ML20010E459

Reply to Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law on Emergency Planning Issues.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20010E459
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	08/27/1981
From:	Adler R, Straube M PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:
References
NUDOCS 8109040146
Download: ML20010E459 (14)

Text

'. '

6191/8i .

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUIAIORY C0bMISSION

$ ' 9' h '

ad ,.4

(

9 BEFORE 111E ATOMIC SAFE 1Y AND LICEtSING BOARD [ N(L U Li .

U SEP 0 3198W 'q In the Matter of ) ,9 v.5.g.Y

)

MEIROPOLITAN EDISON CDMPAIN, )

) Docket tb. 50-289 4,# ip (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart)

Station, Lhit No.1) ) p ft ~

i N0 3 j 199l >, q 5 f *) 7 g

a 4

v 8 C0btDNEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA'S REPLY PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LW ON EMERGENCY PIANNIIU ISSUES ROBERT W. ADLER MICHELE STRAUBE Attorneys for the Commrrl'ealth 505 Executive llouse, P.O. Box 2357 Ilarrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Telephone: (717) 787-7060 fj S I p l

~

8109040146 810827 gDRADOCK 050002s9 PDR

UNITED STATES OF A>ERIQ\

NUCLEAR REGUIAIORY C0t' MISSION BFARE THE AIGIIC SAFEIY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

MEIBOPOLITAN EDISON C0tIPAhY, )

) Ibcket tb. 50-289 (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart)

Station, Lhit Ib.1) )

C0t4DhMEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA'S REPLY PROPOSED FINDIt0S OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF IM ON EtERGENCY PIENING ISSUES I. PRELIMINARY MATIER IN THE IM1URE OF AN AMENDt'ENT Upon second review of the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Inw on Emergency Planning Issues filed by the Comronwealth on or about August 14, 1981, counsel for the Canumealth has discovered two (2) instances where incomplete reference was made to the emergency planning rule. Thus, the Comomealth seeks to amend its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Iaw on Emergency Planning Issues as follows:

1. Page 32, 153, line 3 add "S50.54(s)(2)" after "S50.47(a)(1)".

2. Page 41, 561, line 7 add "S50.54(s)(2)" after "S50.47(a)(1)".

II. REPLY PROPTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIOIS OF L\W A. Rebuttable Presumption Standard

1. The Licensee asks the Board to establish a standard for the rebuttable presumption standard in 10 C.F.R. S50.47(a)(2) as following:

"the FDIA finding is presumptively valid and we will require substantial, ,

1 convincing and probative evidence to rebut such a finding." Licensee's l

i Proposed Energency Planning Finding 32. Licensee provides no citation to support this standard, and it nust be rejected by the Board. The Cormonwealth properly directed us to Federal Rule of Evidence 301, which I sets the appropriate standard for this proceeding. Comnonwealth's Proposed Energency Planning Finding 11.

l

. B. Emergency Operations Facility Staffing *

2. Licensee asks the Board to find that NUREG-0654 and

! NUREG-0696, Rev.1 do not require the Emergency Support Director to i

report to the EOF within one hour of declaration of a site energency.

Licensee's Proposed Bnergency Planning Finding 46. Yet in a footnote, i Licensee acknowledges that NURFB-0654 "recomnends" such a practice. Id.

at n. 13. The Board finds that the tw NUREGs, when read together with the emergency planning rule, require the full staf5ing and operation of

! the EOF within about one hour. See Com1onwealth's Proposed Energency Planning Findings 22-24. The fact that the Staff guidance documents do not contain detailed staffing criteria beyond the requirenent for a director, as argued by Licensee, does not eliminate the Staff's requirement for " full functional operation" with a senior nunagement director of the EOF. Staff Ex. 7, Table B-1; Staff Ex. 8, at 19. As noted earlier, regulatory guidance is entitled to presumptive weight. [Cormonwealth's j

Proposed Emergency Planning Findings 15, 25] Licenscc has the burden to j dmonstrate a functional alternative to the Staff's recomnendations.

j The Board finds that Licensee has not dwonstrated an alternative regarding 4'

the functions _ performed by the Energency Support Director. Licensee i

, argues that the absence of the Director is compensated for by Licensee's I

)

• Response to Licensee's Proposed Duergency Planning Findings 44-56;

covered in Cormonwealth's Proposed Bnergency Planning Findings 19-50.

I

'f

. ao e

~

- . - . - .--m o __. - - - . . . . , . - ., .-- . , < , . _ . , , - , , , ---.r.e , - , ,w . _ _ , . m - . . ~ . _ _ _ - - . .

large offsite response organization. Licensee's Proposed Emergency Planning Finding 46. he Board does not comprehend this argunent. If anything, the increased size and complexity of Licensee's offsite response organization argue in favor of the need for a single coordinator of the offsite response netwrk.

3. Licensee later argues that stationing of an Emergency Support Director within one hour is not required by IRC regulation.

Licensee Proposed Emergency Planning Finding 51 n. 16. The Board, however, interprets Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 as imposing such a requirenent.Section IV.E.8 of Appendix E requires "a licensee near-site emergency operations facility from which effective direction can be given and effective control can be exercised during an emergency."

(emphasis added). See Conuunwealth's Proposed Emergency Planning Finding

25. The Board does not understand how direction can be given without the presence of a director.

4. Licensee characterizes the concerns raised by the Connonwealth of Pennsylvania regarding EOF staffing as '\ holly speculative and without any factual basis." Licensee's Proposed Emergency Planning Finding 54.

This allegation is unsupported by the record. The Connemealth's testimony was based on direct observation and participation in drills and exercises conducted at 'HH-1. See Conunmealth's Proposed Emergency Planning Finding 34. The opinions of the rcatomealth's expert, Mr.

Dornsife, were based on his observations of all of the technical and radiological information available at the EOF, and of the functioning of the EOF during the June 2,1981 exercise. See id., Findings 37, 39, 41.

Moreover, Mr. Darnsife's views were confirmed by the Staff. See id.,

Findings 34, 36. On the other hand, it is the Licensee's views as to the functioning of the EOF without a director that are " wholly speculative and without any factual basis." Licensee's proposal has not been tested in any exercise or drill, particularly with offsite organizations, to establish the workability of the onsite/offsite interface. See id.,

Findings 39, 40, 41. In short, not a scintilla of evidence has been produced to support Licensee's " functional equivalence" argument with respect to Licensee's interface with the Camonwealth and other offsite response organizations.

5. Licensee also mischaracterizes the Comaonwealth's testinony regarding BRP's accident response. Licensee's Proposed Energency Planning Finding 55. Mr. Dornsife testified that it was the Comotr.malth's intention to dispatch a nuclear engineer to the EOF within one hour after declaration of a site emergency. Tr. 23, 017. Mr. Dornsife simply noted that BRP wuld not formally consider a nodification to its emergency plan until Licensee makes its conmitment to staff .the EOF fully within one hour. Id. at 23, 017-19. Moreover, Mr. Dornsife explained that resource limitations within BRP may preclude an absolute conmitment to arrive within one hour. Id. at 23, 019. Rather, the Coanonwealth's approach is based on the desire to provide the best possible accident response given available perronnel resources. Id_. at 23, 083-84. This approach is perfectly reasonable.*

• Similarly, the Board does not understand Licensee's reference to other Pennsylvania reactors. Licensee's Proposed Bnergency Planning Finding 55 n. 19. Obviously, the Connonwealth is bound to provide the best possible accident response at each site in the state given available resources and iven site location. "he fact that a different approach may be require tor Beaver Valley should not prevent optimum protection of public health and safety at 1MI-1. In any case, Mr. Dornsife indicated the Conmonwealth's intention eventually to provide 24-hour coverage for each site in the state. Tr. 23, 083 (Dornsife).

-. . - - .- - - _ _ . -, . _ . , _ - . . _ ~

C. Public Education

6.

• In their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Inw, Intervenors incorrectly cite to the record to reflect that the Cmnomealth's pamphlet containing general radiation information

(Comnomealth Ex. 3) is being revised prior to redistribution. Combined Intervenors' Proposed Findings, page 75,1173, lines 11 and 12;** page 77, 1175, lines 13 and 14.*** The transcript reference used by Intervenors to draw this conclusion is a enss-examination question posed by counsel for the Comnomealth, in which the fact that the five county brochures (e.g. , Conmowealth's Ex. 4, 5 and 7) were being revised was an underlying assumption. As discussed in the Camonwealth's Proposed Findings of I Fact and Conclusions of law, the five county brochures will be revised.

2 Connewealth's Proposed Findings, page 59,194. The record reflects l that at the time of hearing, PER had no present intention of revising .

the PDM pamphlet (Connonwealth Ex. 3). Tr.18, 067 (Comey) .

7. The record also reflects that Licensee has conmitted to pay for the printing and distribution of both the Pan pamphlet and the updated five county brochures. Tr. 22, 878 (Chesnut). Given this opportunity, PER has undertaken certain minor revisions to the PDR pamphlet. In its Reply Proposed Findings of Fact, the Connomealth has indicated that while revisions and t.pdated information will be included f prior to printing and distribution, the exact content of such additional or dunged information has not been fully determined.

l

• These sections are necessary to clarify certain incorrect references to the record made in combined Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Iaw.

** " . . . the Connonwealth's information pamphlet (Ex. 3) which is i

being revised prior to redistribution. (Tr. 22, 916, Straube)."

• • • "Chesnut didn't even know there would be a new pamphlet from Pan . . . "

^

8. 'Ihe Board has concluded that the public education program nust be inplanented prior to restart, at least to the extent of distribution of the P12R pamphlet and the five county brochures.

Contonwealth's Proposed Findings, page 59, %93; page 60, 'i95. Licensee is in agree nent with this requiranent and has conmitted to effectuate such distribution prior to restart. Licensee's Preposed Findings, page 126, %160; page 128, %163. 'Ibe Board is concerned, however, that Licensee's projected target date for distribution by Septauber 1,1981, may result in the distribution of incomplete information. Tr. 22, 878-79 (Chesnut) . We feel that the effectiveness of this portion of the public education program is directly dependent upon the accuracy and proximity of the information being distributed. In light of the anticipated changes and additions to the PI2M and county brochures,**

the Board finds it imperative that Licensee does not make distribution of this public education mterial until all changes and revisions have been made.

D. Transients

9. *>* Licensee seeks to have this Board find that the nere existence of a plan of distribution for public education materials to transient locations, and the statement by one county coordinator that he is 1.orning on publicizing anergency responsibilities reg trding transients "provides adequate assurance that transients in the York County area at

• Reply to Licensee's Proposed Findings,Section II.D., 55156-163.

• • See, Connonwealth's Proposed Findings, pages 58-59, %92, and Licensee T Proposed Findings, page 128, 5167 Footnote 40, for some description of anticipated changes anu auuttions.

• !* Reply to Licensee's Proposed Findings,Section II.D., %%170-171.

risk will be provided with sufficient emergency preparedness infornntion in the event of an emergency at 'IMI." Licensee's Proposed Findings, page 135, '471. Licensee would also have us rely on future monitoring by FER as assurance thac actual distribution will be accomplished.

Licensee's Proposed Findings, page 135, 5171. 'Ihe Board cannot draw full assurances from this, since FDR has no regulatory or enforcement powers of its own. E.g., Tr. 22, 477 (Bath); Tr. 22, 402 (Bath).

10. Furthermore, the issue of education and notification of transients is one which extends far beyond York County alone. Transients are a sector of the public for whom planning according to the 16 planning standards of the mergency planning rule must be accomplished. See, Co m nwealth's Proposed Findings. page 61, %97; 10 C.F.R. SS50.47(b)(7),

(b) (10) . As such, this Board nust determine whether the relevant planning standards have been met, and whether the plan can be implemented as written. Board's March 23 Order; 10 C.F.R. SS50.47(a)(1), 50.54(s)(2);

see also, Licensee's Proposed Findings, page 20, 526. As discussed more fully previously,* the Board finds that actual distribution to all transient location of updated and current information is required for compliance with the mergency planning rule. 'Ihe Board has also found that owners or key individuals of transient locations and businesses must be made aware of their respor. ,ib' ities during an emergency before there can be any reasonable oo -"cn that transients will, in fact, be notified "at the time or need". BaC , ff. Tr. 22, 350, at 2.

l' See, Contunwealth's Proposed Findings,Section VII, for complete discussion on notification to transients.

E. I~plementation of Protective Actions 11.* '1he Board is' surprised by Licensee's statenents which attaupt to minimize the importance of complete planning for evacuations, by referring to Irvenson's theories regarding concentrations of I-131 escaping a nuclear facility during an accident.** Licensee's Proposed Findings, pages 241-42, %%314-315. '1he Board does not doubt that in certain situations, ". . . sheltering for a limited period of time probably will be an adequate protective neasure . . .". Licensee's Proposed Findings, page 241, 5315; Tr. 18, 540 (Reilly). 'Ihe Comission's

" defense-in-depth" philosophy does not permit us, however, to igncre an important means of protecting the public health and safet,/ on the basis of a theory that is as yet unproven. See, Levenson, ff. Tr. 19, 525.

In fact, the cross-e.untnation of Licensee's witness Irvenson indicated that his " hypotheses" are controversial and highly disputed. E.g.,

Tr.19, 533 (Irvenson); see also, Tr.19, 531 (Levenson), referring to a report co-authored by the NRC (Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation) which contradicts Levenson's hypotheses (draft NUREG-0772) .

12. The Board notes further that the stated planning basis for emergency planning encompasses a range of possible accident scenarios, including " planning for the worst possible accident, regardless of its extranely lov likelihood." NUREG-0654,Section I.D., p. 7. 'Ihe likelihood (or lack thereof) of a particular accident scenario occurring cannot be

• Reply to Licensee's Proposed Findings,Section II.G, $5314-315.

• • Licensee makes a similar argument in its section on potassium iodide distribution. Licensee's Proposed Findings,Section II.G.12, 55416-418. 'lhe Board lilusise cannot rely on Levenson's unproven and controversial theories in reaching its decision on Intervenor's contention regarding pre-distribution of KI to the general public.

_3_

used by this Board, or the Conmission, as a justification for overlooking or minimizing certain portions of the emergency planning effort. The energency planning rule requires that a " range of protective actions" be developed. 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(10) . Evacuation of the entire plume

. exposure pathway EPZ is one of the three protective actions developed by the Connonwealth of Pennsylvania. Connonwealth Ex. 2. In addition, the Camomealth's Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) has indicated that ,

sheltering and evacuation are equally likely options to be reconmended as a protective action. See, Tr. 18, 144-147 (Reilly). Absent any indication in the planning itself, the Board is not given the discretion to attach varying importance to each of the protective actions. Thus, we are required by the rule and by this Conmission's Order and Notice of Hearing to inquire fully into the extent to which the planning for each element of a particular protective action (i.e. , evacuation, sheltering and. access control) is necessary, sufficient, and presently capable of i being implemented.

]

F. School Plans '

13.* Licensee would have this Board reject all Intervenor

! contentions which allege deficiencies relating to school planning in York and Dauphin Counties, arguing that the existence of school evacuation -

f " master plans" ulthin those two county plans resolves any problans.

E.g., Licensee's Proposed Findings,,page 286, 1357; page 290, 1363, page 1

294, 1370. Without at this point discussing the merits of individual

, contentions, the Board emphasizes that its review of emergency planning _

in this proceeding ext'nds e beyond the issues identified in specific

* . , Reply to Licensee's Proposed Findings,Section II.G.6,11355-361, and Section II.G.7,11366-370. '

-- -,--r:- + -pr- +-w,. +~,---g - - - - - - "

contentions. Thus, where school evacuation planning is concerned, this Board must determine whether the present state of planning and preparedness provides reasonable assurance that school evacuations can and will be accomplished in each county including York and Dauphin. Based on the record, we find that presently there is no such reasonable assurance.

The development of coordinated planning to at least the school district level would, however, provide reasonable assurance that school evacuations could be successfully executed. Tr. 22, 480 (Bath).

14. As Licensee correctly points out, one FD R witness did state that he felt that individual school plans as such were not a prerequisite to compliance with the emergency planmng rule. Licensee Proposed Findings, page 286, 1358; Tr. 22, 401 (Bath). Licensee's arguments, however, focus too closely on the necessity for individual school plans and ignore the Board's larger concern regarding reasonable assurance that the health and safety of school children will be protected.

This same FDLi witness stated that the only assurance he had rcgarding coordinated implementation of the county "maste- plan" was the knowledge that the school districts would receive notification and instructions in the event of an cmergency. Tr. 22, 396-97 (Bath). He had no assurance that the schools, at the other end of the process, could evacuate as directed. Tr. 22, 397 (Bath).* Inter, he again stated that school district plans were important "in order to dmonstrate that there is an adequate capability of evacuating sch al children in accompaniment with county plans." Tr. 22, 436 (Bath). The Board considers this tantanount to saying there is no assurance that school children will be evacuated and reunited uith their parents after evacuation.

• The Board notes that these conments were made after the witness had participated in the June 2 exercise. We thus infer that the exercise did not provide any additional assurances which would clininate the prob 1 cms associated with a lack of planning.

15. The Doard has previously identified the various reasons it considers planning at the school district level to be necessary and sufficient to provide the requisite reasonable assurance. Connotucalth's Proposed Findings,Section IV. h'e just briefly point out that the assurances regarding school evacuations cited by Licensee are m t the only relevant ones. The ability "to notify parents and bus drivers of unscheduled school closings" is not the only responsibility which the schools or school districts must fulfill in the cient of an emergency.

Licensee's Proposed Findings, page 286, $357; page 293, 5368. Ibr are discussions with school district superintendents in one county enough to establish an acceptance of responsibility on the part of all school districts within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and their ability to perform a coordinated evacuation. Licensee's Proposed Findings. page 286, %357. In a fixed nuclear facility incident, the speed and efficiency of an evacuation are especially important in tetms of protecting public health and safety. The time-consuming task of coordination

• of school evacuations is exactly what FEMA has been concerned about. Tr. 22, 866-67 (Hardy); Tr. 22, 480 (Bath). During the June 2 exercise, Elizabethtown Borough also expressed concern over coordination of school evacuations. Staff Ex. 20, at 12.

16. Leaving Imny of the coordinating decisions up to ad hoc managment at the tiue of an emergency would greatly impact on the l

time necessary to evacuate schools. See, Staff Ex. 21, at 19.

Ftethermore, children (and thus their parents) are totally dcpendent.

upon school authorities to protect their interests in the event of an mergency. Thus, the Board finds that planning for school evacuations

• " Coordination" includes an identification of adequate resources, and a recognition and acceptance of responsibility. Tr. 19, 215 (Adler).

must be conpleted to at least the lwest coordinating level of the school district before there can bc re.asonable assurance that the county

" master plans" can and will be inplemented, and that school children can and will be evacuated from the EPZ in a timely and coordinated nunner.

Respectfully submitted,

' L 4.

ta sse [i HICllELE STRAUIE ROBERT W. AD11R Attorneys for the Conmwealth UN17ED STATES OF RIERICA NUCLEAR REGUIAIDRY CotMISSION BEFORE illE AlmIC SAFE 1Y AND LICE!EI!X; 10ARD In the bhtter of ) '

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON G11PNN, )

) Docket Ib. 50-289

('Ihree tiile Island Ibclear ) (Restart)

Station, thit Ib.1) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that true and correct copics of the within Reply Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Smrgency Planning Issues were filed with the nunbers of the Atomic Licensing and Safety Board on or about August 27, 1981, and were served on the attached Service Lisu on or about September 8,1981, by U.S. thil, postage prepaid.

] S t II; b- . Y.Lalu MIGIELE STRAUBE Attorney for the Connawealth

.