ML20086H610
| ML20086H610 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000605 |
| Issue date: | 11/27/1991 |
| From: | Rogers A GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Pierson R NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| EEN-9184, NUDOCS 9112090240 | |
| Download: ML20086H610 (141) | |
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GE Nuclear Energy November 27,1991 MFN No.153-91 Docket No. STN 50-605 EEN-9184 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention:
Robert C. Pierson, Director Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate
Subject:
GE Responses to Open issues for GE AllWR ' SAR, Chapter 8 d
Reference:
GE Propcietary Responses to Open issues for GE-ABWR SSAR, Chapter 8, dated November 27,1991, MFN 154-91 Enclosed are the subject documents which we committed, at the September 16-18, 1991 meeting in San Jose, to be provide by the end of November. The documents are consistent with our understanding of the GE action items discussed with the NRC on September 27,1991.
Although many of the open issut.s have already been resolved, we are including a complete set at all of the issues and their associated responses for consistency, We have inserted the symbol
"[N/C)" at the beginning of each response that has been previously reviewed and resolved with the NRC at the September meetings.
Please note that some of the material responding to the open issues is designated as General Electric Company proprietary information and is being submitted under separate cover (See Reference).
It is intended that GE will amend the SSAR to include this material, where appropriate.
Sincerely, b
.e -
g
/ A.E. Rogers, Acting Manager
/ Regulatory and Ar.alysis Services M/C 382, (408) 925-6948 cc: F. A. Ross (DOE)
N. D. Fletcher (DOE)
C. Posiusny, Jr.
(NRC)
R. C. Berglund (GE)
J. F. Quirk (GE)
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Pcge Co.
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. REPORT FORat QUESANS8 TO PRINT NRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & CE RESPONSES FOR ABWR SSAR CHAPT [R 8 NUMBER NRC ISSUE GE RESPONSE 1.000 8.2 0FFSITE POWER SYSTEM Items 1-3 LN/C]: (See the response to Question 435.63.)
Based on information presented on figure 8.3-1 of the A8WR SSA 4t aopears that the of fsite pnwer system consists of the fotLowing three st 2:
Items 4-7: The following rww section has been acMed to acMress separation.
1.
A back feed from the transmission network through the main transforcer, 8.1.2.1.1 Separation bus duct, and two unit Auxiliary transformers to the Ctess 1E distribution system irput terminals. To initiate this back feed, the main generator must The locations fer the sein transformer, unit aw!!!ary transforsers, and be disconnected from this source by a generator b eaker; reserve auxiliary transformer are shown on Figure 1.2-25.
The reserve auxiliary transformer will be seperated from the mit auxiliary transformers 2.
An offsite line from the transmission network through the reserve by 50 feet or shadow fire watt.
Auxiliary transformer tc the Class 1E distribution system input terminats; and Reference is made to Figure 1.2-1, and to Figures 8.3-1, 2 and 3 for the single line diagraras showing the method of feeding the loads. Separation of 3.
A ccetustion turbine generator to the Class 1E distribution system input the noemal preferred and alternste preferred power feeds is accceptished by terminats.
floors and watt s over their rcutes through the turbine, control and reactor tulldings except within the switchgear rooms where they must be routed to the Section 8.2.3 indicates that these circuits, for the most part, are within same switchgear Lineupa. The normat preferred feeds are routed within the the AeWR design scope; however, sections 3.1.2.2.8.2.2, 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 turbirm building from the mit auxiliary transfor,arrs to the turbine building indicate that these circuits are, in total, out of the ABWR Standard Plant.
switchgear and to the c m trol building. Frtso there, the normat preferred scope; thus, description and analysis demonstrating empliance of the of fsite feeds continue across the divisions 1 ard 3 sides of the contro! and reactor circuits to regulatory regairements has not baen provided in the AEWR SSAR.
buildings (right side of buildings in Figure 1.2-1) to the respective To initiate r r review of the offsite system, acMitional information is safety-related switchgear roces in the reactor buitding.
required fer the following items and/or positions.
The alternate preferred feeds from the reserve auxillery transformer are 1.
The inconsistency between sections 3.1.2.2.8.2.2, S.2.1, 8.2.2, ard 8.2.3 routed outside and alongside the turbine building. The feed for the of the ABWR $$AR as to what part of the offsite system is within ABWR scope, rcresafety reisted switchgear peels of f and enters the train A switchgear room at grade to pick W the switchgear at that elevatices, and then rises crt @ to 2.
The description and analysis of the offsite power systen's preferred the train 8 switchgear room above. The other atternate preferred feed, which of f site power sumlies f rom the utility-ABWR interf aces to the Class TE is for the safety-related buses, continues on outside of the turbine building distribution system input terminals which is within the ABWR Standard plant mtit it enters the clean access corridor (Figure 1.2-25) Just below grade scope.
between the turbine and control buildings. It crosses the turbine building in the top of the clean access twriet and then enters the divisions 2 and 4 side 3.
Interface requirenents for the of fsite circuits f rcm the utility-AsWR of the control building. From there, it crosses the divisiens 2 and 4 sides m.
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. REPORT FORM QUESANS8 TO PRINT NRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & CE RESPONSES FOR ABWR SSAR CMAPTER 8 t'JMBE R NRC ISSUE GE RESPUNSE interfaces out to the utility grid system which is outside the A8vR Standard of the control and reactor buildings (left side of buildings in Figure 1.2-1) plant scope.
to access the switchgear roonus within the reactor twilding. The normat preferred power feeds are not attowed to be routed in or through the clean 4 Description and analysis of criteria relating to physical and electricpt access corridor, separation between the normal and alternate preferred offsite circuits and betieen the preferred offsite and the onsite circuits i cluding The location of the combustion turbine generator (CTG) is shown on Figure n
instrunentation and controt circuits Onsite circuits include Class 1E power 1.2-26.
The stantRyy power feed from the rtG is routed directly to the sumty circuits and the Class 1E distribution system circuits to the loads.
switchgear rooms in the turbine building.
5.
Interface criteria relating to physleal and electrical separation between The branch to the reactor building is routed adjacent te the alternate the normat and alternate preferred offsite circuits and between offsite and preferred feeds across the control and reactor buildings.
onsite circuits including instrunentation and controt circuits.
6.
Physical lay out drawings which shows the gAysical separation of the Ites 8 LN/C]: The second paragraphs of sections 8.1.3.1.1.1 and 8.3.1.1.1 offsite circuits ard separation between onsite and offsite circuits. This have been revised in accordance with section 8.3.4.9.
In addition, secH ons shalt incttde the instruwntation and control circuits associated with each (1), (3) and (4) of 8.3.1.1.7 have been clarified to allow feed from either offsite circuit.
offaite source during normat plant operation.
7.
The physical and electrical separation between the circuits associated with the contustion turbine generator and other of fsite circuits inctufing item 9 (N/CI: GE questions the validity of this criteria. CDC 17 reesires instrunentation and controt circuits.
two of fsite sources. Yet, any plants (including the AeWe) with more than two divisions could not meet such criteria, because the loss of one of the offsite 8.
Inconsistencies between response to question 435.48 (or section 8.3.4.9) sources sust affect rore than one division. Yet less reliable plent desl ps i
and section 8.3.1.1.1 as to the normat offsite power feeds to Class 1E having only two divisions would meet the criteria. We suggest this item be division I, II, and III. Similarly, sections 3.1.2.1 arvi 8.1.3.1.1.1 are deleted since it is redmdent to SER lssue 8.2.1.
incoral stent.
9.
No single failure ground fault or other aberration in one offsite item 10 t#/C1: There ere no restrictions placed on testing of the of fsite preferred circuit between the plant switchyard and the Class 1E distribution systems daring normal plant operation. Interface 8.3.4.9 provides for system input terminals shalt cause loss of offsite power to or chattenge in continuous feed from both the preferred and atternate power sources.
any way more than one Class 1E distribution system.
Therefore, the need for testing should be minimmt. Mowever, testing procedures and fregaency of testing far the offsite circuits is determined by 10.
Identification, analysis, and justification for each circuit or the utility /a mlicant.
conponent part of the of fsite system which will not be tested during normat plant operation.
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. REPORT FORM cVESANSS TO PRINT NRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & GE RESPONSES FOR A9WR SSAR CHAPTER S NUMBER NRC ISSUE -
GE RESPONSE item 11 tu/C1: 'The explicit definition was added to Sunsection 8.3.1.1.1,'as
- 11. Explicit definition of normat plant operation which states that it meses requested (see attached mark-up).
k
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ett modes of plant operation including shutdown, refueling, and start up.
[
- 12. Cooacity and capability of each of fsite circuit to staply connac"-d item 7: eefer to the response to SER issue 8.3.3.6.
tonds.
- 13. Definition of critwie amticable to of fsite systems similar to Table Item 13 14/C3: (See Section 8.2.2 added in response to cuestion 435.63.).
8.1-1.
2.000 8.2.1 Independence between offsite and onsite Systems.
[W/C2 The statement quoted from section 8.3.2.2.1 refers to the individant Ctess TE 125 VDC betteries which control the Ctess 1E switchecer feedins each
.[
The foitowing criteria, specified in section 8.3.2.2.1 for the A9WR design, Class 1E 6.9KV M/C bus. Each divisionet bus is feed by its out divisionet i g tles that a single failure of one 125 VDC system may Jeoperdire'end thus breekers which are controtted by the 125 VDC bettery of thet same division.'
cause toss of offsite and onsite power to one safety division but will not Therefore, it is correct in that no divisionet bettery fatture can effect the jeopardire or cause loss of offsite preferred AC power to any other safety feeders of the other divisions.
divisions.
The statement <woted in 8.3.2.2.1 hos been eterified as follows:
t "The tritikely toss of one 125 VDC swstem does not jeoperdire the stspty of preferred and stanty AC power to the Ctess 1E buses of the other toed
- The unlikely toss of one 125 VDC system does not jeope-dire the Claes tE feed 1
groms."
sg pty to the Ctess 1E buses of the other toed grtmes.*
[
This criteria, with respect to the DC system, meets the staff position that no single f atture, gromd fault, or other aberration in one offsite preferred circuit between the plant switchyard arrf the Ctess 1E distribution system i
input terminets shall cause toss of offsite power to or challenge in any wer i
more than one Class 1E distribution system, division, or toed grow and is,
[
therefore, acceptable. However, the offsite system being pr g osed for the ABWR does not meet this criterie. For exagte:
e, - Fellure of the single main transformer styptying two of the safety h
divisions will cause loss of offsite power to more that one safety division.
b.
f ailure of any one of the four tsilt sunillary transforsers will cause toss of offsite power to more than one safety division.
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.EEPORT F0i!M GLESANS8 TO PRINT l
' met DRAFT SER ISSUES & E RESPONSES FOR AeWR $$AR CMAPtER 3
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l NUMBER NRC ISSUE
. GE RESPONSE 3
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To initiate our review in this area, additionet information is re w ired for the following items.
j
.1.
The extent Ctess 1E DC power is used for cuntrol and protection of the of fsite circuits from the switchyard to the terminst connection on the Ctess 1E system.
2.
Descriptive information or enetysis demonstrating comptience of the AeWR
)
design to the above stated criterie.
I 3.
Specific identification and documentation of the abcve end other exceptiors to this criteria in the ASWR $$AR with justification.
2.100 8.2.2 Protective System for the Reector Internet Puups (Question 435.4)
The reference statement in section 15.3.1.1.1 of the $$am, specifying thet no-sinste feiture shell cause en inadvertent trip of more then three RIPsi is e -
Section 15.3.1.1.1 of Amendernt 10 to the SSAR states that since four buses design rewirement on the on-site RIP power sigipty esquipment. Foutts in the 1
ere used to suspty power to the ten reactor internet pumps (RIPS), the worst off-sits circuit which reoutt in e teos of AC power to plant em Ipsent are.
single felture een enty cause three RIPS to trip. Further doun in this same anetyred in Section 15.2.6 of the SSAR. The section 15.2.6 evetuations de.
section a statement is ande that the probability of any additional EIP trips address e loss of power to the on-site Rio pouer sesupty ewipument.
'j is low (less then 10**(-6) per year). Therefore, this event (i.e., the sinuttaneous trip of.more then three Rie ) is etessified es e timiting feutt.
An enetysis is provided in Apperdia 15C to the $$AR which desenstretes thet-s the coattined probability of events reoutting in a trip of more then three WIPs is less than 1E-6.
This anstysis includes mein generator tripe, feutts on the L In order to establish that the probability of any additionet RIP tripe is'
- cesmuon fee 6*r upstream of the 6.9 W foseers (broking effect), and toes of less then 10**(-6), adrfitionet.information or enetysis is required from GE in of f-site power, thereby beimding any postuteted feutts in the of f-site e SSAR emendernt to address each. of the following items.
circuit. The enetysis reeutte, es provided in Amerdment 15, are listed below.
(e) Probability onetysis which demonstrates that a fault on the offsite No. of Pumpe Tripped Probability circuit that occurs anywhere between and including the of fsite switc**yerd and -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~
the reactor internet pumps wilt not cause loss cf more then three reactor 1
0.113/yr-internet pumps (RIPS).
2 0.028/yr 3e (w/o coestdomin) 0.',6/yr (b) Identify each couponent part of the power steply to the reector irdernet 3b (w/ coestdown) megligible'
.j pumps and/or protective systems that is expected to ftmetion to assure the 4
segligible*
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. REPORT-FORM GUESANSS TO PRfWT NRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & GE RESPCNSES FOR A8WR SSAR CMAPTER 8 ICUMBER NRC ISSUE GE kESPONSE asstsytions used in the probability anstysis of item (a) above.
megligible*
L 6
- egligible*
(c) Probability analysis which demonstrates that the etwtined probability of 7
Negligible
- att. events (including those described in item (e) above) is less than 8
segligible*
1C**(-6) for trip of more then three RIPS.
9 wegligible*
10 Westig!ble*
i
- < 1.0E-6/yr i
As explained in Section 15C.4, the fatture of power to the motor /Generetor
-1 (M/G) sets does not generetty constitute a trip cf the Ries powered by the W/G sets.
The response to RAI 435.4 has been modified to be consistent with this infoamstion (see attached merk-se).
L 3.000 S.3 oustTE POWER STSTEMS IN/C] Response 435.26 hos been modified as follows:
8.3.1 Compliance with General Design Criteria item (1)(b) of section
- Att conformance stateamts in the anstysis sections of Chapter 8 howe been 8.3.1.2.2 indicates that the Ctess 1E Constant Voltage Constant frequency modified to state fuit comptience trithout the applicability cavest (see (CVCF) power stwty is in compliance with Generet Design Criterie (Est) 2, 4, etteched).
17, and 12 in port or in whole, as esplicebte. Response to question 435.26
~
prcvides clarification that there are no noncompliances, but some portions'of l.
There are no non-conformances with the CDCs. The 'as applicable' statements the CDC's are not applicebte at this tevet (for. exemple, the statement in GDC were intended only to differentiete between those portions of the GDCs we 17 ebout 'two physically independent circuits from the transmission network).
Inteepreted to be applicable to the plant as o' dote, re+her then to it is incteer es to what parts of these GDC's you consider ret applicable to individJet systems or components. however,' it is better to delete such the CVCF power stoplies. Also it is uncteer as to why two physically statements !f they are construed to mean any degree of non-confonnance."-
~
independent circuits from the transmiss!on network are not ogpticable to the CYCF power supplies.' In order to clarify these and other related items, additionat information is required for the following issues.
With regerd to the CYCF power stoptiet, they are ultimately fed free their.
respective 6.9KY divisionet buses (see FigJres 8.3-1, 8.3-3 and 8.3-6).
Each
- 1. ^ identification of each part of (DC 2, 4,17, a ad 18 tAich is not 6.9Ev divisional bus is conrectable to two offsite sources (prefered aruf considered applicable to the CVCF power steplies and justification for each
. alternate prefered) and two onsite sources (EDG and CTC).
part that is considered not a5pticebte.
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. REPORT FORM OUESANS8 TO PRINT kPC DRAFT SER ISSUES 1 GE RESPONSES FOR A9WR S$AR CMAPTER 8
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NUM3ER NRC ISSUE GE RESPONSE 2.
Clarification as to why the CDC 17 requirement for two independent power The above sodification closes att Itmas except #6 and #7 iAlch ere addressed sources is not applicable to the CYCF power (upplies, as.follows:
3.
Clarification for each non applicable criteria shown in table 5.1-1.
Item 4 [N/C): Scsection 8.1.3.1.2 and Tabte 8.1-1 heve been modified for 4.
Inconsistencies within Table 8.1-1 ard between Table 8.1-1 and section consistency. (See attached mark-up) 8.1.3.1.2 as to applicable criteria.
[
5.
Identification with justification for each port of the criteria listed in Item 7 [N/C1: The second sentence in Sdeection 1.2 1.1.2(11) has tren section 8.1.3.1.2 that is considered not applicable to some part of the eterified as fottows:
electrical system.
- For Ctess it; systems or components (i.e. IEEE 279 applies), single failures 6.
Identification with justification for each part of the design of the of either active or possive electrical convenents..."
i Instrunentation'and Control system that is considered to meet the stbstance and intent of eversus conptience with) IEEE 279,10 Cf st 50 Appendia A, General Design Criterie 3, 17, 21, 22, and WRC Regulatory Guides 1.75 (IEEE 384) and 1.53 (IEEE 379).' (
Reference:
section 8.3.1.4.2.1) i i
7.
Clarification of the systems or components to which IEEE-279 apply (reference: item (11) of section 1.2.1.1.2),
t 3.100 8.3.1.1 Compliance with Criteria 2 and 4 The second sentence of the third peregraph in sSAR section 8.1.3.1.1.1 !!smae moted peregraph (2)) has been endified per the fottowing:
Chapter 8 of the ABWR SSAR contains the following statements in relation to the compliance of electrical system design to the requirements of criterion "Redurutent ports of the system are physicatty seperated and 14...La to the 2, Cesign Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomens, and criterion 4, extent that in any design basis event with any resulting toes of equipment eruf I.
Envirernmental end Missites Design seses, of Appendix A to 10 [ft Part 50..It. single fatture, suf ficient reuninifg safety systems will be eveitable to f
appears that each statement can be incorrectly interpreted to mean that effect a safe plant shutdown for att allowebte aedes of plant operation.
protection need only be provided for two of the three (or four) inoependent safety related electrical divisions.
Also, many of the peregrachs quoted have been modified or deleted because t
opeti*i seperation by distance et*me (i.e., without berriers), is not ottowed (1)
"In some instances seetist seperstien is provided such thet no single without justification. Three-hour fire-rated barriers are required between event may disable more than one of the redtedent divistors or prevent safe redundant divisions in erees outside the inerted contelrument and the centrot '
shutdown of the plant. Electrical equipment and wiring for the Class 1E room. Within those erees, the seperation requirements of IEEE 384 and
[
systems which are segregated into separate divisions are separated so that no Regulatory Guide 1.75 apply. Ary emeeptions are anetyred and justified in
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.REPCCT FOR4 QUESANS8 TO PRINT WRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & CE RESPONSE 5 FOR ABWR SSAR CHAPTER 8 GE RESP 086SE NUMBER NRC ISSUE design basis event is cepsbte of disebling any FSF total itsittion." (ref:
9A.5.
section 8.3.1.1.5.1)
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(2)
" Redundant parts of the system are physicatty seperated to the extent that a single credible event...comot cause loss rf power to redsdant load groups." (ref: section 8.1.3.1.1.1)
)
(3)
"Where spatial separetion centwt be maintained in hazardous areas (e.g., potential missite areas), physical isolation bete electricot equipment of dif ferent divisions is echieved by use of a 6-inch mininum thickness reinforced concrete barrier." (ref: tection 8.3.1.4.1)
(4)
" Class 1E electric emipment and wiring is segregated into separate 1
divisions so that no single credible event is capable of disabling enoug'1 l
l equirnent to hinder reactor shuttwn. removat of decay heat f rtxa the core, or isolation of the contelrunent in the event of an accident." (ref: section 8.3.1.4.1.13 (5)
"Ftpipent errengement and/or protective barriers are provided such that no locally generated force or missils can destroy any reciandent RPS, NSSS, ECCS, or ESF functions. In addition, arramament and/or separation berriers are previded to ensure that such diswrbances do not c8fect teth MPCF and RCiC systems." (ref: section 8.3.1.4.1.1)
(6)
" Containment penetrations will be so ar2anged that no design basis eventcan disable cablino in snore than one division." (ref: section 8.3.1.4.2.3.2.(7)
(7)
"The protection System and ESF control logic, and instrument penets/ recks shall be located in a safety class structure in adtich there are no potential sources of missites or pipe breaks that could jeoperdize redundant cabinets and receweys." (ref: section 8.3.1.4.2.2.3)
(8)
"In any corpertmer.t containing an operating crane...there cust be a minteur horizontal separation of 20 feet or a 6 inch thick reinforced
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. REPORT Form QUESAMS8 TO Pt!NT ktC DsMT SER ISSUES & CE RESPONSES FOR A8WR $$As CMAPTER 8 E eF*>tssW QSSER WRC ISSUE corstrete welI betwaen treg conteking cables frews different divisions.*
tref: secticn 8.3.1.C.2.2.2(3))
(9)
"In rooms or comportwents having Seevv rotatitur machinery...or i t rooms containing high pressure feed water piping or hig5 pressure steem lines...mMinua separation of 20 feet or a 6-inch thick reinforced c-JncrMe wolt is required batween trays conteMit4 cebts cf different divisiert."
(ref: section 8.3.1.6.2.2.~(1))
Based on a review c1 the above statements, it appears that berriers between rSdndent safety divisions (versus berriers fross the ef fects of a credible event such as a tocetty generated miss.'te) is the design basis for electricot systems meetMg the protection requirements of criterie 2 eruf 4 o8 Accamdis A to 10 CTR Part 50. The design bosis for pro *ection of safety systems is not clear. It is not cleer that following any design basis event with e 7 resultirvj toss of equipe=mt anci siftte feiture, sufficient reuein'rg safety systems will be avoitebte to ef;ect a safe plant shutotwn for att allcwebte modes of plant operation.
ttees 1 & 2 tutt3: The tent of sections 8.3.'.
.2.3.1(6)&tT) and the response l
4.E"/J 8.3.2 PersiCAL ITEPENDENCE to <p;estten 435.35 (section 20.3) tse been modif f ed in h =Itt the ettsched 8.3.2.1 Cordaits to open Treys Section 8.3.1.4.2.3.1 and respc we to ata stion 435.33 fruficate thet Wicet l
seperation, for condaits containing serem setenoi.1 germ circu t wiring, witt tree 3: The Srp reesiees that seestatory Guide 1.75 be adsressad, yet ttst 4
We assumed the superni tw es be try a seiniaan seperation distence of one inch frae either metal enclosed guide specificotty endorses IEEE 386-MT4 receurys or ron-extosed receways. The one inch of swaretion cetwaan a the guide would ecoty er: Jetty to IEEE 386-1981 es mrt:. though some secticn ceduit and enclosed receweys complies with seguietory Guide 1.75 sepnestion rss6ers within the TEEE dxweet were changad in the newer veesion. To guidelines and is ther~ fore ecceptable. The one inch of seperation betweet e eterify the aw contradicteen, we have ed$ad this assusction state===*t to conduit and non-enclosed rr.:eweys, however, does not comply e,ith separation resporse 435.32 (see ettsched). tEEE 386-1961 is identified es the correct versian for the Asw certificatien. es fruficated in respc se 435.33 and table guidelines of tegMetory Guide 1.75.
The steH is therefore m w. 4 that the proposed one inch of separation soy not provide sufficient ind eenom *e 1.8-21 twee SsAR pege 1.5-62 (Amerdrumt 7231 between redurdent systems ervt/or erotectivt to safety systems in accordence with the requirewents of Criterion 17 of Ageendia A to 10 CFR Part 50. To Tebtes 1.8-21 and 8.1-1 hew, been reviewed to deteMne the <lscomacts eesolve this concern, odditionet infor sation is reesired for the feitowing between the versions of IEEE stendeeds refemed in the SSAR (es required Lv 4
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8EPORT Fo m outSewSS TO PeinT WPC DetAFT SER t$$tES & GE RESPONSES FOR Jrrier Sigt cleaPTER 8 4-IRPIBER se#C' ISSUE E 2ES80WSE i
items.
' the Eicensig Seview 9esis Decneurnt), verses those versiere eneersed br regutetery guides. The results are es fetious:
l T.
Identification with justificetters for the one inch of sepe 4 tion, j
CA.8 IIBC I t.G.
SSAR 2.
The contradiction between response to esestion 435.35 (or itein 6 of -
IEEE t.5.
Datt DATE i-section 8.3.1.4.2.3.1) and respecse to esestion 435.33 (or sectier 8.3.1.2.1*
with regard to attowebte seperactern between coneksit are, non enetooed 300* f.32 1974 1980 4
races ors. Desponse 435.33 prohibits by reference to IEEE 38& este reopense 317 1.43 1983 1983 I
435.35 specificetty ettows one inch of seperation. (Seperation by one inch 338 1.118 1977 1977 l
between enclosed and non enclosed recamoys is's kneurs eree of m Wience 386* 1.75 1976 1981 l
with the guldr tines of Regulatory Guide 1.75 dich is ette=sul by the AeWR 38P t.9 1977 1986 i
design. This nori ctruptience should bt. jwtified within the AeWR SSat. It
.&5C*
1.129 19 5 1987 should not be considered es en interface regsirement to be resetved by others 484* 1.128 1975 1967 es indicated in section 8.3.4.5).
i
- De wtes date discerewet j
3.
The contradiction between response to ssestfori 435.33 and 435.32 in the useof IEEE Stenderd 384-1961 versus 384-!974 E had streedy perferimed e caussmeison s*udy for IEEE 386-1974 verses IEEE 386-1981, and e cepy inns sent to the suRC. neuever, GE does tot interet te
- 4 Extent of use of IEEE Standard 386-1981 in tre desian of AeWR.
simiter comuserisen studies for tN ether IEEE sierWerds. f E imellewes this is
(
en enc responsibitity.
5.
Requirements relating to seperation contained in letter SECT-89-013.
e.
Itser 4 14/C3: As empteined in Ites 3 ocove, and in few 435.33, IEEE 306-1981 is the certificottore stenderd, but is eseissed to be eussented by 1-Reguletery Guide 1.75.
There are no tieritoilere en the estent of use of this.
stardea( in the ASWE Standsed Merit Design. In fact, the 3-hour berriers seperating deslyteted fire erose /divistma eacceth the criterie of AG 1.75 and IEEE 384 L
l l
tree 5 tt/t2:. 3ECT-89-C1;3 rosestres t%=t *...desipwes of stardned i
plants...aust desenstrate thet eefe chutdmet of their destyw con be schieved, esenspieg thet ett codpeont in ery one fire eres hos beeri renskred ineguerable by fire and thet reentry to the fire eree for repairs and for operater e-tims is not possible."
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1 This remireamt necessitetad 3-hour fire berrier pretection be providad to the ustts smting redi.rident divisimal erees. Such berrices thus defin d the fire stee M m deries.
~ l I
a reference to 9.5.1.0 hos bam ptoced et the and ef the first peregrech in se.bsection 8.3.1.1.1.1 (pege 8.3-3).
This ties SECY-87-013 with the 3-hour fire berrier require w.
5.000 8.3.2.2 containamt Penetrations tu/CI The rerpense to 435.31(a) ord section 5.3.1.4.1.2(7) have tw= t endified to sere specifiestly state the seperation criterie for the pmetrations. Such Itent (7) of section 8.3.1.4.1.2 indicates that electric penetration seperation criterie ence=ds that of IEEE 354-1861, es empteined in the esseebtles of different Ctess 1E divist m ere se m ted by distence, imodified eesponse (see attached).
saperate rooms or be+riers, ord/or tocation on z*perate floor levels.
Seperate rooms or bef*iefs erwuor tocation ces separete ficer levels exce=ds seperation guidelines for penetrations and is acceptable. Seperation by distence soy otso aueet saporation guidelines; however, inferention es to what constitutes the minimme allowebte distence between penetrations has not bem cteerly defined. To clarify ashot constitutes minisun seperation distence, additional information is reauired for the following ite=is.
1.
Clorification of the response to gi.estion 43' 31(e) es to:
- e. Minimme et towebte distence betwee3 redtrdent penetrations.
- b. Minisun seperation distence between perurtretions containing norr-Class 1E circuits and penetrations containing Ctess 1E or essociated Ctess 1E circults.
2.
Minfeuw attowebte saperation distence between penetrations (cetaining Ctess TE circuits) and other divisionet or non divisional cables.
6.000 3.3.2.3 Ctess 1E Equissemt tu/C) Subsection 8.3.1.4.2.3.f t9) stated that sees and WCMS =cabtes will ret be ptoced in any enclosure idisch wilt tsubly restrict capability of eeweing Section 8.3.1.1.3.1, Physical Seperation and 1 % e, states that probe corrwM: tors for esintem purposes." Ptscament of cables within fles divisionet seperation for Ctess TE e mipnant (=Aich includes RFS e C a aer corubit, es stated in 94.5.5.5, is emsistent with this rewireawat. sowever,
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.NEPOPT FCEM QUESAsS8 TO Fttui het OsATT SER ISSUES & GE RESPONSES FOR A*WR SSAR CMAPTER S NUMBER kRC ISSUE GE RESPONSE ESF systems) is achieved through the use of berriers, spetist seperation, eM ta evoid misinterpretation, the statemmt in 8.3.1.4.2.3.1(9) hos been totetty enclosed recaweys. This cor6inatie of sethes for achieving modified to stete " cables will be enclosed a ad sesereted es defined in separation meets the guide-Lines of section 4.3 of IEEE Stenderd 384 *974 94.5.5.5.*
end is acceptable.
Ite= 1 [4/C1: IEEE 384 and segutstory Guide 1.75 have already been identified Section 8.3.1.4 indicates thet barriers tused to seintain divisionet es the design bests criterie for seperation, es fMicated in the resolutions seperation) are fire rated abere feasible. Also section 8.3.1.1.5.1 iMicates to previous issues, and throughout Chapter 8.
This !s else reitersted within that receweys embaddad in concrete watts, ceiting, or floors wilt tw used es tha some stesection referenced in this issue 18.3.1.4.2.2.2t4)&<511.
In bereiers to maintain divisionet seperation. The use cf fire reted berriers addition to the seperation criterie, the plent is designed such that ce sue end cabed$ed cerviait meets the intent of IEEE standard 384-1974 for t arnout within a fire rene can be assusied par SECT-37-013.
seperation of divisionet cat 8es and 8s ecceptebte. Section 8.3.1.4.2.2.2, however irdicates en esception to the conbinetton of barriers, spetist separation, and totetty enclosed receways se the criterie for seintaining Items 213 tu/CI: We have streedy I&ntified and justified ery euceptions to divisional seperation. In plant erees with potentist herards (such es seperation criterie in Acpe wfin 94.i.5, ord/or within the ecsweariete sections high-pressure fead water piping or high pressure steen lines) redundant wher* they ere discussed. For exemple, the ERC ochrewtedged the excepties receveys separeted tw 20 feet without berriers or being totsetty enetosed is identified for the teekage detection instrtmeatetion in the mein steen timet, attowef to be used to maintain divisionet seperation. Also item (9) of 8.3.1.4.2.2.2(1).
[See etso 94.5.'. 73 It mes noted these cables are ptoced section 8.3.1.4.2.3.1 indicates that cables ossociated with the four in cerrAsit, though they co e,ot be fysicatty separated to the sense estent es redundant divisions of the start to range sionitoring system and the two other cables mentioned in (1), yet they do meet seperation reesirements of divisions of the rod control and informati.pt systee located snder the vessel IEEE 386 Furthersiore, edeutterwous fatture of alt cables in the prer.s> was wilt not use berriers, spotlet seperation, or totatiy enclosed receweys.
onetyred and found to be acceptable..acwever, the ett did not state ehether Movever sactior 94.5.5.5 indicates that flexible metstlic condait is ettewed this is ecceptabte. The emenetes referenced in the question ere not to be used en these cables snder the vesset. To clarify or resolve thete inconsistencies, but are port of the enceptions and justi'* cations reaaested irconsistencies and to estebtish consistent seperation criterie, additionet by these items.
~
fnfornetton is regJired for the following iteas.
The response to 435.35 was modified, es explained in the resoonee to SER issue 1.
Clarification of the criterie to be ussi es the tlemsing and/or design 8.3.2.1.
besis for saperation between (a) redundant divisional receweys (or cables) and (b) divisionst or associetad divisionet eruf non-divisionet receweys (or cables).
- 2. Idmtification of each enception to the licensing ord/or dasign besis criterie for seperation.
3.
Detailed design dascription and enetysis justifying each exception l
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. REPORT FORM QUESAarS8 TO PRINT woc DRAFT SER ISSUES & CE RESPONSES FOR ASWR $$4R CMAPTEW 8 I
NUMBER WRC ISSUE GE RESPomSE k
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identified.
k I
s If design basis criteria for seperation is IEEE Stenderd 384, seperation for l
emanple between open troy and totetty enetosed raceweys with less than 3 feet l-of horizontet separation or 5 feet of verticet separation seast be eddressed es' pert of items 2 and 3 above. nesconse to question 435.35 states that each scram conduit will be physicotty separated by et leest one (1) inch from
{
non-enctosed receveys. For any seperation of 5 feet to one inch between a conduit arvi non-enclosed recewey the design does not meet seperation i
guidelines of IEEE Starvierd 384 1974 and sust be justified by anstysis.
3
.}
7.000 8.3.2.4 Cables in Cabinets /Penets Item 1: There is no inconsistency between the referenced sections, because j
the totement in 8.3.1.1.5.1 refered to reuting in raceweys, iAlch is enternet l
Section 8.3.1.1.3.1 states that div4sionet cables to and from the contairment to the contret room eree. newever, seperation is also mainteined within the and to eM frase the dedicated divisionet equissment in the reactor building controt room penets in accordance with tes Guide 1.75 and IEEF 384.
are routed in seperate cable racewcys for each division. Section 8.3.1.1.5.1
~
further states that divisionet cabte routing is maintained to to the terminet The operator interface for the main controt comptes does remdre circuits of cabinets in the mein cer trol room. This statement lapties that separate cable saattiple divisions, or Class 1E versee non-Ctsas TE circuits, in close receweys for eech division may not be mein *.eined within cabinets and implies -
prosfeity. Seperation criteria for these arves are addressed in 8.3.1.1.5.1.
f that non Sefety cables any be routed in twe same recewey with divishmet Fire-rated tyvriers cannct be provided in the centrol room itself, but the l
cables within cabinets or thet rededent divisionet cables any be routed in remote shutdown system (the reesutent systes foe the contret room), provi1es -
(
the same racewey within cabinets. This statement contradicts other sections acceptable risk for complete burnout of the control rose.
I of the ASWR $$AR whIch require seperate receweys from terminet to terminst j
including inside of cabinets or other types of enclosures. To resolve this a referem e to 8.3.1.4.2.2.3, A lch dieeusees sepe etion within the contret
+
inconsistency and other concerns, odditionet information is required for the room penets, was added to 8.3.1.1.3.1 (see ettsched mark.se).
i foitowing items.
f 1
C i
1 Inconsistency between section 8.3.1.1.5.1 and 8.3.1.4.2.2.3 es to item 2 tu/CI: The requested seperation criterie for ett types of enctoewes required separation between rededent circuits within e cabinet.
is detineeted in the whole M section 8.3.1.4, and porticuterly 8.3.1.4.2 ord e
its stesections.
2.
Criterie for separation between safety (or essociated) and non safety
{
cables eruf between 'divisionet cables within cabinets se any other type of enclosure tocated inside and outside the main contret room.,
Item 3:
".he fcttowing reptoces S@eection 8.3.1.3.2.1(3):
I 3.
Merking of cabtes inside of cabinets arvirer penets (ref: section Cables shall be merked in a omrvier of sufficient darability to be legible r
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. REPORT FORM QUESAuS8 70 PR!uf hRC DRAFT SER ISSLEE & CE RESPoltSES FOR ABWR SSAR CMAFTER 8 kUMBER NRC ISSUE GE RESeTNSE 8.3.1.3.2.1(3)).
throug % ut the life of the plant, and et fetervels not to exceed 5 feet, to facilitate inittet verification that the instettetton is in conforwurite with 4
In addition, section 8.3.1.4.2.2.3 incitr3es the statement that the the seperatim criteele.
purpose of criteria for physicot seperation of cabtes in perwis is to preclude the possibility of fire propogeting between redsdent circuits and such merkings shall be colored, es detirweted in 8.3.1.3.1, to miguety preventing safe shutdown of the plant. The staff feels that this statement of identify the division (or non-division) of the cable. Generelty, individJet i
purpose may be misleading in that it dces not fully detineste the conductors exposed by stripping the Jacket are else color coded or color requirements of GDC 2, 4, and 17. The purpose for physicet seperstico is to tagged (et ir.tervets not to enceed 1 foot) such that their division is still preclude feituee of non-safety circuits from cousing feiture of any safety dfsceenebte. Exceptions are parwitted for individuel corductors within circuit and to precita$e feiture of one safety circuit free cousing feiture of cabinets or penets wheee ett wirire is unigt 2 to e single divisie (or is any othe* redsdent safety circuit (i.e. to p wtude coemn cause feiture of non-divisionet ).
safety circuits). The purpose for heving physicet seperation in penets should be c!erified in the ABJt SSAR.
i Item 4 Is/C): The purpose for physicst seperotion hos been rewritten es fuggested (sae ettsched serk-ip).
8.000 8.3.2.5 Associated circuits As of Neves6er,1991, the only *essociated circuits" (es defirwd in IEEE 384) are in the safety related tighting subsystems (see r=wty added sectime Section 8.3.1.1.5.1, Physicet Seperation and Irdependence, states, in port, 9.5.3.2.2.1 and 9.5.3.2.3.1 in proprietary otheittet). References to such that associated cables are teested es Ctess TE circuits. The staff circuits have therefore been deleted in ett erees of Chapter 8 except interprets this stateeent to mean that associated cables or circuits wilt 8.3.1.3.2, ord a new interf ace rewiremant pieced in 8.3.4.13.
These heve meet e81 requirements pieced on Ciess TE circuits. At t eerssonents in the bem retelned to define criteele for additionet associated circuits, should associated circuit's current toop (toods, cables, connectors, switches, they be added prior to the laptementation design stege.
- note 1* has etso retsys, protective devices, etc.) will meet Ctess TE re wirewents. Each been ockfed in 8.3.1.3.2 to eterify criterie (3) and (4) of IEEE 384-1981, exception to this interpretation should be identified and justified in the Section 5.5.1.
With the exception of the safety rotated stentby and eaergancy lighting 1
fixtures, ett im-,as which interface with Ctess 1E circuits are also wellfied as Ctess 1E, mtess they are specificetty isolated wie esproved isolation devices. Suen isolated circuits and components then bacane non-Ciess 1E. The test peregraph of section 8.3.1.4.1.3 hos be=n modified to sore specifIcetty id=ntify these exceptiens.
9.000 6.3.2.6 Cable /Recewey identification Item 1: The color coding methods for cables and receweys are cetinested in 8.3.1.3.1 end 8.3.1.3.2 (inettafing 8.3.1.3.2.1).
(See : M 10, page
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. REPORT FDeM QUESANSS TO Pt!NT WRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & CE RESPONSES FOR A8Wt $$AR CnAPTER 8 GE RESPokSE WUMBER NRC !$ SUE i
In regard to mee king of cables and receways, response to question 435.29 8.3 11 213.3 Adsitionet clarification hos been e@d to both sectiens es indicates the the idmtifiestion criterie specified in section 8.3.1.3.1 eM follows:
8.3.2.3.2.1 fully ecepties with the reqpirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75
- Cables shall be norted in e numer of suf ficiant dJrability to be legitle (revision 2) and IEEE 354-1974 The staf f reviewed this criterie with respect throughout the life of the piant, and to facilitate initiat verification that Regulatory Guide 1.75 (revision 2) the instettation is in conformance with the separation criterie.
8 to the guidelines of position 10 and 110 and section 5.1.2 of IEEE 384-1974 e,d ac e result identified a rucer of concerns. To resolve these concems, additionet information is required for
- Such merkings shott be colored to wiigupty idmtify the division (or non-division) of the cable. Generetty, (Mividust conductors esposed ty the following items.
stri#g the jocket ere also color coded or cetor taggee (et intervals not tc
- 1. The aethod for color coding power, instrumentation and control cables and eucced 1 foot) such that their division is still discemsble. Esceptions are permitted for individJet concheters within cabinets or penets =Aere ett wiring j
raceways.
is uniqpe to a single division (or is norMiivisicnet).*
l
- 2. The eethod for distinguishing tetween Men-Class TE circuits associated Also, in 8.3.1.3.1, "At t cable troys are morted with their proper...* hos teen with diffe/ent redundant divisions.
changed to *Att Ctess TE cobte t. eys are morted with the division color, eM
- 3. The darability of merkings.
with their preoer...*
- 4. The merking of cables throughout the entire cable length frame terwinst cxcection to terminet come; tion including inside cebinets entJ' oe penets.
Item 2: The method for distinguishing between fen-Ctess 1E cires:its essociated with dif ferert redJndent divisiens is dettnested in 8.3.7.3.7, eM bes been clarified es follows:
- Associated cables are un%sely idantified ty a torgitudinal stripe or other color codad method, ed the date cri the labet.
The color of the caote merker for associated cables shett be the same es the related Ctess TE cabte.*
Item 3 tu/C1: A durability statement hes teen adsad to sections 8.3.1.3.1 a af 8.3.f.3.2.1(3) consistent with IEEE 334 (sae attachad).
Itee 4 iu/CI: These contems ere streedy ad$ressed in issue 8.3.2.4, eruf in Items 1 & 2 aoove.
10.000 8.3.2.7 Cables A m roeching and/or Emiting Cabinets /Penets tu/C1 The utt's stated imellestion is not consistent with the att's contems stated in Sr2 section 8.3.2.4, nor $$at section c.3.1.T.5.T.
Th=t section
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. REPORT fcRM OUESANS8 TO PRIst WRC DRAM SER ISSUES & GE PEIPonSES FOR A5We :;3AR CMAFTER 8 i
WUMBER WeC ISSUE GE RESPONSE Response to question 435.30 states that cable spreading aress are not specifies that IEEE 384, Reg Guide 1.75 and Ccc 17 criterie is aceticable to i
amlicebte to the AINR and are not in the plant toyout because the mejority at t diaisional equi:sment, incttsfing inte w.,,. ting cabling. In stifi'im, of the signals will be suttiplesed to the corr et roces. Thus. It has been 3-bour fire rated bearlera separate divisions in ett arcos of the ptent e= cept imotled that the 1 foot-3 f set seperation guidelines attowed by section 5.1.3 as noted in tram 4 below.
of IEEE Standard 384-1974 will not be e mlicable to A8WR nor will the ouicetinas of position C12 of Regulatory reide 1.75. Criteria for the separation end protection of cables omroaching aruf/or emiting Item 1 tw/C1: The rewd e==ents delineered in 8.3.1.1.5.1 do net dist6nesish cabinets /penets has not tm addressed in the ABWR SSAR. To initiate our between surtellic or fiter-optic cables, and thus are ecclicable to both. The review in this eres, additionet information is rmired for the fottowing following sentence mes ockkd at the end of the first peregrach of 8.3.1.1.5.1:
items.
"Ctess 1E to non-Ctess TE seperation is desipwd in accortsence e.ith the require = eats of IEEE 384.* Cebte receweys are sepeeste, according to voltage
- 1. Routing criterie and protection to be providad electrical and/or optical tevets, es described in 8.3.1.4.1.114).
tne =v1= levet tparagrege (d)} hos cables used to carry cuttiptened or other type of signets to the control te modified to incluse fiber-optic cables (see ettsched).
room.
- 2. Criterie for routing of safety or non-safety power cabtes in any room with Item 2: The strysical er, 3._,
a of raceweys keeps power cables seperste free instrteentation and contret cables.
1&C strut cables, es described in 8.3.1.4.1.114).
The following s m tence hos been addad to 8.3.1.4.1.1(3): "Ctess 1E and ruyrtless TE cables are seperated
- 3. Inconsisterey betwen item (5) of section 8.3.1.E.2.2.2 and response to in sm he w;th IEEE 384 and es 1.75 (see FlyJres 94.4-1 through 94.4-15).
I question 450.30.
4 Cable seperation in cebte tumats.
Ite= 3 tu/CI: Section 6.1.3.1 of IEEE 384 "931 chanc+s the term "caele spreeding rooma to anor*erord eree*. Peregrac* (5) of 8.3.1.4.2.2.2 bes been l
sexfified to state specf fic re: sirements that ett safety equipment er cotde areas shell seet or exceed the regdrements of IEEE 38' (see ettechad me* k-sc).
Iten 4 It/CI: The tmsilding structures for the AEWR Standerd Plant are laid out in such a manr** t%st cobte turviets era mt regsired for divisionet cables. Cable choses, aAlch are designad in wm he with IE22 38&,1o esist wit %in the buildicars. Encept for the instrument sensor cables for t*e turbine stop volve closure eruf turtrine controt volve fast closure (see i
7.2.2.2.4(431 Ctess 1E cable rtais eccur ordy beteen the reector eruf contret buildings; eti others are non-Class 'tE.
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.FEPORT TORM QUESA958 T3 PtteT kRC DRAFT SEE ISSUES & E RESPONSES FOR ABWt SSAR CMAFTER 8 sPJuBER
- RC ISSUE GE RE M)m!E I
Each civisionet coo 4e duct twtimen eruf throughout these buildings is entirety seperate and isolated frors redtsidert divisions by three.bour rated fire berriers. Esceptions occur omty within the contret rene ctuetes itself, and within the primary conteirwumt, ard for teek detection thermoccuptes. Yet these euceptions still meet the regsirements of tes Guide 1.75 and IEEE 384 by previding metet barriers ord/or spetist seperation between divisima. Spelet cases within the reacter building ere enetyred es acceptable (in h
with SECY-87-013) in 94.5.
The control roam comtes fire snetymis is provided in 9A.4.2 A.1.
Ctess TE cables are seperated free non-Ctess 1E cables in accorde ce with the regelreuents of IFE 384 and RG 1.75 in ati erees of the plant, including cable choses.
11.000 S.3.3 PROTECTION
[W/CI The met stated essumptien that *...the proposed desi r will include re&ndent inteertsyting devices on ett instrtp etation and contret circuits es 8.3.3.1 Electric Penetretions well es powee circuits that pess through conteirvueet* is ret coerect. Some l
circuits do not have high fault current evettable, such es thermoccete Item 7 of Section 8.3.1.4.1.2 indicates that power circuits going through circuits.
electric penetration esse 4 ties are protected egoinst over current by redundant interrwting devices. In ad$ition, restmnse to questions 635.311b}
indicates that it is on ABWR design regJirement that redtru$ent interrteting It m 1 (4/C3: The reoJestea information was ed & d to 8.3.1.4.1.2(7), but with devices be providad for electrical circuits going through conteirunent the high eweitable feutt curmt stipulation.
penetrations, if the samisase available feutt current (including felture of e.pstream devices) is greetee then the continuous current reting of the penetration. Based or the above design requirearnts, it appee s the* the Its 2:
8.3.4.4 has been modified to specify the regaireamts for preer peoposef design will incits$e redundant interrteting devices on ett coordinetton of theesel capability curves yd protection of the penetration instrismantatim and controt circuits as welt es power circuits that post co9d;ctors (see attached).
through conteirvaant. In addition, aAen calculating enzise.ss evettable fault current at the penatration, current timiting devices witt not be used in the it s 3 t=/CI: Sectim 5.4 of IEEE T41-1966 specifies that 1) "Whece e calculaticws (i.e. worst esse feiture or shorting of the wstream or current penetratim eesembly ces Irwiefinitely withstand the menisase current evellable timiting devices will be esstsied es e given in the calculation). Sesed on due to e feutt inside contelrment, no special consideratim is the above interpretatiora, the staf f corcludes that the proposed daulgn meets regsf red.t5.4.2]* end 2) *Etectricot penetrations regsirtais specist regutetory Guide 1.63 (revision 3) and is acceptable. To confirm the abov*
comideration shett be provided with dast primary protection operating interpretation ard to resolve other related emcerns, additionet information setnerate interrspting devices, or primary and boche protection oppreting is required for the fottowing items.
senerete in errwting devices.t5.4.2.11* aruf 3) *The t x s ist curves of i
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.7EPORT 50RM CVESANS8 TO PRIET 4RC DRAFT $ER ISSUES & GE RES*04Ses Fue A8WR SSA2 CHAPTER 8 i
NUMBER WRC ISSUE GE RESP 0eSE the &et prisurry protection or the prieery and beckup protection shett
- 1. Descriptive info e.ation which emplicitly states that electricot circuits coordinate with tNr tiee-current capability curve of the electricot includes ati instrwentation and controt circuits es wet t es power circuits.
penetration to be protectad.t5.4.2.2]" This hes streedy ten provided per Items 1 arvi 2 above.
- 2. Clerification of interface requiremmts presented in section 8.3.4.4 to clearly state the criterie or design requiremente, that sust be dmonstrated by (e) f ault currant eteoring-time curves for protective devices, (b) thernet Item 4: In w h with Section 5.4.2 of IEEE 741-1966, no socclei espebility curves of the penetration, (c) location of protective devices, and consideration is rewired if f ault curreat Is limited to that which the (d) power supptles for protective devices.
pmetration essenety can indefinitely withstand. Therefore, if odag.aste current-timiting devices exist in the circuit, re & ndent protective o* vices
- 3. Descriptive information which eteerty indicates how penetration protective are not required. Now ver, where there is potentist for a; w.M dte to a
devices wit t confone to each requirements of section 5.4 of IEEE Standard feiture of upstreem devices (i.e., the current-tietting device itself), it is 741-1956, IEEE Standerd Criterie for Protection of Class TE Power Systems and considered good & sign practice (though net reg: ired by Seguietory Guide 1.63 Equipment in Nucteer Power Generating Systems, that is reconme-wwd by
/ IEEE 741) to include a current.derrupting &vice in the circuit. Adeguste posi tinr: 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.63 (revision 3).
protection is provided for ett penetrations, including those for the RIPS, ty the interf ace requirements defined in SSAR Section 8.3.4.4 (es modified per
- 4. Criteria which would permit use of one current limiting device ard one Item 2 above).
protective device as the redtridant protective devices needad to meet the guidelines of position 1 of Regulatory cuide 1,63.
12.000 8.3.3.2 Safety suses Item 1 tu/C): A description of the groi. riding devices and their essocieted intertecking logic has ten added to sikse-tion 8.3.1.1.1 (se-ettsched).
On every bus shown in figures 8.3-1, 8.3 2, and 8.3-3, there is t-ve circuit shown corviected to groisid through a circuit breeker. The circuit breaker or bus groisding device is used to provide a safety grossid on buses dJring Item 2 tW/C): The addition of ary geoisding device witt, by its enistence, reintenance operations. Intertocks for the bus grossiding &vice es stated in contribute to some seesure of deprodotion in reliebitety. Bowever, the response to quastion 435.47(e) include:
interlock. constraints (includtry those essociated with the rocking out/disconnact position of t*te breeker itself) piece the breekers in a state
- 1. Under voltage retsys sust be actuated; of semi-esistance (i.e.,
- recked out") white the bus is energized, such that the tus cetiabitity is not unacceptabty degraded.
- 2. Reteted breekers oust te in the discomect position and i Voltage for bus instrue mtation evettable.
Item 3 tu/C): An interf ace requiresamt hos been oddad to assure eduinistrative controts are in ptoce to keep these circuit breekers racked out The staff feels that the proposed grounding device mey be an fr5ertant (i.e., in the discomect position) white the buses oce energized
,..ed Fage No.
18 11/26/91
.D0 CMSISSUE
+
. REPORT FORM QUES 4aS8 70 PRtWT WRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & GE RESPONSES FOR ABWR S$AR CRAPTER 8 GE RESP 0sSE NUMBER 4RC ISSUE erhancewnt for performing maintenance on safety buses arvi should tw included Furthecse** an arviunciator witt sotnf whenever these breakers are rocked in in the design; however, the staff is concerned that the above proposed for servist. This precaution, in arMition to the other intertecks providad, interlocks may not tw suf ficient in and of themselves to prevent inadvertent should preclude any probot itity the breekers could tv inadvertently closed closing of the device daring non-maintenance operation. To resolva this during non-maintenance operation of the power system. See new sectim concern, eMitional information is required for the following items.
8.3.4.14 attached.
- 1. Description and analysis for the proposed design.
- 2. Justification that the tevet of reliability of the safety bus has not bean degradad by the addition of the device.
- 3. Interface renJirew nts, stares, or other controts Alch wilt be inplemented to assure the device will not be inadvertently closed.
item 1 tu/C1: The first paragraph on 8.3.1.2.4 bes been revised to say 13.000 3.3.3.3 Cualificatica
...at t Class 1E equipment is designed to operate daring and af ter any design Section 8.1.3.1.2.2 indicates, ty reference to conpliance with Regulatory basis event, in the accident environment expected in the area in d ich it is Guide 1.32, tFat each type of Class 10 e4Jipmant wilt be quotified by located. All Class 1E electric equipment is gastified to IEEE 323 (see Section 3.11).*
analysis, successfut use tsider stariter conditions, or by actual test to demonstrate its ability to perform its function snier normat and design basis Section 8.3.1.2.4 and 8.3.3.1 include the fottowing items (it events.
appears) in stoport of conptierv:e with this Regulatory Guide 1.32 stem 2 [4/CI: Compliance with IEEE 303 for the g*ysical indapendence of electric power systems is committed in the test paragraph of 8.3.1.4.1, as requirement.
appropriate to this section. Futt coopt!ance to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (hence, to IEEE 308) is stated in Subsection 8.1.3.1.2.2(3) and Table 8.1-1.
- Mowever,
- 1. Ctess 1E equi;rnent essential to limiting the consequences of a LOCA are the certification standard is IEEE 306-1950, not IEEE308-1974, as shown in designed to operate in normat service and post accident envircrvnents; Table 1.5-21.
Correspondirw sections referenced for the 1980 version are 5.3,
- 2. Electric equipnent is seismicatty qualified; 5.4 and 5.9, respectively.
- 3. At t ciass 1E cables are moisture and radiation resistant and highly flame Section 4.7 of 306-1974 sisoty states that equipnent sfuuld be motified by type testing, operating experience, or analysis. Section 5.9 ef 305-1980 resistant; requires that eg2 pment be qualified in -av.he with IEEE 323-1974, which 8
detinaates att of these methods incitafing their combinations (see IEEE
- 4. Separate certification proof tests are performed to demonstrate 60 year life, radiation resistance, enviroremental capability, fleas = resistance, and 323-1974, Section 5). Therefore, Sectim 5.9 of 308-1980 is more stringant than Section 4.7 of 306-1974.
gas evolution of cables;
Pege No.
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. REPORT FORM QUESANS8 TO PRINT NRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & CE RESPONSES FOR ABWR SSAs CHAPTER 8 NUMBER NRC ISSUE CE RES80tSE
- 5. Each power cable has a radiation resistent covering; Item 3 [4/C]; Seperation criteria for the e wipment in the drywett is
- 6. Conductors are specified to continue to operate at 100% relative hueidity discussed in 9A.5.
Envircrwentet quotificetion for att ewipant in ett with a tife expectancy of 60 years; and locasions, including the drywett, is discussed in section 3.11 and Appendix
- 31. A reference to 3.11 (which in turr references Apperdim 31) is streedy
- 7. Class 1E cables are designed to survive the LOCA anbient conditions at the included in 8.3.1.2.4 end of a 60 year life span.
l Each of the above items meets in part the guidelines of Regulatory Guide Itese 4 [W/C]: The test sentence of 8.3.1.4.1.2(2) InAlch mentioned the 1.32-however, based on the information presented, it is not eteer that att drywelt was not considered a hostile area] has been changed to: " Cable routing cables, for exenple, are designed and quotified to survive the cocined in the drywett is discussed in essociation with the e w fpment it serves, in ef fects of toperature, hunidity, radiation, etc. associated with a LOCA the 'specist cases' section 9A.$."
environment or other design basis event envircrwents at the end of their quetified and/or design life. Clerification of the design and w ellfication requirements for cables as wett es other Ctess 1E ewipneet to survive nomat Itee 5 tu/C]: The term *hostite eree* was intend =d to maen those etees it.ich and accident envirements (inclu$ing identification with justification cf could be potentially exposed to the energy of a postulated reactor cootent exceptions to the design and wellfication requirements) should be prowSM (steem or water) pressure boundary pipe rupture. This criterie is defined in
'n the ABWR $$AR.
Appensin 31 and tables 38.3-1 through 31.3-21.
In addition, section 8.3.1.2.4 Indicates that att Ctess 1E equipment which is essential to limiting the consequences of a LOCA is designed for operation in Item 6 [W/C]: Plant Design specifications for electrical equipamt require normat service emirement ord to opprete in the post accident envircrement such equipmant be copsble of continuous operation for voltage f ttetuations of expected in the eres in e.hict it is located. Also, this section indicates
+/- 101. In addition, Ctest TE motors aust be able to withstand voltage drops that electric equipnent is qualified to IEEE 344 (i.e. electric ewipnect to 70% rated during starting trenelents. [These two santences have baen added witi be demonstrated to meet its performance requirements during and to SSAR Subsection 8.3.1.1.$.2(1)),
foitowing the design basis seismic event by test ard/or enetysis).
Sesed on information presented, the design ard quotification cognitment for electric equipment in the proposed ASWR design is not clear with respect to the copsbility of ewiprent to survive the combined ef fects of a LOCA emironment. To clarify and resolve this and other issues, additionet information is required for the following items.
- 1. Explicit design commitsent that att Class 1E electric equipment will be i
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. REPORT FORft OJESAWS8 TO FtINT l
4tC CRAFT SER ISSUES & EE RESPONSES FOR A8WR SSAR CMAFTER 8 wumtER NRC ISSUE GE RESPONSE f
designed and quotified for operation in its normet service emirersent and to operate in the accident e-d post accident emironment expected in the eres in which it is located for any design basis event.
- 2. Compliance of the ABWR design with sectims 4.2, 4.3, and 4.7 of IEEE Standard 308-1974.
I
- 3. Empected normat and accident twircrwent, seperation criteria, protection of ferded Class 1E equipment and cables, and qualification of equipment for any emirorement in the dryweit.
6 i
- 4. For the expected worst case ac:fdent environment in the drvwett, clarification of iAy the drywett is not considered a potentietty hostile r
area.
I
- 5. Criterie for establis%ing hostile areas.
- 6. Design and gastification of equigement to operate for 5 wirutes when steject to voltage et 90 percent of rated voltage and to operate for e predetermined time at 70 percent.
I 14.000 8.3.3.4 5,bnergence tu/C) there is no contradictkr: bacwen the resarwe to 435.36 arr13.3.1.2.1.
Quite the opposite is true, ta tMt the meeted tereinatieris pmetude starrtiM Item (6) of sectian 8.3.1.4.2.3.2 states that any electricat equipment and/or effects on opeestton of the devicoc, thfch in t$is esse ere t%emocmeN.
recewey for RPS o-ESF tocated in the eg pression poet levet so At rene will Mowever, 8.3.1.4.2.3.2t6) mas errummse axnd has been correcte6 pet
- the
[
be desipied to satisfactority complete their ftretion before being rendered attached morirte.
Inopereole due to exposure to the environment created by the levet phenosame.
f In response to stof f cpsestien 435.36, tne tIcensee identified etactricet Section 4 7 of IEEE 308-7974 se superceded by se:tien 5.9 cf JEE 300-19M j
equipment that may be s,hmergad as e result of stwression poet tewet cwett which regJires Ctest TE capsipumt be motified to ITEf W3-1974. Tine.
phenomene or es a result of a LOCA. The licensee further indicated that the esplicit comeritment hem been saGmf to response 435.35 in s:(1rrdence with se t
l design spacifications ossociated with tnis electric cosipment would rearire mRC request fsee etteched emet-q 3.
terminations be seated such that equipment operetten would not be inseired by f
stksmersion. The quotification of this equipment in ww..f with the It should be reetired thet, se Indicated in reopense 435.36, tie any j
guidelines of secticn 4.7 of IEEE Standerd 306-1974 mes, however, not electrical devices (besloes piant lightig eq1*pmenO in the semit era, em i
specifically addressed. Based on information presented, it appears that thermocouples and instrument piping for levet sumitors (the instrtarMs L
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.REPoltT FDpet GUESAlr$8 TO PRINT j
NRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & GE RESP 04SES FOR ASW $$4R CIIAPTER 8
-t t
WUMBER NRC IS$1JE GE #ESPQIrSE 1
I
(
electricot equismumt stbject to sutznergeare is not treetified and enty thauselves are evtside the wetuett). teost of these thersmucomptes are pertietty designed for s@ mergence. This conclusion contradicts sect on sabusarged ett the time. The reesining ones are destysed specificetty to be i
i 8.3.1.2.1 of the Asum SSAs iAlch states that ett Ctess 1E estipment is stasierged es the poet levet suetts. Thus, concerne about a galpment fatture" f
e qualified.
or " adverse effects on Ctess 1E power sources.* due to poet smelt are not
[
werfected.
i It is the staf f concern that egaissumt feiture due to sutsmerirmee mey i
T adversely ef fect the safe operatiert of the plant and sury adversety effect i
Class 1E power sources s*rving this egJigsment. To resotwe this concern, f
j e&fitionel infornietion is required for the fattowing itens.
I f
- 1. The opperent contradiction between section 8.3.1.2.1 and response to f
l question 435.36 in regard to tsuntification of equipment.
I 4
- 2. Anotysis desmonstreilng that feiture of tmepJetified egalpument due to l
submergence will Nt adversely ef fect safety or Ctess TE power sources.
[
I I
- 3. ExptIcit ecuseit= eats to quetificetten in confor,sence to sectten 4.7 of I
IEEE S:d 306-1976.
I i
i i
j 15.000 8.3.3.5 Imingeneat of fire storessant tw/C2 The plant is designed with w. m reted fire berrices temperstics
}
)
reds dort di Asiens. Therefore, e complete teos of fametten een be eseumed 1
Section 3.3.3.1 states that the cable instettetion is such thet direct within any one fire eree, with ecceptelde cerwegsences (i.e., safe shutdanri).
i impingaammt of fire stseressent will ret prevent safe reoctor shutdoesn.
We safety furg:tlen is regrired of any calde erre it,is espeeed to fire. tmder f
Sesed cri this statement it is ret eteer whether igirigesumt of fire such circumstances, the reesident divisterus usutd sosisme the safe shutdeun
[
stepressent will or will not cause feiture of cable systeams. Clerification fisiction. In addition, the fire borrier syster confines emebe, het sooes, seuf
{
l of tw oMign and quotification of cables to perform their safew ftsiction fire sagupressent to the divielen of the fire; es stated in the fourth I
h white being subjected to the direct ingringeernt of fire siseressent should be reerfr w Jcompliance peregraphe et s noection 9.5.1.0.
falso, see providad.
54sectier: 9.3.1.0.10.)
This is the intent of the stetammt in 8.3.3.1, =Alch hos been modified for clarificetten (see etteched me-k-se).
.)
l Ctess 1E cables are gaetificetiers testd to withstand severe e wriftmeentet b
\\
j stress, as fruticated in 8.3.3.1, and coeutetent witt> IEEE 323. They are etso t
j.
home-stream tested, and ulti be tied domen in smetet troys. Even thongIh I
feesiderrt divisione ere eveltable, the cables should perfane their fiertiene l
s==wer, f
i eAlte being subjected to direct iging-eat of fire siepressant.
o 4
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I vege no.
22 1
I 19/26/91 4-
.00 CESISSUE
+
. REPORT Forme etKSANS8 TO FEtWT WRC DeMT SER ISSUES & E RESPONSES FOR AgWR SSAR C24PTER 8 i
WUeBER WRC ISSUE GE DESP0eSE because of the radwulency eveltobte la seperate fire zones, specific testing in this regard is mt required, nor considered necessery.
16.000
'8.3.3.6 Isoletion Letween Safety Suses and Won-Sefety Loads A revised single-line discreer is sidseitted for review tar the ueC staff. There 4
1 see no nort-Cteen 1E toads en the safety tsumes for the eevised single-line.
i Section 8.3.1.1.2.1 indicates that isoletion breeters ore provitiad tweveen non-sefety reteted toeris e hich reorire stansky power heve ett baen tocated en the Cle#s 1E and non-Ctess 1E buses. In addition to normet over current buses which heve the comeustion turtrine geneestor es en etternate source of tripping of the isolation breeter, zone selective interlocking is providad power.
1 betwen each iso.etion breaker end its testrees Ctess 1E bus feader breaker.
Section 8.3.1.2.1 indicates that even though t+e isoletion breeker is GE betleves thet this new single-tine ocktresses ett of the met stoff's I
l feutt-current octuated in 7.,,.. %11once with the guidelices of position 1 of concerns regarding voltage distributfore. The Iglementation, homever, J
Reguistory Guide 1.75, the intent of this Guide is set 'M the rena constitutes e comudete F=,,i. m of the euedique-vottage distribution selective interteciting technique-thus,' the design seats the recoeumendetions system, enri tbJs effects significart portiene of the S$AR test and some of this ered other guidas.
Rai/SER responses editch pertain to the previous single-tine drawirig. At 4
present, the Staff le esked to review this prupeset I.__ Mty es sidmeitted With respect to protecting Ctess 1E systenum frase feiture cf rian-Class 1E in Attactument #1 (see proprieteay eMttet). Following NRC meusrowel, systenis and comumnents, the stof f agreas with the licensee that coordinated ossprepriate adjusteents will be nede fsr the other effected erees in the SSet i
breekers with rene selective interlocking sects the intent of positie 1 of during the formet ent reering review of Cheptee 8 (see SER lesue 8.3.6.2).
i Regulatory Guida 1.75 and seets the pretection roepsiremants of criterie 2 and 3
4; howaver, with respect to meeting the sufficient i.aAme regstrement Attacheant #1 Iru:tudes the revised single tiew sketches, e toed sessmery i
of criterion 17, the staff d?segeers with the licensees essessment. men (normet leeds on the mit munitiary transfonmers are essumed to be 5 seen par safety coguters and transient recorder toeds shown on figure 8.3-5 beve trivision), e suummery of effects of changas, and en opersting feetures summary.
e previsiens Inctu&d fn theif power stsspty design for outoesticetty transferring these loads from Ctess 1E division 1 to 3 and fresa Ctess TE divisim 2 to 3.
In addition, it appeers that the power sassdy may else include prowlsion fer automat c transfer of these toads betmean division 1 i
erd 2.
The design does not meet the guidelinas of pe7atetory Guide 1.6 mr the intent of positim 1 of Regulatory Guide 12. The proposed destyi thus mey not opet the indapan@nce requireemants of criterion 17 of Asparufia A to 10 CTR Port 50. To resolve this and other issue *, additionet infoeinstion is,
i j
required for the following items and/or staff positions.
- 1. Retlebility, testability, test fressency, functional test, and cellbro+ ~ i of the isoletion breeker coordinetton er'd zone selective Interlocking.
4 h
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6 Page no.
'23 11/26/91'
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. REPORT FOSR SUESme58 TO PW!eT -
f WRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & W t NrS FOR Astat SSAR CNAPTER 8 t
O MgER WRC ISSUE-GE RES*0mSE i
1
- 2. Att non safety circuits comected to the Ctess 1E system through the isolation breeker with mone setective htertecking shstl be treeted es t
associated circuits, f
{
- 3. Intercomection between redurusent divisions (w% ether through safety or mn i
safety tuses) shall be emintained with two noriastly open and interlocked
[
devices that are sepe-ste end the.; such that singte failure or single 2
t operator action cart not cause the interconnection of or chatte ge to f
redundant divisions.
4
- 4. Administrative interface criterie and/or stares for maintaining and
[
essuring interconnactions open.
l S. IdeMification of etI safety and non safety toads that can be powered from more than one Ctess.1E division parar soply. eppendia 205 should be f
j modifled to cleerty indicate f oods that con be fouered from more then one I'
safety division.
(
L
- 6. A description and onetysis of the trte of *eutt actwted Isoletion devices 5
4 in the Ctess TE constant voltsee constant frw power systemt.
l 1
- 7. The use of tatinterrtetible pouer sigedies as isoletion gew!ces teeference j
response to question 435.34c).
j l
i
- 8. Isolation devices used at the interface between Ctess 1E circuits and l
non-Class 1E equipment circuits (i.e., arensiciators or date toggers)
(reference section 8.3.1.4.2.2.4).
I
,I i
I
- 9. The contradictica betu=en Figure 8.3-3 ard response to esestion 235.49c.
Response to question 435.49c states that T/s NCC is non Ctess it end is
(
pouered fran non Ctess TE pouce sources. Figure 8.3-3 in contradiction shous it T/s mCC to be powered from Ctess 1E power sources.
[
i j
to., The contradiction betweer. response to esestion 435.18e, esestion 435.14, i
r ed other Agut SsaR sections (e.g. 8.3.1.1.2.1) es to tripping af non-sefety
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.,,,,we y
,.c y
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.#EPORT FCMI GUESAWS8 TO rit!NT -
f MRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & GE WESP0uSES FOR AgWR S$at CMAPTER 8 t
1 I
i 1
NUMBER NRC ISSUE GE eESPONSE k
l tonds ora e LOCA signet.
'I
- 11. Idmtification of sit twri-safety toeds and their KW retings tP can be powered frove safety reisted diesel generators and identificatter of the entre KV capecity evellebte to supply non-safety toeds during the various sedes cf 4
I plant operet tori, t
ti
- 12. The cepecity, capacity mergin, and other provisions that will be included in the sizing criterte for electric systeous and cosgewwnts (i.e. dieset
[
generators, betteries, distribution ustems, etc.) which witt ettow them to I
perform their safety ftsiction reliably iAile supplying non-safety toads.
{
i-
- 13. Inconsistency between response e and d to gnestion 435.18 es to toads I
4 l~
that are discennected for a LOCA occurring efter toeds have been sequenced tottowing a loss of offsite pen.er. Desponse c indicates toeds not regaired p
- ~
for LOCA are triped iAile response d implies that LOPP toads reamin
[
comected.
1 i
4 i
l 17.000 8.3.3.7 Dieset Generator Protective Retsying Iten 1: The bus differentiet reteys trip the generetor breeker, but de not i
j shut doses the dieset. There ore two ersuments iAy the bus differe tiet retoys i
{
Section 8.3.1.1.6.4,_Protectim Wegsirements, Indicates that the following should not be bypassed touter LOCA canditions:
f
}
protective releying will trip the dieset generator and will be retained touter occident conditions: Generator differentist, bus differentist, engine over
- 1) A bus dif ferencial Indicates a serious feutt condition, in e similar ctoss speed, low diestt cooling water pressure (two out of two sensors), and low
. with the generater differentist. tecorufitional trips should apply to inst
~
p
{
dif ferentist pressure of secondary cooling water (two out of two sensors).
dif ferentist sirists for the same reemans they apply to generator differentiet -
[
1 Other protective trips will be bypessed dJring LOCA conditions. This slytet s.
The generator arut taas anset be protected from such faults because i
protective reteying (except for bus dif ferentiet) appears to meet position T - they are capabtei of inflictig selv h to the gerwrotor or taas if lef t of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (revision 2) and is acceptable. To resolve the teichecked. gus differentist protection is recommended by 1EEE 242-1986 (IEEE exception (i.e. bus offferentist releys tri p ing the dieset generator) and suf f gook, Section 12.4) for busses fed by tacet generators.
l r
other related corwerns, additionet information is required for the following
[
i tenus.
- 2) There ore three seperate dieset generators, each supplylg its can f
independent safety division. Since e einlanse of only one division (i.e., one j
j
- 1. gases and justification for bus differentist reteys' tripping the diesel-dieset generator) is regrired to achieve oefe plant shutdemon (see response
.I generator.
435.24), each generetor een be better protected without compromisig ytet safety. It is not necessery to risk desnoge or distruction of one generefor, g
f 4
s
rege so.
25 11/26/91
.00 CM8 ISSUE
+
. REPORT foem cuESANS8 TO PRINT htC DRAFT SIR ISSUES & GE RESPoe'AS F0t A9WR SSAR CMAPTER 8 l
NUNCER WRC ISSUE GE RESPOWSE
- 2. Design description for eterming ett trips including those that are even wafer LOCA cornfitions, then there are two remaining generator divisions bypassed during LOCA.
evoilable.
- 3. Design description of bypess circuitry and its comptionee with IEEE 279 For clarification, the first sentence of $4section 8.3.1.1.6.4 hos been l
requirements.
changed es follows: *When the dieset-generstors are colled upon to operate during LOCr. conditions, the enty protectiva devices which shut down the diesel i
' 4. Separation between the two trip sensors and logic for low dieset coolh g are the generator dif feemtiet reteys and the engine overspeed trip." A water pressure and tow dif ferer-tiet pressure of seemdery cooling water.
reference to 8.3.1.1.8.5 was etso added et the end of 8.3.1.1.6.4 for consistency.
- 5. Inconsistencies betwem section 8.3.1.1.6.4 and 8.3.1.1.8.5 as to bus differentist relaying.
1 Item 2: The storm Lists in S e section 8.3.1.1.8.5 have been tabuteted, and are provi & d in a new Tebte 8.3-11.
The etere list hos been esponded to -
include the bus differentist trip, the generator gramd overturreM trip, and the generator loss of fletd trip. Those signets which are bypassed daring 3
LOCA ere so fruficated in the table. However, the octuel eterms required may i
very d=pseuding on the specific diesel generators selected in the desipi l
lactementation stage.
I i
Item 3: The bypesses used for the diesel generator ere desirwd in accordance h
j with Position 7 of Regulatory Guide 1.9.
Only the engine-overspeed and peneratordif ferentist tripe ere not bypassed during m occident signet (see i
8.3.1.1.6.4, es modifled per itom 1 above). The test of Section 8.3.1.1.6.4 hos been clarified es follows: "The reters are automotically isoleted from I
the triccing circuits during LOCA conditions. Womever, ett bypassed
- [
{
peremeters are emunciated in the main contret room (see 8.3.1.1.8.5).
The bypasses are testable, and ere wily reset es required by Position 7 of Reg. Guide 1.9.*
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k i
I Item 4: The low diesel cooling water pressure trip witt be bypseeed darirg f
LOCA (see atow-tow Jecitet water pressure" on new Tebte 8.3-11 ottsched). Yne need to trip the dieset based on low differentist pressure of secondary cooling water is dependent on the specific moruefacturer's design. Therefore, l
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.w e,---
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'. REPORT FORM QUESANS8 TO Pt!47 WRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & CE RESPONSES FC* ASWt $$4R CMAPTER 8 NUMBER eRC ISSUE GE RESPONSE-both of these trips have been removed fr<r
- xtion 8.3.1.1.6.4 1
Itee 5: The bus dif ferentist retey trip has been edtied to the new tabte 4
8.3-11 (see attached mark-up).
1 18.000 8.3.3.8 Thernet Overtoeds As irdicated in resporse 435.60, circuit details et the elementary tewet ere s
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beyond the LRS. Momever, overtoed protection circuits are ovellebte uhich
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In response to question 435.60, the licensee indicatad that themet evertoed include annual operation trip buttons to peerit testing of operability of the protection for Ctess 1E MOW's is in ef fect only den the McV's are in test overtood-sensing releys. The bypass contacts een therefore be tested in i
1 and are bypassed at ett other times by seens of closed contacts in parettet coordiMtion with the operation of the releys wie these trip buttons. An f
with the therset overtoed contacts. A visuet trafication is provided in the interf ace regstrement hos been added es section 8.3.4.15 to assure the nDr i
t main control rocss when the Mov is in test. The proposed design for bypess overtoed circuits irctude the testabte feeture (see etteched).
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can essure that the thernet overtood protection will not be in ef fect during occident conditions to prevent operation of wolves. The design thus meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.106 and is ecceptable with the possible
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exception of tes*ebility. Sufficient information relating to the capability for periodicetty testing the cortects that are in parettet with the thernet overtoed contacts to assure they are closed during noneet operation ha ret
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j been presented. To resotwe this concern, additionet inforestion is required t
1 concerning testing of the thernet evertoed bypass device.
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17.000 8.3.3.9 steeker Coordination (W/CI The sentence hos been clarified es fottous: " Tripping e~ the Class 1E l
' feed breeker is normat for feutts which occur on the Ctess 1E tus it feedr.
l l'
In section 8.3.1.1.2.1, the licensee states that tripping of the Class 1E bus Coordinetion is provided between the bus mein feed breekers and the toed feeder breeker is normat for feutts which occur on its Class 1E toeds. The breekers..* See etteched merit-w.
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j staf f disagrees with this statement. Ctess 1E toed br W ers should be coordinated with the Ctess 1E bus feeder breaker so that feutts dich occur
{
on its Ctess TE loeds will, to the entent possible, not cause trip of the bus
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4 Clerificat on of the AgWt desip with respect to breeker i
feeder breeker.
coordination is required for resolution.
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20.000 8.3.3.10 Protective metering tu/C The details for setpcint met %edotopy speelfic for the aeWt any be feiput in th* " Instrument Setpoints Design Regsfrements* docussat identified in the Esperience with protective reter/ epplications has estebtished that May trip reference in Section 1.1.3 of the aeWt $$at. A reference to this doctspet hos
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.NEPORT FOsm OUESAES8 TO PRINT i
NRC DRAFT SER ISSES & GE RESPONSES FOR A8WR SSAR CRAPTER 8 i-j t
l NUMBER WC ISSLE '
GE RESPOUSE set point will drif t with corwentionet types of relays. Set point drift et been added to response 435.58 (see ettechment).
. Mutteer power plants has resulted in premature trip'of redundant safety L
related pump ectors when they were required to be gerative. ' IAlle the besic need for proper fault protection for feedert/ equipment is recognized (and I
may be e requirement for the design basis event H re), it is the staff position that totet non-eveliability of redsident safety systems dse to '
spurious trips of protective reteys is not acceptatde. The primary safety function of the electricot distribution system is to provide power, relistdy, to safety related equipment. The licensee in response to this positim h
(question 435.58) indicated that toads, such es entors, wilt be purchased
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with suf ficient current carrying capability or overiced mergins so that set f
points of protective devices can be set sufficiently above the operating I
current point of Iceds to eItow for set point drif t.
Purchese of notors =1th sufficient overtoed mergins meets the intent of th* ebove steif position and f.
is acceptable if one esstames the following:
j i
- 1. The overtoed mergin will accommodate the lood's startirg current es well l
~
es the normal operating currents of toads.
I f
- 2. Specific design poremeters and/or interface retprirements cteerty define (in the ASWR SSAE) the overtoed mergin reesirements with respect to f
protective device trip set point, the mergin between the trip set point and
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operating current point of toeds, set point drif t, eruf the sergin between the trip set point and overtoed reting of toads.
f I
- 3. The toed bree6er protective device trip set point is estatdished with sufficient omrgin'(a) between trip point and opeetting current, (b) between
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trip point and overtoed reting of the loed, and (c) between trip point and j
trip point of the sein bus feeder breeker.
/. The protective device trip set point is periodicotty verified and f
cotibrated.
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. 5. The protective device is sihjected periodiestly to e fimettonet test to i
4 de=enstrate (e) its capability to not trip at its design setting f.e. the i
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. ~. ~, - -,...
rege No.
25 11/26/91
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. REPORT Form QUESA458 70 PR!wT WRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & GE sESPouSES FOR A5WR SSAR CHAPTER 8 WUMBER WRC ISSUE GE RESPOWSE norme! opreting current of toed pttes mergin end (b) its capability to trip when stbjected to e f ault currect.
The staf f is concerned that the AgwR design may not meet the above essurptiens.
21.000 8.3.3.11 Foult ? -werrtsting Cepecity item 1: 8.3.1.1.5.2(4) hos tren sedified to say: *tetereupting cepecity of switchgeer, toed centers, motor cor trot centers, and distribution penets is Design criterie (4) in section 8.3.1.1.5.2 states that interrteting repecity eguet to or greater thou the seminue evailable feutt curewt to which it is of switchgeer, load centers, motor control centers, ard distributim penets emposed tridee eli erJdes of operation." (See ettsched.)
is compatible with the short circuit current evet tebte et the Ctess 1E buses.
gesed on this statment, it is not etese that the interrupting cepecity of this equi; rent will be equel to or greater then the memimse eveitable feutt Itee 2: Comtlence of this ewipment to "coswore frukstry sterderds (i.e.,
current to dich it would be esposed. To clorify the criterie fee the those which are designer oriented eruf not required ftr est licemirw) is in:errteting cepecity of eqJigreent and to resolve other related concerns, beyord the licensing review besis for the A8WR ceetification. Wowever, art edittionet information is required for the following item.
imerf ace item has baen odded to assure such stendeeds are eferenced in the purchese specifications (see Section 8.3.4.17).
I
- 1. Clarification of the criterie for interrupting cepecity, ord
- 2. Corptf orce of both Ctess 16. and non-Ctess TE switchgeer, toed center actor contret centers, and distribution penets to appticable iraisstry standards.
22.000 8.3.3.12 Contret of Design Parar=eters item 1 tu/CI: mormet settings of the thernet overtood trips, in accordance with the seriuf acts.ree's reelrements, will protect the volve opwsting motors vetve problems such as excess friction, packing too tight, etc., con result of att non-Ctess TE N s et att times.
la en operationet condition dere the current drewn will exceed the design r-ting or cepobility of the insutetion system used in the volve motor Ctess TE p's have simiter protection dJring annuet testing or maintenarce winding. Operating experience has shown that excessive current, if uruhr administrative contret (see resprinse 435.60). newevee, Ctess 1E Mot undetected during operation, can cause premature or unempcctad feiture when thernet overtoed trips are bynessed at ett other times in accordance with the valve is nest operated. Methods, design provisions, eterne, or Reguletory Guide 1.106.
procedJres for assuriruj the volve motor will not be cpe sted with escesstve currents (or will etweys be operated within their design limits) hos not been presented in the Asut SSAR. To resotwe the issue discussed above e d related Item 2 tu/C): Att Ctess TE as are destywd, purchesed, tested, and concerns, additionet informaticrt is required for the fottowing itee:
Inspected in accoruence with IEEE 2??, specificetty peres-ephs 4.3 and 4.4
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_ REPORT FORet QUESARS8 TO PRINT htC DRAFT SER ISSUES & CE RESPONSES FOR A8WR SSAR CMAPTER 8 wpBER W e GE RESPouSE
- 1. Methods used to assure detion perameters for motor operated vstwes witt not be enceeded during volve ope-etion.
- 2. Method used to essure design parameters for ett Ctess TE ces witt not be e=ceeded during ett modes of plant operation.
23.000 8.3.3.13 fire Protection of Cable Systens tw/C] Spetfat separation, where necessary, is justified within the primary contal uneett because it is inerted with nitrogen dJririg r*ector opmtion. An section 8.3.3.2 indicates that spatiet seperation is used as a method of espesure fire carvict be sustained in the nitrogen envireremm. (See response i
prevent ng the spread of fire betwaen adjacent cable trays of dif ferent to SER Section 8.3.2.2.)
divisiens (e.g. Inside primary containmmt). The objective is etweys to seperate cable trays cf different divisions with structuret fire berriers 10 CFR 50, Amersfie R applies to riucteer po==r tecilities operating prior te such es floors, ceilings, erw$ ustis. Where e floor, ceiling, or weit is not Jaruaery 1,1979; therefore, comptience with Appendia R is not addressed in the a
possible, divisionet treys are separated spetietty by 3 f t. boritetetty and A8WR Standerd Plant.
I 5 ft. vertically. Where this 3 ft.-5 f t. spetist seperstlen is cet possible, fire rated berriers are used to seperste divisionet emble troys. For a fire in h with the SRP, the A8WR hos caeritted to meet STP CRES 9.5.1, l
initiated by e cable f ault within one division, the above defined sepstation which interpeestes the rewirements covered by Appendix R.
Conottence with maets the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.75, witt provide reesenable 8TP CMES 9.5.1 is discussed in SSAA section 9.5.1 and Acrendia 9A.
i essurance that a fire in one division will not propegate to a redsident q
division, and is acceptable. For the design basis event fire, spetiet seperation and fire rated berriers may not be sufficient to PN m mt the spread of fire twtween adjacent cable trays or wire bundles. f.terification cf the design's corptience with 10 Cf R Part 50 Aspendia R rewiremants is l
required to resolve staf f concerns.
4 74.000 8.3.3.14 Electriest Protection Assect> ties (EPAs)
Tha nead for redtsident EPAs was based on the fact thet RPS power suDpties in operation daring 1980 were non-Ctees 1E: therefore, a singte rando= feiture Two independent etactrical protection esseablies (EFAs) were rewired (by a had to be taken in o&fition to the postutsted power sWy felture. Question Septeober 24, 1983 letter to att operating BWRs) co the output of RPS power 435.7 ocknowledgad that because a tiess it RPS power sesety is t. sed on the stanties in order to satisfy the single f ailure criterion for non-fait-safe A8Jt, redsujant EPAs e*e not rewired since feiture of the Ctess TE sisety is type feltures eAlch mey be caused by wider voltage, over voltege, and tsioer the first ren&un falture taken. The focus of the o_*stion, then, was unether f requency conditions.
e single seperate and frdependp*-t EPA is reepsired.
Response to question 435.7 irvficates 11*st EPAs will riot be used in the ABWR GE's position is that even a single seperate and independset EPA is not design because of speclet dasign features. These special features include necessary, bacouse (w* tine previous plants) the type of pretection previded by
a Pege 1so.
30 11/26/91
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.EEPORT f0RM QUESARS8 TO Petaf WRC DRar; SER ISSUES & GE RESPOISES FOR AE A SSAR CMAPTEE 6 wuMBER mRC ISSUE GE RESPONSE avmitoring of voltage and f requency, automatic transfer of power steply frput sasen a seperate EPA is stremfy included within the protation circuita of the sources when voltage and/or frequancy etceed preestablished limits, contret power stsplies thesselves. Tha Ctess 1E power sources steplying power to the room eters for abnormat conditions, oparator action in response to s'erse of solenoids of the scram pilot volves are equiped with Ctess TE weitege and seriormatity, and dasign end quelification of eQJippumt to n6t f ail offer frequ?9cy regu*etion Circuits, and else with fmetionetty tdmk.G CIDss *E operation for a period of time under the extrtees of vettsge end f requency.
erinitoring and protectim devices iAlch erwitor for wdervottoge, eve voltage r tsiderf recuency and overfreg,ancy conditions and thich will euttsmeticetty trip 3esed m a review of these spacist features, it egpeers thet they any provide the pcwer source (i.e., ciscorvwet the f oods from the degended power source)
I reasonable assurance that any abnormality in wottage eruf freoJency (nAich can ebenever en out-of-specificatim condition persists. These lettee s=enitoring cause feliure of fail-safe-type equip ent) will be proeptly disconnected by and protection circuits satisfy the twictions of EFAs used in the post for storms and operator action. The speciet feetures, howevee d2 ret weet the non-iE RFS scree solenoid power sources.
single feiture criterion. Feiture of the specist features to eterm or of the oparator to sake prcept omropriate acticn are single feitures eAlch sey Two fattures are necessary to cause e coradition of dagraded power to the scram cause e non-f ait-safe type feittre. The capability to serem the reactor sey pilot valve solenoids. The first feiture would be the omgraded power thus be cworomised.
condition of the Ctess 1E pow =r source; the second wasuid be the feiture to trenefer power, to etere, or to trip. The pow =r distrita: tion systese is thus An erplicit statement of compliance with the staf f position that two EPAs be design =d such that a singte feiture comet result in degredad power beirig provided on the output of the RPS pow =r sumties with justification for erees sicc4 f ed to the "A* or '8* Sete elds.
of non corrptience should be includad in the ABVR $5AR.
Both the technicet erss redteidency functlens performed by en EPA are therefore preserved within the design of the power sWy itself, eru en e=*emst EPA is cet necessary oe reauf red.
With regard to !rdependence, the Ctess 1E vettege end feenm monitoring ord toed trip circuits for the Ctess 1E 12ir AC power sources for the AsWR ere simiter to the " EPA" circuitry that was provit>d for the Clint m project. In both cases the monitoring and trip circuits are functionally fr*perdant of the inverter voltage end fregJency regutetten circuits, eruf are monsited en seperste legic cords. However, in both cases, the two fwittienetty tr+pandmt circuit cards are tocated within the same power sWy get met osure.
25.000 8.3.4 ELECTE CAL lacEPtwofu E tu/C1 This issue is ediressed in response 433.67. Figure 8.3-8 was sodified as empteined in that respense.
8.3.4.1 Intercomactions i
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. REPORT FOM4 QUESANS8 TO PRINT Net CRAFT SER ISSLES & GE RESPoesES FOR AM $$AR CMAPTER 8 l-NUMBER - WRC ISSUE-CE RESP 0eSE i
8igure 8.3-8 shows two interconnections between redindent divisions:
- 1. Division 111 480 volt bus designated P/C Eat is connected to Divisim I '
q-480 volt bus designated P/C CNt through circuit breakers end wechanicet '
l Interlock. Section 8.3.2.1 indicates that this interconnection is used to 1
transfer the 250 VDC horset bettery charger between Division I and til toed I
centers.
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!t 480 volt bus designated P/C C41 through bettery chargers, breeters, and her
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interlocked breekers. Section 5.3.2.1 indicates that this interconnection is used for selection of the norsul or the stentby bettery charger.
f i
Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Port 50 reguires leue between redtru*nnt divisions such that felture of one will not challenge or cause l
f ailure of the requaining redurdent divisions. Sufficient information
{
describing these and other intercomections es to their cegtlance with the f
independence rewirement of criterion 17 has net been provided in eSe Agut j
Sp.R.
It is the staf f positten that two independent open disconnect tires,
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rocked open brwikers, or other equivalent open devices be neintained betwem l
redtmdent divisions if rededent divisions are to be electrically L
l Interconnected. AcMitional information es to extent of countiarra with the I
j ebove staf f position with justification of area of Don Cogliance is rewired in the t.3WR SSAR for resolution of this issue.
l 26.000 8.3.4.2 Constant voltage Constant Fregtency Power Stgipties tu/C] There ore four inducendent and reesident betteries Aich eWy DC power f
i to the CYCF's. The only list between divisims is through the division tv Section 8.3.1.1.4.2 indicates thet each of the four inderendent trip systees bettery charger, which receives its power fram the division I AC sumpty.
I ofthe reactor protection logic and centrol system are powered by four There is complete independence of the four divisions from the betteries, constant voltage constant frequency control power buses (Divisions I, II, through the CVCFs, and on to the toeds. The statement in 8.3.1.1.4.2.1 hos
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111, and IV). This section also states that each of these buses is supplied t:een cierified to explicitty identify the four DC sasipties and three AC I
independ=ntly from en inverter which, in turn, is supplied free one of four-sigipties (see attach =d merk-se).
I independent and redimdent AC and DC power saggdies. Subscupamt sections and I
5 figure 8.3-6, however, indicate that the AC sisiply for divisions I and tv the purpose of division tv is to provide futt two-eut-of-four logic for tM originates fram a single 480 voit motor centrol centee (C14). A single 480-SSLC, whi:h governs the ECCS and RPS channets. It also facilitetes reversten f
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32 11/26/91 L
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. REPORT TORM OtJESAXS8 TO Ptt4T WRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & CE RESPONSES FOR A8UR SSAR CMAPTER 8 trJMBElt N1rt 15$UE CE sESPCaSE volt actor ceritrol center is not independent 'nd redndent es stated in to two-out-of-three logic et the loss of ery one of the four channels. A section 8.3.1.1.4.2.
To resolve this inconsistency and other conce ns, complete justification of this wi w m - ; is essured by the fact that safe erMitioret information is remired for the following issues and/or positions.
shutdown criterie, including single felture considerations, are streedy occomanodeted with divisions I, !! and !!! elone. Also, this link betwaen the division IV twttery charger e uf the division I podar source is explicitly
- 1. Description, justification, and ennlysis to dramnstrate that sufficient defined in the PsA studr. For edditlanet deteits, see response 43D.315 and i
redJncsoney and indapandence has baen designad into the protection system and sibs-ction 9.5.1.2.11 their essociated pewer siselles in accordance with the requircaen's of j
criterion 21 of Appandis A to 10 CFR Peet 50.
i
- 2. AC cower suopty for Division tv should be powered f rom e 6.9 rv division bus that is indepeMent, to the estent practical, frau Division I, II, and 1II 6.9 KV and 480 volt distribution systems.
27.t'00 8.3.4.3 Power Suspty Circuits for Safety /setief Velve (SRVs)
Itew 1 [W/C3: Section 19E.2.1.2.2.2 hos be=n modified es shown in the k
ette3ed merk-to (see proprietary sabeittet). There e e sin safety reifef Section 19E.2.1.2.2.2 iruficates that portions of each safety /ratief valve velwes on each of divisions I, !! and III. ADS Velves are cetrolled by (SRV) centrol circuit uttiire non-safety grade power and that this twaw=-safety divisions t and it. Won-divisional powar is not utilited in either the SFV or grade power is taken from the Ctess 1E DC swstem through DC/DC converters or ADS functions. Division IV ls used enty for the two-out-of-four initiation i
isolatitut devices ccmected to each of the four rededent and iru$ependeM togic for the ADS. The electrics! power divisions esslgned to each wetwe ere Ctess 1E DC system: buses. Section 19E.2.1.2.2.2 implies that controt power shown on Table 19C.3-3.
for each SRV comes frors e mirminum of two dif ferent Ctets 1E powar so;rce divisions. Dre source directly from the Ctess TE DC bus with the other
- rem e dif ferent Ctess 1E DC bus through the DC/DC converter. The staff is Itea 2 [4/C]: The physicet and electricet seperation for AOS contret circuits corz mn! that the proposed design for powering the SRV's esty not provide is preserved. The close premielty of the divisions I and !! ADS solenoids sufs
- nt independe re t etween the redJndent DC power Sources in eCCordance requires berriers to seintain seperation These solenGids are isolated by j
with ths re wirements of GDC 17. To resolve this concern, odditionet metet jsnction bones, rigid concksit, and/or short sections cf flesit:te information is reQJirLJ for the feltowing items.
CondJit, es deKrihad in 8.3.1.4.2.3.2(6).
- 1. Design information and/or criteria for the physicet and electrical saperatien of safety and non-safety rentrot power circuits for each Suv from the powte source to and including the SRV contrei circuit.
- 2. Physicet and electricet seperation of the ADS control circuits and their sources of power. fSection 19E.2.1.2.2.2 frvfiestes that four of the eight T
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.tEPORT FORM GUESAESS TO PRINT MFC CRAFT SER ISSUES & GE RESPCRSES FOR ASWR SSAP CitAPTER 8
l SEV's taed two divisions enri the remaining four can be stoptied by any of three divisions).
2 28.000 6.3.5 LIGMTimG SYSTEMS ttee 1: The ti@ ting levels are based on the IES reememded intensities, es,
indicated in 9.5.3.1.1(1).
Section f.5.3.1.2 irdicates that soavete lighting for any safety related eres, such as areas used dering emergencies or shutdoens, including those Figure 9-80 of the IES Lighting manhoot provides currently recommended 5
along the aggvopriate eccess or exit rcutes, ere presided frtuo 3 dif ferent illuminatien tevels for electrical generating statierte. Although a few a*ees lighting circuits. (a) hornet,' (b) Sten &y, and (c) Emergery DC ard/or identified in SSAA Table 9.5-1 are not specifically listed in the IES l
self-contained bettery fixtu*es.
Man &ook, teere ere eress of simiter fspiction, or common envirorwapetat i
cherecteristics such thet the adequecy of the itttseinstim tevet can be In order to etete*e our review of lighting systeas, adfitimet information justified. The ittuninetien level of some erees in totde 9.5-1 heve baan is required for the fottowing items.
modified to tm more consistent with the IES he&ook. A copy of both tables is providad in Attachner t 82. febte 9.5-1 is sorted, es n-edad, for l
T. Criterte for eAat constitutes an adequete levet of lighting for various consistency with Figure 9-80; and Figure 9-80 is morted to show the areas of the plant and fer the various modes of ptarit operation.
corresportfing item in Table 9.5-1.
4 4
5 l
- 2. Clarification of the levet of tighting providad by 100 and 50 pew of Ite= 2 tu/t1: titumination tavels for ett erees are given in Tabte 9.5-1.
i rormat tighting.
These are considered 100s tevets; tharefore, the 50% tevets ere helf those given on the table.
+
- 3. Identificatton with justificetion for specific ptan*, erees and ordes of plant operation that do not weet criteria for eAat constitutes adequate ite= 3 tu/C1: At t erees meet criterie for ade=pete lighting.
1ighting.
Ites & tu/CI: Section 9.5.3.2(1) Identifies normat tIshting es non-essentiet.
- 4. Source of power for norset ti@ ting.
Therefore, the source of power for noriest lighting is the non-Class 1E AC power distribution system.
- 5. freg;ancy of insoection for normat lighting.
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Item 5 tu/CI: Section 9.5.3.3 freicetes no periodic testing is reg 2 ired for
- 6. Plant etess where 50% tighting shalt be secured with one stan&y tighting normat lighting.
power sigsdy.
Itcs 6 N/C1: Section 9.5.3.1.1(4)(r) irdicates two power buses shalt etspty
- 7. Meth d of distinguishing between norset, stardry, and Esergency DC tighting to staircases and possages in mein buildings. The addittenet bus
,I circuits to assure that they witt be routed seperately.
sitews these erees to be t=agererty ptoced on 50% tighting (i.e., one power j
supply) aAlte the other is asider inspection or maintenance.
- 8. Source of power *or sten &y lighting.
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. REPORT TORM CUESA458 TO PRINT 1
alc CRAFT SER ISSUES & GE RESPONSES FOR A8WR SSAR CMAPTER 8 j
i i
ut*rdER ett ISSUE GE at$sorSE l
tree 7: Wiring /cabtes are separated and color coded in occordence with
- 9. Separation between the t=0 sten &y power source circuits.
criterie detineated in s
- sections 9.5.3.1.1(7) and 18), respectively; and in 8.3.1.3.
A refereme to 8.3.1.3 has twan e@d in 9.5.3.1.1(7).
- 10. Lewt of tighting with 100 percent eM 30 percent of stan&y tighting for various erees.
' +eae 8: The standoy lighting system is sede of two stbsystems, safety retsted o # non-safety reteted. The safety related stan&y tighting s* system (SSLS) l'
- 11. Seismic desi ri of stan&y lig5 ting.
Serves the safety related erees (erees where safety retete:S equipment are t
motseted), and their essociated pessojeweys. The non-sefety related stentby
- 12. Coptisnce of stardby tighting with Ctess TE circuit rewiremmts.
tighting subsystems teSLS) serves the non-safety related erees (arees he non-sofety related erpipment ere mots tad), one their essociated possegeways.
- 13. The redundancy of the -. y a y DC t ighting circuit?.
The back-te power source for the above subsystems are:
- 14. The level of itttmeirtation of e==argency lighting.
SSLS - Dieset Generators
- 15. Pe-todic intoaction and testir.g of tigmting.
NSt$ - Cor6ustion Turbine
- 16. Justification for not having self contained battery fiatures seisaricetty guelified.
54bsection 9.5.3.2.2 hoc bem revised for clarification, es shown in the etteched merk-ups.
- 17. The littsninetton levets with justifiestion of the self contained bettery fixtures.
Item 9: Tebte 9.5-3 and Section 7.5.3.1.1(4)(r) beve bem revised to clorify the separation betwe e the two poiarr sources, sedsdent divisions are not
- 18. Justification for having self containad battery f f ature tighting turn of f ettowed within the same lighting eree. Seperation between the Ctess TE and with restoration of power versus restoration of ed**pete light.
non-Ctess TE tighting circuits is designed in occordance with IEEE 386 and Regutstory Guide 1.75, es detineated in Section 8.3.t.4.1.1(3).
- 19. Justification for not having any seismicatty quellfied tighting.
4 Item 10: Ittusination levels for ett erees are given in Table 9.5-1.
These ere considered 100% tevets; therefore, SC% tevels are half these given in the tobte. Arees specifically designated for stancty tightirw ' 4 Idantified in Table 9.5-3.
Item 11: (See the response to item 8 above.,
item 12: (See the response fo Item 8 above.)
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. REPORT. FORM OUESANS8 TO PRINT Wec DRAFT SER ISSULS & GE RESPON$ES FOR ASWR $$At CMAPTER 8 NUMBER,NRC ISSUE GE RESPONSE Item 13: The DC -.-, lighting is redwusent to the AC stener lightig, which is reda=3mnt to the nonnet AC tighting. DC eueregency tightig is not autti-divisionet within e given eree, but is of the same division es the eres (i.e., designated fire beundary) it serves, es indicated in Tatde 9.5-4 item 16: The etnisue iltwrinetton levels for DC emergency lighting ere glwen in Tobte 9.5-4 (modified per attached).
Iteur 15: Inspection and testig reesirceumte ere identified in Sect!cn 9.5.3.3.
The fregtsency of testing is 4 M on the operating and..
saintenance prAedares of the utility applicant. An interface iteen (9.5.13.131 he, been added to ederess this.
t Item 16 tu/C3: Self-cor:teined bettery fixtures are seismicotty tsuellfled as steted in the test peregraph of section 9.5.3.2.4..
I Iteen 17: The besic fwetion of the emergwey tighting system is to prevent totat blackout in the erees identified on Table 9.5-4 for periods efte= topP (tess of nonumt lightig), eruf setf L the dieset generators energize the stoney tighting systems. Therefore, the emergency tighting system Is not regrired to have the same Ifghting lituminotion tewet es the nortset/sterdry tighting systems ressire. Tabte 9.5-4 hos been revised to specify tight 4
f ewels enceeding the recemumendatione of the IES tifting beneook.
4 1
Item 15: The guide temps chargers eruf tm rete /s are fed frse the AC.
q stoney tighting systmo.
l j
tten 19: The stoney lighting, the DC eseegency lightig, and the self-contained bettery fixtures are ett seismically sagsmrted (see 9.5.3.2.2.1 and 9.5.3.2.3.1 etteched).
.l i
j) 29.000 8.3.6 DESIGN CONTROL tu/C2 The design control for the AgMR is boomd an eEDD-11209-06e, the " Green gook *, Rev. 7.
This h% hos boon approved by the WeC, and is referewed l'
B.3.6.1 Control of the Design Process in SSAR Section 17.1.3.
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. REPORT FJtM QUESANS3 70 PRINT NRC DRAFT SER ISSUES 1 GE RESPONSES FOR ABWR SSAR CMAPTER 8 GE RESPtWSE NtMBER WAC SSUE Recently, there have been a rvber of problsens identified M h the electrical t
system design at nuclear power plants. Although the Lajo T y of these problems arose as a result of modifications performed ef ter plant licensing sore were (and at t cau'.d have been) the result of graor originot design.
Genes ic letter 88-15 addresses a nurter of thsse prabteac. that 1 ave occurred primnrity as a result of inadequate centre' ^ ' tfe design process. These problems have occurred in areas of electritat
-tes design which have historicatty wet t established ard coripreu w & ign crite-ia and guidelines available for the design engiree
,s circuit b eaker coordination and f ault cuerent interruptfor.spc.iitity.
The staff a not nornet ty mdertake a detailed review of these arcas. The staff instead ret'.es on the designers preper exercise of the weit established design criteria and guidelines. Tt,e9sure that the criteria red guidelines are fot towed control is reqJired. The control being isytewenteu for the A9WR et*ctricat design ard the reaJired control for any subseq;ent modificattens thereto should be described in the A8WR SSAR.
(N/C) El;;ht of the fif teen issues identifyla inconsistencies in this draf t 30.000 8.3.6.2 Oontrol of the Design 8ases SER were the resutt of design changes M aMch areas discussing the sawee topic l
The bases for the design described and presented in the ASWR SSAR is, for the were not at t updated at the samme tisat, t5ae reJoonses for draft SER sections l
most part, used as the basis by which the NRC issues a plant operating 8.3.1, 8.3.2.1, 8.3.2.3, 8.3.2.4, 8.3.7 e, 0.3.6.2, 8.3.7, ard 8.3.8.1) These the bases presented in Chapter 8 and other have been corrected in association with these responses, as irdicated 1icense. Based on a review of related chapters, ruerous irconsistencies have been identified. These throughout this sdsmittet. Mowever, a forvet engineering review and upoete inconsistencies are identified in other sections of this safety evetuation will occur fottowing receipt of the SE9 for Chapter 8.
The formal review has report. Given these inconsistencies, it appears that the process for been awaiting that time, so that resolation to SER issues car,be incorporated controtting the design bases being presented in the ABWR $$AR eiay be along with the ge.serat update of the chapter. This is consistert witc our deficient. The process for controtting the design bases should be clarified scheduling program f or the A8We/SSAR docu=ent control.
The remaining seven (s w e were, in fact, erroneous interpretations of the information reviewed. We have also identified these areas within this sdsnittal. (see responses for draf t SER sectious 8.2, 8.3.2.7, 8.3.3.4, 8.3.3.7, 8.3.4.2, 8.3.8.3, and 8.3.8.5.)
The NRC is rew;ested to reconsider this question in the tight of the responses and tent updates associated with this stheittet.
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NRC DRAFT SEP ISSUES & 4 wtwi>WSES TOR AgWR $$AR Ch*"tER 8 NUMBER kRC ISSUE GE RESPONSE 31.000 8.3.7 TESTING Ites 1: Section. i *.1.1.5.3 has' tren modified to specifically state -
conformence with ne wtatory beide 1.118 and IEEE 338 (see aM ched). The Section 8.3.1.1.5.3, testing, im'icates that the design of.. ass 1E equipment specific provision for testing with an additional attomance ter sing;e 'siture '
provides for periodically testing the cha!n of system elements from sen*ing is addressed in Section 3(4) of IEEE 338.
device
- through driven equipnent to assure that Class 1E equipment is functioning in accordance with design requirements..This section also inplies that the requirements cf the single failure criterion described in items 2-4: This information'is contained'in the Technical Specificatione,,
IEEE Standard 379 are met with respect to testing of class 1E equipment. The Chapter 16. Specificatty for item 2, the test fregumcies, as identified in staf f interprets this section to mean that wie couplete electrical system the Tech' Specs, itt account for both preptamad and unpienned maintenance.
'l division may be deenergized and taken out cf service for maintenance and/or The basis for both will be estatdished in the PR4.
.y repair during any ende of plant operation and still have the rearining electrical systems in cceptience with the single failure criterinn. The-staf f concludes that this design provision for testability of electrical.
Item 5 IN/C1:.There are no divisional cross connections re wired for testing l
i systems as interpreted meets the sufficient testability requirement of purposes in the ASWR Standard Plant Deafgn.
t l
Criterion 17 and is acceptable. In order to confirm and clarify this t
interpretation in the A8WR SSAR arri address other related issues, additional informatien is requirad for the following items.
Item 6 IN/C]: The appropriate versions for att IEEE standards are given in t
Tob'e 1.8-11.
- 1. Explicit statemant for testability durtrig normat plant operation while
[
meeting single f ailure requiremente with remaining systems for any design basis event.
Item 7: Certain ( mas camot be fully tested &ririg reactor operation without degeading plant operability or safety. Some Class 1E cs.ponents were
- 2. Proposed a11 owed outage times M one diwIsion to be out of service to specifIca11y identifled in response 420.120. ' in addition, the mair generator i
perform preptamed and urplemed maintenance.
circuit breaker cannot be operated without taking the unit off the line.
l Mowever, it can be tested edille the reactor is in het stanchy.
t
- 3. Frequency for periodically testing each system element to assurr its availability to mitigate design basis events.
It is possible, (though not advisahte for operability or grid stability
~
reasons in some casas), to test att other components in the etectrical power A. Basis for establishment of test frequency for each system elemWet, distributien system while the reactor is in cperatier S. Identification (with justification for their use) nf any divisional cross somection which must be used to meet the above c? sty provision for item 8 IN/C): we camot deter 1mine any inconsistencies between these two testability.
sections. If the supposed inconsistencies are related to the statements involving applicability, these have been removed in association with item 3 of r
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- 6. Clerification of the version of IEEE Standard 379 being referener1 in SER issue 8.0.
Otherwise, the anc needs to speelfleetly identify the simposed section 8.3.1.1.5.3.
Inconsistener.
- 7. Identification with justification for any areas of non-cceptience with the I
atmve design provision for testability.
Items 9,10 and 12 [W/C): This information is contal*wd in the Technicet
~
Specifications, Chapter 16.
- 8. Inconsistency between section 8.3.1.1.5.3 and 8.3.1.2.2 with respect to meeting the sfrute feiture criterion white testing one division of the CYCF power supply system.
Item 11 IM/C): The testing and calibration of the dieset generato-
- overcurrent reley is based primarity on the reiey manufacturer's
- 9. Periodic' testing provisions to assure the capability of the diesel recommendations; e wi ciso on the utility /aplicant*t surveittance test l Denerator to accept toeds in any loading order (reference: 435.18).
procedtres. This levet of detalt is tryond the licensing basis for the Aghat Stenrterd Plant.
- 10. Periodic testing to dmonstrate the dieset generator's cepebility of betng started in 13 seconds and futty toeded within 30 seconds.
Iteen 13 [N/C): The commsituents to meet the regsfrements of Regulatory Guide
- 11. Testing and calibration of the dieset generator over current relay.
1.47 ere given in SSaa sections 8.3.1.2.1(2)(d)&(3)(e), and a (Istieg of anntriciations associated with this regstressent is given in section
- 12. Testing and/ur snetysis to be performed periodicatty to demonstrate the 8.3.1.1.8.5.
cacobility of the dieset generator to supply the actual fuit design basis toad current for each secaseneed load step.
Item 14: The AguR utilizes two-out-of-four logic which con permit any one
- 13. Interf ace requirements for compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.47, channet or division to be bypassed ediite the reuelning channels or divisions 9ypassed and inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety revert to two-out-of-three logic. This, in conjunction with the self-test Systens and BTP PS8-2, Criteria for Alarms and Indications Associated with features ir.herent in t'ne Safety System Logic and Control 4SSLC), greetly Dieset-Generator Unit Bypassed and Inoperable Status.
e s ences the testability of the protection systems.. The testability feetures of the Agnst IEC are discussed in Sections 7.1.2.1.6, 7A.2(6), 7A.2(14), and'
- 14. (Added to DSER per 9/16-18/91 meetings) Confirmation that tne testability eAl responses 420.67, 420.70 and 420.73.
inherent in the design of protection systems is not so burdensome operationetty that required testing at intervals of 1, 2, or 3 months comet Surviettence intervals for protection systems are an*.icipated to be three be included in the Technical Specifications if deemed necessary. The systems armths or less. Except for certain components eAlch cannot be tested during 1
.sddressed should include but not be limited to the reactor protaction system'.reector operation (see Item 7 above), the proposed test inter'sts could be
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and the engineered safety featur s actuation system.' Identify exceptions.
ecceseodated if deemed necessary.
e i
- 15. (Added to DSER per 9/16-18/91 meetings) Testing to demonstrate the j
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. REPORT FORM QUESANS8 TO PRINT kRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & GE RESPONSES FOR AEWR SSAR CMAPTER 8 CJMBER WRC ISSUE GE RESPONSE capability of the dieset generator to automaticet ty revert to the emergency tres 15: This testing is incitsfed in the ITAAC for the Emergmey Diesel response ende while in the test mode if a design basis accident or loss of Generator System.
offsite power event were to occur.
32.000 8.3.8 CAPACITY AND CAPABILIIT
[N/C) Section 1.2.1.2.5.2 has been modified to egree with section 8.3.1.2.1, which is correct (see attecned mark-te).
8.3.8.1 Shutdown Capability of Each Load Grotp Section 8.3.1.2.1 states that the stancby power system redundanc, is based on the capability of any one of the four divisions (one of three toad grotps; to provide the ministsa safety ftsirtions necessary to shut down the unit from the control room in case of an accident and maintain it in the safe chutdown condition. However, in apparent contradiction section 1.2.1.2.5.2 states that the Class 1E power systems are designed with three (3) divisims with any two divisions being adequate to safety place the unit in the hot shut down cc Jition. This arparent contradiction should be clarified in the ASWR SSAR.
33.000 3.3.8.2 mon-Safety DC Power Systems Section 1.2.2.5.1.6 has been amended as shown in the attached aerk-te. The 12S VDC non-Class 1E system is briefly discussed near the end of section Section 1.2.2.5.1.6 indicates that the ABWit design includes a mit etaillary 8.1.2.1; however, e new sec tion 8.3.2.1.4 has been added which further de power system that stpplies power to de loads that are non-safety related.
describes this system. The DC-to-DC converters are considered as " power however, section 8.3.2, which is stopose to ackfress de power systems included packs" per Sectioi '.2.2 of IEEE 384, and meet att the requirements of in the ABWR, omits description end analysis of the ts11t auxittery de power Regulatory Guide 1.75 and IEEE 384 respecting isolation devices.
system. This system and the extent it will be used to stpply de controt power to systems that are ipportant % s.ef%ty (such as offsite pow *r circuits) sh wtd be defined in the A8Wk sSAR.
34.000 8.3.8.3 Class 1E 125 volt DC Battery capac'ty Section 5.4.6.1 has been modified, per ettsched merk-te, to be consistent with the eight-hour coping capacity stated in section 19E.2.1.2.2.2.
Section 8.3.2.1.3.2 indicates that each of the four Class 1E 125 volt batteries have sufficient stored energy to operate connected essentist toads The two-hour eyeliability time stated in section 8.3.2.1.3.2 is not continuously for at least two hours withert recharging. During loss of ec inconsis*ent with the eight hour coping time in that the former esstanes power, section 5.4.6.1 indicates that the bettery capacity should attow over continuous toad condielma. The eight-hour time for station t>teckout four 1.ours of operation of the RCIC system. Item 3 of section 19E.2.1.4.2.2 conditions is evaltable because RCIC toeds are intermittent, and other toads
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NRC DRAFT SER ISSUES &'GE RESPONSES FOR AgWR SSAR CHAPTER 8
.3 t
1 N'JMGER NRC ISSUE GE RESPONSE indicates that the de batteries will be sired to be capable of operating the con be shed or shif ted to other divisions (i.e., SRV functions). l This is RCIC system for a minimun of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> assuning toed sh(Jding arvf use of att -
expteined in responses 435.38(c) em1435.2 (SSAR section 20.3, tab RAI-8) and four Ctess 1E betteries. Item 2e of section 19E 2.1.2.2.2 indicates that in secticn 19E.2.1.2.2.2.
This clarification hos been added to 8.3.2.1.3.2 Division 1 bettery by itself has sufficient cepecity to operate the RCIC per the etteched merk-tp.
system for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. These inconsistencies should be eterified and the design -
basis load profile for each bettery shoutr* be explicitly stated in the A8WR An estimated toed demand profite for the 125 VDC betteries was provided in SSAR.
Response 435.38 (SSAR sw 20.3-253.21). As empteined in that response, this infos.netion could change as the design is specified for unique applications.
I A toad cepecity onetysis (besed on IEEE 485-1978) was performed for both the '
two-hour and eight-hour periods, using the
- te provided in Response 435.38.:
The results are shown in newly added Tables 8.3-5 through 8.3-10 (ettsched).
The two-hour enetyses (Tables 8.3-5,
-7, and -9) show extensive additionet -
mergins. The Division I additionet eergin is 149E of the re wired cepecity including the 15% design mergin and 25% aging factor suggested by IEEE 485.
The eight-hour onetyses (Tables 8.3-6, -8, and -10) show thet cepecities are slightly exceeded when the 15% design sorgin and 25*. esing factor ere l
considered. However, the eight-hour copifg is justified for t h station
^
blackout scenerlo for the following reesonst a
- 1. The enetyses are highty conservative in that they assume no toed shedding.
During station blackout, toeds would be shed thereby greetly increasing the -
empere-hours ovellebte.
- 2. Divisiem 2, 3, and 4 ere redundant to each other, and es e grow redurdent to Division I except for the controt of the RCIC from the control room.
Therefore, the life of the Division i bettery could be greetty extended by y
shedding att of its toads except the RC!C controls.
2
- 3. Even with the toads not ehed, the cepecities are within re g iressente if the i
15% design mergin is not'opptied.
- 4. The enetysis method itsatf is highty conservative in that toeds are
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NRC ISSUE GE RESPONSE considered corstant throughout vericus periods, when, in fact, many are intermittent.
5.'.The AgWR he4 three Ctess 1E diesel generetors and a non-Class 1E condiustion turbine generator (CTG) on site. This condiinetton cf four on-site power
- sources suggest the probabitity of' a stotion btockout is very 1ow.. In addition, per Regulatory Guide 1.155, the CTC gastifies es en AAC, and precitdes.the need for a coping onetysis (see Sections 3.2.5 and 3 3.5 of Reg.
Guide 1.155).
35.000 8.3.8.4 use-of sittcon Dh+ != tk. nc ut
~ The'information requested in Iten 2 was provided in response 435.38 (SSAR page 20.3-253.21), and further supported by the load cepecity onetysis provided in l
Figure 8.3-7 and ressense to question 435.51' indicates that e siticon diodeL response to SER Issue 34.
(510) which has a voltage drop of.10 volts has been instetted in series with the output of the bettery and bettery charger. During normal operation (i.e.
Items 1, 3, and 4'are remotved !.ecause the $1Ds and essociated shorting.
tettery charger output voltage is set at 140 volts for equatire charge) the.
switches have been removed from the power sigply. circuits.. The decision to switch in parettet with the silicon diode rdtt be open so that the voltage remove the SIDs is based on the fact that DC equipemt is'specified to operate ~
from the bettery charger to the DC bus wilthremain et 130 vetts (14* w its et 140 vDC, and therefore does not need the. voltage drop provided by the SID-minus the 10 vott drop across the silicone (Jode) untie 140 volts is steptied dJring the brief equalize chorging periods. This deslyt change is reflected :
to the bettery for, egralize charge. The stt'f feels that the proposed design per the attached merk-tes of Figure S.3-7 and RAI Response 435.51.
has merit; however, sufficient descriptive (Normation and enetysis to reach a conclusion on acceptability for ett modes # plant operation has not been presented in the ABWR SSAR. To resolve steft *oncerns, additional information is required for the following itet.
- 1. Reliability of the proposed DC system..The +sddition of the silicon diode in the DC system circuit adds en additionet tev*t of unretlebility to the system while et the same time may inprove over4f t DC system retlebility.
- 2. Capacity and capability of the DC system to SJpply design besis Ioede during loss of offsite power events.
- 3. Design provisions' to assure the bettery witi never hove 'to sigply its design basis toads with the silicon diode conneval in series with the bettery and DC bus.
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- 4. Monitoring for the switch instatted in parattet w(th the diode.
36.000 8.3.8.5 Class 1E AC Stanty Power System Iten 1 LN/C): The dieset generator'(D/G) capability of reaching futt speed and voltage has changed frtum 13 secords to 20 seconds because additional As a result of our review of the stanttr/ power system proposed in the ABWR mergin in the design requirements permits less stress on the diesets. The SSAR, the following erfas of concern have been identified.
changes are shown in attached marb es for sections 8.3.1.1.8.2(4), 8.3.4.2, and Table 8.3-4.
- 1. Inconsistency betveen seetion 8.3.1.1 8.2 and 8.3.1.1 8.3 as ta the design capability of the diesel generator to start and attain rated voltage and frequency.
Ite== 2 LN/C): ' As indicated in saction 8.3.1.1.8.2(2), the D/G is desipied such that its voltage drop wilt not exceed 25% (75% bus voltage), even mder
- 2. The capability of the dieset generator to supply loads assuming loss of seg;ence loading emditions. There* ore,' white the D/G is steplying power to offsite, loads being either s w ptied by or being sequenced on the dieset the bus, the bus voltage will not drop below 70% for a sustained period miess generator, and bus voltage drops below 70 percent.
the D/G itself faits or there is a feutt condition. Under such conditions, the of fending division toads are tripped (essuring no LOCA), and the safety
- 3. Clarification of the diesel generator design details which are to be fmetions will be assumed by the redundant divisions. The three independent swptied by others (reference question 435.21(b)) and the criteria the design D/Gs, and their. essociated divisions, provide more than adegante rededency to i
eust s'eet (i.e. interf ace requirasents).
mitigate the suggested single-feiture scenario.
- 4. Clarification of the contirtous and overtoed retings of the dieset generator defined in section 8.3.1.1.8.2.
Item 3: The dieset generators, their controtters, and their sunitiery support systens will be s@p!!ed at the implementation stege of the design. NRC question 435.21b can only be answered idwm the specific dieset sgpier is selected and its corresponding controtter circuitry 'can be obtelned.
Interf ace item 8.3.4.2 is written to eseure the infor1metion is provided, regerdiess of who acquires it, aceponse 435.21b has been modified for consistency with the above (see ettschad page 20.3-253.13).
k Item 4: This inforitation was provided in response 435.21(e), but in addition,.
has now been ached es subsection 8.3.1.1.8.2(5) (see ettsched merk w)..
37.000 8.3.9 STAft04 SLACK 0UT Item 1: A more severe anetysis is streedy provided.,Section 19E.2.1.2.2.1 y
indicates that if AC power is still moveitable ef ter the 8-hour period,' the I
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NUrtBER NRC ISSUE GE RESP 0eSE The ABWR coping enetysis for Stati m Stockout is presented in section com cooling ftnction is esst.aued to be lost. This scenerlo is referred to 19E.2.1.2.2.
Also, table 19E.2-2 presents design basis vetues for verlous Section WE.2.2.3, which provides en enetysis showing that core cooling can be plant parameters that will not be exceeded at the end of the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> coping s.t'teined frMinstely if the operfstor injects using the fireweter system.
i duretf or* for a Station Stockout event. Itssed on a review of this coping Moweve.,' we conteirNnt cooling systese is aveif eble amtil AC power is enetysis and design information presented in other sections of the AgWR restored.
$$4R, the staf f has identified the following erees of concern.
Tebte 19E.2-9 shows ts.d mch more time is evettable (24.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) to restore'.
- 1. Analysis results demonstrating soft plant "hutdown cett be accouptished contelruemt Cooling then y tolersted for restoration of core cooling. Any.
starting with reestablishetet of AC power t3 any one of the three A one of the three divisions of s e is sufficient to safety shut down the plant.
divisions from either of fsite, dieset generators, or combustion turbine Therefore, restoration of AC power to any one division et the end of the generator et the end of the 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of coping.
8-hour perioj eosity facit{tetes resumption of the contefrument cooling function, and subsequently safe shutdown, whether or not the operator restores
- 2. Justification for the proposed design which provides en ettemete AC the ECCS. Further, even if conteirument cooling carsut be regained, the surpty (conbustion turbine generator) but dictetes that its first priority.
overpressu e protection system rupture tilsks will retleve pressure and prevent use be to sigply AC power to Non-Class 1E plant investment protection toads contaltunent felture.
versus Ctess 1E toads needed to assure safe plant shutdown.
The three Irvjependent diesel generators are designed with bypass volves for
- 3. The cepecity and capability of the combustion turbine senerator to esgoty their DC solenoids such that each con be started manuelty without DC power.
minimum safe shutdown Londs and mininue required plant Irwestment protection (i.e., esstseing the DC betteries are discherged following 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of coping).
toads et the smae time.
Also, the chtien turbine generstor is started by e emetter self-contained dieset with its own bettery. Therefore, the probability of no AC power. for 8
- 4. Design and quotification of egaipment for the environments expected during - hours is extremely remote. This redundancy and diversity, combined with the and foitowing the'8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> coping time anstyred for station blackout events.
'more severe enetysis provided in 19E.2.2.3, precludes the need for W$ltionet enetysis.
- 5. Clarification of how Division 2, h and 4 are shutdown during a station blackout situation.
Item 2 (N/C): The con 6ustion turbine generator (CTC) is included in the AeWR
- 6. Clarification of the source of instrisernt power fremt DC or constant Stenderd Plant es en etternate and diverse source of on-site AC power. Its voltage constant frequency sources during stetten blackout situations.
function is consistent with the foltawing: 1) The unit is non-Ctess 1E, and is..
provided to feed perminere ran-sefety toads during toPP events, 2) It is
- 7. Extent to which the contiustion turbine generator complies with posittort available to back tp the Ctess 1E DGs, shculd they fait 'or not.be evellebte, 3.3.5 of Regulatory Guide 1.155, Station steckout.
and 3) It is capable of coping with a station blackout.
e
- 8. The inconsistency between response to question 435.2 and the 6/4/91 draft The CTG essumes non-sofety Irwestment protection toads autoesticetty, tan the section of 19E.2.1.2.2 of the SSAR with respect to the nietier of SRys powered connection to each Ctess-1E bus is manuel. This is justified because: 1)
L L
v
Page No.
44 11/26/91 i
. 00 CM81SSLE
+
. REPORT TORM QUESANS8 TO PRINT Nkal CRATT SER ISSUES & GE RESPONSES FOR A8WR SSAR CHAPTER 8
~
MUMSER NRC ISSUE GE RESPONSE
'r hem division 1.
On-site a-@4 power is provided by three Ctess-1E DCs ard no credit is -
taken for safe shutdown utilizing the CTG. 2) Although the CTG con cope with the station blackout, the AgWR can cope with station blackout without the need i
foe the CTG, es described in 19E.2.1.2.2. 3) The CTG interfr:e configuration provides i.e.at stoney pouee for non-safety loads and thus maintain; better separation between safety and non-sofety systems..This else prevents the Investsent protection loods from hoving to be oestsumf by the DGs.
i Item 3 IN/C): ' The CTG is rated to produce approximately 20% more power than a DG (i.e., 6 4 for the CTG, compered to 6.25 MvA a 0.8 pf = 5 m for e DG).
Nouever,' the CTG is not designed, nor regaired,'to esstase stl investment protection toads in addition to e DG toed. If the need erose for the CTG to' essume the Ctess 1E toede on a DG bus, the investment protection toede would be shed.. This is also done es e precaution to assure non-Ctess 1E toede do not adversty effect the CTG's ability to steply power to the Class 1E toeds.
Item 4: The envirorumentet effects cn most electricot equipment during e station blackout event ere espected to be teos severe then the accident i
environments enstyred in Section 3.11. This is because such equipment would
.l be in its deenergized state, and thus would prt&ce no internet heet rise i
compared with the envirorument. Exceptions may be the RCIC rooms and the controt room because of energized ogJipment operating in a loss-of-NWAC-envirorument. Nowever, design constraints for these erees prevent room f
temperatures from reaching the ecpsipment design temperatures for et teost eight hours (see 19E.2.1.2.2.2, 5) & 6)].
1 teemaining items are addressed in the continuation which follows.)
'i 37.500 8.3.9 $TATION BLACKOUT Item 5 IN/CI: In a station bleckout event, if division I instrumentation is functioning property, the operator should annuotty shut down re&ndant (Continuation of previous question to ellow room for GE responses.)
divisions II, III eruf IV in order to 1) reduce heet dissipation within the control room white NVAC is lost, and 2) conserve bettery energy for additionet SPV cepecity, or other specific purposes as rweded, as fruficated in i
19E.2.1.2.2. Only division f is essential to the RCIC opeestion and should
i-Pagt No.
45 11/26/01
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. REPORT FORM QUESANS8 TO PRiti NRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & CE RESPONSES FOR ABWR SSAR CnAPTER 8 NUMBER NRC ISSUE C' PESPONSE J
rescin f6retional at ett times daring this event. This is why the division I tettery has sigr:f ficantly more cepecity then the other betteries.
An inte ? ace section 8.3.4.16 hos been e63ed to assure this operator action is' included in the amticent's Emergency Operating Procedures. (See etteched mark-up.)
Item 6 I4/C): As a generet rule, ett Ctess 1E frttrument smwer comes directly 1+om the divisional DC buses. The only exceptions are some E/0 converters in the process radietion monitoring system. These require AC power provided ty the DC vie the CVCF power supply units. Non-divisionet CVCFs etso stgiply snwer to the non-Class 1E area radiation detectors.
Item 7: Att of the five criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.1554 Section 3.3.5, are met cf exceeded by the CTC. SSAE Section 9.5.11 descrites the CTG, ed stgg.9rts each c.f the referenced criterie es follows:
Criterion : SSAR Section 9.5.11.3 states "The CTG #ses tr:t supply power to nucteer safety *eteted epipamt eiccept on condition of (emplete fatture of the emergency dicv8, generatort vid ett off site poner.* Thus, it is not nonnetty "directly c-ruweted to the...t.el2's onsite emergency ec power
- system."
Criterion 2: sSAR Section 9.5.11.2 references Stt-Ffeure 8.3-1 nefeh shows that there is mirtlmn potentist for cannern cause faltura with the..orsite a
emergency ec power sourr+s" from the electricet pevvpective. Protection from
" single-point vulnere!Allty" due to "weether tetsted event or single active fatture" is etso inheret in the physical saperatism of tNe CTC (tor.ated in '
' the Turbine 9utiding trigure 94.4-201) erd the dieset generators (loceted in the React".,r Sul1dir4 *Heure 9m.4-4)b Criterion 3: 'sSA4 Sectton 9.5.11.2.stMos %Ety tontrotted breekers eteo provide the capability of connecting the centuetion hsrbire generator' ts any one of the emergercy buses if att ettrer powee ocurces are test." Thou, the CTG has "...provssfens to be founuelty conrmeted t9 ene or-ett of the tedisident
Page No.
46 11/26/91
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. REPORT FORft QUESANSS TO PR14T NRC DRAFT SER ISSUES & GE RESPONSES FOR ASWR SSAR CHAPTER 8 CE RESPONSE NtMBER NRC ISSUE safety buses as reqJired." Also, the criteria that "The time re p.cd for I
seking this equigment available should not be more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />..." is f ar exceeded by the CTG capabilities as stated in SSAR Section 9.5.11.1(1): "The CTG unit shalt automaticatty start, accelerate to rated speed, reach nominal voltage, and begin accepting load within two minutes of receipt of its start signet."
Criterion 4: SSAR Section 9.5.11.1(3) truficates the CTG's rating at 6 su.
This exceeds that of each (leset generator, Alch is rated at 5 se.
TF*refore, it has more tha7 "...suf ficient capacity to operate the systems...".
Criterion 5: SSAR Section 9.5.11.4 states that " Site acceptance testing, periodic surveitlance testing and preventive namintenance, inspections, etc.,
shall be perfotard..." Also, per that same section, the CTG must uridergo f actory testing similar to the diesel generator (i.e., per IEEE 387) tsitess its retimbitity maintelrm 99% ever a five-year period.
Ites 8: The reference to "5 safety retlef valves" has ten changed to *6 safety relief watwes" consistent with the Section 19E.2.1.2.2.2, as modified per SER lssue 27 (see attached).
i
-'ABWR-mime Standard Plant _
nry A (7) Radiation _ shielding is provided and access allowances for natural environmental.
'O control patterns are established to allow a -
disturbances such as earthquakes, floods, properly trained operating staff to control and storms at the station site.
radiation doses within the limits of applicable regulations in any mode of normal (15) Standby electrical power sources'have plant operations, sufficient capacity to power all safety related systems requiring electrical power (8) _Those portions of the nuclear system that concurrently.
form part of,the reactor coolant pressure boundary are designed to retsin integrity as (16) Standby electrical power sources are a radioactive material containment barrier provided to allow prompt reactor shutdown following abnormal operational transients and removal of decay heat under circum-and accidents.
stances where normal auxiliary power is not available.
(9) Nuclear ' safety systems and engineered safety
. features function to assure that no damage (17) A containment is provided that completely to the reactor coolant pressure boundary encloses the reactor systems, drywell, and results from internal pressures caused by suppression chambers. The contain ment
- abnormal operational transients and employs the pressure suppression concept.
accidents.
(18) It is possible to test primary contain-(10) Where positive, precise action is immediate-ment integrity and leak tightness at'
-ly required in response to abnormal opera-periodic intervals.
tional transients and accidents, such action
~is automatic and requires no decision or (19) A secondary containment is provided that manipulation of controls by plant operations completely encloses the primary containment personnel.
above the reactor building basemat. This
~(h
~
secondary containment provides Ier a
(
f, g,l < l.2(11) Safety related actions are provided b/
controlled, monitored release of any.
equipment of sufficient redundance and inde-potential radioactive leakage from the pendence so that no single failure of active primary containcent.
components, or of passive components in cer-tain cases in the long p;
'll prevent. (20) The primary containment and secondary the re r compo-containment in conjunction with other nents(quired a(tions. Fo7f 1,0 ~ a p r$1EEE 279 gle fail-safety related features limit radio-l y
urcs of either active or passive electrical logical effects of accidents resulting in components are considered in recognition of the release of radioactive material to the the higher anticipated failure rates of containment volumes to less than the passive electried components relative to prescribed acceptable limits, passive mechanic al components.
(21) Provisions are made for removing energy (12) Provisions are made for control of active from the primary containment as necessary' components of safety related systems from to maintain the. integrity of the the control room.
containment system following accidents that release energy to the containment.
(13) Safety related systems are designed to
-permit demonstration of their functional (22) Piping that penetrates the_ primary performance requirements, containment and could serve as a path for the uncontrolled release of radioactive
-(14) The design of safety related systems, material to the environs is automatically components and structures includes isolated when necessary to limit the 122 Amendmca 1 m
s.
ABM UA0100AC Standard Plant 1EV,A 4
(7). Backup reactor' shutdown capability is radiation doses within the limits of applicable :
provided independent of normal reactivity regulations.in any-normal mode of plant
^!
control provisions. This backup system has operation.
q the capability to shut down the reactor from Lany operating condition and subsequently to 1.2.1.2J Process Control Systems Criteria -
maintain the shutdown condition.
The principal design criteria for the process
-(8) The nuclear system is designed so there is no control systems are as follows:
tendency for divergent oscillation of any operating characteristic, considering the 1.2.1.2.5.1 Nuclear System Process Control-interaction of the nuclear system with other Criteria appropriate plant systems.
(1) Control equipment is provided to allow the 1.2.1.2.2 Electrical Power Systems Criteria reactor.to respond automatically to load changes within design limits.
Suffielent normal auxiliary and standby sources of electrical power are provided to (2) It is possible to control the reactor power attain prompt shutdown and continued maintenance
- IcVel manually.
of-the station in a safe condition under all credible circumstances. The power sources are - (3) Nuclear systems process displays, controls
- adequate _to accomplish all required essential and alarms are arranged to allow the-safety actions under all postulated accident operator to rapidly asses the condition of conditions.
the nuclear syrtem and to. locate process system malfunctions.
r
.1.2.1.2.3 Auxillary Systems Criteria 1.2.1.2.5.2 Electrical Power System Process
-(1) Fuel handling and storage facilities are Controt Criteria Threclodpcq0h) _
(1) The Class,}E po(wer(' systems a designed to prevent inadvertent criticality
-cooling for spent fuel, for>Nhees. (KKdivisions)with anh divis and to maintain adequate shielding and being adequate to safely the unit in z(2) Other auxiliary systems, such as service the E0 :En
- 8#k 50 gown condition.
W".
water, cooling water, fire protection, 1
heating and ventilating, communications, and (2) Protective relaying is used to detect and
,!ighting, are designed to function as needed isolate faulted equipment from the system during normal and/or accident conditions, with a esinimum of disturbance in the event of equipment failure.
i
_(3) Auxiliary systems that are not, quired to effect safe shutdown of the eactor or _ (3) Voltage relays are used on the emergency maintain it in a safe condition are designed equipment buses to disconnect the normal so that a failure of these systems shall not source in the event of loss ~of offsite power =
prevent the essential auxiliary systems from and to. initiate starting of the standby performing their design functions.
emergency power system diesel generators,
- 1.2.1.2.4 Shielding and Access Control (4) The standby emergency power diesel Cdkda -
generators are started and loaded-l-
automatically.
Radiation shielding _is provided and access control patterns are established to allow a (5) Safety related electrically operated break.
, properly trained operating _ staff to control ers are controllable from the control room.
l l'
l Amendment t t.2-4 l
l' l
,n
~
- GWR usuoo4c Standard Plant Rev c loads which do not require an uninterruptible flow rate through the core and thereby changes O
power source.
the core power level. The system can automati-I cally adjust the reacter power output to the 1.2.2.5.1.5 Uninterruptible Power System load demand. The solid. state adjustable speed drives (ASD) provide variable voltage, variablo The uninterruptible power system (UPS) frequency electrical power to the RIP motors, supplies regulated 120.VAC single-phase power to In response to plant needs, the recirculation con Class 1E instrument and control loads which flow control system adjusts tbc ASD power supply require an unintersuptible source of power. The output to vary RIP speed, core flow, and core g
power sources for the UPS are similar to those power.
g for the SSLC, but are non-Class 1E.
1.2.2.5.2.3 Neutron Monitoring $ystelu 1.7.2.5.1.6 Unit WClass it DC Power system The neutron monitoring system (NMS) is a l
the non Class 1E DC power system surpties power t q
system of in. core neutron detectors and I
j unit DC Loads that are nonsafety related, g,
g j
j en-Class 1E power is taken from each of the four The system provides indication of neutron flux, Class 1E batteries, class 1E isolation is which can be correlated to thermal power level provided by Dc to DC converters.
for the entire range of flux conditions that can exist in the core. TI ere are fixed in core 1.2.2J.1.7 Unit Class 1E DC Power System sensors which provide flux level indications during reactor startup and low-power operation, The unit Class 1E DC power system supplies 125 The startup rarge neutron monitors (SRNM) and VDC power to the unit Class 1E loads. Battery average power range monitors (APRM) allow chargers are the primary power sources. The assessment of local and overall flux conditions system, which includes storage batteries that during power range operation. The automatic serve as standby power sources, is divided into traversing in core probe (ATIP) system provides four divisions, each with its own independent a means to calibrate the local power range distribution network, battery, battery charger, monitors. The NMS provides inputs to the rod,
and redundant !oad group.
control and information system to initiate rod blocks if preset flux limits or period limits 122.52 Nuclear System Process Control and for rod block are exceeded as well as inputs to Instrumentation the RPS if other limits for scram are exceeded.
1.2.2.5.2.1 Rod Control and Information System 1.2.2.5.2.4 Refueling Interlocks The rod control and information system (RCIS)
A system of interlocks. hat restricts provides the means by which control rods are movement of refueling equipment and control rods positioned from the control room for power when the reactor is in the refueling and startup control. The system operates the rod drive modes is provided to prevent an inadvertent motors to change control rod position. For criticality during refueling operation. The operation in the normal gang movement mode, one interlocks back up procedural controls that have gang of control rods can be manipulated at a the same objective. The interlocks affect the tim e.
The system includes the logic that refueling platform, refueling platform hoists, restricts control rod movement (rod block) under fuel grapple, and control rods, certain conditions as a backup to procedural controls.
1.2.2.5.2.5 Reactor Vessel Instrumentation -
1.2.2.5.2.2 Recirculation Flow Control System In addition to instrumentation for the nuclear safety systems and engineered safety During normal power operation, the speed of features, instrumentation is-provided to monitor the reactor internal pumps is adjusted to control and transmit information that can be used to flow. Adjusting RIP speed changes the coolant assess conditions existing inside the reactor Amendment 7 1.2-12
- ABWR msmo Standard Plant su v c i
' depressurization sptems perform adequate core (!) a loss-of coolant (LOCA) event; y
cooling to prevent excessive fuel clad temperature during LOCA event. Detailed (2) vessel isolated and maintained at hot discussion of RCIC meeting this GDC h described standby; in Subsection 3.1.2.
- (3) vessel isolated and accompanied bp loss of Cempliance with GDC 36. The RCIC system is coolant flow from the reactor feedwater designed such that in.scryice inspection of the system; system and its components is carried out in accordance with the intent of ASME Section XI. (4) complete plant shutdown with loss of normal The RCIC design specification requires layout and feedwater before the reactor is depressur.
arrangement of the containment penetrations, ired to a level where the shutdown cooling process-piping,-- valves, and other ' critical system can be placed in operation; or equipment outside the reactor vessel, to the maximum practical extent, permit access by (5) loss of AC powerA "^
- b. ".
testing and inspection of system integrity.
I- - -
m[
personnel and/or appropriate equipment for Acceptance criteria II.3 of SRP Section 5.4.6 The RCIC system is [ states that the RCIC system Compilance with GDC 37.
function without the availability of any AC designed such that system and its components can power. Review Procedure III.7 further requires I
be periodically testcd to verify operability.
that there be sufficient battery capability for Systems operability is demonstrated by two hours of operation. While RCIC is designed preoperational and periodic testings in - for 30 migufes of operation duri loss-power, theAbMicrf capacity * *g""pfge--"- @
r
- accordance with RG 1.68.
Preoperational test will ensure proper functioning of controls, fc= E:= d MMe, @E eW -m h c 3,[-
instrumentation, pumps and valves. Periodic q.1,=Megl'f kever of co.d$ dvrg testings confirm systems availability and o bo., blacfroor6ee 19r.2.t.s.sh operability through-out the life of the plant.
During loss of AC]ower, RCIC when started at During normal plant operation, a full flow pump wat' r level 2 is capable of preventing water e
test is being performed periodically to assure - level from dropping below the level which ADS -
systems design flow and head requirements are mitigates (Level 1). This accounts for decay attained. All RCIC systema components are heat boil off and primary system leakages.
capable of individual functional testings during plant operatior..
This. includes sensors, Following a reactor scram, steam generation instrumentation, control logics, pump, valves, will continue at a reduced rate due to the core and more _ Should the need for RCIC operation fission product decay heat. At this time the occur while the system is being tested, the RCIC turbine bypass system will divert the steam to system and its components will automatically re aligned to provide cooling water into the reactor. The above test requirements satisfy GDC 37, 5.4.6.1 Design Basis The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system is a safety system which consists of a turbine, pump, piping, valves, accessories, and instrumentation designed to assure that suffi-l1 cient reactor water inventory is maintained in the reactor vessel to permit adequate core cool-l.
ing to take place. This prevents reactor fuel l
overheating during the following conditions:
I f -s-
- Amendment 1.5 h10.1
<GWR usaman Standard Plant nry c crature. The energy release from the A
reactor will be contro!!ed by the shutdown
(
I cooling system, and there is no need to l
re ase the reactor energy to the pool.
Normal shutdown cooling is a nonsafety.
5,4.7.33 Emergency Shutdown Cooling related event and is therefore analynd assuming that all three RHR loops are operational.
The ossign requirements for ABWR emergency shutdown cooling capability are specified in The design beat exchanger capacity is Regulatory Guide 1.139, as follows:
sufficient to meet the normal shutdown cooling criteria.
The reactor shutdown cooling system (SDCS) should be capable of bringing the reactor to 5.4.7.4 Pre operational Testing a cold shutdown condition sithin 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> following reactor shutdown with only offsite The pre. operational test program and startup power or onsite power available assuming the tests program discussed in Chapter 14 are used most limiting single failure.
to generate data to verify the operational capabilities of each piece of equipment in the The limiting condition is for the case with system: each instrumert, each set point, each loss of offsite power which would disable the logic element, each pump, each heat exchanger, forced circulation. The most limiting single cach valve, and each limit switch. In addition, f ailure is the loss of one RHR division these programs verify the capabilities of the (designated as N 1 case). Therefore, for the system to provide the flows, pressures, cooldown emergency st.utdown cooling purpose, one of the rates, and reaction times required to perform bases of RHR heat exchanger sizing is to meet the all system functions as specified for the system following requirements:
or component in the system data sheets and
')
The ABWR RHR in shutdown cooling mode should be capable of bringing the reactor to Logic elements are tested electrically; l
cold shutdown conditions (1000C) within 36 valves, pumps, controllers, and relief valves nours followisg reactor shutdown for N 1 are tested mechanically. Finally, the system is case, with only onsite power available.
tested for total system performance against the Jesign requirements using both the offsite power The ABWR selected design configuration meets and standby emergency power. Preliminary heat 7
all design requirements and is consistent with exchanger performance can be evaluated by F
the heat exchanger size required for post LOCA operating in the pool cooling mode, but a vessel
,, ' pool temperature control.
shutdown is required for the final check due to gA the small temperature differences available with
,g 5.4.7.3.4 Nonna! Shutdown Cooling pool cooling.
M After a normal blowdown to the main SA.S ReactorWater Cleanup System condenser, the shutdown cooling subsystern is activated. In this mode of operation the RHR The reactor water cleanup (CUW) systen is l shall be capable of removing enough residual heat classified as a primary power generation system, a part of which forms a portion of the reactor l w(decay and sensible) from the reactor vessel ater to cool it to 600C within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). Tbc remaining the control rods are inserted.
portion of the system is not part of the RCPB because it can be isolated from the reactor.
The CUW system n:ay be operated at any time l during normal reactor operations.
)
3O Amendment Ls
t' R co #
jay
~r 4 J W
fr!
I The RHR heat exchanger sizing is such that cold shutdown can be achieved with l
only one loop, assuming an extension of time beyond the 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> required for the N-1 case. An analysis was performed for this scenario using the nominal 1
decay heat curve.
The results showed that the time to reach 100 degrees C with
(
only one RHR loop available varied from 38 to 51.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> as the temperature of
}
the ultimate heat sink varied from 29 to 35 degrees C.
j
~.
/ABWR mum Standard Plant g
SECTION 8.1 CONTENTS Sectlon Illie Page 8.1.1 UtilItv Grid Descrintion 8.1 1
- 8.1.2 Onsite Electrical Power System 8.1 1 8.1.2.1 Description of Electrical Power System 8.11 8.1.2.1.1 ri: L___ t $eparaff,9 8.1 1 8.1.2.1.2 0 "'
- d Safety Loads 8.1 2
/-
8a.3 Deslan Bases 8.12 8.13.1 Safety Design Bases -Onsite Power 8.1 2 8.13.1.1 General Functional Requirements 8.12 8.13.1.1.1 Onsite Power Systems-Geners!
8.1 2 8.13.1.1.2 SSLC Power Supply Sptem Design Bases 8.1-3 8.13.1.2 Regulatory Requirements 8.13
'8.13.1.2.1 General Design Criteria 8.1 3 l
3.13.1.2.2 NRC Regulatory Guide 8.1 3 8.13.1.23 Branch Technical Positions 8.1-4 8.13.1.2.4 Other SRP Criteria 8.1-4 8.1.4
- Interfaces 8.1-5 8.1.4.1 Stability of Offsite Power Systems 8.15 8.1.4.2 Diesel-Generator Reliability 8.15 TABLES Table Illlt East 8.1 1 On Site Power Syster 4 P Criteria Applicability Matrix 8.16 8.1.ii p I Gue8 ES g,p q
(,,9 l(v Ous Layo t lSepwfion 1,y.
~~a--m g.z 9q yv 60s neutin /seiovano" h.'t-3 6 9 XV BUS PiStribatie lSe/**W"
4
-._-A b
A a
_1
_aa b
23A610MG Standard Plant uv n
8.1 INTRODUCTION
There is also a combustio jurbine which sup 4
hiirbine building bu $plieggnfb power to7he pfant' investmen 1
8.1.1 Utility Grid Description
)
_ _ nd er d: n; :_:il : 5:!'fre t..M l
Out of ABWR Standard Plant Scope.
Manually controlled breakers provide the
=
capability of connecting the combustion turbine-8.1.2 Onsite Electric Power System generator to any one of the emersency buses if all other power sources are lost.
g.1.2.1 Description of Electrical Powr System The reactor building is supplied with three The scope of the onsite electrical power divisions of class 1E AC power (Figure 8.31),
system includes the entire system on the plant Each of the Division I, II, and III Class 1E 6,9 0
side of the low voltage terminals of the main kv buses have two feeders from the offsite sour-power transfortner and the connection at the high ces normal preferred and alternate preferred voltage bushings of the reserve transformer, as power. The Class 1E AC power system is divided indicated on the single line diagram, Figure into three independent divisions to provide AC 8.31. The main power transformer is not in power to the three divisions of Class 1E scope. The combustion turbine generator (CTG)is loads. In general, motors larger than 300 KW within scope, are supplied from the 6.9 kV bus. Motors 300KW or smaller but larger than 1 are supplied The electrical interface requirements are power from 480V switchgear.
gotors 100KW shown on the single line diagram. A generator or smaller are supplied power rom 480V motor
- breaker capable of interrupting the maximum control centers. The 6.9KV and 480V switchgear-available fault current is provided. This allows single line diagrams are shown on Figures 8.31,
~
the generator to be taken offline and the main 8.3 2 and 8.3 3.
grid to be utilized as a power source for the unit auxiliary transformers and their londs, both During normal plant operation all of the non.
Class 1E and non Class IE. This is also the Class 1E buses and two of the Class IE buses are start up power train for the unit.
supplied with power from the turbine generator through the unit auxiliary transformers. The d
There are four unit auxiliary transformers, third Class 1E bus is supplied from the reserve two to feed the non Class 1E buses and two to transformer. This third division is immediately feed the Class IE buses. The ' Normal Preferred
- available, without a bus transfer, if the normal power feed is from the unit auxiliary preferred power is lost to the other two transformers so that there normally are no bus divisions. Either of the normal preferred or transfers required when the unit is tripped off the alternate preferred AC power sources are the line.
capable of providing power to all Division 1.
II, and til Class 1E loads in addition to some One, three winding 30 MVA unit reserve selected non Class 1E loads.
3 transformer is supplied to provide power for the emergency buses as an alternate to the ' Normal The three standby AC power supphes provide a Preferred
- power. This is truly a reserve separate onsite source of power for each class transformer because unit startup is accomplished IE load group when normal and alternate from the normal preferred power, which is backfed preferred power supplies are not available. The over the main power circuit to the unit auxiliary transfer from the normal preferred or alternate transformers. The two low voltage windings of preferred power supplies to tl:e diesel generator
~
the reserve transformer are rated 15 MVA cach. is automatic. The transfer back to the normal One winding provides the second off site power preferred or the alternate preferred power source for Divisions I and II. The other winding source is a manual transfer, provides the second off site power source for Division III and non safety bus B2 which supplies The Division I, II, and III standby AC power investment protection loads.
supplies consist of an independent 6.9 kV Class IE diesel-generator, one for each division. Each Amendment 10 Bl1
ABWR ux6ima Str ndard Plant av n g,l.2.l.1 may be connected to its respective 6.9 kV Class 4+ertst Sarrty Loads 1E switchgear bus through a main circuit breaker located in the switchgear.
The safety loads utilize various Class IE AC and/or DC sources for instrumentation and motive The standby AC power system is capable of providing the required power to safely shutdown the reactor after loss of preferred power (LOPP) and/or loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or to maintain the safe shutdown condition and operate the Class 1E auxiliaries necessary for plant safety during and after shutdown.
The plant 480 VAC auxiliary power system distributes sufficient power for normal auxiliary and Class 1E 480 vc,lt plant loads.
All class 1E elements of the auxiliary power distribution system are supplied via the 6.9 kV Class 1E switchgear and, therefore, are capable of being fed by the normal preferred, alternate preferred, standby or combustion turbine generator power supplies.
The 120 VAC non Class 1E instrumentation power system, Figure 8.3 4, provides power for non Class 1E control and instrumentation loads.
The Class 1E 120 VAC instrument power system, Figure 8.3 4, provides power for Class 1E plant controls and instrumentation. The sjstem is separated into Divisions I, !!, and III with distribution panels fed from their respective divisional sources.
l The 125V DC power distribution system pro-vides four independent and redundant onsite sources of power for operation of Class 1E DC loads. The 125VDC non-Class IE power is taken from the Class 1E batteries. Class 1E isolation is provided by DC to DC converters. Separate non Class IE 250V bat: cries are provided to supply uninterruptible power to the plant l computers and non Class 1E DC motors.
The safety system and logic control (SSLC) for RPS and MSIV derives its power from four uninterruptible 120 VAC buses. The SSLC for the ECCS derives its power from the four divisions of 125VDC buses. The four buses provide the redundancy for various instrumentation, logic and trip circuits and solenoid valves. The SSLC power supply is further described in Subsection 8.1.3.1.1.2.
Lf 9d W&
Amer.dment 10 8Il1
Raco nawar-Items 1 (See th r onse oQ stio 635.
.)
t s 4-7: - 7" ollow.a ne ect nh been dde
.o a res. separ to
[8,1.2.1.1 Separation The locations for the main transformer, unit auxiliary transformers, and reserve auxiliary transformer are shown on Figure 1.2-25.
The reserve auxiliary transformer will be separated from the unit auxiliary transformers by 50 feet or shadow fire wall.
' Reference is made to Figures 8.3 1,.2 and 3 for the single line diagrams showing the method of feeding the loads.
Separation of the normal preferred and alternate preferred power feeds is accomplished by floors and walls over their routes through the turbine, control and reactor buildings except within the switchgear rooms where they must be routed to the same switchgear lineups.
The normal preferred feeds are routed within the turbine building from the unit auxiliary transformers to the turbine building switchgear and to the control building.
From there, the normal preferred feeds continue across the divisions 1 and 3 sides of the control and reactor buildings to the respective g
safety related switchgear rooms in the reactor building, b
The alternate preferred feeds from the reserve auxiliary tra.nsformer are routed alongside the turbine building. The feed for the non safety related switchgear peels off and enters the train A switchgear room at grade to pick up the switchgear at that elevation, and then rises on up to-the train B switchgear room above.
The other alternate preferred feed, which is for the safety related buses, contir.ues on outside of the turbine building until it enters the cle,sn access corrider (Figure 1.2 24) just below grade between the turbine and control
}
buildings.
It crosses the turbine building in the top of the clean access tunnel and then enters the divisions 2 and 4 side of the control building.
From there, it crosses the divisions 2 and 4 sides of the control and reactor building to access the switchgear rooms within the reactor building.
The normal preferred power feeds are not allowed to be routed in or through the clean f
access corridor.
The location of the combustion turbine generator (CTG) is shown on Figure 1.2 26.
The standby power feed from the CTC is routed directly to the switchgear rooms in the turbine building.
The branch to the reactor building is routed adjacent to the alternate preferred feeds across the control and reactor buildings.
p.
-g It 8:
e seco para aph of ectio 8.1.3.
.1 andh 1.1.1 h e been s
rev in ecor ce with ction
.9.
Ir ddi on, et s
(3)x
-(4) 8.3, I
ha e bee arifie allo eed fro ther o te sour d ing norma plant pe tion j
Item 9 E ques ns ev idit of is iter CDC quire. two spffs e so rcer
- e t,
plants luding ABWR w. mor th two di sions e d no mee uch crit a, becau the los of one o the off ite rces mu ffect - et an on di sion.
Yet ess el ble an desi ns j
ha ng o yt div ns ul meet e
iteria.
e sugg this b
/
le.
since i s re ndan to SER Is e 8.2.1.
s I.
1
~~.-.-.
ABM 2sx6ioaso Stand;rd Plant Riw n or control power or both for all systems required (ii) Steam Supply Shutoff Portion
- h for safety. Combinations of power sources may be -
involved in performing a' single safety function.
(c) Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system decay For example, low voltage DC power in the control heat removal logic may provide;an actuation signal to control a 6'.9kV circuit breaker to drive a large (S) Essential hfonitoring Systems AC. powered pump motor. The systems required for safety are listed below:
(a) Neutron hionitoring System (1) Safety System Logic and Control Power (b) Process Radiation Monitoring System Supplies including the Reactor Protection System (c) Containment Atmosphere Monitoring System (2) Core and Containment Cooling Systems (d) Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring System (a) Residual Heat Removal System (RHR)
- ' ' ' * :L ; L"x ' - L L (b) High Pressure Core Flooder (HPCF) System For detailed listings of Division 1,11 and-(c) Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
III loads, see Tables 8.3-/. hd 8.3 2.
(d) Leak Detection and Isolation System 8.1.3 Design Bases (LDS)-
(e) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 8.1.3.1 Safety Design Bases-Onsite Power
_ (RCIC) 8.1.3.1.1 General Functional Requirements
.(3) ESF Support Systems 8.1.3.1,1,1 Onsite PowerSystems General (a) Diesel-Generator Sets and Class 1E AC/DC power distribution systems -
The unit's total safety.related load is divided into three divisions of load gic ups.
-(b) HVAC Emergency Cooling Water System. Each load group is fed by an independent t 9.kV (HECW)
Class IE bus, and each load group has awess to two offsite and one onsite power sount:e An (c) Reactor Building Cooling Water (RCW) additional onsite power source is provided by System the combustion turbine generator (CTG).
- (d) Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Each of the two norinally eneigized power-1 feeders are provigfogtgivgpn lyang3,j.
g (e) Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) glEsgsgs j
.j gg4 j
(f) Reactor Building Emergency HVAC System akEb lDN' #-I$d57d M e b #
M rs YYe 17[nDer#NWalte r nate t
(g) Control Building HVAC System preferred feeder is manual. During the interim, power is automatically supplied by the diesel l
(h) High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply System generators.
(4) Safe Shutdown Systems The redundant Class IE electricalload grount (Divisions I, II, and III) are provided with (a) Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) separate onsite standby AC power supplies, electric buses, distributioa cables, controls.
(b) Nuclear Boiler System relays and other electrical devices. Redgd nt,gge,,ogrn7 parts of the system.are physically separa.e 4 o t
ij (i). Safety / Relief Valves (SRVs) t h e e x t e n t t h a t [ " ;; h - - '"- L -. w "
/
Amendment 10 8.12
..~..
JABWRt mano
- Standard Plant -
nry n G"4
- IIP evtHf wb OH <
>g,ng g (n,.' bd#IS,,,,,,s of equ o Jud dl:;; : ^!:;;!: b!b t'-b;.l f.'Iu4., 4-e e ee s#-
.),\\
......,...ar.......s.-.>...,...>.-.-.-.-
^
resvitte los m.
i S v 79, c,,,7 r,,,,,guO
.c l Independent raceway systems are provided to meet 3, f,f,f gy,7,,,,. wi ll be a tai /4h/e fo load group cable separation requirements for (effecf a. safe p/det shufdown foe o //
_: Dmstons I, II, and III.
a lic u a bic m o des c f p/<t a t Opera t io (r,
Divisions I, II, and !!! standby AC power j supplies have sufficient capacity to provide power to all their respective loads. Loss of the.
normal preferred. power supply, as detected by
-l 6.9 kV Class 1E bus under voltage relays, will cause the standby power supplies to start and connect automatically, in suffi.
1 i
)
- a
.?
A i
t I
l l
s Amendreent 10 B.14!!
ABM MA61DdAG Standard Plant nrva cient time to maintain the reactor in a safe 8.13.12.1 General Destp Criteria condition, safely shut down the reactor or limit the consequences of a design basis accident (DBA)
(1) GDC 2 - Design Bases for Protection against to acceptable limits. The standby power supplies Natural Phenomena; are capable of being started and stopped manually and are not to be stopped automatically durir:g (2) GDC 4 Environmental and Missile Design l emergency operation unless required to preserve Bases; integrity. Automatic start will also occur on receipt af a level 11/2 signal (HPCF initiate).
(3) GDC 5 Sharing of Structures, Systems and Cornponents; The Class IE 6.9.kV Divisions I,11, and 111 l
switchgear buses, and associated 6.9.kV diesel The ABWR is a single-unit plant design.
generators,45) VAC distribution systems,100 VAC Therefore, this GDC is not applicable.
and 125 VDC power and centrol systems conform to Seismk Category I requiremuts and are housed in (4) GDC 17 Electric Power Systems; Seistnic Category I structures. S c istaie Qualification is in accordance with IEEE Standard (5) GDC 18 - Inspection and Testing of Elec.
3.t4.
trical Power Systems; 8.13.1.1.2 SSLC (Safety System Lo;t c and (6) GDC 50 Containment Design Bases.
i Control) Power Supply System Design Bases 8.13.1.2.2 NRC Regulatory Guides In order to provide redundant, reliable power of acceptable quality and availa6Wty to support (1) R G 1.6 ladependence Between Redundant the safety logic and coutrol functions during Standby (Onite) Power Sources normal, upset and accident conditions, the and Between Their Distribution following design bases apply:
Systems; (1) SSLC power has four separate f : $ icdependent (2) RG L9 - Selection, Design and Qualifica-Class 1E inverter constant voltage constant tion of Diesel-Generator Units frequency (CVCF) power supplies each backed UsLd as Standby (Onsite) Elec-by separate Class 1E batteries.
tric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants; (2) Provision is made for automatic switching to the alternste bypass supply from its divi-(3) RG 132 - Criteria for Safety-Related Elec-s:on in case of a failure of the inverter tric Power Sys; ems for Naclear power supply. The inverter power supnly is Power Plants; synchroniacd in bah frequet.cy and phase with the alternate bypass supply, so that (4) RG 1.47 Bypassed and Inoperable Status unacceptable voltage spikes will be avoided Indication for Nuclear Power in case of an automatic transfer from normal Plant Safety Systems; to alte.tnate supply. The SSLC uninterrup-tible power supply complies with IEEE Std.
(5) RG 1.63 - Electric Penetration Assemblies 944 in Containment Structures for Light. Water-Cooled Nuclear Power 2.13.1.2 Regulatory Rrquirements Plants; The following list of criteria is addressed in (6) RG 1.75 - Physical Independence of Elec-a cordance with Table 8.11 which is based on tric Systems:
Table 8-1 of the Standard Review Plan. In 3
generaltbe ABWR is designed in accordance witu Isolation between Class 1E power supplies ell p pH@rit e ria.
cla{rTstations tre so noted.Any exceptions or and non-Class 1E loads is discussed in I
Subsection 8.3.1.1 2.1.
s.,i 0
Amerdaut 10 8.13
4d N motxAo stadanmmt__._
.acc.3 The diesel.gercrator sets are act used for peakiug in the ABWR design. The.refore, this criteria is shiisfied.
h
((3) BTJMCSB if (PSB)4 Pability Offsite,Q_
I wer Systems; /
//
~,/
,/
/
\\ J,0 -4 S e e S ubteetion S.I.4.]/ lor inter f/ce t e q uir etfi e n t.
/
/ s
/
("O RG 1.31 -
Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systene for Multi Unit Nuclear Power Plants; (4) BTP ICSB 18 (PSB) Application of the The ABWR is designed as a single-unit Single Failure Criterion to Manually, plant. Therefore, this Regulatory Guide is Controlled Electrically Operated Valves; not applicsbie.
(5) BTP ICSB 21 Guidance for Application of
(!) RG 1.106 Thermal Cverload Protecion for Regulatory Guide 1.47; Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves; (6) BTP PSB 1 Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages, (9) ' R G 1,108 -
Feriodie Testing of Diesel (See Subscetion S3.1.1.7 (S)]
Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Syste:ns at Nuclear Power Plants; y [t (10) RG 1.118-Periodic Testing of Electr;c Power and Protectioc Ssstems;f r f~
~
i -.(11 R'G 1.123-/I n s t a llprTo n D ejs 't a a n (7) BTP PSB 2 - Criteria for Alarms and Instspition of,Arge Lea Indications Associated with Diesel-Y Sep/ age Battet/s for Nuc car Generator Unit Bypassed and inoperable
'g C' I
ower Plaa ;
Status; TdIibng, a -
8.1.3.1.2.4 Other SRP Criteria (L2) RG 1,d-M ai enance, j P, placemenWf Large cad N
Storage B <t'eries to. uclear (1) N'JREG/CB 0660 Enhancement of Ousite Power ants; Diesel Generator Reliability; S.I.3.1.2.3 Branch Technical Positions Operating procedures and the training of personnel are av:iide the scope of the AFVR Standard Plau.. NUREG/CR 0660 is there-(1) BTP ICSB 4 (PSB) - Require =ects en Motor-r Operated Valves in the ECCS Accumulator fore iasposed es au 'verface requiremer.t Lines; for the appucact. Ste Subseccica 3.1.4.2
{
for interface requirement, i
This BTP is written for Pressurind Wster Reactor {PWR) plants only and is therefore (2) TMl Action Item II E.31 - Emergency Power not applicable to the ASWR.
Supply for Pre,surizer Wner; (2) BTP ICSB 8 (PSB). Use of Diesel Ge.nerawr TMs criteria h applicable only to DWR3 Sets for Peding; etd does not apply to the ASWn.
Amendx.ent to 514 9
ABM
- amioono Standard Plant prvy (3) TM1 Actior. Item II.G.1 Emergency Power for Pressurizer Equipment; This criteria is applicable only to PWRs and
)
does not apply to the ABWR.
l 8.14 Interfaces
- 8.14. Stability of Offshe Power Sptems BTF ICSB 11 (PSB) pertaining to the stability of offeite power systems shall be~ addressed (See
'?
Subs ction 8.1.3.1.2.3(3).
3.1.4.2 Diesel Generstor Rellebsty.
NURSG/CR 0660 pertaining to the enhancement of onst e die. set generator reliability through operatirg procedures and training of personnel will be addressed by the appilchat referencing
- [ the N4WR design (see Subsectics 8.1.3.1.2.4(1)).
8.1.4.3' Separated power feeds for 6,9 KV Switchgear p -
Wi t'
- n.
- "';;rt: ?.5-1
-.2
" '. 2, G,.
l Instrumentation and controls associated with the
[freferred and alternate. 6.9 KV buses feeding the 4
non Class 1E loads shall be powered by-separate dc(
non-Class 1E DC sourcos, with power and instrurnent.
J~)
,b)O' ' j* <7
- e
- ables Inn in-separate trays, Sepaiated non. Class
)
1E DC power. sources are available.from any two of the four DC-to DC convertars shown on Figure
} ggp g
~
-8.3-7.
a l
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hM 279 LITP ICSB 4*
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NUREG CR06/4
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?g II.E.3.1*
Eg II. G. l*
.(:)
i
LABWRs 3MMMAO
- Standsrd fut nrv s SECTION 8.3 -
y
. CONTENTS (Continued)
- Section Ihle P.agt
.8.3.4.8-Diesel Generator Load Table Changes 83 23 83.4.9'
- Offsite Power Supply Arrangement 83 23.1 i
8.3.4.10
- Diesel Generator Qualification Tests 83 23.1 83.4.11 Defective Refurbished Circuit Breakers 83 23.1 8.3.4.12
. Minimum Starting Voltage for Class 1E Motors 83 23.1 TABLES Table Illis Eage 83 1-D/G Load Tab!c. LOCA 83 24 83 2 D/G Lead Table. LOPP 83 26 83 3 Notes'For Tables 831 and 83-2 83 28 at2C\\i B.)nso
~ Load Sequence 83 29 m 83-4
- ~'
ILLUSTRATIONS Elgute Illie Eage l.83 i.
6.9kV Power Distributwa System SLD 8 3-30 83 2 480V Non 1E Powe Distribution System SLD 83 31 83-3
' 480V 1E/Non 1E Power Distribution System SLD 8 3 '42 83-4
- lustrument Power Supply SLD 83 33 83-5 Process Computer Constant Voltage, 8 3-34 Constant Frequency Power SLD -
83-6 Plant Vital Constant Voltage Constant 8 3-35 Frequency Power SLD 83 7 125 VDC Power System SLD 8 3-36 83-8 250 VDC Power System SLD 8 3-37 83-vi Amendment 10
8.3 5 Two llour Battery Capacity Analysia Div. I 8.3 6 Eight flour Battery Capacity Analysis - Div. I 8.3 7 Two llour Battery Capacity Analysis Div.116 III
'- l8 Eight liour Battery Capacity Analysis Div.116 III 39 Two llour Bat?ery Capacity Analysis Div. IV 8.3 10 Eight llour Battery capacity.inalysis - Div. IV c
g q \\\\
G ie.s e f G o4 rV
- Te r A ldr"<1 4
4 1
4 e
+
l 9
.l.
1 i
MN 2n6mo Standard Plant mea 8.3 ONSITEPOWERSYSTEMS 83.1.1.2.1 Power Centm i
8.3.1 AC Power Splems Power for 480V avalliaries is supplied from j
load centers consisting of 6.9.kV/460V transfor.
I 8J.1.1 Descripdos mers and associated metal clad s.zitchgear, Fig.
ute 8.3 3. There are three 480 VAC non Class 1E The auntiary electric power system includes load centers which are respectively and three independent Class 1E AC electric power sye Individually fed from Division I, il and lit tems for suc! car safety relsted loads. The prio.
6.9KV Class 1E buses. Isolation breakers are cipal elements of the auxiliary AC electric power provided between the Class 1E and non. Class 1E systems are shown on the single 18ns diagrams buses, in addition to normal overcurrent
($1.D) in Figute 8.31. 2, 3, 4 and 5.
tripping of the isolation breaker, zone selective interlocklog is provided between each Each Class IE division has a dedicated diesel isolation breaker and its upstream Class 1E feed generator, which automatically starts in case of breaker, if fault current flows in the a level trip and/or loss of voltage on the divi.
non. Class 1E bus, it is seesed by the Class 1E i
sion's 6.9 kV bus. Each 6.9.kV Class 1E bus current device for the isolation breaker and a feeds'it's assoelated 480V unit substation trip blocking signalis sent to the upstream through a 6.9.kV/ 480/277V load center trans.
Class 1E feed breaker. This blocking lasts for former.
about 75 milliseconds. This allows the isolation breaker to trip in its normal 5
See Subsection 8.3.4.9 for interface instantaneous tripping time of 35 to $0 m"
5 regiurements, milliseconds,if Ibe magnitude of the fault current is high enough. This assures that the 83.1.1.1 Medium Voltage Power Distribution fault current has been otminated before the Sptem Class '.E upstream breaker is free to trip. For fault rurrents of lesser magnitude, the blocking AC power it supplied and utilized at 6.9 kV delay will time out without either breaker for motor loads larger than 300 KW and transform.
tripping, but the isolation breaker will r
ed to 480 V for smaller loads. The 480V system - eventually trip and alsays before the upstream is further transformed into lower voltages as re.
breaker. This order of tripping is assured by quired for instruments, lighting, and controls, the coordination between the two treakers The 6.9.kV system includes normal and alternate _ __ provided by long time pickup, long time delay preferred power supply feeders.
and instantaneous pickup trip device characteristics. This coordination is carried Class 1E AC power loads are divided into three through to the non. Class 1E load Meakers so divisions ; Divisions 1, !!, and !!!), each fed that for a load fault the load breaker would l
from an independent 6 9 kV Class IE bus,= During normally trip without the bus isolation breaker p3 normal operationTf ' !x h r _. # ;.;.I E
- tripping.
4 p..
"' "" are led from an offsite sormal.
N',I'*dpN e75 ply.[gjpf,*ry, y
Tripping of the Class 1E feed breaker is
/, ll '
g normal for faults which occur on the Class 1E Dtandby[d of Elass 1E buses is sup.
feeds r-bus 21 ^ 2 '
$[<M' [MN__[
1t,N/Q,W.
[
Jee plied by diesel generators at 6.9 kV and distri.
beted by the Class 1E power distribution system.
_ Clasa 1E 480V load tenters supplying Class IE Division 1,11 and til buses are automatically loads are arranged as independent _ radial sys.
transferred to the diesel generators when the not.
tems, with each 480V bus fed by its own power mal preferred pown <unniv rs bese buses is transformer. Each 480V Class 1E bus in a divi.
lost. -
[gOp %"
sion is physically and electrically independent
-Y W
'I of the other 480V buses in other divisions.
83.1.1.2 Low Voltage Power D s ution
-=
The 480V unit substati breakers supply mo-System c(,,$cle/cs aIf _ mdes tor control centers and 4 \\ motor loads up to C WCW,
gelen1}ftM1tCH)1.t.,dvsm.),T'wo
~
Aelm s%%b u (of 4ke k kee d wisicM Aswsdenent 16 '
^
Dt M-
- 5-9 w,-
-e,-e,-e%e-
-9,,.--m
..%w w-,,,,,e--,
m.
-e-.,,.----.-v.m.-
m..,w,w-~
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.~.
-,~..2-
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i t
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Each 6.9 kV bus has a safety grounding circuit breaker designed
) ( hgctif _
to protect personnel during maintenance operations (see figure 8.b1).
During periods when the buses are energized, those
!(
,.[ a breakers are racked out (i.e., in the disconnect position).
A
\\*j control roorn annunciator sounds whenever any of these breakers are racked in for service.
The interlocks for the bus giounding devices are as fallows:
g%
- 1. Undervoltage relays must be actuated.
- 2. Related breakers must be in the disconnect position.
- 3. Voltage for bus instrumentation available, j
Conversely, the bus feeder breakers are interlocked such that they cannot close unless their associated stounding breakers are t
in their disconnect positions.
t The4 allow new/ in.rface ah f ori.is Yded n's ho i:
\\,'r \\J A:
1 N
o J.4.1 A
lp \\tr ve con 3p r' Bus G,undtT% frcu t enker /a f
I a
Fi urr 8.
1,.3 at b^- show t - groun w ag}circt d br
.rs, w IJ 1 are 1te nde lrovi spfety.ound ripg ma enance/ 1 oratio -
s Adr isttat i
po
- r hal be '
e if uit irea rr ack d out (f.e.,
n'th prav ded i k ep th rigdt os ti
)TEfu ver cet{Rp6nd.
. tee di a ge.
ae ene con r 1 ro b, wh nhver, h6'pha{1 be provid pu[ h morn ani iciati n to a breake'rsareyekedinforAervice.
AB'WR m-o Standard Plant ny n 8.3.1.1.4.1 120V AC Safety Related instrument also supply power to neutron monitoring system Power System and parts of the process radiation monitoring,
system and htSIV function in the leak detection Individual transformers supply 120V AC instru.
system. Power distribution 16 arranged to ment power Figure 8.3 4. Each Class IE division.
prevent inadvertent operation of the reactor l al transformer is supplied from a 480V MCC in the scram initiation or MSIV isolation upon loss of same division. There are three divisions, each any single power supply.
backed up by its divisional diesel generator as the source when the offsite source is lost. Po.
Routine maintenance can be conducted on wer is distributed to the individual loads from equipment associated with the CVCF power l distribution panels, and to logic level circuits supply. Inserters and solid state switches can through the control room logic panels.
be inspected, serviced and tested channel by channel without tripping the RPS logic.
8.3.1.1.4.2120V AC Safety Related Uninternptible Power Supplies (UPS) 8.3.1.1.4.2.2 Class IE RPS and MSlY Solenlods Power Supply 8.3.1.1.4.2.1 Constant Voltage. Constant frequency (CVCF) Power Supply for the Safety Three of the CVCF power supply buses are System Logic and Control (SSLC) for the Reactor designed to proside power to the RPS scram and MSIV solenoid valves. The bus for the RPS A l Protection System (RPS) solenoids is supplied by the Division 11 CVCF l
The power supply for the RPS SSLC is shown in power supply. The RPS B solenoids bus is Figure 8.3 6, with each of the four buses supplied from the Division 111 CVCF power supplyin5 po+er for the independent trip sptems supply. The #3 solenlods for the MSIVs are of the SSLC setem. Four constant voltage, powered from the Division i CVCF; and the #2 constant frequety (CVCF) control power buses soleniods, from the Division 11 CVCF power (Divisions I,11, Ill, and IV) have bee n supply.
established. They are cach normally supplied independently from inverters which,in turn, are 8.3.1.1.4.2.3 Process Computer Constant supplied from four independent and redundant Voltage, Constant frequency (CVCF) Power Supply l M
' y-ami DC supplies ad f We i, Ap. dent.4 recMat Ad sv//I'et Two constant voltage and constant frequency For Divisions I,11, and 111, the AC supply is power supplies are provided to power the process from a 480 V MCC for each division. The backup computers. Each of the power supplies consists DC supply is via a DC/AC inverter from the 125VDC of an AC to DC rectifier, and a DC to AC inver-central / distribution board for the division. A ter, a bypass transformer and DC and AC solid static switch also is capable of transferring state transfer switches (Figure 8.3 5). The from the inverter to a direct feed through a normal feed for the power supplies is from a l voltage regulating transformer from a 480V motor non. Class IE power center supplied from the control center for each of the three disisions.
Division I diesel generator for one power supply and from a non. Class IE power center supplied Since there is no 480V AC Division lY power, from the Division 11 diesel generator for the Division IV is fed from a Division I moior other power supply. The backup for the normal control center. Otherwise, the AC supply for the feeds is from the 250VDC battery. Each power Division IV CVCF power supply it similar to the supply is provided with a backup AC feed though other three divisions. The DC supply for isolation transformers and a static transfer Division IV is backed up by a seperate Division switch. The backup feed is provided for IV battery, alternate use during maintenance periods.
l The CVCF power supply buses are designed to 8.3.1.1.4.2.4 Non. Class IE Vital AC Power l prvide logic and control power to the four-System disision SSLC system that operates the RPS. [The SSLC for the ECCS derives its power from the 125 The function of the Non. Class IE Vital AC l VDC power system (Figure 8.3-7)]. The AC buses Power Supply Sptem is to provide reliable 120V Amendment 10 8M
e ABM uomo Standard Plant piv n uninterruptible AC power for important non safety 8.3.1.1.4.2.7 Operating Configuration related loads that are required for continuity of power plant operation. The system consists of ne four 120 VAC essential power supplies op.
two 120V AC uninternptR>le CVCF power supplies, erste indepcodently, providing four divisions of l each including a static inverter, AC and DC CVCF power supplies for the SSLC. The normal static transfer switches, a regulating stepdown lineup for each division is through an essential transformer (as an alternate AC power supply), 480 VAC power supply, the AC/DC rectifier, the and a distribution panel (Figure 8.3 6). The inverter and the static transfer switch primary source of power comes from the non. Class Transfer from the inverter, directly to the es.
1E AC power centers. The secondary source is the sential AC source is done automatically in case non. Class 1E 12$ VDC central distribution of inverter failure, or to the DC source in case
- panels, of rectifier or AC power failure. Annunciation in tbc control room is provided for any of the l If the inverter f ails, the AC static switch alternate operating modes. Three of the four transfers to the regulating transformer without divisions supply independent power to the RPS interruption (not more than 4 msec). If the AC scram solenoida and the MSIV solenoids for source or rectifier fails, the DC thyrister isolation, switch transfers to the DC source without interuption.
8.3.1.1J Class 1E Electric Equipment Considerstjons 8.3.1.1.4.2.5 Components The following guidelines are utilized for l includes the following components:
Each of the four Class 1E CVCF power supplies Class 1E equipment.
8.3.1.1J.1 Physical Separation and (1) a power distribution cabinet, including the Independence CVCF 120 VAC bus and circuit breakers for the SSLC loads; Equipment of one division is segregated from equipment of other divisions and condivisional (2) a solid state inverter, to consert 125 VDC equipment, in accordance with IEEE Std M4, Re-power to 120 VAC uninterruptible power gulatory Guide 1.75 and General Design Criterion supply;
- 17. The overall design objective is to locate the dMsional equipment and its associated con.
(3) a solid. state transfer switch *o sense in.
trol, instrumentation, electrical supporting verter failure and automatically switch to systems and interconnecting cabling such that alternate 120 VAC power; separation is maintained among all divisions.
7.
Divisional separation is achieved through the
/* M (4) a 480V/120V bypass transformer for the al.
use ofgbarriers spatiat-Ser*<uieeland totaly 977t%,
enclosed' raceways.
r ec b ce W
- f d>
pd j'W-d.b V { @U e e (ec t tth % 5. l 0) ternate power supply; 2L a solid. state transfer switch to se nse Redundant divisions of electric equipment and
.h_4 (5) r ectifier or AC power f ailure and (cabling are located in separatgro9ngs or fire
'l g
automatically switch to alternate 125 VDC areas wherever possible. Ic somepostances spa.
,' g
- power, tial separation is provided such that no single event may disable more than one of the redundant i
"e (6) a manal transfer switch for maintenance.
divisions or prevent safe shutdown of the plant. Tmc me aix sect e % S.
a m t y r et a d ps t o f3 ed w
8.3.1.1.4.2.6 (Deleted)
Electric equipment and wiring for the Class 1E systems which are segregt,c,d,i,n,t,o separate di.
3-j visions are separatedis,o that no design basis event is capable of disabling more than one division of any ESF total functioc.
o$$ IE o non-Class ll I
i sem, is nwau 3
m
\\ a m -c w,~ v. m y,,4s3 0f NI y, [
Amendmtet 10 4,
ABWR wuo Standard Plant
_Jux n The safety related divisional AC switchgear, Ing, pull.in and driving torque needed for
/N load centers, battery rooms and DC distribution the particular application, with due consid.
\\
panels and MCCs are located to provide separa.
eration for capabilitit s of t hep r g "h g,g tion and electricalisolation among tbg divi.
sources. 4 sions. Separation is provided among divisional s
cables being routed between the equipraent rooms, (2) Power sources, dlitrIEtion systems and '
~
the Main Control Room, containment and other branch circuits are designed to maintain processing areas. Equipment in these areas is voltage and frequency within acceptable divided into Divisions I,11,111 and IV and se.
limits.
parated by barriers formed by walls, floors, and ceilings. The equipment is locatt;d to facili.
(3) The selection of motor losulation such as tate divisional separation of cable trap and to Class F. H or B is a design consideration provide access to electrical penetrition usem.
bued on service requirements and environ.
blies. Exceptions to this separatwo Nctive ment. The Class 1E motors are qualified by are identified and analyzed as to equ.vdene, sad tests in accordance with IEEE Std 334 acceptability in the fire bazarj analy ds. Uee N rn< h sect oa 1 A.6 (4) Interrupting capacity of switchgear, load The penetration assemblies are loca.:' *to: /.:
deMsganels As[,c,o,n,t,rol cenys dy centers, motor istrig d41ps the periphery of the containment and at dP.fe.
bution i
Nd4/YM ss-t/d "2 ]
- On rent elevations to facilitate rmorir.biv / rect i
b%M"/* *" * " "#" O* * }~do) touting to and from the equipment. No penetra.
7sepo%YMW $<WoU?*YM W#e>W o".3.7,3,laterrupting capacity requirements of Ibc 7d ag m M _i al cru.rirr F M afd is s,ecosicd., n.p./.4/
'vis bles to an(froAthe 's(atai cab 6.9kV Class 1E switchgear is selected to and - a fr th d eRe al -
dif on accommodate the available short circuit e%pm ti be acto uilM qg a rout.. in current at tbc switchgear terminal.
io Circuit breaker and applications are in (d
oreKb"pabi sepa te gab rac *ays
)
s accordance with ANSI Standards. (See 3
utin 's m 'ntai du o tb q
con ol tp ogt rf
,g S u bs e c tio n 8.3.4.1 f o r in t e r f a c e at ma P.
21
't.
- m 1
r e q uir e m e n t s) h-iring for all Clals IE equipment indicating
' ~ lights is an integral part of the Class IE cables Unit substation transformers are sized and used for control of the same equipment and are impedances chosen to facilitate the selection of
( considered to be Class 1E circuits, low. voltage switchgear, MCCs and distribution
- { ag, panels, which are optimized within the manufac.
bo Associated cablegare treated as Class 1E turer's recommended ratings for intenrupting circuits and routed in their corresponding capacity and coordination of ovejleurrentImpeds b..c",'f N divisional raceways. Separation requirements are devices.
the same as for Class 1E circaits, factored in for a specific physical layout.
su2 e..f.e f es n,<3 Ts praf'h\\
The careful placing of equipment is important 83.1.1JJ Testing u t... <.ed b3'Pc/c:i n d eL f b 'e *N'*"j' Qp to the necessary segre : ion of circuits by divi.
's t ' h
- M n
sion. Deliberate routing in separate fire areas The design provides for per'(dically testin d i ca.
on different floor levels, and in embedded ducts the chain of system elements rom sensing devi. y/J,'(8%,
is employed to achieve physical independence.
ces through driven equip - nt to assure that Class IE equipment it funp ioning in accordance 83.1.1.5.2 Class 1E Electric Equipment Design with design requirementsJThe requirements of Bases and Criteria IEEE Std 37 hare m;t.
l, l ll (nykte3 60,de 1.Ilf n,,d Tiu 318 l
(1) Motors are sized in accordance with NEMA 8J.1.1.6 Cirruit Protection standards. The cr.anufacturers' ratings are at least large enough to produce the start.
83.1.1.6.1 Philosophy of Pratection Simplicity of load grouping facilitates the Amendment 10 sM
~~
N_______-
dit: N' JER
/
Ins
.itun
! em 5: de\\rin " iostile a a" was int ide to me n those.
as
$hich uld be p.entially xph ed to ie enert,f
. a postu it i reac r coolant. (a som or ater) irer ure bount
- 1. ' pipo r >ture.
j Thi criteria a defiIie in Append I and t'iles L3 through
/
f3.321.
+
y-L r 'lant Design specifications for electrical equipmenP m
( rrquire such equiptnent be capable of continuous operation for voltage fluctuations of +/ 10%.
In addition, Class 1E inotorn
( 3, [
must be able to withstand voltato drops to 701 rated during s t a r t i ng t rans i e nt a. ['[ hew-4wo-sen&+nus have-4%e t.*-ErfM aa a euba+ctiu. 0, J.1,1. ';,2 ( l 1 ] r l
'I a
he*'
p u, g.? 0)
ABM urnooxo Standard Plant krv n Q
use of conventional, protective relaying practi-Other protective relays, such as loss of ces for isolation of faults. Emphasis has been excitation, antimotoring (reverse _ poweg.gocecer placed on preserving function and limiting ^ loss overcurrent voltage restraint,(high jacket water.v,8 er pre 3M of Class 1E equipment function in situations of temperature and low lube oil pressure, are used power loss or equipment failure, to protect the machine when operating in parallel with the normal power system, during Circuit protection of the Class 1E buses periodic tests. Tbc relays are automatically t
contained within the nuclear island is interfaced aolated from the tripping circuits during LOCA ry i
with the design of the overall protection system conditionsgNo trips are bypassed during LOPP g
(r+d "
outside the nuclear island.
or testing.
/
ver, all hgstsc/ nentten 17 8.
y are asevacoat se ts,e no, comth e r oom ts n I t'e 6.aeuer a r e te3 rule a sd as c 44,.3 1J.1.1.e. t. o. I r.ding and5equencing on ev /wgeret 7 lead S gJ.1.1.6.2 Grounding M*thods Q'g j g i g=
Claaa IE Buses The medium voltage (6900V) system is low resis-j,9' tance grounded except that each diesel generator This subsection addresses Class 1E Divisions is high resistance grounded to maximize availabi.
I,11, and 111. Load shedding, bus transfer and
- lity, sequencing on a 6.9kV Clara 1E bus is initiated on loss of bus voltage. On,y LOPP signals are 83.1.1.6J Bus Protection used to trip the loads. However, the per,ence of a LOCA during LOPP reducu the time delay for l
Bus protection is as follows:
initiation of bus transfer from 3 seconds to 0.4 seconds. Tbc load sequencing for the diesels is (1) 6.9kV bus locoming circuits have inverse given on Table 83 4.
3 time overload, ground f ault, bus r
differential and undervoltage protection.
Load shedding and buses ready to load signals are generated by the control system for the I
(2) 6.9kV feeders for load centers have electrical power distribution system, instanttaneous, inverse time overload and Individual timers for each major load are reset ground fault protection.
and started by their electrical power distribution systems signals.
(3) 6.9kV feeders for heat exchanger building substations have inverse time overload and ground fault protection.
(1) Loss of Preferred Powgr (LOPP): The 6.9kV !
Class 13,bgs,ferred power suppifibould h8 gtgpprmally energized from (4) 6.9kV feeders used for motor starters have instantaneous, inverse time overload, ground the normaTgre fault and motor protection, the bus voltage decay to below 70% of its nominal rated value for a predetermined time (5) 480V bus incoming line and feeder circuits a bus transfer is initiated and the signal have inverse time overload and ground fault will trip the supply breaker, and start tbc protection.
diesel generator, As the bus voltage decays,large pump motor breakers are trip-83.1.1.6.4 Protection Requitw.ents ped. The transfer proceeds to the dicsci generator, if the standby diesel generator When the diesel. generators are called upon to is ready to accept load (i.e., voltage and Operate during (OJA eg-- igs.gygoly frequency are within normallimits and no
/-
'g f
protective device a re lockout er.ists, and the normal and alter-the generator ifferential relays",KThe nate preferred supply breakers are open),
engine overspec trip, k - d = ' w d. ; -.. A then the diesel. generator breaker is signal.
p pou) 5 m :.. o'.m e.. ef -, ann) ::o !: 4 led to close, accomplishing automatic trans-i FN d!fk W d r u a a va' Aeii aug a:M fer of the Class 1E bus to the diesel gen.
- = cf :a.:::m). These protection crator. Large motor loads will be sequence g: r:
devices are retained under accihnt conditions to started as required and shown on Table protect against possible, signir cant damage.
8.3 4.
G Amendment 10 t
s}$
m.
_ mm -
MM 2M61 mao S1111dArd Plant prv s (2) Lois of Coolant Accident tLOC41: When a LOCA occurs, with or without a LOPP, the load sequence timers are started if the 6.9 KV emergency bus voltage is greater than 70%
and loads are applied to the bus at the end of preset times.
Each load has an individual load sequence timer whleh will start if a LOCA occurs and 6
the 6.9 KV emergency bus voltage is greater than 70%, regardless of whether the bus voltage source is preferred power or the diesel generator. The load sequence timers are part of the low level circuit logic for each LOCA load and do not provide a means of common mode fallae that would render both onsite and offsite power unavailable, if a timer failed, the LOCA load could be applied manually prosided the bus voltage is greater than 70%. [g,. a (1et adc) l(3) LOPP fol[ wine LOC A: If the but voltage (normal (preferred power) is lost during post. accident operation, transfer to diesel generator power occurs as desnibed in it) yalter*AlC)
- b**
~
l(4) LOCA following.lf)ff If a CA occurs fol.
lowing loss of the normal, preferred power supplies, the LOCA signal starts ESF equip-ment as required. Automatic (LOCA + LOPP) time delayed load sequencing assures that tbc diesel generator will not be overloaded.
l (5) LilCA when diesel renerator is carallel *lth ereferred oower source durine test: Ifa LOCA occurs when the diesel generator is paralled with either the normal preferred power or the alternate preferred power g
source, the D/G will automatically be disconnected from the 6.9 KV emergency bus regradless of whether the test is being conducted from the local control panel or the main control room.
Ansadment 10 sM1
.. w- -
i M Na tur,1 mao i
SAndArd Plant uvn (6) LOPP darlas dinaal menerator narallellan g.3.1.1.1.1 Redundant Standby AC Power j
- agal: If the normal preferred power supply Supplies is lost during the diesel. generator paral.
leling test, the diesel. generator circuit Each standby power system division, including breaker is automatically tripped. Transfer the diesel generator, its availlary systems and to the diesel generator then proceeds as the distributieu of power to various Class 1E dese.ribed in (1),
loads through the 6.9kV and 480V systems, is se.
gregated and separated from the other divi.
If the alternate preferred source is used sions. No automatic interconnection is provided for load testing the diesel generator, and between the Class 1E divisions. Each diesel.ge.
the alternate preferred source is lost (and nerator set is operated independently of the no LOCA signal calsts), the diesel generator other sets and is connected to the utility power breaker will trip on overcurrent, and LOPP system by manual control only during testing or condition will calst. Load shedding and bus for bus transfer, transfer will proceed as described in (1).
l (7) Hentersjism er affalte mowert Upon restoration of offsite power, the Class 1E The size of each of the diesel. generators bus (es) can be transferred back to the serving Divisions I,11 and lit satisfies the re.
offsite source by manual operation only.
quirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.9 and IEEE Std 387 and conforms to the following criteria:
(8) Protectica analmst denraded voltane: For protection of the Division I,11 and III (1) Each diesel generator is capable of start.
electrical equipment against the effects of ing, accelerating and supplying its loads in a sustained degraded voltage, the 6.9 kV ESF the sequence shown in Table 8.3 4.
bus voltages are monitored. When the bus voltage degrades to 90% or below of its (2) Each diesel generator is capable of start.
rated value and after a time delay (to ing, accelerating and supplying its loads in prevent triggering _ by transients),
their proper sequence without exceeding a A
undervoltage will be annunciated in the 25% voltage drop at its terminals.
control room. Simultaneously a 5. minute timer is started, to allow the operator to (3) Each diesel generator is capable of start.
take corrective action. After 5 minutes, ing, accelerating and running its largest the respective feeder breaker with the motor at any time after the automatic load-undervoltage is tripped. Skould a LOCA ing sequence is completed, assuming that the occur during the 5 minute time delay, the motor had falk $ to start initially, feeder breaker with the undervoltage will be g
bl tripped lastantly.- Subsequent bus transfer (4) Each diesel generator is capable freachin will be as destibed above.
full speed and voltage within econ s after receiving a signal to start, and cap.
g.3.1.1.g Standby AC Power Syssem able of being fully loaded within the next ll,g+
Whisecondsfas si'm in Table A3-%
m p $ g>
The diesel generators comprising the Divi.
sions I,11 and !!! standby AC power supplies are
$ce Subsection 8.3.4.2 and 8.3.4.8 for designed to quickly restore power to their respec. ! interfece requirements.
W$
tive Class 1E distribution system divisions as l
required to achieve safe shutdown of the plant g.3.1.1.g.3 Starting Circuits mad Systems and/or to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA in the event of a coincident LOPP. Figure 8.31 Diesel generators I, !! and 111 start automa.
l shows the laterconnections between the preferred tically on loss of bus voltage. Under.5oltage
%_ys are used to start each diesel engine power supplies and the Divisions I,11 and 111 rela l
diesel generator standby power supplies.
(r) ca.k diesel 3 enerefer has o cwris.vevs Ioad area 3 of G.asm @ OS gwedecyr (see Figure 1 3-l). De overl**d VaTI ns ll0 90 Of he Nted 4 A M T W
- M "h "'*
A m nd m et10 fe BM
ABWR nuimo Standard Plant nrv n the event of a drop in bus voltage below preset values for a predetermined period of time.
Low water level switches and drywell high p.es.
l sure switches in each division are used to ini.
tinte diesel start under act.ident conditions.
Manual start capability (without need of D.C.
power) is also provided. The transfer of the Class 1E buses to standby power supply is automatic should this become uccessary on loss of all preferred power. After tbc breakers connecting the buses to the preferred power supplies are open the diesel. generator breaker is closed when required generator voltage and frequency are established.
Diesel generators 1,11 and til are designed to start and attain rated voltage and frequency l within 20 seconds. The generator, and voltage regulator are designed to permit the set to accept the load and to accelerate the motors in the sequence within the time requirernents. The voltage drop caused by starting the large motort does not exceed the requirements set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.9, and proper acceleration of these tootors is ensured. Control and timing
(
Amendment 10 8361
_ ~
MN uAstooAo Standard Plant f
^
pn n circuits are provided, as appropriate, to ensure 1(3)gener. loss of f, d) eq i
that each load is applied automatically at the correct time. Each diesel generator set is pro.
(4 everse power
- vided with two independent starting air systems.
(5) low tur - d preuure; 8.3.1.1.8.4 Automatic Shedding, leading and 3
,9 Isolation (6) ' gibrition; g
The diesel generator is connected to its Class high lube o' emperatun; 1E bus only when the locoming preferred source breakers have been tripped (subsection 8.3.1.1.
(8) low l oilpreuure; 7). Under this condition, major loads are tripped from the Class 1E bus, except for the (9) crankcase uure; and i
Class 1E 480V unit substation feedets, before (
closing the diesel generator breaker.
\\ 10) C lowj er water preuure.
Tiese and etker (aloons a nd tryr)
The large motor loads are later reapplied A TL E S..., protective functions $s4ppof I sequentially and automatically to the bus after the engine or the generator breaker and other closing of the diesel. generator breaker.
off normal conditions are anng!bes-e,1,n,thg y.y.g
[(ag main control room and/or locally rartrE 8.3.1.1.1J Protection Systems
. % ::c;d (Tr-' rx::_g;;J h dy.a "
}Qb:
....-;?::=.
"L.
ptal The diesel generator is shut down and the alarm / annunciation points have aux:,lary generator breaker tripped under the following isolated switch outputs which provide in uts to n
conditions during all modes of operation and innemg# alarm /sonunciator refresh uni in the g
testing operation:
maiyon,t,rgt rgog ybich identifies th diesel o
generat6tAcodcerne87 Those anomalies which (1) engine overspeed trip; and cause the respective D/O to become inoperitise are so indicated in accordance with Regulatory (2) generator differential relay trip.
Guide 1.47 and BTP PSB.2.
The generator broadis tripped un rthe (1 ow level-jacket wate following conditio during normal ope sons and g
testing:
- (2) low preuure-ja et water,W ure-jacket water,h (1) generator ground overcurt (3) low low pr
,(2 erator voltage re ainployercurre ;
(4) low te rature-jacket water in;
/
Q (3) but underft ocy;
($)
temperature-jacket w r out;W (4) genera r reverne poutr; a high.high temperature acket water out; r.-
(5) nerator loss of field 3
(7) Ice level-lube o' ark; has diffeves V elas f HP in addition, du g diesel. generator rmal (8) low tempe ure-lube oilin; I
operations or i ing, the diesel gen stor is shut down d to:
(9) hi h t perature-lubc oil out, 6
(1) h' acket water temperature-(10) high.high temperature--!
oil; t
(2) generator high bearing i perature; 11) high differentia pressure.. lube oil filter;
/
p L, Trips generf becager ungl7 mj,, op (p,,
,g,
~
Amendment to 8M
GWR Standard Plant pr n
( N4ressu turbo ou rig eft bankh
,s (D) low low pressure -
o ou; h (14) low pressur ube oUh (lf) low l pressure"lu oU J
i l
l l
l
[
l Arnendment 10 83-71
f:
ABWR uuim40 Standard Plan l PtlN J)
[
hi h te:9pffature D/O tion in the diesel generator room by operating 6
l cue;g key switches at that station.
(17) pressure-cr y
8.3.1.12.7 Engine Mechanical Sptems and
(
excesdve D be vibt onWV Accessories 4
/ (19) engly 'trspee Descriptions of these systema and accessories y
are given la Section 9.5.
(20)
Veult f failure,i I
8J.1.1JJ Interiocks and Testability (2) D overs age ;
Each diesel generator, wh6n operating other
/ ) low p ure.. starting ',
than in test mode,is totally independent of the
/ ((23) 22 preferred power supply. Additionalinterlocks maintenance m e; to the LDCA and 14PP sensing circuits terminate parallel operation test and cause the diesel ge.
k nerator to automatically revert and reset to its J ) unit fails to bos L
standby mode if either signal appears durlag a
'/ (25) D/G4 derfrequen test. A lockout or maintenance mode removes the diesel generator from service. The inoperable n
(26) /G phne ov' urrent ; -
status is indicated in the control room.
A' out of se 8.3.1.l A.9 Rellability Qualification Testing a
(28) die engine shutdo ;
The qualification tests are performed on the diesel generator per IEEE $td. 387 as modified (29 ock out relay rated; by Regulatory Guide 1.9 requirements.
- 30) emergen start; See Subsection 8.3.4.10 for interf ace y
f requirements, to (31) D/ voltage res tovere ent';
j
/
8.3.1.2 Analysis (3) low.high le -fuel da ank;
[
2
/
BJ.1.2.1 General AC Power Sptems
/ (33) low pr ure-fue) il;
/
/
The general AC power systems are illustrated
[
(34) differe pressur fuel fdte in Figures 8.31 through 8.3 3. The analysis q
demonstratj,sjag!pliance of the Class 1E AC power q
system tow "
NRC General Design Criteria J
(35) generat (GDC), NN@egulatory Guides and other criteria
[
reverse ' er ;
(36) injacal conti aly; consistent with the Standard Resiew Plan (SRP).
{
/
(3 generator erenti Table 8.11 identifies the onsite power
/ ) 605 rffer ial tri system and the associated codes and standards f). !I
(
M
(
applied in accordance with Table 81 of the n
-83.1.13.6 lual and Remote Control
[
SRPQtg!4Q!hriteria are listed in order of
')
the listing on the' table, and the degree of Each diesel generator is capable of being conformance is discussed for each. Any started or stopped manually from the main control exceptions or clarifications are so noted.
room. Start /stop control and bus transfer con.
trol may be transferred to a local control sta.
(1)
General Design Criteria (GDC):
/3 Q1
' Denotes control room annunciator (a) Criteria: GDCs 2,4,17,18 and 50.
Amendown: 10 8M
t ABM nuim40 Standard Plant nv n (b) Conformance: The AC power spremjs in There are three 6.9 KV electrical divisions costillance with these GCDs,@n <
which are independent load groups backed by h
a;:. &% r vpub@The GDCs are individual diesel generstor sets. The low Q
c generically addressed in Subsectico voltage AC systems consists of four divisions 3.1.2.
which are backed by independent DC battery, charger and inverter systems.
(2) Regulatory Guides (RGs):
The standby power system redundancy is based Independence Between Redun-on the capability of any one of the four divi-(a) RG 1.6 dant Standby (Onsite) Power sions (one of three load groups) to provide the j Sources and Between Their minimuny
( functions necessary to shut down Distribution Systems the unit the control room in case of an accidenn an sintain it in the safe shutdown Selection, Design, and Ous-con dition','
(b) RG 1.9 lification of DiesebGene-rator Units Used as Standby There is no sharing of standby power system (Ousite) Electric Power Sys-components between load gtg and there is no tems at Nuclear Power Plants sharing of diesel generator power sources be.
tween units, since the ABWR is a single plant (c) RG 1.32 - Criteria for Safety Related design.
Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants Each standby power supply for each of the three load groups is composed of a single ge-(d) RG 1.47 - Bypassed and Inoperable Sta-nerator driven by a dicsci engine having fast-tus lodication for Nuclear start characteristics and sired in accordance Power Plant Safety Systems with Regulatory Guide 1.9.
(e) RG 1.63 - Electric Penetration Assem-Table 8.31 and 8.3 2 show the rating of each biles in Containment Struc-of the Division I,11 and ill diesel generators.
tures for Light Water Cooled respectively, and the maximum coincidentaiload Nuclear Power Plants for each.
(f) RG 1.75 - Physical 1odepeodeaee of (3) Branch Technical Positions (BTPs):
Electric Systems (a) BTP ICSB 8 (PSB) Use of Diesel Gene.
(g) RG 1.106-Thermal Overload Protection rator Sets for Peaking for Electric Motors on Mo-tor Operated Valves (b) BTP ICSB 18 (PSB) Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Manually (b) RG 1.108 Periodic Testing of Diesel Controlled Electrically Operated Valves.
Generator Units Used as On-site Electric Power Systems (c) BTP ICSB 21 Guidance for Application at Nuclear Power Plants of Regulatory Guide 1.47 (i) RG 1.118 Periodic Testing of Electric (d) BTP PSB 1 Adequacy of Station Electric power and Protection Sprems Distribution System Vol,tages Regarding Position C 1 of Regulatory Guide (e) BTP PSB 2 Criteria for Alarms and in.
1.75, see Section 8.3.1.1.2.1-Although the AC dications Associated with Diesel Gene-isolation is fault current actuated, the intent rator Unit Bypassed and inoperable of Regulatory Guide 1.75 is met through the zone Status selective interlocking technique. Therefore, the onsite AC power system is designed in accor.
The onsite AC poer systern is designed dance with recominendations of this guide, and consistent with these positions, with the other listed Regulatory Guides.
Amendment 10 gp l
y' ABWR nuioao Standard Plant prv n (b) RG 1.32 - Criteria for Safety Related n
Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants (c) RG 1.47 - Bypassed and inoperable Sta -
(4) Other SRP Criteria:
tus Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems (a) NUREG/CR 0660 Enhancement of Ondte Diesel Generator Reliability (d) RG 1.75 - Physical Independence of Electric Systems As indicated in Subsection 8.1.3.1.2.4, t h e operating procedures and training of person.
(e) RG 1.118-Periodic Testing of Electrie net are outside of the Nuclear Island scope Power and proce< tion Sptems of supply. NUREG/CR 0660 is therefore im-posed as an laterface requirement for the Regarding Position C 1 of Regulatory guide l
applicant.(See Subsection 8.1.4.2) 1.75, see Section 8.1.3.1.2.2 (6). Otherwise, the Class 1E CVCF power system is designed in l 3.3.1.2.2 Class 1E Constant Voltage, Constant accordance with recommendations of this guide, Prequency (CYCF) Power Supply and with the other listed Regulatory Guides.
The CVCF power supply oneline diagram is There are four independent electrical divi.
Illustrated in Figure 8.3 6.
The following sions, each with its own individual power supply f;)
anal; sis indicates comppghe Class 1E as illustrated on Figure 8.3 6. The cornial unin-CVCF power supply tos"wNRC General terruptible power (UPS) to each of the four CVCF l Dedgn Criteria (GDC), NNC Regulatory Guides and divisions is provided by its divisiooa1 i
other criteria consistent with the Standard rectifier and inverter por cred by its divisional l Review Plan (SRP).
AC bus. The AC/DC rectifier powered by a 450 VAC bus provides the normal DC power with the l
Table 8.11 identifies the Class 1E CVCF power power supplies are not shared among mult 125 VDC division as a bachp. The Clau 1E CYCF supply and the associated codes and standards a. tied in accordance with Table 81 of the SRP.
reactor units since the ABWR is a single unit Aggli@ griteria are listed in order of the plant design.
listing on The table, and the degree of conformance is discussed for each. Any The Class 1E CVCF power supply redundancy is exceptions or clarifications are so noted, based on the capability of any one of the four divisions to provide the rainitoum safety n
(1) General Design Criteria (GDC):
funct;;ns necessary to shut down the unit from the control room in case of an accident and (a) Criteria: GDCs 2,4,17, and 18.
maintain it in the safe shutdown condition.
(
(b) Conformance: The Class 1E CVCF powfer The Class 1E CVCF power supply system is l styply is in compliance with these GDgs. designed to permit inspection and testing of all I
6 in c hancpwith tbpre GpC's isrpa. important equipment and features, and all as a wMle, as gplicabre.JThe GDCs automatic and nunual switching functions.
l are generically addressed in Subsection 3.1.2 (3) Branch Technical Podtions (BTPs):
(2) Regulatory Guides (RGs):
(a) BTP ICSB 21 Guidance for Application of Regulatory Guide 1.47 (a) RG 1.6 Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite)
(b) BTP PSB 1 Adequacy of Station Electric Power Sources and Between Distribution System Voltages Their Distribution Systems l
l Amendment 10 8.3 10 1
MM 33AstooAo Standard Plant prv n With regrad to BTP PSB1, protection assinat (1) certify 60 year life by thermal aging degraded voltage is discussed in Subsection 8.3.1.1.7(8). The CVCF power supply is designed (2) prove the radiation resistance by espo.
consistent with these BTPs.
sure ol' aged specimens to integrated do. l sage; gJ.1.23 Quality Assursace Requittaments (3) prove mechanical / electrical tests of A planned quality assurance program is provid.
cable for environmental conditions ed in Chapter 17. This program includes a enmpre-specificd; hensive system to ensure that the purchased mate.
rial. manufacture, fabrication, testing and qual.
(4) prove flame resistance by the vertical ity control of the equipment in the emergency tray,70,000 Btv/br flame test for 8 electric power system ekforms to the evaluation minutes (minimum); and of the emergency electric power system equipment vendor quality assurance programs and preparation (5) show acceptable levels of gas evolution of procurement specifications incorporating qual.
by an acid gas generation test.
ity assurance requirements. The administrative responsibility and control provided are also des.
The directives which also govern the qualifi-cribed in Chapter 17.
cation are:
These quality assurance requirements include IEEE Std 317 Electric Penetration Assemblies an appropriate vendor quality assurance program and organization, purchaser surveillance as re-IEEE Std 323 Class 1E Equipment Qualifica-quired, vendor preparation and maintenance of tion appropriate test and inspection records, certi-ficates and ather quality assurance documenta.
IEEE Std 334 - Continuous Duty Class 1E Motors tion, and vendor submittal of quality control records considered necessary for purchaser IEEE Std 382 Class 1E Electric Valve retention to verify quality of completed work.
Operalors A necessary condition for receipt, installa-IEEE $td 383 Class IE Cables, Splices and tion and placing of equipment in service has been Connectors the sighting and auditing of QA/QC verification data and the placing of this data in permanent IEEE Std 387 Diesel Generator Standby Power onsite storage files.
Supplies l
gJ.1.2.4 Environmental Considerations See Subsection 8.3.4.3 for interface reqmts.
E G
in addition to the effects of operation in nor-8J.13 Physicalldentifiestlos of mal service environment, all Claan IE equipmentf> Safety Related Equipment w a 1,..... a.,...
kk'f kNsigneE[operatha th[h' g.3.13.1 ?= Sr -
a
- 6q d'*P U##"
5ccident enviro.spoen cign the area in YH"4 8"d a ffer' d** 4 e
l which it is'locat'e rirequipment is Equipment of each division of the Class 1E l qualified to IEE see Section 3.11).
electric system and various CVCF power supply l 3 23 divisions are identified as follows:
g,'(
All cables specifigd for Class 1E systems /a'nd I
^
'- ' circuits /are moisture and radiation (1) The background of the nameplate for the
'I resistant, are highly flame resistant and equipment of a division has the same color l evidence little corrosive effect when subjected as the cable beket markers and the raceway to beat or flame, or both. Certified troof tests markers associated with that dinsion.
are performed on cable samples to:
1 (2) Power system distribution equipment (e g.,
l motor control centers, switchgear, trans-An endmcal 10 8M 1
ABWR m ax40 Standard Plant rrv n formers, distribution panels, batteries, cables. Scram solenoid cables are run in a se.
~
chargers)is tagged with an equipment number parate conduit for each rod scram group.
the same as indicated on the single line
- diagrams, in addition, the cables of the rod control aad infor. nation system in the hydraulic control (3) The nameplates are laminated black and white unit (HCU) are also placed in separate conduits plutic, arranged to show black engraving on and cable trays, a white background for non Class 1E equip-ment. Fot Class IE equipment, the name.
The redundant Clus 1E, equipment and cir-plates have color coded background with cults, assigned to redundant Class 1E divisions black engraving.
and non class IE system equipment and circuits are tvadily distinguishable from each other All cables for Class 1E systems and aseengd without the necenir fer consulting reference b
circuits (except those routed in conduits) are materials. This is accomplished by color coding a
tagged every 5 f t prior to (or during) of equipment, nameplates, cables and raceways, installation. All cables are tagged at their u described above.
terminations with a unique identifying num. ber (cable number), in addition to the marking 13.13.2 lutivmentation and Control Systems
., abaracteristics shown below.
Q af "SD Major electrical and control equipenent, as-Q,g
' cat 1 conduit is similarly tagged with a unique semblies, devices, and_ cable @irouped into sepa-conduit number,in addition to the marking cha.
rate diviticos pJatge4@ hall be identi-racteristics shown below, at 15 ft intervals, at fied so that t eu ciectrical divisional assign-discontinuities, at pull boxes, at points of ment is apparent and so that an observer can vi-entrance and exit of rooms and at origin and sually differentiate between Class 1E-(:ME4
+ede;;drequipment and wiring of different Conduits containing p+ivisions, and between Class 1E and non Class 1E l
destination of equipment.
~
d cables operating at above 600V (i.e.,6.9kV) are
~
also tagged to indicate the operating voltage. =(:- b:: :nlE =i::o ::d rce C!1 IM.
,A ! These markings are applied prior to the equipment and wires. The identification method
, installation of the cables, shall be placed onyclorsoding. All markers _
within a divisio/s) fe"a'l f ge gg[i e
clan lE wih nc divipon coleh ed Ih the sacoe color For atsociated labid as Clau 1F t ere beu)
AllAcable trays are markedAwith their proper raceway identification at 15 ft intervals on shall be an"A"a ppended tc) e divisional desig-
'I'l straight sections, at turning points and at nation (e.g., Alb-Theistler'A" stands for u-o d
points of entry and exit from enclosed areas, sociated and ND for nondivisional. Associated f
A Cable trays are marked prior to installation of c abje,s, unigpgly,1feg fled gyp longitudinal *
+
their cables.
stripeAan the data o tMabel. The color (gey) of the cable arker for associated cables shall ~
To belp distinguish the neutron monitoring and be the same as the related Class 1E cable. Divi-scram solenoid cables from other type cables, the sional separation requirements of individual following unique voltage class designations are pieces of hardware are shown in the system ele-used in the cable routing program:
mentary diagrams. Identification of raceways, cables, etc., shall be compatible with the iden.
Type of lintqn tification of the Clau IE equipment with which Soechl Cables Voltace Clus it interfaces. Location of identification shall be such that points of change of circuit clani-Neutron r.nonitoring VN fication (at isolation devices, etc.) are readi-ly identifiable.
Scram solenoid cables VS 83.13.2.1 Identifleation Neutron monitoring cables are run in their own divisional conduits and cable trays, separately (1) Par els and racks from all other power,instrutnentation and control D
hh>
Amendmcat 10 l}l:
'k b f W ollohqa) % e h M t
f bles shall be marked in a manner of suf icient durability to be legible throughout the life of the plant, and to f.scilitate initial verification that \\
i fthe installation is in conformance with thn separation criteria, k
Such markings shall be colored to uniquely identify the division (or non division) of the cable.
Cenarally individual conductors exposed by k stripping the jacket are also color coded or color tagged (at intervals not to I, exceed 1 foot) such that their division is still discernable.
Exceptions are
\\ perm tted tor individual conductors within cabinets or panels where all wiring y
que to a single division (or is non divisiona1L is uni g-j 7p
t -
\\
\\
\\
Record # c e.ut's rd,s inserted Y indicated:
9 Ti following I' q
\\rface crite4'\\
\\
8,3.4) 3 dentified,io and Just.fic on of Asso lated rcuits y
r to the fii design, ther were no "associ. ed circuits" asdeJ d
by 'f.EE
- 84) known o e:ist in th /A "R Standard P n design.
In t e fifnal uit in t e A!WR SSA d, (n)d sho -
d ign, p ovide assut nc> that thi is still true tatement, or pecifical y it ntify an just.Ify each uch ci it meets tl, equirements f;/ Regulatory tid 1.75, posit in C.4.
/
The fol. wing lote 1"j ias als beer,a ed a.sa reference pe'r aining to associ ed circu to in 8.3.1,3.?:
h!Jote1: Associated circuits added beyond the certified design must be specifically identified and justified per 8.3.4.13.
Associated circuits are defined in Section 5.5.1 of IEEE 384 1981, with the clarification for Items (3) and (4) that non Class 1E circuits being in an enclosed raceway without the required physical separation or barriers between the enclosed raceway and the Class 1E or associated cables maken the circuits (related to the non Class 1E cable in the enclosed raceway) associated circuits.
\\.
I l
.m
ABWR mm
$_talidard Plant riv vi ddd Df r, colN~o)f engrating fill. Tbc masker plates /Wh b
rdass ar/a[s (esparfal st arati m
cannt
>e m ntaine in iL
. pote tial m' site u as),
".I shall include identification of the proper (p ys 'lisollItionfetwee lectri I eqt jment division of the equipment included, f
of ifferfst divhions achi ed by se o (2) Junction or pull boxes g6 och spinimu/thicksess rdforceJ -
conc ff c
,,g
/
Junction and/or pull botes enclosing wiring for the nuclear <afety related systems shall The physicalindependence of electric power have identificallen similar to and compati.
systems complies with the requiretrents of IEEE ble with the pAes k ar! 'acks.
Standarda 279, 308, 379, 364, General Design Criteria 17,18 and 21 and NRC Regulatory Guides 4
(3) Ca esf p,/J L4 8 t'
T 1.6 and 1.75.
(rfiJEdffdie / sad / f pane 8.3.1.4.1.1 Clasa 1E Electric Equipment the ydh ty.p44cpf>)yste
'Cib1 shall e Arnagement to y
M ark d, a s 7 dsyted i
'ubse ion y-8.3.
.1, to,dellyMi1h t, m it oth -
(1) Class IE electric equipment and wiring is (ru) $
c. es a /edely he' )separ
/
e divi on segregnted into separate divisions so that g.<3 s ap n ea ts. T)&i id e tific ion, no single credible event is capable of dis-requ emefdoepot opp to ip vidyaf-shutdown, removal of decay beat from the abling enough equipment to binder reactor Qop uctog,J.
L core, or isolation of the containment in tbc (4) Raceways event of an accident. Separation require-ments are applied to :ontrol power and Those trap or conduits which carry nuclear motive power for all systems involved, safety related s% tem wiring shall be identi.
A fied as indicate.d in Subsection 8.3.1.3.1, (2) Equipment arrangement and/or protective bar.
S at room entrance points through which they ricts are provided such that no locally ge-pass (and exit points unless the room is nerated force or missile can destroy any re-small :mugh tu, f acilitate convenient dundant RPS, NSSS ECCS, or ESF tunctions.
following of cabic) mith a perrnaneet marker in addition, arrangement and/or separation identifying their aigned division.
barricts are provided to ensure that such disturbances do not affect both IIPCF and (5) Sensory equipment grow,ing and designation RCIC systems, letters (3) Routing of wiring / cabling is arranged such Redundtti tensory logic / control and actus.
as to climinate, irisofar as practical, all tion equipment for safety related systems potential for fire damage to cables and to shall bn identified by suffix letters.
separate the redundant divisions so that fire in one division will not. pre te to 8.3.1.4 Indeperdence of Redundant Sptems anogt dgsjon. C/gsglg jay
- g 4 y w j se InL 3 Y en.d' RG p ?&.(See 6yres %.+I 8.3.1.4.1 Power Systeras (4) An independent raceway system ts provided
% Ig
\\ q A.y.s(,)I for each division of the Class 1E electric The Class 1E onsite electric power systems system. The raceways are arranged, physi-
~,--[. -
(h and major corsponents of tbc separate power cally, top to bottom, as follows (based on divisions is r,hown on Figure 8.31.
the function and the voltage class of the cables):
Independence of the electric equipment and racewsy sptems between the different divisions (a) V4 = Medium voltage power,6.9kV (Sb is maintained primarily by firewall type separ.
insulation class).
ation whet e-icesibk ;a4-bypatial-+epasasionM
'Ta%geedwee-with-4situit;;h=-it S h c e ties-.-t L 3.W', *h sn-44awelk-m m fenMu et ci e> s c H b eef g n 5 ghsec ! te s4 g.3. ). si. 'Z.
da9 e w erfret o c p sD f' M se gfgef Cl A y 5dsecit 0% 9 A. 5,5~ T.
g gw y
- i L_
__m..
Record #
comments,
n i See answer fobomme(b'tkathJAupte-frtra ;
m i
Pop 1 gr%1bifidep!Kwas-Q,tibit3W p
i Cables shall be marked in a manner of sufficient durability to be Icgible
.j 3 throughout the itic of the plant, and at intervals not to exceed 5 feet. to facilitate initial verification that the installation is in conformance with the I
separation criteria.
Such markings shall be colored, as delineated in 8.3.1.3.1, to uniquely identify the division (or non division) of the cable.
Generally, individual conductors exposed by stripping the jacket are also color coded or color tagged (at 9-intervals not to exceed 1 foot) such that their division is still discernable.
Exceptions are permitted for individual conductors within cabinets or panels
- where all wiring is unique to a single division (or is non divisional).
I
_J b
1 0
t ww 1
t I
+
MN 23AstoMO i
d Sigi ard Plant ni;v g i
(b) V3 = Low voltage power including 480 cations) are tagged at their terminations VAC,120VAC,12.5 VDC power and all with a unique identifying number. Colors
[-
instrumentation and control power used for identification of cables and. ace.
y' supply feeders (600V insulation ways are covered in Subsection 8.3.1.3.
5g class).
I, Q (6) SpacInn of MrInf Anil2BMRtata la tu!Irlg M (c) V2 =High level signal and control, ItnudLpandt.11ultdAY rathA-Separation 1, E including 125 VDC and 120 VAC is accomplished by mounting the redundant :$ 3 0 i
controls which carry less than 20A devices or other components on physically ed current and 250 VDC or AC for relay _
separated control b <tds if, from a plant r. h v, contactor control. Mer.opr.< cowesJ operational point ot,lew, this is feasi.
- J %
- '# * *f*'l,t C8 4"3 L
ble. When operational dealgo dictates that Tyr b (d) V1 = Low levejl igns o1,in.
redundant equipment be in close proxiteity, CM S lD.l cludingfes' analog signadup to 55 separation is achieved by a barrier or t /~ d VDC and digital signadup to 12 enclosure to retard internal. fire or by a J {:! H Q
VDC.
maintained air spacrt in accordance with h~ cI criteria given in Subt.ection 8 3.la.2.
8J.1 A.1.1 Dectdc Cable Installation kM I
in this case, redundse,t citalls which serve h' ~
y dQ
~h, (1) Cable Deratlet ag(,tpble trav fill.. Base the same safety *related function enter the ampacity rating of cables is established as control panel through sepatrated apertures p y, described in Subsection 8.3.3.1. Electric and terminate on separate and separated ter-c ol cables of a discrete Class 1E electric sys.
minal blocks. Wnere redundant circuits un-.! h J k tem divillon are installed in a cable tray avoidably terminate on the same dewice, ban N %
tiers are provided between the device te system provided for the same division,
,}
Cables are installed in trays in accordance nations to ensure circuit separation approv.
4 with their voltage ratings and as described ed isolators (generally optical) are wed.
[ va n o,
[
in Subsection 8.3.1.4.1. Tray fill is as M
s established in Subsection 8.3.3.2.
(7) Electric neat.lration asse.uthbr. Electric y-penetrati.n assemb(ieg f di je g Cjasa IE o
{"
(2) Cthie routine la notentially _ h o s tile divisions are separ1te b fIc%
(du):
separate floor levels)(GroupinTnTTir rate rooms r h;;b.Undfor 1 aMas on ann ~ Circuits of different 3afety divi.
sions are not routed through the same poten.
j tially ho: tile ares,,with the exception of in penetration assemblies fo!!ows ths same main steam line instrumentation and control raceway voltage groupings as desq&ett in Qef tThr#^
IJ 7 C circuits and main steam line isolation Su'ention 8.3.1.4.1.
b
- j valves circuits which are exposed to possi.
og el trie ener ble steam Ig
,cak a9 @turbing,missfles,,Y d
to cir s
ssem e
refrot ted gaiosf
@k 1
M&d4 :"81 M 1 4 M.
d
[r spegu M 1*.W gfLj!? N M !L a M *$ m ! E M r f
LJ !
,7 s
ov urre "an" neeren ent Mter.;
tWIWccer"
,;,, d]n by
(%idRpenetration damage ee 4 i""' M in the event of failure of any single over.
(3) sharine or emble tui..All divisions of current device to clear a fault within the y
Class 1E AC and DC systems are provided with penetration or beyond it. (See Subsection s
independent raceway systems.
8.3.4.4 for interface requirements).
g (4) Cable fire erotection and detection..For 83.1.4.1J Control of Comp!!ance with details of cable fire protection and Separation Criteria During Design and detection, refer to Subsections 8.3.3 and Installadon 9.5.1.
Compilance with the criteria which insures (5) Cable and_ raceway markinn..All cables independence of redundant systems is a supeni.
(except lighting and nonvital communi. sory responsibility during both the design and
(
installation phases. The responsibility is Amendreco 10 sal 4
'^
l=
l
h44d/A
~
i g
t1 on 4, hyAQ.gh 11 g1 ng ei l e t
[
dundant overcurrent interrupting devlees are provided for all electrical circuits (irmleding all instruroentation and control circuits, an well as power circuits) going through containtrent penetrations, if the rnaximum available fault curre nt. (including failure of upstrean devices) is greater than the continuous current rating of the penetrutinn.
j l
a
(
II b
{
l l
I l
1 s
t
_ y _4 m,f e
v~..
h0$
uwna SIA11dfd@fdd
_..Jiv]
daharged b)-
equipm.tht. The equipment is then designated (N
'associat..d' per Reg;ulatory Guide 1.75. Cables (1) identifying applicable uitena, used to connect sue.h equipment are safety rpade sad qualified and routt.d as 'ar.societed cir-(2) issuin; wwWp procedure to impinacnt these cuitt.' and manied as descrfued in Subsection nitetu:;
B.3.1.3.
(3) modifying procedure!. Ib keep them curteut W.3.1.4.2 ludependeace of ikdund. ant aef, wot Lable; Saferyhted lastrusoent.atloa and Control L
Systese (4) checking the maatifscturer's drawings and specifict'5tes it ensure compliance with This subsection defines independence criteria 7
y proct.durO; and applied to safety.related elt.ctrical s.ystems and y
instrumentation and contml equipment. Safety.
J (5) cuntrolling installatine and procure:ucnt to related systems to which the criteria apply are asste ccmpilane wth appri>ved astiissued tho.e neernary to sr.itigate the effects of and, drawings acd spe.:ificatiotas, cipated and abnormal operational triantients or design basis accidents. This includes all those Tbt epiptraent nearnenclature used on the A'BWP.
systems and functions enumerated in Subsections 5ttindsid dusign is ono of the ?timr,ry mechanism 7.1.1. 3, 7.1.1.4, 7.1.1.5, a n d 7.1.1. 6.
The j
foi couring proper terparation. Each equipment term ' systems' includes the overall complex of ud/t>r assembly of equiptnent carries a single.setuated equipment, actuation devices (actra.
number, (e.gy the item numbers foi rootcr drivers tors), logic, instrutsent channels, controls, and E
are the stirac as Ibc snachinery drhers). Based on interceonecdog cables which at required to per.
these idenafit.stion numbers, each item con 'oe form system safety fanctions. The criteria out.
identified as essential or nonessential, and each lines the separation requirements necessary to essotlal itein can further be identified to its achicsc independence of safety.related functions siten f.eparation dirision. This is carried compatible with the redundant and/or diverse
!=
thcu@ and dictate appropriate treatment at the equipment provideci and postulated events.
design level during preparation of the m a n u f a c t us.t t 's dr uwin g s.
8.3.1.4.2.1 General 6
ben Clan IE cpipment is separated where de-Separation of the equipment for the. systems sired to enhauce power generation reliability, referred to in Subsection 7.1.1.3, 7.1.1.t.
thly,_Lt,e in ct>mpliance with(blhhed so thatp
{3 although such separatbo is not a safety 7.1.1.3, and 7.1.1.6 is accom t dam.q8) 3 c 0 rir.id r t &1b n.
y
+eyIEEE 2?9,1DCFP.50 Appendix A, General Once the safety related equipraent has been Design Criteria 3,17, 21 as;d 22, and NRC identified with c Class 1C safety division, the Regulatory Guides 1.75 (IEEU 24) and 1.53 (IEEE Mvisional astignmset dictates a characteristic 379).
(- - ~----
color (Subsection 8.3.1.3) for positive viaval
( N 'e*M I'"'~.N Wrf,T5r) ide ntification. Likewise, ihe divisional iden-Independence of mutually reduedant and/or di.
tification of au ancillary equiptnent, cable and verse Class 1E equipment, devices, and cables
,besexcure d raceways match the divisional anign-is achieSed by phenicale9%, and/pdlet-y fjgg trical isolation.g%cMjppjtedesband '.at F IDent of the syfitta il supJorts, P
The t.tancIb and emersoca It)M o'e "'*CN%F' Provide'd ta **i" tai" 'h' q4%++ wenoeWerceptionT to the Ebove independence of nuclear safety reisted circuits where non Class 1E equipment is connected to and equipment so that the protective function re-Clus 1E power sources (N functional desi.n rea-quired during and following a design basis event sonsd4 err-+hweney AC.4id>M*$ This is including a single fire anywhere in the phnt or immediately app 2 rent by the abtence of essential a sirgle failure in any circuit er equipment can 1
classification identification of the econected be accomplished. The e u cpf.o.* I c aSer serc t r es ne pessr Ve n i.st H S & s
)
barretus %re b en e = a ly s t cf c ud 5.s t rNw $
/s rp e>d i n Section M&
ie Arnewmeo to 8115 j
1
______.m._______.,__.___.___________._m
i ABWR
- mmc, SMid.an[ Plant Riv n n
-n.
8J,1.4.2.2 Separstion Techniques (2) [dund svit geat mot conti. equi hs ment ssoci ed wi red dant afety.
e lat syst sisa loc ed io pote ial The methods used to protect redundant safety spt:ms from results of single failures or events n) chani damap zon, such s discu. din r
are utilaation of safety class situcturen, ep4. e 1).
/
i i
/
- M
~tlaleparetina aedtog[proleclive barrigand isolation devices.(mc W h utedj 3)lu ny comjdttme con: ' ing an, pera g e"
~
ane(s b asi regi abov lhc re stor J
vesse, ther must b e wa > (
Safety Clus Strveture
'#! o 8.3.1.4.2.2.1 ressu koei ca! ;, r <
fM Mw 6.in >
(g* laut layout thi reinf.ced to crete
!! bet en tr s The bule design conrideration Is such that tedundant circuits and ipment are ntaini cable rom di erent d' iont located in separate safety class arcis insofar as q
possible. The separation of Class E circuits
) $p ial sep ation gener i pla t at 4
and equipment is such that the required indepen.
equal cateed e min' am owe y
dence will not be compromised by the failure of EEE 3 4.(See ubsce on 8 4.5 for l
mechanical systems served by the Class 1E elec.
Interf e requ em e nty trical system. For example, Class 1E circuits gj e y o g /, _}, ~, "
- J]geparation ingh W2 afsball equal or exceed the%'.~Yg,,,,
are touted or protected so that failuie of reist.
C:
-g Nd k.:
ed mechanical equipment of one system cannot disable Class IE circuits or equipment essential IEEE 384.(See Subsection 6.3 4.5 for 3
to the operation of a redundant system. This interface requirements) 0 separation of Class 1E circuits and equipments make effective use of features inherent in t,be 8.3.1.4.2,2.3 Main Control Room and Relay Room g
plant design such as using different rooms MPeO Panels epe e 'um x;.;;r(4%=4 e..
nece 6ve h e, a f e,/
The protection system and ESF control, logic, 83.1.4.2.2.2 Sp+: N..& ::?/em t.nd instrument panels / racks shall be located in a safety class structure in which there are no Protecthe Barriers,,
fi g
(,re role potential sources of missiles or pipe breaks SpuieH&ns-(!.mEsep%..,~r4TJI[proiec.
that could jeopardize redundant cabinets and n
ive barriers shall be such that no locally ge.
raceways.
! nerated)he;or missile resulting from a design
,7 r
basis event (DBE) or from randorn failure of Scis.
Control, relay, and instrument panels / racks
'gefglgg 4 f[fl!
mic Category I equipment can disable a safety re. p.will be desis;ned in accordance p
Y ny.){n gagegerg;qe gg lated function.f th 94 n
g.q g hj g us,4o sy(por les nge qui e 7g74ggg c
i Urb Mk i oY "sOe
$ ge
%/
r l
T WJr,6ErornW em u
tiWr5 contain circuits or devices of the redundant Nc
1
)
/(ding m inery och the rbine.g '
protection system or ESF systems except:
nerat or the cact feed ater sy. ro pu s) or in oms staini high.p ssur-(1) Certain operator interface control panels-fredwate pipi r big press ste may have operational considerations which i
i 2 -
lines s as 1 se bets..rn the act and dictate that redundant protection system or I
- be rbine E = p :p::
- m. /Jf-t ESF system circuits or devices be located in I.
ya a 6.in thick inforc co rete 11 -
a single panel. These circuits sod devices
}
j,/Is req ed bet en tray con aning les are separated horizontally and vertically by of ' ferent avisi o n, Ayesce son i/
a miniaturn distance of 6 inches or by steel l
t-I de in e stea lun 1 whe all f r barriers or enclosures.
i sivisio of con are epar by out
[
l umep tig) (2) Class 1E circuits and devices sie li thret or fou ec+ or t) d 1p agepfutig6 infs separated from the non.Cins 1E circuits and x
Amendmm to -
su 1
a o-
.+..
=.,-,--.r e--
e,..
...~.,-.,.m...
,. ~ -
,.v
,cr...
w.,,-,
-sn s
y.----i*+<--r-
ABWR standuditanL-su I
7 from each other horizontslly and vertically by a minimum distance of 6 inches or by steel barricts or enclosures.
]
- 0) Where electricAlinterfaces between Clan 1E and non. Class 1E circuits or between Class i
1E circuits of different divisions cannot be i
avoided, Class 1E isolation devices are used i
(Subsection 83.1.4.214).
A 1
Wiring from Class 1E@d..E - - r22) equip.
f)
(4) If two panels containing circuits of diftet.
ment or circuits which interface with non Class ent separation divisions are less than 3 1E equipinent circuits (i.e., annunci Latt or I
4FM data leg @ers) is treated as Class 1 feet apart, there shall be a steel barrier ned retain its divisional Mitin
)
m %e between the two pentts. Panel creds closed by steel end plates arc considered to be lion up to and including its isolation device.
acceptable barricts provided that terminal The output tittuits from this isolation device l
boards and wit:wap are spaced a minimum of are classified as nond O Mi""' '
' ' d '" ' h ' d ' "' ' ' " ' '
1 inch isom the end plate.
- q...
._..M'it in g.
i;
($) Penetration of separation barriers within a subdivided unnel is permitted, provid..
83.142J Sptem Sepratlos Requirements
{
that such penettalions are scaled or other.
wise treated so thta fire generated by su Speelfic divisional assignment of safety re.
electrical fault muld not reasonably propa. lated splems and equipment is g;ven in Table gate from one section to the other and 8.31. Otleer separation requirements pertaining disable a protective function.
to tbc RPS and otber ESF systems are given in the following subsections.
(6) L.ocal instrument racks on which flow trans.
mitters for main steam or recirculation ra.
%J.1.4.2J.1 Reactor Protection (Trip) Splem l
l ter are located are permitted to have redun.
(RPS) dont instruments on adjacent bays of a sin.
i gle rack in order to avoid superfluous in.
The following separation requirements apply strument piping from flow' elements within to the RPS wiring:
the drywell. In these cases a spatially di.
verse $ct of redundant transmitters shall be (1) RPS sensors, sensor input circuit wiring, L
provided on a seperate local instrument trip channels and trip logic equipment will ract be arranged in four functionally independcot and divisionally seperate groups designated 8J.1A.2.2.4 isolatlos Devices
- Divisions.l.11, il a nd IV.' The trip channel wiring associated with the sensor
/
Where electricalinterfaces between Class IE input signals for each of the four disisions qT r#
'; and non Class 1E ircuits or provides inputs to divisionallogic cabinets r:
i
() '
between Class 1Ey m
'~ n ircuits of which are in the same divisional group as differecit divisions cant. be~avoi
. Class 1E the sertsors and trip channels and which are i
isolation devices will be used. DC isolation is functionally independent and physically
-prodded by DC to.DC conserters. AC isolation is seperated itom the logic cablerts of tbr provided by interlocked circuit breaker coordi.
redundant divisions.
-}
nation as described in Subsection 83.1.1.2.1.
j; (2) Where trip channel data originating from.
9 sensors of one division are required for L
0 coincident trip logic circuits in other L
divisions, Class IE isolation devices will-L d
be used as interface elements for signals L
sens from one division to another such as to I
sSil htt.dment 10.
i liu.
ABM auioxo i
$tandard Plant Krv n maintain electrical isolation between non safety.related circuits and is divisions, physically separag d i sigegt,eynd,e, j
q raceway boundaries (3) Sensor wiring for several trip variables pistene*+f-+ac4sab Any one scrata group associated with the trip channels of one cordult may also be routed along with scram i
division may be run toge:her in the sani group conduits of the same scram group or conduits or in the same raceways of that with conduits of any of the three other i
i same and only divisien. Sensor wiring scrtm groups as long as the minimum associated with one division mill not be separation distance of one inch (2.5 cm) is routed with, or in close proximity to, any maintained.
wiring or cabling associated with a redundant division.
(8) The standby liquid control system redundant Class IF. controls will be run as Division 1 (4) The scram solenoid circuits, from the and Division !! so that no failure of i
actuation devices to the solenoids of the standby liquid control (St C) function will a
t scram pilot valves of the CRD hydraulic result from a single electrical failure in a 0
control units, will be run in grounded steel RPS circuit, conduits, with no other wiring contained I
within the conduits, so that each scram (9) The startup ran3e toonitoring (SRNM) 1 group is' protected-against a hot short to subsystem cab!!ug of the NMS and the rod I
any other wiring by a grounded enclosure.
control and infortnation system (RC&lS) i Short sections (less than one meter) of cabling under the vessel is treaico as flexibic metallic conduit will be permitted divisional. The SRNM cables will be for making connections within panels and the assigned to Division I, !!, til and IV, and connections to the solenoids.
the RC&l5 cables to Division ga,rg I
(5) Separate grounded steel conduits will be provided for the scram solenoid wiring for e S 4 J :: -,p; 6 r recter W et-*
?
enth of four scram groups. Separate see H r p;pn:1t grounded steel conduits will also be provided for both the A solenoid wiring Q.1.4.2.3.2 Other Safety.Related Systems circuits and for the T Jolenoid wiring circuits of the same scram group.
(1) Separation of redundant systems or portions of a system shall be such that no single g._.,._-
(6 The scrp/ group c tfuits will de uniq f ailure can prevent initiation and id c or'f fic a t io and wil e tre ed completion of an enginected safeguard r
[$ - epstiallraceways,y as ' they are s, arate e osed-function.
e conduits otainin-e scram j
solen group ci uit wir g will e (2) The inboard and outboard isolation valves 4
physipa y separate y a mi um sep tion are redundant to each other so they are made dipance of o ' inch fr althe metal
_ independent of and protected from each other tj e6 closed ra sys n.cacio racews - -
to the extent that no single failure can which c tain,or her d asions - r prevent the operation of at least one of an f uon.) vision 3) (non, fety re ted) inboard / outboard pair. The MSI. fall. safe gfyl solenoid circuits follow the cable separa.
tion requirescents descrited in Subsection (7) Any scram group conduit may be routed 8.3.1.4.2.3.1 for RPS rod scram groups.-
alongside of any cable or raceway containing either safety related circuits (of any (3) Isolation valve circuits requite special division), or any cable.or raceway attention because of their function in containing non safety related circuits, as -
limiting the consequences of a pipe break long as the conduit itself is not within the outside the primary containment. Isolation boundary of any f aceway which contains valve control and power circuits are requit.
either the divisional or the Amn4 meet 10 s.3 Is
b 5
e o 3
I cram group conduits will have uniqae identi#ication and will be separately routed as S
Division II and III conduits for the A and B solenoids of the ucram pilot '.31ves.
1 i apect! ely.
This corresponds to the divisional assignment of their powet sources.
l The conduits containing the scram solenoid group wiring of any one scram group will l
j also be physically scparated by a minimum separation distance of 1 inch from the conduit of any other scram group, and from metal enclosed raceways which contain
'f either divisional or non safety related (non divisional) circuits. The scram group condut tr may not be routed within the confines of any other tray or raceway systert.
The RP.' conduits containing the serain group wiring for the A and B solenoids of the scran plot valves (associated with Divisions II and III, respectively), shall be
{
separated from non enclosed raceways associated with any of the four electrical divisionsjin accordance with the normal division to division separation requirements j i
9 3. f. l f.l)
\\ of the plant. (See s
=
fn divi 5ien*l cobIC ]
f I
Y "k
~
.y limiting consequences of a single faiture to equipment listed in any one division of Table 8.3-1. The whing to the ADS solenoJ valves within the drywell shall run in one
~i or more rigid conduits. ADS conduits for solenoid A shall be divisionally separated from solenoid B conduits. Short pit es (less than 2 feet) of flexible conduit may be used in the vicinity of the valve solenoids.
(5) Electrical equipment and raceways for sys-tems listed in Table 8.31 shall not be lo-cated in close proxirnity to primary stear:s piping (steam leakage zone), or be designed for short term exposure to the high tempera-ture and humidity associated with a steam Lt) A (, M7t'B" (6) AnyyUctrical tipment a for t' ways for t
R S or E located i
.ie su ression
.1 evel sw I zone wi be d igned 13 atis factof y compi e the' functip6
_Pye 8J-@ l fl A.B M 2 m iooto Standard Plant prv s I
'be' ten red
- perab ue t xpos 'et The 125 VDC systems provide a reliable
~
e en on nt er ed b el-s
!' control and switching power source for the Class uphe men Thi.one i ude at acy 1E systems, a ve t e su essi po or levt hic ces e sur of w er at c Id All batteries are sized so that required f loads will not execed 80% of nameplate rating,
! res tfr a hi dr to-nta' me
('fere al pre ure, or warranted capacity at end of installed life with 100% decip demand. Each 125 VDC battery is p(rovided wi;is a charger, and a standby ch
'(7) Containment penetrations will be so arranged ger shared by two divisioch each of which is that no design basis event can disable cabling in more than one division. Penetra-capable of recharging its battery from a dis-tions will not contain cables of more than charged state to a fully charged state while one divisional assignment, handling the normal, steady state DC load.
(8) Annunciator and computer inputs from Class Batteries are sized for the DC load in IE equipment or circuits are treated as accordance with IEEE Standard 485.
Class 1E and retain their divisional identi.
ficatien up to Class IE isolation device.
A non class IE 250VDC power supply, Figure The output circuit from this irolation de.
8.3 8, is provided for the computers and the vice is classified as nondivisional.
turbine turning gear motor. The power supply consists of one 250VDC battery and two char-Annucciator and computer inputs from non-gers. The normal charger is fed by 480VAC from Class 1E equipment or circuits do not either the Division I or Division 111 load cen-l require isolation devices.
ters. Selection of the desired AC supply is by a mechanically interlocked trensfer switch. The 8.3.2 DC Power Systems standby charger is fed from a control building motor control center. Selection of the normal 8.3.2.1 Description
- or the standby charger is controlled by key interlocked brealers. A 250VDC central distri-A 125 VDC power system, Figure 8.3 7, is pro-bution board is provided fcr connection of tbe vided for switchgear control, control power, in-loads, all of which are non class IE, strumentation, critical motors and emergency lighting in control rooms, switchgear rooms and See Subsection 8.3.4.6 for interface re-0 l fuel handling areas.
quirements
[ /g g,3-F/ {
fu :or om nt folic i rep 1 e tem 6 of 2
m Class 1E electrical equipment located in the suppression pool level swell zone is limited to suppression pool temperature monitors, which have their terminations sealed such that operation g
would not be impaired by submersion due to pool swell or LOCA. Consistent with their Class 1E status, there devices are also qualified to the requirements of IEEE 323 for the environment in which they are locatet m
1
ABM twiomo
$1andard Plant PfV B Each of the 12' VDC systems has a 125 VDC sufficient energy to start and operate all battery, a battery charger and gd1 tribu 7^
p[
$ panel.,One standby battery chargurp,s-(ds7A,tiggg required load M Q myy C StV tUldivisions ag anot,lgej standby'batJery charger An initial compositfTelfYf oisilii AC and DC Wg y
is4ed4Mwo ottic*r%UiUIL. Tie main DC power systems is called for as a prerequisite to distribution buses include distribution panels, initial fuel loading. This test will verify drawout type breakers and molded case circuit that cach battery capacity is sufficient to sa.
breakers.
tisfy a safety load demand profile under the con, ditions of a LOCA and loss of preferred power.
Local distribution panels and motor control centers are fed from the DC distribution switch-Thereafter, periodic capacity tests may be con-
- gear, ducted in accordance with IEEE Std 450. These tests will ensure that the battery has the capac.
The 125 VDC systems supply DC power to Divi-ity to continue to meet safety load demands.
sions I, II, til and IV, respectively, and are 2
designed as Class 1E equipment in accordance with See Subsection 8.3.4.6 for interf ace f
IEEE Std 308. They are designed so that no sin-r e q uir e rn e n t s.
gle failure in any 125 VDC system will result in conditions that prevent safe shutdown of the 83.2.1.3.3 Ventilation plant. The plant design and circuit layout from these DC systems provide physical separation of Battery rooms are ventilated to remove the the equipment, cabling and instrumentation minor amounts of gas produced during the essential to plant safety, charging o htteries.
8J.2.13.4 Stglow)Birckout 1
Each 125 VDC battery is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distri-
~
bution panel. Each division of the system is lo-Station blackout performance is discussed in 3
cated in an area separated physically from other Subsection 19E.2.1.2.2.
~~----
divisions. All the components of Class IE 125 9,L2.l.y 4 h h at<2r [ e-d 33 VDC systems are housed in Seismic Category I 83.2.2 Analysis L
structures. An emergency eye wash is supplied in each room. All chargers are sized to supply the 8.3.2.2.1 General DC Powr Systems T
continuous load demand to their,assadbus while restoring batteries to a fully charged The 480 VAC power supplies for the divisional y
state.(See Subsection 8.3.4.7 for interf ace battery chargers are frow,se individual class g
requirements) 1E MCC to which the particular 125 VDC system belongs (Figure 83 7). In this way, separation 83.2.13.1 125 VDC Systems Configuration between the independent systems is maintained and the AC power prodded to the chargers can be Figure 83 7 shows the overall 125 VDC system from either preferred or standby AC power sour-provided for Class IE Divisions I, II,111 and ces. The DC system is so arranged that the pro-IV. One divisional battery charger is used to bability of an internal system failure re:ultiug supply each divisional DC distribution panel bus in loss of that DC power system is extremely and its associated battery. The divisional bat.
Iow. Important system components are either tery charger is normally fed from its divisional self alarming on failure or capable of clearing 480V MCC bus.
faults or being tested during service to detect faults. Each battery set is located on its own R.3.2.1.3.2 Battery Capacity Considerations ventilated battery room. All abnormal condi-p,5 a pcml requircwie=T; tions of important system parameters such as A Xhese batteries have sufficicut stored energy charger failure or low bus voltage are annun-
{
to operate connected essential loads continuously ciated in the main control room and/or locally.
for at least two hours without rechargio6 4Each i
distribution circuit is capable ]of transmitting AC and DC switchgear power circuit breakers The divissen I battery wl.,Jr"in each division receive control power from the comols ne Ac tc syc t e m is s, uf fe c s ent k
h hoors of copo d#19 31stan Vn %T-
^*g S Qurun p.e ned wdatt e 5 en pop sred B ed f ed end f*c4 %s e ed ser ar,o,1 h ese avalob'e &,UT,' /mp2s2f j fino bo71erte5 dre
(
also
AB M 2assim^o Standard Plant Frv n batteries in the respective load groups ensuring j
the following:
The unlikely loss o{li/pp y _gsystem does one 1
,70 (1) not jeopardize thh
,..fe:::d ::d <
-?
i edby / O,~.--. to the Class 1E bases
,e (f f}iMb b
~
ry" ~
b IO*$
Ca Pa ct Y3 anal sis is s s been y
I E EE 4 85-197 8, P e r formed,
based en for ertim4t ec(
P C b efferij lo<ds o s I
o F 5et en her, l939.
The <esoHc Ecr ij t
haYh
$UC $1bOV$ 0 se d eig h N Ne WS 0Yf Ta Lim t.3-5 W egi ?.3-fo..t p v vide <l es Amendment 10 BRO.1
R$c d# co ents s
e followin eplaces the nt re subsec on 1.
2.5.
.6:
y 1 2.2.5
.6 Unit. n lass 1E DC P r System The on Class lE D p er syste supplie owe to unit DC ds that are no ety-related Non Class power is k
from each t
foar Cl s 11:.
b ter es.
Cla.
1E iso atio is provided DC-to DC co verters.
The followi new subsee ion added p this resp c:
/
.2.1.4 Non Class 1E Loads The 125 VDC non Class IE power is used for operation of non-safety equipment such as 6.9 KV switchgear (see 8.1.4.3), valves, converters, transducers, controllers, etc.
It also supplies power to non-Class lE distribution panels and local racks housing non-safety instrumentation.
The 125 VDC non-Class 1E power distribution is shown on Figure 8.3-7.
There are four groups of non Class 1E distribution panels which receive their power through DC-to-DC converters from the four Class 1E electrical divisions.
The DC-to-DC converters (or power packs") act as electrical isolators such that any anomalies in the non-Class 1E system will not affect the Class 1E system.
Also, grounds on the output side (non Class 1E) of the DC-to-DC converters do not appear on the input side (Class 1E).
N These power packs fully comply with all the requirements of Regulatory Cuide (n#ew.
l 1.75 and Section 7.2.2 of IEEE 384, and are therefore acceptable isolation l
devices.
The non-Class 1E loads and their relationship to the power packs and Cla.as 1E power supply buses are the same configuration as those illustrated in the #2 load circle of Figure 1 of IEEE 384.
{
The Class lE 125 VDC systems are adequately sized to handle the non-Class 1E loads.
Should a loss of all AC power occur, the non-Class 1E loads can be shed,l l
as needed, to assure extended battery life for the safe shutdown functions of he plant.
(For battery capacity considerations, see Section 8.3.2.1.3.2.)
(
l o
ge
ABWR usi
-o Standard Plant arv 8 l
of the other load groups.
tures for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants b7
' ")
(2) The differential relays in one division and all the interlocks associated with these re-(c) RG 1.75 Physical Irdependence of lays are from one 125 VDC system only, Electric Systems thereby eliminating any cross conocctions between the redundant DC systems.
(f) RG 1.118. Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems 83.2.2.2 Regulatory Requirernents (g) RG 1.128. Installation Designs and in-The following analyses demonstrate compliance stallation of Large Lud Stor-of the Class 1E Divisiong,RC General Design II,111 and IV DC age Batterits Ior Nuclear h'
power systems to@phbty N Power Plants Criteria, NRC Regulatory Guides and other cri-g teria consistent with the standard review plan.
(b) RG 1.129 - Maintenance, Testing, and Re-The analyses establish the ability of the system placement of Large Lead Sto-to sustain credible single failure and retain rage Batteries for Nuclear their capacity to function.
Power Plants p"
The following list of criteria is addressed in The Class 1E DC power system is designed in accordance with Table S.1-1 which is based on accordance with the listed Regulatory Guides.
Table 81 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP). In it is designed with sufficient capacity, inde-a general t ABWR is designed in accordance with pendence and redundancy to assure that the re-
,h
/ all(+PpEnbs criteria. Any exceptions or quired power support for core cooling, contain.
clatifications are so noted.
ment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated (1) General Design Criteria (GDC):
accident, assuming a single failure.
(a) Criteria: GDCs 2,4,17, and 18.
The batteries consist of industrial type storage cells, designed for the type of service (b) Conformance: The DC power s _ era is in in which they are used. Ample capacity is g
compliance with these GD n s, d available to serve the loads connected to the t
M,.w 4WeeHe.fTh GDCs are system for the duration of the time that generically addressed in Subsection alternating current is not available to the 3.1.2.
battery charger. Each division of Class 1E equipment is provided with a separate and (2) Regulatory Guides (RGs):
independent 125 VDC system.
(a) RG 1.6 - Independence Between Redun.
The DC power systern is designed to permit dant Standby (Onsite) Power inspection and testing of all important areas Sources and Between Their and features, especially those which have a Distribution Systems standby function and whose operation is not normally demonstrated.
(b) RG 132-Criteria for Safety Related Electric Power Systems for (3) Branch Technical Positions (BTPs):
Nuclear Power Plants (a) BTP ICSB 21 Guidance for Application (c) RG 1.47-Bypassed and Inoperable Sta-of Regulatory Guide 1.47, tus Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems The DC power system is designed consistent with this criteria.
(d) RO 1.63 Electric Penetration Assem.
blies in Containment Strue.
, )1 N
Amendment 10
$3 2'.
~ _ _.
ABWR m-o Standard Plant uv s h_,redada.1 divivo.r nomted tn Lre kratock (4) Other SRP Criteria:
span. The Fabic7nstallationIls such that direct impingement of fire suppressant will not According to Table 81 of the SRP, there are prevent safe teactor shutdown. (fee the hvrT6 i
tO{uwacd/ con hte m heeme 15/ /)
h no other criteria applicable to DC power systems.
8.3.3.2 i=11=tjos of Firts 8 3.3 Fire Protection of Cable Systems In the event of a fire, the installation de-sign will localize the physical effects of the The basic concept of fire protection for the fire by preventing its spread to adjacent areas cable system in the ABWR design is that it is in-or to adjacent raceways of different divisions.
corporated into the design and installation ra.
Localization of the effect of fires on the elec-ther than added onto the systems. By use of fire tric system is accomplished by separation of resistant and nonpropagating cables, conservative redundant cable systems and equipment as de.
application in regard to ampacity ratings and scribed in Subsection 8.3.1.4. Tioors and walls raceway fill, and by separation, fire protection are effectively used to provide vertical and is built into the system. Fire suppression sys-horizontal fire resistive separatious between tems (e.g ; automatic sprinkler systems) are pro-redundant cable divisions.
vided for cable trays in areas of high combus-tible loads or possible transit fire loading.
In special caset spatial separa ion i: used as a method of preventing the spread of fire g.3.3.1 Realstance of Cables to Combustlos betweer adjacent cable trays or different di-visions (e.g., inside primary containment). In The electrical cable insulation is designed to special c.ses where mLimum separation cannor be resist the onset of combustion by limiting cable maintained between divisional cables in panels ampacity to levels which prevent overheating and or at equipment, barriers are provided betweene the cable systems or@3 justification is[M insulation failures (and resultant possibility of n !c o !: p er M +
fire) and by choice of insulation and jacket" m aterials which have flame resistive and ' k r "- "'-
- ,2 provideME@
?.5d). The objective is ' 'd c self extinguishing characteristics. Polyvinyl always to separate cable trays of different di-
.T 05 chloride or neoprene cable irsulation is not used visions with structursi fire barriers such as; Q l
in the ABWR All cable trays are fabricated from floors, ceilings and walls. Where this is not noncombustible material. Base ampacity rating of possible divisional trays are separated 3 ft
,e I
the cables was established as published in horizontally and 5 ft vertically, which meets bG l WC 51. Each coaxial ca' ole, each single conductor IPCEA-46-426/IEEES 135andIPCEA 54-440/ NEMA minimum separations allowed by IEEE 384 and hf associated Regulatory Guide 1.75./ Fire rated ' hty cable and each conductor in multi conductor barriers are used to separate divisional cable Ye cable is specified to pass the vertical flame trays when they are separated by less than 3 ft E$(
test in accordance with UL 44 horizontally and 5 ft vertically. Tray fill is' limited to 40% cross sectional area for all In addition, each power, control and instru-cables.
mentation cable is specified to pass the verti-l cal tray flame test is accordance with IEEE 383.
Maximum separation of equipment is provided through location of equipment in separate fire Power and control cables are specified to cos-rated rooms. The safety-related divisional AC tinue to operate at conductor temperature not unit substations, motor control centers, and DC exceeding 900C and to withstand an emergency distribution panels are located to provide sepa-
, overload temperature of up to 1300C in accor-ration and electricalisolation between the di-l dancewithlPCEAS-66-524/NEMAWC 7AppendixD. visions. Clear access to and from the main Each power cable has' stranded conductor and switchgear rooms is also provided. Separation flame resistive and radiation resistant is provided between the divisional cables and covering. Conductors are specified to continue between divisional cables and nondivisional ca-to operate at 100% relative humidity with a bles being routed throughout the plant via sepa-m i
service life expectancy of 60 years. Also, Class rate fire rated compartments or embedments.
1E Cables are designed to survive the LOCA Local instrument panels and racks are located to ambient condition at the end of the 60 yr life Amendmeet 10 s}:2 l
l l
f 5et
&t *p pern d MM f*
1 MAG fr (de e #'d en o
cet pyy 3 1
Standard Plant facilitate adequate separation of cab! ng.
curves of th electrical penetrations' primary and secondarylcurrent interrupting devices 8333 Fire Detection and Protection Systems plotted agains3)the thermal capability (1 t)
, L, 3~
2 curve of therpinetration (to maintain mechanical All areas except the diesel generator room are integrity) /Also, provide a simplified one line protected by product of combustion detectors. The diagram showing the location of the protective diesel. generator rooms are protected by carbon devices in the penetration circuit. and indicate dioxide suppression, which is actuated by com-the maaimum available fault current of the pensated rate of heat rise and ultraviolet flame circuit.
] (k*)
detectors.
o,,J (ocafio,is Provide specific identificationAof power e
Automatic wet standpipe, sprinklers, hose supplies used to provide external control power E
reels, and manual pull boxes for the operator's for tripping primary and backup electrical 3
isitiation of fire signals are provided in areas penetration breakers (if utilizeg.
as described in subsection 9.5.1, which includes 4.---(jJ rread " D " Muty p),1 areas where cables and cable trays are routed.
8.3.4.5 AnafysliTesting for Spatial i
Separation per IEEE 384 8 3.4 Interfaces 3
Sub ection 8.3.1.
statelthatk!:SkfMgEE;;E::SEp.h' 2.2 A
'4 2 8J.4.1 Internpting Capacity of Electrical Distribution Equipment areak N g
y; -
fe qu al o.-
O g-exceed thec; _ u _r:d by IEEE 384 The interrupting capacity of the switchgear Identify any specific instances where this and circuit interrupting devices must be shown to requirement is met by testing and analysis (as be compatible with the magnitude of the available opposed to actual %'efd"d *"
fault current based on final selection of the transformer impedence, etc. (See Subsection 8J 4.6 DC Voltage Analysis 8.3.1.1.5.2(4)).
Provide a DC voltage analysis showing 83.4.2 Diesel Generator Design De_ lig battery terminal voltage and worst case DC load co/
terminal voltage at each step of the Class IE Subsection 8.3.1.1.8.2 (4 equires the battery loading profile. (See Subsection e
diesel generators be capable i reaching full 8.3.2.1) pl speed and voltage within seconds after the A
6 signal to start. Demonstrate the reliability of Provide the cuanufactor's ampere hour rating the diesel generator start up circuitry designed of the batteries at the two hour rate and at the g
to accomplish this, eight hour rate, and provide the one minute a
ampere rating of the batteries (see Subsection 83.4 3 Certified Proof Tests on 83.2.13.2).
Cable Samples 83.4.7 Seismic Quali!! cation of Eyewash Subsection 8.3.1.2.4 requires certified proof Equipment g
p tests on cables to demonstrate 60-year life, and resistance to radiation, flame and the Subsection 8.3.2.1.3 specifies that an environment. Demonstrate the testing methodology emergency eyewash shall be located in each j
to assure such attributes are acceptable for the battery room. Provide assurance that the 60 year life.
eyewash and associated piping are seismically qualified, and that the eyewash is located such 83.4.4 Electrical Penetration Assemblies that water cannot splash on the battery.
.k Subsection 8.3.1.4.1.2. (7) specifies de:ign 8J.4.3 Diesel Generator Load requirements for electrical penetration Table Changes assemblies. Provide fault current clearing time Tr.ble s 8.3-1 and 8.3 3 are gen eric.
3 However, changes may be needed for specific Amendment 10 8M3 4
-=-
,~
cord # commen$s V ~--
m
^(
~[
7 13 See answer for cbmments concerning NRO SER issues,
/
N s
N...., Item 1,thefollodingreplacesthefirsthalfofthespcond
/
\\
k/..'...
N f
s 0..............s.
for 3
s 8'.hl.4.1.2(7):
/
/
s
/
\\
/
,/
'\\
\\
f N
/
\\
i Redundant'uvercurrent interrupting devices are provided for all electrical i
circuits (in'ejuding all instrumentation and control circuits, as well'as power j
circuits) goinhsthrough containsent penetrations / if the maximum ava'ilable fault
}
1 current (including failure of upstream devices)/is grhater than tiie continuous
\\ current rating of the penetration.
/
'x
/
7
's j
,/
................,..........._......................\\.3.......
l t(
For Item 2, the followind s added, beginding, at the enFo he last sentence \\ n <
Section'8(3.4.4* /
/
\\
/
N N
6
/'
\\
/
s~
x Provideananal)sisdemonstratingthethermalcapabilityofallelectrical conductors within penetrations is preserved and protected by one of the following:
- 1. Show that maximum available fault current (including failure of upstream devices) is less than the maximum continuous current capacity of the conductor within the penetration; or
- 2. Show that redundant circuit protection devices are provided, and are 4
adequately designed and set to interrupt current, in spite of single failure, at
'S a value below the maximum continuous current capacity of the conductor within g'-
the penetration.
Such devices must be located in separate panels or be t
separated by barriers; and must be independent such that failure of one vill not adsersly affect the other.
Furthermore, they must not be dependent on the same power supply, d
fi e
ABWR i
msmo Standard Plant prv n l
plant applications. Such changes, if any, shall q
be identified and addressed. (See Subsection 8.3.4.14 Aministrettu controts for sus 8.3.1.1.8.2) crounding circuit scukers 8.3.4.9 Offsite Power Supply Arrangement f1,vres B.3 1, 8.3 2, and 8.3 3 show bus grounding circuit breakers, which are intended to provide Operating procedures shall require one of the uf ety grounds during maintenance operations.
}
g three divisional buses of Figure 8.31 be fed by Aministrative controts shall be provided to keep A
the alternate power source during normal thne circuit breakers racked out ti.e., in the operationi in order to prevent simultaneous -
disconnect position) whenever corresponding buses deenergization of all divisional ) tes on the are energired. Furthernore, annunciation shalt be loss of only one of the offsite pr supplies.
provided to alors whereer the breakers are racked 7
ggQ in for service.
l 8.3.4.10 Diesel Generator QualK e Tests m
M 8.3.4.15 inting of anet overte.d sypen The schedule for qualification C"'**"""*
diesel generators, and the subsey f
those tests, must be provided. h d' i "d i " * "d i n * * '"P "" ' ' ' 3 * * " * ""* l be in accordance with IEEE 387 and k.,
o m rt ad pr tecti n f r class 1E Movs is bypassed Guide 1.9. (See Susbsection 8.3.1.1.8.9) at n t times except when the Mov is being tested.
8.3.4.11 Defective Refurbished Circuit Breakers
" 'nons f r usting the bypass shall be V
imptemented, in accordance with the recutreements NRC Bulliten No. 8810 and NRC Information
""* ' ' ' **Y '"'
- l ' 106 -
Notice No. 88 46 identify problems with defective O
refurbished circuit breakers. To ensure that f
refurbished circuit breakers shall not be used in 8.3.4.16 Energency operatirg Proce&res for safety related or non safety related circuitry of station eteekout ~
the ABWR design, it is an interface requirement that new breakers be specified in the purchase Applicants referencing the ABWR standard Plant specifications, should provide instructions in their plant Emergency Operating Procedures for operator
)
8.3.4.12 Minimum Starth g tag for
.etions e ring a postutated station blackout Class IE Motors event. specificanty, if division I instrunentation is functionirg property, the Provide the minimum required starting red m dant divisions it, til and tv should be shut g
voltages for Class 1E motors. Compare these dom in oroer to 1) ndace hed dissipation in the "p
minimum required voltages to the voltages that controt_roon W te Hvac is tost, and 2) conserve will be supplied at the motor terminals during battery enersy for edittionat sRv capacity, or the statting transient when operating on offsite other specific f mctions, a needed, throughout power and when operating on th: ediesel the event, g
generators,
/
[.
-8.3.4.13 Identification and Justification of Associated Circuits I" # #h*** IP*
- II "
- r Prior to the taptementation stage of the in i n to tne Watoy ch aM staMs design, the only
- associated circuits" (as defined N
'**"* "8' F # ***
Plant design are in the safety ret ted -_ _ m a
a
, as app a
e apuram M lighting subsysteek(see 9.5.3.2.Y.. INe gaatity omnufacturing of both safety and implementation design, provide 1) assurance that this is stilt a true statement,
, 2y$h
}
specificatty identify erud justif circuidintheAaWRssAR;andshow EnMet[the I
requirements of Regulatory cuide 1.75, position C.4.
~
r' t'
-ABWR 2xamo StanA.rd Piant uv e TABLE 831 D/G LOAD TABLE.LOCAt toPF 16 d
(
DIESEL ENGINE OUTPUT (kW)
SYS.
LOAD RATING NOTE
- NO.
DESCRIF!10N (kW)
A B
C MOTOR ope VALVES 120x3 X
X
-X (2) gy C12 FMCRD 70x3 X
X X
(4)
C41' SLC HEATER 40;10x1 X
X (3)
SLC PUMP 45:2 47.4 47.4 E11 RHR PUMP 450x3 526.3 526 3 5263 E12 HPCF PUMP 1450 1606.7 1606.7 G31 CUW PUMP 120x2 X
X (6)
G41 FPC PUMP 75x2 78.9 78.9 P13
'MUWCPUMP 55x3 X
X X
P21 RCW PUMP 250x4 584.8 584.8 350x2 818.8 MS F?
P25 HECW PUMP 22x4 46 3 46 3
. HECW REFRIGERATOR 190x4 400 400 P41 RSW PUMP" 200:4 467.8 467.8 250x2 584.8
@ @l PS2 IA COMPRESSOR 110x2 X
X (3)
R23 P/C TRANSF. LOSS 40x6 84.2 -
84.2 84.2 R42-DC 125V CHGR div. I 70x1 98.2 div. II, IE, IV 34x3 47.7 47,7 47.7 (11)
- Si non-div.
34x2 47.7 47.7
$S DC 250V CHGR 126x2-176.8 176.8
. See Table &3-3for Notes
" Pan of Turbine Isla.M Amendment 10 8124
T MM 2Wl%AO Standard Plant arv s TABLE 8.3.,1b
/
.T(L0fD 1?0'if-D/G LOAD TABLE.
, Continued)
D EleENGINE OUTPtTT (kW)
SYS.
LOAD RATING NO1I*
NO.
DESCRIPTION (kW)
A B
C R46 VITAL CVCF(non IE) 20x2
.18.9 18.9
-@ S SSLC CVCF 20i4 37J 18.9 18.9 COMP CVCF 150x2 189.5 189.5 R47 TRANSF. C/R INST 30kVAx3 103 19 3 19.3 NOR INST 50kVAx2 32.2 32.2 RS2 LIGHTING 100x3 117 117 117 ff T22-SGTS FAN 16.5x2 17.4 17.4 SGTS HEATER 25x2 29.2 29.2 T41 DRYWELL COOLER 18.5x4 X
X X
(3)
T49 FCS HEATER 110x2 128.6 128.6 6S FCS BLOWER 11x2 11.6 11.6 U41 R/B ELEC ROOM FAN 57.2x6 60.2 60.2 60.2.
MCR FAN 127.1x2-4999:C 133.9 9 /M.7)
C/B ELEC. ROOM FAN 38.5x6 40.5 40.5 40.5 HX/A FAN 77x3 81.1 81.1.
81.1 DG FAN 30x6 63.2 63.2 63 2 OTHER LOADS 360 120 210 (9)
- 4 m
y$
TOTAL M
4829.8 4646+t l6,((
3 811 *.
4910 See Table &3-3for Notes N
Amendment 10 8M
l uA61ooAo Sjand=M Plant REV B
- [/~
D/G LOAD TABLE LdPP (To LCCd)'
!f,l/
4
\\
(
/
DIESEL ENGIhT. OUTPUT (kW)
- SYS, LOAD RATING NO7E' NO.
DESCRIFTION (kW)
A B
C MOTOR ope VALVES 120x3 X
X X
(2) 8%
C12
~ FM CRD 70x3 X
X X
(4)
-66 (3) )
Ib'[f.
C41 SLC HEATER 40;10x1
_.1L7 46.8
{4W C SLC PUMP 45x2
((,
/
Eli RHRPUMP 450x3 526 3 526 3 5263 E12 HPCP PUMP 1450 1606.7 1606.7 G31 CUW PUMP 120x2 (6)
G41 FPC PUMP 75x2 78.9 '
78.9 P13 MUWCPUMP 55s3 57.9 57.9 57.9 P21 RCW PUMP 250x4 584.8 584.8 350x2 818.8 8M l
l
??
1 P25 HECW PUMP 22x4 463 46 3 HECW REFRIGERATOR 190x4 400 400 P41 RSW PUMP" 200x4 467.8 467.8 250x2 584.8 ME Am PS2-1A COMPRESSOR 110x2 115.8 115.8 3
L
- R23 P/C TRANSF. LOSS 40x6
' 84.2 84.2 84.2 R42 DC 125V CHGR div. I 70x1 98.2 div. II, III, IV 34x3 47.7 47.7 47.7 (11) non-div.
34x2 47.7 47.7 DC 250V CHGR 126x2 1"/6.8 176.8
- See Table &3 3forNotes
" Pan of Twbine Island I
Amadment 10 8126 l
ABM 2mioo40 Standard Plant nv n TABLE 8.3 2 (wA Loci)
D/G LOAD TABLE.LOPP (Continued) g DIESEL ENGINE OlJrPUT (kW)
- SYS, LOAD RATING NOTE
- NO.
DESCRIPTION (kW)
A B
C R46 VTTAL CVCF(non.1E) 20x2
-18.9 18.9 SSLE CVCF 20x4 37.8 18.9 18.9 COMP CVCF 130x2 189.5 189.5
-R47 TRANSF. C/R INST 30 kVAx3 19 3 19 3 19 3 NOR INST 50 kVAx3 32.2 32.2 RS2 LIGHTUlG 100x3 117 117 117 T22-SGTS FAH 16.5x2 17,4 17.4 SGTS HEATER 25x2 29.2 29.2 T41 DRYWELL COOLER 18.5x4 19.5 19.5 39.0 S
T49 FCS HEATER 110x2 X
X (8)
FCS BLOWER 11x2 X
X (8)
U41 R/B ELEC, ROOM FAN 57.2x6 60.2 60.2
-60.2 i g ' If MCR FAN 127.2x2 43&9t -
133.9 M
C/B ELEC. ROOM FAN 38.5x6 40.5 40.5 40.5 HX/A FAN 77x3 81.1 81.1 81.1 DG FAN 30x6 63.2 63.2 63.2
'~
OTHER LOADS 360 120 210 (9)
-TOTAL-W W
fb'l[.
)4%}
49(,0*]
4913'S l
See Table &3-3for Notes l
l Amendment 10 8327
~.
23A6100A0 tiltanalard Plant m's TABLE 8.3 3 NOTES FOR TABLES 8.31 AND 8.3 2 (1).-: shows ti at the load is not connected to the switchgear of this division.
X: shows that the load is not counted for D/G continuous output claculation by the reasons shown on other notes.
(2) ' Motor operated valves' are operated only 30-60 seconds. Therefore they are not counted for the DG continuous out ut calculation.
(3) - 1.OADS are shed with sign 4 M refepeard c" fc P/6 d Idd 8 5 "#I F#5^I' Id'IO (4) FMCRD operating time (about 2 minutes) is not counted for the DG continuous output calculation.1 (5) Deleted (6) CUW pump will not operate under LOCA condition. CUW pump may operate under LOPP condition, but will not operate with SLC pump. On this calculation, the CUW pump is considered and the SLC pump is not sinc: the CUW motor is the larger of the two.
(7) Deleted (8) - FCS will not operate under LOPP condition.
gg (9) Deleted mm (10) Deleted (11) Div. IV battery charger is fed from Div. i motor control center.
_ (12) Load description acronyms are interpeted as follws:
C/B
-.ControlBudding HX
- Heat Exchanger COMP = Computer IA Instrument Air CRD' - Control Rod Driw MCR Main Control Room CUW Clean Up Water MUWC - Make Up Water System (condensed)
CVCF Coastant Voltage Constant Frequency NPSS
- Nuclear Protection Safety System g_g R/B
- Reactor Building mm DG Diesel Generator RCW - Reactor Coohng Water (building)
FCSL - - Pla==ahday Control System FPC Feel Pool Coohng RHR Residual Heat Removal FMCRD - Pine Motion Cotrol Rod Drive RSW
. Reactor Sea Water HECW Emergency Coohng Water S'SGT Standby Gas Treatment HPCF - High Pressure Core Flooder SLC Standby Liquid Control Amenderwn: 10 8128
i f
E.4 i
a' Table 8.34 e
4
- R D/G LOAD SEQUENCE DIAGRAM 9
MAJOR LOADS-3 7
(Response to Questions 435.14 & 435.15)
E
.l l
i Bleek 3
K1 2
plDCE3 4-BIDCK S 6
7 Kg.
m 9
O Tw -
or or o or o pf gs~
S{
A.
M.4e on 20 35 15 go 55 M
MOV D/W Cooling Pee RCW Psy RCW Pouip RSW Pump RSW Pump FMCRD Osegem
$LCramp RHR Peep,
tDPP 1 last.Tr.
DO HVAC
- HECW Pump MCR HVAC R/B Emer.HVAC Hs/A Pmr. IIVAC MUWC Pump CVCI%
HECW Refng CUW Pweph..
FPCPump IJgMing C/B Esmer.HVAC SGIS IA f-(SLC HentbrCuP.mp MOV D/we Pen RCW Pump RCWPump R5W Pump 35W Pump FMCRD Oergen SLC P=mp RJIR Pump 8 Mld DO HVAC -
IRECW Pump MCRHVAC R/B Emer. HVAC IIs/A Pmr. HVAC NUWCPuep CVCFt HPCW Reing CUW Pump (
Lort il
! fast.Tr C/B Emer. HVAC SGIS
,lAQompas/JC Pomp u M=g (stC t/eefee-)
s w Cooli.ey h' 'RCw P.mp A
RCW r.mp Rsw r.mp
.Rsw r.mp rMCRD Goya RnR P.m, MoV
.[
T-
^
hvAc R/B Emer. HVAC Hs/A Emer. lfVAC SGT3 CYCPs EDPP III
' lass.Tr C/S Emer. HVAC 2
Ug*8
'MOV RHR Pamp RCW Persp RCW Pump RSW Pump R$W Pump fMCRD Chargers SLC Fwmp PC5.
IDCA last. Tr Do l!VAC f fECW rump MCRIIVAC R/B Emer. HVAC Hm/A Emer. HVAC MUWC Peep CVCPs HECW wing ITC rump I
lighteng C/B Pser. IfVAC SGT3 SPCUrump]
IDrP MOV AllR P e p
. RCW Pump RCWPamp RSWPump R$W Pump FMCRD Omegrn
$14 Pump FCS IDCA HrCFrump* DolfvAC SIECW Pomp MCR lIVAC R/B Emer. HVAC fle/A Emer. IIVAC MUWCrwep CVCPs IIECW Rafng !?CPemp A
II Inst. Tr C/B Pmer. IIVAC SG!3 5
tj baang IDPP g
MOV RHRPump RCW Peep RCW Pump R5W Pump RSWPomp FMCRD Oe sem tDCA IIPCP Pomp
A III last.Tr C/B Pmer. HVAC
- e25 u Mag
- Drr s
9
- >O Q\\
Nose
- te cese of the fadere of RC3C pump startup
l TABLE 8.3-5 h
i A
N' ABWR Battery Division I Two-Hour Load Capacity Analysis (Assumes no load shedding - based on IEEE 485-1978)
(/
T(low):
70 Mincel1V:
1.75 Period Load LoadChng PerTime SecTime K Factor SecSize
===================================================
1:
Al=
1000 1000 1
120 3.1 3100 2:
A2=
573
-427 1
119 3.1
-1323.7 3:
A3=
339
-234 3
118 3.1
-725.4 4:
A4=
405 66 1
115 3.05 201.3 5:
AS=
338
-67 4
114 3.04
-203.68 6:
A6=
405 67 1
110 3
201 7:
A7=
339
-66 4
109 2.9
-191.4 8:
A8=
405 66 1
105 2.7 178.2 9:
A9=
339
-66 4
104 2.6
-171.6 10: A10=
405 66 1
100 2.4 158.4 11: A11=
339
-66 39 99 2.3
-151.8 12: A12=
340 1
60 60 2
2 Total:
1073.32 (Only the highest of 12 calculated sections is selected.)
' Summary of All Data Maximum Section Size:
1073
+ Random Section Size:
0
- Terperature Correction (1.04):
1116
- Design Margin (1.15):
1284
- Aging Factor (1.25):
1605
===================================================
TOTAL AMPERE HOURS REQUIRED (2 HOURS):
1605 BATTERY RATING FOR DIVISION I:
4000 ADDITIONAL MARGIN (AMPERE-HOURS):
2395
-% ADDITIONAL MARGIN:
149 Legend T(low): Lowest expected electrolyte temperature.
Mincel1V: Minimum allowable cell voltage / # cells (105/60).
Period: Time interval in which current is assumed constant.
Load: Current load luring Period (in Amperes).
LoadChng: Change in load from previous Period (in Amperes).
PerTime: Duration of Period (in minutes).
SecTime: Time to end of Section (in minutes).
K Factor: Battery capacity at SecTime minute rate.
SecSize: Required Section size (in Ampere-Hours).
4a1c5dNbtitteepl,Gpr-d l
3H TABLE 8.3-6 pIJ)
ABWR Battery Division I Eight-Hour Load Capacity Analysis s/
(Assumes no load shedding - based on IEEE 485-1978)
.T(low) -
70 MincellV:
1.75 Period Load Loadchng PerTime SecTime K Factor SecSize
===================================================
.1:
Al=
1000 1000 1
-480 8.21 8210 2:
A2=
573
-427 1
479 8.21 -3505.67 3:
A3=
339'
-234 3
478 8.2
-1918.8
'4:
A4=-
405 66 1
475 8.19 540.54 5
A5=
338
-67 4
474 8.19
-548.73 6:
A6=
405 67
-1 470 8.17 547.39 7:. A7=
339
-66 4
469 8.16
~538.56 8:
A8=
405 66 1
465
~ 8.15 537.9 9:
A9=
339
-66 4
464 8.14
-537.24 10: A10=
405 66-1 460 8.13 536.58 11:--A11=
339
-66 39 459 8.12
-535.92 12: A12=
340 1
420 420 7.95 7.95 Total:
2795.44 (Only the highest of 12 calculated sections is selected.)
Summary of All Data-Maximum Section Size:
2795.
+ Random Section Size:
0
- Temperature C3rrection (1.04):
2907 p
- Design Margin (1.15):
3343 l
- Aging Factor l(1.25):.
4179 L
- ======================================w..======================
TOTAL' AMPERE HOURS' REQUIRED (8 HOURS):-
4179 BATTERY RATING FOR DIVISION I:
4000 ADDITIONAL MARGIN (AMPERE-HOURS):
-179
%-ADDITIONAL MARGIN:
l-
-4 E
I-Legend.
- T(low) : Lowest expected electrolyte temperature.
MincellV: Minimum allowable cell _ voltage / # cells (105/60).
Period: Time interval in'which-current is assumed constant.
Load: Current load duringEPeriod (in Amperes).
LoadChng: Change in load from previous Period (in Amperes).
PerTime: Duration of-Period (in minutes).
[
- SecTime
- Time-to-end of Section (in minutes).
L K Factor: Battery capacity at SecTime minute rate.
7
'SecSizer: Required Section size 1(in Ampere-Hours).
L t \\va[C W N p' A
Si ir TAPLE 8.3-7 (acul J
ABWR Battery Divisions II & III Two-Hour Capacity Analysis (Assumes no load shedding - based on IEEE 485-1978)
T(low):
70 MincellV:
1.75 Period Load Loadchng PerTime SecTime K Factor SecSize
================================================u==
1:
Al=
448 448 1
120 3.1 1388.8 2:
A2=
248
-200 1
119 3.1
-620 3:
A3=
252 4
3 118 3.1 12.4 4:
A4=
301 49 1
115 3.05 149.45 5:
A5a 252
-49 4
114 3.04
-148.96 6:
A6=
301 49 1
110 3
147 7:
A7=
252
-49 4
109 2.9
-142.1 8:
A8=
301 49 1
105 2.7 132.3 9:
A9=
252
-49 4
104 2.6
-127.4 10: A10=
301 49 1
100 2.4 117.6 11: A11=
252
-49 39 99 2.3
-112.7 12: A12=
253 1
60 60 2
2 Total:
798.39 (Only the highest of 12 calculated sections is selected.)
Summary of All Data Maximum Section Size:
798
+ Random Section Size:
0
- Temperature Correction (1.04):
830
- Design Margin (1.15):
955
- Aging Factor (1.25):
1194
===================================================
TOTAL-AMPERE HOURS REQUIRED (2 HOURS):
1194 BATTERY RATING FOR DIVISIONS II & III:
3000 ADDITIONAL MARGIN (AMPERE-HOURS):
1806
% ADDITIONAL MARGIN:
151
~ Legend T(low): Lowest expected electrolyte temperature.
MincellV: Minimum allowable cell voltage / # cells (105/60).
Period: Time interval in which current is assumed constant.
Load: Current load during Period (in Ampares).
LoadChng: Change in. load from previous Period (in Amperes).
L PerTime: Duration of Period (in minutes),
i SecTime: Time to end of Section (in minutes).
K Factor: Battery-capacity at SecTime minute rate.
SecSize: Required Section size (in Ampere-Hours).
l
-c % 5d/battcap? ?,M.
Yl l
r.
TABLE 8.3-8 (ybd)
ABWR Battery Divisions II & III Eight-Hour Capacity Analysis u/
(Assumes no load shedding - based on IEEE 485-1978)
T(low):
70 MincellV:
1.75 Period Load Loadchng PerTine SecTime K Factor SecSize
===================================================
1:
Al=
448 448 1
480 8.21 3678.08 2:
A2=
248
-200 1
479 8.21
-1642 3:
A3=
252 4
3 478 8.2 32.8 4:
A4=
301 49 1
475 8.19 401.31 5:
AS=
252
-49 4
474 8.19
~401.31 6:
A6=
301 49 1
470 8.17 400.33 7:
A7=
252
-49 4
469 8.16
-399.84 8:
AB=
301 49 1
465 8.15 399.35 9:
A9=
252
-49 4
464 8.14
-398.86 10: A10=
301 49 1
460 8.13 398.37 11: A11=
252
-49 39 459 8.12
-397.88 12: A12=
253 1
420 420 7.95 7.95 Total:
2078.3 (only the highest of 12 calculated sections is solected.)
Summary of All Data Maximum Section Size:
2078
+ Random Section Size:
0
- Temperature Correction (1.04):
2161
- Design Margin (1.15):
2486
- Aging Factor (1.25):
3107
===================================================
TOTAL AMPERE HOURS REQUIRED (8 HOURS):
3107 BATTERY RATING FOR DIVISIONS II & III:
3000 ADDITIONAL MARGIN (AMPERE-HOURS):
-107
% ADDITIONAL MARGIN:
-3 Legend T(low): Lowest expected electrolyte temperature.
MincellV: Minimum allowable cell voltage / # cells (105/60).
Period: Time interval in which current is assumed constant.
Load: Current load during Period (in Amperes).
LondChng: Change in load from previous Period (in Amperes).
PerTime: Duration of Period (in minutes).
SecTime: Time to end of Section (in minutes).
K Factor: battery capacity at SecTime minute rate.
SecSize: Required Section size (in Ampere-Hours),
of'goate5d/hatt-eep2. 8pr A 1
o t{
TABLE 8.3-9 (unJ}
ABWR Battery Division'IV Two-Hour Load Capacity Analysis
.(Assumes no load shedding - based on.IEEE 485-1978)-
.Y T(low):
70 MincellV:
1.75 Period
' Load Loadchng PerTime SecTime K Factor SecSize
===================================================
1
- Al=
224 224 1
120 3.1 694.4 2:
A2=
124
-100 1
119 3.1
-310 l
3:
A3=-
127 3
3 118 3.1 9.3 4:
A4==
150 23 1
115 3.05 70.15 5:
AS=
126
-24 4
114 3.04
-72.96
_6 :-
A6= '
151 25 1
110 3
75-7:
A7=
126
-25 4
109 2.9
-72.5 82 A8=
151 25 1
105 2.7 67.5 9:
A9=
126
-25 4
104 2.6
-65 10: A10=
151 25 1
100 2.4 60 11: A11=-
126
-25 39 99 2.3
-57.5 122.A12=
127 1
60 60 2
2 Total:
400.39
'(Only the highest of-12 calculated sections is selected.)
Summary of All Data
. Maximum.Section-Size:
400
-+. Random Section-Size:.
0
- Temperature correction (1.04):
416-e' Design Margin'(1.15):
479 L* Aging Factor (1.25):
599
===================================================
TOTAL AMPERE HOURS REQUIRED (2 HOURS):
599
' BATTERY RATING FOR DIVISION.IV:
1400
-ADDITIONAL MARGIN (AMPERE-HOURS):
801
=% ADDITIONAL MARGIN:
134
-Legend
=-T(low) : Lowest' expected electrolyte temperature.
TMincellV: Minimum allowable cell voltage.:/ # cells (105/60).
Period:LTime' interval in which current is assumed constant.
Load: ECurrentuload during Period (in-Amperes)..
-Loadchng:. Change in. load from previous Period (in Amperes).
PerTime:-Duration-of Period (in minutes).
SecTime: Time toiend of Section (in minutes).
1K Factor: ' Battery capacity at SecTime minute rate..
-SecSize: Required Section size (in Ampere-Hours).
M ealc5d/ bat. teep +:-2 M -
b TABLE 8.3-10 ABWR Battery Division IV Eight-Hour Load Capacity Analysis
( " O#
(Assumes no load shedding - based on IEEE 485-1978) l T(low):
70-MincellV:
1.75 i
Period Load Loadchng PerTime SecTime K Factor SecSize namnamamuum;mmmmmmmmaamamawan=ammmmmmmmmmmmmmm=mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmme 1:
Al=
224 224 1
480 8.21 1839.04 2:
A2=
124
-100 1
479 8.21
-821 3:
A3=
127 3
3 478 8.2 24.6 4:
A4=
150 23 1
475 8.19 188.37 5:
A5=
126
-24 4
474 8.19
-196.56.
6:
A6=
151 25 1
470 8.17 204.25 t
7:
A7=
126
-25 4
469 8.16
-204 8:
AB=
151 25 1
465 8.15 203.75 I
9:
A9=
126
-25 4
464 8.14
-203.5 10: A10=
151 25 1
460 8.13 203.25 11: A11=
126
-25 39 459 8.12
-203 12: A12=
127 1
420 420 7.95 7.95 Total:
1043.15 (Only the highest of 12 calculated sections is selected.)
-Summary of All Data Maximum Section Size:
1043
+ Random Section Size:
0
- Temperature Correction (1,04):
1085
- Design Margin (1.15):
1248 e Aging Factor (1.25):
1560
===================================================
TOTAL AMPERE HOURS REQUIRED (8 HOURS):
1560 BATTERY RATING FOR DIVISION IV:
1400 ADDITIONAL MARGIN (AMPERE-HOURS):
-160
%. ADDITIONAL MARGIN:
-10 Legend T(low): Lowest expected electrolyte temperature.
MincellV: -Minimum allowable cell voltage / # cells (105/60).
Period: Time interval in which current is assumed constant.
Load: Current load during Period.(in Amperes).
LoadChng: Change in load from previous Period (in Amperes).
PerTime: Duration of Period (in minutes).
SecTime: Time to end of Section (in minutes).
K Factor: Battery capacity at SecTime minute rate.
SecSize: Required Section size (in Ampere-Hours),
c: \\cclGdfbatt-eapt. Spr &
i 1i u d:
- u. w Notes relating to Tables 8.3-5 through 8.3-10
[/,j}
An estimated load demand profile for the 125 VDC batteries was provided in Response 435.38 (SSAR page 20.3-253.21),
As explained in that response, this information could change as the design is specified for unique applications.
A load capacity analysis (based on IEEE 485-1978) was performed for both the two-hour and eight-hour periods, using the data provided in Response 435,38, The results are shown in Tables 8.3 5 through 8.3 10.
The two-hour analyses (Tables 8.3-5,
-7, and -9) show extensive additional margins.
The Division I additional margin is 149% of the required capacity including the 15% design margin and 25% aging factor suggested by IEEE 485.
The eight hour analyses (Tables 8.3 6, 8, and 10) show that capacities are slightly exceeded when the 15% design margin and 25% aging factor are considered.
However, the eight-hour coping is justified for the station blackout scenario for the following reasons:
- 1. The analyses are highly cor.servative in that they assume no load shedding.
During station blackout, loads would be shed thereby greatly increasing the ampere hours available.
- 2. Divisions 2, 3, and 4 are redundant to each other, and as a group redundant to Division I except for the control of the RCIC from the control room.
Therefore, the life of the Division I battery could be greatly extended by shedding all of its loads except the RCIC controls.
- 3. Even with the loads not shed, the capacities are within requirements if the 15% design margin is not applied.
- 4. The analysis method itself is highly conservative in that loads are considered constant throughout various periods, when, in fact, many are intermittent.
- 5. The ABWR has three Class lE diesel generators and a non Class 1E combustion turbine generator (CTG) on site.
This combination of four on site power sources suggest the probability of a station blackout is very low, In addition, per Regulatory Guide 1.155, the CTG qualifies as an AAC, and precludes the need for a coping analysis (see Sections 3.2.5 and 3.3,5 of Reg. Guide 1.155).
l T A BL C
% 3-ll QtneL
& B HMdrM A L MM.s V~
LBPf#CCl#S'"
ANNUNCIATION DOS DTS DTT CDT CCB GTT r efsta ENGINE OVEPSPEED TRIP X
X X
X CENERATOR DIFFERENTIAL RELAY IRIP X
X X
X GENT.RATOR CROUND OVERCURRENT X
X X
GENERATOR VOLTAGE RESTRAINT 0VERCURRENT X
X X
GENERATOR BUS UNDERFREQUENCY X
X X
CENERATOR REVERSE POWER X
X X
X GENERATOR LOSS OF FIELD X
X X
X e.,...................
GENERATOR BUS DIFFERENTIAL RELAY TRIP X
.....e...........................................
HIGH.HICH JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE X
X X
X D G BEARINGS FICH TEMPERATURE X
X X
X f
)
X X
X D/G BEARINGS HIGH VIBRATION X
X X
X HIG.I.HIGd LUBE OIL TEMPERATURE X
X X
X X
X HIGH CRA!T
' PRESSURE X
X X
X LOV. L'
.ET WATER PRESSURE X
X X
X LOW l
.. JACKET WATER X
LOW F.Eu dRE.. JACKET WATFR X
LOW TEMPERATURE--JACKET WATER IN X
HIGH TE.KPER AME-.1ACKET VATER OUT X
LOU LEVEL-. LUBE OIL HAPK X
LOW TEMPERATURE..IUBE GIL IN X
HIGH TEMPERATURE..iUBE OIL 001 X
MICH DIFF. PRESSUP.E--LUBE OIL FILTER X
IDW PRESSURE.-TURBO OIL RIGHT/LEFT BANX X
LOW PRESSURE. LUBE DIL X
CONTROL CIRCUIT FIME FAILURE X
1 1
_ _. _ - - _ _ ~.
ANNUNCIATION DOS DTS DTT GDT GCB GTT LEP DIESEL GENERATOR OVERVOLTAGE X
LOV PRESSURE--STARTING AIR X
IN HAIN"'ENANCE HCDE X
X D/G UNIT FAILS TO START X
D/G /HASE OVERCURRENT X
OU OF SERVICE X
X LOCK 0UT RELAY OPERATE 0 X
X X
LOV.HIGH LEVEL-. FUEL DAY TANK X
LOW LEVEL FUEL STORAGE TANK X
LOW PRESSURE -FUEL OlL X
HIGH DIFF. PRESSURE.-FUEL FILTER X
IN LOCAL CONTROL ONLY X
LEGEND:
. Diesel OverSpeed DTS - Diesel Trip or W. Service ino/mtht::
DTT - Diesel Trouble or in Test 007 - Generator Differential Trip GCB - Generator Circuit Breaker trip GTT - Generator Trouble or in Test 12.P - 10CA Bypass (i.e., trip bypassed during LOCA)(ver a n 4 aveulafte uiu/M) t n a lht e*3 vary dependmy v. uv c t,a me tera n *cs Selected.ye r;f specific clies e l g e~ en t**-
l l
t l
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1 1
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i 4
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i 4
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REFER:TO PROPRIETARY SUBMITTAL.
FOR FIGURs 8,3-2 c
t i
i io e
f l,~
~
t i-(
l I
l
(.
L i
I I-l(
l l
f t
i i
I.;'.
[
l-l I
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l
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n -,
~ -
REFER-TO PROPRIETAR,Y S'UBMITTAL FOR FIGURE 8.3-4 l
l l
l
- '-a
_,ma...___
,9 m74 9
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I i
e REFER TO PROPRIETARY SUBMITTAL FOR FIGURE 8.3-7 t
r we.
-y,-
-m-w-
-. ~,.
.,,,.-,y.,
-..n-..
-,,,,,,,----,,-.,,,-.....--.,,.--_,..,..,,,,---,.,-,,.,.,y y
_.-.w-._,,,..
REFER TO PROPRIETARY SUBMITTAL FOR SECTION 9.5.3 AND ASSOCIATED SUBSECTIONS
. )
- - ~,,
+ ~ _
m-
MN susiowt standard Plant uv n (4) Ultim6tc heat sink be conducted. Any nos compliance shall be documented as being requised and acceptable on i
g The applicant's fire protection program shall the basis of the Fire Harard Analysis, Appendix comply with the SRP Section 9.5.1, with ability 9A and the Fire Hazard Probabilistic Risk m
to bring the plant to safe shutdown condition Assessment, Appendia 19M.
- sn Serb; following a complete fire burnout without a need for recovery.
9.5.1Iheterences f "g "
9J.1.3.10 HYAC Pnssurt Calculations 1.
Stello, Victor, Jr., Design Arquiremtnis Related To The Evolutionary Advanced Light 8
The applicant referencing the ABWR design Water Ataciors (ALWRS), Policy issue, shall provide pressure calculations and confirm SECY.69 013 The Commissione.*s, United capability during pre operational testlog of the States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, smoke control mode of the HVAC systems as January 19, 1989.
l described in Subsection 9.5.1.0.6.
2.
Cote, Authur E., NFPA Fitt protection 9 3.13.11 Plant Security Systems Critaria Handbook, National Fire Protection Association, Slateenth Edition.
The design of the security system shall include an evaluation of its impact on plant
?.
Design of Smoke Control Systems for operation, testing, and maintenance. This Buildings, American Society of Heating, evaluation shall assure that the security Refrigerating, and Air Conditioning restrictions for access to equipment and plant Engineers, Inc., September 1983.
regions is compatible with required operator actions during all operating and emergency modes 4.
Atcommended fractics for SmoAr Control of operation (i.e., loss of offsite power, access Systems, NFPA MA, National Fire Protection for fira protection, health physics, maintenance, Association,1988.
testing and local operator). In addition, this evaluation shall assure that:
2$,1f g
a (a) There are no areas within the Nuclear Island where communication with central and f@CN secondary alarm stations is not possible; 4
hd 1
(b) Portable security radios will not interfere
\\,
with plant monitoring equipment, I'
y yo,ff # '
, 1 *f eJ f'[<g*nt3 p,c v til'I (c) Minimum isolation.ons and protected area 5 all f t*dgC i
b illumination capibilities cannot be defeated gf jgb by sabotage actions outside of the protected per iodic lHJff'I i'
area: and, and peninte***ce Proced.ne y ne standbd ** d C # '"J'"'
l --
(d) Electromagnetic laterference from plant l
equipment startaps or power transfers will gj3 p jwd Syyte*$
/
j not create amisance alarms or trip security
_ access control systems.
i 9J.13.12 Fire Haanrd Analysis l~
l A compliance review of the as built design
(
against the assumptions and requirements stated in the fire hnard analysis (Appendix 9A) shall Am.annu sf 9M03
.._ _ _. _- _. ___.__..~_ _ _. _. _ _ _. _ _.___
MN u As w.Ati gandard Plant uv g electrical power for operation. Each divlslon i
also has its own cooling water supply, diesel
/
\\
generator and room cooling system. For the shutdown coollag function each division has its own, suction line from and return line to the RPV. Thus each of the three RHR divisions is com pletely Independent of the other divisions in its s sutdown cooling function. The RHR system reduces the primary system temperature to
$1.70C within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of plant shutdown.
Normally, in evaluating component failure considerations associtted with RHR system shutdown cooling mos,e operation, ective pumps, valves or instrumentation would be assumed to fall. If the single active failurcieriterion is applied to the RHR system, one of the three RHR divisions would be inoperable. However, the two operable RHR divisions could achieve cold shutdown to 1000C within M hours after reactor shutdown.
1 Failure of offsite power is another case which could affect the shutdown cooling function. The plant will have two independent offsite power supplies. If both offsite power supplies are lost, each RHR division has its own diesel generator which will permit operating that division at its rated capacity, Application of the single active failure criterion would still leave two RHR divisions operstional.
The RHR systern description and performance
- evaluailon in Subsection 5.4.7 describes the models, assumptions and results for shutdown cooling with 4wo-RHR=0M. -,-m.::1
,]. l Tnrian opr*ti.j< car.di%.s.
i 15.2.10 References 1.
F. G. Brutshscy, et al., Scharfor of lodine
[
In Reactor Water During Plant Shutdown and Startup, August 1972 (NEDO 10585).
l2.
H. Creway, V. Nguyen, and P. Stancavage, Radiological Accident.The CONAC0.1 CODE, December 1981 (NEDO.221431).
j l
k 3
- Amendment 16 WU s ev g
-y'-"
r vr
- vrw w-w
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,---v
-m-r--.
- - * --e
- i-w-w au-w'w1 m
'w---
V
' - "hu W
---'9*d'--U-4
~4*'--T,r-w g-g y
rw ag gr1y-y
-+wi-ye-w ges--e
-w-~-
m--M----y wr+-
e v
REFER To PROPRIETARY SUBMITTAL 1
FOR SECTION 19E.2.1.2.2.2 i
e l
f l'
I I -
m
-9__,
ABWR msar Standard Plant mn Rt.SPONSE 435.2 The ABWR plant design has the capability to maintain core cooling during the station blackout.
Upon loss of AC off site and on. site power, the RCIC system will be initiated and provides water to the reactor vessel from the condensate storage tank. The condersate storage tank has sufficient water capacity to provide core cooling to the reactor vessel. The suppression poolis another water source which can be used during the station blariout if the ondensate storage tank becomes low.
g f'l is capable of delivering 6
f The RCIC system an -
ety relief valves (SRVs) derive their power from the Didslou ! DC bus, which ampere hours. These will support RCIC equipment for a minimum of eight hours.
An alternate AC (AAC) power source is available from an on site combustion turbine generator (CTG),
should all other power sources fail. However, the plant is capable of coping with a station blackout without the need for the CTO. The design bases and description of the CTO is provided in Subsection 9.5.11.
Station blackout performance is discussed in detailin Subsect on 19E.2.1.2.1 QUESTION 435.3
- Section 8.1.2.1 of the ABWR SSAR states that the transfer of the Class 1E buses to the alternate preferred power source is a manual transfer. This seems to contradict sections 3.1.2.2.9.2.1 and 3.1.2.2.9.2.2 whleh indicate that the transfer is automatic. Please clarity, and if the transfer is automatic provide details on the type of transfer (slow, fast, make before break, etc.), the signals used to laitiate transfer, and how the transfer is accomplished.
RESPONSE 435J Subsection 3.1.2.2.9.2 has been revised in Amendment 7 to reference Chapter 8. The transfer from the normal preferred to the alternate preferred power source is manual QUESTION 435.4 (a) - In section 8.2.3 of the ABWR SSAR one of the Neelear Island interfaces identified is fout 6.9 kV feeders to four transformers powering ten RIP pumps. However figure 8.31 and figure 8.3 2 show motor r
generator sets between two of the 6.9 kV feeders and the RIP pumps. Please clarify whether the motor generator sets will be used in the ABWR design and if so, describe their function.
(b) Also, with regard to the same subject, section 15.3.1.1.1 states that since four buses are used to supply power to the RIPS, the worst single failure can only cause thr*? RIPS to trip, and the frequency of occurrence of this event is estimated to be less than 0.001 pem
. urther down in t}is same section a I
statement is made that the probability of additional RIP tre t low (less than 10 per year), Justify l
these figures in light of the fact that historically, a total loss of cGsite power occurs about cace per 10
- site years (NUREG/CR 3992). Alto, has the effect of a fault on the common feeder upstream of the 6.9 I
- kV feeders been considered with respect to the coastdown capability of the RIPS and motor generator -
sets (braking effect)?
RE.SPONSE 435.4
- (a) - Motor generator sets are used in the ABWR design. Their primary function is to prodde additional mechanicM inertia to extend the coastdown time of the connected RIPS during a bus failure transient.
With the adoption of motor generator set design, the probability of having an all RIPS trip is virtually eliminated.
Amer 4 ment 10 --
20MS31
, _ _ _ _. _, - _ _. _ _ _. ~ _ -. -. - _ _., _. - _, -
r ABWR momt Standard Plant pey n J
(b) IA RIP reliability 4alpis is induded i This analysis e mates the pr4 ability that e tly 1,2, 10 d
of ten R1Ps m' trip. The results shown la the fo wing-f3 l A
{}
, 11Y PUMPS TRIPP jiQ)(
9,(
y 1
5.57E 3 i
/JfAA 2
1.07E 4 sbM ti 3
1.6tE.
(?
', k 4
6.44f/6 j
4,E.3 6
37E 7 7
1.41E 7 8
< < 1.00E.6 l
9
< < 1.00E 6 10
< < 1.00E 6 This analyv includes the ei of a fault on the co mon feeder up cam of the 6.
V feeders.1. wever, the effe of a to.at loss o ffsite power is not in - ded. This is b use the rea or system res nse to a total) dst of offsite po r is more than a trip RIPS For e ple, a load r etion followed y a reactn van mill be laitiate after a loss of offsite ower.flhe complete discussion of the loss of offsite power event is coatained in Subsection 15.2.6.
QUESTION 435.5 (a) Section 8.23 Identifies the nominal voltage and number of feeders interfacing between the Nuc! car Island and remainder of plant power systems; but they do not specify any interface requirements such as voltage and frequency tolerances, available fault current, loading, availability, etc., that are necessary to completely
{/
define the required laterfaces. Please pro ide the information.
(b) You also need to provide additionalinformation on the power sources (Unit Transformer, Startup r
l Transformer, etc.) and the way they are configured to provide power to the RIP pumps in order to support the availabilities claimed for these power sources in section 153.1. We sugge;f a one line diagram similar to that which you provided in your presentation to the staff on September 14,1988, be included in the ABWR SSAR to better define this interface, RESPONSE 4353
+
(a) Subsection 8.23 has been revised to provide the updated laterface definition.
l (b) The electrical system single line (Figure 831) has been revised (per attached) to provide additional information on the power sources (Main Transformer, Auxiliary Transformers, etc.) and the way they are configured to provide power to the RIP pumps in order to support the abilities claimed for these power sources in Section 153.1.
- QUESTION 4354 L Section 83.1.1.4.1 and Figure 8.14 brie 0y describe the 120 VAC Safety Related instrument Power Sptem.
This is interruptible power backed up by the divisional diesel generators. Please identify the major loads and type of instrument loads fed by this system.
E a
Amcodment 19 XLM33.2 l
l 5 s
( d)j s
Rscor nsvar 7
The refe ice statene in Secti 15.3.1.1.1 the SS spectlying that no
/,
single allure shal cause an advertent tr c.f more han three
'I Ps, is a des!,i requiremen on the on. Ite RIP powe supply e ipment.
I ita in t of site circut which rest - in a loss AC powe to plant e-ipment 4
ialyzed in S tion 15.2.
of the SSAP The See on 15.2.6 aluatio do dress a 1 e of power o the on si e RIP powe supply e tt oment.
hanalysisisprovidedinAppendix15CtotheSSARwhichdemonstratesthatthe cottbined probability of events resulting in a trip of more than three RIPS is
(
less than IE.6.
This analysis includes main generator trips, faults on the common feeder upstream of the 6.9 kV feeders (braking effect), and loss of off. site power, thereby bounding any postulated f aults in the off sit a circuit.
The analysis rekult6, a provided in Amendment 1$, are listed below.
No. of Pumps Tripped Probability 1
0.113/yr 2
0.028/yr k(7, 3a (w/o coastdown) 0.36/yr 3b (w/ coastdown)
Negligible
- 4'
- j..
W, 4
Negligible
- Negligible
- 6 Neg11 1ble*
6 7
Negligible
- 8 Negligible
- 9 Negligibic*
10 Negligible *
- < 1.0E 6/yr As explained in Section 15C.4, the failure of power to the Motor / Generator (M/C) sets does not generally constitute a trip of the RIPS powered by the M/G sets.
_A l'
l l
l
\\
ABWR um,m SlRIldAfd dn11t n.z n
RESPONSE 435.18 P
(a) If a LOCA occurs just after a LOPP but prior to load scquencing of the LOPP loads, the following events occur:
(1) Following a LOPP the 6.9 KV emergency bus leads are shed and the diesel generator output is connected to the diesel bus. This function is not dependent upon a LOCA.
(2) When a LOCA occurs (just after the LOPP) and when the 6.9 KV emergency bus voltage is gretter than 70%, the load sequence timers start and apt y the appropriate 6.9 KV emergency bus LOPP and l
LOCA loads at preset times.
D, (b) If a LOCA occurs in the middle of a LOPP loading sequence, sequencing ofloads that are applied to the 6.9 KV emergency bus after a LOPP will continue without interruption. The drywell cooling fans will be
}
tripped off the bus if they have been started. All other auto loaded LOPP loads are required for LOCA and g
sill remain on the butes. The diesel generators are capable of accepting the load blocks in any loading I
order.
4 (c) If a LOCA occurs following completion of the LOPP sequence, loads uhich are only applied to the 6.y KV iE, emergency bus in the event of a LOCA will be sequenced onto the bus. l. cads not required for a LOCA are w
tripped off.
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60 (d) In the event of a LOCA following completion of a LOPP sequence, LOPP loadsfremain on the bus;b Additionalloads required for a LOCA are scyuenced onto the bus.
(c) Non Class 1E loads are tripped by i al and no t
(f) The diesel generator circuit breaker is not tripped to accomplish the LOCA loading following a LOPP response.
QUESTION 435.19 Section 83.1.1.7(4) states that if a LOCA occurs wben the diesel generator is paralleled with the preferred power source during test and the test is being conducted from the local control panel, control must be returned to the main control room or the test operator must trip the diesel generator breaker. Because the diesel generator is not available to automatically respond to the LOCA in this circumstance it is considered to be bypassed and automatic indication of the bypass should be provided in the control room in accordance with RO 1.47. Please verify that this is the case.
RESPONSE 435.19 Section 83.LL7(5) has been changed to read:
- 1f a LOCA occurs when the diesel generator is paralled with either the normal preferred power or the alternate preferred power source, the D/O will automatically be disconnected from the 6.9 KV emergency bus regardless of whether the test is being conducted from the local centrol panel or the main control room."
QUESTION 435.20 In section 83.1.1.7(5) the description of what occurs following a LOPP during a diesel geneEator paralleling test with the normal preferred power source is different from that described for a paralleling test with the alternate preferred power source. In the first case it is stated that the diesel generator circuit breaker is Amendneci 10 20M5311
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(b)A The d tails of the diesel generator design are beyond the scope of the Licensing Review Bases (LRB)
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Section 83.L1.8.51ists the diesel engine and its generator breaker protective trips and other off normal conditions that are annunciated in the main control room and/or locally. Please identify which of these conditions are annunciated in the main control room and which are annunciated locally.
With regard to the diesel generator alarms in the control room. A review of malfunction reports of diesel generators at operating nudear plants has uncovered that in some cases the information available to the control room operator to indicate the operational status of the diesel generator may be imprecise and could lead to misinterpretation. This can be caused by the sharing of a single annunciator station to alarm conditions that tender a diesel generator unable to respond to an automatic emergency stait signal and to aho alarm abnormal, but not disabling, conditions. Another cause can be the use of wording of an annunciator window that does not specifically say that a diesel generator is inoperable (i.e., unable at the time to respond to an autematic emergency start signal.) when in fact it is inoperable for that purpose.
Review and evaluate the alarm and control circuitry for the dicsci generators in the ABWR design to determine how each condition that renders a diesel generator unable to respond to an automatic emergency start signal is alarmed in the control room. These conditions include not only the trips that lock out the diesel generator start and require manual reset, but also control switch or mode switch positions that block automatic siart, loss of control voltage, insufficient starting air pressure or battery voltage, etc. This review should consider all aspects of possible diesel generator operational conditions, for example test conditions and operation from local control stations. One area of particular concern is the unreset condition following a manual stop at the local station which terminates a diesel generator test and prior to resetting the diesel generator controls for enabling subsequent automatic operation.
Provide the details of your evaluation, the results and conclusions, and a tabulation of the following laformation:
(a) _ all conditions that render the diesel generator incapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signal for each operating mode as discussed above; (b) the wording on the annunciator window in the control room that is alarmed for each of the conditions identified in (a);
(c) any other alarm signah not included in (a) above that also cause the same annunciator to alarm; (d) any condition that renders the diesel generator locapable of responding to an automatic emergency start signal which is not alarmed in the control room; and (c) any proposed ruodifications resulting from this evaluation. For addhional infortnation and the staff position on this item see Branch Technical Position (BTP) PSB.2 in the Standard Review Plan (NUREG 0800),
Describe how the ABWR design meets each position of BTP PSB-2.
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RESPONSE C5.22
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The diesel generator, auxiliary systems and circuitry are unique depending on the supplier. Likewise, conditions which could render the diesel generator unable to rcspond to automatic emergency start signals could vary, depending on the unique design of the units. Such a detailed analysis is hardware specific, and therefore -
Amendment 10 20.3453.13
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AMR memcar Standani Plant Fev D RESPONSE 435.25 The design meets the require:nents of PSI).1. Subsections 8.13.1.23(6) and 83.1.2.1(3) have been revised accordingiy, A new Subsection 83.tl.7(8) has been added to describe the degraded voltage protection prosided for the safety related buses.
QUESTION 435.26 Clarify statement (1)(b) of section 83.1.2.2 regarding conformance of the SSLC power supply to GDC 2,4, 17, and 18. If the SSI.C power :upply is not in conformance with any part of the GDCs, so state and justify.
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RESPONSE 435.26
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p A line wasjnissing in the first'bbmittal and has be added so that it is insistent with simil statements in '
other seaionv Th(/
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statement is in; nded to mean that he SSLC power supp y complies with I portions of the lijs ad
/
GDC%hich are ap%plicable to this type of po-r supply. There apr'no non complianc, but some portionjs f the GlKs are not appl ble at this level (f exarnplc, the statpn nt in GDC 17 a. t two physically ingtfendent tacuits from.tb_e transmission networkL QUESTION 435.27 Section 83.1.2.2 states that tbc SSLC redundancy is based on the capability of any two of the four divisions to proside the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the unit in case of an accident and maintain it in the safe shutdown condition. Why can't the unit be shut down in case of an accident with only one of the four divisions available? Identify the systems or loads needed that require that two of the four dhkions be available.
RESPONSE 435.27 Subsection 83.1.23 was incorrect and has been revised accordingly. The reactor can be safely shut down from the control room with any one of the three load groups available.
QUESTION 435.28 la section 83.1.2.4, item (1) states that certified proof tests are performed on cable samples to certify 60 i
year life by thermal aging. Subsequent items, (2) thru (5), identify various cable attributes such as radiation resistance, mechanical / electrical endurance, flame resistance, and level of gas evolution that are also l
demonstrated by certified proof tests performed on cable samples. Do the tesis identified in items (2) thru (5) j demonstrate that the cables have an acceptable level of the particular attributes at the end of their 60 year life?
l How is this demonstrated?
l RESPONSE 435.28 The thermal aging test is the inclusive test that proves a reasonable expectancy of a 60-year life for the cable.
The other tests, items (2) through (5), prove that individual parameters such as flame resistance, radiation resistance, etc. have a reasonable expectance of remaining wi6hin acceptable limits of change for each parameter i
over the 60-year life of the plant. (See Subsection 83.43)
Amendment 10 M:1115 l
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'A conformance statements in the analysis AD sections of Chapter 8 have been modified to state full compliance without the applicability caveat (see attached).
There are no non conformances with the GDCs.
The
'as applicable' statements were intended only to differentiate between those portions of the CDCs we interpreted to be applicable to the p#is.
lant as a whole,ratherthantoindividualfdOEdnen However, it is better to delete such statements if they are construed to mean any degree of non conformance.
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Zi (c) Provide the fault current clearing. time curves of the electrical penetrations' primary and secondary cunent interrupting devices plotted against the thermal capability (l'!*t) curve of th'c penetration (to maintalo mechanical integrity). Provide a simplified one.line diagram on this drawing showing the location of tl protectivs devicca in the penetration dreuit, and indicate the maximum available fault cunent of the circuit.
(d) Where cuernal control power is needed for tripping electrical penetration breakers, signals for tripping the I
primary and backup breakers should be independent, physically separated and powered from separate sources. Verify that your design complies and identify the power supplies to the redundant circuit breakers.
I RESPONSE 435.31 h
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(b) 16 is a design requirement that redundant overcurrent interrupting devices be provided for electrical circuits
.l golig through containment penetrations,if the maximum available fault current (including failure of i
upstream devices) is greater than the continuous cunent rating of the penetration.
(c) The detail design for the eunent interrupting devices for the electrical penetrations has not been performed and is beyond the scope of the Licensing Review Bases (LRB) document. It is an interface requirement for i
the applicant to supply this information.(See Subsection 8.3.4.4)
(d) In general, breakers and starters will be backed up by properly selected current !!miting fuses. Smaller cu' cuits will employ redundant fuses. Specific identification of power supplies for redundant breakers, if utilized,is an interface requirement to be supplied by the applicant.(See Subsection 8.3.4.4)
QUESTION 435.32 t
Section 8.3.1.4.2.1 identifies the standards that are used for the separation of equipment for the systems referred to in subsection 7.1.1.3,7.1.1.4, and 7.1.1.6 (safetyirelated control and instrumentation systems), IEEE 384 1974 however is not listed. The separation of equipment in these systems should comply with the requirements of this standard. Please verify that this is the case.
In addition, the listed standards and requirements are not identified as being applicable to subsection 7.1.1.5 -
(safety related display instrumentation). Ficase verify that they are indeed applicable to this subsection.
RESPONSE 435.32
!EEE 384 is addressed in Tables ?,1-2 a4d 8.11, as endorsed by 'tegulatory Guide 1.75. Since the Nt Ye$gf this guide envelog J endorp I,E,EE J44J is no requirements
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unnecessary redundancy in the text, we have not addressed the IEEE standards sepvate from the Regulatory Guides which endorse them. However, since IEEE 379 was inadvertently mentioned in addition to RG 1.53, we have modified and clarified the paragraph per the attached mark.up.
Also, the separation requirements do apply to the Safety Related Display. Therefore, a reference to Subsection 7.1.1.5 has been added.
1 L
QUESTION 435.33 Items (4) and (5)in section 8.3.1.4.2.2.2 state that spatial separation in general plant areas and in cable spreading areas shall equal or exceed the minimum allowed by IEEE 384. IEEE3S41974 however prosides two means for establishing minimum physical separation distances. The first, which is specified in section 5.1.1.2 of Amendment 10 20 1 233.17 Pb
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(a) The separation of elect.
-enetration assemblics exceeds the requirements for cables and raceways given.
fon 6.1.5 of IEEE 384 1981.
5 Separation by distance (without barriers) is allowed only within the inerted containment.
Here the minimum allowable distances of 3 feet horizontal and 5 g
feet vertical between penetrations apply, as delineated in Section 6.1.5 of IEEE (vg) 384 1901.
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i For the other ends of the penetrations, which are outside the containment in the
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non inerted areas, separation by distance alone is not allowed.
Those will be
/
separated by separate rooms, or barriers, or different floor levels.
Such walls, barriers or floors are 3. hour fire rated.
Such separation criteria applies to the following:
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- 1. Between redundant penetrations, j
- 2. Between penetrations containing non Class 1E and
- penetrations containing Class 1E or associated Class 1E l
- circuits, j
- 3. Between penetrations containing Class 1E circuits and
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other divisional or non divisional cables.
The lesser distances allowed by IEEE 384 for enclosed raceways does not apply to
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the containment penetrations.
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the standard allows the minimum separation distance to be established by analysis based on tests of the proposed cable installation. The second, which is specified in sections 5.13 ana 5.1.4 of the standard, specifies specific minimum physical separation dhtances that nust be rnaintained.
Please clarify whether you intend to meet the specific distances specified in the standard er whether you j
intend to establish your own separation distances through analysis based on tests. The prefereble option is to
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meet the specific distances spectfied in IEEE 3S44974.
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In ccordance with the Licensing Review Bases (LRB) document, the certification is based on IEEE 3S4 1981 The specific separation distances listed in IEEE 384-1981 will be met wherever possible and practical.
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In addition, the ABWR will provide separation by fire barricts sufficient to meet the requirements ofletter SECY 89 013. As the detail design proceeds, specific instances which can best be resobed by ana]> sis may arise.
Identification of such cases is an interface requirement for the applicant.(See Subsection 83.4.5)
L I
I QUESTION 43534 (a) Section 83.1.4 2.2.4 discusses the use of isolation devices in power circuits. It states that non Class 1E instrument and control circuits will not be energized from a Class 1E power supply unless pctential for degradation of the Class 1E power source can be demonstrated to be negligible by effectise current or voltage limiting (i.e., functional isolation) under all design basis conditions. Please explain wbat this n: cans.
Does it imply that no isolatica desice will be used if no credible failure modes can be identified that will result in fault currents? Qualified isolation devices should be used in all cases where a non. Class IE circuit is connected to a Class 1E power supply.
(b) It also states in section 83.1.4.2.2.4 that Class 1E power supplies which interface non Class 1E circuits are required to be disconnected or otherwise decoupled from the non Class 1E circuits such that conditions of the non Class 1E portion of the system cannot jeopardize the Class 1E portiors (e g., by a current limiting 4
element). Verify that,if overcurrent interruptings devices such as fuses or circuit breakers are used as l
isolation devices, redundant qualified interructing devices will be used at the Class 1E/non Class IE l
interfaces. List all the locations where there is an mterface between a Class 1E power supply and non. Class IE circuit. Identify the isolation desice that is used at the interface.
(c) Where redundant Class IE power circuits interface with a common non, Class IE system such as a computer, the isolation desices used should ensure that a worst case abnormal occurence (fault, oversoltage, voltage surge or spike, etc.) on one of the Class 1E power circuits cannot migrate through the non. Class IE system and affect the redundant Class 1E circuit. This is in addition to the normal criteria for isolation devices that require that any worst case occurences (maximum credible faults, etc.)in the noroClass 1E system not affect the Class IE system.
RESPONSE 43534 (a) The discussion under Subsection 831.4.2.2.4 means that qualified isolation devices will be used in all cases where a non Class 1E circuit is connected to a Class IE power supply. Subsection 83.1.4.2.2.4 has been rewtitten (per attached) to better define the use of isolation desices.
(b) See revised Subsection 83.1.1.2.1 for locations and type of isolation devices used between Class 1E pow er supplies and non-Class IE circuits. A single Class 1E isolation breaker is used, but in addition to the normal coordinated t' rip devices, zone selective interlocking is used. This insures that unless there is a failure of the Class 1E isolation breaker, the Class 1E bus feed breaker or the Class IE current sensing and tripping desices, the isolation breaker and not the Class 1E but feed breaker will always trip if there is a l
fault at any location in the non Class IE system. Load circait faults on the non Class IE sptem will normally trip their load breaker without tripping the bus isolation breaker. The large difference in the tctal size c.f the Class 1E loads versus the total size of the non Class 1E loads, rough'y 2 to 1 presides a wide Ame Mm nt 10 dI233 t
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s%Ddard Plant mn margin between the time current curves of the Class 1E feed breaker and the non Class 1E isolation breaker.
(c) Precautions are taken to ensure that a worst case abnormal occurrence on one of the Class IE circuits cannot migrate through a non Clus 1E system into another Class 1E dhhion. For example, power for the computer is suppued by non Class 1E uninterruptable power supplies that are powered by non-Class IE bus extensions of the Dhhions I and 111 Clus IE buses. The non-Class 1E buses are isolated from tbe Class 1E buses as described in the revised Subsection 83,1.1.2.1. Tbc uninterruptable power supplies will prevent disturbance on one Clus 1E bus from paning to the other Clus 1E bus, via the computer. Signalisolation for computer input circuits is by fiber optic cables.
QUESTION 435.35 Item (4) of section 83.1.4.23.1 states that the scram solenoid conduits will have unique identincation but no specific separation requirements and the scram poup conduits may run in the same raceway with other dhhional circuits. If the scram group conduits are run in the same raceway with other dhhional circuits or if they have leu than the rninirnum separation from Class 1E circuits they must be treated as anociated circuits and must meet the requirements specined in section 4.5 of IEEE 1'rt 1974. P' esse verify that this is the case, and identify the specific separation requirernents that will be applied to the scram group conduits when they become associated citet'hs.
RESPONSE 435.35 The statement in item (4) related to "no specific separation requirements" was not correct. There are specific separation requirements for the conduits containing the RPS wiring associated with each of the four m
scram poups,i.e., the conduits required from trie $ctam actuating devices to the scram solenoid fuse panels, and C from the fuse panels to the two solenoids of each of the indhidual scram pilot valves. Subsection S3.1.4.23.1 has Q been completely revised as per attached pages.
4 S.
Indhidual grounded steel conduits will be provided to contain the scram solenoid wiring of each of the fout 4 scram poups to protect this wiring from bot shorts to any other wiring. Indhidual conduits will also be provided
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for the A solenoid wiring and for the 13 solenoid wiring in the same scram group.
The ro&9 ~And idesti%hn of the sen 3 g coedvits a descoord I e sfam gr conou' will taas nique ~ cntifica ~ n and w oc trca# udolb 6 M i,i.n eparat nelos raceway
.e., the e duits co aining th scram s noid poup reuit w' mg will physic y I,
sep ted fr racewa -
hich co m eithe ivision r *non-isional' (. n safet related ircuits.
ny
. gram gro.f condui iay be r ted alorr ide of racewa containing ther s.ty.relat circuit of my dhhio,or any r eway co aining no. safety tr ted ctr its, as 10n sthec iduit its f is not thint 1;ou ary of th raceway ich con s either e dhhio or none ety-rela d circuit ays p,p = p }
Each m con.iit
. be phypily separ d by at, q
ast one ) inch fr.
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w QUESTION 435.36 Item (6) of section 83.1.4.23.2 states that any electrical equipment And/or raccways for RPS or ESF located in the suppression poollevel swell zone will be designed to satisfactorily complete their function before being rendered inoperable due to exposure to the emironment created by the level swell phenomena. This information is not su5cient for us to evaluate the effects on flooding of electrical equipment. Please identify all electrical equipment, both safety and non safety, that may become subruerged as a result of the supprenion poollevel swell phenomena or as a result of a LOCA. For all such equipment that is not qualified for service in such an emironment provide an analysis to determine the following:
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Amendment 10 203 @ 19 C
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ABWR mstam Standard Plant Rev D 4
(a) The safety significance of the failure of this equipment (e.g., spurious actuation or loss of actuulon function) as a resnit of flooding.
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(b) ne effects on Class 1E electrical power sources serving this equipment as a result of such submergence, I
and (c) Any proposed design changes resulting from this analysis.
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RESPONSE 435J6 Clas5 Ifflectrical equipment that may be submerged as a result of suppression poollevel swell phenomena, or as b Ll\\
the tesult of a LOCA, ism ~yevorcd fo raet %e enviewemtal muireae it c+ Im $2]
is i ents fied a.s folkws :
d Uce sect ten jo t(). Seek equip,e.,t (1) Suppression pool temperature monitors (48 each) Temperature monitors are required for safety.
Electrical wiring for each sensor is to be terminated, for sensor replacement or maintenance,in the wetwell.
i The design specifications require that terminations be scaled such that operation would not be impaired by-submersion due to pool swell or LOCA.
(2) Suppression pool level monitors (6 each) and suppression chamber pressure monitors (2 each): This equipment is required for safety. The level and pressure transmitters are located outside of the wetwell.
Therefore, their operation will not be impaired by pool swell or LOCA.
(3) Suppression chamber free volume temperature monitors (4 each): Temperature monitors are required for safety. The design specifications require that terminations be sealed st.ch that operation would not be-Impaired by submersion due to pool swell or LOCA.
QUESTION 435J7
-In the description of the DC power system in section 83.2.1it is stated that the operating voltage range of Class 1E DC loads is 105 to 140 V. It is also stated that the maximum equalizing charge voltage for Class 1E -
batteries is 140 VDC, and the DC system minimum discharge voltage at the end of the discharge period is 1.75 VDC per cell.
For a 125 VDC lead acid battery with 60 cells,1.75 VDC per cell equates to a final discharge voltage of 105 VDC at the battery terminals. This is the same as the stated minimum operating voltage of the Class 1E DC loads. There is therefore no allowance for voltage drop from the battery terminals to the ter,ninals of the Class 1E loads at the final voltage value of 1.75 VDC per cell. Please address this discrepancy.
Also, provide the results of your DC voltage analysis showing battery terminal voltage and worst case DC load terminal voltage at each step of the Class 1E battery loading prcfile. See the following question with regard to the battery loading profile.
RESPONSE 435.37 The required operating range for DC loads is 100 to 140 VDC. This leaves 5 volts for the voltege drop from the battery terminals to the terminals of the Class 1E loads. Subsection 83.2.1 has been corrected accordingly, t
A worst case DC voltage analysis is beyond the s!>pe of the SSAR, as defined by the Licensing Resiew p
Bases (LRB) document.- However, it is an interface requirement for this to be performed as part of the detail design of the plant.(See Subsection 83.4.6)
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23A6100AT Starfard Plant nu n QUESTION 43538 Section 83.2.1 addresses the DC power systems in general and section 83.2.1.3.2 specifically addresses battery capacity. With regard to battery capacity, section 83.2.13.2 states that battery espacity is sufficient to satisfy a safety load demand profile under the conditions of a LOCA and loss of preferred power, and the batteries have sufficient stored energy to operate connected essential Inds continuously for at least two hours without recharging.
(a) Proside the stated load demand profiles and a breakdown of the loading during this demand.
l (b) ' Provide the manufacturer's ampere.bour rating of the batterics at the two hour rate and at the eig.ht hout rate, and provide the one minute ampere rating of the batteries.
(c) Address station blackout with regard to battery capacity. If a station blackout coping analysis is being prepared for the ABWR, provide a battery load demand profile for the coping duration. Provide a breakdown of the loading during this demand.
RESPONSE 43538 -
.(a)_ Based on information avai4ble as of September,1989, the load demand profile for the 125V batteries under LOCA conditions with lost.of preferred power is estimated as follows:
Dit i DivII Div til Div IV Min.
Amps Amps Amps Arnps Total 01 1000 448 448 224-2121 12 573 248 248 124 1193 25 339 252 252 127 (Xe 56 405 301 301 150 1157 1
6 10. 338 252 252 126 968 10 11 : 405 301 301 151 1158 11 - 15 339 252 252 126 969-15 16 405 301 301 151 1158 16 20 339 252 252 126
- %9 -
20 - 21 405 301 301 131 1158 21 60 339 252 252 126
-969 60 120 339 1 252 252 126 969 Rated AH 4000 3000 3000 1400 AH / 2 hrs 7023. 514.5 - $14.5 257.2 i
- (b). The manufactwer's ampere hour rating of the batteries at the two hour rate, the four hout rate and the one min
- pere rating is beyond the License Review Bases (LRB) document definition. (See Subsection
- 8.4.K l
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(c) Deing station blackout, Disisions II,III and IV will be powered down to an output of essentially zero.
l The load demand on Division 1 will be intermittant as the RCIC cycles on and off and will be equal to, or.
less than, the value shown above for Division I during any two hour period. For additional information -
related to dealing with a station blackout refer to the response to Question 435.002.
Amendment 10 203 253.21 2.. ~
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(c) If the T/B MCCs at non Clau 1E identify the isolation devices used and the interface requirements, RESPONSE 435.49 (a) The feeds for 480V switchgear P/C 6A 1, P/C 6A 2 P/C 6D 1, and P/C 6B.2 are shown on revised Figure 831. These are the non dass IE 480V switchgear for the plant. They feed all of the 480V non safety loads except those few nou Clau 1E loads which are fed from Class 1E buses as indicated in revtsed Figure 83 3.
(b) P/C 6SB.1 (P/C SB 1) provides power to motor control centers which are primarily used for maintenance outages. The cross ties to the safety related buses were for maintenance outages also. The cross ties have been removed.
(c) The motor control centers are spotted in the listed buildings to be acceuible during mdntenance outages.
The motor control centers are non Class 1E and are fed from non Class 1E power centers.
- QUESTION 05 50 The non safety related instrument power system s.hown in Figure 83-4 has two redundant Class 1E power feeds to it. Identify the isolstion devices used between the C! ass 1E and non Class 1E systems. A Class 1E drcuit breaker tripped on a LOCA signal or two redundant Class 1E circuit breakers coordinated with the upstream MCC feeder breaker are acceptable isolation devices.
RESPONSE 43530 The non safety related instrument power supplies ne fed from the aon-Class 1E catensions of the Class 1E 480 V busca. See the revised Subsection 83.1.1.2.1 (see response to Ltion 435.9) for a description of the isolation between the Clau 1E bust and the non Class 1E extension buses.
QUESTION 435J1 On figures 83 5,83-6,83 7, and 83 8 describe the function and operation of the various devices that are identified by device numbers. Also, on figures 83 7 and 83-8 define the acronym SID located next to the diode device; Describe the function and operation of this device.
RESPONSE 435.51 Figures 83 5, 6, 7 and 8 have been revised. However, the meaning to the numeric codes on the new figures are as (cllows:
27
- AC undervoltage relay.
' Operates seen AC voltage drops below predefined minimum value.
Ground overcurrent reb y. Uses voltage to detect grounded circuit.
64 76 DC overcurrent relav.
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- DC undervoltage s elay.
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QUESTION 435.52 On figure 83 7 '125 VDC Power System' describe the function and operation of the various key interlocks sbown on the figure.
RESPONSE 435.52 The key interlocks on the output of the standby chargers insme that a standby chargtr is only connected to one load at a time. The key interlocks on the inputs of the standby chargers insure that the standby charger is connected to only one input feed at a time.
The key interlocks on the output of the normal chargers prevent the normal charger and the standby charger from being simultaneously connected to the load.
QUESTION 05.53 On figure 83 8 *150 VDC Power System' describe the type of isolation prosided between the Class 1E divisional power feeds and the non. Class 1E DC Power System. Also describe the type ofisolation and separation provided between the power feed from P/C 6E 1 (Division Ill) and the power feed the P/C 6C 1 (Division I).
RESPONSE 435.53 Figure 83-8 has been revised and subject power feeds are now identified as P/C CN1 and P/C DN1. These fm power feeds come from non-Class LE extensions of buses P/C C1 and P/C D1 and are therefore non-Class 1E.
\\g See revised Figure 83-3 and the responses to Questions 435.9 and 435.40 for a description of the method used to i
I schieve electricalisolation.
1 QUESTION 435.54 With regard to the cbsification of structures, components, and systems in Table 3.21; item R1 'DC Power Supply Nuclear Island' and item R2 ' Auxiliary AC Power Sptem' are very generalin their present form. We have therefore determined that Table 3.21, items R1 and R2, should be expanded to include the following list of items. Please incorporate these items into Table 3.21 adding any additionalitems ucessary to make it a complete list.
R1 DC Power Sucolv Nudear hland l
125 volt batteries, battery racks, battery chargers, and distribution equipment Control and power cables (including underground cable system, cable splices, connectors and terminal l
blocks)
Conduit and cable trays and their supports Protective relap and control panels Containment electrical penetration assemblies Motors Amcodment 10 20.k253N
1 ABWR mm Suindard Plant v.ua Valve operations have been evaluated in the dedgn. If inadvertent open operation has unacceptable safety consequences,two valves are placed in series on the pipe with logic segregation such that no single electrical failure can open tch valves. Likewise,if inadvertent cha operation has unacceptablJ safety consequences, two valves are placed la parallel en the pipe with logic sepegation such that no single electric failure can close both valves. The power disconnect option is therefore unnecenary and is not uted.
QUESTION 435.!S Experience with nuclear power plant Clau IE electrical systern equipmitet protective relay applications has established that relay trip setpoint drifts with conventional type relays have resulted in premature tilps of redundant safety related system pump motors wben the safety sys, tem was required to be operathe While the buic need for proper protection for feeders / equipment agains perminent faults is recognized,it is the staffs position that total non availability of redundant safety systems due to spurious trips in protective relays i:, not acceptable.
Provide a description of your circuit protection criteria for safety systems / equipment to avoid incorrect initial setpoint selection and the above cited protective relay trip setpoint drift problems.
RESPONSE 435.58 The ABWR design is such that there are no single failures of electrical protective desices which could cause loss of function of redundent systems. This will minimite the probability of simultaneous trips.
User desices such as motors will be purchased with sufficient overload margins for set points of protective devices to be set sufficiently above the operating point to allow for setpoint drift. Sefpom7 meNdofeg<f rf deTooled m rke % stem..e s yor.,ts m. sip %weennts' dow' rent rekmeral
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QUESTION 435.59 Explicitly identify all non. Class 1E electricalloads which are or may be powered from the Class 1E AC and DC systems. For each load identified provide the horsepower or kilowatt rating for that load and identify the corresponding bus number and dhision from which the load is powered.
Also identify the type ofisolation device used between the non. Class 1E load and Clan IE power supply.
RESPONSE 435.59 la Appendix 20B under " POWER SOURCE *, the following 480V buses are powered by Class 1E AC systems and are used to power Non Class 1E AC loads: 480V P/C CN1, DN1 and EN1. (See Figure 8.3-3.)
These buses power instrument air compressors,50 chargers, CVCFs for the computer power supplies and motor control centers (MCCs) for smaller loads. Leads on the MCCs are also shown in Appendix 20B. The electrical dhision from which each load is powered is identified in Appendix 20B. All of the loads on these diesel-fed, non. safety power center buses and associated MCCs are included in the D/O load summary tables, Tables 8.31 through 8.3-3. Their estimated power requirements are aho shown on the tables. The actual KW rating for each load cannot be identified until vendor data is seceived during the bid / purchasing phase.
Isolation betwren non. Class 1E buses P/C CN1, DN1 and EN1, and Class 1E buses P/C C1, D1 and El is described in revised Subsection 8.3.1.1.2.1 (See response to Question 435.9).
Non-Class 1E DC loads powered by Class 1E DC systems are powered from non.Clus IE buses DCN A10, DCN B10, DCN C10 and DCN D10. Load and electrical division information for these buses is shown in Appendix 0B.
Amendment 10 20 M 5).33
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