IR 05000424/2010007

Download: ML102310602

Text

August 17, 2010

Mr. TomVice President - Vogtle Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASIS INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2010007 AND 05000425/2010007

Dear Mr. Tynan:

On July 16, 2010, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 16, 2010 with Mr. Russ Dedrickson, Plant Manager, and on August 9, 2010, via telephone, with Mr. Tom Petrak, Engineering Support Manager as well as other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green), which involved a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you contest this NCV you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305.

SNC 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Binoy B. Desai, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000424/2010007, 05000425/2010007

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc w/encl: (See page 3)

SNC 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/

Binoy B. Desai, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000424/2010007, 05000425/2010007

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc w/encl: (See page 3)

G PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G SENSITIVE G NON-SENSITIVE ADAMS: G Yes ACCESSION NUMBER:_________________________ G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS SIGNATURE RBERRYMAN SWALKER DMASPENERANDA MKING JEARGLE SKOBYLARZ SSPIEGELMAN NAME By email By email By email By email By email By email By email DATE 8/9/2010 8/4/2010 8/4/2010 8/4/2010 8/2/2010 7/30/2010 7/30/2010 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICE RII:DRP SIGNATURE NAME SSHAEFFER DATE 8/ /2010 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRS\Eng Branch 1\BRANCH INSPECTION FILES\CDBI INSPECTIONS\CDBI INSPECTIONS\INSP REPORTS\CDBI Final Inspection Reports\Vogtle CDBI 2010007 Report (rmb) Rev-0.doc SNC 3 cc w/encl: Managing Attorney and Compliance Officer Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution B. D. McKinney, Jr. Regulatory Response Manager Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution Hickox, T. Mark Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Mark Ajluni Licensing Manager Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution T. D. Honeycutt Regulatory Response Supervisor Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Jeffrey T. Gasser Executive Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution L. Mike Stinson Vice President Fleet Operations Support Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Paula Marino Vice President Engineering Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Bob Masse Resident Manager Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Oglethorpe Power Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution Moanica Caston Vice President and General Counsel Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Chris Clark Commissioner Georgia Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Lee Foley Manager of Contracts Generation Oglethorpe Power Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution F. Allen Barnes Director Environmental Protection Division Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Cynthia A. Sanders Radioactive Materials Program Manager Environmental Protection Division Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution James A. Sommerville Program Coordination Branch Chief Environmental Protection Division Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Mr. James C. Hardeman Environmental Radiation Program Manager Environmental Protection Division Georgia Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Ted V. Jackson Emergency Response and Radiation Program Manager Environmental Protection Division Georgia Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution (cc w/encl continued next page)

SNC 4 (cc w/encl continued) Mr. Steven M. Jackson Senior Engineer - Power Supply Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Electronic Mail Distribution Mr. Reece McAlister Executive Secretary Georgia Public Service Commission Electronic Mail Distribution Office of the Attorney General Electronic Mail Distribution Office of the County Commissioner Burke County Commission Electronic Mail Distribution Arthur H. Domby, Esq. Troutman Sanders Electronic Mail Distribution Director Consumers' Utility Counsel Division Governor's Officer of Consumer Affairs 2 M.L. King, Jr. Drive Plaza Level East; Suite 356 Atlanta, GA 30334-4600 Susan E. Jenkins Director, Division of Waste Management Bureau of Land and Waste Management S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution SNC 5 Letter to Tomfrom Binoy B. Desai dated August 17, 2010.

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASIS INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 05000424/2010007 AND 05000425/2010007 Distribution w/encl: C. Evans, RII EICS (Part 72 Only) L. Slack, RII EICS (Linda Slack)

OE Mail (email address if applicable) RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMVogtle Resource

Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81 Report No.: 05000424/2010007, 05000425/2010007 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates: June 14, 2010 through July 16, 2010 Inspectors: R. Berryman, P.E., Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead) S. Walker, Senior Reactor Inspector D. Mas-Penaranda, Reactor Inspector J. Eargle, Reactor Inspector S. Kobylarz, Contractor S. Spiegelman, Contractor Accompanying Personnel: M. King, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Leader)

Approved by: Binoy B. Desai, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000424/2010007, 05000425/2010007; 06/14/10 - 07/16/10; Vogtle Electric Generating

Plant, Units 1 and 2; Component Design Basis Inspection. This inspection was conducted by a team of four NRC inspectors, one NRC inspector who was in training, and two NRC contract inspectors. One Green finding, which was a non-cited violation (NCV) was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Finding for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or is assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," (ROP) Revision 4, dated December 2006. A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) for the failure to reflect all changes made in the facility or procedures as described in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) up to a maximum of six months prior to the date of filing of periodic updates to the UFSAR with the NRC. Licensee procedure NMP-ES-022, "DCP Site Approval, Implementation and Closure," Ver. 7.0 addressed the processing of documentation regarding design change packages (DCPs). Step 6.7.2.3 of this procedure required the modification engineer to assign an action item to the licensing document owner identified in the licensing document change request (LDCR). Licensee procedure NMP-AD-009, "Licensing Document Change Requests," Ver. 8.0 addressed the processing of LDCRs. NMP-AD-009 included updates to the UFSAR in the scope of LDCRs. This procedure did not contain any timeliness guidance regarding the completion of LDCRs which impacted the UFSAR to ensure compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4). The licensee submitted Revision 15 of the UFSAR to the NRC on April 16, 2009. The inspectors identified five instances where DCPs were implemented which made changes to the facility or procedures as described in the UFSAR more than six months prior to the April 16, 2009 submittal. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as condition report (CR) 2010109181.

The failure to reflect all changes made in the facility or procedures as described in the UFSAR up to a maximum of six months prior to the date of filing of periodic updates to the UFSAR with the NRC is a performance deficiency. Traditional enforcement applies since this finding reflects an impact on the regulatory process in the form of timely and accurate reports to the NRC. This finding is more than minor consistent with Section XIII, Supplement I, D.6 of the NRC

Enforcement Policy. This section of the enforcement policy states, in part, that a failure to update the FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) in cases where the information is not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures is a SL IV violation. The team reviewed the five DCPs which were implemented greater than six months prior to the submission of Revision 15 of the UFSAR to the NRC and conducted focused queries of licensee CRs dating back to the implementation of the oldest of the five affected DCPs. The team was not able to find any occurrences where the lack of timely updates to the UFSAR resulted in an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. The inspectors determined that the thorough evaluation of problems such that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary was a significant cause of this performance deficiency. The licensee generated CR 2007107068 in June 2007 in response to a discovery that the FSAR did not reflect the changes associated with a DCP. The extent of condition of the corrective actions associated with this failed to identify that the LDCR procedure did not contain any timeliness guidance to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4). This is directly related to the Corrective Action Program component of the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution (P.1.(c)). (Section 1R21.2.08)

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection

.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process

The team selected risk-significant components and operator actions for review using information contained in the licensee's Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). In general, this included components and operator actions that had a risk achievement worth factor greater than two or Birnbaum value greater than 1 X10-6. The components selected were located within the residual heat removal (RHR) system, safety injection (SI) system, primary safety valves (PSVs), pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs), steam generator (SG) atmospheric relief valves (ARVs), 4160 VAC electrical system,480 VAC electrical system, 120 VAC electrical system, and the reactor trip breakers (RTBs). The sample selection included 15 components, five operator actions, and five operating experience items.

The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of the selected risk-significant components to verify that the design bases had been correctly implemented and maintained. This design margin assessment considered original design issues, margin reductions due to modification, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition issues. Equipment reliability issues were also considered in the selection of components for detailed review. These included items such as failed performance test results, significant corrective action, repeated maintenance, maintenance rule (a)1 status, RIS 05-020 (formerly GL 91-18) conditions, NRC resident inspector input of problem equipment, system health reports, industry operating experience and licensee problem equipment lists. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the available defense in depth margins. An overall summary of the reviews performed and the specific inspection findings identified are included in the following sections of the report.

.2.1 4160 VAC Switchgear Bus 1BA03

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the one-line diagrams, the short-circuit and load-flow calculations, and the switchgear vendor specifications and drawings to determine maximum load, interrupting duty and bus bracing requirements for design basis conditions. This review was also conducted to verify conformance with the switchgear equipment vendor ratings. The breaker coordination calculation was reviewed to verify selective coordination for the reserve auxiliary transformer and load center 1BB16 feeder breakers. Switchgear and circuit breaker maintenance results were reviewed for indications of adverse conditions. The inspectors reviewed the modification history to verify that modifications did not adversely impact the design basis. The inspectors also reviewed the corrective maintenance and condition report history to verify that there were no recurring issues affecting reliability.

An inspector walkdown of the switchgear was performed to observe the visible material condition of components to verify that any potentially degraded conditions were appropriately addressed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.2 4160/480 VAC Transformer 1BB16X and Load Center 1BB16

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed one-line diagrams, transformer vendor test results, and the transformer model in the load study calculation to confirm that correct transformer impedance values were utilized. The inspectors confirmed the adequacy of the overcurrent relay settings for design-basis loading requirements and for selected load center breaker coordination, including motor control center (MCC) thermal overload relay heater selection methodology for degraded voltage conditions. The inspectors reviewed the modification history to verify that modifications did not adversely impact the design basis. The inspectors also reviewed the corrective maintenance and condition report history for recurring issues which could have impacted reliability. An inspector walkdown of the load center and transformer was performed to assess observable material conditions and to verify that any potentially degraded conditions were appropriately addressed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.3 Safeguards Driver Cards A516 and A517

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed schematic diagrams and the vendor manual to identify key circuit card components. The inspectors also reviewed vendor recommendations and industry operating experience on card refurbishment and preventive maintenance and compared them to licensee programs to verify that actions were appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the corrective maintenance and condition report history to verify that any reliability issues were appropriately addressed. The inspectors reviewed the preventive maintenance procedures to verify that components that affected solid-state protection system (SSPS) reliability were replaced periodically in accordance with industry recommendations. An inspector walkdown of the SSPS was performed to assess observable material condition and to verify that any potentially degraded conditions were appropriately addressed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.4 Reactor Trip Breakers

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the maintenance manuals and vendor technical manuals for the reactor trip breakers to verify that vendor requirements had been incorporated into station maintenance and surveillance procedures. The inspectors reviewed station procedures and records to verify that periodic vendor contacts were performed as required to ensure up-to-date vendor information was being maintained in station technical files. The inspectors reviewed completed maintenance documentation to verify that potentially degraded conditions were properly documented and resolved.

Maintenance and surveillance schedules were reviewed to verify that vendor and TS periodicity requirements were being satisfied.

Maintenance and corrective action documentation was reviewed to verify that potentially degraded conditions were being appropriately addressed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.5 Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP) Relay K158

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the LOSP and degraded voltage relay setpoint calculations, motor starting and running voltage calculations, and MCC control circuit voltage-drop calculations to verify that adequate voltage would be provided to safety-related devices at required design voltage levels. In addition, the inspectors reviewed procedures and completed surveillance tests for relay calibration to verify that acceptance criteria was consistent with the design calculations and the relays were capable of performing the intended safety functions. The team also reviewed operating procedures to determine whether the limits and protocols for maintaining offsite voltage were consistent with the design calculations. The team interviewed the system engineer and performed a non-intrusive visual inspection of the relays to assess the installation configuration and material condition to verify that potentially degraded conditions were being appropriately addressed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.6 120 VAC Instrument Panel 1BY2B

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed loading and sizing calculations for the Inverter and transformer connected to instrument panel 1BY2B to verify whether the panel would have sufficient capacity to support its required loads under worst-case accident loading conditions. The inspectors reviewed degraded voltage calculations to verify that the cumulative effects were appropriately considered in determining that supplied voltage would be adequate during worst-case design conditions. The inspectors also reviewed installed panel circuit breaker ratings to verify that the interrupting capability was appropriate given potential short-circuit currents. The inspectors interviewed the system engineer and performed a non-intrusive visual inspection of the transformer, inverter and panel 1BY2B to assess the installation configuration and verify that degraded material conditions were being appropriately addressed. A review of associated corrective action history was also performed to verify that potentially degraded conditions were being appropriately addressed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.7 RHR Pump 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B Motors

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed control diagrams to verify that the controls of the RHR pump motors were consistent with the design basis and operational requirements. The inspectors reviewed voltage calculations to verify that adequate voltage to the motors would be available under worst-case accident conditions. The inspectors reviewed the results of the load-flow and voltage calculations to verify that sufficient power would be available to start the motors during worst-case degraded voltage and service conditions. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the motor protection setting calculations to verify that there was adequate overcurrent protection during degraded voltage conditions. The inspectors reviewed the pump performance and brake horsepower requirements to verify that the motor was adequately sized for the worst-case load conditions. The inspectors reviewed maintenance and corrective action documents to verify that potentially degraded conditions were being appropriately addressed. The inspectors performed a non-intrusive visual inspection of the RHR pump motors to assess the installation configuration and verify that degraded material conditions were being appropriately addressed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.8 RHR Pumps 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the design basis documents, net positive suction head (NPSH) calculations, heat transfer calculations, and system flow calculations to verify that required flow could be supplied by the pumps for required functions. The inspectors also compared the design flow with the values and functions specified in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) and TS to verify that acceptance criteria were appropriate. The inspectors interviewed design and systems engineers and reviewed pump test results, trending data, and corrective actions over the past three years of operation to verify that any potentially degraded conditions were addressed promptly and in a comprehensive manner. Finally, the inspectors walked down the RHR pumps to evaluate the physical condition of the pumps and adjacent equipment to verify that degraded material conditions were being appropriately addressed.

b. Findings

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) for the failure to reflect all changes made in the facility or procedures as described in the UFSAR up to a maximum of six months prior to the date of filing of periodic updates to the UFSAR with the NRC.

Description:

Licensee procedure NMP-ES-022, "DCP Site Approval, Implementation and Closure," Version (Ver.) 7.0 addressed the processing of documentation regarding design change packages (DCPs). Step 6.7.2.3 of this procedure required the modification engineer to assign an action item to the licensing document owner identified in the licensing document change request (LDCR). Licensee procedure NMP-AD-009, "Licensing Document Change Requests," Ver. 8.0 addressed the processing of LDCRs. NMP-AD-009 included updates to the UFSAR in the scope of LDCRs. This procedure did not contain any timeliness guidance regarding the completion of LDCRs which impacted the UFSAR to ensure compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4). The licensee submitted Revision 15 of the UFSAR to the NRC on April 16, 2009. The inspectors identified five instances where DCPs were implemented which made changes to the facility or procedures as described in the UFSAR more than six months prior to the April 16, 2009 submittal yet the UFSAR was not updated to reflect the changes.

Analysis:

The failure to reflect all changes made in the facility or procedures as described in the UFSAR up to a maximum of six months prior to the date of filing of periodic updates to the UFSAR with the NRC is a performance deficiency. The inspector determined that traditional enforcement per NRC Enforcement Policy was applicable since this finding reflects an impact on the regulatory process in the form of timely and accurate reports to the NRC. This finding is more than minor consistent with Section XIII, Supplement I, D.6 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This section of the enforcement policy states, in part, that a failure to update the FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) in cases where the information is not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures is a SL IV violation. The team reviewed the five DCPs which were implemented greater than six months prior to the submission of Revision 15 of the UFSAR to the NRC and conducted focused queries of licensee condition reports (CRs) dating back to the implementation of the oldest of the five affected DCPs. The team did not identify any occurrences where the lack of timely updates to the UFSAR resulted in an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. The inspectors determined that the lack of s thorough evaluation of problems such that the resolution address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary was a significant cause of this performance deficiency. The licensee generated CR 2007107068 in June 2007 in response to a discovery that the UFSAR did not reflect the changes associated with a DCP. The extent of condition of the corrective actions associated with this failed to identify that the LDCR procedure did not contain any timeliness guidance to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4). This is directly related to the Corrective Action Program component of the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution (P.1.(c)).

Enforcement:

10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) states, in part, that periodic revisions to the UFSAR submitted to the NRC must reflect all changes made in the facility or procedures as described in the UFSAR up to a maximum of six months prior to the date of filing. Contrary to the above, Vogtle submitted Revision 15 of the UFSAR to the NRC on April 16, 2009 with five DCPs implemented in the plant which were greater than six months old and affected the facility or procedures as described in the UFSAR. Because this is a non-willful SL IV violation and was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2010109181, this finding is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000424 and 425/2010007-01, Violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) for Failure to Reflect Changes to Facility and Procedures in Final Safety Analysis Report Periodic Revisions)

.2.9 Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) Pumps

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down accessible areas of the NSCW pumps and the tower basins to verify that any potentially degraded material conditions were being appropriately addressed. The inspectors evaluated selected condition reports, operability determinations, and apparent cause reports to verify that appropriate and timely corrective actions were implemented. In-service testing (IST) results were reviewed to verify that adequate flow was available in accordance with design calculations to achieve the system requirements identified in the UFSAR, TS, and design-basis requirements. Interviews were conducted with the system engineer and design engineers to discuss the system health and any plans for system modifications. NPSH and system resistance calculations were reviewed and compared with test results and regulatory commitments to verify that the pumps could provide required flow during design-basis conditions.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.10 High Pressure Recirculation Suction Valve from RHR Heat Exchanger A (HV8804A)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a non-intrusive visual inspection of HV8804A to verify that potentially degraded material conditions were being appropriately addressed. The inspectors compared valve testing data with the design opening and closing time requirements to verify that valve performance was adequate. The inspectors reviewed calculations that determined required valve actuator torque and thrust limits and traced these requirements to the vendor-supplied data. The inspectors interviewed the systems engineer and corporate valve engineers to discuss the valve analysis as well as operational and maintenance history to verify that potentially degraded conditions were being appropriately addressed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.11 SI Pump B Suction Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) (HV8923B)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a non-intrusive visual inspection of HV8923B to verify that potentially degraded material conditions were being appropriately addressed. The inspectors interviewed the systems engineer to verify that potentially adverse material conditions were being addressed appropriately. The inspectors reviewed the vendor data for valve design, including the valve manual and the design calculations to verify that calculations appropriately considered valve thrust and torque loads that the operator load limit was not exceeded. The inspectors reviewed calculations that determined required valve actuator torque and thrust limits and traced these requirements to the vendor-supplied data.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.12 Safety Injection Pumps - 1/2-1204-P6-003/4 & Mini-Flow Isolation MOVs 1/2HV8813

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed applicable portions of the plant TS, UFSAR, design basis documents (DBDs), system descriptions, and system lesson plans to identify design basis requirements for the SI pumps. Design calculations (i.e., minimum flow, NPSH, minimum voltage, differential pressure, and required torque/thrust) and site procedures were reviewed to verify that the design basis and design assumptions had been appropriately translated into these documents. The inspectors reviewed the calculations for degraded voltage at the MOV terminals to verify that proper voltage was utilized in the torque calculations. Control logic diagrams were reviewed to verify that the mini-flow isolation logic was consistent with the protection of the pump. The licensee response to GL 88-04 was reviewed to verify that the mini-flow line provides adequate flow to ensure protection of the pump. The inspectors reviewed system modifications to verify that any modifications did not degrade the component's performance capability and were appropriately incorporated into relevant drawings and procedures. Component walkdowns were conducted to verify that the installed configurations would support their design basis function under accident conditions and had been maintained to be consistent with design assumptions. Control panel indicators were observed and operating procedures reviewed to verify that component operation and alignments were consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions. Test procedures and recent test results were reviewed against design basis documents to verify that acceptance criteria for tested parameters were supported by calculations or other engineering documents and that individual tests and analyses served to validate component operation under accident conditions. External event analyses were reviewed against design specifications and requirements in order to verify that the equipment was adequately protected. The inspectors examined maintenance rule documentation to verify that the pumps were properly scoped, and monitored. Vendor documentation, system health reports, preventive and corrective maintenance history, and corrective action system documents were reviewed in order to verify that potential degradation was monitored or prevented and that scheduled component replacements were consistent with vendor recommendations and equipment qualification life.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.13 Steam Generator ARVs (1/2PV3000, 3010, 3020, and 3030)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed applicable portions of the plant TS, UFSAR, DBDs, system descriptions, and system lesson plans to identify design basis requirements for the ARVs. Design calculations and site procedures were reviewed to verify that the design basis and design assumptions had been appropriately translated into these documents. Control logic diagrams were reviewed to verify that controls and interlocks were consistent with the design-basis performance requirements and operating procedures.

The inspectors reviewed system modifications to verify that any modifications did not degrade the performance capability of the ARVs and were appropriately incorporated into relevant drawings and procedures. Component walkdowns were conducted to verify that the installed configurations would support the design basis function under accident conditions and had been maintained to be consistent with design assumptions. Control panel indicators were observed and operating procedures reviewed to verify that component operation and alignments were consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions. Test procedures and recent test results were reviewed against design basis documents to verify that acceptance criteria for tested parameters were supported by calculations or other engineering documents and that individual tests and analyses served to validate component operation under accident conditions. External event analyses were reviewed against design specifications and requirements in order to verify that the equipment was adequately protected. The inspectors examined maintenance rule documentation to verify that the valves were properly scoped, and monitored. Vendor documentation, system health reports, preventive and corrective maintenance history, and corrective action system documents were reviewed in order to verify that potential degradation was monitored or prevented and that scheduled component replacements were consistent with vendor recommendations and equipment qualification life.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.14 Pressurizer PORVs and Block Valves (1PV0455A, 1PV0456A, and 1HV8000A/B)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed applicable portions of the plant TS, UFSAR, DBDs, system descriptions, and system lesson plans to identify design basis requirements for the pressurizer PORVs and associated PORV block valves. Design calculations (i.e., minimum voltage, flow, differential pressure, and required torque/thrust) and site procedures were reviewed to verify the design basis and design assumptions were appropriately translated into these documents. The inspectors reviewed the calculations for degraded voltage at the MOV terminals to verify that proper voltage was utilized in the torque calculations. Control logic diagrams and single-line power supply drawings were reviewed to verify that any controls and interlocks were consistent with the design basis performance requirements and operating procedures. The inspectors reviewed system modifications to verify that any modifications did not degrade the performance capability and were appropriately incorporated into relevant drawings and procedures. Control panel indicators were observed and operating procedures reviewed to verify that component operation and alignments were consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions. Test procedures and recent test results were reviewed against design basis documents to verify that acceptance criteria for tested parameters were supported by calculations or other engineering documents and that individual tests and analyses served to validate component operation under accident conditions. External event analyses were reviewed against design specifications and requirements in order to verify that the equipment was adequately protected. The inspectors examined maintenance rule documentation to verify that the valves were properly scoped, and monitored. Vendor documentation, system health reports, preventive and corrective maintenance history, and corrective action system documents were reviewed in order to verify that potential degradation was monitored or prevented and that scheduled component replacements were consistent with vendor recommendations and equipment qualification life.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.15 Pressurizer Safety Valves (1/2PSV8010A, 1/2PSV8010B, and 1/2PSV8010C)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed applicable portions of the plant TS, UFSAR, DBDs, system descriptions, and system lesson plans to identify design basis requirements for the valves. Design calculations and site procedures were reviewed to verify the design basis and design assumptions were appropriately translated into these documents. The team reviewed system modifications to verify that any modifications did not degrade component performance capability and were appropriately incorporated into relevant drawings and procedures. Control panel indicators were observed and operating procedures reviewed to verify that component operation and alignments were consistent with design and licensing basis assumptions. Test procedures and recent test results were reviewed against design basis documents to verify that acceptance criteria for tested parameters were supported by calculations or other engineering documents and that individual tests and analyses served to validate component operation under accident conditions. External event analyses were reviewed against design specifications and requirements in order to verify that the equipment was adequately protected. The inspectors examined maintenance rule documentation to verify that the valves were properly scoped, and monitored. Vendor documentation, system health reports, preventive and corrective maintenance history, and corrective action system documents were reviewed in order to verify that potential degradation was monitored or prevented and that scheduled component replacements were consistent with vendor recommendations and equipment qualification life.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Review of Low Margin Operator Actions

a. Inspection Scope

The team performed a margin assessment and detailed review of five risk-significant and time-critical operator actions. Where possible, margins were determined by the review of the assumed design basis and UFSAR response times and performance times documented by job performance measures (JPMs). For the selected components and operator actions, the team performed an assessment of the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs), Annunciator Response Procedures (ARPs), and other operations procedures to determine the adequacy of the procedures and availability of equipment required to complete the actions. Operator actions were observed on the plant simulator and during plant walk downs as appropriate. The following operator actions were observed on the licensee's operator training simulator:

• Operator Initiates high pressure injection (HPI) after AC Recovered during station blackout (SBO)

• Operator response to an anticipate transient without SCRAM (ATWS)

• Operator Actions to Establish high pressure recirculation (HPR) for long-term feed and bleed

• Operator actions to depressurize steam generators during SBO

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Review of Industry Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed selected operating experience issues that had occurred at domestic and foreign nuclear facilities for applicability at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant. The issues that received a detailed review by the team included:

• IN 2003-19, Unanalyzed Condition of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakoff Line During Fire Scenarios or Station Blackout

• NRC Information Notice 2007-09, Equipment Operabilty Under Degraded Volatage Conditions.

• IN 2000-06, Offsite Power Inadequacies

• GL 91-07, GI-23 "Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failures" and Its Possible Effect on Station Blackout

• IN 2006-029, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a result of Stem Nut Wear

• IN 2006-026, Failure of Magnesium Rotors in Motor-operated Valve Actuators

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary On July 16, 2010, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Russ Dedrickson, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff. The team returned all proprietary information examined to the licensee. No proprietary information is documented in the report.

On August 9, 2010, a telephone exit was conducted with Mr. Tom Petrak, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Engineering Support Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.

ATTACHMENTS:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

S. Ashworth, Principal Engineer - Mechanical Design Support

D. Bunch, Senior Engineer - Technical Support

G. Coady, Senior Engineer - Technical Support

N. Davis, Engineer - Electrical Design Support

W. Gover, Principal Engineer - Engineering Support

M. Hickox, Principal Engineer - Licensing

S. Kerstiens, Principal Engineer - Engineering Support

J. Olson, Senior Engineer - Site Design Mechanical

R. Reddy, Senior Engineer - Electrical Design Support

L. Smith, Principal Engineer - Site Design I&C

E. Sweat, Senior Engineer - Senior Engineer - PRA

J. Todd, Shift Manager - Operations NRC

M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED, AND REVIEWED

Opened

05000424, 425/2010007-01 NCV Violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) for Failure to Reflect Changes to Facility and Procedures in Final Safety Analysis

Report Periodic Revisions (Section 1R21.2.08)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Design Basis Documents and System Descriptions

1X6AA00-00441, Reactor Coolant System Description, Rev. 3 1X6AA00-00444-6, Safety Injection System Description, Rev. 6 1X6AA00-443, RHR Design Description, Rev. 3 2X6AA00-00441, Reactor Coolant System Description, Rev. 3

2X6AA00-443, RHR Design Description, Rev. 3 2X6AA00-00444-6, Safety Injection System Description, Rev. 6 DC1007, Design Basis Environmental Discipline, Ver. 34 DC1201, Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 5 DC1202, NSCW Design Bases, Ver.13 DC1202A, NSCW Design Manual, Ver. 11 DC1202B, NSCW Make-up System, Rev. 7

DC1204, Safety Injection System, Ver. 6 DC1205, RHR System Design Bases, Rev. 6

DC-1301, Main Steam System, Rev. 11 DC1801, Offsite Power System, Rev. 7 DC1823, Electrical Protection Criteria, Ver. 20

Procedures

11877-1, Cold Weather Check List, Rev. 19 11882-1, Outside Area Rounds Sheets, Rev. 76.2

11882-2, Outside Area Rounds Sheets, Rev. 70.1 13150A-1 Train A Nuclear Service Cooling Water System (Operating Procedure), Rev. 5 13601-1, Steam Generator And Main Steam System Operation, Rev. 55 13601-2, Steam Generator And Main Steam System Operation, Rev. 50 14430-1, NSCW Cooling Tower Fan Monthly Test, Rev. 9

14552-1, NSCW Flow Path Verification, Rev. 8.4 14721-1, ECCS Subsystem Flow Balance And Checkvalve Refueling Inservice Test, October 11, 2009 14721-2, ECCS Subsystem Flow Balance And Checkvalve Refueling Inservice Test, March 28, 2010 14801A-1 Train A Transfer Pump In-service Test , Rev. 2 14802A-1, Train A NSCW Pump/Check Valve IST and Response Test, Rev. 3 14804A-2, Safety Injection Pump A Inservice And Response Time Tests, Rev. 4 14804B-1, Safety Injection Pump B Inservice And Response Time Tests, Rev. 3.1 14825-1, Quarterly In-Service Valve Test, Rev. 88.2 14825-2, Quarterly In-Service Valve Test, Rev. 82.3 14860-1, PORV Cold Shutdown Inservice Test, Rev. 10.1

14860-2, PORV Cold Shutdown Inservice Test, Rev. 9.1 17003-1, Annunciator

Response Procedures for

ALB 03 Panel 1A1 on MCB, Rev. 16 17003-2, Annunciator

Response Procedures for

ALB 03 Panel 2A1 on MCB, Rev. 16 17006-1, Annunciator Response Procedures For

ALB 06 On Panel 1A2 On MCB, Rev. 32 17012-1, Annunciator Response Procedures For

ALB 12 On Panel 1C1 On MCB, Rev. 19.1

317012-1, Annunciator Response Procedures For ALB On Panel 1C1 On MCB, Rev. 19.1 17012-2, Annunciator Response Procedures For

ALB 12 On Panel 1C1 On MCB, Rev. 15.1

17012-2, Annunciator Response Procedures For ALB On Panel 1C1 On MCB, Rev. 15.1 17015-1, Annunciator Response Procedures For

ALB 15 On Panel 1B1 On MCB, Rev. 37 17015-2, Annunciator Response Procedures For

ALB 15 On Panel 2B1 On MCB, Rev. 33 17036-1, Annunciator Response Procedures For

ALB 36 On EAB Panel, Rev. 19 17037-1, Annunciator Response Procedures For

ALB 37 On EAB Panel, Rev. 19 17051-1, Annunciator Response Procedures For

ALB 51 On QHVC Panel, Rev. 9.2 18000-C, Pressurizer Spray, Safety, Or Relief Valve Malfunction, Rev. 5

18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, Rev. 27 18009-C, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Rev. 28.1 18011-C, Turbine Trip Below P-9, Rev. 18.2 18038-1, Operation From Remote Shutdown Panels, Rev. 31 19000-C, E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev. 34

19002-C,

ES-0.2 Natural Circulation Cooldown, Rev. 21 19010-C, E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Rev. 33 19011-C,

ES-1.1 SI Termination, Rev. 28 19013-C,

ES-1.3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Rev. 28 19014-C,

ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation, Rev. 15

19100-C,

ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, Rev. 35 19211-C,

FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT, Rev. 20.1 19231-C,

FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Rev. 33.2 20411-C, Control Of Lubricants, Rev. 15 24525-1, Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel I 1P-455 Channel Operational Test And Channel Calibration, Rev. 0 24539-1, Pressurizer Pressure Control 1P-455 Channel Calibration, Rev. 26 26235-C, Garrett Power Operated Relief Valve Maintenance, Rev. 16.2 26823-C, Inspection of Magnesium Rotors in Limitorque Motors, Rev. 5 26860-C, ARV Valve Actuator Set-Up And Maintenance, Rev. 21.1

26861-C, ARV Valve Actuator And Hand Pump Oil Change And Pre-Charge Instructions, Rev. 7 26871-C, Static Testing of Motor Operated Gate/Globe Valves using Viper Test Equipment, Rev. 19 26872-C, Pressurizer Safety Valve Lift Indicating Switch Assembly, Rev. 9 27112-C, Safety Injection Pump Maintenance, March 03, 2009 27720-C, 4.16 KV / 13.8 KV Switchgear Cubicle Maintenance, Rev. 30.2 27731-C, 480 Volt Switchgear Cubicle / Transformer Maintenance, Rev. 33

27761-C, 4.16 KV / 13.8 KV Breaker Preinstallation Check, Rev. 7 28215-C, Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Setpoint Verification, Rev. 12.1 50085-C, Gas Accumulation Monitoring And Trending, May 10, 2010 55025-C, Calculation of Breaker Trip Settings for AC Molded Case Circuit Breakers and Selection of Thermal Overload Protection for AC Motor Loads, Rev. 18.1

NMP-AD-009, Licensing Document Change Requests, Ver. 8.0

NMP-AD-020, Receipt, Initial Routing, and Administrative Processing for Vendor Documents, Ver. 1.0

NMP-ES-017-009, MOV Magnesium Rotor Inspection, 3/16/10

NMP-ES-022, DCP Site Approval, Implementation and Closure, Ver. 7.0

NMP-OS-007-001, Conduct of Operations Standards and Expectations, Rev. 6.0

NMP-SH-002, Heat Stress, Rev. 4.0

4SCL00011, Maintenance Specification and Work Orders, Limitorque

SMB-000/00 Butterfly Valves and Dampers, 3/2/10

Completed Test Procedures

WO 1061132801, Unit 1 Cold Shutdown PORV Inservice Test, September 9, 2006

WO 1062076701, Unit 1 Cold Shutdown PORV Inservice Test, March 16, 2008

WO 1062264001, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test, February 14, 2007

WO 1062289901, Cold Shutdown Valve Inservice Test, April 18, 2008

WO 1070494001, Limitorque Clean/Inspect/Lubricate/Test VIPER, October 22, 2008

WO 1070494101, Limitorque Clean/Inspect/Lubricate/Test VIPER, March 18, 2008

WO 1070855401, Pressurizer Relief Valve (1PSV8010A) Inservice Test, March 26, 2008

WO 1070987001, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test, August 5, 2007

WO 1080329001, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test, May 2, 2008

WO 1080931801, 1HV8813-MO Stroke Time Test, September 21, 2009

WO 1080932201, VIPER Testing, September 21, 2009

WO 1081989901, ESFAS Slave Relay And Final Device Train A Block Test, October 31, 2009

WO 1082032601, Train A Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer Switch and Control Circuit 18 Month Surveillance Test, October 11, 2009

WO 1082032701, Train B Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer Switch And Control Circuit 18 Month Surveillance Test, October 14, 2009

WO 1082051601, Pressurizer Relief Valve (1PSV8010A) Inservice Test, October 19, 2009

WO 1090183401, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test, April 19, 2009

WO 1090464301, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test, June 21, 2009

WO 1092052301, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test, February 9, 2010

WO 1092181401, Safety Injection Pump B Inservice And Response Tests, February 11, 2010

WO 1100287401, Quarterly Inservice Test For 1HV-8000B PORV Block Valve, April 4, 2010

WO 1100287501, SSPS Slave Relay k749 Train A Test PRZR Low Pressure, April 19, 2010

WO 1100347101, Quarterly Inservice Test For 1HV-8000A PORV Block Valve, April 19, 2010

WO 1100347901, Safety Injection Pump A Inservice And Response Tests, March 21, 2010

WO 1100443701, ECCS Flow Path Verification, March 16, 2010

WO 1100878501, 1 MO BRAVO SI Pump 4 MTR Cooler Flow Test, May 29, 2010

WO 1100961001, SSPS Slave Relay k749 Train A Test PRZR Low Pressure, June 28, 2010

WO 1101021001, 1 MO ALPHA SI Pump 3 MTR Cooler Flow Test, June 16, 2010

WO 2070135601, Pressurizer Relief Valve (2PSV8010A) Inservice Test, April 18, 2007

WO 2090056001, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test, February 20, 2009

WO 2090056201, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test, March 21, 2009

WO 2090598101, Train B Diesel Generator And ESFAS Test, March 29, 2010

WO 2091128801, Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel Test, May 6, 2010

WO 2091139801, Train A Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer Switch and Control Circuit 18 Month Surveillance Test, March 18, 2010

WO 2091139901, Train B Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer Switch and Control Circuit 18 Month Surveillance Test, October 11, 2009

WO 2091330101, Cold Shutdown Valve Inservice Test, April 6,2010

WO 2091338501, 18 Month Pressurizer Control Loop P-455 Channel Calibration, March 22, 2010

WO 2091476201, Pressurizer Relief Valve (2PSV8010A) Inservice Test, April 2, 2010

5WO

2091891601, Quarterly Inservice Valve Test, December 31, 2009

WO 2100904201, 1 MO BRAVO SI Pump 4 MTR Cooler Flow Test, June 8, 2010

WO 2101067501, 1 MO ALPHA SI Pump 3 MTR Cooler Flow Test, June 17, 2010

Drawings

1X3D-AA-A01A, Main One Line Unit 1, Ver. 26 1X3D-AA-D02A, One Line Diagram 4160V Switchgear 1AA02

1-1804-S3-A02, Ver. 13 1X3D-AA-D02B, One Line Diagram 4160V Switchgear 1AA02

1-1804-S3-A02, Rev. 9

1X3D-AA-D03A, One Line Diagram 4160V Switchgear 1BA03

1-1804-S3-A03, Rev. 11 1X3D-AA-D03B, One Line Diagram 4160V Switchgear 1BA03

1-1804-S3-A03, Rev. 12 1X3D-AA-E04A, One Line Diagram 480V Switchgear 1AB04

1-1805-S3-B04, Rev. 9 1X3D-AA-E06A, One Line Diagram 480V Switchgear 1BB06

1-1805-S3-B06, Rev. 7 1X3D-AA-E17A, One Line Diagram 480V Switchgear 1BB16

1-1805-S3-B16, Ver. 2.0

1X3D-AA-F19A, One Line Diagram 480V Motor Control Center 1BBA

1-1805-S3-BBA, Rev.16 1X3D-AA-F24A, One Line Diagram 480V Motor Control Center 1ABE

1-1805-S3-ABE, Rev. 26 1X3D-AA-F25A, One Line Diagram 480V Motor Control Center 1BBE

1-1805-S3-BBE, Rev.17 1X3D-AA-G01A, Main One Line Class 1E 125V DC and 120V Vital AC Systems, Rev. 10 1X3D-AA-G02C, 120V AC Class 1E Vital Instrument Distribution Panels

1-1807-03-V15 & V16, Ver. 14 1X3D-AA-H01A, One Line Diagram 125V DC Class 1E Distr Train A

1-1806-S3-DSA,

1-1806-S3-DCA, Rev. 15 1X3D-AA-H02A, Main One Line Class 1E 125V DC Class 1E Distribution Train B

1-1806-S3-DSB, Rev. 17

1X3D-AA-M04A, Unit 1 Load Center Transformer Data and Tap Settings, Ver. 6.0 1X3D-AA-M08A-15, Unit 1 Relaying Data, Ver. 2 1X3D-AA-M08A-32, Unit 1 Relaying Data, Rev. 1 1X3D-AA-M08A-33, Unit 1 Relaying Data, Rev. 2 1X3D-AA-M08A-39, Unit 1 Relaying Data, Rev. 1

1X3D-BA-D03E, Elementary Diagram Electrical System 4160V SWGR, 1BA03 P.T. Cubicle, Rev. 11 1X3D-BC-Q03Q, Elementary Diagram Main Steam & System 1PV-3000 & 1PV-3030, Rev. 9 1X3D-BC-Q03R, Elementary Diagram Main Steam & System 1PV-3010 & 1PV-3020, Rev. 12 1X3D-BC-Q03R, Elementary Diagram Main Steam & System 1PV-3010 & 1PV-3020, Rev. 9 1X3D-BD-B02A, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System 1HV-8000A, Rev. 7 1X3D-BD-B02B, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System 1HV-8000B, Rev. 8

1X3D-BD-B03F, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System 1PV-0456A, Rev. 9 1X3D-BD-B03H, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System 1HV-8000A, Rev. 9 1X3D-BD-D01C, Elementary Diagram Safety Injection System, Rev. 7 1X3D-BD-D01D, Elementary Diagram Safety Injection System, Rev. 8 1X3D-BD-D02L, Elementary Diagram Safety Injection System, Rev. 11

1X3D-BD-D03B, Elementary Diagram Safety Injection System, Rev. 7 1X3D-BD-E01A, Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System

1-1205-P6-001-M01, Rev. 10 1X3D-BD-E01B, Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System

1-1205-P6-002-M01, Rev. 10

1X4AF02-00032, Nuclear Service Cooling Water Pumps (Unit 1), Rev. 7 1X4AW05A-30002, Passive Strainer Interface Control RHR System, Ver. 1.0

61X4DB111, P &I Diagram Reactor Coolant System, Ver. 42 1X4DB112, P& I Diagram Reactor Coolant System, Ver. 42

1X4DB113, P &I Diagram RTD By-Pass Reactor Coolant, Ver. 27 1X4DB121, P & I Diagram, Safety Injection System, Ver. 42 1X4DB122, Residual Heat Removal System P&ID, Ver. 50 1X4DB133-1, NSCW P&ID, Ver. 52 1X4DB133-2, NSCW P&ID, Ver. 58 1X4DB134-1, NSCW P&ID, Ver. 31 1X4DB135-1, NSCW P&ID, Ver. 29

1X4DB135-2, NSCW P&ID, Ver. 34 1X4DB159-1, P & I Diagram Main Steam System, Ver. 37 1X4DB159-2, P & I Diagram Main Steam System, Ver. 32 1X4DB159-3, P & I Diagram Main Steam System, Ver. 35 1X5DT0130, Level Setting Diagram Containment Emergency Floor Drains Level Transmitters, Rev. 0 1X6AG02-00010, Stainless Steel Pump And Motor, Ver. 1 2X3D-AA-A01A, Main One Line Unit 2, Ver. 19 2X3D-AA-A01B, Main One Line Diagram Switching/Load Dispatching Only, Ver. 8 2X3D-AA-D02B, , One Line Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2AA02

2-1804-S3-A02, Rev. 5

2X3D-AA-D03A, , One Line Diagram 4160V Switchgear 2BA03

2-1804-S3-A03, Rev. 9 2X3D-AA-E04A, One Line Diagram 480V Switchgear 2AB04

2-1805-S3-B04, Rev. 5 2X3D-AA-E06A, One Line Diagram 480V Switchgear 2BB06

2-1805-S3-B06, Rev. 4 2X3D-AA-F24A, One Line Diagram 480V Motor Control Center 2ABE

2-1805-S3-ABE, Rev. 21 2X3D-AA-F25A, One Line Diagram 480V Motor Control Center 2BBE

2-1805-S3-BBE, Rev. 17

2X3D-AA-H01A, One Line Diagram 125V DC Class 1E Distr Train A

2-1806-S3-DSA,

2-1806-S3-DCA, Rev. 11 2X3D-AA-H02A, One Line Diagram 125V DC Class 1E Distr Train B

2-1806-S3-DSB,

2-1806-S3-DCB, Rev. 11 2X3D-BC-Q03Q, Elementary Diagram Main Steam & System 2PV-3000 & 2PV-3030, Rev. 7

2X3D-BD-B02A, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System 2HV-8000A, Rev. 7 2X3D-BD-B02B, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System 2HV-8000B, Rev. 4 2X3D-BD-B03F, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System 2PV-0456A, Rev. 6 2X3D-BD-B03H, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant System 2PV-0455A, Rev. 8 2X3D-BD-D01C, Elementary Diagram Safety Injection System, Rev. 5 2X3D-BD-D01D, Elementary Diagram Safety Injection System, Rev. 5 2X3D-BD-D03B, Elementary Diagram Safety Injection System, Rev. 6

2X3D-BD-E01A, Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System

2-1205-P6-001-M01, Rev. 10 2X3D-BD-E01B, Elementary Diagram Residual Heat Removal System

2-1205-P6-002-M01, Rev. 10 2X4AF02-00033, Nuclear Service Cooling Water Pumps (Unit 2), Rev. 5

2X4DB112, P& I Diagram Reactor Coolant System, Ver. 42 2X4DB121, P & I Diagram, Safety Injection System, Ver. 50 2X4DB122, Residual Heat Removal System P&ID, Ver. 52 2X4DB159-1, P & I Diagram Main Steam System, Ver. 37 2X4DB159-2, P & I Diagram Main Steam System, Ver. 31

2X4DB159-3, P & I Diagram Main Steam System, Ver. 36 2X6AG02-00010, Stainless Steel Pump And Motor, Ver. 1

234C8466, Passive Strainer Interface Control, Rev. 0 6069D07, Schematic Diagram Safeguards Driver Solid State Protection System, Rev. D

7038D04, Westinghouse WNES Monroeville, PA. Low Voltage Mental Enclosed 'AE' and 'GBE' 260V 3

PH 58.3 Hz Schemes, August 7, 1978 7243D07, Function Diagram Safeguard Actuation System, July 12,1973

Calculations

1X4AW05A-20017, Containment Sump Passive Strainer System, S0100 Hydraulic Sizing Report, Ver. 1.0 1X4DR008, Vogtle Electric Plant Unit 1 Station Blackout Analysis Report, Rev. 1 41-2870B, Seismic Analysis And Thermal Transient Certification Report Of The Power-Operated Relief Valve For Westinghouse Nuclear Technology Division Garrett Part

3750014, December 9, 1981 AX6AA04-00030, Precautions, Limitations & Setpoints For Nuclear Steam Supply Systems, Ver. 60

CN-CRA-97-30, SGTR Analysis To Provide Margin To Overfill For Vogtle While Allowing Operation With Only 3 ARVs, Rev. 1

CN-CRA-98-081, Vogtle SGTR Analysis With Revised Operator Action Assumptions, Rev. 0

DOEJ-SM-04-0140-001, RCP Seal Leak-Off Line Overpressure Review, Rev. 1

GP-16886, SGTR Reanalysis With Revised Operator Action Times, December 4, 1998

GP-6702, Overpressure Protection Report, January 14, 1983

REA 97-VAA149, NPSH Calculation for the Containment Sump, dated December 15, 1997

RER 2004-V0140, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1&2 Response to NRC Information

Notice 2003-19, RCP Seal Leak-Off Line Over Pressure, Rev. 0

SEC-OSE-2761-C0, Plant Vogtle SGTR Analysis, February 1, 1988

SEC-TSA-3379-C), Vogtle (GAE/GBE) Uprate/V5 LOFTTR2 SGTR Analysis, Rev.0

WCAP-10541, Supplemental Information to WOG Report, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal

Performance Following a Loss of All AC Power, Rev. 2 X3CA18, Vogtle Unit 1 Load Study, Rev. 8 X3CA25, Offsite Dynamic Analysis, Rev. 0 X3CA26, Protective Relaying Calculation, Ver. 8 X3CH01, 120 VAC Bus Loading, Ver. 6 X3CH02, 120V AC MCC Control Circuit Fuses - Degraded Voltage Effects, Rev. 4 X3CK03-C, Control Cable Sizing Details and Maximum Cable Lengths for Cutler-Hammer Freedom Series Starters, Rev. 1

X3CK08A, Class 1E DC Power Cable Sizing, Rev. 8 X4C1000U01, Differential Pressure Calculations, October 29, 1991 X4C1000U02, Valve Required Thrust/Torque And Operator Capabilities And Limitations For The Generic Letter 89-10 Scope MOVs, Rev. 15 X4C1202P05, NSCW NPSH Verification, Rev. 0

X4C1202S15, Analysis of NSCW system during one and three pump operation, Rev. 2 X4C1202S17, NSCW Temperatures Post LOCA, Ver. 2 X4C1202S26, Ultimate Heat Sink Analysis, Rev. 5 X4C1204T03, RWST Volume Distribution and Sizing, Ver. 5 X4C1204V01, Emergency Core Cooling Pumps Suction Line Losses and NPSH, Ver. 4

X4C1204V01, Emergency Core Cooling Pumps Suction Line Losses And NPSH, Ver. 5

8X4C1204V02, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Dimension And Calculation/Heating Loop Verification, December 22, 1981 X4C1000U01, Differential Pressure Calculations (for Valves), Ver. 18 X4C1000U02, Valve Required Thrust, Torque and Operator Capacities, Rev. 19 X4C1202V02, NSCW Cooling Tower Fan Performance after SBO, Ver. 4 X4C1202V08, NSCW/COPATTA-11 Input Data LOCA Design Case, Ver. 9 X4C1202V09, NSCW System Orifice Sizing, Ver.

7 X4C1202V54, Maximum Heat Sink Temperature (Post LOCA), Ver. 2 X4C1301V04, Main Steam Power Operated Atmospheric Relief Valves, January 20, 2009

X4C1532S01, Loss of HVAC - Control Building ESF Electrical Equipment Rooms, Ver. 2 X4C2108V01, Auxiliary Building HVAC Load Calculations for System 1551, 1553, 1555, 1561, Ver. 12 X4C2108V02, HVAC Equipment Sizing and Selection for System 1551, 1553, 1555, 1561, Ver. 4

X6CXC-39, Containment Minimum Flood Level Due to LOCA, Ver. 3.0

Corrective Action Documents

CR 2004244782,

RER 2004-V0140 determined applicability of

IN 2003-19 to Vogtle

CR 2007100247, Potentially unanalyzed scenarios for SBLOCA

CR 2007101820, 1PV3020 Tailpipe Temperatures Exceed 210F, February 17, 2007

CR 2007103387, Relief Valve Failed The As Found Acceptance Criteria, March 20, 2007

CR 2007107068, FSAR does not reflect changes in DCP

CR 2007107954, During Performance of 14701A-1 Reactor Trip Breaker Trip Open

CR 2007110826, Oil Samples Do Not Meet Manufacturer Limits, October 18, 2007

CR 2007112246, During walkdowns of various electrical equipment rooms I notice that several rooms are extremely hot. Having new Electronic inverters such as 1BD1I12

CR 2007200335, Action Item to Address

IN 06-29, Stem Nut Failure, 1/18/07

CR 2008100481, NSCW pump 2 in alert range on DP, 1/14/09

CR 2008102946, Minor Dry Boric Acid Residue Noted On 1HV-8000B, March 19, 2008

CR 2008103103, SIP Tripped While Being Used To Fill SI Accumulators IAW13105-1, March 22, 2008

CR 2008103815, Documentation Not Updated for Design Change That Replaced Transformers

CR 2008106920, Gas accumulation in Unit 2 RHR cold leg injection line

CR 2008107718, Battery room temperature 98.3 degrees

CR 2008108598, During Performance of 14701B-1, RTB did not close using the Push To Close Pushbutton

CR 2008108673, Oil Samples Exceeded The OEM's Recommended Limits, August 19, 2008

CR 2008111258, Dry Discolored Boron Noted At Body To Bonnet Area Of Valve

CR 200910978, Boric Acid found on RHR seal water line, 9/30/09

CR 2009101679, Two pms's will not meet schedule, 2/18/09

CR 2009103039, bearing site glass shows low oil and oil is leaking, 3/24/09

CR 2009103601, Evaluation of

NSAL-08-1 Rev. 1

CR 2009104301, On Indication Of Oil In The Sight Glass, April 30, 2009

CR 2009105999, Minor Boron Buildup in valve 1HV8923A packing, 6/22/09

CR 2009107019, NSCW Pumps 2 and 6 exceeded their MO hours, 7/22/09

CR 2009107454, Elevated Particle Count In The 5-50 Micron Range, August 3, 2009

CR 2009108077, Lubrication of Valve Stems of 211V8804, 8/21/09

9CR

2009109602, Boric Acid Residue in packing area of 211V8804, 9/30/09

CR 2010101529, Sump level value in 19013-C not changed after modification

CR 2010104088, Failure of Interlock test for 211V8804, 3/25/10

CR 2010104312, SIP 2B Discharge Pressure And Flow Initially Spike, March 29, 2010

CR 2010106620, PdM Finding: The latest sample of the unit 2 RHR Bravo, upper motor bearing showed ferrous cont ACD

CR2006111774, NSCW Pump Unexpectedly Tripped during ESFAS testing, Ver. 1 ACD

CR2008100361, NSCW Pump Failed to meet IST requirement Pump 11202P4007, Undated

ACD

CR2008103787, NSCW Transfer Pump Trip resulting in system functional failure, Ver.3 ACD

CR2009100496, NSCW functional failure due to Pump 11202P4006M01) Vibration, Ver. 1 ACD

CR2009105577, NSCW functional failure due to exceeding response time, 6/10/09 ACD

CR2009111224, Apparent Cause Report for tripping while shifting NSCW Pump, Ver. 1

AI 2010200911, NSCW Motor Cooling Water Line Freezing, 2/11/10

AI 2010201243, Evaluate if adequate cooling would be available for NSCW pump from air temperature, 3/8/10,

AI 2010201342, No Motor Cooling Water During NSCW Pump Swap, 3/08/10 OD 1-07-003, Operability Determination Excess Pressure at Sump Isolation Valve, Rev. 1

Work Orders

WO 10000197, Valve 2HV8802 Viper Test, 9/26/00

WO 10000786, Valve 2HV8802 Viper Test,

2/11/00

WO 1010178300, Calibrate 1BA0301 & 05 Breaker, October 16, 2003

WO 1020237800, Calibrate 1BA0309, September 29, 2003

WO 1020239900, Clean / Inspect / Tighten 480V Switchgear 1BB16, August 30, 2002

WO 1040082101, RHR Pump Motor Relay Calibration Train A, February 24, 2005

WO 1053736901, Westinghouse Type

DS-416 Circuit Breaker Maintenance, September 26, 2007

WO 1061048501, PM for RHR Pump Motor Breaker Train B, February 12, 2007

WO 1061048601, PM for RHR Pump Motor Breaker Train A, February 15, 2007

WO 1062083601, Westinghouse Type

DS-416 Refurbishment PM, April 11, 2010

WO 1070184201, Pressure Switch Calibration, June 6, 2007

WO 1070228201, Reactor Trip Breaker Train B UV and Shunt trip Test, May 27, 2007

WO 1070461501, Westinghouse Type

DS-416 Circuit Breaker Maintenance Train B, March 21, 2008

WO 1070461601, Westinghouse Type

DS-416 Circuit Breaker Maintenance Train A, March 21, 2008

WO 1070496801, RHR Pump A Motor Megger Test, July 25, 2009

WO 1070725501, Reactor Trip Breaker Train A UV and Shunt trip Test, July 22, 2007

WO 1070837901, Westinghouse Type

DS-416 Circuit Breaker Maintenance Train A, February

27, 2008

WO 1070846201, Safety Features Sequencer Train A Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, March 27, 2008

WO 1070846301, Safety Features Sequencer Train B Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, April 8, 2008

WO 1070924001, Vital Inverter 1BD1I12 Periodic Maintenance and Calibration, April 3, 2008

WO 1070924201, Emergency Inc Breaker (from RAT 1NXRA), April 11, 2008

10WO

1070970001, Calibrate 1BA0301, April 12, 2008

WO 1070978701, Calibrate 1BA0309, April 9, 2008

WO 1070983201, Reactor Trip Breaker Train B UV and Shunt trip Test, September 23, 2007

WO 1071011601, Vital Inverter 1BD1I12 Periodic Maintenance and Calibration, April 4, 2008

WO 1071129901, RHR Pump A Motor Clean/Inspect, February 1, 2008

WO 1071130001, RHR Pump B Motor Clean/Inspect, March1, 2008

WO 1071278301, Reactor Trip Breaker Train A UV and Shunt trip Test, November 20, 2009

WO 1071686101, Reactor Trip Breaker Train B UV and Shunt trip Test, January 6, 2008

WO 1080049101. NSCW Transfer Pump #7

WO 1080061801, Reactor Trip Breaker Train B UV and Shunt trip Test, April 24, 2008

WO 1080445801, Reactor Trip Breaker Train A UV and Shunt trip Test, February 28, 2008

WO 1080681301, Reactor Trip Breaker Train B UV and Shunt trip Test, August 16, 2008

WO 1080725701, Reactor Trip Breaker Train A UV and Shunt trip Test, June 22, 2008

WO 1080889601, RHR Pump B Motor Clean/Inspect, September 26, 2009

WO 1081010401, Westinghouse Type

DS-416 Circuit Breaker Maintenance Train B, September 21, 2009

WO 1081010501, Westinghouse Type

DS-416 Circuit Breaker Maintenance Train A, September 21, 2009

WO 1081199901, Reactor Trip Breaker Train A UV and Shunt trip Test, October 12, 2008

WO 1081349501, RHR Pump A Motor Clean/Inspect, August 25, 2009

WO 1081369301, Hydraulic Oil Sampling And Level Check, August 20, 2009

WO 1081457101, Reactor Trip Breaker Train B UV and Shunt trip Test, December 4, 2008

WO 1081784601, Reactor Trip Breaker Train A UV and Shunt trip Test, February 6, 2009

WO 1082027901, Reactor Trip Breaker Train B UV and Shunt trip Test, March 26, 2009

WO 1082056501, Westinghouse Type

DS-416 Circuit Breaker Maintenance, October 12, 2009

WO 1082068401, Safety Features Sequencer Train B Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, October 1, 2009

WO 1082068501, Safety Features Sequencer Train A Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, September 22, 2009

WO 1090328901, Reactor Trip Breaker Train A UV and Shunt trip Test, June 7, 2009

WO 1090461101, Quarterly IST Test NSCW Pump 6 Train B, 4/06/09

WO 1090463701, Quarterly IST Test NSCW Pump 2 Train B, 5/29/09

WO 1090474501, Rework Leaking PORV, November 9, 2009

WO 1090591101, Reactor Trip Breaker Train B UV and Shunt trip Test, July 16, 2009

WO 1090664801, Quarterly IST Test NSCW Pump 6 Train B, 5/03/09

WO 1090786001, Clean Hydraulic Oil Residue, October 16, 2009

WO 1090821601, Quarterly IST Test NSCW Pump 6 Train B, 5/31/09

WO 1091117401, Quarterly IST Test NSCW Pump 2 Train B, 8/27/09

WO 1091121301, Reactor Trip Breaker Train A UV and Shunt trip Test, September 11, 2009

WO 1091367701, Quarterly IST Test NSCW Pump 6 Train B, 8/27/09

WO 1091384101, Reactor Trip Breaker Train B UV and Shunt trip Test, November 8, 2009

WO 1091662401, Reactor Trip Breaker Train A UV and Shunt trip Test, September 28, 2009

WO 1091669901, Quarterly IST Test NSCW Pump 2 Train B, 11/15/09

WO 1091883501, Reactor Trip Breaker Train A UV and Shunt trip Test, January 25, 2010

WO 1091949001, Reactor Trip Breaker Train B UV and Shunt trip Test, February 22, 2010

WO 1092050701, Quarterly IST Test NSCW Pump 2 Train B, 2/08/10

WO 1092053801, Safety Features Sequencer Train B Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, February 3, 2010

11WO

1092053901, Safety Features Sequencer Train A Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, February 17, 2010

WO 1100289201, Reactor Trip Breaker Train A UV and Shunt trip Test, April 25, 2010

WO 1100436801, Safety Features Sequencer Train B Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, April 30, 2010

WO 1100492901, Safety Features Sequencer Train A Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, May 12, 2010

WO 2052092801, Reactor Trip Breaker Maintenance, September 9, 2007

WO 2054213501, PM for RHR Pump Motor Breaker Train A, May 30, 2006

WO 2061338101, Reactor Trip Breaker Maintenance, March 25, 2007

WO 2070047201, PM for RHR Pump Motor Breaker Train B, August 28, 2007

WO 2071388901, Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Maintenance, September 7, 2008

WO 2071535001, RHR Pump B Motor Clean/Inspect, September 3, 2008

WO 2071535401, RHR Pump A Motor Clean/Inspect, August 2, 2008

WO 2071925001, Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker Maintenance Spare, September 6, 2008

WO 2080079701, Safety Features Sequencer Train B Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, October 7, 2008

WO 2080092901, Westinghouse Type

DS-416 Circuit Breaker Maintenance Train B, July 18, 2008

WO 2080112401, Safety Features Sequencer Train A Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, September 21, 2008

WO 2081092401, Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve Control 2P-3010 Channel Calibration, August 11, 2009

WO 2081551301, Pressure Switch Calibration, May 7, 2009

WO 2090198301, Main Steam SG 3 Atmospheric Relief - Drag Globe Valve Maintenance, May 13, 2010

WO 2090234001, Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Removal And Installation, April 27, 2010

WO 2090280701, 2HV8802A-MO Valve IST, 4/17/10

WO 2090692101, RHR Pump B Motor Clean/Inspect, January 4, 2010

WO 2090707501, RHR Pump B Motor Clean/Inspect, January 14, 2010

WO 2090708001, RHR Pump A Motor Clean/Inspect, February 15, 2010

WO 2090728901, RHR Pump A Motor Clean/Inspect, March 20, 2010

WO 2091138201, Safety Features Sequencer Train B Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, March 21, 2010

WO 2091339201, Safety Features Sequencer Train A Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, March 9, 2010

WO 2091677301, Safety Features Sequencer Train B Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, December 8, 2009

WO 2091954001, Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve Control 2P-3000 Channel Calibration, May 1, 2010

WO 2092059601, Safety Features Sequencer Train A Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, February 18, 2010

WO 2092191301, Safety Features Sequencer Train B Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, March 21, 2010

WO 2100496101, Safety Features Sequencer Train A Channel Operational Test and Channel Calibration, May 14, 2010

WO

C049614001, Determine applicability to Vogtle units and Farley units to

IN 2003-19, dated

December 9, 2004

2 Design Change Packages

DCP 92-V1N0138, Motor Operated Valve Setpoint Document, Rev. 0

DCP 98-V1N0061, PORV 1PV-455A Setpoint Change, December 4, 2000

DCP 02-VAN0017, Inverter 1BD1I12 Functional Test, June 15, 2007

DCR 92-VAN0203, 1805, Class 1E 4160-480V Transformers for Switchgear 1/2-1805-S3-B04, B05 B06, B07, B15, and B16, Rev. 0

MDC 1053596901,1BB16X Replacement, Ver. 1

MDC 99-VAM013, Install Optional Sight Glass On ARV, Rev. 0

Training Procedures

V-RQ-JP-18038-007, Plant Vogtle Job Performance Measure for 18038-1/2, Attachment H,

Rev. 26.2 V-RQ-JP-18038-016, Plant Vogtle Job Performance Measure for 19030-C and 18038-1/2,

Attachment E, Rev. 29/22 V-RQ-JP-19100-006, Plant Vogtle Job Performance Measure for 19100-C, Attachment G, Rev.

33.2 V-RQ-JP-19011-001, Plant Vogtle Job Performance Measure for 19011-C, Attachment C, Rev.

26.2 V-RQ-JP-19211-003, Plant Vogtle Job Performance Measure for 19211-C, Step 8, Rev. 20

Operator Work-Arounds

0-082-OWA-2009-0095, Starting Two RHR Pumps on One Unit 1/2 4KV Shutdown Board 0-057-OWA-2009-0113, Implementation of the Safe Shutdown Instructions during an Appendix R Event.

Miscellaneous

1X3AC02-20103, Transformer Test Report 1BB16X - 1LUB - DS7257500, Ver. 1.0

1X4AF02-00093, NSCW Pump and Valve Manuals, 2/10/98 1X6AA06-0043, Manually Operated, Motor Operated and Swing Check Valve Operating Manual, Rev. 8 1X6AA06-00235-1, Installation, Operating, And Maintenance Instruction For Crosby Style Safety Relief Valves, February 18, 1998 1X6AA06-00239, Instruction Manual For Installation, Operation, And Maintenance Of VELAN Motor Operated Bolted Bonnet Gate, Globe, Stop Check Valves, December 8,1997 1X6AA06-0431, Instl/Oper/Maint Manual-MT, MNL, Swing Check Valves, Rev. 3 1X6AG02-00016, Instruction Manual For Pacific Pumps Safety Injection Pumps, September 30, 2008 25-LA-0005, Technical Service Report "Lube Oil Analysis", Rev. 0 2X6AA00-00564-2, NSSS Control System Setpoint Study, April 1, 1989 2X6AA06-0043, Manually Operated, Motor Operated and Swing Check Valve Operating Manual, Rev. 6

2X6AA06-00235-1, Installation, Operating, And Maintenance Instruction For Crosby Style Safety Relief Valves, September 18, 1989

132X6AA06-00240, Instruction Manual For Installation, Operation, And Maintenance Of VELAN Motor Operated Bolted Bonnet Gate, Globe, Stop Check Valves, December 5,1998 2X6AA06-00580-6, Operation Maintenance Instructions for Solenoid Power Operated Relief Valve, Rev. 6 2X6AG02-00016, Pump Instruction Manual Addendum, October 21, 2008 2XCAA06-00431, Manually Operated, Motor Operated and Swing Check Valve Instructional Manual, Rev. 6 33-51903-QSA, 5 KV, 350 MVA Switchgear Class 1E Electrical Equipment Environmental Qualification Report, Rev. 3

9002-SSPS-008, Technical Manual Solid State Protection System, March 1983 AX3AC02-00547, Instructions Type

AKD-6 Low Voltage Switchgear

GEK-72101 8-77, Rev. 3 AX3A002B-20016,

ABB 480V Breakers Installation & Maintenance Manual, Ver. 3.0

AX3AC02B-20017, ANSI Qualification Report - ABB RMAX Circuit Breaker, Ver. 1.0

AX3AC02B-20018, ABB RMAX 480V Circuit Breaker KEMA Test Report 04036-A, Ver. 1.0

AX3AC02-20020, Class 1E Load Center Transformer Instruction Manual, Rev. 2 AX5AC13-00088, Instruction Manual for Paul Munroe Valve Operator, Ver. 11 AX6AF02-20030, RHR Pump and Motor Vender Manuals, Ver.17 AX6AT01-10005-2, Maintenance Program Manual for Safety Related Type DS Breaker for Low

Voltage Metal Enclosed Switchgear, November 4, 1999

AXGAA04-0030-2, Precautions, Limitation And Setpoints For Nuclear Steam Supply Systems, Rev. 4

C051139301, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Solid State Protection System Long Range Plan, Rev. 0

C091486901, Inservice Testing Procedure Review For Pump Performance, Rev. 0

E-EPS-2374, Reactor Trip Switchgear (Type DS) Description of Operation, May 5, 1977

ELV-02088, Response To Generic Letter 90-03, September 28, 1990 Gen-92, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Maintenance Rule Scoping Manual, Rev. 5 GP13800, Westinghouse Response To NRC Bulletin 88-04, September 9, 1988

GP-18605, Westinghouse Review Of Vogtle Pump Performance Acceptance Criteria And Associated Procedures, January 18, 2010

HVA-94, Response To Bulletin 88-04 Safety-Related Pump Loss, October 25, 1988 I.L.41-100E, Type CO (HI Lo) Overcurrent Relay, April, 1980

LTR-SEE-07-20, Trapped Gas Analysis Results in RHR Systems, dated July 19, 2007

LTR-SEE-IV-10-76, Qualigfaction of the Motor and Bearing Sight Glasses on the RHR Pumps at Vogtle, dated July 22, 2010

NSAL-08-1, Oil Sight Gauge (772A760H06) on Safety-Related Motors, Rev. 1

REA 98-VAA602,

IN 97-90 Pump IST Minimum Performance, 11/20/98 RER2053083601, HP Requests A Cover Be Installed Over The Inboard Mechanical Seal Housings, December 31, 2005 RER Response Form

C091486901, In-service Testing Procedure Review for Pump Performance,

Seq. 2

SG-12588, ECCS Surveillance Venting Deficiency, July 1, 1993

SG-12588, ECCS Surveillance Venting Deficiency, July 1, 1993 System Health Reports, Main Steam System, 1st Qtr 2007 to 1st Qtr 2010 System Health Report, Reactor Coolant System, 1st Qtr 2007 to 4th Qtr 2009 System Health Report, Safety Injection System, 1st Qtr 2007 to 1st Qtr 2010 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Power Options, Rev. 0

14WCAP-13117, Vogtle Electric Generating Plants Units 1 And 2 Nuclear Steam Supply System Rerating Engineering Report, October 1993

WCAP-16613-P, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Measurement Uncertainty Recapture Power Uprate Program Engineering Report, Rev. 2 Westinghouse Letter

GP-18505, Westinghouse Review of Pump Performance Acceptance Criteria and Associated Procedures, 1/14/10 X4AF02,

Specification for Nuclear Service Cooling Water Pumps and Transfer Pumps, Rev. 13

Corrective Action documents initiated due to CDBI activity:

CR 2010107935, Temporary rigging chain hanging near ARV seismic concern

CR 2010107936, Personnel safety concern for removed insulation near ladder

CR 2010107937, Minimum oil level not consistently marked on ARV oil sight glasses

CR 2010107938, Metal file left unattended above ARV hand pump station

CR 2010107957, Impedance value for transformer 1BB16X in calculation X3CA18

CR 2010107972, Unattended vacuum cleaner near ARVs

CR 2010107994, Maintenance Rule Scoping Manual revision needed for Main Steam

CR 2010108163, Error in calculation X3CF02 1DD1B initial battery voltage on Sheet 65

CR 2010108264, NSCW PID discrepancy of physical arrangement

CR 2010108365, Discrepancy in submergence depth used in sump strainer vortex analysis

CR 2010108462, Tape hanging from table trays potentially combustible

CR 2010108464, 2HV8813 has hardened grease just above packing follower

CR 2010108465, 2HV8920 has small amount of white residue at stem to packing interface

CR 2010108467, Grating for room drain in 2A SI pump room is dislodged

CR 2010108468, Top of ladder inside 2A SI pump room needs swing gate removed

CR 2010108469, Lighting inside 1A SI pump room is poor

CR 2010108491, Long term plans for life expectancy of DG sequencer relays

CR 2010108536, Procedure enhancement to monitor NSCW basin level post-LOCA

CR 2010108554, Loose metal band clamp inside 1B RHR pump contaminated area

CR 2010108555, Dry boric acid residue on pipe cap for valve 11205X4004

CR 2010108558, Grating not properly placed on mezzanine of 1B RHR pump room

CR 2010108559, Ladders on mezzanine of Unit 1 RHR pump rooms do not have swing gates

CR 2010108563, Boric acid residue on pressure plate and yoke of valve

1-1205-U4-226

CR 2010108565, Lighting is poor in 1A RHR pump room

CR 2010108629, Chain bags hanging from hoists in SI pump rooms

CR 2010108632, Calculation X4C1202V02 reflects exceeding NSCW pump design temperature

CR 2010108673, Calculation X3CK03-C did not consider fuse or contact resisitance

CR 2010108674,

NMP-SH-002, "Heat Stress" does not address emergency conditions

CR 2010108677, Weakness in 1HV08813 MOV capability calculation

CR 2010108983, Discrepancies in calculation X4C1205V04

CR 2010109008, Questions regarding sump level used in 19013-C Step 2

CR 2010109021, Rounds procedure does not specify minimum ARV oil level

CR 2010019034, Material conditions in 1A RHR pump room

CR 2010109035, Loose screws on top of 1HV8804A

CR 2010109036, White residue on support below piping downstream of

1-1205-X4-140

CR 2010109057, Oil quality in ARV actuator system

CR 2010109058, ARV procedures do not address changing actuator and hand pump filters

CR 2010109077, Typographical error in attachment 3 of 26871-C

15CR

2010109085, Procedure 27761-C step 4.1.2.10 acceptance criteria discrepancy

CR 2010109102, Boric acid residue on

1-1205-X4-053

CR 2010109103, Criteria for replacing fluid in ARVs not documented

CR 2010109104, Basis for declaring ARVs operable in

CR 2009104301 not clear

CR 2010109130, Longer headset cords for ARV operators to minimize heat stress

CR 2010109178, Non-conservatively high thermal overload settings on AC motors

CR 2010109181, DCP and LDCR procedures do not reflect 10

CFR 50.71(e)(4) requirements

CR 2010109182, Broadness review of seismic concerns regarding chains from lifting devices

CR 2010109188, Seismic qualification of RHR pump and motor oil sight glasses

CR 2010109194, Thermal protection settings of AC motors may allow insulation damage

CR 2010109237, Weaknesses in calculation X4C1000U2