ML19332D379
| ML19332D379 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000605 |
| Issue date: | 11/27/1989 |
| From: | Marriott P GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Chris Miller NRC, NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| MFN-093-89, MFN-93-89, NUDOCS 8912010101 | |
| Download: ML19332D379 (88) | |
Text
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November 27,1989 MFN No.093-89 Docket No. STN 50 605
- Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Charles L Miller, Director Standardization and Non Power Reactor Project Directorate
Subject:
Submittal of Responses to Additional Information as Requested in NRC IA tier from Dino C. Scaletti, Dated May 16,1989
Reference:
Submittal of Proprietary Section of Responses to Additional Information as Requested in NRC Letter from Dino C. Scaletti, Dated May 16,1989,.MFN No. 094-89, dated November 27,1989 i
Dear Mr. Miller:
i l Enclosed are thirty four (34) copies of the completed Chapter 8 responses to the subject Request ! for Additional Information (RAI; on the Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR) for the Ad-I vanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR). In order to help facilitate your review, the entire set of L Chapter 8 questions and associated responses is included in this transmittal. This includes the i responses that have been sent previously (July 13, Aug. 2 and 23), which have been duplicated here l for ycur convenience. l Please note that Table 1, Equipment Database, and Figures 8.31 through 8.3 8 contain information that is designated as General Electric Company proprietary information. This information is being submitted under separate cover (referenced above). It is intended that GE will amend the SSAR with these responses in a future amendment. Sincerely,
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f/ @ r $ P. W Marriott, Manager Licensing and Consulting Sen* ices WT *M
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ADOCK 05000605 eDe iMp
i i l' 1 QUESTION 435.001 The scope of the electrical systems that t'. intends to provide under the ABWR design is poorly defined. In sections 1.2.2.5.1.1 and 8.1.2.1 a brief description of the Unit Auxiliary Pow r System is provided that j states that this system supplies power to ut. t loads that are non safety i related and uses the main generator as the no.zal power source with the i reserve auxiliary transformers as a backup source. It is not clear however whether this system will be provided under the ABWR design. No detailed description or single line diagrams of this system, the main j generator, are provided. unit auxiliary transformer, or reserve auxiliary transformers Nor is this system identified as being outside the ABWR ,
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design with appropriate laterface requirements provided. The staff ' requires that a clear distinction be made between the electrical systems l that will be provided under the scope of the ABWR standard design and those that will be provided by others. This is necessary so that the ' staff can judge the completeness and adequacy of the electrical systems within the ABWR design and the completeness and adequacy of the ; interface requirements to those systems outside the ABWR design scope. Please provide this information, !
RESPONSE
435.001 The scope of the ABVR design for the electrical systems has been increased since the submittal of Chapter 8. The interface is now at the ;
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low voltage terminals of the main power transformer and the connection ' at the high voltage bushings of the reserve transformer, as indicated on the revised one.line diagram, Figure 8.3 1 (attached). The main transformer is not in scope. The reserve transformer and the combustion turbine generator (CTC) are within scope. The electrical design within ' these interfaces will be provided as part of the ABWR design. Section 8.1.2.1 has been revised to include a more detailed interface definition (see attached). '
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QUESTION , 435.002 The ABWR SSAR does not address how the ABWR will cope with a station p blackout event. The station blackout rule, 10 CFR 50.63, which became eifective July 21, 1988, requires that each light. water. cooled nuclear power plant licensed to opert.te must be able to withstand for a specified duration and recover from a station blackout (loss of all alternating current power). Please provide details on the design ! aspects of ABWR systems and equipment that will be used to cope with a station blackout. In particular address the capabilities of the de power systems to cope with a station blackout, the loading and endurance of the batteries used to cope with a station blackout, and the capabilities of any alternate ac (AAC) power sources used to cope with a ' station blackout. Identify any interface requirement needed on the offsite power system or other systems in order to support the station blackout design criteria. Additional information and guidance on station blackout can be found in Regulatory Guide 1.155 and NUMARC.8700.
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i RESPONSE l 435.002 ; The ABWR blackout. the station plant design has the capability to maintain core cooling during i I Upon loss of AC off. site and on. site power, the RCIC system will be !
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initiatedpool. storage and provides water to the reactor vessel from the condensate, ( to provide coreThe condensate cooling to the reactor storagevessel. pool has sufficient water capacity The suppression pool is 1 another water source which can be used during the station blackout if ; the condensate storage pool becomes low. ; i The RCIC system and 5 safety relief valves (SRVs) derive their power from the Division I DC bus, which is capable of delivering 4000 ampere hours. These will support RCIC equipment for a minimum of eight hours. An alternate AC (AAC) power source is available from an on.sitd
- combustion turbine generator (CTC), should all other power sources fail. J However, the plant is capable of coping with a station blackout without the need for the CTC. The design bases and description of the CTC is !
provided in Section 9.5.12. t Station blackout performance is discussed in detail in Section 19E.2.1.2.2. [ QUESTION 435.003 I Section 8.1.2.1 of the ABWR SSAR states that the transfer of the Class ; 1E buses to the alternate preferred power source is a manual transfer. This seems to contradict sections 3.1.2.2.9.2.1 and 3.1.2.2.9.2.2 which ;
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indicate that the transfer is automatic. Please clarity, and if the ' transfer is automatic provide details on the type of transfer (slow, fast, make.before. break, etc.), the signals used to initiate transfer, , and how the transfer.is accomplished.
RESPONSE
435.003 Section 3.1.2.2.9.2 has been revised to reference Chapter 8. The l transfer from the normal preferred to the alternate preferred power source is manual.
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QUESTION 435.004 (a) In section 8.2.3 of the ABWR SSAR one of the Nuclear Island interfaces identified is four 6.9 kV feeders to four transformers powering ten RIP pumps. However figure 8.3 1 and figure 8.3 2 show motor pumps. generator sets between two of the 6.9 kV feeders and the RIP Please clarify whether the motor generator sets will be used in l
the ABWR design and if so, describe their function. ' (b) Also, with regard to the same subject, section 15.3.1.1.1 states that since four buses are used to supply power to the RIPS, the worst single failure can only cause three RIPS to trip, and the frequency of occurrence of this event is estimated to be less than 0.001 per year. Further down in this same section a statement is made that the probability of additional RIP trips is low (less than .000001 per year). Justify these figures in light of the fact that historically, a total loss of offsite power occurs about once per 10 site years (NUREC/CR.3992). Also, has the effect of a fault on the common feeder
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upstr:am of the 6.9 kV fosders be:n etnsidered with'rcspset to th2 coastdown capability of the RIPS and motor generator sets (braking effect)? RESPONSE ^ 435.004 (a) Motor generator sets are used in the ASWR design. Their primary function is to provide additional mechanical inertia to extend the coastdown time of the connected RIPS during a bus failure transient. With the adoption of motor. generator set design, the probability of having an all RIPS trip is virtually eliminated. (b) A RIP reliability analysis will be submitted as Appendix 15.C to Chapter 15 of the SSAR. This analysis estimates the probability that exactly 1, 2, ... 10 out of ten RIPS will trip. The results are shown in the following:
# OF PUMPS TRIFPED PROBABILITY 1 ................ 5.57E.3 2 ................ 1.07E.4 3 ................ 1.64E.3 4 ................ 6.44E.6 l- 5 ................ 4.36E-5 1
6 ................ 6.37E.7 7 ................ 1.41E 7 8 ............... <<1.00E.6 9 ............... <<1.00E.6 i 10 ............... <<1.00E.6 This analysis includes the effect of a fault on the common feeder upstream of the 6.9 kV feeders. However, the effect of a total loss of offsite power is not included. This is because the reactor system response to a total loss of offsite power is more than a trip of RIPS. For example, a load rejection followed by a reactor scram will be initiated after a loss of offsite power. The complete discussion of the loss of offsite power event is contained in Subsection 15.2.6. A new analysis for Subsection 15.2.6 will be submitted to include the affect of M/G sets. QUESTION 435.005 (a) Section 8.2.3 identifies the nominal voltage and number of feeders interfacing between the Nuclear Island and remainder of plant power systems; but they do not specify any interface requirements such as voltage and frequency tolerances, available fault current, loading, availability, etc., that are necessary to completely define the required interfaces. Please provide the information. (b) You also need to provide additional information on the power sources (Unit Transformer, Startup Transformer, etc.) and the way they are , configured to provide power to the RIP pumps in order to support the availabilities claimed for these power sources in section 15.3.1, We suggest a one line diagram similar to that which you provided in your presentation to the staff on September 14, 1988, be included in the ABWR SSAR to better define this interface. ,
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l RESPONSE ' 435.005 (a) Section 8.2.3 has been revised to provide the updated interface ! definition. A copy of the mark up is provided in the attachment. (b) The Electrical System Oneline has been revised (per attached) to i provide additional information on the power sources (Main Transformer, j Auxiliary Transformers, etc.) and the way they are configured to provide i power to the RIP pumps in order to support the abilities claimed for i these power sources in Section 15.3.1. : 1
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435.006 Section 8.3.1.1.4.1 and Figure 8.3 4 briefly describe the 120 VAC ' Safety.Related Instrument Power System. This is interruptible power ; backed up by the divisional diesel generators. Please identify the major loads and type of instrument loads fed by this system. '
RESPONSE
435.006 leads with sufficiently important functions to warrant providing power to them during the time that there is no offsite power available are on these buses. They are loads which may have their power interrupted without unacceptable consequences for the time that it takes to restore power from the diesels. A complete load list (Table 1) is attached, which .is current as of Septembe r, 1989. There will be some shuffling of individual loads as the detail design progresses. The specific loads which will eventually be on the instrument power system buses have not been identified yet. They.are presently included in the loads on the uninterruptible buses, They will be separated from the other loads during the detail design phase of the plant. QUESTION 435.007 Section 8.3.1.1.4.2.2 and Figure 8.3 6 briefly describe the Class 1E RPS Power Supply. They show a rectifier and inverter fed from the 480 VAC Class 1E power system which is backed up by the 125 VDC power system. They do not however show an independent electrical protection assembly (EPA) on the output of the RPS power supply. Redundant EPAs were required (September 24, 1980 letter to all operating BWRs) on the output of past non Class 1E RPS power supplies in order to satisfy the single i failure criteria for non. fail. safe type failures (undervoltage, ! overvoltage, underfrequency). Because a Class 1E RPS power supply is used on the ABWR, redundant EPAs are not required since failure of the Class 1E supply is the first random failure taken. However, because that failure could be a non. fail. safe type failure that could result in loss of the scram function, at least one independent EPA should be monitoring the output of the RPS power supply. (a) Please describe the type of EPA that will be used and discuss its independence from the RPS power supply. (b) Also provide the voltage and frequency setpoints and tolerances that will be used on the EPA.
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RESPONSE-
'435.007 Electrical protection assemblies (EPAs), of the type similar to those j used for previous BWR RPS designs (e.g., the type that disconnected the i
scram solenoid loads and other RPS circuits from power when voltage ! and/or frequency of the power source were 'outside' of the normal i ranges assigned as Class 1E voltage and frequency limits or were
'outside* of the voltage and frequency limits for which the scram solenoids, or any other safety related equipment receiving power from l
the RPS power supplies, were qualified to operate continuously and i without degradation), will not be used for the ABWR. Because of special design features of the Class 1E 120 VAC constant voltage, constant frequency (CVCF), uninterruptible power supply (UPS) ansemblies used by the ABWR for the four divisional power sources, j separate, independent EPAs are not required. Several independent protection functions are included in the total CVCF ! power supply design which preclude the possibility of any "non fail-safe' type single failure which could cause potentially destructive voltages or frequencies to exist for a period of time j sufficient to compromise the correct. operation of the scram solenoid j loads,' or any other loads of the CVCF power supply, to the extent that j loss of the scram function would result. Four separate Class 1E CVCF power supply assemblies provide the four i ' divisions of safety related equipment with vital 120 VAC power. Each ' CVCF is designed to supply uninterruptible AC power to the
safety-related loads. Each CVCF consists of a 3. phase 480 VAC to 125 l
'VDC rectifier, a 125 VDC to 120 VAC inverter with both voltage and frequency regulation and protection features, and a 480 VAC to 120 VAC transformer for standby AC power. Each CVCF has internal oscillators l
used to maintain the output frequency of the inverter within acceptable ( limits. Voltage, current and frequency monitoring equipment is included in the CVCF design. Automatic protective control equipment ; designed to initiate automatic power transfer or power switching operations when the CVCF output voltage or frequency is determined to ' be 'outside" of an acceptable range is also provided. Thyristor
- switches are used to provide power switching without momentary interruption of the power supplied to the loads of the CVCF. All such ,
t functions provided by the total CVCF assemblies assure that the output voltage and frequency of the CVCF is maintained within the limits to which the safety related loads have been designed and qualified to operate, even when subjected to a single failure of any one of these ' safety related features. Three power sources are supplied for each CVCF, i.e., a Class 1E 480V i normal input AC power supply, a Class 1E 125V DC power supply and a Class 1E 480V standby AC power supply. Required acceptable range of - fluctuation of Class 1E AC input voltage is +10%, -15%, with short time fluctuation of +10%, 25%. Required aceptable range of short time frequency fluctuation for Class IE AC input power is +5%, -5%. For DC power input, the acceptable range of voltage fluctuation is +10%, 20%, with short term fluctuations of +201, 20%. For these ranges of input power source fluctuations, the CVCFs are designed to maintain the nominal output voltage of the CVCF to 120 VAC +/ 2% (117.6 to 122.4 VAC) and the nominal output frequency to 60 hz +/ 2% (58.8 to 61.2 bz).
'All Class 1E equipment, including the solenoid operated scram pilot 1 valves of the hydraulic control units (HCUs) of the control rod drive 1
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I i syst c, ch:uld be qualified to operate continuously and without ! degradation at the extremes of the general power supply voltage range. ! For_ Class 1E equipment supplied with nominal 120 VAC powr, the safety related equipment should be capable of continuous operation at ) the extremes of voltage, i.e., 120 VAC +101 (132 i VAC) and 120 VAC -15% - (102 VAC), and at the extremes of the general power supply frequency, i.e., l 60 hz +5% (63 bz) and 60 hs 51 (57 ha), and for some defined > short period of time should be' capable of operation without degradation at_a voltage level of 120 VAC -2$1 (90 VAC). Note that operation at i the lower voltr.ge levels does not preclude the safety function from resulting. The equipment should be qualified such that failure to
-i function after operation under the indicated extremos of voltages and !
frequencies will not be a consequence of such operating conditions. ; Voltage drop from voltage source to equipment loads should also_be considered when establishing the lower voltage extremes for the Class ! IE equipment. t
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w Under normal conditions (when both the normal !nput AC power condition and the standby AC power condition are within specified ranges), the input power source to the CVCF shall be the normal AC power supply and the CVCF shall be run such that the inverter output of the CVCF is j synchronized with the standby AC power supply. However, if the frequency of the standby AC power supply is found to be outside of the , range of 60 bz +/ 2% (i.e., >61.2 hz or <58.8 bz), then the frequency ' of the inverter output is switched such as to be'in synchronization with an internal oscillator installed within the CVCF. If the standby AC power frequency returns to be within 60 hz +/ 21 for 60 seconds or longer, then the inverter output switches back such that it is again in i synchronization with the standby AC power supply. During the period of time that the inverter output is synchronized to the internal 1 oscillator, the CVCF output frequency is regulated to be within the range of 60 bz +/11 if the CVCF is operating normally with the normal AC power input. If the CVCF is operating with the DC power supply providing the input power a,ource, then the output frequency of the CVCF 1 inverter will be maintained within 60 hz +/ 21, whether the inverter is
- synchronized with the standby AC power supply or is synchronized with the internal oscillator. ,
If the normal input AC supply voltage should fall below 88% of rated, then the CVCF immediately switches its power source from the normal AC i supply to the DC power supply and at the same time switches from external synchronization to internal synchronization. If normal input AC voltage returns to 88% or higher for 60 seconds or longer, then the ; CVCF switches its power source back to the normal AC supply and the ' frequency will also be switched such as to be in synchronization with the standby AC power frequency provided it is within 60 hz +/-2%. For . such switching conditions, the CVCF inverter output voltage shall remain within 120 VAC +/ 10% and the voltage will be within 120 VAC
+/ 2% within seven cycles after switching.
During any of the normal or abnormal conditions indicated above, the - CVCF power output is provided by the inverter. The output voltage of the CVCF will remain within the range of 120 VAC +/-10% oven if 30% load breaking or loading occurs. Recovery time to the rated design voltage variation range of +/-21 is less than seven cycles after the
- load breaking or loading occurs. However, whenever the output voltage of the inverter should exceed 120 VAC +10% (>132VAC) or fall below 120 VAC 101 (<108 VAC), or, whenever the inverter output frequency exceeds 60 bz +3% (>61.8 hz) or falls below 60 hr 3% (<58.2 hz) for 1 second
E tr Bonger, h h o #o a.yr. CVCF cra cutomati;;11y switched to the st ndby Cices,1E AC cupply, with:ut momentary inttrruptien, by cctitn cf the thyrister switch 3s. .
The-conditions (including those above) which rssult in CVCF invartGr trip and transfer of the safety.related loads to the standby Class IE AC power' supply without any momentary interruption include: (a) Incoming molded case circuit breaker trip. (b)-Inverter output voltage hi Sh (c) Inverter output voltage low (d) Inverter output frequency high. (e) Inverter output frequency low (f) Cooling fan trip (g) High temperature inside the CVCF panel (h) Imss of inverter control power (1) less of control power for gate circuit (j) Smoothing condenser overcurrent in the case of special failure, such as commutation failure, the inverter is also tripped and the transfer to standby AC power is made but there may be a short period of time where the output voltage is less than 80% of the rated peak value for 50 msec (3 cycles) or less. Switching-from the standby AC power source to the inverter is always made manually, after the causes of the automatic transfer from inverter to standby AC power have been removed. By reviewing the various protective features of the CVCFs described previously, it can be observed that any " failure of the Class 1E suFPly" can not result from the occurrence of just one fault (i.e.,
"the first random failure taken"). During normal conditions of operation of the CVCFs, at least two independent random failures of Class 1E CVCF equipment must occur before a "non fail. safe type failure (undervoltage, overvoltage, underfrequency") can result at the output of the CVCF. At the occurrence of "the first rand;.a failure", the fault itself is indicated by annunciation of a CVCF failure in the main control room and the protection equipment installed in the CVCF isolates the loads from the faulted portion of the CVCF such that Class 1E power is continuously supplied to the CVCF loads.
The voltage, frequency and current flow of all input and output power sources of all CVCFs are continuously monitored. Any off. normal (abnormally high or low) voltage or frequency condition or any overload
- or overcurrent condition will result in timely alarms in the main control room. The CVCF protection equipment will at the same time effect appropriate transfers of frequency synchronization or power source such as to maintain uninterruptible power output from the CVCF ,
or, if necessary, overcurrent power trips will result. During those periods of required CVCF maintenance, when safety related loads of the CVCF will be supplied with power from the standby AC power source, any abnormal condition of standby AC power will be immediately alarmed in ' the control room. The plant operators can at this time monitor the abnormality of the voltage, frequency or current condition of the standby AC power source (either input or output) and take any appropriate action required.
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t QUESTION 435.008 Section 8.3 does not identify any interf==== between the 3haclear Island and the remainder of plant systems within the onsite power systems. Please verify that all of the onsite power systems are within the e l Nuclear Island scope, or identify the interfaces and the interface ; requirements.
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RESPONSr 435.008 All onsite power systems are within the scope of the ABER design. , The ; one line drawings have been revised per the attachment, r QUESTION ! 435.009 Section 8.3.1.1.4.2.3 and Pigure 8.3 5 briefly describe the Process ' Computer Constant Voltage, Constant Wequency Power Supply; but they do not state whether it is qualified Class 1E although it is discussed ; under Section 8.3.1.1.4.2 entitled *120V AC Safety Related Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS).* 2he backup to this power supply i is from the non. Class'1E 250 VDC battery, and Section 4.3.2.1 states that all of the 250 VDC loads are non-Class 1E. {
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l (a) Plsase clarify whether the Process Camputer Poeur Sqpply is qualified Class 1E. t' (b) If it is Class 1E explain why a backup mon. Class ~1E 250 VDC supply is connected to it, and describe the class 1E/non-Class 1E isolation provided. (c) If it is non. class 1E explain why a normal and backup Class 1E 460 VAC supply is connected to it, and descrlhe the. class.1E/ man. Class 1E isolation provided. ; RESPONSE ' 435.009 (a) The Process Computer Power Supply is 1pon-Class 1E. (b) See response (a). (c) The 480 VAC supplies are from the non.m=== IT sections of the ' Class 1E power centers. Section 8.3.1.1.2.1 has been revised (per attached) to better describe the Class IE/non. Class 1E isolation. . QUESTION t 435.010 (a) Section 8.3.1.1.4.2.4 states that the function of the Vital AC Power Supply System is to provide reliable 120V uninterruptible AC power for important non. safety related loads that are required for continuity of , power plant operation. However it does not identify the non. safety l related loads that it supplies, nor is a one-line diagram of the power ; supply systems provided. Please identify the non safety related loads + that this system supplies and include a one.line diagram of the power supply system in the ABWR SSAR identifying the power sources to it. If there are any 1E/non.1E interfaces identify the isolation provided. (b) This section also states that an independent 125V DC system, including a battery and battery charger, is the normal source of power for the Vital AC Power System. However section 8.1.2.1 states that
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thoro cre no non.C1ces 1E 125 VDC batteries supplied as part of the i plant design. .Please clarify.this apparent discrepancy. Also, include
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this system in a one.line diagram to be provided for the Vital AC Power System. l i
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RESPONSE'
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'435.010 (a) Non safety related loads powered b; 120 V uninterruptible power are :
identified as CVCF ANIO and CVCF SNIO in the attached Table 1 under the ; 1-
. POWER SOURCE column. All loads are non. Class IE, as is the bus
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upstream. The Class 1E / non. Class'1E interface is at the 480. volt level which feeds the bus. This interface is shown on the revised , Figure 8.3 3 and described in the revised Section 8.3.1.1.2.1 (See response to question 435.9). ; t (b) The 125 VDC system source of power for the non. safety related 120 VAC uninterruptible power is a non. safety related source that is powered t by a class 1E 125 VDC battery system. Isolation between the Class 1E-l and non Class 1E 125 VDC systems is provided by a DC to DC converter. [- QUESTION i j I 435.011 Section 8.3.1.1.5.1 describes the physical separation and independence i of electric equipment and wiring. It seems to indicate that there is ; separation between the divisions but a statement is made that seems to imply that the separation may not in all cases be total. This statement ; says that electric equipment and wiring for the Class 1E systems which
- are segregated into separate divisions are separated so that no design basis event is capable of disabling any ESF total function. This ;
statement could be interpreted to mean that in an area with three i divisions, each with_100% capability, a single design basis event would i be allowed to fail two of the divisions since 100% capability for the ' i-ESF function would still survive. Please clarify this point and indicate whether a single design basis event will ever be allowed to i fail more than one division.
RESPONSE
435.011 The design objective is that no design basis event will disable the l ability to safely shutdown the reactor with less than either of two i divisions. The text has been revised as shown in the attachment. l - (- .............................................................................. : QUESTION i 435.012 Design criteria (4) in section 8.3.1.1.5.2 states that interrupting capacity of switchgear, load centers, motor control centers, and i distribution panels is compatible with the short circuit current ' available at the Class 1E buses. Verify that this criteria ensures that the interrupting capacity of this equipment will be equal to or greater l than the maximum available fault current to which it could be exposed. L
RESPONSE
435.012 Final selection of the transformer impedances and calculation of the available fault currents is an aspect of the detail design which will be performed by an architect engineer during the detail design phase for a specific plant. The inclusion of the compatibility requirement in the SSAR makes it an interface requirement which the architect engineer must meet. The architect engineer's own calculation procedures would require that the interrupting capacity of the switchgear and circuit interrupting devices be compatible with the magnitude of the available t
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I fault current. ! QUESTION l 435.013 The first statement in section 8.3.1.1.6.4 indicates that the only protective trips active on the diesel generators during LOPP or LOCA conditions are the generator differential relays and the engine overspeed trip device. Following statements indicate that the other ; protective relays are bypassed.during LOCA conditions. ' (a);Please clarify whether these other protective relays are bypassed I only during LOCA or whether they are bypassed during both LOCA and LOPP conditions,
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(b) Also verify that the diesel generator protective trips meet the-other criteria specified in position C.7 and C.8 of RG 1.9, Rev. 2 (i.e. , that they include the capability for- (1) testing the status and operability of the bypass circuits, (2) alarming in the control room abnormal values of all bypass parameters, and (3) manually resetting of the trip bypass function (automatic reset not acceptable), and the surveillanco system indicates which of the diesel generator protective , trips is activated first). RESPONSE i 435.013 (a) The text of Section 8.3.1.1.6.4 has been revised (see attachment) to more clearly state the bypass conditions. The generator & bus differential relays, engine overspeed trip, low diesel cooling water i pressure (two sensors out of two sensors) and low differential pressure . of secondary cooling water (two out of two sensors) are not bypassed > during LOCA conditions. All other engine trips are bypassed. -No trips are bypassed during LOPP or testing. ' (b) The design, installation and oparation of the diesel generator will meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 2.
.............................................................................. ..i QUESTION ,
435.014 Section 8.3.1.1.7 states that, in general, non. Class 1E loads are : tripped off and thereby automatically isolated from the Class IE bus 9s
- 1. by a LOCA or LOPP signal. Please verify that LOCA and LOPP signals are L used to trip non. Class 1E loads and the loads are not subsequently resequenced back on automatically, RESPONSE '
435.014 The design has been modified so that only LOPP signals are used to trip
- the loads on the bus.
Some non. Class 1E loads are automatically sequenced back on as indicated on Table 8.3 4 The diesels are sized to handle all of these automatically sequenced loads. Section 8.3.1.1.7 has been revised accordingly (see attachment). e
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F QUESTION 435.015 (a) Section 8.3.1.1.7(1) states that should the Class 1E bus voltage decay to below 70% of its nominal rated value for a predetermined time a bus transfer is initiated and the signal will trip the supply breaker; and start the diesel generator. Please provide the value of
" predetermined time" (time delay) associated with bus voltage below 70%.
(b) Also, the last sentence in this section states that large motor loads will be sequence started as required and as shown on Table 8.3 2. Table 8.3 2, however, is only a "D/G 14ad Table" that does not identify any load sequencing times. Table 8.'3 4 on the other hand is entitled
" lead Sequence *, but the table is "to be provided by December 31, 1988."
Please identify the correct table that will contain load sequencing times.
RESPONSE
435.015-(a) The time delay is 0.4 seconds if a MCA signal is present. It is 3 seconds if there is no thCA signal. (b) The correct reference is Table 8.3 4 for the D/G loading sequence. The text has been revised per attachment. Also, Table 8.3 4 has been revised, and a copy of the new table draft is provided in the attachment. QUESTION 435.016 Section 8.3.1.1.7(2) states that if the bus voltage (normal preferred power) is lost during post. accident operation, transfer to diesel generator power occurs as described in (1) above (*(1) above" describes the normal sequence of operations following a 1hPP). This, however. does not fully describe all the sequence of operations that need to occur for a 1DCA followed by a 14PP. e (a) If the 1DPP occurs near the beginning of the IDCA sequence before the diesel generator has accelerated to full speed and voltage on standby what occurs? (b) If the 14PP occurs in the middle of the IDCA sequence after the diesel generator has accelerated to full speed and voltage on standby what occurs? (c) If the 1DPP occurs following completion of IDCA sequencing with the diesel running in standby at full voltage and frequency what occurs? L (d) How is residual voltage handled when making the transfer from l preferred power to the diesel generator with the diesel generator running in standby? (e) Are non-Class 1E loads sequenced onto the diesel generator when the 1DPP follows a lhCA? The lhPP following 1hCA sequence is important because, if a LOPP occurs as a result of a lhCA and the subsequent trip of the main generator, it may likely happen several seconds after the lhCA grid, due to a sequence of events resulting in an unstable or overloaded p l
, _ _ _. _ ~ -- -
p F
- RESPONSE i 435.016 (c) 1 If o IDPP coturs no:r the beginning cf the IDCA ccquenco, before the following events will take place:the diesel generator has ac- '
;
1) I The diesel will continue to accelerate to full speed.
- 2) Wen a lhCA signal is received, (before a 14PP) 6.9 KV energency bus load sequencing timers will start and continue i I
their timing ~ sequence'as long as the 6.9 KV emergency bus voltage remains at 70% or greater. j
't 3)
When a thPP occurs, near the beginning of a 1DCA sequence, ! loss of 6.9 XV emergency bus voltage will cause: t load sequencing timers to stop and reset. (B) The (A) 6.9 The KV ! emergency bus loads to be shed. , 4) When the 6.9 KV emergency bus voltage ia greater than 701 (bus now automatically connected to the diesel generator) the load sequencing timers will ste.rt and apply appropriate loads to the 6.9 KV emergency bus at preset times. (b) If a LOPP occurs in the middle of the lhCA sequence, after the diesel generator has accelerated to full speed and voltage and is on $ standby, the following events will take place:
- 1) The 6.9 KV emergency bus loads will be shed.
i
- 2) The diesel generator output will be connected to the diesel bus. :
- 3) The load sequence timers will start and apply appropriate loads to the 6.9 KV emergency bus at preset times. f (c) l If a 14PP occurs following a completion of thCA sequencing with the .-
following events will occut: diesel generator running in standby at full volta i
- 1) The 6.9 KV emergency bus loads will be shed. l
- 2) The diesel generator output will be connected to the l
6.9 KV emergency bus. t
- 3) The load sequence timers will start and apply appropriate loads to the 6.9 KV emergency bus at preset times. ;
(d) value, the loads will not be tripped from the 6.9 KV bus unt residual voltage is at or below 30% of its initial value. tripped before a permissive signal is given to close the D/Gleads breakers will be This permissive is most important if a thPP occurs during a 1DCA, or any other time that the diesel is required to pickup a bus from the idling condition. (e) Some non Class 1E loads are sequenced on to the non Class 1E
- sections of the 6.9 KV emergency buses as shown on Table 8.3 4 These L are the 250 VDC battery chargers and associated constant voltage, L constant frequency (CVCF) power supplies, lighting, and some non Class 1E instrument transformers. The diesels have been sized to supply this l
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I~ ! o P i cquipment during o LOCA. ! I
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QUESTION 435.017 Section 8.3.1.1.7 does not have a scenario addressing the sequence of , events that occurs for a LOCA without a LOPP. Please address.this scenario and add it to section 8.3.1.1.7.- If LOCA loads are sequenced on to the offsite power system, the sequencer used should be separate from that used to sequence loads on to the onsite power system. If this ; is not the caso provide a detailed analysis to demonstrate that there ! are no credible sneak circuits or common failure modes in the sequencer l
;
design that could render both onsite and offsite power sources ' unavailable. In addition provide information concerning the reliability of your sequencer and reference design detailed drawings. RESPONSE . 435.017 v When a LOCA occurs, with or without a LOPP, the load sequence timers are started if the 6.9 KV emergency bus voltage is greater than 70% and-loads are applied to the bus at the end of preset times. , \ . ( Each LOCA load has an individual load sequence timer which will start if
- a LOCA occurs and the 6.9 KV emergency bus voltage is greater than 70%, ;
regardless diesel of whether the bus voltage cource is preferred power or the generator. The load sequence timers are part of the low level , circuit logic for each LOCA load and do not provide a means of common i mode failure that would render both onsite and offsite power unavailable. If a timer failed, the LOCA load could be applied manually provided the bus voltage is greater than 70%. j ' This information requested. has been added to Section 8.3.1.1.7 (see attachment) as i i l QUESTION 435.018 Section 8.3.1.1.7(3) addresses the LOCA following LOPP scenario, however it provides few details. (a) If the LOCA occurs just after the LOPP but prior to load sequencing of the LOPP loads what occurs? (b) If the LOCA occurs in the middle of the LOPP sequence, what occurs? l 1 I (c) If the LOCA occurs following completion of the LOPP sequence, what occurs? l (d) Are any LOCA loads not already energized simply sequenced on to whatever load.shedLOPP first? loads are on.line or are some or all of the LOPP loads L (e) Are non. Class 1E loads tripped by the LOPP signal or the LOCA l- signal? l (f) Is the diesel generator circuit breaker tripped at any time to accomplish the LOCA following LOPP response? i
'I iF RESPONSE .
5 435.018 the(a) If a'LOCA LOPP loads, the occurs following justevents afteroccur: a LOPP but prior to load sequencing o) s
- 1) Following a LOPP the 6.9 KV smorgency bus loads are shed and the diesel generator output is connected to the ;
. diesel bus.. This function is not dependent upon a LOCA. ;
- 2) When a LOCA occurs (just after the LOPP) and when the 6.9 KV amergency bus voltage is greater than 701, the load
;
sequence timers start and apply the appropriate 6.9 KV , emergency bus LOPP and LOCA loads at preset times. > (b) If-a LOCA occurs in the middle of a LOPP loading sequence, , LOPP will continue without. interruption. sequencing of loads that ai 1 be tripped off the bus if they have been started.The drywell cooling fans will : LOPP loads are required for LOCA and will remain on the buses.All The other auto. load i diesel generators loading order. are capable of accepting the load blocks in any _
- k ,
(c) If a LOCA occurs following completion of the LOPP sequence, loads f which are only applied to the 6.9 KV en.rgency bus in the event of a LOCA will be sequenced onto the bus. tripped off. Lesds not required for a LOCA are ; t (d) In the event of a LOCA following completion of a LOPP sequence LOPP londs remain on the bus. Additional loads required for a LOCA are sequenced onto the bus, t u (e) Non. Class 1E loads are tripped by a LOCA signal and not by a LOPP. I L (f) The diesel generator circuit breaker is not tripped to accomplish I the LOCA loading following a LOPP response. t
.............................................................................. i QUESTION "
435.019 Section 8.3.1.1.7(4) states that if a LOCA occurs when the diese generator is paralleled with the preferred power source during test and i tho test is being conducted from the local control panel, control must
;
be diesel returned to the generator breaker. main control room or the test operator must trip the Because the diesel generator is not available to automatically respond to the LOCA in this circumstance it is be provided in the control room in accordance verify that this is the case. with RG 1.47. Please
;
RESPONSE
435.019 Section 8.3.1.1.7(5) has been changed to read: '
'If a LOCA occurs when the diesel generator is paralled with either the normal preferred power or the alternate preferred power source, will automatically be disconnected from the 6.9 KV emergency busthe D/G regardless panel or theofmainwhether control theroom."
test is being conducted from the local control
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l n ; i QUESTION , 435.020 In section 8.3.1.1.7(5) the description of what occurs following a LOPP during a diesel generator paralleling test with the normal preferred i power source is different from that described for a paralleling test with the alternate preferred power source.- In the first case it is ! stated that the diesel generator circuit breaker is automatically. i tripped if the normal preferred power supply is lost during the test, ' and in the second case it is stated that the diesel generator breaker will trip on overcurrent if the alternate preferred source is lost ! j during the test. ' (a) If what occurs during the two scenarios are different describe the i differences and why they are different. (b) If the diesel generator breaker ir automatically tripped identify what signal will trip it since an urdervoltage condition may not be' generated. ': (c) If the diesel generator breaker is tripped on overcurrent verify ; ( that no lock outs will be generated to preclude automatic sequencing of LOPP loads. ; (d) Verify that in either case the diesel generator will be returned to i the isochronous acde prior to load sequencing, i (e) Describe the what paralleling test. happens if a diesel generator bus fault occurs during ,
RESPONSE
435.020 (a) The events following a LOPP during diesel generator paralleling tests with the normal preferred power source are essentially the same as : those with the alternate preferred power source. In the first case, the ~ diesel generator circuit breaker should be automatically tripped by a signal from the main power transformer or high voltage breaker lockout
;
circuits when there is a disturbance on the off. site source. If this ' trip does not occur, the DC breaker will be tripped by its overcurrent , relay. In the second case, the diesel generator breaker is tripped by the lockout voltage relays for the reserve auxiliary transformer or its high breaker. If this trip does not occur, the DG breaker will be tripped by its overcurrent relay. (b) During paralleling tests, if the alternate preferred power source is ' lost the diesel generator will be tripped as described in-(a) above. (c) If the diesel generator is tripped on overcurrent, lock. outs will not be generated to preclude automatic sequencing of LOPP loads. (d) The diesel generator will be returned to the isochronous mode prior to load sequencing. L (e) If a 6.9 KV emergency bus fault occurs during the paralleling tests, all power supply breakers to the bus will be tripped and locked out by the bus differential current relays. This is true for a bus fault on any 6.9 KV emergency bus.
- . - -. . - ~. . . . . --,
l
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QUESTION 435.021 (a) Section 8.3.1.1.8.2 is entitled ' Ratings and Capability" but it provides no diesel generator ratings. Please provide the continuous load rating and short time overload rating of the diesel generators. j 3 (b) In addition this section states that each diesel generator is I capable of reaching full speed and vo*tage within 13 seconds after the i signal to start. Does the diesel governor contain a ramp generator or i
.i some other circuitry to provide a controlled acceleration to operating speed during this 13 second starting period? If so, how will the i i
reliability of this circuit be demonstrated? RESPONSE i 435.021 (a) The continuous load rating of the diesel generators is 6250 KVA. The overload rating of the diesel generators is 1101 of the rated output for a two (2) hour period, i (b) The details of the diesel generator design are beyond the scope of t the Licensing Review Bases (LRB) document. It is therefore an interface requirement that this response be provided by the applicant. ' QUESTION 435.022 Section 8.3.1.1.8.5 lists the diesel engine and its generator breaker ' protective trips and other off normal conditions that are annunciated in the main control room and/or locally. Please identify which of these ~!
;
conditions are annunciated in the main control room and which are annunciated locally. ' With regard to the diesel generator alarms in the control room: A review of malfunction reports of diesel generators at operating nuclear plants has uncovered that in some cases the information available to the control room operator to indicate the operational status of the diesel generator may be imprecise and could lead to misinterpretation. This can be caused by the sharing of a single annunciator station to alarm ' l i conditions that render a diesel generator unable to respond to an automatic emergency start signal and to also alarm abnormal, but not disabling, conditions. Another cause can be the use of wording of an annunciator window that does not specifically say that a diesel generator is inoperable (i.e., unable at the time to respond to an automatic emergency start signal.) when in fact it is inoperable for that purpose. i l
- Review and evaluate the alarm and control circuitry for the diesel i generators in the ABWR design to determine how each condition that renders a diesel generator unable to respond to an automatic emergency start signal is alarmed in the control room. These conditions include ,
not only the trips that lock out the diesel generator start and require manual reset, but also control switch or mode switch positions that block automatic start, loss of control voltage, insufficient starting air pressure or battery voltage, etc. This review should consider all aspects of possible diesel generator operational conditions, for example test conditions and operation from local control stations. One area of particular concern is the unreset condition following a manual stop at the local station which terminates a diesel generator test and prior to resetting the diesel generator controls for enabling subsequent automatic operation.
T. . i
;
. Provide the details of your evaluation, the results and conclusions, and a tabulation of.the following information: f i
' (a) all conditions that render the diesel generator incapable of i responding mode as discussed to an automatic above; emergency start signal for each operating i
i (b) the wording on the annunciator window in the control room that is alarmed for each of the conditions identified in (a); l (c) any other alara signals not included in (a) above that also cause i. the same annunciator to alara; .!' i (d) any condition that renders the diesel generator incapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signal which is not alarmed { in the control room; and i (e) any proposed modifications resulting from this evaluation. ; For additional information and the staff position on this item see Branch Technical Position (BTP) PSB.2 in the Standard Review Plan ' (NUREG 0800). Describe how the ASWR design meets each position of BTP PSB.2.
RESPONSE
435.022 Section 8.3.1.1.8.5 ; between the local and control room annunciations.has been rewritten (per ! The diesel on depending generator, the supplier. auxiliary systems and circuitry are unique L Likewise, conditions which could render the
- diesel generator unable to respond to automatic emergency start signals could vary, depending on the unique design of the units. Such a detailed analysis is hardware specific, and therefore beyond the generic intent of the Licensing Review Bases (LRB) for the ABWR Standard Plant. .
However, the requirements to meet Regulatory Guide 1.47 and BTP PSB.2 ' are committed in Section 8.3.1.2.1 [(2)(d) and (3)(e) respectively). 1
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QUESTION . 435.023 Section 8.3.1.2.1 states that there are four 6.9 kV electrical divisions, three of which are independent load groups backed by individual diesel generator sets. Figure 8.3 2 entitled '6.9 kV System - Single Line" however shows only the three divisions backed by diesel generators. It does not show the fourth 6.9 kV division referred to in L ' section 8.3.1.2.1 Please clarify this discrepancy and show the fourth division, if it exists, in Figures 8.3 1 and 8.3 2.
RESPONSE
435.023 Section mark attached 8.3.1.2.1 was incorrect and has been revised in accordance with up. There are only three 6.9 kV electrical divisions.
, . . . . ,ww ,._,m....,- .m.,.. .,_ +, + , . , ....,..._..._,.._m_,.
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QUESTION 435.024 t In section 8.3.1.2.1 it is stated that the standby power system i redundancy is based on the capability of any two of the four divisions ! (two of three load groups) to provide the mininum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit in case of an accident and maintain it in the safe shutdown condition. Why can't the unit be shut down in case of an accident with only one of the three load groups available? Identify the systems or loads needed that require that two of the three -i load troups be available, i
RESPONSE
435.024 section 8.3.1.2.1 was incorrect and has been revised in accordance with ! attached mark.up. The reactor can be safely shut down from the control ! room with any one of the three load groups available. ' QUESTION 435.025 In sections 8.1.3.1.2.3(6) and 8.3.1.2.1(3) it is stated that the undervoltage detection schemes for the 6.9 kV offsite power feeders. is outside the nuclear island scope of supply, and BTP PSB 1 is therefore : imposed as an interface requirement for the applicant. On the contrary
- however, the purposa of the undervoltage protection logic required by the BTP is to protect and ensure the adequate operation of safety equipment at the 6.9 kV safety buses and below.
It is required to be qualified Class 1E and should be physically located ' at and electrically connected to the Class 1E 6.9 kV switchgear. The undervoltage protection logic therefore protects equipment that is ,
- within the nuclear island scope, monitors voltage on the 6.9 kV safety buses that are within the nuclear island scope, and should be located in the Class 1E 6.9 kV switchgear that is within the nuclear island scope, s l The setpoints of the undervoltage relays should be chosen to protect and ensure adequate operation of all safety. loads down to the 120 volt l
level. The only connection between the requirements of the undervoltage protection and the 6.9 kV offsite feeders is that the feeders should be required to maintain adequate voltages to the safety buses under all operating conditions to ensure acceptable operation of safety equipment and to ensure that the undervoltage relays will not be unintentionally tripped. This should be accomplished by imposing appropriate interface requirements on the offsite feeders. . You should therefore provide the second level undervoltage protection i required by the BTP and address the other positions of BTP PSB.1.
RESPONSE
435.025 The design meets the requirements of PSB.1. Sections 8.1.3.1.2.3(6) and , 8.3.1.2.1(3) have been revised accordingly. A new section 8.3.1.1.7(8) has been added to describe the degraded voltage protection provided for , the safety related buses. These marked up changes are provided in the attachment.
l QUESTION 435.026 Clarify statement (1)(b) of section 8.3.1.2.2 regarding conformance of the SSLC power supply to CDC 2, 4, 17, and 18. If the $$LC power supply i is not in conformance with any part of the CDCs, so state and justify. '
RESPONSE
435.026 A line was missing in the first printing, but has been added (per , attached) so that it is consistent with similar statements in other ' sections. ' b The statement is intended to mean that the SSLC power supply complies with all portions of the listed CDCs which are applicable to this type J of power supply. There are no non compliances, but some portions of the CDCs are not applicable at this level (for example, the statement in CDC. I 17 about two physically independent circuits from the transmission ; network). QUESTION 435.027 Section 8.3.1.2.2 states that the SSLC redundancy is based on the capability of any two of the four divisions to provide the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit in case of an accident { and maintain it in the safe shutdown condition. Why can't the unit be j shut down in case of an accident with only one of the four divisions available? Identify the systems or loads needed that require that two of the four divisions be available, i RESPONSE j' 1 435.027 Section 8.3.1.2.2 was incorrect and has been revised in accordance with attached mark up.. The reactor can be safely shut down from the centrol E i room with any one of the three load groups available. L l QUESTION 435.028 In'section 8.3.1.2.4, item (1) states that certified proof tests are i performed on cable samples to certify 60 year life by thermal aging, l Subsequent items. (2) thru (5), identify various cable attributes such as radiation resistance, mechanical / electrical endurance, llame I resistance, and 1.3 vel of gas evolution that are also demonstrated by l certified proof tests performed on cable samples. Do the tests identified in items (2) thru (5) demonstrate that the cables have an acceptable level of'the particular attributes at the end of their 60 1 year life? How is this demonstrated?
RESPONSE
435.028 The. thermal aging test is the inclusive test that proves a reasonable expectancy of a 60. year life for the cable. The other tests, items (2) through (5), prove that individual parameters such as flame resistance, radiation resistance, etc. have a reasonable expectance of remaining within acceptable limits of change for each parameter over the 60. year life of the plant. The method of reaching a conclusion is unique for L each type of test. The details of each test are imposed as an interface ' i requirement for the applicant.
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_ QUESTION 435.029 (a) Section 8.3.1.3.1 discusses the means used to physically identify safety related power systems equipment. It states that all cables for Class 1E systems and asociated circuits (except those routed in conduit) are tagged every 15 ft. In addition all cables are tagged at their terminations with a unique identifying nu6ber. R.G. 1.75, Rev. 2 states that these cables should be marked at intervals not to exceed 5 ft. and the preferred method of marking the cable is color' coding. .IEEE 384 1974 also states that these cable markings shall be applied prior to or during installation. Please verify that these recommendations are met or justify the differences. If exception is taken to position C.10 of R.C. 1.75. Rev. 2 regarding cable marking, the exception should be
- identified in section 8.1.3.1.2.2 and wherever the exception is applicable. ,
(b) Section 8.3.1.3.1 also describes the marking of conduit and cable trays. Please verify that in accordance with the requirements of IEEE 384 1974 these markings are applied prior to the installation of cables. (c) The identification requirements for instrumentation and control system cables and raceways described in items (3) and (4) of section 8.3.1.3.2.1 should be the same as those for power systems provided in section 8.3.1.3.1 subject to the above comments.
RESPONSE
435.029attached. Sections 8.3.1.3.1 and 8.3.1.3.2.1 have been revised as shown on The identification criteria fully complies with the requirements of R.G. 1.75, Rev. 2, and IEEE 384 1974 regarding marking. of cables, conduit, cable trays and raceways. QUESTION 435.030 Provide a description of the ABWR cable spreading areas in the ABWR SSAR. Describe how the requirements specified in section 5.1.3 of IEEE 1 384 1974 (as modified by position C.12 of R.G. 1.75) are met.
RESPONSE
435.030 A description of the cable spreading areas is not applicable to the ABVR because a majority of the signals will be multiplexed to the control room. A cable spreading area is not in the plant layout. QUESTION 435.031 (a) Item (7) of section 8.3.1.4.1.2 discusses electric penetration assemblies. It states that electric penetration assemblies of different Class 1E divisions are separated by distance, separate rooms or barriers and/or locations on separate floor levels. With regard to separation by distance, no specifics are given on what is the minimum distance provided between redundant penetrations. As required in IEEE 384 1974 the minimum physical separation for redundant penetrations should meet the requirements for cables and raceways given in section 5.1.4 of that standard. Please verify that this is the case. (b) Item (7) of section 8.3.1.4.1.2 also states that power circuits going through electric penetration assemblies are protected against overcurrent by redundant overcurrent interrupting devices to avoid
penetr titn damags. Th3 us3 cf r:dundant cver:urr:nt int 3rrupting devic:s chtuld not b3 licit:d t3 only power cirsuits gsing thrtugh ; slectric penetration assemblies._ They should be used on all penetration j electric circuits (including instrumentation and control circuits) where the available fault current is greater than the continuous rating of the i electric penetration assembly. If the maximum available fault current i is less than the continuous rating of the penetration, but is greater ; than the continuous rating of a device upstream of the penetration whose i failure can result in fault current levels in excess of the penetration ! continuous rating (such as a control power transformer), then redundant ; overcurrent interrupting devices should be used. Please verify that ; this is the case. ' (c) Provide the fault current clearing time curves of the electrical penetrations' primary and secondary current interrupting devices plotted against the thermal capability (I*I*t) curve of the penetration (to maintain mechanical integrity). Provide a simplified one line diagram on this drawing showing the location of the protective devices in the penetration circuit, and indicate the maximum available fault current of the circuit. (d) Where external control power is needed for tripping electrical penetration breakers, signals for tripping the primary and backup breakers should be independent, physically separated and powered from separate sources. Verify that your design complies and identify the power supplies to the redundant circuit breakers.
RESPONSE
435.031 (a) The physical separation between redundant penetrations meets the requirements for cables and raceways given in Section 6.1.5 of IEEE 384 1981. (b) It is a design requirement that redundant overcurrent interrupting devices be provided for electrical circuits going through containment penetrations, if the maximum available fault current (including failure of upstream devices) is greater than the continuous current rating of the penetration. (c) The detail design for the current interrupting devices for the electrical penetrations has not been performed and is beyond the scope { of the Licensing Review Bases (IJtB) document. -It is an interface
. requirement for the applicant to supply this information.
(d) In general, breakers and starters will,be backed up by properly selected current limiting fuses. Smaller circuits will employ redundant fuses. Specific identification of power supplies for redundant breakers, applicant. if utilized, is an interface requirement to be supplied by the p QUESTION
-435.032 Section 8.3.1.4.2.1 identifies the standards that are used for the i separation of equipment for the systems referred to in subsection {
7.1.1.3, 7.1.1.4, and 7.1.1.6 (safety related control and instrumentation systems). IEEE 384-1974 however is not listed. The l separation of equipment in these systems should comply with the requirements of this standard. Please verify that this is the case. In addition, the listed standards and requirements Lre not identified as
being cppliccblo.to sub:cetiin 7.1.1.5 (s:foty rolct:d dispicy ) instrumentation). Please verify that they are indeed applicable to this j subsection. l t RESPONSE 1
)
435.032 IEEE 384 is addressed in Tables 7.1 2 and 8.1 1, as endorsed by J Regulatory Guide 1.75. Since the requirements of this guide envelope. : and endorse IEEE 384, it is not necessary to address IEEE 384 ' separately. To be consistant with the Standard Review Plan format (SRP Tables 7 1, f
-7 2 and 8 1), and to avoid unnecessary redundancy in tho' text, we have l not addressed the IEEE standards separate from the Regulatory Guides [
which endorse them. However, since IEEE 379 was inadvertently mentioned in addition to RG 1.53, we have modified and clarified the paragraph per the attached mark up. l Also, the separation requirements do apply to the Safety Related f Display. Therefore, a reference to Section 7.1.1.5 has been added as marked.' ' t QUESTION , 435.033 Items (4) and (5) in section 8.3.1.4.2.2.2 state that spatial separation in general plant areas and in cable spreading areas shall equal or exceed the minimum allowed by IEEE 384. IEEE384 1974 however provides i two means for establishing minimum physical separation distances. The first, which is specified in section 5.1.1.2 of the standard allows the i minimum separation distance to be established by analysis based on tests of the proposed cable installation. The second, which is specified in sections 5.1.3 and 5,1.4 of the standard, specifies specific minimum , physical separation distances that must be maintained.. Please clarify whether you intend to meet the specific distances specified in the standard or whether you intend to establish your own separation distances through analysis based on tests. The prefereble option is to meet the specific distances specified in IEEE 384 1974. 7
RESPONSE
435.033 In a::cordance with the Licer. sing Review Bases -(LAB) document, the certification is based on IEEE 384-1981. The specific separation distances listed in IEEE 384 1981 will be met wherever possible and practical. In addition, the ABWR will provide separation by fire barriers sufficient to meet the requirements of letter SECY.89 013. As the detail design proceeds, specific instances which can best be ! resolved by enalysis may arise. Identification of such cases is an : interface requirement for the applicant. QUESTION 435.034 (a) Section 8.3.1.4.2.2.4 discusses the use of isolation devices in , power circuits. It states that non. Class 1E instrument and control j circuits will not be energized from a class 1E power supply unless potential for degradation of the Class 1E power source can be demonstrated to be negligible by effective current or voltage limiting (i.e., functional isolation) under all design basis conditions. Please explain what this means. Does it imply that no isolation device will be used if no credible failure modes can be identified that will result in
~ . .
t fcult currento? Qualificd issictitn devicas sh;uld be u x d in~cil ecses where a non. Class IE circuit is connected to a Class 1E power supply. l (b) It also states in section 8.3.1.4.2.2.4 that Class 1E power supplies-which interface non Class 1E circuits are required to be disconnected or i otherwise decoupled from the non Class 1E circuits such that conditions ! of the non. Class 1E portion of the system cannot jeopardize the class 1E portions (e.g. , by a current limiting element). Verify that, if , overcurrent interrupting devices such as fuses or circuit breakers are used as isolation devices, redundant qualified interrupting devices will ! be used at the Class 1E/non Class 1E interfaces. List all the locations j where there is an interface between a Class 1E power supply and ; non Class 1E circuit. Identify the isolation device that is used at the interface. ! (c) Where redundant Class 1E power circuits interface with a common non, Clan IE system such as a computer, the isolation devices used - should ensurs that a worst case abnormal occurence (fault, overvoltage, ' voltage surge or spike, etc.) on one of the Class 1E power circuits ; cannot migrate through the non. Class 1E system and affect the redundant , l- Class 1E circuit. This is in addition to the normal crite*ia for l isolation devices that require that any worst case occurences (maxinum ; credible faults, etc.) in the non Class 1E systen not affect the Class IE system. , i
RESPONSE
435.034-(a) The discussion under Section 8.3.1.4.2.2.4 of the SSAR means that : qualified isolation devices will be used in all cases where a non. Class 1E circuit is connected to a Class 1E power supply. Section i 8.3.1.4.2.2.4 has been rewritten (per attached) to better define the use , of isolation devices. p (b) See the revised Section 8.3.1.1.2.1 (attached per response to question 435.009) for locations and type of isolation devices useo between Class 1E power supplies and non Class 1E circuits. A single Class 1E isolation breaker is used, but in addition to the normal coordinated trip devices, zone selective interlocking is used. This insures that unless there is a failure of the Class 1E isolation , l ' breaker, the Class 1E bus feed breaker or the Class 1E current sensing and' tripping devices, the isolation breaker and not the class IE bus I feed breaker will always trip if there is a fault at any location in the non Class 1E system. Load circuit faults on the non. Class 1E system ' will normally trip their load breaker without tripping the bus isolation ' breaker. The large difference in the total size of the Class 1E loads , versus the total size of the non Class 1E loads, roughly 2 to 1 , provides a wide margin between the time current curves of the Class 1E feed breaker and the non. Class 1E isolation breaker. (c) Precautions are taken to ensure that a worst case abnormal
" occurrence on one of the class 1E circuits cannot migrate through a '
non. Class 1E system into another Class 1E division. For example, power for the computer is supplied by non. Class 1E uninterruptable power supplies that are powered by non Class 1E bus extensions of the Divisions I and III Class 1E buses. The non Class 1E buses are isolated from the Class 1E buses as described in the revised Section 8.3.1.1.2.1. The uninterruptable power supplies will prevent disturbance on one Class 1E bus from passing to the other Class 1E bus, via the computer. Signal isolation for computer input circuits is by fiber optic cables.
-...~,~..m.,_ .,.,.n_..., ,,,,,,..,..e ,_ ,.,-.v.._,.,,-._qv. . _ ,
i I QUESTION i 435.035 Ites (4) of section 8.3.1.4.2.3.1 states that the scram solenoid h conduits will have unique identification but no specific separation > requirements, and the scram group conduits may run in the same raceway
- with other divisional circuits. If the scram group conduits are run in i the same raceway with other divisional circuits or if they have less ,
than the minimum separation from Class 1E circuits, they must be treated as associated circuits and must meet the requirements specified in section 4.5 of IEEE 384 1974 Please verify that this is the case, and i t identify the specific separation requirements that will be applied to the scram group conduits when they become associated circuits. , RESPONSE i ' 435.035 The statement in item (4) related to *no specific separation requirements" was not correct. There are specific separation requirements for the conduits containing the RPS wiring associated with each of the four scram groups, i.e., the conduits required from the s scram actuating devices to the scram solenoid fuse panels, and from the fuse valves.panels to the two solenoids of each of the individual scram pilot : Section 8.3.1.4.2.3.1 has been completely revised as per attached pages. ; Individual grounded steel conduits will be provided to contain the scram " solenoid wiring of each of the four scram groups to protect this wiring - from hot shorts to any other wiring. Individual conduits will'also be provided for the A solenoid wiring and for the B solenoid wiring in the same scram group, ; The scram group conduits will have unique identification and will be treated essentially as if they are separate enclosed raceways, i.e., the conduits containing the scram solenoid group circuit wiring will be physically separated from raceways which contain either divisional or ,
"non. divisional" (non. safety related) circuits. Any scram group conduit s may be routed alongside of any raceway containing either safety related circuits-(of any division), or any raceway containing non. safety related circuits, as long as the conduit itself is not within the boundary of 3 the raceway which contains either the divisional or non. safety.related circuits.
Each scram conduit will be physically separated by at least . one (1) inch from either metal enclosed raceways or non. enclosed raceways. QUESTION ; 435.036 Item (6) of section 8.3.1.4.2.3.2 states that any electrical equipment and/or raceways for RPS or ESF located in the suppression pool level swell zone will be designed to satisfactorily complete their function before being rendered inoperable due to exposure to the environment created by the level swell phenomena. This information is not sufficient for us to evaluate the effects on flooding of electrical equipment. please identify all electrical equipment, both safety and non. safety, that may become submerged as a result of the suppression pool level swell phenomena or as a result of a LOCA. For all such equipment that is not qualified for service in such an environment provide an analysis to determine the following: (a) The safety significance of the f ailure of this equipment (e.g., spurious actuation or loss of actuation function) as a result of _ _ _ _ ~ - - - _ - - - - - - -
e
>\ ; ,
i flesding. sm (b) The effects on Class 1E electrical power sources serving: this equipment as a result of such submergence, and
- i 4
'(c): ; Any. proposed design changes resulting from this analysis.
RESPONSE
435.036 Electrical equipment that may be submerged as a result of suppression pool level swell' phenomena, or as the result of a LOCA, is as follows:
- 1. Suppression pool temperature monitors (48 each):- Temperature 1 monitors .are required for ~ safety. Electrical wiring.for each sensor is.
. to be terminated, for sensor replacement:or maintenance, in the wetwell. !'
The design specifications require that terminations bs sealed such that operation would not be impaired by submersion due to pool swell or.LOCA. 1 i q g 2. Suppression pool level monitors (6 nach) and suppression chenber
;K pressure monitors (2 each):
level- and pressure transmitters are located outside of the wetwell.Th Therefore, their operation will not be impaired by-pool swell or LOCA. i
- 3. Suppression chamber free volume temperature monitors (4 each):
^. Temperature monitors are required for safety. The design specifications- ! require that terminations be sealed such that operation would not be { impaired by submersion due to pool swell or LOCA.-
.. ,.......................................................................... q
-QUESTION
-435.037-In the Gescription of the DC power system in section 8.3.2.1 it is
'140 V. that the operating voltage range of Class 1E DC loads is 105 to stated 3 i.
l It is also stated that the maximum equalizing charge voltage for- '! Class 1E batteries is 140 VDC, and the DC system minimum discharge voltage at the end of the discharge period is 1.75 VDC per cell. ' F t
~For a 125 VDC lead acid battery with 60 cells, 1.75 VDC por ce'll equates' to-a finalLdischarge voltage of 105 VDC at the battery terminals. This is the same as thr stated minimum operating voltage of the Class 1E DC loads.
There -is therefore no allowance for voltage drop from the battery cerminals to the terminals of the Class 1E-loads at the final volta 5e value of 1.75 VDC per cell, ! Please address this discrepancy. Also, provide the results of your DC vcitage analysis showing battery terminal the Classvoltage and worst 1E battery case l' ..ng DC load terminal voltage at each step of profile. regard to the battery .oading profile. See the following question with
RESPONSE
435.037 Tne required operating range for DC lo is 100 to 140 VDC. This leaves 5 volts for the voltage drop from the uattery terminals to the terminals of the Class 1E loads. the attachment. Section 8.3.2.1 has been corrac.ted as shown in A worst case DC voltage analysis is beyond the scope of the SSAR, as defined by the Licensing Review Bases (LRB) document. However, it is an interface requirement for this to be performed as part of the detail vasign of the plant.
4 1 i
;
1 QUESTION ~ i
'435.038- Section 8.3.2.1^ addresses the DC power systems in general and section L
-8.3.2.1.3.2 specifically addresses battery capacity. With regard to-battery capacity, section-8.3.2.1.3.2 states that battery capacity is I
sufficient to' satisfy a safety load demand profile under the. conditions ' of.a LOCA and loss of' preferred power, and the batteries have' aufficient j stored energy to operate connected essential loada continuously for at ! least two hours without recharging. (a) Provide the stated load demand profiles and a breakdownJof the loading during'this demand. ' (b) Provide the manufacturer's ampere. hour rating of the batteries at. ' the two hour rate and at the eight hour ~ rate, and provide the one minute ampere rating of the batteries. (c) Address station blackout with regard to battery capacity. If a - ' station blackout coping analysis is being prepared for the ABWR, provide a battery _ load demand profile for the coping duration. Provide a - breakdown'of the loading during this demand. : 1 i
RESPONSE
435.038 (a) Based on information available as of September, 1989, the load demand profile for the 125V batteries under LOCA conditions with loss _of. preferred power is estimated as follows: Div I Div II Div III Div IV Min. Amps Amps Amps Amps Total 01 1000- -448 448 224- .2121 1-2 573 248 248 124 1193 2-5 339 252 252- 127 968 5-6 405 301 301 150 1157
-6 10 338 252 252 126 968 10 11 405 301 301 151 1158 11 15 339 252 252 126 969 15 - 16 405 301 301 151 1158 16 - 20 339 252 252 126 969 20 - 21 405 301 301 151 1158 21 60 339 252 252 126 969 60 - 120 339 252 252 126 969 Rated AH 4000 3000 3000 1400 AH / 2 hrs 702.8 514.5 514.5 257.2 Note: The above estimates are for general use and are subject to change as the design is specified for unique application.
(b) The manufacturer's ampere. hour rating of the batteries at the two hour rate, the four hour rate and the one minute ampere rating is beyond the License Review Bases (LRB) definition. This information will not be available until purchase specifications are prepared and selected vendor battery data is available. (c) During a station blackout, Divisions II, III and IV will be powered down to an output of essentially zero. The load demand on Division I will be intermittant as the RCIC cycles on and off and will be equal to, or less than, the value shown above for Division I during any two hour
. -. ._. ~~ - _ -
p *a. -u
.p3ried. 'Far cdditicnal inftrmatien r31ct:d t3 d3 ling with o st tien J '
.bicek:ut rofsr to ths racp:nso to Qu:stien 435.002, 4
t
' QUESTION .
435.039 In section- 8.3.2.1 it is stated that each:125 VDC battery.is provided
;
with a charger and a standby _ charger shared by two divisions, each of
-' g~ ~w hich is capable of recharging its battery from a discharged state to a fully charged state while handling the normal,1 steady. state DC load.
(a) Provide the continuous and; current. limited output ratings-of the= 1 battery chargers. (b) In accordance with position C.I.b of R.C.-1.32, Rev. 2 verify that. . the~ capacity of the battery charger supply is based on.the largest l combined demands of the various steady. state loads and the charging
' capacity-to restore the battery from the design minimum charge' state to the, fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the plant during which these demands occur, E i (c) Verify that the battery charger can operate stably as a battery eliminator (i.e.. with.the charger remaining connected to supply the loads while the battery is disconnected .from the loads).
(d) Verify that no reverse DC current can flow into the battery charger output from the battery, during pericds of low AC input battery charger y voltage or during total loss of AC input voltage to the charger, , RESPONSE '* 435.039 (a) The rated output current rating of the Division IV charger is 200 amperes. .The rated output of all the other chargers is 500 amperes. L The current-limited output of the chargers is 1201.of their rating. i L (b) The battery charger capacities meet the requirements of position [ C.I.b of Regulatory Guide 1.32, Rev. 2. l (c) The battery chargers will operate with the battery disconnected. (d).No reverse DC current will flow in the chargers during periods of ' [ low or no AC input voltage to the charger. QUESTION 435.040 Section 8.3.2.1 and figure 8.3-8 identify the connection of the L non. Class IE 250 VDC battery chargers to divis!.ons 1 and 3 of the Class L 1E system. Identify the isolation devices used at this interface. Are the Class 1E breakers shown at the interface, tripped on an accident signal? If not, they should be, or else redundant qualified breakers should be provided. l ts b . . _ . . _ - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - -
y .- . . . _ _ _ _ _ 1
' ,Er j RESPONSE-m ~435.040 The 250 VDC battery chargers are: fed from the-non. Class lE extensions of-othe~ Class'1E 480 VAC buses. See the. revised Section 8.3.1.1.2.1 -
- (attached with the response to 435.009) for's description of the ,
isolation between:the' Class lE. buses and the non. Class 1E extension buses. A mechanical interlock prevents' connecting both non. Class lE l extension buses to the 250 VDC normal charger _at the same time. ' QUESTION i
'435.041 Section 8.3.2.1.2 very generally identifies the type of loads fed from.
the 125 VDC Class 1E power system. Please provide a more specific
,l breakdown of the loads fed from each division of the 125 VDC Class lE power system.
t
RESPONSE
t' 435.041 A complete load list (Table 1) is attached, which is current as of September, 1989. There will be some shuffling of individual loads as t the detail design progresses. ' l L ' QUESTION 435.042.In section 8.3.2.1.3 it is stated that an emergency eyewash is installed in each battery room.- In order to ensure that water cannot be inadvertently splashed on the batteries the eyewash stations should be located sway from the batteries and the eyewash installation and its
. piping should be'seismicallyfqualified. Please. verify that this is the case. .i
RESPONSE
435.042 Details showing locations of the eyewash and associated piping are not ~ ,. L' ! available for the ABWR standard plant. However, it is specified as an L interface requirement that the eyewash piping will be seismically qualified. as its routing requires, and the eyewash will be located such that water cannot splash on the battery. y .............................................................................. ;
~ QUESTION f
L 435.043 Section B.3.2.1.3.3 states that battery rooms are ventilated to remove the minor amounts of gas produced during the charging of batteries. Verify that, in accordance with position C.1 of R.G.1.128 the ventilation system will limit hydrogen concentration to less than two [ percent by volume at any location within the battery area. Also, in accordance with position C.6.e of R.G. 1.128, verify that ventilation air flow sensors are installed in the battery rooms with their associated alarms installed in the control room, , p U l
- 4 . . + . , +~ s -m . - .a - , ,
a u u.e... +% .u a 4 # l
, , RESPONSE .
435.043 The ventilation system for the battery room will maintain the I concentration of hydrogen to less than 2X as a design requirement. The l airflow sensors are described in Section 9.4.1.2, which has been revised .j i (per attached) to reflect the 21 limit on hydrogen concentration.:
.............................................................................. s QUESTION-435.044 With regard to the DC power systems, section 8.3.2.2.1 states that all !
N abnormal conditions of important system parameters such as charger
" failure or low bus voltage are annunciated in the main control room and/or locally. .Please identify the specific meters and alarusiused for monitoring the status of the Class 1E DC power systems and indicate whether they are located in the main control room and/or locally. As a-minimum the.following indications and alarms should be provided in the control room:
s Battery current (ammeter. charge / discharge) Battery charger output current (ammeter) DC bus voltage (voltmeter) Battery charger output voltage (voltmeter) j Battery discharge alarm DC bus undervoltage and overvoltage alarm DC bus ground alarm (for ungrounded system) Battery breaker open alarm Battery. charger output breaker open alarm Battery charger trouble alarm (one alarm for a number of abnormal conditions which are usually indicated locally) p Because the ABWR is an advanced reactor design, you'should consider the ' use of a state.of.the. art battery and electrical system monitoring i system.to assure immediate notification of battery and electrical system problems and to provide for post event sequence analysis. !- This system L should provide for the monitoring of'at least the individual cell { parameters of the batteries and the status of the various electrical system circuits, and ideally should provide for monitoring the status of' ' all AC and DC system circuits down to and including all control circuits.
RESPONSE
435.044 As a minimum the following indications and alarms will be provided in ^ the control room: . l; (1) Battery current (ammeter. charge / discharge) (2). Battery charger output current (ammeter) (3) DC bus voltage (voltmeter) (4) Battery charger output voltage (voltmeter) (5) Battery discharge alarm . (6) DC bus undervoltage and overvoltage alarm (7) DC bus ground alarm (for ungrounded system) (8) Battery breaker open alarm (9) Battery charger output breaker open alarm (10) Battery charger trouble alarm (one alarm for a number of abnormal conditions which are usually indicated locally) The ABWR utilizes technology which has been proven by prior applications, where possible. It meets the applicable regulatory
rcquircaents. Wi. do' not plcn' ts uso th2 typa of battsry monitoring ( cyst:aD cugg)stod unloos. it bacones c manufcctursr'o stcnd:rd. QUESTION' , 435.045 Section 8.3.3.1 states that conductors are specified_to continue to operate. at 100% relative humidity with a service life expectancy of 40 years.;iThe following sentence states however that the Class.1E cables L are designed to survive the IOCA ambient condition at the and of the E 60.yr. life span. _ If the intent. is to qualify the cables for the
- 60. year life of the plant, why 'is a service life expectancy of only 40 years:specified for the 1001-relative humidity condition?-
RESPONSE
a 435.045 Section 8.~3.3.1 has been revised (see attached) to indic2te.that conductors are specified to continue to operate at 100% relative humidity with a service life expectancy of 60 years. QUESTION 435.046 The following questions pertain to Table 8.3 1 "D/G Load Table LOCA," Table 8.3 2 "D/G Load Table - LOPP," and Table 8.3-3 " Notes for Tables 8.3 1 and 8.3 2:" (a) Please provide a translation for the acronyms used in these tables. (b) Please correct the numerous errors / discrepancies between tables 8.3 1 and 8.3 2 regarding the ratings of the loads. There are many instances where the rating of an identiral piece of equipment is different in table 8.3 1 from that given ic table 8.3 2.
--i.
(c) Please explain why the loads shown on the diesel engine are larger than their rated values. If this is-to account for losses through the generator please explain the advantage of calculating the loads on the diesel engine versus the more commonly used.means of calculating the loads on the output of the diesel's generator. Provide the factors and their rationale used for increasing the various loads from their rated values, since the loads are not all increased a like amount. (d) Provide a more complete breakdown of the loads identified in the i L -category "Other Loads". i (e) Why is the load identified as "NPSS CVCF" listed as 31.8kW for the D/G "c" load? LOCA load while it is listed as 37.9kW for the D/G "c" IDPP ~ In all other cases IDCA and IDPP loads are the same value if they are energized under both conditions. I L (f) I do not understand note (5). It says, "Divission III HPCF pump motor starts by L2 signal on the case of loss of preferred power (IDPP) . " Table 8.3 2 however shows the HPCF pumps running on both divisions II and III (B and C) during a lhPP. Do one or both motors start and run during a IDPP? Note (5) also says "As HPCF pump motors has very large capacity, they are connected to Div. II, III to equalize the DG load capacity." What is the intent of this note? If the HPCF pumps are 100% redundant pumps, wouldn't you want to connect their motors to different divisions anyway to preserve their redundancy? (g) Note (6) states that the CW pump may operate under LOPP condition,
. . . . _ . . . _ - _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ = _
.;
?
W ;
;but nit tparcto with SLC pump sparaticn. On this c lculcticn,.it ;
states, CW pump is not considered because' SID pump is. included. j Because- the CW pump operating load is greater than the SLC pump '
. operating load, the CW pump load should be used. instead of the SLC pump. (
' load during LOPP, in order,co provide the worst case loading on the !
diesel generator. . Please justify or. change the- table accordingly.; ((h)' Note (1) states:that the TCW/TSW pumps are connected to non div. switchgears. ' : Although . these pumps ; are . listed in tables 8.3 1. and 8.3 2, > no loading on the diesels are-identified for these pumps.- If these ; pumps lcannot be connected to the diesel generators why are they shown in-
. tables 8.3 1 and 8.3 27 If they can be connected to the diesels, then a- '
load should be identified for them on the diesels during the 1DPP. condition. This will provide = worst case loading on the diesels during'a. - 1DPP.
~
(i) Note (9) states that the remainder'of plant equipment are connected to div. I and, if A and B motors are provided, they,are connected to div. I and II'respectively. -According to this note loads should only be-shown on D/Cs "A" and "B" in the category ("Other Loads"). that the note refers.to. .There is, however, a load of 210kW shown on D/G "C" under j this category. Please clarify this apparent discrepancy.. i a (j) Note .(10)'says, "Only part of HNCW (HVAC normal cooling water system) will be considered under IDCA case." This note, however, is ! provided in the 1DPP table (table 8.3-2), A note (note (3)) is provided ; in the IDCA table (table 8.3-1) for this ' equipment which states, " Loads are shed with IDCA signal." It appears then that note (10) should read,. :
"Only part of HNCW (HVAC normal cooling water system) will be_ considered' y under IDPP case'. " Please clarify whether this is the case. If the: +
p foregoing is the case, a load for the HNCW equipment should be shown on ; '7 the diesels for the 1DPP condition (table 8.3-2). Presently, a load on j the diesel generators during LOPP is not identified for this equipment. ' l: l' - i
RESPONSE
435.046-(a) A translation of the acronyms used in Tables 8.3 1 and 8.3-2 # follows: CRD - Control Rod Drive FMCRD- Fine Motion Control Rod Drive SLC - Standby Liquid Control ' RHR - Residual Heat Removal ' [ HPCF - High Pressure Core Flow , l CW - Clean Up Water 1J FPC - Fuel Pool Cooling i MWC - Make Up Water System (condensed) < RCW - Reactor Cooling Water (building) HECW - Emergency Cooling Water
' RSW - Reactor Sea Water IA - Instrument Air CVCF - Constant Voltage Constant Frequency NPSS - Nuclear Protection Safety System l COMP - Computer !
SBGT - Standby Gas Treatment I FCS - Flammability control System i MCR - Main Control Room R/B - Reactor Building HX - Heat Exchanger C/B - Control Building ) i DC - Diesel Generator
. _ . _ . . _ _ - _ .~ _. _ ,
sqg , s .
;(b) Erraro in Tables 8.3 1 and 8.3 2 have been corrected as requested.
(See attached)- "
-(
, 4
_(c). Loads on the diesel engine are_ larger than their_ rated value to ) account for the loss through the diesel generator and through the loads. The starting point of the-calculation is the brake horse power required' , 1 for the pump. The generator output. requirement is then calculated from 1 the motor output motor efficiency.(approximately 0.9 to 0.95 depending, j on motor capacity). The~ output of the diesel engine.is then calculated based on a generat'or efficiency of 0.95.= The information in Tables' '
~8.3 1 and 8.3 2 is generic and may change based on unique requirements-for specific plant applications. 5
~(d): IDPP 'and IDCA loads listed as "Other Imads" are designations of c
spare capacity which may be identified in the unique plant application phase of the design. (e) The load idenS tied as "NPSS CVCF" for the D/G "C" 14CA' and 'LOPP has been corrected to read 37.8 KW for both the LOCA and LOPP loads. l (See attached) (f) Note (5) was incorrect and has been deleted. t (g) Note (6) has been changed to read as follows: "The CUW pump will not operate under a LOCA condition. The CW pump may operate under a
-IDPP condition, but will not operate with the SLC pump. On this calculation, the CW pump is considered and the, SLC pump is not since '
the' CW motor. is the larger. of the two. " (h) Note (7) has been deleted and the TCW #md TSW pumps have been q g ' deleted from the IOCA and IDPP load lists. These-loads are treated as ti, _ plant investment protection. The CRD pumps have also been deleted from the LOCA and IAPP load lists, and placed on two non. Class 1E buses. However, - these buses are respectively backed up with the combustion turbine generater and the alternate preferred power supply. (i) Note (9) has been deleted. (See attached) (j) . Note (10) has been deleted. (See attached)
;
E QUESTION 435.047 The following questions pertain to Figure 8.3 1 " Power Distribution Single Line Diagram": (a) The division II 6.9kV bus is shown broken into two separate buses. L' This is apparently an error. Please correct. I (b) The circuit between the division III 6.9kV bus and the 480V ! switchgear P/C 6E-1 does not show an intervening transformer. Please (. correct. !1 (c) Identify the ratings of the diesel generators and 6900/480V transformers on this drawing. l, (d) Discuss the circuit from the division I, II, and III 480V switchgear }. to the turbine island labeled as "To 480V Switchgear (Alternate H Preferred Power)." If this is a power feed to loads in the turbine
_ _ , . - . ~ . --- - - ' lh y iioldnd_ identify thb icads it fecds,~th) g
- le:ds cro=isd, cnd de: crib 3 tha: 1E/n:n.lE circumstancas und3r which ths isalstisn provid:d. If this ,1 is a p:wsr- foedl frta ths- turbina isicnd identify the source 'of power and '!
the need for a second source of power to the 480V Class ~1E bus. In
, either~ case identify the interface requirements for-this circuit.-
(e) On every bus shown in figure 8.3 1 there'is one circuit shown' connected.to ground through a circuit breaker. this circuit. If the circuit is used_to provide aDescribe the function of-safety. ground on the t
.bue during maintenance' operations describe the interlocks, controls -and:
~
'non.
alarms providedoperations. maintenance to assure it is not inadvertently energired during
'(f) Note 2 on this drawing says, 'See 480V MCC one line diagram for-1 i
details."' the SSAR. There is, however, no '480V NCC one.line diagram" provided in-
.t . SSAR.
Please provide us this diagram and include-it in the ABWR' (g) The arrangement of-the' normal preferred and alternate-preferred power figure sources 8.3 2. to the_6.9kV buses does not agree with that shown on Please-correct.this discrepancy. l; . RESPONSE L
'435.047 (a) The revised-Power Distribution Single Line Diagram (attached) has been corrected to show the Division >II, 6.9 kV bus as.one bus. '
(b) The revised Power Distribution Single Line Diagram has been l corrected to show intervening transformers between the Division III, 6.9 kV bus and the 480 VAC switchgear. ,' (c) The rating of-the diesel generators and the 6900/480 V transformers lr i are shown on the revised Power Distribution Single Line Diagram, (d)
-The circuit from the Divisions I, II and III 480'VAC switchgear to the turbine island labeled as "To 480 V Switchgear (Alternate Preferred- 3 Power)" has been deleted in the revised Power Distribution Single Line Diagram.
j j ~ i (e) The bus grounding devices are used to provide a safety ground on buses during maintenance operations,. 1 devices are as follows: Interlocks for the bus grounding a
- 1. Undervoltage relays must be actuated. r
- 2. Related breakers must be in the disconnect position.
- 3. Voltage for bus instrumentation available, j
(f) The problem regarding Note 2 on Figure 8.3 1 has been corrected on. the revised Power Distribution Single Line Diagram. . 4 (g) The discrepancy between normal preferred and alternate preferred . power sources to the 6.9 kV buses has been corrected on the revised Power Distribution Single-Line Diagram. '
l g 4
;
- QUESTION
- 435.048 The offsite power! circuits to the 6.9kV Class IE buses shown in figure. l 8'.3 21"6.9kV System Single Line" should be appropriately labeled as; h
" Normal Preferred Power" or " Alternate Preferred Power."E L
Also, the way; the~ offsite circuits are arranged on this drawing makes .it ( appear that they are connected to the same 6.9kV High Voltage Switchgearq as the RIPS. The offsite circuits to the Class 1E buses should be . directly connected to a winding of'the Offsite-Power Transformers that- 1 J'
' is separate from that which feeds the'non. Class 1E loads. The Offsite-Power Transformers, however, should have the capability of feeding both--
Class 1E and non Class;1E loads so tha plant does not have to rely _on only Class 1E loads when'only.one offsite power. source is Icst. , Also, the offsite power. supply circuits to-the_ Class 1E buses should be-arranged so that all three-Class 1E divisions are not simultaneously i deenergized on-the loss-of only one of the offsite power supplies. These should be included as interface requirements. Please verify that. '+ this is the case, v t
RESPONSE
9 435.048:The single line. drawing has been revised to incorporate a low voltage generator breaker-(see attached). The main power-circuit _to the ,
' switchyard is now the " Normal Preferred Power". The " Alternate Preferred Power" is via the reserve auxiliary transformer and has been-clearly marked on the single line.
If the main power connection to the grid is lost, the unit.is shut down and power generation equipment is not needed. - Investment protection loads remaining on buses Al and 81 can be respectively assumed by-the combustion' turbine generator and'the reserve auxiliary transformer' . I Investment protection requirements are met by the services on'only one of~these two buses. Class 1E and non. Class lE loads do not share. normal auxiliary transformers. However, one of the windings of the. reserve auxiliary [ transformer, which feeds.the 5.9 KV Division III bus, can also be i connected to provide an alternate power source to one of the non. Class ! 1E buses. -This option provides the back up power for the non Class 1E investment protection loads-as described in the previous paragraph. The shared winding does not significantly jeopardize the availability of the - Division III bus, since it can also be fed from either the diesel generator or the combustion turbine generator if the' normal preferred power and the connection to the alternate preferred power are lost. As shown on the one-line diagram, Divisions I & III buses each have three available sources of feeder power. Division II has the same sources with an additional feeder path from the normal preferred power. The design of the bus feeds and their controls is such that an operator may select any or all divisions to be fed from the same offsite power source. Only operating procedures would prevent him from doing this. It is therefore an interface requirement that operating procedures shall require one of the three divisional buses be fed by the alternate power source during normal operation; in order to prevent simultaneous deenergization of all divisional buses on the loss of only one of the offsite power supplies. wsw.r,-- +,--*,.m,-g -- 4
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. QUESTION .i L' '
435.049:With. regard to figure 8.3 3 "480V System Single Line": 'I
. (a) Identify the feeds to 480V switchgear P/C 6A.1, P/C 6A 2 P/C 6Bil, and P/C 6B.2. 1 Describe the purpose and function of these switchgear-and '
the R/B MCCs they feed'. Identify the type of loads they feed (b); type the Identify the location, of loads it feeds.purpose'and function:of P/C 6SB 1. Identify [ divisions of 480V switchgear?Why does it have feeds'from all three Identify the isolation devices.used, andi provide a-connection diagram of the three divisional-feeds to P/C'6SB 1. 5 If P/C 6SB-1 is outside the nuclear island provide its interface requirements.- .. 3
';
(c) Ifthe and theinterface T/B MCCs are non. Class-lE identify the' isolation devices used requirements.
. RESPONSE .
o g' 435.049 (a).The feeds for 480V switchgear P/C 6A.1, P/C 6A 2, P/C 6B 1, and P/C I 6B.2 are shown on revised Figure 8.3 1 (mark.up attached), These are the non class lE 480V switchgear for the plant. They feed all of the 480V non. safety loads except-those few non. Class lE loads which are fed from
' Class IE buses'as indicated in revised Figure 8.3 3 (also attached).
(b) P/C 6SBil (P/C SB-1) provides power to motor control centers which
-are primarily used for maintenance outages. The. cross ties to the r safety-related buses were for maintenance outages _also. =The1 cross ties .
- have been removed. ,
s t (c) The motor control.centera are spotted in the listed buildings to be accessible during maintenance outages. The motor control centers are nonkClass'lE and are fed from non. Class 1E power centers. QUESTION 1 435.050 The non safety related instrument power system shown in Figure 8.3 4 has two redundant Class lE power feeds to it. Identify the isolation devices used between the Class 1E and non. Class 1E systems. A Class 1E circuit breaker tripped on a LOCA signal or two redundant Class lE circuit acceptablebreakers coordinated isolation devices,with the upstream MCC feeder breaker are
RESPONSE
t 435.050 The non. safety related instrument power supplies are fed from the non-Class Section lE extensions of the Class lE 480 V buses. See the revised 8.3.1.1.2.1 (attached per response to question 435.009) for a description of the isolation between the Class 1E buses and the non-Class lE extension buses.
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-QUESTION
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.435.051Lon' figures;8.3 5,~8.3 6, 8.3 7,,and 8.3 8 describe the" function and
)J operation of~the various devices that_are identified by device numbers. Also, on_ device. the diode figures 8.3 7'and 8.3 8 define the acronym SID located-next to Describe the function and operation of this' device.
. RESPONSE 435.051JFigures_8.3 5, .6,'~.7 V and .8 have been revised.
the numeric codes on the new. figures are as follows:However .the meaning to , 27 .l AC undervoltage relay. Operates' when AC voltage drops below predefined-minimum value. 64 . Ground overcurrent relay. Utes voltage'to detect grounded circuit. 76 DC overcurrent relay. ! 3, 1 80 . DC undervoltage relay. >
~
t 84 . Voltage relay. Operates at a specified voltage for DC or AC circuits. i 6 L ~"SID"'is the acronym for silicone diode. When the batteries are on
. shorting float charge.
switchtheisbattery closed.terminal voltage is about 129 VDC and the diodo-- When the battery is placed on equalizing. charge, p the terminal. voltage is increased to about 140 VDC~and the L, shunting with switch for_the diode is opened so that the diode is in' series-the battery. The diode has an almost constant voltage drop of approximately 10 its current _ rating. volts over the forward current range of 10%-to 100% of. This functions to maintain constant voltage at the distribution panel as load current varies'during the time that the
- -battery.is on equalizing charge. '
1 u L QUESTION-v 435.052 On figure 8.3-7 "125 VDC Power System" describe the function and operation of the various key interlocks shown on the figure. I
RESPONSE
435.052 L The key interlocks on the output of the standby chargers insure that a p standby charger is only connected to one load'at a time. The key j interlocks on the inputs of the standby chargers insure that the standby charger-is connected to on?y one input-feed at a time. L L The key interlocks on the output of the normal chargers prevent the - R normal charger and the standby charger from being simultaneously connected to the load. H
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QUESTION _ , . 435'.053-en' figure.8.3 8."250 VDC Power' System" describe the type of isolation -l
;
- provided between the. Class 1E divisional power feeds and the non. Class ;
IE DC Power System. Also describe =the type of isolation ~and separation'. !
- provided between the power feed from P/C .6E.1 (Division-III)- and the
, power' feed the.P/C 6C.1 (Division I). ,
RESPONSE
435.053 Figure 8.3 8;has been revised '(see attached); and subject power feedt are - now identified as P/C CN1 and P/C DN1r These power feeds come from
.lo non. Class 1E; extensions of buses P/C C1 and P/C D1 and are therefore' f non Class 1E. See revised Figure 8.3 3 and the~ responses to questions 435.009.and 435.040'for~a description of the method used to achieve y '
electrical-isolation. QUESTION 435.054 With regard to-the classification of structures, components, and systems in Table 13.2 1; item R1."DC Power Supply - Nuclear Island" and item R2 l
" Auxiliary AC Power System".are very general in their present form. We have therefore determined that Table 3.2-1, items R1 and R2, should be ,
{ expanded to include the following list of items. Please incorporate' ! these items.into Table 3.2 1 adding any additional items necessary to make:it a complete list. R1 DC Power Supply . Nuclear Island 125 volt batteries, battery racks, . battery chargers, and distribution . equipment Control and power cables (including underground cable system, cable. L splices, connectors and terminal blocks) L'
' Conduit and cable trays and their supports Protective relays and control panels Containment electrical penetration assemblies Motors R2 Auxiliary AC Power System L
6900 volt:switchgear 480 volt load centers 480 volt motor control centers 120 VAC safety related distribution equipment including inverters Control and power cables (including underground cable systems, cable splices, connectors and terminal blocks) Conduit and cable trays and their supports
- Containment electrical penetration assemblies ,
Transformers Motors Load Sequencers Protective relays and control panels Valve Operators
- Raceway installations containing Class 1E cables and other raceway installations required to meet seismic Category 1 requirements (those whose failure during a seismic. event may result in damage to any Class 1E or other safety related system or components).
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- 435.054 Table-_3.2 1,: items R1 and R2 have been expanded.with the additions shown
;
.below,Las' requested.
E R1 DC Power Supply-
.1. - 125 volt batteries, 3 SC,X, - - -- -
B I
-battery. racks, battery ' RZ chargers, and distrib .
ution equipment . 2..'Contro'l power: 3_ SC C,X,
* . --- B ;I
-cables (including under-RZ' ground' cable' system,1 j cable. splices, connect-3 ors and-terminal blocks- ,
- 3. Conduit and cableJ 3 lSC,C,X,- --- i' B~ I trays and theirLaupports RZ
- 4. , Protective relays. 3 SC X, --- B- I and' control panels h RZ.
5.. Containment electri- '3-cal penetrations'assen. . SC,C - - -
'B' I blies
.6. Motors 3 SC.C,X, -- - B I RZ .
R2. Auxiliary AC Power System
.1. 6900 volt switch- 3 SC,X, ---
~
gear B I RZ 2, 480 volt load centers 3- .SC,X, - - -- B I
;
RZ
- 3. 480 volt motor 3 SC,X, -- -
L B I L control centers- RZ
~
L 4 120 VAC safety rela-L 3 SC,X, --- B I ' .ted distribution equip- RZ-ment including inverters *
- 5. Control and power 3 SC,C,X, --- B I cables (including under- RZ
" ground cable systems,
-cable splices, connectors
'and terminal blocks) 6 Conduit and cable g
3 SC,C,X, --- B I trays and their supports RZ
- 7. Containment electrical 3 SC,C,X, - -- B I penetration assemblies RZ
- 8. Transformers 3 SC C,X, ---
B I RZ
t
- 9. Motors: 3- S C , C , X ,- .- B I
. RZ I
- 10. Load sequencers 3 SC,X, --- B I
[' RZ
- 11. Protective relays 3 SC,X, ..- B I and control panels RZ
- 12. Valve operators- 3 SC,C,X, -.. 8 I-f.-
RZ
. QUESTION 435.055 Section 8.3.1'.1.8.9 states that the qualification tests are performed on.
the requirements. diesel generator per IEEE Std 387 as modified by Regulatory Guide j 1.9 If the qualification tests have been performed please provide us the results of the tests. If the tests have not yet been performed please indicate at what point the tests will be conducted. RESPONSE ! 435.055 The qualification' tests for diesel generators have not.been done, a The- { schedule for .their performance will not be known untilla plant has been l ordered and the purchase orders.for the diesel generators placed. Such-information is beyond'the scope of the Licensing Review Bases (LRB) document,,but shall be supplied by the applicant as an interface requirement, t
. .............................................................................. Lj QUESTION q
435.056 There have recently been a number of problems identified with the l electrical systems at nuclear power plants. Although a number of these j o arose as a result of modifications done on the' electrical systems after the plants were licensed, some were or could have been the result of j H poor original design. ! (a) Generic Letter 88-15 addresses a number of electrical system 4 i problems that have occurred primarily as a result of inadequate control l over the design process. Some of these inadequacies have occurred in ; L L areas of electrical system design which have historically well ? established principles such as circuit breaker coordination and fault current interruption capability. As a result the staff has not normally undertaken a detailed review of these areas, relying instead on the designers exercise of these well established principles. It is ! important that these areas have comprehensive, detailed design criteria and guidelines established for the design engineer. Controls should i exist to ensure that these criteria are followed~during the design process. Please address the specific problems discussed in GL 88-15 identifying the criteria and guidelines used to ensure that these inadequacies will not be found in the ABWR design. Provide a general discussion of the controls that exist over the design process in the electrical system area of the ABWR design. (b) NRC Information Notice No. 88-75 identifies a problem where the anti-pump circuitry on circuit breakers can, under certain ; circumstances, result in loss of manual or automatic control of the circuit breaker. Subsequent to this, engineering personnel at Zion
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' identified a prtblem b3twasn thi eleong.lsgic cnd cnti. pump circuits- of certain' circuit breakers that would prevent.the closing of these circuit ._ -'
breakers following a loss of offsite power. Please review the automatic
' and manual closing and tripping logic of the ABWR circuit breakers 4 to. U determine lif there are any conditions that could result in loss of ;
manual or automatic. control through-interaction with the breaker anti-pump. circuits. Provide us the results of_your review. j
-(c) NRC Bulletin No. 88 10 and NRC Information N5ticeLNo. 88 46 j identifies a problem with defective refurbished circuit breakers. -
Although the_ primary concern is with circuit breakers used in L) t o safety.related circuits, there is also a concern with non. safety.related i breakers used for electrical penetration protection, since these also provide:a safety.related-function but undergo less scrutiny fPlease identify how you ensure that non. Class'IE breakers purchased for use in ' containment electrical penetration circuits are_high quality, new circuit breakers from the circuit breaker manufacturer, rather than i refurbished circuit breakers.
. RESPONSE J
'435.056 (a)'The Generic latter (GL) 88 15 discusses' problems due.to the. lack of full compliance-with, and implementation of, u neral Design Criterion 1 a(CDC)later 17 date. on the original' design and/or chang <e to the original design at-The ABWR electrical power systems design complies with CDC 17 as specified in Subsection-3.'1.2.2.8. ~
(b) NRC Information Notice nu:aber 88 75 discusses the problem of disabling of diesel generator output circuit breaker by anti. pump circuitry.
- 1) The review of the automatic and manual closing and tripping logic of the ABWR circuit breaker reveals that '
there are no conditions that could result in loss of manual or automatic _ control through interaction with the breaker anti. pump circuit, 1 l
- 2) The'ABWR circuit breaker logic is designed such that !
all potentially sealed.in close circuits for the circuit ; breakers are broken by spring. return control switches, j time delay drop.out circuits, or control interlocks. ! Removal of the close signal will drop out the anti. pump ! seal.in circuit which provides the condition for the breaker to respond to the next close signal, L l (c)-The NRC'Information Notice number 88 46 discusses problems with j defective refurbished circuit breakers. To ensure that refurbished l circuit breakers shall not be used in safety related or non. safety related circuitry of the ABWR plant design, it is an interface j requirement that new breakers be specified in the purchase 4 specifications. i-l l l l 1 1
a.
.1 QUESTION ..
435.057 With respect to the application of single failure criterion to manually. controlled, electrically. operated valves, list all valves for. .; which SRP Branch Technical Position ICSB 18 (PSB) may apply.- Describe i (1) how power is locked out to active and passive valves,-(2) how power ' can be reinstated from the control roontif valve repositioning (active valves) is required later, and'(3) how the valve position indication ,
. meets.the single failure criterion. !
RESPONSE
'435.057 <
There are no valves in the ABWR plant design which are required to meet the provisions of SRP Branch Technical Position ICSB 18 (PSB), Valve operations have been evaluated in the design. If inadvertent open j operation has unacceptable safety consequences, two valves are placed in series.on the pipe with logic segregation such that no single electrical failure can open both valves. .Likewise, if inadvertent close operation has. unacceptable safety consequences, two valves are placed in parallel on the pipe with logic segregation such that no single electric failure can close both valves.. The power disconnect option is.therefore unnecessary and is not used.
- . QUESTION l 435.058 -3
- Experience with nuclear power plant Class 1E electrical system equipment 1 protective relay applications has established that relay trip setpoint drifts with conventional type relays have resulted in premature trips of redundant safety related system pump motors when the safety system was L
required to be operative. While the basic need for proper protection L for feeders / equipment agains perminent faults is recognized -it is the staff's position that total non availability of redundant safety systems due to spurious trips in protective relays is not acceptable. ; Provide a description of your circuit protection criteria for safety j systems / equipment to avoid incorrect initial setpoint selection and the above cited protective relay trip setpoint drift problems. ,
RESPONSE
435.058 The ABWR design is such that there are no single failures of electrical protective devices which could cause loss of function of redundent systems. This will minimize the probability of simultaneous trips. User devices such as motors will be purchased with sufficient overload margins for set points of protective devices to be set sufficiently above the operating point to allow for setpoint drift. QUESTION 435.059 Explicitly identify all non. Class 1E electrical loads which are or may be powered from the Class 1E AC and DC systems. For each load identified provide the horsepower or kilowatt rating for that load and identify the corresponding bus number and division from which the load is powered. Also identify the type of isolation device used between the non. Class 1E load and Class 1E power supply.
y . . . - -. . -. - - _ ~ - c i o l
RESPONSE
435.059 In Table 1 (attached) under!" POWER SOURCE", the following 480V buses are-powered by Class 1E AC systems and are used to power Non. Class 1E AC' l 4- _ loads: 480V P/C CN1, DN1 and EN1. -(See Figure 8.3 3-) These buses-
. power. instrument air' compressors, 250 chargers, CVCFs=for the computer power supplies 'and motor control' centers (MCCs) for smaller loads.
Loads on.the MCOs are also shown on Table 1. -The electrical division
.n from which each load is powered is identified on Table 1. All'of'the . 'j loads on these diesel. fed,' non. safety power conter buses and associated J MCOs are included in ~ the' D/C load summary tables, Tables 8.31 through.
8.3 3. Their estimated. power requirements: are also shown on the ~ tables. - ,
, The actual KW rating for'each load cannot be identified until vendor l data is received during the bid / purchasing phase- i i
Isolation between non Class lE buses P/C CN1, DN1 and EN1,-and C1' ass _lE! buses P/C C1, D1 and El is described in revised paragraph 8.3.1.1.2.1 (attached-per response to question 435.009).- ' l Non. Class;1E DC loads powered by Class lE DC systems are' powered from ! k
.non. Class 1E buses DCN A10, DCN B10, DCN C10 and DCN D10. Load and I I electrical division information for these buses is shown in Table 1 = '
Isolation between the non. Class 1E DC loads and their Class.lE, 125 VDC supply buses is provided by a Class 1E DC.to-DC converter for each division. [j 1 l 4 QUESTION
'435.060 Section 8.3.1.2.1 states compliance with the recommendations.cf.R.C.
1.106 " Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor. Operated Valves". Describe the means used to bypass the thermal overload
- , protection to Class 1E MOVs during accident conditions. Describe what l
I type of indication for the bypass or lack of bypass is provided in the . y control room. Provide a schematic of the design or give MOV drawing references as specific examples of the design.
RESPONSE
L 435.060 Thermal overload protection for Class 1E MOV's.is in effect only when-the MOV's are in TEST and is bypassed at all other times by means of closed contacts (one per phase) in parallel with the thermal overload contacts. A visual indication is provided in the MCR when a MOV is in-
. test. A copy of the thermal overload relay bypass table from the RCIC j System IBD is provided in the attachment. Circuit details at the '
elementary drawing level are beyond the scope of the Licensing Review Bases (URB) document. I
.............................................................................. l QUESTION 1
435.061 Experience with nuclear power plant Class 1E motor. operated valve motors ' has shown that in some instances the motor winding on the valve operator j could fail when the valve is subjected to frequent cycling. This is I primarily due to the limited duty cycle of the motor. H Provide the required duty cycle of the ECCS and RCIC steam and water line motor operated valves as they relate to their respective system i modes of operation during various events. Demonstrate that the availability of the safety systems in the ABWR design will not be i
. ._ . . ~ . _ _ _ . . . . .
e
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temprrnicsd dur to tha licit:d = duty cycle of thn valve op3rotcr Ectors. RESPONSE- [
- 435.0611 The ECCS' and RCIC motor operated valves are not subjected to constant. !
cycling during their various modes of operation. They are either driven -! full cpen or full closed and left'in position until the system operating. : F mode is changed. - Throttle valves are not expected to be subjected to L .1
. conrtant cycling because they are manually' set.for descrete positions by the control room operator:and left until'a position change is required.
Design life requirements are provided in the ECCS specifications and
' equipment will be procurred to meet those requirements. -Duty cycle
- information will not be available until purchase' specifications are- .
' written, based in part on design' life requirements, and selected vendor; 7
)
data is available. '
....................................e..........................................
QUESTION.- 435.062 Provide the minimum required starting voltages'for Class.1E motors. Compare these minimum required voltages to the voltages that will be supplied at the motor terminals during the starting transient when 3 operating on offsite power and when operating on the diesel generators. _ RESPONSE ~ 435.062 The minimum required starting voltage information for' Class 1E motors and information'regarding the voltages that will be supplied to motor , terminals during the starting transient.when operating on offsite power. and when operating on diesel generators will not be available until equipment purchase specifications are issued for specific application, i.' 5 , .y,._,__._.,_,.._.._m, _ - _ _ - , . , . . . . . - . . - . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ __ _ _ ___,._._________.______u _ ._ _ . _____,
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GENERAL ELECTRIC PROPRIETARY - prwided under separate cover. L l l E e i! y. w. L F, , k 4 I' , 1 i 1k$ 1' l
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Figure 83 8 250VDC Power System SLD !
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1 I MN. meerd Plant - anAssooAo I arv a ,
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The standby AC power system is capable or providing the required power to safely shut down ' 8.1.1 Utility Gdd Description the reactor after loss of preferred power (l. OPP) ' Out of ABWR Standard Plant Scope. and/or loss of coolant seeldest (LOCA) or to maintain tbc safe shutdown opedition and operate i 8 the Class IE avulliaries accessary for plant O s05,00I 1.2 OnsiteElectricPowerSystem safety durins and after shutdown. s.t.2.1 Description of Electrical Power System
-+ The plant 480 VAC auxiliary powe'r system j' /2stpr t}The reactor building is supplied distributes with sufficientthree power _ for normal auxiliary and Class 1E 480 volt plant loads, divisions of class 1E AC powerNigure 8.31). All class 1E elems :s of the auxiliary power.
Each of the Division 1,11, and III Class 1E 6.9 distribution system are supplied via the 6.9 kV kv buses have two feeders from the offsite sour- Class IE switchgear and, therefore, are capable The Cless 1E AC power system is divided intoces normal preferred and alternate alternate preferred efstanby
- j wer luppMI."
three independent divisions to provide AC power to the three divisions of Class IE loads. In Th 00 .C ;' r ; n : : g r ; n ?.f;.!= t i- general, motors larger than 300 KW are supplied u
- - C'~ 15 f.;... .. .;;' d:in :nn:r; k. "-
L from the 6.9 kV bus Motors 300KW or smaller but ;!::. y....M The 1,20 V non Class IE larger than 100KW are supplied power from 480V instrumentation power sysfc o des power for , switchgear. 460V motors 100KW or smaller are aupplied power from 480V motor control centers. non Class IE control and instrumentation loads. The 6.9KV and 480V switchgear single line dia. grams are shown on Figures 8.3 2 and 8.3 3, provides The Class 1E 120 VAC instrument power system,9ee AJ-g power for Class 1E plant controls and
.' 5 respectively.
instrumentation. The system is separated into i
, i Divisions I, II, and Ill with distribution pa-Duringo'majllant gerajign all of the non- nels fed from abeir respective divisional Class 1E bus [(hrt ifulpised hatF76wer from the sources, giurbine generator through the unit auxiliary y transformers."."." Chn IE Sr= =: ::;;E:dm The 125SC power distribution system pro-h; :n d ;L :- ;;.;..y ;;;i;z:.:-
Eitser /tbe normal preferred *de#the alternate pre,Ed :_vides four independent and redundant on ferred AC power sources are capable of providing sourcegfggr rgrgn lo g g y g g ],g y g gi gg..gy E g gg g power to all Division 1,11, and 111 Class IE _ loads in addition lifTsIIected non Class 1E loads. @/ff_. onee6C ;: f;.;7I.....N. p'- - === d;t-'M 9 . ;'m dr!; s-r - C!n; :: t==. e ! Separate non Class IE 250V batteries are pro-vided to supply uninterruptible power to the The three standby AC power supplies provide a separate onsite' source of power for each class 1E esseee **"- Clar 4 P C dor 8' plant computers and :h :xt!:: '9; ,w, load group when normal and alternate preferred power supplies are ogygige asfer from the normal preferre6 power,,, @supp g 4afft g ,Jo s g njthe g 7;nn control (SSI.C) fer #6 r;;,; r ; ru -, our un y gelgeratpr,ip pomatic. The transfer 4ee 120 VAC buses. The four buses provide the d Athe aEernatElreTerrelpower souredis a manual redundancy for various instrumentation, logic p ' transfer, and trip circuits and solceoid valves. The SSLC power supply is urther described in Subsection The Division 1,11, and 111 standby AC power 8.1.3.1.1.2. aspplies consist of an independent 6.9 kV Class *7p 1E diesel generator, one for each division. Each 8.1J11 Safetylands g' (g,e five dMs may be connected to its respective 6.9 kV Class IE switchgear bus through a main circuit breaker The safety loads utiliu various Class 1E AC located in the switchgear. and/or DC sources for instrumentation and motive Amsadment 6 8.11
i (INSERT [[) l The scept o1 the.onsite electrical power system includes the entire system on the plant side of the los voltage terminals of the main power transformer and the connection at the high voltage bushings of the reserve transformer, as indicated on the oneline diagram, Pigure 8.3 1. ne main power transformer is not in scope. The combustion turbine generator .LTC) is within scope. , i The electrical interface requirements are shown on the oneline. A generator breaker capable of interruptinf the maximum available fault current is provided. ' This allows the generator to be taken off line rnd the main grid to be utilized as a power source for the unit auxiliary transinrners and their loads, both Class IE and non Class 1E. This is also the start up power train for the unit. There are four unit auxiliary transformers, two to feed the non. Class IE buses and two to feed the Class 1E buses. The ' Normal Prefr red" power feed is frem the unit auxiliary transformers so that there normally art no bus transfers required when the unit is tripped off the line. If the unit is on the line the
- Normal Preferred" power vould normally be available for both the Class 2E and non. Class IE buses.
One, three. winding 30 MVA unit reserve transformer is supplied to provide power for the emergency buses as an alternate to the " Normal Preferreda power. This is truly a reserve transformer because unit startup is accomplished from the ; normal preferred power, which is backfed over the. main power circuit to the unit auxiliary transformers. The two low voltage windings of. the reserve transformer are rated 15 MVA each. One winding provides the second off site power source ( for Divisions 1 and II. The other winding provides the second off site power , source for Division 111 and non safety bus B2 which supplies investment protection loads. There is also a combustion turbine rhich supplies standby power to two turbine building buseo, The plant investment protection loads are grouped on the two turbine building buses. Manually controlled breakers provide the capability of 1 connectir;; the combustion turbine generator to any one of the emergency buses if . all other power sources are lost. l ' i (INSERT () The third cla'ss 1E bus is supplied from the reserve transformer. This third dit'ision is immediately available, without a bus transfer, if the normal prefered power is lost to the other two divisions. L l
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n any a a ' 8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEMS 8J.1. Desenplion - ! Out of ABWR Standard Plant scope. l S.2.2 Analysis : i Ost of ABWR Standard Flaat scope. -i i 8.2.3 laterfaces g.
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i t fg.2J.1 Class IE Feeder Cornelas ---
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i Each of Division I, II, and 111 Class 1E buses shall be provided with two short access
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feeder circuits from the transmission network. -- The two power feeders (referred to as normal
' preferred and alternate preferred) shall be from f4j6 0C[f :
independent transmission sources. 1 All Class 1E feeders shall be 6.9kV. Both [ normal preferred and akernate preferred AC power sources to each division of Class 1E buses shall i be espabla ^f providing power to the Class 1E and ~ non Clas; ff load 2 on that division. ; L 8.2.3.2 Nee.Cless IE Feeders ' t i , Non Class 1E load groups shall be supplied , L with individual feeders from the auxiliary power system. t 8.2.3.3 Speeli'le Offsite Power System Interfaces. l Specific ABWR Standard Plant /remalader of ' plant power system interfaces are as follows:
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(1)- Two 6.9kV normal preferred feeders, one I # branched to divisions 2 and 3; k(2) One 6.9kV alternate, preferred feeder, branched to three divisions; l ' (3) Four 6.9kV feeders to four transformers powering ten RIP pumps; and ,
- 4) Four 480V feeders to four 480 volt motor control centers to power non safety related ;
loads la the reactor building. Amensmem 8.21
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(Insona g) ! The interface point between the ABWR design and the utility design for the main [ generator output is at the connection of the isolated phase bus duct to the main ' power transformer low voltage terminals. The rated conditions for this . interface is 1500 MVA and 26.325 KV. It is a requirement that the utility provide sufficient impedance in the main power transformer and the high voltage circuit to limit the primary side maximum available fault current contribution , from the system to no more than 275 KA symmetrical and 340 KA asymmetrical at 5 cycles from inception of the fault. These values should be acceptable to most , utilities. When all equipment and system parameters are known, a refined calculation based on the known values with the fault located at the generator side of the generator breaker may be made. This may allow a lower impedance for the main power transformer, if desired. , 1 The second power interface occurs at the high voltage terminals of the reserve auxiliary transformer. The rated load is 30 KVA at a 0.9 power factor. The voltage and frequency will be the utilities standard with the actual values to l be determined at contract award, i Protective relaying interfaces for the two power system interfaces are to be defined during the detail design phase following contract award. d
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EQUIPMENTDATABASE GENERAL ELECTRIC PROPRIETARY . provided under separate cover (Table has $7 pages) t l l-1 l, l' l p.
MN Standard Plant nAMDOAO im A SJ ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS load centers consisting of 6.9 kV/480V transfor. N35 d g mers and associated metal clad switchgear, Fig-8 3.1 AC Power Systems GhtC of ure8.33. & r: r SF r: r
- 1E 'rN m .9 w- u iq - = 4 4 83.1.1 Desertption ;;: H: h n;p S4 '.e ;a4 :r!erm >
r:rr!teSeM:c s hhed.% The auxiliary elettric power system includes three independent Class 1E AC electric power sys- Class 1E 480V load esaters supplying Class 1E tems for nuclear safety related loads. Tbc prin- loads are arranged as independent radial sys- , elpal elements of the auxiliary AC electric power tems, with each 480V bus fed by its own power , t transformer. Each 480V Class 1E bus in a divi-systemsea areocshowgin si.ye n.c Figure 8.31, A,ye.s mi2, 3,)4 ated 5. slon is physically and electrically independent Each Class 1E division has a dedicated d!esel of the other 480V buses in otber divisions, generator, which automatically starts in case of a level trip and/or loss of voltage on the divi- The 480V unit substation breakers supply mo- , sion's 6.9 kV bus. Each 6.9 kV Class 1E bus for control centers and 460V motor loads up to feeds it's associated 480V unit substation and including 300KW, Switchgear for the 480V i throurb a 6.9.kV/ 480/277V load center trans. load centers is of indoor, metal enclosed type former, with drawout circuit breakers Control power is (- from the Class 1E 125 VDC power system of the 8.3.1.1.1 Medium Voltage Power Distribution same division. System 83.1.1.2.2 Motor Control Centers l AC power is supplied cod utilized at 6.9 kV for motor load larger than 300 KW and transform. Tbc 480 MCCs feed motors 90KW and smaller, ! ed to 480 V for smaller loads. The 480V system control power transformers, process beaters, is further transformed into lower voltages as re- motor operated valves and other small electri-O" ontrols. 480120V quired for instruments, lighting, and (includescally The 6.9 kV system x ^ C* '94 operated auxiliaries, includin]ITrol cen. and 480 240V transformers. Class 1E"4 i normal and alternate preferred power supply ters are isolated in separate load groups , feeders, corresponding to divisions established by the 480V unit substations. Class 1E AC power loads are divided into three divisions (Divisions I,11, and 111), each fed Starters for the control of 460V motors smal, from an independent 6.9 kV Class IE bus. During ler than 90KW are MCC mounted, across the. line normal operation, Divi; ion 1. Division !! and Di- magnetically operated, air break type. Circuits vision 111 loads are fed from an offsite noimal leading from the electrical penetration assem-preferred power supply. blies into the containment area have a fuse in series with the circuit breakers as a backup pro. Standby AC power for Class 1E buses is sup- tection for a fault current in the penetration plied by diesel generators at 6.9 kV and distri- in the event of circuit breaker overcurrent or buted by the Class 1E power ditribution system. fault protection failure. Division I, !! and 111 buses are automatically transferred to the diesel generators when the nor- 83.1.13 120/240V Distribution System mal preferred power supply to these buses is lost. Indi idual transformers and distribution panel ocated in the vicinity of the loads i 83.1.1.2 tm Voltage Power Distribution requi' 120/240V power. This power is us:d for System lighting.120V receptacles and other 120V loads. S3.1.1.4 lastrument Power Supply systems 83.1.1.2.1 Power Cei.ae* l Power for 480V auxiliaries is supplied from 1' 8M ( Amendment 2 l l
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There are three 480 VAC non Class 1E load centers which are respectively and i individually. fed from Divisions I, 11 and III 6.9 KV Class 1E buses. Isolation , breakers are provided between the Class 1E and non Class 1E buses. In addition to the normal overcurrent tripping of the isolation breakers, zone selective > interlocking is provided between each isolation breaker and its upstream Class 1E feed breaker. If fault current flows in the non Class 1E bus, it is sensed by the Class 1E current device for the isolation breaker and a trip blocking , signal is sent to the upstream Class 1E feed breaker. This blocking signal lasts for about 75 milliseconds. This allows the isolation breaker to trip in
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its normal instantaneous tripping time of 35 to 50 milliseconds, if the - magnitude of the fault current is high enough ' This assures that the fault current has been terminated before the Class 1E upstream breaker is free to trip, Tor fault currents of lesser magnitude, the blocking delay will time out without either breaker tripping, but the isolation breaker will eventually trip and always before the upstream breaker. This order of tripping is assured by the coordination between the two breakers provided by the long time pickup, long time delay and instantaneous pickup trip device characteristics. This coordination is carried through to the non. Class 1E load breakers so that for a , load fault the load breaker would normally trip without the bus isolation breaker tripping,
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Tripping of the Class IE feed breaker is normal for faults which occur on the Class 1E bus or its Class 1E loads, ; O e e a -
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as-4rd Plant tsAM00AG arv A ; i When the DC source is lost or when the inverter 83.1.1.4.2.7 Opernelag CasAguraties fails, the static switch transfers to the regu. lating transfo)mer without interruption (not more > ne four 120 VAC essential power supplies op. than 4 msec). erste independently, providing four divisions of : Inverter power supplies for the $$LC. The not. 83.1.1.433 Compeoents l mal lineup for each divisloa is through an essen. ! tial 400 VAC pcmer espply, the AC/DC converter, ; Each of the four essential $$LC power supplies the laverter and the static transfer switch. ; includes the following components: Transfer from the inverter, directly to the es. : settial AC source is done automatically la case ! (1) a power distribution cabinet, including the ofinverter failure, or maevally for malateasoce
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SSLC 120 VAC bus and circuit breakers for or testing. Assveelation in the control room is the $$LC loads; ! provided for the following: switching to the al. i ternate source;leverter failure, and manual by. (2) a solid. state inverter, to convert 125 VDC pass. The 120 VAC RPS power supply supplies power to 120 VAC uninterruptible power independent power to the RPS scram solenoids and supply; the MSIV nolenoids for isolation. (3) a solid. state transfer switeb to sense in. 83.1.1J Class IE Electric Equipment verts failure and automatically switch to Ceasiderstions alternate 120 VAC power; The following guidelines are utilized for (4) a 480V/120V bypass transformer for the al. Class 1E equipment. + ternate power supply; 83.1.1J.1 Pbnical Separation and ($) a manual bypass switch to manually trans, ladependency fer SSLC supply from inverter to an alter. sete source; and Equipment of one division is segregated from equipment of other divisions and nondivisional (6) an output isolation transformer. equipment, in accordance with IEEE Std 384, Re.
- ' gulatory Guide 1.75 and General Design Criterion Each of the two RPS power supplies consists of 17. Tbc overall design objective is to locate tbc power distribution cabinet, including the 120 the d; visional equipment and its associated con. ,
VAC bus, input breaker and circuit breakers for trol, instrumentation, electrical supporting the individual loads, systems and interconnecting cabling such that separation is maintained among all divisions. 83.1.1.4.2.6 Power Sourm Divisional separation is achieved through the s use of barriers, spatial separation, and totall) (1) $$LC 120 VAC: Each SSI.C disional l20 VAC enclosed raceways, bus is fed by a 480V Class 1E power supply via two paths. The normal path is via an Redundant divisions of electric equipment and AC/DC converter to a divisional DC bus which cabling are located la separate rooms or fire powers an inverter. The alternate path is areas wherever possible. In some instances spa, direct, through a Class 1E stepdown trans, tial separation is provided such that no single former. Tbc DC bus utilizes 125 VDC power event may disable no.e than one of the redundant ; from the Class IE battery, as a backup. divisions or prevent safe abutdown of the plant, (2) RPS 120 VAC: Each of the two RPS buses Electric equipment and wiring for the Class derives its power from a SSLC power supply. 1E systems which are segregated into separate di. RPS A solenoids are fed from division 2 and visions are separated so that no design basis RPS B solenoids are fed from division 3. event is capable of disablinggany ESF total ' function. eneet It.es est efivilip o f Amendment 2 8.33
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3146100A0 mandard Plant arv s ! use of conventional, protective relaying practi. loss of citation, antimotoring (reverse power) l ces for isolation of faults. Emphasis has been overcurrent voltage restraint, high Jacket water !
,placed on preserving function and limiting loss temperature and low lobe oil pressure, are used !
of Class 1E equipment function in situations of to protect the machine when operating in ; power loss or equipment failure. parallel with the normal power system, during periodic tests. The relays are automatically , Circuit protection of the Class 1E buses isolated from the tripping circuits during LOCA l costeleed within the nuclear island is interfaced conditions. No frip ere 6vpoeta/ Ar,b . with the design of tbc overall protection system L(// te fe M "$' ? outside the nucleat island. 33.1.1.7 Land Sheddlag and 7 % on . Ns'UM'esiirisees cten irth1 Fens I,' It-SJJ.1O eding thods '
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The medium voltage (6900Y) system is low reais.
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tat <ce grounded except that each diesel generator i is high resistance grounded to maximize availabi- " # " * * '***** " '
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y a LoCs darina LoPP redsces the time detty for Initotion of bus transfer from 3 secomes to 0.4 S.3.1.14.3 Bus Protection '
- alven ***on*Table ** 8.3*4
**'" ** * *~ M',f4 Bus protection is provided as follows: L,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,u,,,,,,,y,,,,,,,,,,,g,,,,l '
(1) 6.9kV bus incoming circuits have inverse , eenmW by W conmt ente for W etecuteet{ time overload, ground f ault, bus differeatial and undervoltage protection. ***h **I*' '*** * '**** ""' ****d "' 'k*i' ' g1MI P"I.8'.'YY_**i8Ir%'Nb%V s . (2) 6.9kV feeders for load centers have Class 1E buses are normally energiecd from (O instantaneous, inverse time overload and ground fault protection, the normal preferred power supply. Should the bus voltage decay to below 70% of its nominal rated value for a predetermined (3) 6.9kV feeders for beat eschanger building time a bus transfer is initiated and the
- substations have inverse time overload and signal will trip the supply breaker, and ground fault protection, start the diesel generator. As the bus voltage decays,large pump motor breakers (4) 6.9kV feeders used for motor starters have are tripCped. The transfer proceeds to instantaneous, inverse time overload, ground the diesel generator. If the standby fault and motor protection. diesel generator is ready to accept load (i.e., voltage and frequency are within (5) 480V bus incoming line and feeder circuits normal limits and no lockout exists, and have inverse time overload and ground fault Ibc normal and alterCoate preferred supply protection. breakers are open), then the diesel generator breaker is signalEled to SJ.1.14.4 Protection Requirements close, accomplishing automatic tranCfer of the Class 1E bus to the diesel gen.
l gg.03] When the diesel-generators are called uponerator. to Large motor loads will be sequence operate during '-- ' pri ::f ;; n %^"') = " started as required and as shown on Table hsGeir] LOCA conditions,16e only protectivgevjces for 83 fal % the diesel ges retor are the generato(differen. @) ten eF Cu/a t Ac,At( @ f* ,g tial relays the engine overspeed tripj ded g) LOPP rollowlan LOCA: If tbc bus' voltage
-- re ' " met' :6p red e W (normal preferred power) is lost during epWe,38Mr'eTimed g r-M " under accident post. accident operation, transfer to diesel conditions to protect against possible, signifi. generator power occurs as described in (1) ,
ficant damane. Other orotective relays, such as above. Ree 3eeset coeu et w e rse so weeieir.o y_ay_s) ea seu d. umr e resure (wr euc*4r e ed of wr seum)um e
(W3fRT T When a LOCA occurs, with or without a LOPP, the load sequence timars are started L if the 6.9 KV emergency bus voltage is greater than 70% and loads are applied to the bus at the end of preset times. Each LOCA. load has an individual load sequence timer which will start if a LOCA occurs and the 6.9 KV emergency bus voltage is greater than 70%, regardless of whether the bus voltage source is preferred power or the diesel generator. The load sequence timers are part of the low level circuit logic for each LOCA load and do not previde a means of common mode failure that would render both onsite and offsite power unavailable. If a timer failed, the LOCA load could be applied manually provided the bus voltage is greater than 70%. i l I f
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I 1 s 1 2146100A0 me..Amed Plant arv m j 1DCA fellowimp LDPP. If a LOCA occurs fol. lowing loss of the normal preferred power i supplies, the LOCA signal starts ESF equip-seest as required. Automatic (LOCA + LOPP) time delayed load sequencing assures that ,
. the diesel stattator will not be overloaded, l l
i LDCA arven diesel spenerator la parallel ]l j meeferred namer anarce durine test: f a occurs waen sac usesei generator i under routine testing and thegeo is from tb l ontrol room, the dinel gene. { retor circuit sker is tripped automa. ! tically to termina t ' testing and with m . preferred power a ' e,(be LOCA sequenc. 'f)5'.4If j ing procedure arts as 5 cribed in (1). f If Ibc testJsIcing conducle om tbc io- r ' tal con i panel, control must eturne i to 1 main control room or the test era must trip the diesel tenerator breaker
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Re'ordh c ',a6swer h - L9 $oction,2.3 1.1705),has been changed co 'esadt-e . b p . _
- ,J- .- -
m > I "If a LOCA occurs when the diesel generator is '
' paralled with either the normal preferred power or
; the alternate preferred power source, the D/G will i
automatically be disconnected from the 6.9 KV .
\emergencybusregardlessofwhetherthetestis j being
'the mainconducted control room." from the local control panel o jr L
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i eirealts are provided, as appropriate, to' ensure (3) peerstor loss of escitation; ! that each load is applied automatically at the ! correct time. Each diesel generator set is pro. (4) reverae pomer; vided with two ladependent starting air systems. }
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(5) low turbo oil pressure; I 811.1A4 Amtematic Shaddies, Leading and laelselos (6) high vibratica; i The diesel generator is cosmetted to its Class (7) hisb lube oil temperature;- IE bus only whom the incoming preferred source ; breakers have beca tripped (subsection 8.3.1.1. (8) nowiube oilpresswe; 7). Linder this conditloa, major loads are tripped from tbc Class IE bus, escept for the (9) higb enskenne pressure;and Class IE 480V unit substation feeders, before closing the diesel generator breaker. (10) lowJacket water pressure. M fellwims - The large motor loads are later reapplied f.,Frotective functions (trips) of the engine or sequentially and automatically to the bus after the generator breaker and other off.aormal con closing of the diesel generator breaker, tions are annunciated la the male control room and/or locally.gGW f3**** werd "M.*st**tET N \ ' o Sal.lAS Protection Systems - 1 $', ma,i*,",",#",*[M'..,;..'[,4,',, (1) low level-jacket water; .te. The diesel generator is shut down and the , j ay,- i e weleegs/.. ,ai tg g,,,,y,4 ,,, syy . generator breaker tripped under the following (2) low pressure-jacket water; N g .f[[[M conditions during all modes of operation and vUi*,ane***.I$,$,,,,;* <e, c w r,% testing operation: (3) low low presswe-jacket water;
/[ s,ia, e...se eso-< ties
' e es, (1) engine owrspeed trip;and (4) low temperature-jacket water in; \ re4*c tier, p/o y, 6.,[jf ,
r W ori % e eve se;..w , . (2) peerator differential relay trip. (5) high temperatwo-jacket water out; I",,* **7.,,%'. d , q ( nec [ hr (sg.: The generator breaker is tripped under the (6) high high temperature jacket water out; - following conditions during normal operations and testing: (7) lowlesel-lube oilmark;
. (1) paerator ground overcurrent; (8) low temperature-lube allia; (2) generator voltage restrained overcurrent; (9) high temperature-lube oilout; (3) busunderfrequency; (10) high high temperature-lube oil;
. (4) generator reverse power; and (11) bigb differeatial pressure lube oil filter; l (5) peerator loss of field. '
(12) low pressure- turbo oil right/left bank; la addition, during diesel scaerator normal operations or testing, the diesel generator is (13) low low pressws-turbo oil; shut down due to: (1) highjacket water temperstwe; * (15) now lowpressure-lube oil; (2) generator high bearing temperature; Amneament 2 SM
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MNN i h=dard Plant 2146100AG mA i E/b (16) high temperaturegbearings; trol may be transferred to a local control sta. ~ (17) hi Sb pressure crankcase; tion la the diesel generator room by operating ' key switches at that station. ,
-(18) excess V kerie [ivegibrRion; i 8.3.1.1.8.7 Eaglee MechankelSystems and '
Accessortes I (19)f.sAegomrspeed; t a Descriptions of these systems and accessories (20) -__,---,,; get wl_ piteult
-; (pE. 6//gre r - deses are gives in Section 9.5.
P (21)]&ove,ry'ettogs"' - -
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8.3.1.1.8.8 laterleeks and Testability e (22) low pressure-starting air; ' Each diesel generator, when operating other than la test mode,is totally independent of the- i (23) in maintenance mode; preferred power supply. Additional interlocks ; to the LOCA and LOPP sensing circuits terminate ' (24) unit fails to start; parallel operation test and cause tbc diesel ge-p acrator to automatically revert and reset to its (25)s/c underfrequency; standby mode if either signal appears during a g,,,,,7 r test. A lockout or maintenance mode removes the (26)_ pfp g, diesel generator from service. The inoperable status is indicated in tbc control room. (27) out of service; efiegel ggegw 8.3.1.1.8.9 Reliability Qualifkstice Testlag l (28)4 engine,;.-:,,,f, . r i The qualification tests are performed on the
' (29) lock out relay operated; diesel generator per IEEE Std. 387 as modified l
(* by Regulatory Guide 1.9 requirements. f y l3 (30) emergencystart; ! N S'3'I E A**I!*I* (31) Q{& _Yoltope, festraint e,veverest [ 8.3.1.1.1 General AC Power Systems - (32) low bigh level.. fuel day tank: ; The general AC power systems is illustrated l' (33) low pressure-fuel oil; in Figure 8.31. Anselysis of the Nuclear Island ; portion of tbc general AC power system is dis. (34) high differential pressure-fuel filter; cussed berein. Tbc analysis demonstrates com. eaentee
- evert (t w e r # Pliance of the Class 1E AC power system to ap.
(35) {.J r - + *- Z,e i;
"- plicable NRC General Design Criteria (GDC), NRC 1 Regulatory Guides and other criteria consistent (36) in local control only; with the Standard Review Plan (SRP).
(37)p C 1- entre " differestial 0 trip Table 8.1 1 identifies tbc onsite power system and the associated codes and standards
^*) 5:: ' :: ; n : ;M A applied in accordance with Table 81 of tbc SRP. Applicable criteria are listed in order of
^ 9 % _ :' q : A the listlog on tbc table, and the degree of conformance is discussed for each. Any 8.3.1.1.8.6 Iment and Ramete Centrol exceptions or clarifications are so noted, t
Each diesel generator is capable of being (1) General Design Criteria (GDC): started or stopped manually from the main control room. Start /stop control and bus transfer con- (a) Criteria: GDCs 2,4,17,18 and 50. Anwnsment 2 sM
# Densi es contevi retse amavatioiw . ~ . _ . . , .____
A M 'R zwinuo I StandardPlant nr y (b) Conformance: The AC power system is in with the other listed Regulatory Guides, compliance with these GCDs,in part, or 9 ,e j as a whole, as applicable. The GDCs are There are desq6.9 KV electrical divisions, generically addressed in Subsection Jin d wbleb are independent load groups , ] 3.1.2. backed by individual diese - erator sets #35 02h low voltage AC syste@ four divisioI. Tbcs%e (2)- Regulatory Guides (RGs): backed by independent DC battery, charger and inverter systems, i I (a) RG 1.6 - independence Between Redun- . dont Standby (Onsite) Power The standby power system refundancy is based Sources and Between Their on tbc ca a ility of anyMbf the four divi g,gy , Distribution Systems sions three load groups) to provide the L > F minings afety fgelignecessary to shut down (b) RG 1.9 - Selection, Design, and Qua- the uhMn elsToTan accident and maintain it lification of Diesel Gene- in the safe sbuidown condition. , retor Units Used as Standby , There is no sharing of standby power system (Onsite) Electric Power Sys-I tems at Nuclear Power Plants components between load groups, and there is no , sharing of diesel generator power sources be. ! (c) RG 1.32 - Criteria for Safety Related tween units, since the ABWR is a single plant Electric Power Systrms for design. , Nuclear Power Plants ; l Each standby power supply for each of the (d) RG 1.47 - Bypassed and Inoperable Sta- three load groups is composed of a single ge- 1 tus Indication for Nuclear nerator driven by a diesel engine having fast. Power Plant Safety Systems start characteristics and sited in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.9. (c) RG 1.63 Electric Penetration Assem-blies in Containment Strue. Table 8.31 and 8.3 2 show the rating of each i tures for Light Water Cooled of the Division I,11 and lit diesel generators, Nuclear Power Plants respectively, and the maximum coincidental load , foreach. (f) RG 1.75 - Physical Independence of Electric Systems (3) Branch Technical Positions (BTPs): (g) RG 1.106 Thermal Overload Protection (a) BTP ICSB 8 (PSB) Use of Diesel Gene. for Electric Motors on Mo- retor Sets for Peaking tor Operated Valves (b) BTP ICSB 18 (PSB) Application of the (b) RG 1.108 Periodic Testing of Diesel Single Failure Criterion to Manually. Generator Units Used as On- Controlled Electrically Operated Valves. . site Electric Power Systems . at Nuclear Power Plants (c) BTP ICSB 21 Guidance for Application of Regulatory Guide 1.47 (i) RG 1.118- Periodic Testing of Electric power and Proter an Systems (d) BTP PSB 1 Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages Regarding Position C 1 of Regulatory Guide ' 1,75, see Seetion 8.1.3.1.2.2 (6). Otherwise, (c) BTP PSB 2 Criteria for Alarms and in-the onsite AC power system is designed in accor- dications Associated with Diesel Gene-dance with recommendations of this guide, and retor Unit Bypassed and Inoperable Ststus Amendment 2 sS9
. . , ~ . _ _- .__ __ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _. _..._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _.. _ _ _. _
2sAuooAo - 1 mrv s j
;
~
The diesel. generator sets are not used for } peaking in the ABWR design. Therefore, ; this criteria is satisfied. t J (3) BTP ICSB 11 (PSB)'. Stability of Offsite l Power Systems; l See Subsection 8.1,4.1 for interface l requirement. l' i I. } l (4) BTP ICSB 18 (PSB) App!! cation of the t Single Failure Criterion to Manually. : Controlled Electrically Operated Valves; i i ($) BTP ICSB 21. Guidance for Application of I Regulatory Guide 1.47; , (6) BTP PSB 1 Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages: - N 35.02 Fl g
^
Undervo ge detectio chemes forJtfe'6.9 KV o site power eders is oudide the _ , se e of the AB R design, eBTPip ! ' l erefore imp ed as an inte ce requjre. ' - > ment. See section 8.1. for intprTace 6' (7) BTP PSB 2 Criteria for Alarms and. , Indications Associated with Diesel. Generator Unit Bypassed and Inoperab!c l Status; 8.1J.1.2.4 Other SRP Criteria (1) NUREG/CR 0660. Enhancement of Onsite l: Diesel Generator Reliability; l Operating procedures and the training of 8.1J.1.2J . Branch Technical Positions personnel are outside of the Nuclear island scope of supply. NUREG/CR 0660in there. (1) . BTP ICSB 4 (PSB) Requirements on Motor- fore imposed as an sarensa regnisement Operated Vkives la the ECCS Accumulator for the applicant. 1.ines; * (2) TMI Activt. Item II.E.5.1. . Emereenev Pw:r This BTP is written for Pressurized Water Supply for Pressurizer Heater;
- Reactor (PWR) plants only and is therefore not applicable to the ABWR. This criteria is applicable only to PWRs and does not apply to the ABWR. l (2) BTP ICSB 8 (PSB) Use of Diesel Generator s, i Sets for Peaking; l
. Amendment 6 8N I
I Readavel Plant - 2.%O00A0 strY A j ments of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.9 and IEEE Std I (%6) isLOPP Agg: lost during darlas dilemet the diesel generator meneratar paral-If marallellan the normal preferred power supply 3rr leling test, the diesel generator circuit (1) Each diesel generator is capable of start-breaker is automatically tripped. Transfer i ing, accelerating and supplying its loads in to tbc diesel generator then proceeds as the sequence shown in Tables 8.31 and
;
;
described in (1). 8.3 2. If the alternate preferred source is used (2) Each diesel generator is capaide of start-for load testing the diesel generator, and ing, accelerating and supplying its fonds in ! the alternate preferred source is lost (and their proper sequence without exceeding a ' so LOCA signal exists), the diesel generator 25% voltage drop at its terminals. , breaker will trip on overcurrent, and LOPP ; condition will exist. Load shedding and bus (3) Each diesel generator is capable of start. I transfer will proceed as described in (1). ing, accelerating and running its largest i motor at any time after the automatic load-(s kenaaratlan er artsste newer: Upon ing sequence is completed, assumitig that the ' ('l{) restoration of offsite power, the Class 1E motor had failed to start initially, bus (es) can be transferred back to the l oJIsite sgce by manual operation only. (4) Each diesel generator is capable of reaching
- l
! gy,pspf Q)1.12 {tN.5W Standby D ACPmrSystem full speed and voltage within 13 seconds g3-after receiving a signal to start, and cap. at>1e of being full) .'onded within tbc next The diesel generators comprising the Divi. 30 seconds. i sions I,!! and 111 standby AC power supplies are designed to quickly restore power to their respec- 33.1.1.g.3 Starting Cireults and Systems tive Class 1E distribution system divisions as required to achieve safe shutdown of tbc plant Diesel generators I,11 and 111 start automa-and/or to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA in tically on loss of bus voltage. Under voltage the event of a coincident LOPP. Figure 8.31 relays are used to start each diesel engine in shows the interconnections between tbc preferred the event of a drop in bus voltage below preset power supplies and the Divisions 1,11 and til values for a predetermined period of time, diesel generator standby power supplies. Low water level switches and drywell high pres- g f sure switches in each divisions are used to ini _ \ gJ.11.g.1 Redundant Standby AC Pmr llate diesel start under accident conditions. Oi 8epplies The transfer of the Class 1E buses to st power supply is automatic should this become ' Each standby power system division, including necessary on loss of all preferred power. After the diesel generator, its auxiliary systems and the breakers connecting the buses to the prefer. the distribution of power to various Class 1E red power supplies are open the diesel generator loads through the 6.9kV and 480V systems, is se. breaker is closed when required generator gregated and separated from tbc other divi- voltage frequency are established. aions. No automatic interconnection is provided og l between tbc Class 1E divisions. Each diesel ge- Diesel encrators I, !! and Ill are designed merator set is operated independently of the to start ad attain rated voltage and frequency l other sets and is connected to the utility power within seconds. The generator, and voltage 1-system by manual control only during testing or regulator are designed to permit the set to for bus transfer, accept the load and to accelerate the motors in the sequence within the time requirements. Tbc gJ 1J.32 Ratings and Capability voltage drop caused by starting tbc large motors does not exceed the requirements set forth in The size of each of the diesel generators serv- ' tegulatory Guide 1.9, and proper acceleration of ing Divisions I,11 and 111 satisfies the require- these motors is ensured. Control and timing
^*"8""i 2 g.u l-
l [5NSERI{) ' (8) protection against degraded voltare: For protection of the Division 1, 11 , and 111 electrical equipment against the effects of a sustained degraded voltage, the 6.9 kV ESF bus voltages are monitored. When the bus voltage degrades to 90% or below of its rated value and after a time delay (to prevent ' triggering by transients), undervoltage will be annunciated in' the control rootn. Simultaneously a 5 minute timer is' started, to allow the operator to take corrective action. After 5 minutes, the respective feeder breaker with the : undervoltage is tripped. Should a LOCA occur during the 5. minute time delay, the feeder breaker with the undervoltage will be tripped instantly. Subsequent bus transfer will be as described above. l Y t 9 I
;
(. : l 1' l 1' ll
ABM - nasieao I g,g h " d**d Plaat an. A Asin ted in $4bsection 8.1 71.2.3, BTP (b) RG 1.32 - Criteria for Safety.Related SB 1 as latef face requ meat foryte l Electric Power Systems for ! applips'at. Otherpte, the onsi C power tem Nuclear Power Plants ' QfesWed comptent with t position . ; (c) RG 1.47 Bypassed and inoperable Sta, j (4) Other SRP Criteria: tus Indication for Nuclear ; Power Plant Safety Systems ; (a) NUREG/CR 0660. Enhancement of Onsite .. DieselGenerator Reliability (d) RG 1.75 Pitysical Independence of '
;
Electric Systems ; As indicated la subsection 8.1.3.1.2.4, the - operating procedures and training of person. (e) RG 1.118 Periodic Testing of Electric i nel are outside of tbc Nuclear Island scope Power and protaalon Systems j of supply. NUREG/CR 0660 is therefore im. ' posed as an laterface requirement for the Regarding Position C 1.of Regulatory guide applicant. 1.75, see Section 8.1.3.1.2.2 (6). Otherwise. the $$LC power system is designed in accordance . g3.1JJ Safety System 14gic and Control with recommendations of this guide, and with the (SLLC) power supply other listed Regulatory Guides. The $$LC power supply oatline diagram is There are four independent electrical divi. Illustrated in Figure 8.3 6. The following sions, each with its own individual power supply analysis indicates compliance of the SSLC power as illustrated on Figure 8.3 6. The normal unin. aupply to applicable NRC General Design Criteria terruptible power (UPS) to each of the four $$LC , (GDC), NRC Regulatory Guides and other criteria divisions is provided by its divisional inverter consistent witb the Standard Review Plan (SRP). powered by ks devisional DC bus. An AC/DC con. verter powered by a 400 VAC bus provides the aor. ! l Table 8.11 identifies tbc SSLC power supply mal DC power with a floating battery as a back. f and the associated codes and standards applied in up. The $$LC power supplies are not shared accordance with Table 81 of the SRP. Applicable among multiple re. actor maits since the ABWR is a i ; i criteria are listed in order of tbc listing on single. unit plant design. the table, and the degree of conformance is discussed for each. Any exceptions or Tbc SS edundancy is based on tbc capabi. , clarifications are so acted, lity of any ' l the minia; e sfe) of the four divisions jognecessary to provide )g*y to shut - i (1) General Design Criteria (GDC): down the 1s in se accident and main.
- tain it in the safe abetdown condition.
(a) Criteria: GDCs 2,4,17, and 18. Tbc $$LC power supply system is designed to
'ISSM (b) Conforge,eyT,ht$.SLCrower tii Mif, or as I wTM,Ns applicable, supply is permitand equipment inspection features, and and testing of allimportant all automatic and Tbc GDCs are generically addressed in manual switchlag functions.
Subsection 3.1.2 (3) Branch Technical Positions (BTPs): (2) Regulatory Guides (RGs): (a) BTP ICSB 21. Guidance for Application (a) RG 1.6 - Iadepcadeacc Between of Regulatory Guide 1.47 Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between (b) B17 PSB 1. Adaquacy of Station Electric Their Distribution Systems Distribution System Vokages I Amenament 2 s.).10 l u
1 1 s; ABWR ma-M Plant awiouo i arV A formers, distribution panels.- batteries, (HCU) are also placed is separate conduits sod ] chargers)is tagged with as equipment number cable trays. I the same as indicated on the single line i diagrams. The redundast Class 1E, equipment and cit- -l cults, assigned to redundast Class 1E divisions j (3) The nameplates are laminated black and white and non class 1E system equipment and circuits : plastic, arranged to show black engraving on are readily distinguishable from each other i a white background for non Class 1E equip- without the necessity for consulting reference meet. For Class 1E equipment, the same. . materials. This is accompthbed by color coding i plates have color coded boekground with of equipment, nameplates,e, ables and raceways, _ black engraving.p,, ,,(,, gQ,,g,g, gas described above. j 6f 35.029) A ll cables1Efor Class systems and associated 8J.lJJ laaerusassemelse and Centrol systems 4 circuits (exceg,t thqhe routed in conduits) are ; tagged every(5 ftf All cables are tagged at Major electrical and control equipment, as. ; their terminations with a vaique identifying num. semblies, devices, and cables grouped into sepa- ) ber (cable number),in addition to the marking rate divisions per Table 8.31 shall be identi- , characteristics abown below, fied so that their electrical divisional assign-ment is apparent and so that en observer can vi- , All conduit is similarly tagged with a unique smally differentiate betacea Class 1E (or IE. l conduit number, in addition to the marking cha- associated) equipment and wiring of different recteristics shown below, at 15 ft intervals, at divisions, and between Class 1E and non Class IE discontinuities, at pull bones, at points of (or between IE associated and non Clast, IE) l entrance and emit of rooms and at origin and equipment and wires. The identification method i destination of equipment. Conduits containing sball be placed os color cod:sg. All markers l cables operating at above 600V (i.e.,6.9kV) are within a division shall have the same color, a also tagged to indicate.the ogeratingt=n voltagegnew For associated cables treated as Class 1E, there , ge9,s y enheec e to me ens shall be an A appended to the divisional desig. , 3 All cable trays are marked with their proper sation (e.g., A1). The latter A stands for as. ' raceway. identification at 15 ft intervals on sociated and ND for noodivisional. Associated ; straight sections, at turning points and at cables are uniquely identified by a longitudinal ; l so stripe and/or the data on the label. Tbc color i j ge{sts f gtgirof emir su, god emit
** *' # P"'#"from.
7' #8enclo9'ed
'h i'*
- areas.
of tbc cable marker for associated cables shall To help distinguish the neutron monitoring and be tbc same as the related Class 1E cable. Divi-acram solenoid cables from other type cables, the sional separation requirements of individual ' following unique voltage class designations are pieces of bardware are shows in tbc system ele- , t used in the cable routing program: mentary diagrams, Identification of raceways, cables, etc., shall be compatible with the iden-
, Tas.cf Unias tification of the Class 1E equipment with which '
Special Cables Vohnge Class it interfaces. kocation of identification shall be such that points of ebange of circuit classi. Neutron monitoring VN fication (at isolation devices, etc.) are readi-ly identifiable.
$ctam solenoid cables VS SJ 1J.t.1 Identinention Neutron monitoring cables are run in their own
' divisional conduits and cable trays, separately (1) Panels and racks from at ether power, instrumentation and control cables. Scram solenoid cables are run in a se- Panels and rocks associated with the nuclear parate conduit for each rod scratn group, safety related systems aball be labeled with marker plates which are consplevously dif.
le addition, the cables of the rod control and ferent from those for other similar panels. Information system in the hydraulic control unit Tbc difference may be is color, shape, or g Amesiament 2 SS12
l Lm...a.,a MN pi... su6touc m., color of engtaving fill. The marker plates Where spatial separation cannot be maintained in . shall include identification of tbc proper barardous areas (e.g., potential missile areas), I division of tbc equipment included. physical isolation between electrical equipment I of different divisions is achieved by use of a ) (2) Junction or pull boxes 6. inch sleimum thickness reinforced concrete 1 barrier. 1 Junction and/or pull bones ceclosing wiring for the nuclear safety related systems shall The physicalindependence of electric power I have identification similar to and compati. systems complies with the requirements of IEEE ble with the panels and racks. Standards 279, 303, 379, 334, General Design ' Criteria 17,18 and 21 and NRC Regulatory Guides (3) F= 1.6 and 1.75. as i.4WI i,. Sedica f.$.l.3 ld , c Cables external to cabinets and/or panels 83.1.4.1.1 Ones lE Easeer6c Egelpswet for the safety related systems aball be Arrnagement ; marke to distinguish them from other cables .l and identify their separate division as (1) Class 1E electric equipment and wiring is applicable. This identification requirement segregated lato sepseate divisions so that does not apply to individual conductors, no single credible event is capable of dis. l abling enough equipment to blader reactor i (4) Raceways shutdown, removal of decay beat from the , core, or isolation of the containment in the Those trays or conduits which carry suelear event of an accident. Separation require. 7 fety related system wiring shall be identi. ments are applied to control power and - l fied t room entrance points through which motive power for all systems involved. . they pass (and exit points unless the room l is small enough to facilitate convenient (2) Equipment arrangement and/or protective bar. , following of cable) with a permanent marker riers are provided such that no locally ge. identifying their assigned division. aerated force or missile can destroy any re. dundant RPS, NSSS, ECCS, or ESF functions. I (5) Sensory equipment grouping and designation 'a addition, arrangement and/or separation letters barriers are provided te ensure that such i disturbances do not affect both HPCF and Redundant sensory logic / control and actus. RCIC systems, tion equipment for safety related systems shall be identified by suffix letters. (3) Routing of wirlag/ cabling is arranged such as to eliminate, insofar as practical, all t 3.3.1.4 ledependemn of Redundant Systems potential for fire damage to cables and to separate tbc redundant divisions so that 33.1.4.1 power Systems fire la one divis en will not propagate to 8 another division. i Tbc Class 1E onsite electric power systems and major components of the separate power (4) An independent raceway system is provided divisions is shown on Figure 3.31. for each divisions of the Class 1E electric system. The raceways are arranged, physi. Independence of the electric equipment and cally, top to bottom, as follows (based en raceway systems between the different divisions the function and the voltage class of the is maintained primarily by firewall. type separ. cables): ation where feasible and by spatial separation, la accordance with criteria givsa in Subsection (a) V4 = Medium voltage power,6.9kV (8kv g.3.1.4.2, where firewalls are not feasible. insulation class). Amendment 2 8M
. . .. - . - - _ - - - - - . - . - - ~ - . - - _ - - . - - .-.- . -
l MN .m.., 2Ms100AG _ m. l dscharged by: . equipment. Tbc equipment is thea designated
' associated
- per Regalatory Guide 1.75. Cables (1) identifying appbcable urkuria; maad to commaet soeb ognipment are safety grade l and gealified and rooted as ' associated cir.
(2) issuing working procaders Ao implement thesc cents' and marked as described in Subsection criteria; S.3.1.3.
]
1 (3) modifying prosadates la heep them current 83.1.42 leerpsedsme of Radamenet and workable; Seemy.Rainted lasarussement6es and Cameret ] i SPseems : (4) checking the masafectarer's drawings and ! specifications to ensare tosspliases with This sabasetism defhses independence urlieria l procedures; and applied to safety.relaisd electrical systems and ; instrumentation and control equipment. gaiety. , (5) controlling instaHaties and procurement to related systems to which the criteria apply are , I assure compliance with approved and issued those ascessary to mitigste the effects of asti. i drawings and speciamaions. . cipated and abnormal operational transients or design basis accidents. This includes all those , The equipment namendstore used on the ABWR systems and functions sommerated la Subsections ! standard design is one of the primarymechanism 7.1.1.3, 7.1.1.4. 7.1.1.5, an d 7.1.1.6. The : for ensuring proper separation. Each equipment term ' systems' includes the overall comptes of l and/or assembly of equipment carries a single actuated eqelpment, actuation devices (actua. number, (e.g., the hem members for motor drivers - tors), logic, instrument channels, controls, and are tbc same as tbc ==b-ry drivers). Based on intercomaecting cables which are required to per. l these identification numbers, sach item can be form system safety functions. The criteria out. - j identified as essential or --stial, and esce lines the separation requirassets accessary to i= essential item can further be identified to its achieve independence of safety.related functions p* safety separation division. This is carried compatible with the redundant and/or diverse
, through and dictates appropriate treatment at the squipocat provided and postulated events.
design level dur.ng preparation of the manufacturer's drawings. '13J.423 Gumusal Non. Class 1E aquipment is separated where de. Separation of abe squipment for the sygs sired to embance power generation reliability, referred to is Subsections 7.1.1.3,7.1.1.4,ased . although such separation is not a safety 7.1.1.6 is accomplished so that they are le - coasideration. sampliance with the substance and intest ofIEEE 4EG2 i 279 andM10CFR$0 Appendix A, General l Once the safety-reisted es3mipment has besa De, sign Criteria 3,17,21 and 22, and NRC l identified with a Class 1E anfety division, the Asgalatory Guides 2.74and .1.5K divisional assipment dictates a characterhtic 68ef3N) (wr3M) color (Subsection 8.3.1.3) for positive visual - " ; '== of mutually redundant and/or di. l idestification. Likewise, the divisional iden. tarse Class 1E agaipment , devices, and cables tification of all ancillary equipment, cable and is achieved by physical separation and/or elec. associated receways match the divisional assign. trical isolation. Physical separation and/or l- mest of the system it supports. electrical isolaties is provided to malatala the ! indepcodence of nuclear safety.related circuits There are certain exceptions to the above and equipecat so that the protective function re. ! where nom. Class IE equipment is connected to quired during and following a design basis event Class 1E power noerces for functional design rea. including a single fire anywhere in the plant or sons (viz., tbe standby AC lighting). This is -.a single failure is any circuit or equipment can immediately apparest by the absence of essential be accomplished. classification identificatian of the cosaceted i l l Amienemnt 2 B.315 l
. - ~ . _ . _ , - _ _ . _ . . . - , . - ~ _ - . - _ . - - - _ - - - . _ _ _ - - - - . - - - - - - - -
i l ABM iwsmo me"=rd Plant arv A
)
from each other borleostally an'd vertically e ible by errective current or tot by a minimum distance of 6 inches or by limiti f.e., functional isolation J-. , cr all, j steel barriers or enclosures. design bas omditions. Cla . power supq plies which ist ea l ass 1E circuits are i (3) Where electricalinterfaces between Class 1E required to be d ected or otherwise, and non Class 1E circuits or between Class decoupled fr e non- 1E circuits such j , SE circuits of different divisions cannot be ;that con ' s of the non Class rtion of 3 i evolded, Class 1E isolation devices are used i tbe tem cannot jeopardine the 1Ej i (Subsection 3.3.1.4.2.2.4). rtions (e.a.. by a current limlil== element ./ (4) If two panels containing circuits of differ. Wirby from Class 1E (or IE associated) equip-est separation divisions are less than 3 ment or circuits which interface with son. Class feet apart, there shall be a steel barrier 1E equipment circuits (i.e., annunciators or between the two panels. Panel ends closed data loggers) is treated as Class 1E (or 1E as. by steel end plates are considered to be sociated) and retals its divisional identifica. acceptable barriers provided that terminal tion up to and including its isolation device. 3 boards and wireways are spaced a minimum of The output circuits from this isolation device l l inch from the end plate. is classified as sendivisional and shall be j physically separated from the divisional (or (5) Penetration of separation barriers within a 1E associated) wiring. ' l subdivided panel is permitted , provided that such penetrations are scaled or other- 33.1.4.23 System Seperstloe Requirements ' !. wise treated so that fire generated by an electrical fault could not reasonably propa- Specific divisional assignment of safety re. L gate from one section to the other and lated systems and equipment is given in Table disable a protective function. 3.31. Other separation requirements pertaining : to the RPS and other ESF systems are given in ' (6) Local instrument racks on which flow trans- tbc following subsections. ; mitters for main steam or recirculation wa. ter are located are permitted to have redun- g3.1.4.1J.1 Remeter Protection (Trip) System dont instruments on adjacent bays of a sin. (RPS) gle rock in older to avoid superfluous in-strument piping from flow elements within The following separation requirements apply the drywell. In these cases a spatially di- to the RPS wiring: : verse set of redundant transmitters shall be provided on a separate local instrument (1) The RPS has its sensors (input signals) ar. rack. ranged in four divisionally separated groups designated Divisions I, II, Ill and IV, 3.3.1.4.2.2.4 Isolation Devices providing inputs to four corresponding divisionally separated logic cabinets. Where electricalinterfaces between Class 1E l or (1E associated) and son Class 1E circuits or (2) The scram solenoid circuits from the actu. between Class 12 or (IE associated) circuits of stion devices to the CRD bydraulics modules
- different divisions cannot be avoided, Class 1E will be run in grounded steel conduits, so
,I % 5 034 isolation devices vill be used. PC is ,v t,,* 8 that each scram group is protected against a L J previc'ed h Sc to Pc ceawatert. AC W8f'" bot short by a grounded enclosure, on Class Iti power circuits will t>e separa E ad isolated from all Class IE assoc
- cir. (3) A separate conduit is provided for each cults and from all Class 1E , In addi- acram group. This conduit may contain both tion, non Class 1E ' ment and control cir- the A and B solenoid circuits for the group cuits will energiud from a Class 1E power since failure of one group of rods to move ,
y unless potential for degradation of the) cannot prevent a reactor scram.
~ 1R :..=, ameem === he hemonstrated tjo il f rw# 8fe eI, l'j NteelecKe( c # >< in 7 g een t n-coeuehrs at eiescribed in knich T 31.F.2 f, Amenament 2 sM7 v w c ~ - -w m- - - -~---.-r--- -- - ----_ - _ _ _ -- _----
i RecCrd# COMMENTS .
)
35 Section 8.3.1.4.2.3.1 has been revised as follows: j
'8.3.1.4.2.3.1 Reactor Protection (Trip) System (RPS) f 436.0 The following separation requirements apply to the RPS wiring (1) RPS sensors, sensor input circuit wiring, trip channels and trip
;
logic equipment will be arranged in four functionally 1 independent and divisionally separate groups desagnated Divisions 1, II,-III and IV. The trip channel wiring associated i with the sensor input signals for each of the four divisions ; provides inputs to divisional logic cabinets which are in the same divisional group as the sensors and trip channels and which j are functionally independent and physically separated from the ; logic cabinets of the redundant divisions. 3 (2) Where-trip channel data originating from sensors of one division ! are required for coincident trip logic circuits in other i divisions, Class 1E isolation devices will be used as interface 1 elements for signals sent from one division to another such as to maintain electrical isolation between div?.sions. (3) Sensor wiring for several trip variables associated with the [ trip channels of one division may be run together in the same conduits or in the same raceways of that ssee and only division. Sensor wiring associated with one division will not ' L be routed with, or in close proximity to, any wiring or cabling associated with a redundant division. l (4) The scram solenoid circuits, from the actuation devices to the - solenoids of the scram pilot valves of the CRD hydraulic control units, will be run in grounded steel conduits, with no other . wiring contained within the conduits, so that each scram group
- is protected against a hot short to any other wiring by a l l grounded enclosure. Short sections (less than one meter) of L flexible metallic conduit will be permitted for making connections within panels and the connections to the solenoids. '
(5) Separate grounded steel conduits will be provided for the scram solenoid wiring for each of four scram groups. Separate grounded steel conduits will also be provided for both the A solenoid wiring circuits and for the B solenoid wiring circuits , of the same scram group. (6) The scram group conduits will have unique identification and will be treated essentially as if they are separate enclosed raceways. The conduits containing the scram solenoid group circuit wiring will be physically separated by a minimum separation distance of one inch from either metal enclosed raceways or non enclosed raceways which contain either divisional or "non divisional" (non safety related) circuits. (7) Any scram group conduit may be routed alongside of any cable or raceway containing either safety related circuits (of any division), or any cable or raceway containing non safety.related circuits, as long as the conduit itself is not within the boundary of any raceway which contains either the divisional or
t i the non.c fsty.re?at:d circuits and is physically s:percted from I said cibics and r:c;w:y b:undaries by a cinimum s:paratiin distance of one inch. Any one scram group conduit may also be ] routed along with scram group conduits of the same scram group l or with conduits of any of the three other scras groups as long ! as the minimum separation distance of one inch (2.5 ca.) is t asintained.
;
(8) The standby liquid control. system redundant Class 1E controls will be run as Division I and Division II so that no failure of ' standby liquid control (SLC) function will result from a single electrical failure in a RPS circuit. ' 1 (9) The startup range monitoring (SRNM) subsystem cabling of the NMS and the rod control and information system (RG&IS) cabling under the vessel is treated as divisional. The SRNM cables will be assigned to Divisions I, II, III and IV, and the RC&IS-cables to Divisions I and II. Under the vessel, cables will not be placed > in any enclosure which will unduly restrict capability of ! removing probe connectors for maintenance purposes. ' i l i L t l 4 V
. - - . - _ - -- -- . - - - - . - - . - - - _ - . - . ~ - . - . - _
l 2W190AG I
' Eleanhrd Plane an' A ]
a ; being readered inoperable due to esposure to The 125 VDC systems provide a reliable ! the enviros mest ersated by the level swell control and switching power source for the Class phenomesa. This some includes that space AE aystsas. above the suppression pool normallevel I which sees the surge of water that could All batterles are sleed to that required i resrlt from a high drywell to.costainment loads will not eseced 80% of nameplate rating, differential pressert, or warranted capacity at sad of. installed life ; with 100% desige desanad. Ensk 125 VDC battery ! p) Cantainment peamerations will be so stranged is provided with a charger, and a standby char. ! that so design basis event cas disable ser shared by two divisions, each of which is emblingin more than est divisios.. Pesetro. capable of techarging;its battery from a dis. tions will act costala esbles of more aan sharged state to a fully charged state while ' one divisional assignment. handling the ac^ mal, assady. state DC load. ; t (g) Annunciator and ==pma impeas from Osas Batteries are sized for the DC load in 2E squipment or sirealts are treated es accordance with IEEE Standard 485. I Class JE and retain their divisionalidenti. ! i fication up to Class IE isolation device. A son cians SE 250VDC power supply Figure ' { The estpot tirenit from this isolation de. 6.3 8, isyrovided for the computers and the ' l .vice is classified as aosdivisional. tarbine taraing gear actor. The power supply consists of one 250VDC battery and tv o char. . Aussociator and tempster bputs frcze son. gers. 7be normal charpt is fed by 480VAC from i Class IE agaipment or cissaits do not either the division 3 or division 3 load cen.
- j. require isolatiam devices. ters, Selection of the desired AC supply is by l l a mechanically interlocked transfer switch. The l SJ.2 DCPomersystems standby charger is fed frem a control building L. motor control center. Selection of the normal *
{ g.32.3 Descriptian or the standby charger is controlled by key interlocked breakers. A 250VDC central diri. A 125 YDC power system,Tigure s.3."7, is pro. bution board is provided for connection of the vided for switehgeat contro!, eestrof power, in- leads,all of which ars ree-class 1E. stramentatica, critical motors and emergency lighting is control rooms, switchgear rooms and 8.32.1.2 Osas1E DClands fuel handling areas. The 125 VDC poner system is ; not shared between units. The J25 VDC Class IE power is r: quired for emergency lightias, diesel. generators field Four independant Cass 1E 125 VDC systems are flashing, contrel and switching functions such provided to supply normal and amesposy DC pomer. as the maasrol of 6.9.&V sad 480V switchgear, contrel relays, meters and indicators, as well i The DC power systems provide adaquate poner as DC components used in the reactor core for station sastgency auxiliaries and for sos- isolation sooling system. trol and suiteking during all modes of operatita. The font divisions that are essential to the hsr.03'U The
~
crating voltage range of Class IE DC safe shutdown of the reactor are supplied from loads l c 340V. four independest 125 VDC buses. The maximum equalizing charge voltage for BJJ.1J Ratien tsteeriss aad Battery ' Class IE batteries is 340 VDC. Charpes. General Cassiderethes l The DC system minimum diediarge vokage at the The four F_cvad groups are supplied from end of the Ascharge period is 1.75 VDC per esR. 1be four Ctaas 1E 125 VDC systems. haamm 2 I}I'
, . . _ . . - _ . ~ . - . _ _. . _ _._ - - __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _
!. ..-)
ABWR - mom !
! Standard Plant om a !
-/ l l Recirculation unit for subsptem 1 consists of a (4) HVAC equipment room,
. prefiker nction, a high efficier.t filter section, an electric heater, a cooling coil, and two 50% capacity (5) Safery related electrical equipment room, supply fans. The supply fans are placed on !
low. speed when the fans are in the smoke reinovel (6) Pausges, ! mode. (7) SGTS equipment at EL TJ00 in CB. ; Two 50% capacity retura exhaust fans draw air y i , from safety related battery rooms. During smoke re. moval mode, the fans are placed on low speed and Recirculation unit for subsystems 3 consist of a prefilter uction, a high efficient filter asetion, an elec-
'j g j i
f the air is discharged to atmosphere. tric heater, a cooling coil, and two $0% capacity 4 ; f
.& N g.
I supply fans. The supply fans are placed on low speed 5 9.4.IJJ.2 Safety Related Subsystem 2 when the fans are in the smoke removal mode. {4.$g w e' Subsystem 2 specifically serves: Two 50% capacity return exhaust fans draw air Th s l from the safery related battery rooms. During smoke $ (1) Safety related batiery room 2, removal mode, the fans are placed on low speed and e the air is discharged to atmosphere. e ** 1 (2) Euential chiller room B, ,, , ) l 9.4.1.2.4 Safety Evaluation t I i i (3) RB cooling water pump and heat exchanger 4 'd i room B. The cuential electrical HVAC system is designed to g $ ensure the operability of the cuential electrical equip- j (4) HVAC equipment room, ment YAll safety reined HVAC sculpment and sur-tour fling structures are of seismic category I desig? QC-0 t l (5) Safety related electrical equipment room, and operable during lou of the offsite power suppl g The ductwork which services these safety functions _ 4 c1 s (6) Passays. 3 is termed ESF ductwork, and is of Seismic Category I e !gi e (7) Non cuential electrical equipment rooms. design. ESF ducting is high pressure safety grade ', y 0 ) ductwork designed to withstand the maximum positive 1 Recirculation unit for subsystem 2 consist of a and/or negative preuure to which it can be subjected Es.c 6 prefilter section, a high efficient filter section, an under normal or abnormal conditions. Galvani:ed & l clectric heater, a cooling coi!, and two 50% capacity steel ASTM A526 or ASTM A527 is used for outdoor
]
supply fans. Tbc supply fans are placed on air intake and cahaust ducts. All other ducts are low speed when the fans are in the smoke removal welded black steel ASTM A570, Grsde A or Grade mode. D. Ductwork and hangers are Seismic Category 1. , Bolted Flange and welde ' joints are qualified per Two 50% espacity return exhaust fans draw air ERDA 76 21. l from the safety.related battery rooms. During smoke removal mode, the fans are placed on Redundant components are provided where neces. I Iow speed and the air is discharged to atmosphere, aary to ensure that a singic failure will not preclude l 9.4.lJJJ Safety Related Subsptem 3 9.4.1.23 laspection and Testing Requirements Subsystem 3 specifically s:rves: Provisions are made for periodic tests of the out. (1) Safety related battery room 3, door air cleanup fans and filters. These tests include determinations of differential pressure across the (2) Essential chiller room C, filter and of filter efficiency. Conassions for testing, such as injection, sampling and monitoring are prop-(3) RB cooling water pump and heat exchanger room C, Amendmem 6 9+1C
.- ~. -_ = - . - - -- .. -. ._ _ --. - - --
ABM 2m uoxo ! N Plant arv s (4)_ Other $RP Criteria: span. The cable icstallation is such that .' direct lapingement of fire suppressant will not j According to Tab!c 81 of the SRP, there are prevent safe reactor shutdown. . no other criteria applicable to DC power systeas. 3.3.3.2 Locallaation of Fires ' 8.3.3 Fire Protection of Cable Systems in the event of a fire, the lastallat!on de- l sign will localize tbc physical effects of the ! The basic concept of fire protection for the fire by preventing its spread to adjacent areas . cable system in the ABWR design is that it is in- or to adjacent raceways of differcat divisions. : corporated lato the design and installation ra. Localitation of the effect of fires on the elec. 1 ther than added onto the systems. By use of fire tric system is accomplished by separation of i resistant and nonpropagating cables, conservative redundant cable systems and equipment as de. ! application in regard to ampacity ratings and scribed in Subsection 8.3.1.4. Floors and walls ; raceway fill, and by separation, fire protection are effectively used to provide vertical and I is built lato the system. Fire suppression sys. borizontal fire resistive separations between ' teins (e.g.t automatic sprinkler systen't) are pro- redundant cable divisions, i vided for cable trays in areas of high combus. tible loads or possible transit fire loading. In special cases, spatial separation is used as a method of preventing the sp, -d of fire 8.3.3.1 Bas . of Cables to Combudian . between adjacent cable trays of different di-if visions (e.g., inside primary containment). In l The elec alde# 'N' don is designe7deygjP einsui to special cases where minimum separation cannot bc ; resist the onset of combustion by limiting cable maintained between divisional cables in panels ' ampa:ity to levels which prevent c'verheat. Ing l or at equipment, barriers are provided between .i
- and lasuistion failures (and resultant possi. the cable systeiss or jusilfication is provided ;
bility of fire) and by choice of insulation and between the cable systems of justification is s' jacket materials which have flame resistive and; provided (Subsectica 9.5.1). The objective it self extinguishing characteristics. fall cable always to separate cable tr vs of different di. ; trays are fabricated from noncombustible mate. visions with structural fire barriers such as e rial. Bast ampacity rating of the cables was floors, ceilings and walls. Where this is not established as pub!!shed in ICEA P 46 426/IEEE possible divisional trays are separated 3 ft .; S 135 andlCEA P 54440/ NEMA WC 51. Each coaxial horirontally and 5 ft yertically, which mee s
~
l cab!c, each single conductor cable and each minimum separations allowed by IEEE 384 and conductor in multi conductor cable is specified associated Regulatory Guide 1.75. Fire rated e to pass the vertical flame test in accordance barriers are used to separate divisional cable ! with UL.44 trays when they are separated by less than 3 ft horizontally and 5 ft vertically. Tray fill is in addition, each power, control and instru. limited to 40% cross sectional area for all l acatation cable is specified to pass the verti. cables. , cal tray flame test in accordance with IEEE 383.
- l. Maximum separation of equipment is provided Power and control cables are specified to con- through location of equipment la separate fire ,
tinue to operate at conductor temperature not rated rooms. The safety ralated divisional AC
- exceeding 900C and to withstand an emergency unit substations, motor control centers, and DC ,
overload temperature of up to 1300C in accor. distribution panels are located to provide sepa. L dance wish lCEA S.66 524/1 FEMA WC.7 Appendix D. ration and electrical isolation between the di-L Each power cable has stranded conductor and visions. Clear access to and from the main flame resistive and rediation. resistant switchgear rooms is also provided. Separation covering. Conductors are specified to continue is provided between the divisional cables and to operate at 100% relative humidity with a between divisional cables and sendivisional ca. service life espectancy of years. Also, Class bles being routed througboet the plant via sepa-1E Cables are designed t survive the LOCA rate fire rated compartments or embedments, ambient condition at the end of the 60 yr life Local instrument panels and racks are located to Annenwn a EM2
ABWR - 2-mo l gggadagl Platit REV A , TABLE 8.31 ' D/G LOAD TABLE.LOCA l 1 435.0'l6, ; DIESEL ENGTNE OUTPUT (kW) M $5. C59 ; SYS, LOAD RATING NO n.* ) NO. DESCRIPTION (kW) A B C (12) l
- MOTOR ope VALVES 120x3 X X X (2)
.C12 p.m , .. _ . . . n M . G) '
FMCRD 70x3 X X X (4) C41 SLC HEATER 40;10x1 X X - (3) l SLC PUMP 45x2 47.4 47.4 - l
;
E11 RHR PUMP 450x3 526 3 5263 5263 . Ett HPCF PUMP 1450 - 1606.7 1606.7 A' G31 CUW PUMP 120x2 X X - (6) G41 FPC PUMP 75x2 78.9 78.9 - P13 MUWCPUMP $$x3 X X X P21 RCW PUMP 250x4 584.8 584.8 -
' (-
350x2 - - 818.8 9 l P_.' _ 'a.n rumr ,x6 ( .. .. - Q
- l -- ..~,..,,u,, ,,_., e m ,.i o
~
;.;J.%, .
. . n'Cv nru _ _un_ - usun "..
o
~
);(
s., l P25 HECW PUMP 22x4 46.3 463 - i HECW REFRIGERATOR 190x4 400 400 - P41 RSW PUMP" 200x4 467.8 467.8 - l 250x2 .. ~ 584.8
?C T5"/rb mi- ^ - -( - - -
5M PS2 1A COMPRESSOR 110x2 X X - (3) R23 P/C TRANSF. LOSS 40x6 84.2 84.2 84.2 R42 DC 125V CHGR div. I 70x1
# 98.2 .. -
div. II, til, IV 34 a 249:tf 47.7 47.7 47.7 (11) non div. 34 r F,47:94 47.7 f/4 DC 250V CHGR 1 P.64 E.19&ez( 176.8 - [176.8
- Set Table 83-3for Notes
" Part of Turbine bland 1
Amendment 2 83 24
23A6100AG- f RemmAmed Plant , ., REV.A l ns
.!?A - TABLE 8.31 J a- D/G LOAD TABLE .LOCA (Continued)- [
'Or DIESEL ENGINE OUTPUT (kW)' l 1j SYS.' : LOAD-
- RATING NOTE * ;
5 NO. DESCRIITION - (kW) - .t B C R46 VITAL CVCF ~- t P R 9t* 31.6 31.6 -
, NPSS CVCF - ff. 4 289- 18.9' 18.9 E8c 3 7, t 1 COMP CVCF l(tpx 2.4G9:6ma-- 'w9.6 - 189.5 R47- TRANSF. C/R INST- 30kV?.x2 193 193 ' 193 NOR INST. $0kVAx2 32.2 32.2 -
- Rf2 LIGHTING . 100x3 117- - 117 117.
T22' l(,Ek lllPN-SGTS FAN 17.4 17.4 SGTS HEATER g,gy L 39r1~ 29.2 29.2 ~-
- T41 DRYWELL COOLER 18.5x4 X X X (3)
T49 FCS HEATER soar P ,tget 128.6 128.6 - FCS BLOWER . j f x E *.1.6 11.6 11.6 - - ( U41- R/tS ELEC, kOOM /AN 57.2x6 60.2 60.2 60.2 . MCR FAN 127.2x2 133.9 - 133.9 - 38.5x6 40.5 40.5 40.5 ; C/B ELEC. R00M FAN l - HX/A FAN 77x3 - 81.1 81.1 81.1-' DG FA' -30x6 63.2 63.2 63.2 , L l '~ OTHER LO. E 360 120 210 (9) 1 ~ TOTAL 39403/ 49ffffb
- - em.r vary r
- l. See Table F3-3for Notes L-l-
l .' t Amender.ent 2 8.3 25
-+r1--wc--- c -p w --
e rmp- ,e-,e - .,m m w _- *
- _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _*---_._=-----*---a -
7 1 MN 23A61ooAo ! me.adard Plant - u.vA-TABLE 8.3 2 5 F D/G LOAD TABLE.LOPP q35. o</4, I DIESEL ENGINE OUTPUT (kW) U I' - 3 SYS. 14AD RATING NOTE
- j NO. DESCRIPTION ' (kW) A B- C (11)
MOTOR ope VALVES. 120x3' X X- X' (2)' 1 1
' C12 -C 2 '" *'" !!^J ,wJ -
'" 05 4 CRD 70x3 X X X (4)
- C41 SLC HEATER '40;10x1 11.7 46.8 -
)
SLC PUMP -45x2 47.4 47.4 - t E11 RHR PUMP 450x3 5263 526 3 326 3
. E12 HPCF PUMP 1450 - 1606.7 1606.7 [
G31 : CUW PUMP 120x2 X X - (6) G41 FPC PUMP 75x2 78.9 78.9 - P13 MUWCPUMP 55x3 57.9 57.9 57.9 s- P21 RCW PUMP 250x4 ' 584.8 584.8 - 350x2 - .. 818.8 l-c
* .;^a.,-
_ TO" ?"*'"" . - -
.(D {
D-
'" ^
'".~
. . . ~ .J.
. ~n -u 2
a o
~
.3 uv, .
P25 HECW PUMP ?.2x4 403 46 3 - HECW REFRIGERATOR - 190x4 400 400 - l P41 RSW FUMP" 200x4 467.8 467.8 - 250x2 - - 584.8 - m ww er tup" Ge t7j o
- 5. ..
PS2 1A COMPRESSOR 110x2 115.8 115.8 - - R23 - P/C TRANSF. LOSS 40x6 84.2 84.2 84.2 R42 DC 125V CHGR div. I 70x1 98.2 - - div. II, III, IV 34x3 47.7 47.7 47.7 (11) non.div. 34x2 47.7 - 47.7 DC 250V CHGR 126x2 176.8 -- 176.8
- See Table 83 3for Notes
" Part of TurbineIsland Amendment 2 8.3-26
,l q ,' -. , -_
----mm.,,
, , ,-m- -rwer _ ~ ~ ~ ~ " - " " = ' "
2M6iOOAG e Steandard Plant m'A
. 1 TABLE 8.3 2 ,
-1 D/G LOAD TABLE .LOPP (Continued) f1 l DIESEL ENGINE OUTPUT (kW)L l SYS. ..
LOAD RATING NOTE *
' NO. DESCRIITION- (kW) A. B C 1
R46 . VITAL CVCF 25x2 31.6 31.6 - l NPSS CVCF 15.4 18.9 18.9 ' 37.,c F I COMP CVCF - 150x2 189.5 -- 189.5 1 W ' R47 TRANSF.C/R INST 30x3 193 193 193
, NOR INST . 50x2 32.2 32.2 -
. RS2 LIGHTING 100x3 117 117 117
. T22 SGTS FAN 16.5x2 17.4 - 17.4 - L SGTS HEATER 25x2 29.2 29.2 - T41- DRYWELL COOLER 18.5x4 19.5 19.5 39.0 T49 FCS HEATER ' 110x2 X X -- (8)- FCS BLOWER 11x2- X X - (8) U41 R/B ELEC ROOM FAN . 57.2x6 60.2 60.2 60.2
.MCR FAN 127.2x2 133.9 133.9 -
C/B ELEC. ROOM FAN 38.5x6 40.5 -- 40.5 40.5
-C' n) HX/A FAN. 77x3 81.1 81.1 81.1 1 DG FAN - 30x6 63.2 63.2 . 63.2 l OTHER LOADS 360 120 210 (9)
TOTAL W A99t2~ if$$5" 489%d WP S~ ; See Table 8.3-3for Notes - Assendment 2 SM
. . . . _ _ . . . . ~ _ . . . . _ _ . . _ _ .- . _ . - - _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
, . ~. . , ,- . _ . _ . _ _. _ . _ _ _ - . . _ _ .
, b ,
. ~ . . ....; . . . . :. a. .
-)
m .
}MM . mmo Standard Plant - _
arV A , a
-- TABLE 8.3 3.
1 NOTES FOR TABLES 8.31 AND 8.3 2 435,oyQ l 435 05'I [ (1) -: shows that the load is not connected to the switchgear of this division. { X: shows that the load is not counted for D/G continuous output claculation by the ; reasons shown on other notes. !
. 1 (2)
- Motor operated valves
- are operated only 30 60 seconds. Therefore they are not counted ,
for the DG continuous output calculation. ; (3) LOADS are shed with LOCA signal. l (4) FMCRD operating time (about 2 minutes) is not counted for the DG continuous output
. calculation.
l . Q- - SL.-. - of prefered power ' (S[pereX) III)iPCF pump motor starts by L2 signal ADivision o of loss e case
. As HPCF pump motors has very lar acity, they are connected to Div. II, !!!.
.- to equalize the DG load capacity. <
(6) CUW pum '%not operate under LOCA condition. CUW pump may ate under LOPP condition, b ate with SLC mPer...uv.f~On this calculatio pump is near considered C p is
- aince f he c.uW 'k r. j y af-he '
F,pgqt(;_ 0 r- - - - - - S-- 't* W
. -y !: - -- 5 . . - ..d c.. (
M' (8) FCS will not operate under LOPP condition. D e/qApd- r _ w = ;m,.,_.. .. . - o- -- :. :: e, . . : .... . = m q 1, .= mcoto u _-I:: r rn! # OS C flRd. q=; c ;= :n r= c =.c .-
-- -- -- - "= ' -- "
.u.w;
.(
(11) Div. !V battery charger is fed from div. I motor control center, tl1) Lead descrift te.s scenyes em is,tteproted as phe.U: , L:30 Control Rod Drive FMCRD Fine motton Control Rod Drive SLC
- Steruby LispJid Controt l Rut Residaat Meet Removet NPCF High Pressure Core Flow cuW Cleon Up Water FPC Fuel Poot Cooling
- f. 14NC Make Up Water system (condensed)
RCW Reactor Cooling Water (bullding) MECW Emergency Cooling Water R$W Reactor see Water IA Instrument Air CVCF Constant Voltage Constant Freesency NPSS
- Nucteer Protection Safety system COMP Computer sag 1 Ston e y Gas Treatment FCs Fleseabitity Control system NCR Main Control Room R/B Reector Building Amendneset 2 WM Nest Exchanger 8.1 28 C/B Controt tullding DC Dieset Generator
,1 L
N. nA6100AE arv n
- Standard Plant ' '
1
;.
.l TABLE 3.21 ]
CLASSIFICATION
SUMMARY
(Continued) l
. Quality a Group' Quality Safety face. . Classi. ' Assumace Seismic Principal Componenta QRub linn' Asatiend Ra==lr==amt' Catspor / Entu l P5 lastrument/ Service Air Systems
- 1. - Containment isolation indud- 2 C B B I ing supports valves and piping
- 2. Accumulators, and downstream 3 '" 1 I piping induding supports with-safety related function ,,,
e
~ 3. Electri- 1 IC' ' y t;
safety RiggtoWf ,gget *** \ , d # 3 , wit'fY g Cable y g, g I 4. function ytte rT g e\s"# I
$, Qlber not U ECdanica gget [* je#f #'
component
'tC [
cab \es L w t** ge (, 6YS ,
, t Malceup Water S3 of ,pggces
- gg ,C,b 3
of' g ter 2 5 I
' y-M ** g, gts *,,
I P8Pasindudint gt S MYCs forming p ,, gg,y lainment bounda I'trov, g th8If * ,
- 2. Condensate storag eot'55"' se,c uel 3
~ induding supports con ,
s-
- l l 3- Condensate header . cont *# ...
mduding supports anc
$',1 pene""W s2 d' Piping induding suppor. pogor t A) ~
h YaIves b. L 5. Other components 0 D - - R1 D
/
ower Supply ~ s
--f, f p ,
- 1. All components with saf . 3 SC,C,X, --
B / ) RZ relateffunction M r. 1 l L 32.D Amendaunt 7
n . M..M...a pi.. -
=
saAsicoAE
-I -
TABLE 3.21 ;
;
CIASSIFICATIO'N
SUMMARY
(Continued) ... Quality li ~ Group = . Quality Safetg Assermace Seismic Classi d e-Primelpal Comne ant" Qan %en d .h t 3 HW ,W -
,/ ~
i
'~
( : R2 Amutlian AC Peuer System / - {
/
- l -: 1. All components with safery/ -
3 SC.C,X. - B
/
( relapd function / ,/ RZ / /. -
=> B y - ,s
- 1. Sta** g RZ C B I (y).
gt ? ' s sf~p s. + .*
\
c *'
- s. s p#&,ps/g "p ,#
s + ..' s.- v f St y. ,\ - - - 3 je 3 G .'
# "p \o > B I t' #, .s
,c ,S .
p g g i'
'/
4 Ws '.*
# t e. B I
% *
- pt c#,< '
gc .C ' ' [
#t j,P#j[ v'g* s 4 -
O - s "Ms##<4 s /pt'
- c# g\ , / ,g p ?' ,.
\
p s' ,s. fe s p ..
,c .C ' ,
.6. D. s*
',gee5 p + ## p / ,,. ,s s G I (y) i Mect -
eMg[ 4 e\'c#' t c .* * *
\
! 7. e+ S' I L e.e*# v * ** l modul t+ c#,/',8s ,c 3 * ' ,
\
l 1' ptj# ,, pt* 3 4 ..- 8 Cable with a f %',g s functions gt .* ' s s 0 .-
- 9. Other mechanica electrical modules q.
* 'v' 50'* '
- s f*et' s + .*
.. / ,p 4-.e . 3
'j/p n 24 h.'
l (O.s
+*
ls st-
y
,, ,. .- - ~
-.35 J L.J e, , , .
., 9 1 W ~
g. 4 ?,-- = h ;. [ ,3fcg3g g ,3 i
' ~ _
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- N.
l SE ON RCtC E51-F037 STfAM SUPPLY VALVE OrV 1 OC RT yS RCC E 51-F039 TURerE EXHAUST VALVE O!v 10C A * #"* B-M ROC E 58-F045 STEAM SUPPLY BYPASS VALVE Orv 1 DC U RCC E58-F047 M VACUUM PUMP OrSCH ISOL VALVE Orv I OC C t-RCC E51-F048 STEAM LINE WARM-UP VALVE Orv 1 AC .. A
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