ML20058Q268

Forwards Comparison of Advanced LWR Requirements Document & GE Advanced BWR SSAR Design

ML20058Q268
Person / Time
Site:	05000605
Issue date:	06/12/1990
From:	Wilkins D GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20058Q265	List: ML20058Q262 ML20058Q268
References
NUDOCS 9008220012
Download: ML20058Q268 (10)

Text

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i Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i

Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

omnarison of ALWR llacui>ements

)ocument and GE ABW-1 SSA 1 Desian.

Please find attached our comparison of the ALWR Requirements Document-and the GE ABWR SSAR design.

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i GE has been a major participant in the EPRI ALWR Requirements Program-since-its inception in 1985, and'has worked closely with EPRI to achieve consistency of the.ABWR SSAR design with the ALWR requirements.- This

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effort has involved extensive technical dialog betweenLGE,tthe Utility i

Steering Committee and the ALWR Program staff over the last"five. years.

During this process, numerous' enhancements were' incorporated into-the i

ABWR SSAR design to meet the ALWR requirements.

A' detailed comparison'of I

the ABWR SSAR design to the several'thousand ALWR requirements' documented i

in the 13 chapters shows that the ABWR complies with all but the smal1 i

number of ALWR requirements shown in the:atta'chment.

The'results of this comparison have been reviewed with the EPRI ALWR program staff.

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Table 1A documents areas where the' ABWR SSAR design'is different from specific' ALWR requirements.

Several of these stem'from differences between ALWR requirements-and-GE's approach to addressing current regulatory requirements.- In all cases, we believe the ABWR S$AR design provides an acceptable level.of safety.

In addition, someiitems are still under discussion with EPRI ALWR Program i

staff.

It is tiikely that' these differences will be resolved in-the future. These areas are provided _in Table IB.

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y-Dr. Thomas E. Murley June-12, 1990 Page 2 The comparisonsL in' the. attached. tables were.made with respect to the-version of the ALWR Requirements Document Volume 11 Chapter status listed in Table 2.

I hope the attached comparison is' helpful in~ demonstrating to you and your staff that the ABWR SSAR design.is highly consistent with the LALWR requirements.

Sincerely,

~

i D. R. Wilkins l

Attachments cc: ALWR Utility Steeri_ng Comittee

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NRC Comissioners ACRS Chairman-D. J. McGoff, DOE J. Taylor, EPRI' B. Wolfe. GE w:DRW90-080:j L

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' TABLE 1A-l~

LIST OF DIFFERENCES FROM: SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS-

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' Operating basis earthcuake. -

-2.

Timing of fission protuct release.

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Metal water reaction.

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Containment overpressure protection.

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Electrical power distribution.-

6.

Standby ens treatment system charcoal filters.

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Fuel casli size.

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Main control room work station redundancy.-

9.

Main control room restrooms.

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-TABLE 1A:

u DIFFERENCES FROM SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS i

1.

Doeratina Basis Earthauake Reference Chapter 1, Rev. IB,-Section 4.6.2.4.4.1,iPage 1.4-12 requires t' hat.the "....

magnitude of the OBE shall be... independent of. the magnitude of the SSE."'

Section 2.3.1.10 and: Table 1.2 6 require-the use'of 0.lg for the 0BE.

SSAR Design The SSAR design has been analyzedLfor; an.OBE level corresponding:to' a value!

equivalent to half the SSE' level, i.e., a. bounding value of 0.15 g.

2.

Timina of Fission Product Release r

Rtfernace Chapter 5, Rev.1-A, Section -1.2.3.4,' Page 5.1-11' requires that the ' Require-ments document will assume that release of substantial amounts of fission; prod-J ucts... would occur no sooner than about one hour after scram of the reac-L tor."

_l SSAR Desian The-SSAR analysis was done with two sets of assumptions -. one used the assump-

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tions stated in the requirements and the second assumed instantaneous release.

For both analyses the design met the applicable criteria..

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DIFFERENCES FROM SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

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Metal' Water Reaction j

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N Chapter 5 s ocifies"that the containment shall-be! designed to handle "... an amount of h drogen equivalent to~ that generated by oxidation of 75 percent of the fuel-c1 dding surface..."

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The SSAR design uses inerting.to prevent hydrogen detonation and has sufficient

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pressure capability, making the. design insensitive to the percent of oxidation.'

The design pressure is. determined by design basis accident LOCAs and sufficient' margin exists between design pressure and, applicable stress limits to handle 100% metal water reaction.

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Containment Overnressure Protection Reference l

The ALWR requirements-are silent with regard to containment-overpressure pro-

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tection, but are intended to: provide adequate containment performance without requiring a containment vent.

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SSAR Desian The ABWR SSAR design includes an overpressure protection feature, consisting of rupture disks and recloseable valves to preclude a'large release of. fission.

products resulting from uncontrolled. failure of. containment due to overpres-sure.

The ABWR meets the ALWR-requirements without-reliance'on this contain 1 ment overpressure protection feature.

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DIFFERENCES FROM $PECIFIC REQUIREMENTS 5.

Electrical Power Distribution Reference A three tier electrical distribution network is required by. the ALWR require-ments.

Chapter 11, Rev. 0, Section 2.3.2, and Chapter 11, Section 4.3.3. page.

11.4-9 (dedicated nonsafety buses)--require that ".-.. the onsite. power distribution system shall follow a three-tier conce st...

....A second tier shall 1nclude the distribution systems supplying power to permanent nonsafety loads..."-

The rationale states that this: concept ".... in' particular recognizes th'at redundant power sources.. =. must be-provided.. <.

for nonsafety loads expected to remain operational' at all times (e.g.,;during 'a -

loss of offsite - power).- Chapter 11, Rev. 0, Section 2.3.9, page 11.2 8, requires ".:.. non Safety circuits are not connected to safety circuits....."

In addition, other requirements also relate to this issue.

These requirements include Chapter 9. Rev. lA, Section 8.3.2.3.8, page 9.8-37 (powering drywell.

cooler fans during loss of off-site power events)- and Chapter _11, Section 2.3.4, page 11.2-7 (dedicated sources for permanent nonsafety power loads) and i

Section 4.3.3 page ll.4-9.(dedicated.non safety buses).

SSAR Design ThezSSAR design has a two tiered power distribution system.

Loads that would comprise the ALWR second tier have been allocated to either special top tier buses'or isolable sections of safety buses, eliminating the second tier. ' The j

isolable non IE loads' connected to the safety buset are the instrument air compressor, 250V DC: battery chargers, computer power supplies,- three motor-control. centers and the reactor ' water cleanup system pumps. - The SSAR -design meets the four purposes stated in the. rationale of.Section 2.3.9'of Chapter ll, r

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-TABLE-IA DIFFERENCES FRod SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS 1

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SGTS Charcoal Filters j

Reference Chapter 9,isection 8.3.4.1.3 requires no charcoal filters in the SGTS.

$$AR Design The SGTS design includes charcoal filters in the system.

7.

Fuel' Cask Sire L

Reference Chapter 7 Section 2.3.2.5.1, Page 7.2-30,: requires that the-plant:be designed for "... the largest multiple assembly spent fuel-shipping cask being de-signed by the DOE.

SSAR Design The cask loading facility is 10 feet square, large enough to accommodate' the GE IF300 cask, which is the largest currently available. -

l 8.

Main Contro1' Room Work Station Redundan v Reference Chapter 10,Rev.0,.Section2.2.10,page10.2-7,sta'es-that"Thioperatorsand t

supervisor in the Main Control, Room will interface' the plant'through redundant-workstations...

The supervisor's workstation will be identical to the oper-

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ator's workstation except that' all of its plant equipment control functions shall be normally disabled."

ll SSAR Design

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In the SSAR design, the' main 1 control' room has operator work. stations:and a monitoring-only. work station for the shift supervisor. The work stations in the SSAR design each have different-functional requirements and none are:. identical-to any of the others. However, they have functional redundancy and meet all of the ALWR requirements regarding reliability and the definition of work.statica functional allocation based upon comprehensive task analyses.

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' TABLE 1A-DIFFERENCES FROM SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS 9.

Main control Room Restrooms Reference

,l Chapter 10, Rev. O, Section 4.9.1.4'.. Page~ 10.4-61, requires that the restroom for main control room personnel. "shall not be shared with areas outside the.-

creases.the traffic into the control:g Rationale states, "A shared restroom in-

. main-control room." The'accompanyin area.

SSAR Desian The SSAR. arrangement provides restrooms1 which are located directly outside:the main control room. ' These facilities are. shared with areas outside the main-i control room.

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Radwaste Buildina Reference Chapter 12,'Section 2.2.7.4 requires that' interior walls shall not be used for j

structural support.-

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SSAR Desian I

The SSAR design utilizes interior load bearing walls for' structural support, in the large multi-story radwaste butiding.

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Fuel Pool Level Indication j

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Chapter 8, Section g.3.6.1, requires fuel pool level indication in addition to 4

l a low and high level, alarm, s

i SSAR Desian The SSAR. design has a-level switch provided for low and high level alarms, to signal. the small. level changes expected during normal operation.

3..SGTS Filter Redundancy 7

Reference Chapter.9, Section 8.3.4.1.3 recuires that-th' e SGTS: have: redundant divisions withtwosets,includingthepass<vecomponents(filters).:

i SSAR Desian The SSAR design has redundant active components but uses a common passive filter train.

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TABLE 2 J

ALWR RE0b1REMENTS DOCUMENT VOLUME-II CHAPTER STATUS. 3/14/90 Ch& git,t Status 1

Revision 1-8, Issued 1/90(l) 1, Appendix A Revision 0, Updated 2/90 1, Appendix B Revision 1 B, Issued 2/90-1 2

Revision I-A, Issued 12/90, plus boiler room 11/29/89-3 Revision I-A,1 Issued 12/89, plus boiler room 2/20/90 4

Revision 1 A,' Issued 20/89, plus comment resolution 2/90 Revision I A,' Issued 11/89(I) 5 Revision-1-A, Issued 11/89 6

7 Revision I A, Issued 1/90, plus boiler room 1/31/90 8

Revision 1 B, Issued 2/90-

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Revision liA, Issued 1/90,~plus boiler room 2/22/90(l) 10 Revision 0, Issued-10/89 11_

Revision I A ' Issued 1/90 12 Revision I-A, Issued 1/90, plus boiler room 2/22/90 13 Revision I-A, Issued 11/89-l (1)Plus agreements / discussions at GE/EPRI ALWR Program Staff meetings and telecons 5/4/90, 5/I2/90 and 5/23/90.

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