ML19323D862

Deficiency Rept Re Failure of Mcgraw Edison Electronic Control Circuit for Detecting High Temps in Air Filtration Sys.Caused by Acid Flux Used in Sealing.Recall Notice Issued.Permanent Solution to Be Implemented by 800829

ML19323D862
Person / Time
Site:	Hartsville
Issue date:	05/03/1980
From:	Kammerzell D MCDOWELL-WELLMAN CO.
To:
References
REF-PT21-80-217-000 NUDOCS 8005220449
Download: ML19323D862 (9)

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ATTACWD IS A PART 21 REPORT FRCN lE t%Il UNIT - ROOM 359E/W PART21IDENTIFICATIONNO. ff 6 -&'l-o o c COPPANY t#ECIT- hAvu DATEOFLETTER *~/YIo DOCKETNO.

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DATEDISTRIBUTED /3 /rd ORIGINAL REPORTSUPPLEFENTARY 2 _

DISTRIBLITION:

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REACTOR (R) M REL CYCLE g SAFEGtMRDS(S) f%TERIALS(M)

NRR/ DOR, DIRECTOR ~ AD/FFMSI- AD/SG-IE NRR/DPM DIRECTOR -

INSS/FCMS AD/RDI AD/RDI ( 2 ) REGIONS REGIONS

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AD/RCI IEFILES NRR/DDR,DIECTOR -

REGI0tG PDR INSS/SG SS-881 IEFILES(2) LDDR PDR

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CENTRALFILES CENTRAL FILES-SS-3% LPDR CENfRAL FILES (CHRON) FILES (CHRON) TEPA PDR IE FILES (2)

LPDR f - CENTPAL FILES 016 TEPAd L0EB/FPA M B 5715 ,

l CENTRAL FIES (CHRON)

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PA MG 5715 l EOD - MBB-7602 CENTPAL FILES - SS-396 i

AEOD ffGB-7602 LEB/tPA MB 5715 '

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AE0D ttGB-7602.

ACTION: .

PRO _IMINARY EVUALATION OF THE ATTACHED fiEPORT INDICATES LEAD RES FOLLOf-UP AS SHOWN BELOW:

EE] H8R .__ NfE __ DER __.

EP ROI SG FFMSI Q EV. 5/5/80

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CTFNUCLEAR Division of McDowsil-Wellman Company May 3, 1980 O id.13X0%

Mr. J. G. Kepeler -- - -

Office of Inspection & Enforcement ..

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 799 Roosevelt Glen Allen, Illinois 60137 g , g j7,_ g 6 SUBJ: 10 CFR 21 NOTICE OF POTENTIAL FAILURE TO COMPLY OF TEMPERATURE DETECTION UNITS Gentlemen:

This is to confirm our telecon of April 30, 1980 reporting a defect pursuant to 10 CFR 21.

Notification is hereby provided of the following information:

(1) Name and address of the individual or individuals informino the Commission.

CTI-Nuclear Division of McDowell-Wellman Company 113 St. Clair Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44114 (2) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity with-in the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

The device used by CTI-Nuclear is McGraw Edison P/N 377-02831, arid is an inte-gral part of the electronic control circuit for detecting high temperatures.in the airstream, both upstream and downstream of the vertical deep bed gasket-less carbon filters in various air filtration systems. The device is also used as part of a control circuit for high temperatures themal cutout of electric air. heaters in the same air filtration system. These controllers are used on CTI-Nuclear Part Numbers D-31557, D-31556, D-31555, D-32063, D-31441, and D-31250.

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(3) Identification of the fim constructinp the facility or supplyino the basic component wnich fails to comply or contains a defect.

Edison Electronics Division of McGraw Edison MAY Manchester, New Hampshire g ygOO

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113 St. Clair Ave. N.E., Cleveland, Ohio 44114, U.S.A. ! (216) 6219955 TWX B10-4218263 f

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CTI-NUCLEAR Mr. J. G. Kepeler May 3, 1980 (4) Nature of the defect or failure to canoly and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such de-feet or failure to comoly.

An electronic component similar to devices supplied to CTI-Nuclear failed in service. McGraw Edison attributes the only known failure to use of acid flux in sealing some of the controls during manufacture. McGraw Edison has con-ciuded that there is no convenient method of detarmining in the field if the controllers were sealed with acid flux. The acid flux reportedly could cause corrosion in the controller and result in failure. The mode of a failure is unpredictable, a failure could cause the controller to give erroneous indica-tions such as,1) failing to open and not closing at an alarm point, 2) fail-ing closed and giving a false alarm, or 3) failing at some internediate step and functioning inaccurately.

(5) The date on which the information of such defect or

, failure to comply was obtained.

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February 12, 1980 (6) In the case of a basic comconent which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of all such components in use at, sucolied for, or being supplied for one or more f acilities or acti-vities subject to the reoulation in tnis part,

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Number of CTI-Nuclear P.O. Controllers Purchased 3919 22 3438 26 2462 89, 137 Total Units Supplied t'o Nuclear Plants Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Contract 10407-13-MM-721B Equip. Number Temo. Detection Mat'l Control 1,2M-HJA(B)-F04 Yes , 8 Controllers No 1-M-HFA(B)-J01 Yes, 4 Controllers Yes, 2 Controllers 1-M-HAN-J01(A)B Yes, 4 Controllers No 1,2M-ARN-F01 Yes 4 Controllers Yes, 2 Controllers 1-M-CPN-J02 Yes, 2 Controllers No 1-M-HPM-J01 Yes, 2 Controllers Yes, 1 Controller Total Delivered to Palo Verde - 29 l

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CTI-NUCLEAR Mr. J. G. u p9ict Mey 3, 1980 Tennessee Valley Authority Hartsville Power Plant Contract 77K31-820047 Carbon High Equid. Number Temperature Detection Heater Control P38-22001 4 Controllers / Units I controller / Unit 12/ Units Total Delivered to Hartsville - 60 Stock Units Returned to Edison Electronics - 46 Accounted For - 135 Missing and Presumed Lost, or Damaged and Discarded During Fabrication - 2 (7) The corrective action which has been, is beinn, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization re-

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sponsible for tne action and the length of time that has

. been or will be taken to comalete tne action.

McGraw Edison has issued a recall notice to its customers to return the con-trollers for repair or replace the units.

CTI-Nuclear is similarly recalling the devices from its customers for return to McGraw Edison. We currently estimate that we will have returned all of the controllers to Edison Electronics by July 31, 1980, and that by August 29. 1980, a recommended permanent solution to the problem will be implemented.

(8) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is _being, or will be given to purchasers or licenses.

Recall notifications will be forwarded to CTI-Nuclear customers who have purchased CTI-Nuclear Air Filtration Systens bearing CTI-Nuclear Part Numbers; D-31557, D-31556, D-31555, D-32063,-D-31441, and D-31260.

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CTi-NUCLEAR Mr. J. G. Kepeler May 3, 1980 We trust that you will find this notification consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 21.

If additional action is required, please advise us accordingly.

1 Very truly yours, CTI-NUCLEAR %

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Donald L. Xamerzell Manager of Operations DLK/js cc: Mr. Knop /USNRC

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Evaluccion of Report Ns. @01

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10 C7R 21 Report R visw d by QA Mannget

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Date April 24 1980

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l 10 CFR 21 EEpORT EVALUATION i

l l A. Is Problem Stated Clearly and Adequately Defined? If Not, Restate Problen.

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B. Is the Reported Condition A Basic Cc=penent or Activity? Yes X No Review Definitions 4.5 and 4.6.

Note - A cocenercial part dedicated by CTI-Nuclear C. Prerequisites for Evaluatio:2 - Does the 10 CFR 21 Report Involve any of the Tollowing: , ,

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Yes No

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1. Is "*/roblem" part of a safety-related system structure I component?

2. Does the part perform a safety function v.' thin the I system?

3. Is " Problem" part of seisr.ic Category I equipment? I

4. la function. described in procurement specification to CTI-Nuclear or by NXC Regulatory Guide or rule? X _

5. Has equipment been offered for acceptance to CTI-Nuclear or our customer? NOTE: At least one "yes" must be checked above for the " Problem" to have

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the potential for creating a substantial safety hazard. X D. Is the " Problem" Valid, i.e., does the Condirion E:cist as reported? X Explain Reasoning We have a proble= because va cannot verify that acid flux was not used Note - We assume here that the problem exist, i.e.

3. Does the nProblem n acid flux was used.

1. Put equipment outside of performance requirements.of procurement. specificati.on? I

2. Reduce the margin of safety as defined by technical X

specifications?

3. Increase' the probability of occurence or the severity

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ac ent or. malfunction of equipment important I

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. Tas No

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4 Create an event which is required by Part 21 regulations or technical specifications to be reported to the NRC or our customer (s). I

5. Create a situation that could result in potential offsite exposures co= parable to those referred to in Section 100.11 of Title 10? I NOTE:

An answer of "yes" to any of the above questions indicates a condition or defect that must be reported to h'RC or our custccer(s) . Note, the same conditions reported by others to NRC under other regulations such as 10 CFR 50.55e a requirement of an NRC licensed facility (which CTI-Nuclear is not) requires CTI-Nuclear to report under 10 CTR 21. CTI must report, however, on the disposition of similar equipment. It is advisable to discuss the conditions with the NRC to assure that the reporting has been co pleted and to follow to detail disposition of equipment with other affected customers.

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Evaluation Notes and Cousaents:_, we cannot be sure that the defect exists However, there' is a reasonable possibility that a defect exists

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C. Evaluation Team and Other

Participants:

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1. R. Maier 2. M. Brejer 3. R. Wojnarowski' l

4. J. Carrillo 5. D. W:.llett 6. D. Km::nnerzell 1

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Conclusion:

The Evaluation Team has concluded @ Unanimously C by majority vote (mark one) that the Deviation or Tailure to Comply described on the attached 10 CFR 21 report (

defect. @ does C does not (mark one) create a Substantial Safety Hazard, and is Pi.ll in names of voting team members below if vote was not tmm+ nous:

Majority:

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Minor 1ry: _

l DA1 chairman 9 h30-i(D (Date)

Remarks:

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• PROCEDURE NO.

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ATT.ACEMENT NC. ,

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, NOTE: Cocrplete this page only if the Evaluation Tea = concludes that the Defect or Failure to Com: ply does create a Substantial Safety Hazard.

I. Identification of fir:: constructing the facility or supplying the basic co=ponent or activity that f ails to cencply or contains.a defect:

Edison Electronics. Div of McGrav Edison. Crenier Field Municinal Airport. Manchester, New Hampshire 03103. Suoplied as cart of

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C i-NEc'1' ear Part Nos'D-3i55'7, D 31.i5'5,' D-3155'5$ D-32063. D31441. &

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2 D-31260.

J. The number and location in the facility of all basic co=ponents or acti-vities that f ail to com' ply or contain a defect:

See Attachment I .

I. The Corrective Action that has been, or will be ts. ken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action and the length of time that has been, or will be, taken to complete the action.

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R ,rm71 boxe_s bv 5/1/580. mend to M-Crav E?Mann bv 7 /11 /80. kmve answer bv 8/29/80.

L. The advice related to the Defect or Failure to comply about the facility, or basic component or activities that has been, or is being, or will be 51 ven to purchaser or liscensee.

Reonir or replace bv ennufacturer. not field reunirable

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DISTRIBUTION: . _ _ . . . . . . .. .. .

F. Gabron - Helix R. Wojnarowski V. Dr.lsania D. Yamerzell J. Carrillo E. Sobon

• E. Ellsworth Quality Assurance Records J. Jac5. son - Belix

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Attachment 1

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CTI-Nuclear P.O. Number of Controllers Purchased 3919 22 3438 26 2462 89 Units supplied to nuclear plants -- ~~

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Contract 10407-13-MM-721B Eauipment Number Carbon High Temp. Detection Heater Control 1,2M-HJA(B)-F04 Yes-B Controllers No

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1-M-HFA(B)-J01 '

Yes-4 Yes-2 Controllers

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1-M-HAN-J01(AIB Yes-4 No 1,2M-ARN-F01 Yes-4 "

Yes-2 Controllers _

l-M-CPN-J02 Yes-2 "

No 1-M-HPM-J01

• Yes-2 Yes-1 Controller Total delivered to Palo Verde -- 29

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Tennessee Valley Authority Hartsville Power Plant Contract 77K31-820427 Equipment Number Carbon Hioh Temp. Detection Heater Control P38-ZZ001 A&B 4 Controllers 1 Controller Total delivered to Hartsville -- 60 Stock units returned to Edison Electronics -- 46

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Accounted for -- 135 Missing and presumed lost, damaged and discarded during fabrication -- 2

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