IR 05000280/2019004

Integrated Inspection Report 05000280/2019004 and 05000281/2019004

ML20043E378
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	02/11/2020
From:	Louis Mckown NRC/RGN-II
To:	Stoddard D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR 2019004
Download: ML20043E378 (27)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:ary 11, 2020

SUBJECT:

SURRY POWER STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000280/2019004 AND 05000281/2019004

Dear Mr. Stoddard:

On December 31, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Surry Power Station. On January 14, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. F. Mladen, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Surry Power Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, /RA/ Louis J. McKown, II, Chief (Acting) Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000280 and 05000281 License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37

Enclosure:

As stated

REGION II== Inspection Report Docket Numbers: 05000280 and 05000281 License Numbers: DPR-32 and DPR-37 Report Numbers: 05000280/2019004 and 05000281/2019004 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-004-0031 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Facility: Surry Power Station Location: Surry, VA Inspection Dates: October 01, 2019 to December 31, 2019 Inspectors: A. Butcavage, Reactor Inspector P. Capehart, Senior Operations Engineer P. Cooper, Reactor Inspector R. Kellner, Senior Health Physicist L. McKown, Senior Resident Inspector C. Read, Resident Inspector J. Rivera, Health Physicist Approved By: Louis J. McKown, II, Chief (Acting) Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Surry Power Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71124.01.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Identify Nonfunctional Backflow Preventers During Operator Rounds Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.9] - Training 71111.06 FIN 05000280,05000281/2019004-01 Open/Closed An NRC-identified Green Finding was identified for the licensees failure to adequately inspect backflow preventers as required by procedure 0-LOG-AUX-001R, Auxiliary Building Logs. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify deficiencies with the devices, which resulted in the concurrent non-functionality of backflow preventers in charging pump cubicles 1B, 1C, 2A, and 2C, on July 30, 2019, while both units were operating at rated thermal power (RTP).

Failure to Align B Emergency Service Water Pump to Angle Drive to Diesel Engine Train in accordance with As Built Design Specification Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.14] - 71153 Systems NCV 05000281,05000280/2019004-02 Conservative Open/Closed Bias A self-revealing Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for the licensees failure to adequately translate alignment design requirements of the B train Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump and engine into procedures or instructions during maintenance on May 7, 2019. As a result, the pump and engine were not properly aligned which caused elevated vibrations during subsequent pump testing which then led to pump train failures on June 23, 2019, and July 21, 2019.

Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000280,05000281/20 LER 2019-001-00 for Surry, 71153 Closed 19-001-00 Units 1 and 2, Failure to Align Angle Drive to Pump Results in Inoperable Emergency Service Water Pump

REPORT DETAILS

PLANT STATUS Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On October 19, 2019, Unit 1 was shut down from rated thermal power for entry into a scheduled refueling outage. On November 29, 2019, Unit 1 achieved criticality following the outage returning to rated thermal power on December 2, 2019. On December 15, Unit 1 was reduced to 88 percent power to affect high pressure feedwater heater level control repairs, returning to rated thermal power on December 16, 2019. Unit 1 remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.04)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness to cope with external flooding for the following areas during walkdowns in September and October 2019:

• Auxiliary Building
• Fuel Oil Pump Houses
• Emergency Service Water Pump House

71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2 containment penetrations from the Unit 2 electrical cable vault, on November 7, 2019.

(2) Unit 1 containment spray rings and piping on November 8, 2019.

71111.04S - Equipment Alignment Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 component cooling systems in October and November 2019.

71111.05Q - Fire Protection Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Unit 2 cable spreading room on October 16, 2019.

(2) Unit 1 containment all levels on November 5, 2019.

(3) Unit 1 emergency switchgear room following failure of the 1B1 battery charger on November 11, 2019.

(4) Unit 1 volume control tank room on November 13, 2019.

(5) Unit 1 turbine building 27' elevation on December 18, 2019.

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 02.02a.)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) Circulating water inlet isolation motor operated valves (MOV), flood dikes in Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine buildings and emergency switchgear rooms, and backflow preventers (BFP) in the emergency switchgear rooms, cable tunnels, and mechanical equipment rooms 3, 4, and 5, from July through September 2019.

71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance Annual Review (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) Intake canal, Unit 1 and Unit 2 high level intake structures, rubber expansion joints and isolation valves for Unit 1 'C' and 'D' circulating water pipes, and service water supply piping branching from the Unit 1 'C' and 'D' circulating water pipes.

71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from October 28 to November 1, 2019:

03.01. a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.

1. Ultrasonic Examination (UT)a. 11448-WMKS-0127J1, Reactor Coolant, ASME Class 1, WO38204185716 (observed)b. 11448-WMKS-1105B13, Charging Crosstie, ASME Class 2, WO38203874699 (reviewed)c. 11448-WMKS-1105B13, Charging Crosstie, ASME Class 2, WO38203874701 (reviewed)d. 11448-WMKS-1105B13, Charging Crosstie, ASME Class 2, WO38203874700 (reviewed)2. Liquid Penetrant (PT)a. 11448-WMKS-0122D1, Safety Injection, Class 1, WO38204185716 (observed)b. 11448-WMKS-1105B13, Charging Crosstie, ASME Class 2, WO38203874699 (reviewed)c. 11448-WMKS-1105B13, Charging Crosstie, ASME Class 2, WO38203874700 (reviewed)d. 11448-WMKS-1105B13, Charging Crosstie, ASME Class 2, WO38203874701 (reviewed)03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities.

• CR1118757, Boric Acid Transfer Pump 2C
• CR1112502, Low Head Safety Injection Pump 1A
• CR1127747, Stripper Feed Stream Heater 10A Outlet PI-116A
• CR1127746, Stripper Feed Stream Heater 10A Outlet to Gas Stripper 03.01.d - Pressurized-Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Activities.
• Tube Eddy Current Testing (ET)a. SG-B, ET for Tubes in Cal 4, R3-C43, R3-C44, R1-C40, R1-C41, R11-C33, R24-C23, R-30-C18, ASME Class 1, (Observed)
• Secondary Side Examinations a. Remote VT of Upper Surface of Tube Sheet, SG-B, Cold Leg Lanes, C-45 and C-46 (Observed)

71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03)

(1) The licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), Requalification Requirements, of the NRCs Operators Licenses. During the week of November 18, 2019, the inspector performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations, the crew simulator operating examinations, and the biennial written examinations in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.02, Requalification Examination Results, of IP 71111.11.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated just in time training associated with reactor shutdown into the fall 2019 unit 1 refueling outage on October 17, 2019.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Unit 1 high level intake structure concrete repairs, on October 28 and November 4, 2019.

(2) Unit 1 'A' reactor coolant pump seal replacement activities, including new seal testing and installation, on October 16, October 31, and November 1, 2019.

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) Emergent change in station risk due to Maximum Generation Emergency Alert on October 3, 2019.

(2) Unit 2 Yellow risk during the Unit 1 'H' bus maintenance and testing outage on October 30, 2019.

(3) Unit 1 Emergent risk associated with elevated vibrations in 'A' main feedwater pump outboard pump-motor on December 30, 2019.

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) CR1131702, Fire System Functionality Assessment following multiple line breaks and repairs on October 3, 2019.

(2) CR1132662, Disconnected conduit on 2-SI-MOV-2867C, high head safety injection motor operated valve, on October 7, 2019.

(3) CR1132805 & CR1132807, Unit 1 'D' condenser inlet and outlet isolation valve leakage, on October 10, 2019.

(4) CR1132944, NRC identified air leak on Blackout (AAC) diesel fuel rack air valve concurrent with reserve station service transformer (RSST) load tap changers out of service, on October 10, 2019.

(5) CR1136010, Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump hold down bolt torque adequacy, on December 17, 2019.

==71111.18 - Plant Modifications Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples) The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Unit 1 & 2 back-up fire suppression system on October 4, 2019.

(2) Unit 1 & 2 component cooling temporary modification for installation of butterfly valve in support of 18 inch pipe replacement on November 18, 2019.

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01)

[[IP sample::=

=IP 71111.18|count=6}}

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) 1-OPT-CH-003, Charging Pump Operability and Performance Test for 1-CH-P-1C, on October 14, 2019, after pump overhaul, motor refurbishment, and machining a larger shaft keyway.

(2) Unit 1 B charging pump elevated vibrations during surveillance testing (CR1134305)on October 26, 2019.

(3) Unit 1 'B' battery charger 1B1 failure during testing (CR1135299), on November 9, 2019.

(4) Unit 1 inside recirculation spray pump 1B testing on November 10, 2019, after main control room switch replacement.

(5) Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump turbine return to service testing following internal inspection and maintenance under work order 3810225919 on November 30, 2019.

(6) Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump bearing replacement following reverse rotation due to discharge check valve failure (CR1136400) on November 20, 2019.

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 1R29 activities from October 18 to November 29, 2019.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 1 safeguards actuation with loss of offsite power functional testing, on October 21 and 22, 2019.

(2) Establishment of temporary fire pump test plan with electric and diesel driven pumps non-functional, on December 23, 2019.

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) 0-OPT-SW-009, Emergency Service Water Pump 1-SW-P-1C Comprehensive Test on November 13, 2019.

Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Type C leak rate testing on Penetration 20, "Safety Injection Accumulator Makeup,"

on October 24,

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls.

(1) The inspectors reviewed the following:

Radiological Surveys

• Unit 1 (U1) Containment Initial Entry Survey (all elevations), 10/19/2019
• U1 Upper Internals Lift Rig, 10/21/2019 and 10/27/2019
• U1 B Steam Generator (S/G) Primary Side and Tube Sheet, 10/26/2019 and 10/29/2019
• U1 Transfer Canal, 10/20/2019 through 10/24/2019
• U1 A RCP Cube (seal work), 10/29/2019
• U1 C S/G Secondary side hand holes, 10/30/2019
• U1 Containment RHR Flats, 10/21/2019 and 10/22/2019
• 1-CH-1370 Part 21 Overhaul, 10/28/2019 Risk Significant Radiological Work Activities
• Valve 1-CH-1370 Part 21 Overhaul
• B S/G Eddy Current Testing
• Fuel Transfer System Inspection and Repair Air Sample Survey Records
• Air Sample Number 21-OCT-2019-0040, U-1 CTMT Transfer Canal, 10/21/2019
• Air Sample Number 23-OCT-2019-0007, U-1 CTMT Transfer Canal, 10/23/2019

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to access high radiation areas.

(1) The inspectors reviewed the following:

Radiation Work Packages

• RWP 19-0-2105, Valve Maintenance, Revision 0
• RWP 19-0-2130, RCP Maintenance, Revision 0
• RWP 19-0-2502, B S/G Eddy Current Testing, Revision 0
• RWP 19-0-2503, Seal Table and Flux Thimbles, Revision 0 Electronic Alarming Dosimeter Alarms
• A total of thirty-two electronic dosimeter dose rate alarms occurring between November 2018 through September 2019 were reviewed. All individuals were briefed that an alarm might occur due to the work activity and location. All personnel responded appropriately to the alarm.
• No electronic dosimeter dose alarms occurred between November 2018 through September 2019.

Labeling of Containers

• Labeling of multiple sealands, B-25 boxes, and radioactive material (RAM)storage containers, located in temporary radioactive material storage areas established in the protected area, and permanently established areas within the auxiliary building was verified.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample) The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material.

(1) The inspectors verified the following sealed sources are accounted for and are intact:

• Cs-137 source Serial Number 84CS136
• Cs-137 source Serial Number 0190GP
• Cs-137 source Serial Number 0167GP Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.

(1) The inspectors also reviewed the following radiological work packages for areas with airborne radioactivity:

• RWP 19-0-2130, RCP Maintenance, Revision 0
• RWP 19-0-2502, B Primary Steam Generator Eddy Current, Revision 0
• RWP 19-0-2503, Seal Table & Flux Thimbles, Revision 0
• RWP 19-0-2514, Tri-Nuc Activities, Revision 0
• RWP 19-0-2527, Fuel Transfer System Inspection and Repair, Revision 0, 1, and 2 High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated risk-significant high radiation area and very high radiation area controls.

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency.

==71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation Inspectors evaluated licensees program compliance to ensure protection for members of the public from the processing, handling, storage, and transportation of radioactive material.

Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 02.01)==

The inspectors evaluated radioactive material storage areas for compliance with postings, labels, radiological controls and physical controls during plant walk downs. Inspectors also evaluated the material condition of several containers of radioactive materials for signs of degradation.

Radioactive Material Storage Areas

• Outdoor Storage Yard Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors completed system walkdowns.

• The inspectors evaluated liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems during plant walkdowns for alignment with licensing descriptions, material condition, administrative and physical controls. Inspectors also evaluated processes and changes to the systems, waste stream mixing methodologies and process control program descriptions.

Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample) The inspectors evaluated the radioactive waste characterization and classification for licensee waste streams.

(1) Waste Streams

• 1-FC-I-1 Resin, 7/2/19
• L78292-1 Dry Active Waste (DAW), 4/22/18

Shipment Preparation (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated and observed the radioactive material shipment preparation processes.

(1) No shipments were available for observation while on site.

Shipping Records (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated non-excepted package shipping records.

• Shipment no. D2017-5, dewatered mechanical filters
• Shipment no. SV2017-1, dewatered resin
• Shipment no. SV2017-2, dewatered resin
• Shipment no. SV2018-1, dewatered resin
• Shipment no. SV2018-2, dewatered resin

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below: MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) ===

(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2016 - September 30, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2016 - September 30, 2019)

OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)

(1) November 2018 to September 2019

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in open long-standing limiting conditions for operation (LCOs)described in technical specifications (TS), technical requirements manual (TRM), and other license basis documents that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue on December 16, 2019.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample) The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Following identification of vendor quality assurance issues, the inspectors reviewed licensee response associated with the identification and quarantine of susceptible components in stock and installed, and evaluation of potentially non-conforming installed Auxiliary Feedwater components associated with CR1134525 on November 14, 2019.

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Followup (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors evaluated EN 54401 the loss of all auxiliary feedwater at Unit 2 due to the failure of the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge check valve during Unit 1 to Unit 2 cross-tie surveillance testing and licensees response on November 20, 2019.

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 2019-001-00 for Surry, Units 1 and 2, Failure to Align Angle Drive to Pump Results in Inoperable Emergency Service Water Pump (ML19273A424). The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in the inspection results section as a Green non-cited violation.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Identify Nonfunctional Backflow Preventers During Operator Rounds Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Section Aspect Initiating Events Green [H.9] - Training 71111.06 FIN 05000280,05000281/2019004-01 Open/Closed An NRC-identified Green Finding was identified for the licensees failure to adequately inspect backflow preventers as required by procedure 0-LOG-AUX-001R, Auxiliary Building Logs. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify deficiencies with the devices, which resulted in the concurrent non-functionality of backflow preventers in charging pump cubicles 1B, 1C, 2A, and 2C, on July 30, 2019, while both units were operating at rated thermal power (RTP).

Description:

On July 29, 2019, NRC inspectors identified multiple foreign objects on or inside backflow preventers in the floor drains of mechanical equipment rooms 3 and 4 (MER). On July 30, the licensee performed an extent of condition of the remaining backflow preventers credited for flooding protection including the charging pump cubicles. The issues identified in MER 3 and 4 did not result in the nonfunctionality of the associated backflow preventers, but the backflow preventers in charging pump cubicles 1B, 1C, 2A, and 2C were determined to be nonfunctional.

Backflow preventers 1-BFP-21, 2-BFP-24, and 2-BFP-29 in charging pump cubicles 1B, 2A, and 2C floor drains were found to have excessive buildup of boric acid on the sealing surface. Borated water draining from the charging pump bearing brackets is normally diverted to these drains. An engineering evaluation could not determine how long the boric acid would take to dissolve under flooding conditions and therefore the backflow preventers would allow more than the allowed (or evaluated acceptable) leakage of 0.05 gpm.

Backflow preventer 1-BFP-23 in charging pump cubicle 1C was found with rags covering the device. Although the rags alone would not have prevented the backflow preventer from sealing, the stem was identified as having significant movement, which resulted in the backflow preventer being nonfunctional.

The charging pump cubicle backflow preventers are installed to minimize the probability of common mode flooding of both units' charging pumps via the common auxiliary building floor drain system. The pipe penetrations into the charging pump cubicles which could be submerged during a flooding event are sealed to minimize passage of floodwater.

Licensee procedure 0-LOG-AUX-001R, Auxiliary Building Logs, requires daily inspection of the backflow preventers in each charging pump cubicle and provides instructions to operators to evaluate the condition of the devices. The additional instructions state, Normal BFP status consists of the following: a) BFP is free of corrosion, debris blockage, or damge [sic] that would prevent free movement of float or flapper. If debris is identified, contact RP. b) BFP is not restricted by drain cover or other restrictions. c) Inspect surrounding BFP installation area for debris which could potentially migrate to BFP. If debris is identified, contact RP.

It is unknown how long the conditions existed, but this condition is bounded by the last periodic testing of the backflow preventers on June 1, 2018.

Corrective Actions: The licensees immediate corrective action was to flush the boric acid from the backflow preventers that had accumulations on the seats and replace backflow preventer 1-BFP-23. The licensee retrained operators on the operation and inspection of backflow preventers and retrained them on the requirement to have decontamination technicians flush any devices with boric acid accumulations.

Corrective Action References: CRs 1127944, 1127948, 1127946, 1127945

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure of the licensee to follow procedure 0-LOG-AUX-001R, Auxiliary Building Logs, and adequately inspect backflow preventers daily was a performance deficiency (PD) that was within the licensees ability to foresee and correct. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately inspect the backflow preventers in the charging pump cubicles to ensure that the device was free of corrosion, debris blockage, or damage that would prevent free movement of the float or flapper. The procedure provided adequate guidance to evaluate the condition of the devices. As a result, backflow preventers in two of three charging pump cubicles on each unit were found concurrently nonfunctional.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the backflow preventers were installed to reduce the likelihood of internal floodwaters spreading into multiple compartments in the auxiliary building via the common floor drain system. The backflow preventers are credited in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for reducing the initiating event frequency of several auxiliary building flooding scenarios by two orders of magnitude.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated October 7, 2016, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, SDP for Findings at-Power, dated June 19, 2012. The finding was screened by Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions. The inspectors determined that the issue required a detailed risk evaluation because the finding impacts the frequency of a fire or internal flooding initiating event.

Specifically, the backflow preventers are credited to prevent flood waters from entering the auxiliary building and initiating certain flooding scenarios. A detailed risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Appendix A using the SAPHIRE Version 8.2.0 and Surry Unit 1 SPAR model Version 8.55 dated February 2, 2019. The major analysis assumptions included: auxiliary building flooding would be result in the loss of all coolant charging pumps and component cooling water pumps, the Unit 2 charging system would not be available for operators to cross connect with Unit 1 due to the same performance deficiency, and no credit for recovery was applied. An exposure time of 1 year was conservatively assumed as a bounding case and backflow preventers in all six charging pump cubicles were conservatively assumed to fail.

The analyst selected the four internal flooding sequences affected by the performance deficiency and set AUX-BACKFLOW to TRUE (Auxiliary Building backflow preventers fail) and HPI-XHE-FR-CHG2 to TRUE (operator action to align Unit 2 charging system fails). The dominant sequence involved a flooding event from the Safeguards Building propagating to the Auxiliary Building, a loss of RCP Seal Cooling, and subsequent RCP Seal Failure. The analysis determined that the performance deficiency resulted in an increase in core damage frequency of 7.27 E-8 events per year which corresponds to a very low safety significance (GREEN) finding.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.9 - Training: The organization provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the training component of the human performance cross-cutting area H.9, because although the operators had sufficient information in the procedural guidance, the licensee failed to ensure the operators were knowledgeable enough on the operation and failure mechanisms to identify deficiencies in the backflow preventers on daily rounds.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

Observation: Semiannual Trend Review of Long-Standing Limiting 71152 Conditions for Operation The inspectors performed a review of the licensees corrective action program documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. This review was focused on the implementation of corrective actions associated with open long-standing limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) described in technical specifications (TS), technical requirements manual (TRM), and other license basis documents. Open long-standing LCOs were considered those associated with TS completion times of indeterminate length or non-TS requirements with expired completion times with pending corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed open corrective action program documents, work management program activities, and station logs.

The inspectors determined that the licensee, in general, has screened, established, tracked, and completed corrective actions associated with open long-standing LCOs. However, the inspectors discovered a gap between identification and resolution when the licensee chooses to use a tool pouch activity to correct a condition adverse to quality (CAQ). PI-AA-200, "Corrective Action," directs the screening of an unplanned LCO entry and/or LCO expiration as CAQs. The procedure instructs that significance level 3 (lower level) CAQs can be closed to the Work Management Process, tracked in the stations corrective action database, or closed to an auditable, trackable process / program.

When closed to the work control process, the corrective action is either provided a work request tag to generate a work order number for tracking under the normal work control process, or the action is designated as tool pouch maintenance and the applicable maintenance work group is notified. Tool pouch maintenance is that which can be performed on the spot by personnel having sufficient tools, training and qualifications, and resources, with no time restraints and usually no documentation required. The inspectors found that due to an inconsistent manner used to identify tool pouch activities as well as the lack of documentation and monitoring of open tool pouch activities by performance improvement, work control, and the maintenance work groups, there is no traceability between screening out of the corrective action program and task completion for CAQ tool pouch activities.

Minor Performance Deficiency 71152 Minor Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to track identified conditions adverse to quality (CAQ) closed to the work management tool pouch program to resolution consistent with the guidance provided in procedure PI-AA-200, "Corrective Action," is a performance deficiency reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and prevent. Upon sampling 2019 CAQ condition reports, the inspectors discovered one example of an uncorrected CAQ without tracking to resolution. This CAQ was associated with a fire door deficiency for a long-standing TRM LCO of low safety significance which was quickly restored to functionality using a tool pouch work activity when brought to the attention of the licensee.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. This performance deficiency was not more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated January 1, 2018.

Specifically, the inspectors found this performance deficiency to be minor, consistent with IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, 3.j and 3.k, in that only one uncorrected example of minimal safety impact was discovered which in and of itself is not singularly indicative of a greater programmatic concern.

Failure to Align B Emergency Service Water Pump to Angle Drive to Diesel Engine Train in accordance with As Built Design Specification Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Section Aspect Mitigating Green [H.14] - 71153 Systems NCV Conservative Bias 05000281,05000280/2019004-02 Open/Closed A self-revealing Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for the licensees failure to adequately translate alignment design requirements of the B train Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump and engine into procedures or instructions during maintenance on May 7, 2019. As a result, the pump and engine were not properly aligned which caused elevated vibrations during subsequent pump testing which then led to pump train failures on June 23, 2019, and July 21, 2019.

Description:

In the event of a loss of station power at the river intake, three diesel-driven, vertical ESW pumps have been provided for both units at the James River intake structure to supply makeup to the high-level intake canal. These pumps are sized to provide the design required make-up to the ultimate heat sink intake canal within 2 hours of the event over a mission time of 4 days. Each ESW train is comprised of a single Bingham vertical pump, Detroit Diesel engine, and Johnson angle drive which couples the engine to the pump.

From April 29, 2019, through May 7, 2019, the licensee performed a scheduled maintenance overhaul of the B train pump including pump replacement. During installation of the angle drive, in accordance with licensee procedure 0-MCM-0114-01, "Emergency Service Water Pump Maintenance," technicians attempted to perform pump final alignment per Step 6.6.13.

The technicians, finding that they were unable to perform multiple measurements required for alignment, contacted engineering for assistance. Engineering failed to discover any history of pump angle drive alignment. From the angle drive vendor technical manual, engineering provided, When the upper coupling positions on the lower coupling without springing the head shaft, it indicates the unit is correctly aligned. As the technicians found the coupling halves easily bolted together, and no springing was observed, engineering determined that this was an acceptable alternative to the procedural alignment process.

ET-S-97-0306, "Angle Drive Stand Modifications to Facilitate Pump to Angle Drive Alignment," is a titled technical reference identified in 0-MCM-0114-01. This quality related engineering transmittal captures the dimensions necessary on specific vendor drawings to allow for known ESW misalignment. ET-S-97-0306 and the angle drive vendor technical manual discuss the machined rabbet provided in the angle drive. This machined rabbet is a fitting which allows a groove to be cut into a set of mating surfaces to establish concentric alignment. ET-S-97-0306 was also incorporated into the pump vendor technical manual as an addendum in full.

On May 7, during a 20-hour run, the station identified a new resonance frequency at 880 rpm resulting in elevated vibrations. As the design basis operating speed is 960 rpm, the pump was returned to service and declared operable. On the following day, grouting was installed under the pump pit plate to dampen the resonance. Subsequent surveillance testing on May 28, 2019, showed a reduction in the still elevated vibrations.

Surveillance testing on June 23, 2019, resulted in failure when the field operators immediately heard abnormal sounds upon engine start. The licensee discovered that the pump packing gland follower had failed and packing material had pushed out of the pump stuffing box. When disassembled, the licensee found that the gland follower clamping bolts were bent with damaged threads. The packing gland follower studs were also bent with wear marks on the packing gland indicating shaft contact. The shaft was inspected but no damage was identified. The degraded components were replaced, and the pump was returned to service.

During the next surveillance on July 21, 2019, the field operator observed the pump packing eject from the stuffing box on pump start. Like the June event, degraded components were replaced, and the pump was tested for return to service on July 22. The pump was shut down after 16 minutes due to high vibrations while personnel in the room observed an acrid odor.

On July 23, the licensee chose to run the pump again without performing additional maintenance. Technicians documented that the packing extruded out of the stuffing box while again noting an acrid odor immediately prior to shut down. The licensee found on July 24 substantive train misalignment consistent with the multiple failures since overhaul.

The inspectors similarly determined that the B ESW pump train failures were the result of train misalignment from the overhaul until restoration in July. During this period, at three separate times the A or C trains were separately removed from service for testing and maintenance. At no time was either train unable to be returned to operable status within the 2-hour time-critical operator action. Therefore, there was no identified loss of safety function.

However, the B ESW train was non-functional for greater that its 14-day technical specification (TS) allowed outage time (AOT) as well as TS AOT of TS 3.0.1, 6 hours, when trains A or C were separately unavailable.

Corrective Actions: On July 25, 2019, using the guidance provided in ET-S-97-0306 and 0-MCM-0114-01, the licensee returned the B ESW train to operable by replacing degraded sub-components and establishing proper coupling alignments.

Corrective Action References: CR1125594, CR1127282, CA7630174

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: Inspectors found that the licensee did not adequately translate the design requirements established in ET-S-97-0306, "Angle Drive Stand Modifications to Facilitate Pump to Angle Drive Alignment," into procedures and instructions resulting in Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated January 1, 2018, as it represented a challenge to the Procedure Quality attribute of the Reactor Safety - Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).

The availability and reliability of the ESW mitigating system function was challenged based upon the failure to implement the required design specification prior to returning the train to service resulting in multiple failures. Additionally, the More than Minor Example 5.b of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, dated October 1, 2018, was used to inform the answer to the more than minor screening questions. The described performance deficiency is not minor as the licensee returned the B ESW pump to service.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors assessed significance of this condition in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A, Mitigating SSCs and Functionality. The inspectors determined that this finding required detailed risk evaluation or analysis as it represented an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its TS AOT and two separate safety systems out-of-service for greater than their TS AOT. A detailed risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst in accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix A using the SAPHIRE Version 8.2.0 and Surry Unit 1 SPAR model Version 8.55 dated February 2, 2019. The major analysis assumptions included: Exposure time was from the start of the maintenance window where the adverse condition was introduced until the condition was repaired and returned to service (April 29 until July 25, 2019), a period of 87 days. The analyst conservatively assumed the remaining ESW pumps were susceptible to the same failure mechanism and treated the failure as dependent for a failure to continue running common cause event. The analyst set SWS-EDP-FR-1B to True (Failure if SWS Makeup Pump 1B to Run) and set SWS-EDP-TM-1B to True (SWS pump 1B unavailable due to Test and Maintenance) and allowed the SWS-EDP-CF-FR to auto adjust due to a dependent failure. The dominant accident sequence was a Grid Related Loss of Offsite Power initiating event with a loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal cooling, and subsequent failure of the RCP seals. The analysis determined that the performance deficiency resulted in an increase in core damage frequency of less than 1.0 E-7 events per year which corresponds to a very low safety significance (GREEN) finding.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. The licensee failed to take a conservative approach to decision making, particularly when: information was incomplete, when staff failed to find any past instances of angle drive alignment; and, conditions were unusual, when technicians could not implement the maintenance procedure as written or subsequent to repetitive packing failures.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states in part, Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in § 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.

Contrary to the above, from May 7, 2019, to July 25, 2019, the licensee did not ensure that applicable design bases, including ET-S-97-0306, "Angle Drive Stand Modifications to Facilitate Pump to Angle Drive Alignment," were correctly translated into procedures and instructions following B emergency service water train overhaul, which resulted in substantive misalignment and multiple B train failures.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On January 14, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. F.

Mladen, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

• On October 31, 2019, the inspectors presented the Surry Unit 1 Inservice inspection results to F. Mladen, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
• On November 1, 2019, the inspectors presented the Radiation Safety Inspection Debrief inspection results to F. Mladen, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date 71111.04Q Drawings 11548-FE-35A Arrangement Electrical Penetrations Reactor Containment 11 SH-001 11548-FV-1E Reactor Containment Electrical Penetrations 5 71111.04S Corrective Action CR1068475 Documents Miscellaneous 0-NSP-BS-005 5/12/2017 Inspection Log for Auxiliary Building 71111.05A Fire Plans 1-FS-FP-107 Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear Room Elevation 9 feet - 6 3 inches 71111.05Q Corrective Action C1135722 Documents Resulting from Inspection Fire Plans 0-FS-FP-161 Auxiliary Building Elevation 27 feet - 6 inches 2 1-FS-FP-134 Containment Unit 1 Elevation 47 feet - 4 inches 1 1-FS-FP-135 Containment Unit 1 Elevation 18 feet - 4 inches 1 1-FS-FP-136 Containment Unit 1 Elevation (-) 3 feet - 6 inches 1 1-FS-FP-137 Containment Unit 1 Elevation (-) 27 feet - 6 inches 1 2-FS-FP-127 Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room Elevation 45 Feet - 3 Inches 5 71111.06 Corrective Action CRs 1127841, Documents 1127846, 27849, 27850, 27851, 27852, 27939, 27944, 27945, 27946, 27948 Procedures 0-LOG-AUX-001R Auxiliary Building Logs 32 and 33 0-MPM-1900-02 Flood Protection Backflow Preventer Testing and Installation 18 71111.08P Drawings 02-9146337-000 Eddy Current Sizing Standards Assembly & Detail for Inconel Rev. 0 Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date

                        (1B81049)        600 Thermally Treated Material

1B80274 RPC Axial/Circ EDM Notch Guide Tube Standard Rev. 0 2-9177235B .875 Array Probe Flaw Calibration Standard As Built Drawing Rev, 000 Engineering 51-9194511-000 RVUH Penetration Executive Summary & Detailed Evaluations Examination Summary 51-9300646-000 Qualified Eddy Current Techniques for Surry Unit-1, 1R29 Rev. 000 ETE-SU-2018- Steam Generator Condition Monitoring and Operational 5/21/18 0010 Assessment, Surry Unit-1, Spring 2018 Miscellaneous 3002007571 Steam Generator Management Program: Steam Generator Rev.4 Integrity Assessment Guidelines 51-9300687 Surry Unit-1, Steam Generator ECT Inspection Plan 9/27/19 ETE-CEP-2019- Steam Generator Degradation Assessment Surry Unit 1 9/27/19 1004 Refuling Outage 1R29, Fall 2019 SRY-SGPMS-002 Surry Site Specific Eddy Current Analysis Guidelines Rev.28 Surry ETSS4 Examination Technique Specification Sheet Rev. 0 NDE Reports ETE-CEP-2019- Surry Unit-1, Steam Generator Condition Monitoring and 11/13/19 1006 Operational Assessment, October 2019 Refueling Outage Procedures ER-AA-SGP-101 Steam Generator Program Rev. 0 Work Orders WO 38204196797 7 Day Frequency, PT: Primary to Secondary Leak Rate "A" 10/9/19 71111.11Q Procedures 1-GOP-2.7 Unit Shutdown, Power Decrease from Allowable to Unit Offline 39 for Refueling Outage 1-GOP-2.8 Unit Cooldown, HSD to CSD for Refueling 38 71111.12 Miscellaneous Vendor Technical Instruction Manual TM-0408 Three Stage N-9000 Seal 3 Manual 38-F032- Cartridge 00008 Procedures 0-MCM-0102-04 Disassemble and Assemble Three Stage N-9000 Seal 12 Cartridge 0-MCM-0102-06 Three Stage N-9000 Seal Cartridge Removal and Installation 11 GMP-C-105 Grouting 22 Work Orders 38103536641 71111.13 Miscellaneous PHOENIX Online & Offline Risk Modeling October 3, 2019 PHOENIX Online & Offline Risk Modeling October 30, 2019 PHOENIX Online Risk Modeling December 30, 2019 Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date Procedures NF-AA-PRA-370 Probable Risk Assessment Procedures and Methods: MRule 20

                                           (a)(4) Risk Monitor Guidance

71111.15 Corrective Action CR1125835 Documents CR1129842 CR1131143 CRs 1131374 25743 Corrective Action CR1138058 Documents Resulting from Inspection Miscellaneous Surry Environmental Zone Descriptions 29 71111.18 Corrective Action CR1131143 Documents CR1131702 Engineering DC SU 13-00008 18 inch Component Cooling Pipe Replacement in Auxiliary Changes Building and Turbine Building pipe tunnels Work Orders 38103355485 71111.19 Corrective Action CR1135450 Documents Corrective Action CR1138685 Documents Resulting from Inspection Engineering ETE-SU-2019- Unit 1 Charging Pump 1-CH-P-1B Comprehensive Test 0 Evaluations 0058 Vibration Evaluation Procedures 1-OPT-CH-003 Charging Pump Operability and Performance Test for 1-CH-P- 64 1C 1-OPT-RS-003 Flow Test of Inside Recirculation Spray Pumps 1-RS-P-1A 30 and 1-RS-P-1B Work Orders 38204208872 71111.20 Corrective Action CA7779003 Documents CR1133791 Resulting from CR1136309 Inspection CR1136315 CR1136316 CR1136318 Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date CR1136321 CR1136322 CR1136486 WO38204209883 WO38204209885 Procedures 1-OP-RH-001 RHR Operations 29 1-OPT-RH-003 RHR System Operability Test 24 71111.22 Corrective Action CR1133757 Documents CR1133771 Corrective Action CR1135830 Documents CR1135843 Resulting from Inspection Procedures 1-OPT-CT-201 Containment Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Testing 26 0-OP-FP-006 Operation of Fire Protection Systems 19 1-OPT-ZZ-002 ESF Actuation with Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage 1J 47 bus Work Orders 38103774530 71124.01 ALARA Plans 19-023 Fuel Transfer System Repairs 10/21/2019 Corrective Action CR1107803, Various Documents CR1107890, CR1108891, CR1111633, CR1113430, CR1114997, CR1123705, CR1124687, CR1125424, CR1129122, CR1129589, CR1131122, and CR1131710 CR1125424 PI-AA-5005, Attachment 1, Human Performance Event 06/19/2019 Review [Multiple reviews for the event] CR1125424 Operations Crew Clock Reset Briefing Sheet 06/19/2019 Corrective Action CR1134705 Frisker weekly performance check sticker not updated 10/31/2019 Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date Documents Resulting from Inspection Miscellaneous Contamination Monitor Alarm Setpoints 10/31/2018 Radiation Protection 0630 Shift Turnover Notes and U1R29 10/29 Daily Exposure Status through 10/31/2019 RWP 19-0-2502 Remote Continuous Coverage Log - B S/G Eddy Current 10/29/2019 Equipment Installation and 10/30/2019 RWP 19-0-2527 Remote Continuous Coverage Log - Installation sheave and 10/23/2109 cable in transfer canal Procedures 0-HSP-LHRA LHRA/VHRA Barrier Doors and Locks Inspection Revision 2 DOOR-001 HP-1032.080 Controlled and Unrestricted Area Radiological Surveys Revision 10 RP-AA-110 Radiological Respiratory Protection Program Revision 3 RP-AA-111-1009 Radiological Survey Program Review Revision 1 RP-AA-162 Issue and Control of Respiratory Protection Equipment Revision 3 RP-AA-224 Airborne Radioactivity Surveys Revision 5 VPAP-2101 Radiation Protection Program Revision 35 Radiation Surveys Free Release Survey, 01-VS-MOV-102 Valve Operator 10/26/2019 71124.08 Corrective Action CR1113430 Dose rates on 1-CH-FL-2 approaching limit 01/07/2019 Documents CR1114997 Reduce SFR Liquid Waste Activity by Changing Out Zeolite 01/29/2019 Bed Corrective Action CR1134756 Discrepancy between NRC Form 540 and station shipping 10/31/2019 Documents procedures Resulting from Inspection Procedures 0-MCM-1902-02 HANDLING RADWASTE TRANSPORT CASK CNS 8-120B Rev. 15

                                           (USA/9168/B)

C-HP-1071.040 PACKAGING AND SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE Rev. 18 MATERIAL ROP-3.17 DEWATERING AND DRYING RESIN IN A HIC Rev. 6 Self-Assessments RP-AA-111-1013 Solid Radioactive Waste Control Program Review 09/23/2019 Assignment # 7483957 Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date 71151 Corrective Action CR1132906 Documents Resulting from Inspection Miscellaneous Electronic Dosimeter (ED) Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Logs, November 2018 thru September 2019 Surry Power Station Radiological Protection Performance Indicators, November 2018 to September 2019 Consolidated Data Entry Derivation and Margin Reports for Surry Power Station Mitigating System Performance Index Performance Indicator Residual Heat Removal input 71152 Corrective Action CR1039717 Documents CR1068878 CR1132010 CR1132674 Corrective Action CR1138684 Documents Resulting from Inspection Procedures PI-AA-200 Corrective Action 35 WM-AA-100 Work Management 34 71153 Corrective Action CR1127282 Documents Engineering ET-S-97-0306 Angle Drive Stand Modifications to Facilitate Pump to Angle 0 Evaluations Drive Alignment Miscellaneous 38-B731-00001 Bingham Pump Vendor Technical Manual 38-J304-00001 Johnson Angle Drive Vendor Technical Manual Procedures 0-MCM-0114-01 Emergency Service Water Pump Maintenance 20 24| ]]