment pressurization, environmental conditions, and flooding associated with the escape of the contained fluids cannot cause unacceptable damage to essential components and systems. The assumptions of Section 3.3.1 shall be pd utilized in the analysis. 3.4 Protection From Ruoture of Moderate-Enerav Pinina Systems For the purpose of assuring compliance with the requirements of Section 3.1, through-wall cracks shall be postulated for those moderate-energy systems outside containment which are upgraded to the intent of the SRPs. No systems fall within this category now, but it is included to define protection requirements for future plant modifications. . Piping which meets the temperature and pressure requirements of Section 3.2.2 and remain under the original licensing basis do not require specific crack protection. It shall be demonstrated that flooding associated with the escape of the contained fluids (see Section 9.0) and the local environmental conditions due to water spray (see Section 8.0) cannot cause unacceptable levels of damage to essential components and systems. In this regard, the following assumptions shall be utilized in the evaluation of damage to essential components and systems: a) Electrical cabling and instrument wiring shall be assumed to be severed upon exceeding the local environmental qualifications of the cabling or wiring, unless it can be demonstrated f otherwise. O Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Page 13 of 48
3.6 Evaluation of System and Eauinment Operability q b- 3.6.1 Introduction After fluid system break locations have been located, providing a shield at the break location will be the preferred solution to protecting equipment against the effects of the break. In some cases, providing such shielding will not be possible or feasible. The next step in the evaluation process will then be to determine the effects of the unshielded break on the operability of components and systems required to mitigate the consequences of the break. 3.6.2 Doerability Criteria The process of evaluating the operability of components and systems , which are affected by fluid system breaks will assess the extent of I I break affects, identify equipment affected, determine operability requirements for that equipment and evaluate whether the requirements are met. , If a component is required to be operable, it can be considered l capable of withstanding the environmental effects of the fluid l l system break if: a) Damage sustained by the component as a result of jet impingement does not prevent the component from fulfilling its ! ! safety function, and !O l b> offects of the iocai environment < pressure, temperature, humidity and wetting) do not prevent the component from fulfilling its safety function. In evaluating the operability requirements for systems and components, the maximum time duration for which the system and component may be required to function following the postulated break may be specified. To be considered operable, the component must be able to perform its required safety function (s) during this full < duration. 3.6.2.1 Assessina Break Effects The evaluation will begin with a definition of the fluid leak. l This will include, in the case of a High Energy Line Break, the geometry of the escaping fluid cone, the break temperature and pressure, and the room environmental profile. In the case of a moderate energy line crack, the temperature and wetted areas will l be defined. The following assessment criteria will be applied: a) The general area environmental conditions caused by the break " are enveloped in the existing C9-3 EQ evaluation (Reference 3.0). Criteria and methods for establishing general area l conditions are discussed in Section 8.0. Report Number: 03-0920-1186 aev's'oa 2 O Page 16 of 48 l l^ 1
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. 2. The maximum stress range between any two load sets f.
(including the zero load set) shall be calculated by Eq.
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k (10) in Paragraph I-705, ANSI B31.7 Code, for normal and upset plant conditions and an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) event transient. l If the calculated maximum stress range of Eq. (10) exceeds the limit (2.4 Sm) but is not greater than 3 Se the' limit of U < 0.1 shall be met. If the calculated maximum stress range of Eq. (10) 4 exceeds 3 Sm the stress ranges calculated by both EQ. (12) and Eq. (13) in Paragraph I-705 shall not exceed : 2.4 Sm or the limit of U < 0.1. , Mhere: , Sm . allowable design stress-intensity value, as defined in Paragraph I-705 of the B31.7, N1 Code. U = the cumulative usage factor as calculated in . accordance with Paragraph I-705 of the B31.7, N1 Code. l Non-stress / fatigue related breaks are not postulated per Generic Letter 87-11 (Reference 10.0). 4.1.2 Break Locations in ANSI B31.1 Pinina Ru'ns Combined primary stresses produced by the Maximum Hypothetical Earthquake (MHE [ equivalent to SSE)) are maintained at less than or equal to 120% of the Code allowable stresses from B31.1 (1967), plus Code Case N-7 for durations up to 1% of the operating period. . However, the following break (and similarly for cracks in Section 4.1.7) locations are based on input from the Design Seismic Event (equivalent to the OBE) for consistency with current SRP break postulation methods. l There are several fundamental differences between the B31.1 (1967) l Piping Code and the ASME Section III Code (which forms the break stress threshold basis of the SRPs). The NRC has summarized its position regarding this issue in their letter dated September 28, 1989 (Reference 12), and has outlined its requirements for acceptance. These requirements are met at CR-3, as detailed in the following paragraphs. The loadings used to develop piping stresses, although based on B31.1 methods, are performed consistently and conservatively for HEls at CR-3. Deadweight plus thermal plus seismic (SSE) plus safety relief valve thrust (where applicable) plus pressure loadings were all absolutely summed and compared to 1.2 Sh to determine piping stress acceptability per B31.1. This loading Report Number: 03-0920-1186 n Revision 1 D Page 20 of 48
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combination is equivalent in the later ASME Codes to developing ; faulted loadings and comparing them to upset allowables, a very (-- - conservative approach. i . The stresses from each loading component identified above were calculated separately, and the stress results absolutely summed. Due to the absolute summing process used, this is equivalent to ' absolutely summing the moment components, determining the resultant bending moment, and applying the component dependent SIF to produce ' the required local stress value used to determine pipe stress acceptability. This process meets the requirements of Reference
- 12. [
The break stress development for this Criteria included only the ! OBE seismic stresses (not the SSE stresses), and the resultant stresses were compared to the Giambusso break stress threshold values. Cracks were assumed at one-half the break stress threshold. , A review of the SIF values used at CR-3 was performed per Refer- ; ence 11.G, and the results show justifiable and appropriate individual SIF values were used for components, based on the piping code methods at the time of CR-3 piping design. Breaks, in accordance with Section 4.1.6, shall be postulated to occur at the following locations of B31.1 (N2 and N3) piping. All piping outside containment is analyzed to and rupture locations postulated on the requirements of this section. Break locations for ( the systems evaluated to this criteria are identified in Appendix C. . a) The terminal ends of the run. b) At intermediate locations selected by either one of the following methods:
- 1) At each intermediate weld location of potential high stress or fatigue; or ,
f i l l Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Q'.- Page 20A of 48
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- 2) At all locations where the stress, S, exceeds ,
0.B (S h + SA), where: .O. S = stresses under the combination of loadings associated with the normal and upset plant condition loadings and an OBE event, as calculated from the sum of maximum occasional and maximum thermal expansion stresses. ; Sh. basic material allowable stress at maximum (hot) temperature from the allowable stress tables in. l l Appendix I of the ANSI B31.1 Power Piping Code. Sh ' allowable stress range for expansion stresses, as defined in Paragraph 102 of the ANSI B31.1 Power Piping ) Code. Non-stress related breaks are not postulated per Generic letter 87-11. , 4.1.3 Break Locations in Other Non-Ricorousiv or Non-Seismically Analyzed Hiah Enerav Pinina Runs i Breaks, in accordance with Section 4.1.6, shall be postulated to occur at the following locations, a) The terminal ends of the run. b) At each intermediate weld or fitting location of potential high Q. stress or fatigue i 4.1.4 Break Locations In Pinina Runs Which Contain More Than One System Class Breaks, in accordante with Section 4.1.6, shall be postulated to occur at the following locations. However, where piping stress analysis has accounted for the change in energy levels (i.e. HEL-MEL) no break need be postul_ated at this boundary, a) The terminal ends of the run, b) At intermediate locations selected by either one of the , following methods:
- 1) At each weld location of potential high stress or fatigue, such as pipe fittings, valves, flanges, and welded attachments; or
- 2) At all intermediate locations between terminel ends where the stress and fatigue limits of Sections 4.1.1.b.2, or 4.1.2.b.2 are exceeded, or at locations as specified in 4.1.3.b.
Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Page 21 cf 48 O
l 4.1.5 Break Postulation for the Letdown Line in the Containment Penetration Reaion Per the original CR-3 HELB licensing basis, breaks are postulated at each tereinal end of a high energy line, including penetrations. However, the Standard Review Plans (SRP's) include methods for the exclusion of breaks in containment penetration areas if certain structural, analytical and inspection requirements are ensured. This method of break exclusion is also called the establishment of a No Break Zone (NBZ). The following specific requirements based on the intent of the SRP's are imposed for CR-3 to allow for the elimination of the terminal end break at penetration number 333. Therefore, a NBZ is established for the MVP letdown piping between . the containment isolation valves for this specific containment ' penetration only. The anchor point (Penetration 333) weld has been conservatively analyzed in accordance with the B31.1, 1967 Code, and shown to have stress levels below the break stress threshold of 0.B(Sh+SA). This i evaluation used a conservative SIF value of 2.1 for the weld at the anchor point and absolutely summed the stresses from the rigorous piping analyses from both sides of the penetration. The piping between the isolation valves was also analyzed to the B31.1 Code, and all normal and upset loading conditions result in stresses less than the crack stress threshold value of 0.4(Sh+SA), except at the anchor point as previously discussed. There are no postulated outside containment breaks that would keep the portion ( of piping between the isolation valves from remaining elastic and ensuring valve operability. l All welded lug attachments for pipe supports (with the exception i of the penetration anchor) have been conservatively analyzed to Code Case N-318-3 methods. The resulting stress levels are low, below both break and crack stress threshold limits. The piping between the isolation valves is of seamless construction, and all circumferential welds shall be inspected to CR-3 ASME Section XI Code requirements. The analytical background of the stresses and limits identified for the establishment of this NBZ for Penetration 333, as well as a summary of the existing analysis results reviewed for this effort can be found in Reference 11.H. Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1
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Break confiauration j 4.1.6 o The following types of breaks shall be postulated in high-energy V piping systems. Note that longitudinal and circumferential breaks are not postulated concurrently. a) Nominal Pipe Size of One Inch or Less No breaks are postulated in piping having a nominal diameter less than or equal to one inch or at branch connections of such piping. At intersections of one-inch or smaller nominal l diameter piping with main runs having nominal diameters greater than one-inch, the following shall be applied: ,
- 1) If the piping stress component which would normally result 1.
I in a break being postulated is due to the main run coupling (tee, wye, etc.) or coupling welds to the main run, then a break should be postulated at the main run welds only, not the branch connection weld.-
- 2) If the stress component is due to the branch run or any welds connecting the branch run to the main run, then no breaks should be postulated, b) Circumferential Pipe Breaks-The following circumferential breaks are postulated in high-energy piping at the locations specified in Section 4.1.
- 1) Circumferential breaks are postulated in piping and branch runs exceeding a nominal pipe size of one inch, except where the maximum stress range exceeds the limits of Section 4.1.2 but the circumferential stress range is at least 1.5 times the axial stress range.
l
- 2) Where break locations are selected in fittings due to the t piping stress analysis without the benefit of detailed stress calculations (e.g., finite element analysis), breaks are postulated at each weld to the fitting, and are considered a single rupture location. Alternately, a single break location at the section of maximum stress range may be selected as determined by detailed stress analyses or tests on a pipe fitting.
Where break locations are selected at a fitting weld due to the weld stress, a break location is postulated only at that weld, and is considered a single rupture location.
- 3) Circumferential breaks are assumed to result in pipe severance and separation amounting to at least a Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 1 Q Page 22 of 48 g
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n as demonstrated by inelastic limit analysis or other (J appropriate analytical techniques. For the purpose of analysis, breaks are assumed to reach full size one millisecond after break initiation. Piping movement shall be defined by the piping geometry and configuration with the plane of whip chosen to achieve the greatest moment arm from the whip axis. The plane chosen is the plane of the elbow ' closest to the break. Piping shall be assumed to whip 180' about the chosen whip axis for each diametrically-opposed break. An example follows. (Also, see Figure 4 5 on the L next page.) Since break (E) is located 2/3 of distece from B to C, the ) greatest moment arm, b, is achieved by the whip exis passing ; through points B and 0 as opposed to a whip axis through ) points A and C. Piping segments BCD will whip 180* about i I axis BD. 180' piping movement about the whip axis will result from , each of the diametrically-opposed breaks. Jet Impingement i effects shall be postulated for 360' in the plane perpendicular to the pipe axis. Longitudinal breaks in tees ! only result in piping deformation perpendicular to the tee; i no pipe whip is developed. For the case of the tee, the resulting jet is the worst effect cf the break. 4.1.7 Crack locatigni l L] 7 t a) Through-wall Cracks in rigorously analyzed high energy paping
- 1. are postulated at intermediate locations of potential high stress. Cracks are not postulated ai any intermediate Io:ation :
where the maximum stress is lass than one-half the break > allowables of Sections 4.1.1 or 4.1.2. A summary of the crack locations for systems evaluated to this criteria is presented in Appendix C. b) Through-wall cracks in non-rigorously or non-seismically analyzed high energy piping are postulated at intermediate locations of potential high stress or fatigue that result in the maximum effects of floeding, or local environmental conditions, c) Cracks need not be postulated in moderato-energy piping located - in an area in which a break in high-energy piping is postulated, provided such cracks would not result in more limiting
*- environmental conditions than the high-energy break.
l l 1.
; Report Number: 03-0920-1186 l Revision 1 Page 25 of 48 1'
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., , -- - -- -- . - - - . - . - . - . - ~ I 4.1.8 Crack Confinuration l
.q The following through-wall leakage cracks shall be postulated in "Q high-energy fluid system piping at the locations specified in I Section 4.1.7.
a) Cracks are postulated in high-energy fluid system piping runs exceeding a nominal piping size of one inch. b) Fluid flow from a crack is based on a circular opening of area equal to that of a rectangle one-half pipe inside diameter in length and one-half the piping wall thickness in width, i c) _ The flow from the crack is assumed to result in a local environment that wets all unprotected components within the , vicinity, with consequent flooding in the compartment and communicating compartments. The orifice (with a discharge coefficient of 1.0) is assumed to be oriented at any point about s the circumference of the pipe. 4.2 &derate Enerav Pinino Systems Per the original CR-3 licensing bases (Reference 1.0), piping defined as moderate energy, based only on operating temperatures and - pressure limits, is not required to consider postulation or protection of breaks or through-wall cracks. l 4.3 Chanoina Break Locations for Hioh Enerav Pinina O 4.3.1 ANSI B31. Land B31.1 Pinina As a result of piping reanalysis which follows the completion of the original protection evaluation.-the highest stress locations may be shifted; however, the initially determined intermediate break locations need not be changed unless one of the following conditions exists: a) The dynamic effects from the new (as-built) intermediate break locations are not mitigated by the griginal pipe whip restraints andjetshields. b) A change is required in pipe parameters, such as a major ; difference in pipe size or wall thickness and routing. 4.3.2 Reankivsis to ASME Sectjon III Reauirements Piping reanalysis may be performed to ASME Code Section III requirements. Break threshold limits were initially based on a percentage of ASME, Section III stress limits (1975 SRPs). Report Number: 03-0920-1186 , Revision 1 Page 27 of 48 Q
i a) A homogeneous mixture of air and steam or gas in each , compartment and thermodynamic equilibrium are attained hs I instantaneously. b) Homogeneous or separated 2-phase flow models are used. A break L discharge coefficient of 1.0 is used for all break areas in the ; source compartment. If values less than 1.0 are used, l justification shall be provided in the calculation and. ! notification to appropriate personnel. The orifice discharge ( coefficient between compartments is 0.6 for the " frictionless . Moody" critical flow correlation and 1.0 for the thermal l' homogeneous equilibrium model for air-steam-water mixtures, c) Potential and kinetic energy are negligible and flow work is recovered and stored as internal energy. d) Passive and active heat sinks are considered when justified. l e) The initial state of the contents within a subcompartment are i selected to maximize the resultant differential pressure. Air : is assumed at the maximum allowable temperature, minimum absolute pressure, and near zero percent relative humidity i unless other values are justified for normal operating conditions. Final state is saturated or superheated vapor with , liquid phase, if existing, at saturated or sub-cooled conditions. Details and results of this evaluation are documented in GAI Report Number 1811, (Reference 1.0), Section 6.2, titled " Vent Areas". (] . 8.0 EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS 8.1 Introduction A high or moderate energy pipe rupture will release fluid into l l a building or region and effect its environment (pressure, temperature, radiation and humidity). As the discharge continues, adjacent regions may be affected by flow through doors, penetrations, and HVAC ducting. In addition to the environmental effects to the region or compartment (pressure, temperature, radiation and humidity), specific components may be directly affected by jet impingement, spray or flooding from the local effects of the rupture. The environmental changes resulting from a postulated pipe rupture < could affect essential systems and components which are required to achieve safe shutdown and mitigate the consequences of the pipe " rupture with acceptable offsite consequences. Those essential components and systems required to function or not fail following a given pipe rupture shall be designed to withstand the resulting , environmental effects. O Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 , Page 43 of 48
l P nV 8.2 Desian Criteria For evaluation of environmental conditions resulting from a pipe ' rupture, the following criteria shall be used. Further general details are also presented in Section 6.5 of GAI Report 1811 , (Reference 1.0). Plant specific local environmental results are presented in GAI Report # 2560 (Reference 2.0) and in the CR-3 Environmental and Seismic Qualification Manual (Reference 3.0). Appendix F includes a Table which identifies individual high energy . line breaks and cracks and their locations relative to the EQ Zones of Reference 3. 8.2.1 Oo'eratina Conditions , All normal plant operating conditions shall be considered in selecting the conditions which result in the most severe environment for the component, system, or structure being evaluated. . Break locations shall be selected according to Section 4.0. < 8.2.2 Mass and Enerav Release Steam discharged from postulated steam line (or flashing water line) ' rupture is the significant mode of energy transfer into and between compartments. For thic reason, ruptures in lines with fluid temperatures less than 200*F (or the fluid's boiling point at atmospheric pressure) need not be considered in environmental
- ,- calculations for compartment pressure. For flashing water line
' ruptures, only the mass and energy release rates of the steam portion of the fluid need to be considered in compartment pressure analyses. However, the total mass released sha!1 be considered in l the calculation of compartment temperatures, l
8.2.3 Discharae Rates For conservatism, a break discharge coefficient of 1.0 will be used for all break areas. If values less than 1.0 are used, justification will be provided in the calculation. . 8.2.4 Break Duration 1he calculation of environmental conditions will consider the total amount of fluid released before automatic action or operator l l intervention occurs and any residual blowdown which occurs after the j break is isolated. If operator intervention is required, an > evaluation shall be performed and documented to demonstrate that l ample time and adequate access to equipment are available to perform the required action. l 8.2.5 Ventina Area Areas which vent a region, room, or enclosure shall be considered in I l i determining the thermodynamic state properties in each region. The
- Q discharge coefficients between regions shall be selected to predict L '- a conservative upper bound on the thermodynamic state properties in l the region under consideration.
Report Number: 03-0920-1186 ! Revision 1 Page 44 of 48
1 i nV 8.2.6 Heat losses Heat losses to walls, ceilings, floors, and equipment within a region will occur after a sudden change in room environment caused by a pipe rupture. Consideration of these heat loss factors may be included in the analyses when justified. Approved correlations shall be used for calculating heat transfer coefficients and condensation rates. 8.2.7 Analytical Model The parameters selected for the analytical model used to determine l the environmental effects shall result in conservative upper bounds on the environmental parameters, the presence of air, steam, and water within the enclosure, and flow characteristics to adjacent ? regions shall be considered. 1 8.2.8 Environmental Effects j The environmental effects resulting from breaks and/or cracks postulated according to Section 4.0 shall be evaluated according to the following guidelines. 8.2.8.1 Effects of Hiah Enerav Line Ruotures For ruptures in high energy lines, the effects on pressure, l temperature, humidity, radiation level, and flooding shall be considered for each region. Qualification of electrical equipment for these harsh environmental conditions shall be documented in accordance with the Crystal River Unit 3 program to demonstrate compliance with 10CFR50.49. In addition, the localized effect of spray (i.e. wetting) shall be considered for essential components and systems. Spray shields required to protect essential systems and components shall be designed to seismic Category I requirements. The dynamic effects of L jet impingement on essential equipment in the vicinity of postulated , l high energy pipe ruptures shall be evaluated as specified in Section 6.0. l-8.2.8.2 Effects of Moderate Enerav Line Ruotures , For ruptures in moderate energy lines defined per Section 3.2.2 no evaluation of rupture effects is required per GAI Report No.1811. For future plant modifications where ruptures in moderate energy lines are postulated, the effects on temperature, humidity, radiation level, and flooding shall be considered for each region. Estential components and systems shall be designed to the most severe conditions for which they are required to operate or not fail. Report Number: 03-0920-1186 O Revision 1 Page 45 of 48 . l l
4 i I, L.. 9.0 EVALUATION OF FLOODING EFFECTS 9.1 Introduction A high or moderate energy pipe rupture results in fluid falling to the floor and draining to adjacent regions. Flood levels are ; l ; j established in order to evaluate the effects on essential systems and components. The flood level is a function of discharge rate from the rupture, fluid conditions, room geometries, and draining characteristics. Fluid draining from one region to another involves flow through doorways, penetrations and/or floor drains. Essential systems and components shall be separated or protected such that the failure of a pipe will not result in the loss of a system essential for safe shutdown through flooding. Essential systems and components shall be protected from flooding by one or more of the following methods: a) Locating essential components in areas or at elevations where there , t 1s no potential for flooding. b) Locating essential components in watertight rooms that are protected from flooding. c) Enclosing or encircling components which could be a source of flooding with watertight barriers of sufficient height so that the fluid inventory released is contained by the barrier. i O d> eroviding sufficient reservoir space or drainage capacity to prevent the flood level from reaching essential components. e) Other means, as required, to assure performance of essential safe shutdown components of a design basis accident (DBA) flooding event. Structures or compartments required to protect essential systems or components from the effects of postulated pipe ruptures shall be designed to seismic Category I requirements. The flooding basis for CR-3 is documented in Reference 1. Section 4.3.3, which is included in this criteria in Appendix A, page A-15. Appendix A, page A-16 refers the reader to Section 6.5 for a description of flooding design features. The flooding design features are actually described in Section 6.4 on page A-134. 9.2 Design Criteria For evaluating the effects of flooding conditions resulting from a pipe rupture, the following criteria shall be used. Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 O~ Page 47 of 48
fv U 9.2.1 Deeratina Conditions All normal plant operating conditions shall be censidered in selecting the conditions which result in the most severe flooding condition. These conditions may be different than those used for compartment or environmental considerations in Sections 7.0 and 8.0, respectively. 9.2.2 Discharae Rates For conservatism, a break discharge coefficient of 1.0 should be used - for all break areas. If values less than 1.0 are used, justification shall be provided in the calculation. 9.2.3 Discharae Volume The total volume of fluid released before automatic action or operator intervention occurs and any residual fluid released after the break is isolated shall be considered. If operator intervention is required, i an evaluation shall be performed and documented to demonstrate that ample time and adequate access to equipment are available to perform the required action. 9.2.4 Dain69e Ar.9n Drainage to each region should be considered in the flooding evaluation. Discharge coefficients between the regions shall be r selected based on flow and geometric conditions of the flow area and shall be justifiable. The discharge coefficients between regior,s shall - be selected to predict a conservative upper bound on the flood level 7 within the region which is being evaluated. , 9.2.5 Pinino Systems All high energy piping including both seismic and non-seismic systems J shall be considered in the evaluation. Break locations and break areas l shall be selected according to Section 4.0. . 9.2.6 Comoartment Penetration Passages, piping or other penetrations through walls of a room L containing essential components shall be sealed, if necessary, to
- protect against flood damage resulting from any postulated failure in an adjacent region.
All access doors which are required to serve as watertight barriers for protection of essential components will be locked or adminis- ' tratively controlled to ensure it is maintained in the closed position. l
.Q Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Page 47A of 48
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10.0 REFERENCES
)
1.0 GAI Report No.1811, Revision 4. " Effects of High Energy Piping ' System - Breaks Outside the Reactor Building", dated July 1, 1987. 2.0 GAI Report No. 2560, Revision 0, "High Energy Line Break Criteria for Electrical Raceway Protection", dated March, 19E6. 3.0 Florida Power Corporation CR-3 Environmental and Seismic Qualh'ication Manual, Revision 3 dated June,1989. l , i 4.0 ANSI /ANS *58.2 (1980,1988), " Design Basis for Protection of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants Against the Effects of Postulated Pipe Rupture". 1 1 5.0 ANSI B31.1 (1967), " USA Standard Code for Pressure Piping - P0wer J Piping". ]
)
6.0 ANSI B31.7 (1969), " USA Standard Code for Pressure Piping - Nuclear Power Piping". . 7.0 A5ME B&PV Code, Section III (1974 with 1974 Addenda) 8.0 US NRC Standard Review Plan 3.6.1 (1975,1981), " Plant Design for Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment". {} 9.0- US NRC Standard Review Plan 3.6.2 (1975,1981), " Determination of Break Locations and Dynamic Effects Associated with the Postulated Rupture of Piping". 10.0 Generic Letter 87-11, Revision 0, June 19, 1987, (with revised MEB 3-1 of SRP 3.6.4), " Relaxation in Arbitrary Intermediate Pipe ' Rupture Requirements". 11.0 The following calculations were performed as part of this criteria development effort to establish the break and crack location for rigorously analyzed high and moderate energy lines: l A) 0920-125-C001, Revision 0 B) 0920-125-C002 Revision 0 C) 0920-125-C003, Revision 2 l
- 0) 0920-125-C004, Revision 0 E) 0920-125-C007, Revision 0 F) 0920-125-C008, Revision 0 G) 0920-125-C009, Revision 0 ,
H) 0920-125-C010, Revision 0 12.0 USNRC letter dated September 28, 1989. " Crystal River Unit 3 - ' High Energy Line Break (HELB) Criteria for Analysis of Piping Outside Containment". Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Page 48 of 48
1 e . Appendix C (] CR-3 Outside Containment Final Break / Crack Locations Appendix C identifies the break (Table C-1) and crack (Table C-2) locations for the high energy systems upgraded to the intent of the SRPs. Flow diagrams which show the break locations of Table C-1 follow on pages C-5 through C-II. f Piping isometric drawings which show the location of individual crack locations of Table C-2 are presented on pages C-12 through C-25. For example, the crack locations identified on pages C-12 through C-15 are for the Main Steam run of piping. Therefore, when cracks are located at " Nodes 53 through 82" (e.g. on page C-13) cracks are postulated within the clouded area of the main steam piping run only. Cracks are not to be postulated at other node points (e.g. Node 75) on attached branch lines. Additional crack locations identified per reference ll.G have also been included. The latest isometric and flow diagrams are used to show the location of breaks and cracks in the Revision 1 Criteria issue. The drawings do not require revision for general drawing changes since they only are to be used to locate breaks and cracks. Only when break / crack locations change should the drawings in Appendix C of The Criteria be revised, using the latest revision of the isometric and flow diagrams available at that time. Actual latest drawings should be used and reviewed when design information is required from iso-(s
' metric and flow diagrams for other than break /crar.k location information.
Note that rigorous analysis problem CR-45 has been reanalyzed to extend it's boundaries into existing problem CR-25. The crack locations shown on page C-17 show the CR-25 node numbering. The equivalent node numbering for the latest CR-45 analysis is as follows: CR-25 Equivalent CR-45 Node Number Node Number 65 565A 110 1 i 615 615A 620 615B l (' Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Page C-2 l l
. _ . . . - - , - - - ~ . . . , y_ --
, . . .-_.,.,.._.,y _ - , . - -
Table C-1 O Break Summary System Postulated Breaks Rer. arks (Flow Dinaram) Main (MS-XX) Steam (302-011, SH 1/4) 46, 47, 48, 49 Branch TEs 50, 51, 52, 53 Branch TEs 45 (MSOT TE) Main Steam (MS-XX) ,, (302-011, SH 2/4) 1, 5, 9, 12 PEN TEs 41, 42 OTSG PEN TEs Auxiliary Steam (AS-XX) (302-01), SH 1/4) 1, 5 Branch TEs (302-051, SH 1/1) 12 TD/EFH Pump TE l Ew.rgency feedwater (EF-XX) (302-081, SH 1/3) 11, 13 PEN TEs Feedwater (FH-XX) O (302-081, SH 1/3) 1, 14 6, 10, 20, 24 PEN TEs BRANCH TEs l Makeup and (MU-XX) Purification (302-661, SH 3/5) 5, 6 PEN TEs 7,8,9,10 MUFL ANCHs (302-661, SH 4/5) 15, 16, 17 MVP Pump TEs i Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Page C-3
E l Table C-2 i'). Crack __Summarv System Calculaijan Hode Numbers FM CR-25 110, 620, 65, 615 CR-23 569 3 MS CR-3 72, 81, 90, 62, 92 { CR-4 53, 54, 63. 72, 73, 82 , CR-5 103, 112, 121, 122, 131, CR-6 88, 97, 106, 107, 116 59's, 601-602, 634-636 MS(OTSG) CR-137 639-641, 660, 5, 24, 25: 611l l CC* 0920-125-C004A 10, 15, 148, 152, 155, 160 0920-125-C004B 10, 15, 148, 152, 155, 160
-~
) 20, 25, 32, 48, 52, 58, 62 l MSDT** 0920-125-C007 L
V b Ref.11.0 (D) and (G)
** Ref.11.0 (E) and (G) l Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1
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.,P. !. - ;(J ; i, e Appendix F , Break, Crack, and Environmental Zone Matrix s ys-t O Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Page F-1
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- BREAK LOCATIONS BY ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION ZONE BREAK ' PENETRATION EQ ZONE NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 105 17 MS-1 106 17 MS-5 107 16 MS 201 16 MS-12 MS-41 427 20 428 21 MS-42 54 MS-45 MS-46
_I7 MS-47 I7 16 MS 16. MS-49 MS-50 I7 MS-51 I7 16 MS 16 MS-53 EF-11 424 20 109 14 EF-13 FM-1, 423 21 IO ;"d0 n FM-14 108 53 FM-20 16 FM-24 I7 16-AS-1 AS-5 I7 AS-12 I4 1 MU-5 435 3 MU-6 338 22 MU-7 36 MU-8 36 MU-9 36 MU-10 36 MU-15 I MU-16 I MU-17 I Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Page F-2 O
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APPENDIX F CRACK LOCATIONS BY ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION ZONE ] " STRESS CRACK EQ ZONE NUMBER .; SYSTEM. ANALYSIS NODE (S) i CR-23 569' 17 FH CR-25 65 17 FH CR-25 110 17 FH FH' CR-25 615, 620 17 CR-3 ALL 17 MS i CR-4 ALL 17 MS CR-5 ALL 16 MS CR-6 ALL 16 MS MS'(OTSG) CR-187 5 20 MS (OTSG) CR-187 24, 25 20 CR-187 '599 20 MS'(OTSG) MS (OTSG) CR-187 601, 602 20 MS (OTSG) CR-187 611 20 CR-187 634-636 21. MS (OTSG) CR-187 639-641 21 i MS (OTSG) CR-187 660 21 MS (OTSG) CR-3 ALL 17 [d
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CC CC' CC CR-4 CR-5 ALL ALL 17 16 CR-6 ALL- 16-CC. CR-5 ALL 54
'MSDT 0 Report Number: 03-0920-1186 Revision 1 Page F-3
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