ML071570475

Difficulty:

Plant: SEQUO YAH

Dat e: 4/2007 Last 2 NR C?: NO

Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:31 PM 96

OPL271AOP-P.03 & P.04

Revis ion 0

Page 3 of 24

( I. PROGRAM : OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II, COURSE : LIC ENSE TRAINING

III . LESSON TITLE: AOP-P.03 & .04, LOSS OF 120V AC VITAL INSTRUMENT POWER

BOARDS

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 2.0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months (s)

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

AOP-P.03 & .04, LOSS OF 120V AC VITAL INSTRUMENT POWER BOARDS.

B. Enabling Objectives:

Objectives

O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abi lities associated

with Loss of a Vital Instrument Power Board that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial License

( Training and z 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the

appropriate pos ition as identified in Appendix A.

1. State the purpose/goal of this AOP-P .03 & -P.04.

2. Describe the AOP-P.03 & -P.04 entry conditions.

a. Describe the setpoi nts, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

AOP-P.03 & -P.04 ent ry conditions .

b. Describe the AR P requ irements associated with AOP-P.03 & *P.04 entry

conditions.

c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-P.03 &

-P .04 entry cond itions.

d. Describe the plant parameters that may indicate a Loss of a Vital Instrument

Power Board.

3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-P.03

& -P .04 .

4. Upon entry into AOP-P.03 & -P.04, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to

the appropriate procedural section for response.

OPL271AOP-P.03 & P.04

Revision 0

Page 4 of 24

(

5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-

P.03 & -P.04 .

6. Describe the bases for all limits , notes , ca utions, and steps of AOP-P.03 &

-P .04.

7. Describe the cond itions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

tran sitions to other procedures .

8. Given a set of initial plant condi tions use AO P-P.03 & -P.04 to correctly:

a. Recogn ize entry conditions.

b. Identify required actions.

c. Respond to Continge ncies.

d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.

9. Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance

of AOP-P .03 & -P .04.

10. Apply GFE and system response con cepts to the abnormal co ndition - prior

to , du rino and after the ab normal cond ition.

(

AOP-P.03

( SQN LOSS OF UNIT 1 VITAL INSTRUMENT

POWER BOARD

Rev. 19

I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.4 Loss of 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-IV

1. CHECK reactor TRIPPED PERFORM the follow ing:

Reactor Trip REQUIRED.

GO TO E-O. Reactor Trip or Safety a. ENSURE 1-FIC-3-103 SG-4 Main FW

Injection WHILE continuing in this Reg Valve flow controller in MANUAL

procedure. AND

CONTROL S/G level(s) on program.

b. ENSURE rod control in MANUAL.

c. MONITOR Pressurizer Level and

Pressure:

IF pressurizer ievel approaches Reactor

c Trip setpoint (92%)

Pressurizer pressure approaches PORV

lift setpoint (2335 psig), THEN

TRIP Reactor and GO TO E-G, Reactor

Trip or Safety Injection WHILE

continuing in this procedure .

--~.--

2. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for

applicability:

3.8.2.1, AC Power Distribution

System, Operating

3.8.2.2, AC Power Distribution

System, Shutdown

3.7.1.2, Auxiliary Feed Water

Page 31 of 82

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

51 . 058 A A I.Ol 001

( Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 1 is steady-state at 100% power.

- Unit 2 is in Mode 6 with vessel upper internals removal in progress .

- 125V DC Vital Battery IV Output Breaker tripped and can't be reclosed.

Wh ich ONE (1) of the following describes the required action(s)?

A . Align 125V DC Vital Battery Charger 1-S (spare ) to Vital Battery Board IV.

B~ Align 125V DC Vital Battery Bank V and Cha rger 2-S (spare) to Vital Battery Board

IV.

C. Suspend core alterations on Unit 2 until 125V DC Channel IV is returned to

OPERABLE status.

D. Restore 125V DC Channel IV to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or initiate a

shutdown of Unit 1.

A. Incorrect. Not capable of being aligned.

B. Correct. per 0-SO-250-1

C. Incorrect. No TS requirement.

D. Incorrect. Wrong time requirement per TS.

(

Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:31 PM 97

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Ability to operate and lor monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Cross-tie of the affected de bus with the

altemate supply

( Question No. 51

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating: RO 3.4

Technical Reference: . AOP-P.02

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-P.02, B.8.b

Question Source: Bank

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments:

( Source:

Cognitive Level:

BANK

HIGHER

Source I f Bank:

Difficulty:

SQNBANK

Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?:

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:31 PM 98

OPL271AOP-P.02

Revision a

Page 3 of 17

I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

( II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING

III. LESSON TITLE: AOP-P.02, LOSS OF 125V DC VITAL BATIERY BOARD

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 2.0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months (s)

V. TRAINING OBJEC TIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to

demonstrate or explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios,

the requirements of AOP-P.02, LOSS OF 125V DC VITAL BATIERY BOARD.

B. Enabling Objectives:

Obiectives

O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities associated

with Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Board that are rated " 2.5 during Initial License

Training and z 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the

appropriate position as identified in Appendix A.

1. State the purpose/goal of this AOP-P.02.

2. Describe the AOP-P.02 entry conditions.

a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

AOP-P.02 entrv conditions.

( b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-P.02 entry conditions.

c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-P.02

entrv conditions.

d. Describe the plant parameters that may indicate a Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery

Board.

3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-P.02.

4. Upon entry into AOP-P.02, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the

approp riate procedural section for response.

OPL 271AOP*P .02

Revision 0

Page 4 of 17

(' 5. Summ arize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into

AOp*P.02.

6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP*P.02.

7. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

8. Given a set of initial olant conditions use AOP-P.02 to correctlv:

a. Recoonize entrv conditions.

b. Identify required actions.

c. Respond to Continq encies .

d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.

9. Describe the Tech Spec and TR M actions applicable during the performance

of AOp*P.02.

10. Appl y GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior

to, durinq and afte r the abnormal condition.

(

AO p*P.02

( SQN LOSS OF 125V DC V ITAL BATTERY BOARD

Rev. 10

I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.4 Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Board IV (con t'd)

8. MONITOR 125V Vital Battery Board IV GO TO Step 12.

ready to be ENERGIZED

NOTE Restoring power from a charger is preferred after a fault on the battery board.

9. RESTORE 125V DC Vital Battery

Board IV from one of the following

USING 0-SO-250-1, 125 Volt DC Vital

Power System: [C. 1]

125V DC Battery IV

( * 125V DC Vital Battery Charger IV

125V DC Vital Battery Charger 2-S

Spare Vital Battery IV with Battery V

10. MONITOR 125V DC Vital Battery Bd IV CONTINUE with Step 12.

voltage between 125V and 140V.

WHEN voltage returned to normal,

THEN

GO TO Step 20.

11. GO TO Step 20.

(

Page 38 of97

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

57. 062 A IG.OI 00 1

( Given the following plant conditions :

Unit 1 is tripped.

The crew is perform ing actions of AOP-M .01, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling

Water.

ERCW Supply Header 2B to the Aux Building has been isolated to stop the leak.

0-FCV-67-152 , CCS OB1/0B2 Discharge Valve to header B, has been closed .

- A Safety Injection signal is subsequently received.

W hich ONE (1) of the following describes the function of 1-FCV-67-152 for these

co nditions?

A. The valve will open to its 35% open position. ERCW flow will be provided from

Header 1B.

B~ The valve will open to its 35% open position . NO ERCW flow will be provided .

C. The valve will remain closed because there is no ERCW pressure on the header.

D. The valve wi~ remain closed because there is no ERCW Pump running on the

header.

( A. Incorrect. Since ERCW was manually isolated, no flow will be available

B. Correct. Valves open to Position A (35%)

C. Incorrect. The valves will rspond to the ESF actuation. Pressure on the header will

no t affect the ESF actuation

D. Incorrect. The valves will rspond to the ESF actuation. Pumps running on the

header will not affect the ESF actuation

Monday, March 12,20072:35:32 PM 109

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as theyapply to the Loss of NuclearService Water The conditions that will

initiate the automatic opening and closing of theSWS isolation valves to the nuclear service water coolers

(

Question No. 52

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating: R03.2

Technical Reference: AOP-M.01, section 2.4 step 8

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-M.01, B.8.c

Question Source: New

Quest ion History:

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.8

Commen ts:

So urce: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: HIGH ER Difficulty:

( Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC'!: NO

Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:32 PM 110

OPL271AOP-M .01

Revision 0

Page 3 of 45

('

I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING

III. LESSON TITLE: AOP-M.01 LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLIN G WATER

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 2.0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months (s)

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Term inal Objective :

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

AOP -M.01, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER

B. Enabling Objectives:

O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities

associated with a Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water that are rated ~ 2.5

( during Initial License Train ing and ~ 3.0 during License Operator

Requalification Training for the appropriate license position as identified in

AppendixA.

1. Expiain the purpose/goal of AOP-M ,01.

2. Discuss the AOP-M .01 entry conditions.

a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks , and automatic actions associated with

AOP-M.01 entry conditions.

b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-M.01 entry conditions .

c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-

M.01 entry conditions.

d. Describe the Administra tive conditions that require Turbine Trip/ Reactor trip

due to Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water.

3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-

M.01.

4. Upon entry into AOP-M.01, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to

the appropriate procedurai section for response.

5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-

M.01.

6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-M.01.

OPL271AOP-M.01

Revision 0

Page 4 of 45

( 7. Describe the conditions and reason for transit ions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

8. Given a set of initial plant conditions use AOP-M.01 to correctly:

a. Recognize entry conditions

b. Identify required actions

c. Respond to Contingencies

d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes

9. Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance of

AOP-M.01.

10. App ly GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condi tion - prior to,

during and after the abnormal condition

(

( SQN LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER

Rev. 15

I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.5 ERCW Supply. Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary Building

CAUTION: During operation, CCP and 51 Pumps may experience bearing failure 10

minutes after loss of ERCW cooling.

1. DISPATCH personnel to locate rupture.

2. DISPATCH operators with radios to

perform Appendix F, Rx MOV Board

ERCW Valves. [Aux Bldg el. 749',

Rx MOV Boards].

3. ENSURE 2A-A CCP RUNNING.

( 4. STOP and LOCK OUT the following:

2B-B CCP

2B-B SI Pump

5. DISPATCH operator to piace Aux Air

Compressor B-B in SAFE STOP.

[Aux Bldg, 734' elev, Refuel Floor)

NOTE The following step removes all cooling water from the OB1/0B2 CCS HX.

6. CLOSE 2-FCV-67-147, Hdr 2B to Hdr 1A

Isol Valve. [Rx MOV Bd 2B2-B

Compl. 3B].

(

Page 22 of 142

( SQN LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLI NG WATER

Rev. 15

I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.5 ERCW Supply Header 2B Fail ure to Auxiliary BUilding (cont'd)

CAUTION 1 Crosstying A and B trai n ERCW supply headers should only be performed if

cooling is urgently required fo r Unit 1 Train B CCS related equipment.

LCO 3.0.3 may be applicable.

CAUTION 2 Opening of crosstie valve 1-FCV-67-147 (in Step 7.RNO) may resul t in fouling or

blockage of OB1/0B2 CCS Hx. If ti me perm its, CCS Hx OB2 sho uld be isolated

prio r to opening crosstie valve to preve nt fou li ng BOTH heat excha ngers.

After approx. 10 mi n, OB2 CCS Hx will be returned to service.

NOTE ERCW flow on 28 header will be very low if rupture was isolated in previous step.

7. CHECK ERCW Supply Hdr 28 a. CLOSE 2-FCV-67-82, Aux 81dg Hdr 28

parameters to determine if Rupture Isol Valve. [Rx MOV 8d 2B2-8

ISOLATED: - Compt. 3C]

2-FI-67-52, at expected value b. iF desired to isolate 082 CCS Hx

( * 2-PI-67-488A between 78 psig and

prior to opening crosstie valve,

THEN

124 psig. PERFORM the following:

1) CLOSE 0-67-1501 CCS Hx 082 Inlet.

2) WHEN 0-67-1051 CLOSED,

THEN

OPEN 1-FCV-57-147, Hdr 1A to Hdr

28 Isol Valve. [Rx MOV 8d 1A2-A

Compt. gAl.

RECORD time _

3) IF CCS Hx 08 2 indicates fouling or

flow blockage

OR 1-FCV-67-147 has been OPEN

for approximately 10 minutes,

THEN

OPEN 0-57-1501 CCS Hx 082 Inlet.

4) GO TO Substep d.

(Step continued on next page)

---

Page 23 of 142

( SQN LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER

Rev. 15

I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.5 ERCW Supply Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary Building (cont'd)

7. (Continued )

c. EVALUATE opening 1-FCV-67-147 ,

Hdr 1A to Hdr 28 1501 Valve [Rx MOV 8d

1A2-A Compl. 9AI.

RECORD time _

d. IF desired,

THEN

PLACE O-FCV-67-152 in the 35%

position.

e. CLOSE the following valves:

2-FCV-67-128 . Hdr 28 Supply to

( Space Coolers. AlC & Air

Compressors

[Rx MOV 8d 282-8 Compl. 6C]

2-FCV-67-123. Containment Spray

HX 28 ERCW Supply [O-M-27A]

2-FCV-67-83. Lower Compl

Cooler 20 Supply 1501 [O-M-27A]

2-FCV-67-91, Lower Compl

Cooler 28 Supply 1501 [O-M-27A]

2-FCV-67-138 . Upper Compt

Cooler 28 Supply 1501[O-M-27A]

2-FCV-67-141. Upper Compt

Cooler 2D Supply 1501 [O-M-27Al

(Step continued on next page)

(

Page 24 of 142

( SQ N LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER

Rev . 15

I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.5 ERCW Supply Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary Building (cont'd)

7. (Continued) f. DISPATCH an operator to CLOSE the

foll owi ng valves:

2:67-524B , Supply Hdr 2B to Inst

Room Cooler 2B

[Aux Bldg, 669' elev, Penetration

Room, above Ductwork by panel

2-L-26A].

2-67-675 , ERCW 1501 to B

Shutdown Board Room A/C Water

Chiller

[Aux Bldg, elev 714 ' 12' up at

Col R-A- 12].

2-67-521 B, Hypochlorite

Treatment Circulation Line 1501

( [elev 669 ' TDAFWP Rm by ERCW

supply valves]

g. IF 1A ERCW header was aligned to

OB1 /0B2 CCS HX ,

THEN

GO TO Step 9.

a-

8. ENSURE the following valves are closed:

0-FCV-67-152, CCS HX OB1/0B2 Disch

Valv e to Hdr B

0-FCV-67-151, CCS HX OB1/0B2 Disch

Valv e to Hdr A

[Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A Compt. 8D]

Page 25 of 142

AOP -M.01

( SQN LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER

Rev. 15

[ STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.5 ERCW Supply Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary BUilding (cont'd)

9. START additional Lower Compartment

Cooling Fans and CRDM Fans as required

to maintain containment temperature .

1O. OPERATE ERCW Pumps as necessary IF ERCW header pressure is high,

to perform the following: THEN

EVALUATE opening ERCW supply to

CONTROL pressure between 78 psig Containment Spray HX and/or DG HXs

and 124 psig. to reduce pressure.

MAINTAIN support of system loads

( 11. REFER TO the following :

Appendix 0 , Affected Equipment List

(Header 2B)

Appendix P, Potential Tech Spec

Impacts.

12. ENSURE all breakers reopened

USING Appendix F, Rx MOV Board

ERCW Valves.

13. REFER to AOP-M.03, Loss of

Component Cooling Water.

14.

---.--

GO TO appropriate plant procedure.

END OF SECTION

Page 26 of 142

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

76. E04 02 .1.28 00 1

(" Given the follow ing plant conditions:

Reactor Trip and Safety Injection have occurred on Unit 2.

The crew has transitioned to ECA-1.2 , LOCA Outside Containment.

The leak has NOT been identified and the crew is preparing to isolate Cold Leg

Injection.

W hich ONE (1) of the following describes how Cold Leg Injection is isolated, and how

to determine if the leak has been stopped in accordance with ECA-1.2?

A . Close FCV-63-93 and FCV-63-94, Cold Leg Injection Valves, simultaneously.

Verify isolation by observing pressurizer level.

B. Close FCV-63-93 and FCV-63-94 , Cold Leg Injection Valves, simultaneously.

Verify isolation by observing RCS pressure .

C. Close FCV-63 -93 and FCV-63-94, Cold Leg Injection Valves, one at a time. Verify

isolation by observing pressurizer level.

D~ Close FCV-63-93 and FCV-63-94 , Cold Leg Injection Valves , one at a time. Verify

isolation by oDserving RCS pressure.

A. Incorrect. Valves are closed 1 at a time, not simulataneo usly. RCS pressure is

checked

B. Incorrect. Correct parameter but 1 valve closed at a time

C. Incorrect. PZR level is not the parameter checked, but actions are correct.

D. Correct. Valves are closed one at a time and pressure is checked prior to

determin ing whether to reopen or leave closed. RCS pressure is the parameter

checked

l

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM 146

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEOUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls .

( Question No. 53

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating: R03.2

Technical Reference: ECA-1.2

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271ECA-1.2 Objective 4

Question Source: New

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level: Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments:

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: LOWER

( Job Position: RO

Difficulty:

Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? : NO

Monday. March 12,20072:35:35 PM 147

OPL271 ECA*1.2

Revision 1

Page 9 of 15

x. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

e. CHECK RCS pressure RISING. If pressure is rising then the

leak has been isolated from

RNO - GO TO Step 2. the RCS, therefore

additional diagnosic steps

f. GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4. continuing attempts to

identify the leak are skipped

Basis : over. However the leak may

This step instructs the operator to verify that all normally not be isolated from the

closed valves in low pressure lines and other plant specific RWST and loss of RWST

lines that penetrate containment are closed. The valving inventory may be occurring.

connecting the RHR System to the RCS is of particular

interest in this step since the RHR System is a low If pressure is not rising then

pressure system (600 psig) connected to the high pressure the leak has not been

reactor coolant system (2500 psig). Therefore, a rupture or isolated from the RCS and

break outside containment is most probable to occur in the steps to identify the source

low pressure RHR System piping. These valves are of the leak are to be

normally closed following an accident. completed

Normal and excess letdown valves are also checked

closed since these are plant-specific low pressure lines

which penetrate containment.

( 2. ATTEMPT to isolate break from RCS USING FCV-63- To attempt to identify and

93: isolate a LOCA outside

containment.

a. CLOSE RHR Train A cold leg injection valve

FCV-63-93. This step begins instructing

the operator to sequentially

RNO - GO TO Step 3. close and open all normally

opened valves in paths that

b. CHECK RCS pressure RISING penetrate containment to

identify and isolate the

RNO* PERFORM the following: break outside containment.

1) OPEN FCV-63-93 .

2) GO TO Step 3.

c. GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4. IF the leak is isolated from

the RCS additional

Basis: diagnosic steps continuing

This step instructs the operator to close the isolation valve attempts to identify the leak

in the low pressure injection line for Train A RHR that need not be performed.

connects to the RCS and penetrates containment. If the However the leak may not

LOCA outside containment occurred as a result of failed be isolated from the RWST

check valves on the cold leg injection lines to loops 2 and and loss of RWST inventory

3, then this action will isolate the break from the RCS. may be occurring

OPL271ECA-1.2

Revision 1

Page 10 of 15

( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

3. ATTEMPT to isolate break from RCS USING FCV-63- To attempt to identify and

94: isolate a LOCA outside

a. CLOSE RHR Train B cold leg injection valve cont ainment.

FCV-63-94.

RNO - GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4.

b. CHECK RCS pressure RISING .

RNO - OPEN FCV-63-9 4.

Basis:

This step instructs the operator to close the isolation valve

in th e low pressure injection line for Train B RHR that

connects to the RCS and penetrates containment. If the

LOC A outside containment occurred as a result of failed

check valves on the cold leg injection lines to loops 1 and

4, th en this action will isolate the break from the RCS.

CAUTION L After the break is isolated from the RCS, loss

- of RWST inventory will continue until RWST

leak path is isolated.

( Basis:

This caution alerts operators that continued RWST

inventory loss to the Auxiliary Building may be occurring

until the affected RHR piping is isolated.

CAUTION 2 High radiation or high temperatures in the

Auxiliary Building may prevent local

determination of break location.

Basis :

This caution alerts operators that local determination of

break location and status may not be safe or possible if

high radiation or high temperature conditions prevent

personn el acces s.

(,

ECA-1.2

( SQN LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

Rev. 10

ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2. ATTEMPT to isolate break from RCS

USING FCV-63-93:

a. CLOSE RHR Train A cold leg injection a. GO TO Step 3.

valve FCV-63-93.

b. CHECK RCS pressure RISING. b. PERFORM the following:

1) OPEN FCV-63-93.

2) GO TO Step 3.

(

c. GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4.

3. ATTEMPT to isolate break from RCS

USING FCV-63-94:

a. CLOSE RHR Train B cold leg injection a. GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4.

valve FCV-63-94 .

b. CHECK RCS pressure RISING. b. OPEN FCV-63-94.

(

Page 4 of 6

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

77. E05 EA 1.3 001

( Given the following plant conditions:

Unit 1 is responding to a Loss of Heat Sink per FR-H.1, Response to Loss of

Secondary Heat Sink .

~ All Steam Generator Wide Range levels are Off-Scale low.

- RCS temperature is approximately 588°F and rising slowly.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the preferred method of initiating Auxiliary

Feed flow for these conditions?

A. Feed at the highest possible rate to one S/G to preclude initiation of RCS Bleed and

Feed.

B. Feed at the minimum required flow to prevent possible SG tube failures .

C~ Feed at the highest possible rate to one S/G to reestabl ish SG inventory and

secondary heat sink.

D. Feed at the minimum required flow to establish a controllable cooldown rate and

prevent loss of RCS inventory.

( A. Incorrect. Bleed and Feed would already be initiated under these conditions .

B. Incorrect. Tube failures are the primary concern when initiating feed, but for these

conditions, restoration of 1 SG as soon as possible is the priority

C.Correct. If RCS temp is rising with no inventory, AFW flow should be directed to one

SG at the max rate in an attempt to recover heat sink. This minimizes the chance for

multiple tube failures as wefl as the quickest way to recover at least 1 SG as heat sink.

At this point, bleed and feed should already be initiated.

D. Incorrect. On a loss of heat sink, cooldown rate is not the priority. The RCS has

already heated up. Loss of inventory is a concern due to potential tube failures , but

addressed by feeding only 1 SG

Monday, March 12,20072 :35:35 PM 148

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the reasons forthe following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) Desired operating results

during abnormal and emergency situations.

(

Question No. 54

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating: R03.8

Technical Reference: . FR-H.1 BO

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271 FR-H.1 Objective 4

Question Source: Bank

Question History: WTSI Various previous NRC

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments :

Source: BANK Source If Bank: WT SI

( Cogn itive Level: HIGHER Diffi culty:

Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/200 7 Last 2 NRC?: NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM 149

OPL271 FR-H.1

Revision 1

Page 3 of 18

( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING

III . LESSON TITLE: FR-H.1, LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios , the requirements of

FR-H.1, Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink.

B. Enabling Objecti ves

O. Demonstrate an understand ing of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities

- associated with FR-H.1 , Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, that are rated ;0, 2.5

during Initial License Training and ;0, 3.0 during License Operator

c Requalification Training for the appropriate license position as identified in

Appendix A.

1. Explain the purpose/goal of FR-H.1.

2. Discuss the FR-H.1 entry conditions.

a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

FR-H.1 entry conditions.

b. Describe the requirements associated with FR-H.1 entry conditions.

3. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into FR-H.1.

4. Describe the bases for all limits, notes , cautions, and steps of FR-H.1.

5. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

6. Given a set of initial plant conditions use FR-H.1 to correctly :

a. Identify required actions

b. Respond to Contingencies

c. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes

7. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the performance of FR-H.1

conditions .

OPL2 71FR-H.1

Revision 1

Page 13 of 18

( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

30. ATTEMPT to align condensate tlowoatn to Attempts to esta blish

S/G(s): secondary heat sink in at

a. Refer to FR-H .1 fo r Substeps least one SG may have

b. Refe r to FR-H.1 for RNO been initiated in previous

NOTE: When condensate flowpath is steps before initiation of

established, depressurize SIG at maximum rate bleed and feed heat

using SIG AR Vs until flow is established. Dump removal. These attempts

steam from additional SIGs as necessary. should be cont inued until a

secondary heat sink is

restored.

CAUTION: Refer to CAUTION in FR-H.1 Control feedwater flow

NOTE: Reestablishment of the secondary heat ratesto limit RCS shrinkag e

sink will permittermination of the bleed and feed and press ure transients.

heatremoval method and establish stabilized

plant conditions.

31. CO NTROL feed flow to S/G: If CETs are rising, the

a. Ref er to FR-H.1 for Substeps maintain maximum feed

b. Refer to FR-H.1 for RNa flow to one SIG WR level

NOTE: If SIG being fed is NOT intact then until 10%. If S/G W R level

establish feed flow to an intact SIG and isolate is <10% control feed flow

the affected SI G. between 25 and 100 gpm to

restore S/G level and limit

thermal stresses.

32. DETERMINE if secondary heat sink resto red: Assumes seco ndary heat

a. Refer to FR*H.1 for Substeps sink is restored and begins

b. Refer to FR-H.1 for RNO recovery from feed and

bleed. If heat sink is NOT

restored, then GO TO step

29 and continue attempts to

restore secondary heat sink

33. CHECK RCS temperatures: Checks adequate heat sink

a. Refer to FR-H.1 for Substeps is restored and begins

b. Refer to FR-H .1 for RNO recovery from feed and

bleed

34. VER IFY reactor head vent valves CLOSED. Begins termination of feed

a. Refer to FR-H .1 for RNO and bleed

(

SQN LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK FR-H.1

Rev. 17

(

ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

CAUTION Controlling feedwater flow rates during S/G level recovery will limit RCS

shrinkage and pressure transients.

31. CONTROL feed flow to S/G:

a. CHECK Core Exit TCs STA BLE or a. ESTABLISH maximum available

DROPPING. feed flow to one S /G .

WHEN wide range level

greater than 10% [30% ADVJ,

THEN

PERFORM Substep 31.c.

GO TO Substep 31.d.

(

!

(Step continu ed on next page.)

I

l

Page 37 of 45

SQ N LO SS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK FR-H.1

( Rev . 17

ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPO NSE IIRESPO NSE NOT OBTAINED

31. b. CHECK wide rang e level b. CO NTROL feedwater flow to dry S/G

on selected S/G as follows:

greater than 10% [30% ADVj

1) IF AFW flow is available,

THEN

CONTRO L feed flow to one S/G

between 25 and 100 gpm .

2) IF only condensate' flow available,

THEN

CONTROL cond ensate flow as

low as achievable while

maintaining the following :

Core Exit TCs DROPP ING

wide range S/G level RISING.

(

3) WHEN wide range level

greater than 10% [30% ADVj ,

THEN

PERFORM Substep 31.c.

GO TO Substep 31.d.

c. CO NTROL S/G feed flow as

necessary to restore narrow rang e

level in selected S/G

---

between 10% [25 % ADV] and 50%.

d. NOTIFY Che rn Lab to sample S/G

being fed for activity.

(Step continued on ne xt page.)

Page 38 of 45

FR -H .1

SQN LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK

Rev. 17

(

ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE [ I RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

31. e . MONITOR if S/G being fed is e. IF S /G is NOT INTACT,

INTACT: THEN

PERFORM the following:

NO abnormal radiation

S/G pressure CONTROLL ED 1) ESTABLISH feed flow to ano ther

or RISING . intact SIG.

2) ISOLATE affected SIG .

f. NOTIFY TSC to determine recovery

methods for any remaining dry SIGs

(S/Gs with wid e range level

less than 10% [30% ADV]) .

(

32. DETER MINE if secondary heat sink

restored :

a. CHECK na rrow range leve l a. GO TO Step 29.

in at least one SIG

greate r than 10% [25% ADVj.

33. CHECK RCS tempe ratures : GO TO Step 29.

Core exit T/Cs DROPPING

RCS T-ho t DROPPING.

(

Pag e 39 of 4 5

---_._- - - -_ .,-- -- ..- --- .

QUESTIONS REPORT

forSEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

80 . Ell EK 3.2 00 1

( Which ONE (1) of the following describes the reason and limits required for RCS

depressurization in accordance with ECA-1 .1, Loss Of RHR Sump Recirculation?

A~ To minimize RCS leakage, depressurize the RCS until Pressurizer level is> 65%

OR RCS Subcooling is between 40°F and 50°F.

B. To increase SI Injection flow, depressurize the RCS until Pressurizer level is > 54%

AND RCS Subcoollnq is between 20°F and 30°F.

C. To ensure CL Accumulator Injection, depressurize the RCS until Pressurizer level is

> 65% AND RCS Subcooling is between 40 *F and 50*F.

D. To allow RHR to be placed in service, depressurize the RCS until Pressurizer leve l

is> 54% OR RCS Subcooling is between 20°F and 30*F.

A. Correct. The depressurization is performed to decrease leakage, therefore

decreasing makeup requirements.

B. Incorrect. SI injection flow may not increase because there may be no water

source.

C. lncortect. Setup for accumulator injection is performed later in the procedure

after SG depressurization .

D. Incorrect. RHR will not be placed in service until after the cooldown and

( depressurization are performed, later in the procedure.

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) Normal.

abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation).

Question No. 55

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating: R03.5

Technical Reference: ECA-1 .1 and basis

Proposed refe rences to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271 ECA-1 .1 Objective 4

Question Source: Bank

Question History: WTSI Last Exam VCS 06 Audit

Question Cognitive Level: Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .10

Comments:

Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:35 PM 154

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Source: BANK Source If Bank: WTSI

( Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

LOWER

Difficulty:

Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO

(

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 155

OPL27 1ECA-1.1

Revision 1

Page 3 of 18

( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRA INING - LICENSED

II. COURSE : LICENSE TRAINING

III. L ESSON TITLE : EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE ECA-1.1. "Lo ss of RHR

Sump Recirculation"

IV. L ENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (s)

V. TRAININ G OBJ ECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

ECA-1 .1, "Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation"

B. Enabling Objectives:

o. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities

asso ciated with Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation that are rated ~ 2.5 during

( Initial License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator Requalificatio n

Training for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.

1. Explain the purpose/goal of ECA-1.1.

2. Discuss the ECA-1.1 entry conditions.

a. Describe the setpoints, interiocks, and automatic actions associated with

ECA-1.1 entry conditions.

b. Describe the requirements associated with ECA-1.1 entry conditions.

3. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into ECA-1.1.

4. Describe the bases for all limits , notes, cautions, and steps of ECA-1.1.

5. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

6. Given a set of initial plant conditions use ECA-1.1 to correctly:

a. Identify required actions

b. Respond to Contingencies

c. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes

7. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the performa nce of ECA-1.1

conditions.

(

OPL271 ECA-1 .1

Revision 1

Page 12 of 18

( x. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

27. DEPRESSURIZE RCS to reduce RCS suocoouns: Decreases RCS pressure to

a. Refer to EOP for Substeps limit break flow for a small

b. Refer to EOP for RNO break flow if in progress.

Terminate depressurization

when RCS subcooling

requirements are met or

PZR level increases that

might limit further pressure

decreases

28. DETERMINE if RHR should be placed in If prerequisite requirements

service: for RHR system operation

a. Refer to EOP for Substeps are met and TSC concurs

b. Refer to EOP for RNO then place RHR cooling in

service

29. MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated : Isolates or vents CLA to

a. Refer to EOP for Substeps prevent injection of nitrogen

b. Refer to EOP for RNO into RCS. Traps nitrogen in

CLA after all available water

has been injected into RCS.

( 30. MONITOR if RCPS should be stopped : Continuous action step.

a. Refer to EOP for Substeps Stops RCPs when RCS

b. Refer to EOP for RNO pressure is to low to support

RCP seal operation

31. CHECK RCS temperature greater than 200°F. Objective 5

a. Refer to EOP for RNO If RCS temperature is

<200°F skip steps 31 - 40

which depressurizes the

S/G to lower RCS

temperature

32. CHECK RWST level less than <8%. Objective 5

a. Refer to EOP for RNO If RCS temperature is

>200°F and water is still left

in the RWST then GO TO

step 1 and continue core

cooling by injection from the

RWST

33. PLACE pumps taking suction from RWST in Prevents cavitation of these

PULL TO LOCK: pumps for empty RWST

a. Refer to EOP for Substeps

(

( SQN LOSS OF RHR SUMP RECIRCULATlON

ECA-1.1

Rev. 11

\

iL - ..L- ..L- ---I

ISTEP II ACTlONIEXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

NOTE Upper head voiding may occur during RCS depressurization if no RCPs

are running. This may result in rapidly rising pressurizer level.

.. ,, \

I

27. DEPRESSURIZE RCS to reduce ,i

RCS subcooling:

B. CHECK RCS subcooling based on B. GO TO Step 28.

core exit TICs greater than 50°F.

b. USE normal pressurizer spray. b. USE one pressurizer PORV.

IF ReS CANNOT be depressurized

USING any pressurizer PORV,

( THEN

ESTABLISH auxiliary spray USING

EA-62-4 , Establishing Auxiliary Spr ay.

C. DEPRESSURIZE RCS C. IF RCS subcooling less than 40°F,

UNTIL either of the following THEN

conditions SATISFIED: RAISE RCS makeup flow

to restore subcooling.

RCS subcooltnq

based on core exit TICs

between 40°F and 50°F.

Pressurizer level

greater than 65%.

d. WHEN either condition

In Substep 27.c Is met,

THEN

STOP RCS depressurization.

(

I Page 19 of 38

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

81. E I2G2 .4.3 1 001

( Given the following plant conditions:

".

A steam line rupture has occurred on Unit 1.

- The crew was unable to isolate SGs.

ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, is in progress .

- The crew has taken action to minimize the plant cooldown .

- AFW flow to S/Gs 1, 3 and 4 are currently at 25 gpm.

- The following alarms are received:

1-AR-M3-C3, STM GEN #1 LEVEL LOW

1-AR-M3-C5, STM GEN #3 LEVEL LOW

1-AR-M3-C6, STM GEN #4 LEVEL LOW

Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required?

A. Raise AFW flow to #1, #3, and #4 SGs to ensure NR level remains above 10%

B. Raise AFW flow to #1, #3, and #4 SGs to ensure NR level remains above 50%

C~ Maintain AFW flow at its current value. When Thot starts to rise, raise AFW flow .

D. Maintain AFW flow at its current value . When 3 of 4 SGs are at the applicable

( setpoint, take action in accordance with FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary

Heat Sink .

A. Incorrect. After throttling to minimize RCS cooldown , even if levels are low, AFW

remains throttled until That begins to rise. At that point, AFW is throttled just enough to

stabilize temperature. Credible because 10% is the lower limit that level is checked at

B. Incorrect. After throttling to minimize RCS cooldown , even if levels are low, AFW

remains throttled until That begins to rise. At that point, AFW is throttled just enough to

stabilize temperature. Credible because 50% is the upper limit that level is checked at

C. Correct.

D. Incorrect. Since this an operator induced reduction of AFW flow, FR-H.1 actions

would not be performed

(

Monday, March 12, 20072:35:36 PM 156

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Emergency Procedures I Plan Knowtedge of annunciatorsalarms and indications. and use of the response instructions

( Question No. 56

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating: R03.3

Technical Reference: ECA-2.1. AR M3

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271 ECA-2.1, B.6.a

Question Source: New

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments :

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: HI GHER D ifficulty:

( Job Position:

Date: 4/2007

Plant:

Last 2 NR C?:

SEQ UOYAH

NO

Monday . March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 157

OPL271 ECA-2.1

Revision 1

Page 3 of 46

( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING -LICENSED

II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING

III. LESSON TITLE: ECA-2.1 , "UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM

GENERATORS"

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (s)

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators

B. Enabling Objectives:

O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge 's and Abilities

- associated with Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators that

are rated <: 2.5 during Initial License Training and <: 3.0 during License

Operator Requalification Training for the appropriate license position as

identified in Appendi x A.

1. Explain the purpose/goal of ECA-2.1.

2. Discuss the ECA-2.1 entry conditions.

a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

ECA-2.1 entry conditions.

b. Describe the requ irements associated with ECA-2.1 entry conditions .

3. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into ECA-

2.1.

4. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of ECA-2 .1.

5. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

6. Given a set of initial plant conditions use ECA-2 .1 to correctly:

a. Identify required actions

b. Respond to Contingencies

c. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes

OPL271 ECA-2.1

Revision 1

Page 4 of 46

(

7. Discuss the reasons for maintaining a minimum flow to the S/Gs with levels less

than 10% during the uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs .

8. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the performance of ECA-2.1

condit ions.

OBJECTIVES TO BE COVERED IN THESE SEQUOYAH OPERATOR TRA INING PROGRAMS

OBJECTIVE I NONLICENSED LICENSE TRAINING

I NO.

O.

OPERATORS RO

X

SRO

X

REQUAUSPECIAL

1. X X

2. X X

3. - X X

4. X X

5. X X

( 6. X X

7. X X

8. X X

NOTE: The following approva l is required for License Requalification and special training only:

Training Program

Sequoyah Operator Training Manager I

Date

Sequoyah Operations Manager I

Date

(

UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ECA-2.1

SQN

ALL STEAM GENERATORS Rev. 9

ISTEP IIACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

NOTE Reducing total feed flow to less than 440 gpm, as directed in this procedure ,

does NOT require implementation of FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink,

as long as a total feed flow capability of 440 gpm is available.

2. CONTROL feed flow to minimize

RCS cooldown :

a . CHECK T-cold cooldown rate a. REDUCE feed flow to 25 gpm

less than 100°F/hr. to each S/G.

OPEN MD AFW pump recirc valves

FCV-3-400 and FCV-3-401

as necessary to control flow.

GO TO Substep 2.c (AER column).

(

b. MONITOR SIG narrow range levels b. CONTROL feed flow to maintain SIG

less than 50%. narrow range levels less than 50%.

c. MONITOR SIG narrow range levels c. MAINTAIN feed flow to affected S/G(s)

greater than 10% [25% ADVj . greater than or equal to 25 gpm

UNTIL level greater than

10% [25% ADV].

d. MONITOR T-hot indications d. IF RCS T-hot is rising,

STABLE or DROPPING. THEN

STABILIZE RCS T-hot:

RAISE feed flow

DUMP steam.

(

Page 5 of 34

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

2. 00 1 AA2.04 00 1

( Given the following plant conditions:

Unit 1 is at 90% power.

Which ONE (1) of the following sets of parameters will increase during an inadvertent

continuous control rod withdrawal event?

A. Reactor Power and Charging Flow

B. RCS Hot Leg Temperature and Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio

C. OT Delta T Setpoint and Main Steam Header Pressure

D~ RCS Hot Leg Temperature and Reactor Power

A-Incorrect. Charging flo w will decrease because pressurizer level will increa se due to

heatup. Credible because the parameter does change ans reactor power does rise

B-incorrect because DNBR gets lower (Closer to DNB) as temperature rises. Credible

because tempereture does rise.

C-Incorrect. OT Delta T setpoint will decrease in relation to Tavg increasing. Credible

( because the parameter changes, and steam pressure does rise.

D-Correct. Hot leg temp erature rises, as does reactor power, due to the positive

reactivity being added. OT and OP delta T setpoints will lower as power and

temperature rise

(

Monday, March 12, 20072:35:27 PM 3

QUESTIONS REPORT

fo r S EQU OYA H 2007 - NRC EXA M REV DRAFT

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: Reactor power and its trend

( Question No. 57

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating: R0 4.2

Technical Reference: . T&AA

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271CGFES Attachment 16 Objective 20

Question Source: Bank

Question History: Robinson 2007 Editorially Modified

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.5

Comments:

Source : BANK Source If Bank: ROBINSON 2007 NRC

Cogniti ve Leve l: HIGH ER Difficulty:

( Job Position:

Date:

4/2007

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 20072:35:27 PM 4

( PWR INSTRUCTOR GUIDE

VOLUME: REACTOR THEORY TIME8 HRS

INSTRUCTOR GUIDE: REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS REV 2

OBJECTIVES

15. Expl ain the characteristics to look for when the point of adding heat is reached.

16. Describe reactor power response after reaching the point of adding heat.

17. 18. Describe the monitoring and control of reactor power and primary temperature from 0% to

15% (Babcock & Wilcox Plants).

19. Describe the means by which reactor power will be increased to rated power.

20. Expl ain the effects of control rod motion or boration/dilution on reactor power.

21 . Describe the monitoring and control ofT,,,, T ref, and power during power operation.

( 22. Exp lain the relationship between steam flow and reactor power given specific conditions.

23. Exp lain reactor response to a control rod insertion.

24. Exp lain the shape of the curve of reactor power versus time after a reactor trip.

25. Defi ne decay heat.

26. Exp lain the relationship between decay heat generation and:

a. Power level history

b. Power production

c. Time since reactor shutdown

8

J REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS REV2

( 'INSTRUCTOR GUIDE KEY POINTS, AIDS,

QUESTIONS/ANSWERS

A. Reactor power is maintained at

approximately 2% while secondary plant is

prepared for power operations

1. When turbine generator is ready for

startup , reactor operator withdraws

control rods as necessary to establish

approximately 7- 15% power

2. Steam is bled directly to condenser by

steam dump system to maintain steam

pressure

3. As turbine generator draws more

steam, steam dump system

automatically reduces amount of steam

being bled.to condenser

-

4. ReS temperature and reactor power are

( maintained at appro ximately constant

levels

5. When turbin e generator load has

increased to match reactor power,

steam dumps will be fully elosed

6. Power escalation continues by

gradually opening main turbine

governor valves.

B. When power is increased above 15%, Objective 18

contro l rods may be placed in automatic

control

Objective 19 and 20

(

PWR I REACTOR TH EORY I CHAPTER 60 0f99 It! t 999 GENERAL PHYSICS CORP ORATION

8

I REACTOR OPERAT IONAL PHYS ICS REV 2

( I INSTRUCTOR GUIDE KEY POINTS, AIDS,

QUESTIONS/ANSWERS

I . The control rods will step out Figure 8-18 I TP 8-58

automatically to raise Tm in

acco rdance with ramped T. ve versus

power program (Figure 8-18)

.

./

'

,~ -

..-

~

y-

_!. . O'

2. Values shown are for typical 4-100p

Westi nghouse plant

3. Actual values will vary from plant to

plant

C. Figure 8- 18 is representative for many

( Wes tinghouse plants and is similar to that

of CE stations as well

I. In general, CE station will tend to hold

Tcold as constant as possible, whereas

Westi nghouse plant will often have

T co1d drop as function ofreactor power

2. However, in some cases, T co1d will

actually rise somewhat, as denoted in

Figure 8-18

D. The key for both Wes tinghouse and CE

stations, however, is that T. vc will rise (or

slide) as function of reactor powe r, as

shown in Figure 8- I8

E. The reason for sliding T ave upward (or

holding Tcold constant) is to enable steam

pressure to remain higher at 100% turbine

load

8

I REACTOR OPE RAT IONAL PHYSICS REV 2

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Assuming the rod can be moved, which ONE (1) of the following is the speed at which

the rod will move when it is realigned?

A. 32 steps per minute

B~ 48 steps per minute

C. 64 steps per minute

D. 72 steps per minute

A. Incorrect. 32 SPM is part of the variable speed for auto rod control 3-5 deg F

mismatch. -

B. Correct. Control Bank in Manual or Bank Select will initiate motion at 48 SPM

( C. Incorrect. 64 SPM is for Shutdown Banks

D. Incorre ct. 72 SPM is maximum variable speed

(,

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:27 PM 11

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Ability to determine and interpret the followIng as they apply to the Inoperable { Stuck Control Rod: Difference between Jog and run

rod speeds, effe ct on CRDM of stuck rod

(

Question No. 58

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating: R02.5

Technical Reference: Rod Control SO, pg 38

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective : OPL271AOP-C.01 Objective 5

OPT200RDCNT Objective 4.e

Question Source: New

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level: Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.6

Comments:

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

( Cognitive Level : LOWER Difficulty:

Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 412007 Last 2 NRC? : NO

(

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:27 PM 12

OPL271 AOP-C .01

Revision 0

Page 3 of 28

(

I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II. COURSE : LICENSE TRAINING

III. LESSON TITLE: AOP-C.01 , ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 2.0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months (s)

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Ter minal Objective:

Upon comple tion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

AOP-C.01, ROD CONTROL SYSTE M MALFUNCTIONS

B. Enabling Objectives:

Objectives

O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities

associated with Continuous Rod Withdrawal, Dropped Control Rod, and

Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod that are rated <: 2.5 during Initial License Training

and <: 3.0 during License Operator Requaiification Training for the appropriate

( position as identified in Appendix A.

l. State the purpose/goal of this AOP-C.01 .

2. Describe the AOP-C.01 entry conditions.

a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated

with AOP-C.01 entry conditions.

b. Describe the ARP requ irements associated with AOP-C.01 entry

cond itions.

c. Interpret, p rior itize , and verify associated alarms are consistent wi th

AOP-C .01 entry cond itions.

d . Describe the plan t pa ra meters that ma y indicate rod control fa ilure.

3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-

C.01.

4. Upon entry into AOP-C.01, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the

appropriate procedural section for response.

5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-C.01.

6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-C.0 1.

(

OPL271 AOP-C.01

Revision 0

Page 16 of 28

( x. L ESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

mm.ADJUST PLANT TURBINE LOAD AS

REQUIRED .

nn. GO TO APPROPRIATE PLANT PROCEDURE This is the endpoint of

CASE 2.

E. Case 3 - Misaligned shutdown/control rod(s) or bank Objecti ve 8, Cas e Study

Single misaligned control rod, from 60% reactor power.

1. Mitigating Strategy Objective 5

If > 1 rod misaligned then trip the reactor or

shutdown the unit as required

If oniy 1 rod is misaligned, then realign the

misaligned rod

Stabilize the plant

Monitor QPTR within limits

Reduce load to <75% power in preparation for re-

alignment

Correct the initiating cause

( * Realign the misaligned rod or bank

Update ICS. PIA converter, and bank overlap as

required

Restore control rods to AUTO

Adjust turbine load as required.

2 . Diagnosis

a. Symptoms - QPTR alarms, Power Range channel Obje ctive 2

deviation alarm.

3. Procedure flow path.

a. Evaluate Tech Specs for applicability Tech Specs will be

discussed later in this

lesson

b. Diagnosis step.

(1) This step offers little in the form of Use diagnostic table in

diagnostic steps. rather directs the crew Section 2 of AOP

to the prope r section once the failure is

determined.

(2) Once misaligned rod is diagnos ed. GO Objective 4

( TO SECTION 2.3

OPT2 00RDCNT

Rev. 2

( Page 3 of73

I. PROGRAM : OPERATOR TRAINING

II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING

III. TITLE: ROD CONTROL SYSTEM (RDCNT)

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months lecture ; 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months simul ator demonstration;

I hour self-study/workshop

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Tcrminal Objective:

Upon complet ion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to

appl y the knowledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated with

the Rod Control system in the plant and on the simul ator.

B. Enabling Objectives:

O. Demonstrate an understand ing of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities

associated with the Rod Control System that are rated > 2.5 during Initial License

trainin g for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.

1.- -State the purpose/functions of the Rod Control System as described in the SQN

FSAR.

( 2. State the design basis of the Rod Control System in accordance with the SQN

FSA R.

3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the

Rod Control System as illustrated on the simplifi ed system drawing.

4. Describe the following items for each major component in the Rod Control

System as described in this lesson:

a. Location

b. Power supply (include cont rol power as applicable)

c. Support equipment and systems

d. No rmal operating parameters

e. Comp onent operation

f. Controls

g. Interlocks (including setpoints)

h. Instrumentation and Indication s

1. Protective features (including setpoint s)

j . Failu re modes

k. Unit differences

1. Typ es of acciden ts for which the Rod Control System components are designed

m. Location of controls and indications associated with the Rod Cont rol System in

( the control room and auxiliary control room

SQN.085.RDCNT

Rev. 0

( Page 38 of 100

Rod Control System Major Components

Pulser, Con tinued

Proc ess signals The table below desc ribes the process signals of the two pulsers.

Pul ser Si gnal Mod e Des crip tion

Va riable Rate Auto receive s a speed signal from the

Pulser Reactor Control Unit

Input Manual on an receive s a speed signal from a

individual control manual speed adjus t resistor in

bank the Process cabinets set for 48

SPM .

Shutdown Bank receives a speed signal from a

(SBA and SBB manual speed adjus t resisto r in

only) the Process Cabinet set for 64

SPM.

Auto 8-72 spm (48-432 pulses/min)

Output Manual or 48 sprn (288 pulses/min)

individual control

- bank

Shutdown Bank 64 spm (372 pulses/min)

Signal Description

( Constant Rate Input receives a speed signa l from a speed adjusting

Pulser resistor in the SCD logic circuit of the Logic

Cabinet.

Output 64 spm (64 pulses/min)

Shut down banks The first variable-rate pulser controls shutdown banks A and B because they are

contained in the same power cabinets as the control banks . The constant rate

pulser only controls shutdown banks C and D.

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

37. 028 AK3.05 00 1

( Given the following plant conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power.

Load is being reduced to 50% to remove a Main Feedwate r Pump from service.

Pressurizer Level Control is selected to L1-68-339

The Pressurizer Level Master Controller setpoint fails at its current value .

The load reduction is initiated.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the action that will be taken, and the reason

for those actions?

A. Change the press urizer level channel input to the master controller and restore

Letdown because the backup level channel will cause a letdown isolation .

By Take manual control of, and reduce Charging flow because actual pressurizer level

will be higher than program level for the actual power level as load is decreased.

C. Ta ke manual control of, and raise Charging flow because actual pressurizer level

will be lower than program level for the actual power level as load is decreased.

D. Change the pressurizer level channel input to the master controller and restore

Letdown because the controlling level channel will cause a letdown isolation.

( A. Incorrect. Changing input will not affect the controller because the setpoint has

failed, not the input

B. Correct.

C. Incorrect. Charging fiow must be reduces because level will be artificially high

D. Incorrect. Changing input will not affect the controller because the setpoint has

failed. Letdown will not isolate because actual/eve/ will indicate the same on all

channels

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM 70

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: Actions

contained in EOP for PZR level malfunction

(

Question No. 59

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating: R03.7

Technical Reference : 1-AR-M5-A E-4

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Leaming Objective: OPT200.PZRLCS Objective 5.d

Question Source: New

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments:

( Source :

Cognitive Level:

NEW

HIGHER

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Da te: 412007 Last 2 NRC?: NO

(

Monday, March 12,20072:35:30 PM 71

OPT200.PZRLCS

Rev. 2

Page 4 of 80

( V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):

B. Enabling Objectives (Cont'd):

5. Describe the operation of the Pressurizer Level Control System as it relates to the

following:

a. Precautions and limitations

b. Major steps performed while placing the Pressurizer Level Control System in service

c. Alarms and alarm response

d. How a component failure will affect system operation

e. How a support system failure will affect the Pressurizer Level Control System operation

f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation

6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the Pressurizer Level Control System:

a. State Tech Specs/TRM LCOs that govern the Pressurizer Level Control System

b. State the:::1 hour action limit TS LCOs

c. Given the conditions/status of the Pressurizer Level Control System components and the

appropriate sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability requirements are met and

what actions are required

7. Discuss related Industry Events:

( a. Event Title: SQ970649PER - V-I pressurizer was drained below 25% actual level

while decreasing level from solid water conditions

VI. TRAINING AIDS:

A. Computer.

B. Computer Display Projector & Controls.

C. Local Area Network (LAN) Access.

D. Simulator (if available)

(

OPT200 .PZRLCS

Rev . 2

Page 46 of 80

('

Level Alarms

> 1*AR*55*M5*A (E4)

LS-68-339E/F +5% of span above level

program

bj.5

( X. LESSON BODY:

Alarms: Review alarms using the slide above.

Refer to the appropriate annunciator response procedure for full details

including setpoints, alarms sources, and operator actions.

Bases for energizing heaters on +5% level deviation:

The level deviation-high is assumed to be an insurge produced by a

decrease in load, introducing subcooled water enters the pressurizer.

If a subsequent outsurge were to occur, the subcooled water would not

assist in maintaining pressure by flashing to steam.

It is conservatively assumed that a subsequent outsurge will occur,

therefore, the backup heaters are energized as an anticipatory measure.

32 (E-4)

('

Source Setpoint

SER 367 5% of span above level

1*LS*68*339E/F program

LS-68-339E/F

PRESSURIZER

LEVEL HIGH

BACKUP HTRS ON

Probable 1. Char ging and/or letdown flow mismatch.

Causes 2. Instrument malfunction of level or Tavg .

3. Load transi ent condition.

Corrective [1] CONFIRM instrumentation by CHANNEL CHECK

Actions [2] IF instrument has failed , THEN

GO TO AOP-1.04, Pressurizer Instrumen t Malfunction.

[3] IF instru ment has not failed, THEN

( ENSURE level is returning to program 1-LR-68-339 with

appropriate charging and letdown.

[4] IF RCS pressure ~ 2265 psig , THEN

DEENERGIZE backup heater 1C, [C.1]

[5] EVALUATE Technical Specifications (3 .3.1 and 3.3.2).

References 45B65 5-05A-0,

45N657-15 ,

47B60 1-68-4 5

SQN 1-AR-MS-A

Page 39 of 43

1 - - - - - - - i Rev. 29

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

1. 059 AK I.02 001

( Given the following plant conditions:

An accidental spill of the Monitor Tank has occurred in the Aux Building.

Radiation levels in the area of the spill are 40 mr per hour at 30 em.

Contamination levels on the floor around the tank are 1.2E6 DPM/100 cm 2

Which ONE (1) of the following describes (1) the major radiation concern for the spill,

and (2 ) the postinqs applied to the area?

A. (1) Area radiation is a gamma concern; Contamination is a gamma concern

(2) Radiation area; Contamination area

Bt (1) Area radiation is a gamma concern; Contamination is a beta concern

(2) Radiation area; High Contamination area

C. (1) Area radiation is a beta concern; Contamination is a gamma concern

(2) High Radiation area ; Contamination area

D. (1) Area radiation is a beta concern ; Contamination is a beta concern

(2) High Radiation area; High Contamination area

( A. Incorrect. This area should be posted as a high contamination area

B. Correct. Area radiation is typically gamma, while contamination is beta radiation.

Less than 100 mr per hour is a radiation area. Greater than 50,000 DPM/100 cm2 is a

contaminated area . Greater than 50,000 dpm/100 cm2 is a high contamination area

C. Incorrect. Concern s for the effects are reversed, and postings are incorrect

D. Incorrect. Concerns for effects of area is incorrect and posting for radiation is

incorrect

Monday, March 12,20073:24:52 PM 1

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the operational implicationsof the following concepts as they apply to Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release:

Biological effects on humans of various types of radiation, exposure levels that are acceptable for nuclear power plant personnel,

( and the units used for radiation-intensity measurements and for radiation exposure levels

Question No. 60

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating: R0 2.6

Technical Reference : SPP-5.1, RCI-15

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: RWT-010,

Question Source: New

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.12

Comments:

( Source: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: HIG HER Difficulty:

Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO

(

Monday, March 12, 2007 3:24:52 PM 2

TVAN STANDARD SPP-5.1

PROGRAMS AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS Rev. 5

( PROCESSES Page 32 of 33

Lens Dose Equivalent (LDE) - Applies to the external exposure of the lens of the eye and is

taken as the dose equivalent at a tissue depth of 0.3 centimeter (300 mg/cm').

Licensee - Means the holder of a license.

Member of the Publ ic - Any individual except when that individual is receiving an occupational

dose.

Occupational Dose - The dose received by an individual in the course of employm ent in which

the individual"s assigned duties involve exposure to radiation and/or radioactive material from

licensed and unlicensed sources of radiation , whether in the possession of the licensee or other

person . Occupational dose does not include dose received from background radiation, as a

patient from medical practices, or from voluntary participation in medical research , or as a

member of the public.

On -The-Job Training (OJT) - Performance of duties, commensurate with the level to which the

training will be credited , under the direction of appropriately experienced personnel.

Planned Special Exposu re (PSE) - An infreque nt exposure to radiation, separate from and in

addition to the annual dose limits.

RADCON Instrument * Any RAOCON instrument used (not including installed facility radiation

monitoring-system) to measure radiation exposure, exposure rate, dose, dose rate, dose

equivalent, or dose equivalent rate or to assess airborne or surface contamination. Instruments

utilized in the external and internal dosimetry programs are excluded from this definition.

( RADCON Technician - A technician qualified in radiation protection and serving in a responsible

position per ANSI N18.1-1971.

Rad iation Area - An area, accessible to individuals , in which radiation levels could result in an

individua l receiving a dose equivalen t in excess of 5 mrem in one hour at 30 cm from the

radiation source or from any surface that the radiation penetrates.

Radiation Work Permit (RWP) * A document for ccnt rolling the radiological aspects of work .

Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) - An area within (or that may coincide with) the

Restricted Area (defined in 10 CFR 20.1003) boundaries that may have increasing radiological

hazards.

Removable Contamination - Contamination which may be easily transferred to personnel or

surfaces through casual contact.

Response Check - Exposure of the instrument to radiation in a reproducible geometry such that

a reading is obtained for each scale or decade normally used in order to verify that the

instrument response is acceptable for performing surveys.

Restricted Area - Any area access to which is limited by the licensee for purposes of protection

of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials (10 CFR 20.1003) .

TVAN STANDARD SPP-5.1

PROGRAMS AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS Rev. 5

(-, PROCESSES Page 31 of 33

Declared Pregnant Woman - Means a woman who has voluntaril y informed the licensee , in

writing, of her pregnancy and the estimated date of conception. The declaration remains in

effect until the declared pregnant woman withdraws the declaration in writing or is no longer

pregnant.

Deep Dose Equivalent (DOE) * Applies to external whole-body exposure . The dose equivalent

at a tissue depth of 1 cm (1000 mg/cm').

Derived Air Concentration (DAC) - The concentration of a given radionuclide in air which , if

breathed by the reference man for a working year of 2000 hours0.0231 days 0.556 hours 0.00331 weeks 7.61e-4 months under conditions of light work

(inhalation rate 1.2 cubic meters of air per hour), results in an intake of one ALI. For modes of

intake other than inhalation, an equivalent DAC-hr shall be determined and included as DAC-hrs

in the individual 's dose tracking record . The equivalent DAC-hr is equal to the number of hours

of exposure at the DAC (i.e., DAC-hrs exposure which would result in an equivalent intake of

radioactive material as has been observed in a particular exposure incident). This permits the

comparison of intake by inhalation with other modes of intake (ingestion, injection, absorption ,

etc.). 2000 DAC-hr is equal to one ALI.

Dose* A generic term that means absorbed dose, dose equivalent , effect ive dose equivalent,

committed dose equivalent, committ ed effective dose equivalent , or total effective dose

equival ent.jas defined in applicable sections of 10 CFR 20.

NOTE For purposes of this document and implementing procedures, radiation exposure as

expressed in units of Rlhr and subunits, thereof, is equivaient to dose (rad) and dose

( equivalent (rem). Based on ANSI N13.11 development and terminology, any acute dose

greater than 10 rem is generally denoted in units of rad, since that level is considered as

the accident range of personnel exposure. Any dose less than that level is considered

the protective range of personnel exposure.

Experience - As used in this document and ANSI N18.1-1971and ANSI /ANS-3 .1 (1981), actual

applicable working experience performing duties commensurate with the position . Observation

of others is not considered experience. Up to 12 months of OJT may be credited toward

e xperience on a one-for-one basis.

Fixed ccntamtnattcn- Contamination which is not transferred through casual contact and is not

detected by smear survey. It may become removable through operations such as grinding ,

welding , etc .

High Radiation Area- An area, accessible to individuals , in which radiation levels from radiation

sources external to the body could result in an individual receiving a dose equivalent in excess

of 100 mrem in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months at 30 centimeters from the radiation source or 30 centimeters from any

surface that the radiation penetrates .

Hot Particle* A single discrete object (particle) generally difficult to see (usually <100 micron)

with the naked eye, and at least 0.1 microcuries of radioactivity . It is either an activated

corrosion/wear product or fuel fragment with high specific activity . For the purpose of an

approximate field calculation , any discrete particle surveyed with a standard frisker probe

(HP"260 , HP-210 , etc.) and found to have levels of greater than or equal to 20,000 cpm, shall be

considered a hot particle.

Individual Monitoring Devices (individual monitoring equipment) * Means devices designed to

be worn by a single individual for the assessment of dose equivalent such as film badges,

c thermoluminescence dosimeters (TLDs), pocket ionization chambers , and personal ("lapel") air

sampling devices .

RWTOIO

c Revision 9

Page 86 of 100

Screen post6 POSTED AREAS

Screen TCPTV

Radioactive Materials Area

Define and recognize a Any area or room in which radioactive material is used, stored, or transferred.

Radioactive Materials Area . In addition to the yellow and magenta colors and tri-hlades, tbe word CA UTION

or DANGER will appear on posting.

Screen TCPTW All radioactive materials shall be stored in designated radioactive material

tml cr 99-0072 storage area or room with the posting "Caution, Radioactive Material." All

radioactive material shall be labeled with a "Caution, Radioactive Material' tag.

You must notify RADCON prior to placement or removal of radioactive material

from a radioactive material storage area.

Unlabeled radioactive material shall not be left unattended.

If you find a radiological material container which is torn, unsealed, unlabeled,

or unattended, call RADCON.

S creen TCPTX All items which have been used in a contaminated area or potentially

contaminated system are considered contaminated until surveyed and released

by RADCON.

These items shall be placed in a sealed yellow container/bag containing the

radioactive material symbol.

( Containers with radioactive liquids require special care. RADCON may perform

surveys during the movement. These items should be transported in a rigid

device such as a bucket, drum or cart if there is potential for the primary

container to be damaged and leak.

Screen TerTY Radioactive material which is being transported from one RCA to another

through a clean area will normally be escorted by RADCON , except when

properly bagged hand tools or protective clothing, certain chemistry samples,

and materials are transported by other authorized persons.

You must maintain control of radioactive material in your possession while

frisking or getting undressed upon exiting a contamination zone.

Ensnre you place the radioactive material away from otber personnel.

Screen post9 Radiation Area

Define lind recognize a

Radi ation Area.

An accessible area in which a person could receive a deep dose in excess of 5

mrem in one hour (5 mrem /hr) at 30 centimeters (about 1 foot) from the source.

The word "caution" will appear on the radiological posting.

Screen postl 0 Entry requirements are the same for Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA)

entry.

(

RWTOIO

Revision 9

( Page 87 of 100

Screen postll High Radiation Area

trn2 cr 99-0004

Defin e a nd r ecognize a High

An accessible area in wh ich ra diatio n levels fr om ra diation sources exter nal to

Radiation Arca. the bod)" could resu lt in a n indiv idua l receiving a dose eq uiva lent in excess of 100

mrem in 1 hou r (100 mremlhr) at 30 cent imet ers (abo ut 1 foot) from t he

rad iation source or 30 ce ntimeters from a ny surface that the rad ia tion

pe netra tes.

Screen postl] T he word "'caution" or "danger" wlll appear on the sta ndard radio logical

posting.

Screen postI J Entry requirem ents for a High Ra diati on Area :

Screen post14 * All RCA entra nce re quire ments apply.

Screen postl5 * Eithe r a dose warning d evice, dose rat e meter, or RADCO N coverage. Any

entry into a high ra dia tion area wit ho ut one of these items will subject the

ind ividu al a nd TVAN to an i"H.C violation!!!!

S creen PlJ.'il /7 Not ify th e RADCO N g ro up prior to ANY ent ry into a High Rad iation Area .

Screen post/8 Any entry into a High Rad iat ion Area WITH O UT th e ab ility to kee p t rac k of

dose rates is a serio us violat ion of plant procedure a nd may ca use an

overexposu re.

( Screen post19

Define an d recogn ize a

l ocked lli gh Rad iatio n Area

Areas wh ere dose rat es are greater tha n 1000 mremlbr at 30 cm fro m t he so urce

sha ll be posted as a Locked High Radiation Area a nd locke d (wit h a key

controlled by Ra dCo n).

If the a rea can not be locke d, a contin uous atte nda nt (door wa tch) must be

present. T he door wa tc h will be briefed in Lockcd IIigh Radiation Area

door watc h req uirements.

Screen post/9a

If it becomes necessar y to lock a rea s that d o not have a pe rma nent enclosure,

a temporary enclosure may be install ed a roun d th e area and locked wit h a

High Ra diation Area padlock.

Elect ro nic surve illance ma y a lso be used to pr event un au tho rized entries.

Screen qutzl O UESTION: The room you are working in has a dose rate of 50 mremlhr . It should

(rn ] cr 99-0083 be posted as a high radiation area.

True or False

Screen qutzt c A" SWE R: False. Thc room should be posted as a rad iation area. A High Radiation

Area has dose rates in excess of 100 mrem/h r.

RCI-15

( SQN RADIOLOGICAL POSTINGS Revision 15

Page 10 of 13

6.0 REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

D. Positi ve engineering controls may be necessary to ensure that

airborne radioactivity does not spread to other plant areas.

Ventilation systems in affected rooms should be operable and

maintain a negative pressure differential. Items such as glove

bags or containment tent s may be utilized to confine the source of

airborne radioactivity and portable vent ilation systems may be

used to cont rol the spread of generated airborne radioactivity .

Air borne Radioactivity Areas must be promptly posted and

necessary precautions taken to ensure that the airborne

radioactivity is confined within the posted area .

6.12 Contamination Area

A. 1OCFR20 does not define criteria for establishing or posting of a

Contamination Area . The criterion of ~ 1,000 dpm/100 cm' of

transferrable contamination is used to define this establishment

and posting .

B. A Contamination Area is an area , accessible to individuals, in

which transferrable contamination levels are ~ 1000 dpm/100 ern",

( C. Each Contamination Area shall be posted with a conspicuous sign

or signs bearing the standard radiation symbol and the words

Caution - Contaminati on Area .

D. The entrance/exit for a Contaminatio n Area is ident ified by the use

of a step -off-pad (SOP). Directions printed or written on the SOP

instruct ind ividuals exiting the area to remove conta minated

cloth ing prior to stepping onto the SOP , to prevent the spread of

contamination outside of the posted Contamination Area .

E. It may impractical to post and establish all Contamination Areas as

described above. Due to space limitations and physica l properties,

some areas such as floor drains or samp le/instrume nt panels may

be identified with radiation tape and/or radiation caution tags .

6.13 High Contamination Area

A. 1OCFR20 does not define criteria for establishing or post ing of a

High Contamination Area . The criterion of ~ 50,000 dpm/100 cm'

of tra nsferrable contam ination in the general area is used to define

this establishment and posting .

B. A High Contamination Area is an area , accessible to individuals, in

which transferrable contamination levels in the general area are

~ 50,000 dpm/100 ern".

RWTO IO

Revision 9

( Page 14 0fi 00

S creen treld

u Alpha particles ca n be shielded by a piece of paper, by th e dead

C haracterize the methods of layer of skin on the su rface of the body, or by clothing.

sh ield ing alpha radia tion.

S creen trel e

.u However, becau se alpha particles are highly energetic , the y can

Cha ra cter ize the exp osu re damage the softer internal tissues if depo sited for a period of time.

ha zard of alpha radi a tion.

We say then , th at it is primarily an INTER:'i AL HAZARD.

S creen tret p

Sta re th e four typ es ( I f

Y Gamma Radiation

radia tion fou nd in a

co m me rcia l nuclea r power Gamma radi ation has no electrical charge or mass. It 's a wave of pure

plant. ENERGY!

S creen trel q

y Sources include fission, fission products, and activation products.

C ha ra cterize wh ere ga m ma

radi ati on is found .

Screen trelr

y Gamma radiation is a VERY penetrating form of wave ra diat ion.

Ch ara cter ize gamm a ra dta tlon

by its penetrat ing abili ty. Gamma ray can ea sily penetrate the walls of piping

containing radioactive materials.

( .reen trets

y Gamma radiation can be RED UCED by shield ing the source of th e

C haracte rize th e methods of radiation with very den se material such as lead , steel, o r concrete.

shiel d ing gam ma r a d ia tion.

Sc reen trelt

y Gamm a radi at ion is an extremely penetrating wave that is an

Cha ra cterize the exposure external hazard to the whole body. The majority of nuclear plant

hazard or gamma r adi ation. worker dose is from G AM~IA radiation.

ld en tffy the typ e of r a diatio n

th ai co ntr ibutes th e most too a

worker' s dose.

Screen trelf

State the four types of

~ Beta Radi ation

r ad iati on found In a

commercial nu clear po wer Beta radiation is mad e up of high speed particles with a negat ive elect rical

pla nt. charge which orig inate fr om th e nucleus of an atom.

Sc reen trelg

Source of most beta particles is from activated corrosion and fission

C haract erize w here beta products.

radiali on is foun d.

(

RWTOIO

Revision 9

(' Page 15 of 100

Scum Ire Jlr

Penetration in air is usually limited to a few feet, but beta particles

Characterize beta radiation by have more penetrating power than alpha particles.

its penetrating ability.

Scree" trelI

The best shielding for beta is a few layers of lightweight plastic or

Characterize the methods of light metal.

shielding beta radiation.

Screen ttelj

Eyes and skin can be affected by beta radiation, but normally it eau

Characterize the exposure only penetrate a few layers of skin.

hazard of beta radiation.

Personnel would have to work fairly close to a beta source

to receive much exposure.

Screen trelk

State the four types of radiation

11 Neutron Radiation

found in a commercial nuclear

power plant. Neutron particles are part of the atomic nucleus that has been freed by

either decay or fission. Neutrons have no electrical charge.

Screen/fell

Fission process creates neutron particles.

Characterize where neutron

radiation is found.

( ~TeelJ trelm

Neutron particles are very penetrating.

Characterize neutron radiation

by its penetrating ability.

Screen treln

They are best shielded by water, concrete, or thick polyethylene.

Characterize th e methods of

shielding neutron radiation.

Screen trelo

Due to the high-penetration capabilities of neutron radiation, it is

Characterize the exposure an external hazard to the whole body.

hazard of neutron radiation.

Neutron exposure mainly occurs when in close proximity to

the reactor only while it is operating.

Screen quizl OUESTION: Most ionizing radiation dose at the station is from this type of radiation:

1m2 cr 99-0083

alpha or beta or neutron or gamma

Screen quiz2d ANS'VER: Gamma radiation is very penetrating and is located at variou s locations in the

plant , therefore causing most of our dose .

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

1. 060 AK 1.01 00 1

( Which ONE (1) of the following COMPLETELY lists ALL of the exhaust locations

monitored for airborne effluents that are potential sources of geaseous waste , and the

units that the effluents are measured in?

A. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust for each unit, an Auxiliary Building Exhaust and a

Shield Building Exhaust for each unit: measured in counts per minute.

B~ Condenser Vacuum Exhaust for each unit, a Service Building Exhaust, an Auxiliary

Building Exhaust and a Shield Building Exhaust for each unit; measured in counts

per minute .

C. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust for each unit, an Auxiliary Building Exhaust and a

Shield Building Exhaust for each unit; measured in mRem per hour.

D. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust for each unit, a Service Building Exhaust, an Auxiliary

Building Exhaust and a Shield Building Exhaust for each unit; measured in mRem

per hour.

A. Incorrect. A /~o have a service building exhaust.

B. Correct.

( C. Incorrect. Also have a service building exhaust, and measured in CPM

D. Incorrect. Measured in CPM, but a/l monitors are included

Monday, March 12, 2007 3:36:57 PM 1

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release:

Types of radiation, their units of intensity, and the location of sources of radiation in a nuclear power plant

(-,

Question No. 61

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating : RO 2.5

Technical Reference: ' OPT200.RM

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learn ing Objective: OPT200.RM, Obj 4

Question Source : Modified

Question History: SQN ODCM B.2-2

Question Cognitive Level : Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.13

Comments:

( Source: MODIFIED Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:

Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Lasl 2 NRC?: NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 3:36:57 PM 2

OPT200.R M

Rev. 2

Page 10 of 166

(

ENABLING OBJECTIVES

4. Describe the following characteristics of

each major component in the Radiation

Monitoring System:

Location

Power supply (include control power as applicable)

Support equipment and systems

Normal operating parameters

Component operation

Controls

Interlocks (including setpoints)

Instrumentation and Indicat ions

( I. INTRODUCTION

C. Lesson Purp ose and Significance

This lesson does not include a detail study of all the theory behind radiation and

the principles used to measure it.

Radiation Monitor Student Handout (includes General Background on Radiation

Detection Principles) gives information concernin g types of radiation, interaction

with matter, detection of radiation and type s of detectors.

Instructor Note: Have the students ref er to this handout if there is a need to review these

p rinciples. This handout should be in the students hands a day previous to the

class fo r review.

(

OPT200.RM

Rev. 2

Page 69 of 166

Condenser Vacuum Pump Exhaust Monitors

1,2-RE-90-99 & 119, & 1,2-RE-90-255 & 256

Continuously monitors mechanical vacuum

pump air exhaust for an indication of a

primary-to-secondary leak.

Two low range monitors, 1,2-RE-90-99 &

119, & two accident monitors RE-90-255 &

256

RE-90-99/119 alarm on detectable radiation

in the condenser exhaust - first indication of a

primary to secondary leak.

EO-4

( X. LESSON BODY

D. Major Components

4. Process and Effluent Gas Monitors

Condenser Vacuum Pump Exhaust Monitors 1, 2-RE-90-119, 1,2-RE-90-99, 1,2-

RE-90-255, 1,2-RE-90-256

Continuously monitor the mechanical vacuum pump air exhaust for an indication

of a primary-to-secondary leak.

Two low range monitors, 1,2-RE-90-99 and I ,2-RE-90-119, and two accident

monitors RE-90-255 & 256 (mid & high range) - overlapping ranges

RE-90-99 or 119 continuously samples the condenser vacuum pump exhaust to

monitor noble gas concentrations for indications of primary to secondary leakage

and for evaluations of radioactivity released to the environment.

Co ver the same range of concentrations - both monitors should not be in

service at the same time due to flow limitations on the condenser vacuum

pump exhaust.

alarm on any detectable reading of radiation in the condenser exhaust -

first indication of a primary to secondary leak.

RE-90-255 & 256 , provides detection of noble gases over the entire range of

concentrations from normal operations to accident conditions.

99 & 119 located on el. 732 of the turbine bldg.

Power Supply :- 480 V C&A Vent Board

Instrumentation: Radiation process & area monitor power dist panel

(

OPT200.RM

Rev. 2

Page 74 of 166

(

Shield Building Ventilation Monitors RM/RE-90-

400 I RE-90-402 & RE-90-260 I 261

The shield building vent stack effluent discharge

is monitored by two separate radiation

monitoring systems

- RE-90-400/402

- RE-90-260/261

Each system has its own pumps and detectors.

Flow through both systems is controlled by flow

control valves that receive inputs from a micro-

computer Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM)

EO-4

X. LESSON BODY

D. Major Compone nts

4. Process and Effluent Gas Monitors

Shield Building Ventilation Monitors RMIRE- 90-400, R E-90-402, RE-90-260, RE-90-

261

The shield building vent stack effluent discharge is monitored by two separate

radiation monitoring systems, the RE-90-400/402 & RE-90-260/261.

Each system has its own pumps and detectors.

Flow through these two systems is controlled by flow control valves which receive

inputs from a micro-computer Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM).

l

OPT200.RM

Rev. 2

Page 89 of 166

(

Auxiliary Building Vent Monitor channel

0-RE-90-101

Noble gas monitor - Beta scintillation detector

Particulate & radioiodine is collected with removable filter

& analyzed remotely

Sampling probe assembly fitted with seventy-two sample

nozzles - air adjusted manually

Noble gas channel automatically initiates auxiliary

building vent isolation and startup of the Auxiliary

Building gas treatment system (ABGTS)

Both trains are blocked with HS-90-136A3 (Buffered

signal for isolation between trains) on M-12

EO-4

( X. LESSON BODY

D. Major Components

4. Process and Effluent Gas Monitors

Auxiliary Building Vent Monitor channel O-RE-90-101

Monitors for noble gases

Particulate radioactivity and radioiodine is collected with a removable filter and

analyzed remotely.

Beta scintillation detector

Utilizes a sampling probe assembly fitted with seventy-two sample nozzles

Nozzles geometrically arranged to allow taking a representative sample of

effluent

Air velocity is manually adjusted to effect isokinetic sampling from the

vent

The sample taken from the duct is too large to be routed directly to the

particulate and iodine filters, therefore a sub-sample is taken from the main

sample line.

At setpoint the noble gas channel automatically initiates auxiliary building vent

isolation and startup of the Auxiliary Building gas treatment system (ABGTS)

Both trains are blocked with HS-90-136A3 (Buffered signal for isolation

between trains) on M-12

OPT200 .RM

Rev. 2

Page 92 of 166

(

Service Building Vent Monitor O*RE*90*132

Possib le sources of contaminants in the vent

system are exhaust from the radiochemical lab,

titration room, counting room , & decontamination

rooms .

Indicated & annunciated in MCR (M-12) - high

radiation & instrument malfunction

Power Supply: 480-volt C&A vent board 1A1-A.

Instrument Power:120 vac radiation. process &

area monitoring DBT panel 1, bkr 14.

aDCM 1.1.2: Requires ope rability of noble gas

activity & flow rate monitor.

EO-4

( X. LESSON BODY

D. Major Components

4. Process and Effluent Gas Monitors

Service Building Vent Mo nitor chann el O-R E-90-132

Possible sources of contaminants in the vent system are exhaust from the

radiochem ical lab, titration room, counting room, and decontamination rooms.

Indicated & annunciated in MCR (M-12) - high radiation & instrument

malfunction

Power Supply: 480-volt C&A vent board IAI-A.

Instrument Power:120 vac rad. process & area monitoring DBT panel ! , bkr 14.

ODCM 1.1.2

Drawing 47W6! 0-90-!

(,

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

62 . 068 AK2.02 001

( Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 1 is at 100% RTP when a fire occurs in the cable spreading room.

- Due to the large amount of smoke in the main control room, it is decided by the

Shift Manager that the main control room must be abandoned.

Which ONE (1) of the following responses below describes the proper operating crew

actions for the given conditions?

A'! Trip the reactor and verify reactor tripped prior to abandoning the Main Control

Room.

B. Place HS-13-204 and 205 (M-15) to TRIP and proceed to the Aux Control Room .

Verify the reactor is tripped in the Aux Control Room.

C. Evacuate the Main Control Room and take E-O to the Aux Control Room . Trip the

reactor locally by opening the reactor trip breakers at the MG set room .

D. Announce over the PA to evacuate the Main Control Room and proceed to the Aux

Control Ro0':!.1. Trip the reactor locally by opening the control rod MG set breaker at

the 480V Unit boards.

C A. Correct. Section 2.1 step 1

B. Incorrect. Aux Control Room would have indication of whether reactor is tripped, but

the trip would be verified in the MCR

C. Incorrect. EOPs are not applicable when evacuating MCR

D. Incorrect. AOP-C.04 does not have option for tripping reactor from 480V Unit

boards

(,

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:33 PM 118

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledgeof the interrelations between the Control Room Evacuation and the following: Reactor trip system

( Question No. 62

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating: R03.7

Technical Reference: AOP C.04

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-C.04, B.6

Question Source: Bank

Question History: SON Bank

Question Cognitive Level: Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments:

( Source:

Cogni tive Level:

BANK

LOWER

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

SQN IlANK

Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC'?: NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:33 PM 119

OPL271 AOP-C.04

Revision 1

Page 3 of 26

( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINiNG

III. LESSON TITLE: AOP-C .04, SHUTDOWN FROM AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months (s)

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective :

Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain , using class room evaluations and/or simulator scenarios , the requirements of AOP-

C.04, SHUTDOWN FROM AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM.

B. Enabling Objectives:

Obiecti ves

O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities

associated with Shutdown from the Auxiliary Control Room that are rated <: 2.5

during Initial License Training and <: 3.0 during License Operator Requalification

( Training for the appropriate position as identified in Appendi x A.

1. State the purpose/goal of this AOP-C.04.

2. Describe the AOP-C .04 entrv conditions.

a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

AOP-C .04 entry conditions .

b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-C.04 entry

conditions.

c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-

C.04 entrv conditions.

d. Describe the plant parameters that may indicate a Shutdown from the

Auxiliary Control Room is required.

3. Upon entry into AOP-C.04, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the

appropriate procedural section for response.

4. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-C.04.

5. Describe the actions that must be taken before abandoning the main control room,

including a basis for each action.

6. Explain the staffing requirements for unit abandonment per AOP-C .04.

7. Describe the types of equipment that are on the various checklists associated with

AOP -C.04

8. Describe the actions that may be necessary if procedure steos are taken before all

OPL271AOP-C.04

Revision 1

Page 4 of 26

( Objectives

checklists are complete .

9. Describe the bases for the limits, notes, cautions of AOP-C.04.

10. Describe actions per AOP-C .04, that are required to:

a. Maintain Plant in Hot Shutdown

b. Cooldown plant form Aux. Control Room

c. Return to Main Control Room

11. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

12. Given a set of initial plant conditions use AOP-C .04 to correctly:

a. Recoanize entrv conditions.

b. Identify required actions.

c. Respond to Continoencies.

d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.

13. Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance of

AOP-C:04.

14. Discuss the parameters to be considered by the SED when making a REP

( classification during a control room evacuation.

15. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to,

durinq and after the abnormal condition.

AOP*C .04

( SQ N SHUTDOWN FRO M AUXILIARY CON TROL ROO M

Rev. 13

I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.1 Control Room Abandonment

NOTE EOPs are NOT applicable when evacuating MCR.

1. ENSURE reactor TRIPPED. [M-4]

2. ENSURE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valve

handswitches in CLOSE. [M-4]

3. DISPATCH CRO with radio and Appendix Z

( to perform the following:

a. GO TO AOP-C.04 Cabinet.

[6.9KV Shutdown Board Rm A]

b. ENSURE personnel dispatched

to perform applicable checklists and

appendices USING Appendix Z,

Task Assig nment Sheet.

4. ENSURE one CCP placed in

PULL TO LOCK.

Page 4 of 183

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

67. 074 EA I.08 001

( Given the following plant conditions :

The crew is responding to a LOCA.

Due to equipment failures , the crew has entered FR-C.1, Response to

Inadequate Core Cooling.

Wh ich ONE (1) of the following methods is the highest priority in restoring the Core

Cooling CSF?

A. Depressurize the RCS by venting to Containment.

B. Initiate RHR flow to provide maximum cooling flow.

C. Rapidly depressurize the secondary to facilitate RCS depressurization.

D~ Start available CCP and Sl pumps and align ECCS valves as necessary.

A. Incorrect. Depressurizing the RCS to Cntmt is a last resort.

B. Incorrect. RHR flow would be established after significant depressurization has

occurred. Thsi would not be the primary plan to establish core cooling

C. Incorrect. Would perform once it was determined that HPI is unavailable

D. Correct. Top priority is to establish HPI if possible , although HPI failure most likely

( led to entry to this procedure

Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a Inadequate Core Cooling: HPI System

Question No. 63

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating: R04.2

Technical Reference: FR-C.1

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271 FR-C.1 , B.3

Question Source: Bank

Question History: SQN Bank

Question Cognitive Level: Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments:

Monday, March 12,20072:35:34 PM 128

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQN BANK

( Cogni tive Level:

Job Position:

LOWER

Difficulty:

Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO

(

Monday, March 12, 20072:35:34 PM 129

OPL271 FR-C .1

Revision 1

Page 3 of 16

( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING

III. LESSON TITLE: FR-C .1 , INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demon strate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

FR-C .l , INADEQUATE CORE COOLING.

B. Enabling Objecti ves

Obiectives

O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge 's and abilities

associated with Inadequate Core Cooling that are rated <: 2.5 during Initial License

Training and <: 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the

appropriate position as identified in Appendix A

(

I. State the purpose /goal of this FR-C .1.

2. Describe the FR-C.1entrv conditions.

a. Describe the plant parameters and setpoints associated with FR-C.1

entrv conditions.

b. Demonstrate an understanding of the use of F-O, Status Trees to

indicate when FR-C .1 must be implemented.

3. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into FR-C.1.

4. Describe the bases for ail limits, notes, cautions, and steps of FR-C.1.

5. Describe the condit ions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

6. Given a set of initial plant conditions use FR-C .1 to correctlv:

a. Recoanize entry conditions .

b. Identifv reauired actions.

c. ResDond to Continaencies.

d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.

( 7. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to,

durina and after the abnormal condition.

(

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

EOI PROGRAM MANUAL

FUNCTION RESTORATION PROCEDURE

FR-C.1

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

Revision 12

QUALITY RELATED

PREPARED/PROOFREAD BY: ~:>"...!--,=,,-,'-'....'=!,-,----

D. A. PORTER _

( RESPONSI BLE ORGANIZATION : _ _OPERATIONS

""'--':!.>!"-'-!.'="-'-"'---- _

APPROVED BY: ---'-'~="-"='.!....!!2!:.!:...

TOM MARSHALL _

EFFECTIVE DATE: 01/09/2007

REVISION

DESCRIPTION : Revised to update E-1 step number reference.

This procedure contains a Handout Page (2 copies).

( SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

Rev. 12

HANDOUT

Page 1 of 1

STEP ACTION

1. MONITOR RWST level greater than 27%.

10 . MONITOR if hydrogen igniters and recombiners should be turned on.

10.a.4) WH EN hydrogen analyzers have been in ANA LYZE for at least 5 minutes ,

RNO THEN PERFORM substeps 1O.b through 10.e.

10 .d . WHEN ice condenser AHU breakers have been opened,

THE N ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters.

11. MONITOR CST level greater than 5%.

12 . MAINTAIN Intact S /G narrow range levels between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%.

12 .a . MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 440 gpm

RNO UNTIL level greater than 10% [25% ADV] in at least one S /G .

( 14 .a. WHEN pressurizer pressure less than 1960 psig,

THEN BL OCK low steamline pressure SI.

15. MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated. (RCS pressure less than 100 psig)

(

Page 1a of 22

( SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR -C .1

Rev. 1 2

HANDOUT

Page 1 of 1

STEP I ACTI ON

1. MONITOR RWST level greater than 27%.

10 . MONITOR if hydrogen igniters and recombiners should be turned on.

10.a.4) WHEN hydrogen analyzers have been in ANALYZE for at least 5 minutes.

RNO THEN PERFORM substeps 10.b through 10.e.

10.d . WHEN ice conde nser AHU breakers have been opened,

THEN ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters.

11 . MONITOR CST level greater than 5%.

12. MAINTAIN Intact SIG narrow range levels between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%.

12.a. MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 440 gpm

RNO UNTIL level greater than 10% [25% ADV] in at least one 8/G .

( 14.a. WHEN pressurizer pressu re less than 1960 psig.

THEN BL OCK low steamline pressure 81.

15. MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated. (RCS pressure less than 100 psig)

Pag e 1b of 22

( SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C. 1

Rev . 12

1.0 PURPOSE

This procedure provides actions to restore core cooling.

2.0 SYMPTOMS AND ENTRY CONDITIONS

2.1 ENTRY CONDITIONS

FR-O Status Trees :

F-O.2, Core Cooling REO condition:

Core exit TICs greater than 1200°F.

F-O. 2, Core Cooling REO condition:

Core exit TICs less than 1200°F

( AND

Res subcool ing less than 40°F

AND

All RCPs stopped

AND

Core exit TICs greater than 700°F

AND

RVLIS lower range less than 42%.

3.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS

Page 2 of22

( SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

Rev. 12

ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

1. MONITOR RWST level IF RHR pumps aligned to RWST,

greater than 27%. THEN

GO TO ES-1 .3, Transfer to RHR

Containment Sump.

--~.--

CAUTION Running RHR pumps for greater than 100 minutes with miniflow valves

open and NO CCS flow to RHR heat exchangers could result in pump

damage .

2. CHECK RHR pump status:

( a. CHECK RHR pumps RUNNING. a. GO TO Step 3.

b. CHECK CCS ALIGNED b. ALIGN CCS to RHR heat

to RHR heat exchangers. exchangers.

(

Page 3 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

( Rev. 12

ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

3. ENSURE ECCS valves aligned

as appropriate:

REFER TO EA-63-5, ECCS Injection

Mode Alignment

REFER TO ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR

Containment Sump

( * REFER TO ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot

Leg Recirculation.

CAUTION SI pump opera tion with min iflow isolated and RCS pressure

greater than 1500 psig could result in SI pump damage.

4. VERIFY ECCS flow: START pumps and ALIGN valves

as necessary.

VERIFY CCP flow through CCPIT.

VERIFY SI pump flow.

VERIFY RHR pump flow.

(

Page 4 of22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

( Rev. 12

ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

5. CHEC K RCP support condition s ESTABLIS H condition s for starting an

AVAILABLE: RCP USING EA-68-2, Establishing RCP

Start Conditions.

REFER TO EA-68-2, Establishing

RCP Start Conditions.

6. CHECK CLA isolation valve status :

a . Power to CLA isolation valves a. DISPATCH personnel to restore

AVAI LABLE. power to CLA isolation valves

USING EA-201-1, 480V Board Room

Breaker Alignments.

(

b . CLA isolation valves OPEN. b. OPEN CLA isolation valves

UNLESS closed after CLA discharge.

7. CHECK core exitT/Cs GO TO Step 10.

less than 1200"F.

Page 5 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

( Rev. 12

ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

8. CHECK RVLlS lower range indication:

a. CHECK NO Reps RUNNING. a. IF any Reps running ,

THEN

--.*--

RETURN TO procedure and step

in effect.

b. CHECK RVLlS lower range indication b. IF RVLlS lower range indication

greater than 42 %. rising,

THEN

GO TO Step 3.

(

IF RVLl S lower range indication

stable or droppi ng,

THEN

GO TO Step 9.

c. RETURN TO procedure and step

---.--

in effect.

c..

Page 6 of 22

SQN INAD EQ UAT E CORE COOLING FR*C.1

( Rev. 12

ISTE P IIACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

9. CHECK Core Exit TICs :

a. CHECK Core Exit TIC temperatures a . IF Core Exit TICs dropping,

less than 700°F. THEN

GO TO Step 3.

---

IF Core Exit TICs stable or rising.

THEN

GO TO Step 10.

C

b. RETURN TO procedu re and step

=---

in effect.

Page 7 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

( Rev . 12

ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

10. MONITOR if hydrogen igniters and

recomb iners should be turned on:

a. CHECK hydrogen concentration a. PERFORM the followi ng:

measurement AVAILA BLE:

1) PLACE HS-43-2 DDA in

Hydrogen analyzers ANALYZ E [M-1D] .

have been in ANA LYZE

for at least 5 minutes. 2) PLACE HS-43-21DA in

ANALYZ E [M-1 D].

3) RECORD prese nt time:

4 ) WHEN hydrogen analyzers

have been in ANA LYZE

( for at least 5 minutes,

THEN

PERFORM substeps 1D.b

through 1D.e.

5) GO TO Step 11.

b. CHECK contain ment hydrogen b. CONSULT TSC.

concentration less than 6%. GO TO Step 11.

c. DISPATCH personnel to open ice

condenser AHU breakers

USING EA-2D1 -1, 48D V Board Room

Breaker Alig nments .

(Step continued on next page.)

Page 8 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C .1

( Rev . 12

ISTEP IIACTION /EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

10, d. WHEN ice condenser AHU breakers

have been opened,

THEN

ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters [M-10]:

HS-268-73 ON

HS-268-74 ON,

e. CHECK containment hydrogen e. PLACE hydrogen recombiners in

concentration less than 0,5% , service USING EA-268-1, Placing

Hydrogen Recombiners in Service,

IF hydrogen recombiners

NOT available,

THEN

CONSULT TSC.

(

11. MONITOR CST level greater than 5%. ALIGN AFW suction to ERCW

USING EA-3-9, Establishing Turbine

Driven AFW Flow, and EA-3-10,

Establishing Motor Driven AFW Flow .

Page 9 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

( Rev. 12

ISTEP II ACTIO NIEXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

CAUTION Use of a Faulted or Ruptured SIG during the following steps

should NOT be considered UNLESS no intact SIG is available.

12. MAINTAIN Intact S/G narrow range

levels:

a. Greater than 10% [25% ADV]. a. MAINTAIN total feed flow

greater than 440 gpm

UNTIL level greater than 10%

[25% ADV] in at least one S /G .

IF total feed flow

greater than 440 gpm

CANNOT be established,

THEN

PERFORM the following:

1) CONTINUE attempts to establish

heat sink in at least one SIG

USING AFW, main feedwater, or

condensate system.

2) GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

b. Betwee n 10% [25% ADV] and 50%.

Pag e 10 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

( Rev. 12

ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

13 . CHECK RCS inventory loss paths:

a. Power to pressurizer PORV block a. DISPATCH personnel to restore

valves AVAILABLE. power to block valves

USING EA-201-1. 480 V Board Rm

Breaker Alig nments .

b. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED. b. CLOSE pressurizer PORVs.

IF any pressurizer PORV

CANNOT be closed .

THEN

CLOSE its block valve.

c. At least one block valve OPEN. c. OPEN one block valve UNLESS it

was closed to isolate an open PORV.

(

d. Normal letdown valves CLOSED: d. CLOSE valves.

FCV-62-69

FCV-62-70

FCV-62-72

FCV-62-73

FCV-62-74

(Step continued on next page.)

(

Page 11 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C .1

( Rev. 12

ISTEP I IACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

13. e . Excess letdown valves CLOSED: e. CLOSE valves .

FCV-62-54

FCV-62-55

f. Reactor vessel head vent valves f. CLOSE valves.

CLOSED:

FSV-68-394

FSV-68- 395

FSV-6 8-396

FSV-6 8-397

(

g . RCS and pressurizer sample valves g. CLOSE valves .

CLOSED: [status panels 6K and 6L]

FCV-43-3 or FCV-43-2

FCV-43-12 or FCV-43-11

FCV-43-23 or FCV-43-22

h. Post-accident sample valves h. CLOSE valves .

CLOSED: [M-10]

FSV-43-25 0 or FSV-43-251

FSV-4 3-309 or FSV-43-310

(,

Page 12 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

( Rev. 12

ISTEP I IACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

NOTES * S/G depressurization at the max imum rate may cause S/G narrow range

leve ls to drop to less than 10% [25% ADV] . Th is is acceptable during

an inad equate core coo ling condi tion .

Blocking low steamline pressure SI as soon as pressurizer pressure is

iess than 1960 psig will prevent an inadvertent MSIV closure and kee p

the condens er ava ilable for steam dump.

After the low stea mline pressure SI signal is blocke d, main steamline

isolatio n will occu r if the high stea m pressure rat e is exc eed ed.

14. DEPRESSURIZE Intact S/Gs to reduce

RCS pressure to less than 100 psig :

a . WHEN RCS pressure

( less than 1960 psig ,

THEN

PERFORM the foll owi ng :

1) BLOCK low steamline pressure

SI.

2) CHECK STE AMLI NE PRESS

ISOLISI BLOCK RATE ISOL

ENABLE permissive LIT.

[M-4A, A4)

(Ste p continued on nex t page .)

Page 13 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C .1

( Rev. 12

ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAI NED

14 . b. DUMP steam to condenser b. DUMP steam at maximum rate

at ma ximum ach ievable rate: USING Intact S/G atmos pheric

relief(s).

1) ENSURE st eam dumps in steam

pressure mode. IF local control of atmospheric

relief(s) is necessary,

2) ADJUST steam dump demand to THEN

FU LLY OPEN thre e coo ldown DISPATC H personnel to dump steam

va lves. USING EA-1-2, Local Control of

S/G PORVs.

3) WHEN T-avg is less than 540 c F,

T HEN

BYPA SS steam dump interlock.

c . CHECK RCS pressure c . IF RCS press ure dropping ,

less than 100 psig. THEN

( GO TO Caution prio r to Step 12.

IF RCS pressure stable or rising,

THEN

GO TO Note prior to Ste p 21.

d. ST OP S/G depressurization.

Page 14 of 2 2

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR -C.1

( Rev. 12

ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

15 . MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated :

a. CHECK RCS pressure a. GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

less than 100 psig .

b . RESET SI and

CHECK the followi ng:

AUTO S.1. BLOCKED

permissive LIT. [M-4A , C4]

S.1. ACTUATED

permissive DARK. [M-4A , D4]

(

c. CLOSE CLA isolation valves. c. PERFORM the following:

1) RESET Phase B.

2) ESTABLISH control air to

containment USING EA-32-1,

Establishing Control Air to

Containment.

3) VENT any unisolated CLA

USING EA-63-1, Venting

Unisolated Cold Leg

Accumulator.

IF any CLA CANNOT be isolated

or vented ,

THEN

CONSULT TSC to determine

contingency actions.

(

Page 15 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

( Rev . 12

ISTEP IIACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAI NED

16. STOP all RCPs.

17. DEPRESSURIZE Intact SIGs

to atmospheric pressure:

a. DUMP steam to condenser a. DUMP steam at maximum rate

at maximum rate. USING Intact SIG atmosphe ric

relief(s).

IF local control of atmospheric

relief(s) is necessary,

THEN

DISPATCH personnel to dump steam

USING EA-1-2 . Local Control of

SIG PORVs.

18. VERIFY ECCS flow: CONTINUE efforts to establish

ECCS flow.

CCP flow through CCPIT

IF core exit TICs less than 1200°F.

OR THEN

SI pump flow

RHR pump flow.

--_-.--

GO TO Step 17.

IF core exit TICs greater than 1200°F.

THEN

GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

Page 16 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C. 1

( Rev. 12

ISTEP I [ A CTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

19. CHECK core cooling:

a. Core exit TICs less than 1200°F. a. GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

b. At least two RCS T-hot indications

less than 350°F.

-_...

b. GO TO Step 17.

~

c . RVLlS lower range indication c. GO TO Step 17.

greater than 64%.

( ---~

20. GO TO E-1. Loss of Reactor or

--...--

Secondary Coolant, Step 15.

(

Page 17 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

( Rev. 12

ISTE P II ACTION /EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAI NED

NOTE RCP damage due to absence or loss of normal support conditions is an

acceptable consequence in this procedure.

21. CHECK if RCPs should be started:

a. CHECK core exit TICs a. GO TO Step 22.

greater than 1200°F.

b . CHECK if idle RCS loop available: b. PERFORM the following :

S/G narrow range level

1) OPEN all pressurizer PORVs

greater than 10% [25% ADV]

and block valves.

AND

2) IF core exit T/Cs remain

RCP in associated loop greater than 1200°F,

AVAILAB LE and STOPPED. THEN

OPEN reactor vessel head vents:

FSV-68-394

FSV-68-395

FSV-68-396

FSV-68-397.

3) GO TO Step 22.

c. START RCP in one idle loop.

---

d. GO TO Substep 21.a.

(

Page 18 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

( Rev . 12

ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

22. DEPRESSURIZE Intact S /Gs

to atmospheric pressure :

a . DUMP steam to condense r a. DUMP steam at maximum rate

at maximum rate. USING Intact S /G atmosphe ric

relief(s).

IF local control of atmospheric

relief(s) is necessary ,

THEN

DISPATCH personnel to dump steam

USING EA-1-2, Local Control of

S /G PORVs.

IF NO intact SG available,

THEN

USE Faulted or Ruptu red S/G.

23 . CHECK Co re Exit TICs IF core exit T/Cs dropping ,

less than 1200°F. THEN

GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

--~

IF at least 5 core exit TICs

greate r than 1200°F and rising

AND RCPs running in all available

RCS cooling loops,

THEN

GO TO SACRG-1, Seve re Accident

Controi Room Guideline

Initial Respo nse.

--~.--

Page 19 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

( Rev. 12

ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

24. DETERMINE if CLAs should be isolated:

a. CHECK at least intermittent a. GO TO Step 26.

RHR inj ection flow.

b . RESET Sl and

CHECK the following:

AUTO S.1. BLOCKED

permissive LIT. [M-4A, C4j

& 1. ACTUATED

permissive DARK. [M-4A, D4]

c. CLOSE all CLA isolation valves. c. PERFORM the following:

1) RESET Phase B.

2) ESTABLISH control air to

containment USING EA-32-1,

Establishing Control Air to

Containment.

3) VENT any unisolated CLA

USING EA-63-1, Venting

Unisolated Cold Leg Accumulator.

IF any CLA CANNOT be isolated

or vented,

THEN

CONSULT TSC to dete rmine

contingency actions.

Page 20 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1

( Rev. 12

ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

25. DETERMINE if RCPs should be stopped :

a. CHECK at least two T-hot indications a. GO TO Step 26.

less than 350°F.

b. STOP all RCPs.

26. VERIFY ECCS flow: CONTINUE efforts to establish

ECCS flow .

CCP flow through CCPIT

GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

SI pump flow

RHR pump flow.

27. CHECK core cooling :

___:e--

a. At least two ReS T-hot indications a. GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

less than 350°F.

b. NO RCPs RUNNING. b. STOP all RCPs.

(,

c. RVLlS lower range indication

greate r than 64%.

-_....----

c. GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

Page 21 of 22

SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING F R-C .1

(' Rev. 12

IST EP II AC TION /EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

28. CHECK RCS Ve nt paths ISOLATED:

a . Pressurizer PORVs CLOS ED. a . CLOSE Pressurizer PORVs.

IF any Pressurizer PORV

CANNOT be closed ,

THEN

CLOSE its block valve .

b. Reactor vessel head vent valves b. CLOSE valves .

CLO SED:

F-SV-68-394

FSV-68-395

( * FSV-68-396

FSV-68-397

29 . GO TO E-1, Loss of Reactor or

Secondary Coolant, Step 15.

--~.--

END

(.

Page 22 of 22

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

75. E02 EA1.3 00 1

( Given the following plant conditions:

A steam break has occurred inside containment.

Reactor trip and containment high-high pressure have actuated.

- The fau lted SIG has completely blown down .

- The crew has ente red ES-1.1, SI Tennination.

One conta inment spray pump is in service.

If containment pressu re is 2.5 psig, Wh ich ONE (1) of the following correctly describes

the status of the CCPs and Conta inment Spray pump when the crew transitions from

ES-1.1 to the appropriate plant procedure?

Containment Spray Pump

A. 1 CCP injecting via CCPIT In Service

B. 1 CCP injecting via CCPIT Stopped and placed in A-AUTO

C. 1 CCP inject ing via seal injection Stopped and placed in A-Auto

and normal charging

D~ 1 CCP injecting via seal injection In Service

( and norma l charging

A. Incorrect. Meet SI termination criteria; therefore , second CCP remo ved from service

and normal charging established.

B. Incorrect. Meet SI termination criteria; therefore, second CCP remo ved from service

and normal charging established. Containment pressure is > 2 psid; therefore, CS

is not stopped.

C. Incorrect. Containment pressure is > 2 psid; therefore, CS is not stopped.

D. Correct. Meet Sf termina tion criteria; therefore , second CCP remo ved from service

and normal charging established. Containment pressure is > 2 psid; therefore , CS

is not stopped.

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM 144

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Ability to opera te and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (5 1Termination) Desired operating results during abnormal and

emergency situations.

(

Question No. 64

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating: R03.8

Technical Reference: ES-l .1

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective : OPL271 ES-1.1 , Objective 6

OPL273C502C; Obj. 8.i, 8.j

Question Source: Bank

Question History: SQN ES-1.1.B.1-2

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .10

Comments:

(

Source : BANK Source If Bank: SEQUOYAH BANK

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

D ate: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM 145

OPl271ES-1.1

Revision 0

Page 18 of 39

(

X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Knowledge: Knowledge:

No preference is given about which pumps to start to * This step is a continuous

establi sh ECCS flow although an individual plant may have action step.

a preference. The operator has the option of using either * If conditions deteriorate

a

an SI pump or CCP. If the operator selects to use a and the operator is

CCP, then he must align the suction and discharge of the required to manually start

pump to the safety injection mode and isolate the normal ECCS pumps to restore

charging suction and discharge paths. RCCS subcooling or

pressurizer level, the

operator should leave the

ECCS pumps on until the

SI reduction criteria is

met in the appropriate

step.

13. MONITO R if containment spray should be stopped: To stop containment spray

a. CHECK any containment spray pump RUNNI NG. pumps if running and no

longer needed .

- RNO- GO TO Step 14.

b. CHECK containment pressure less than 2.0 psig Knowledge:

This step is a continuous

( RNO- GO TO Step 14 action step.

c. RESET containment spray signal.

d. STOP containment spray pumps and PLACE in A-

AUT O.

e. CLOSE containment spray discharg e valves FCV-

72-2 and FCV-72-39.

Basis:

Spray pumps are automatically actuated on Hi-Hi

containment pressure . In E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety

Injection, the operator verifies that the Containment Spray

System is operating if it is required. During a LOCA, the

need for continu ed operation of the spray system is

monitored by this step in ES*1.1. After containment

pressure is reduced, the pumps can be stopped to prevent

RWST depletion. If at any time the containment pressure

increases above the pressure setpoint , the ORANGE path

of the Containment Status Tree sends the operator to FR-

Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, which

checks the need for containment spray and verifies that

the spray system is operational if it is required.

OPL271 ES-1.1

Revision 0

Page 13 of 39

( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

6. CHECK RCS pressure STABLE or RISING. To ensure that control is

being maintained after

RNO - ENSURE pressurizer spray valves stopping all but one CCP.

CLOSED.

IF RCS pressure continues to drop,

THEN GO TO ES-1.2 Post LOCA

Cooldown and Depressurization.

Basis:

All but one CCP was stopped in the previous step. RCS

pressure stable or increasing confirms that ECCS flow is

adequate for the operator to maintain control using one

CCP. The operator will then be ready to align the CCP to

the normal charging flow path. If RCS pressure is

decreasing, then the operator will go to ES-1.2, Post

LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, for additional

actions.

If RCS pressure is being reduced by pressurizer spray

(initiat ed in £-1 to assist in increasing pressure level). then

the pressure behavior is not a true indication of leak flow

versus injection flow. Furthermore, if RCS pressure is

( decreasing after all but one CCP is stopped, the operator

is directed to ES-1.2 on the premise that leak flow cannot

be countered by flow from one CCP. This would be an

inappropriate transition if pressurizer spray is causing the

pressure decrease. The operator should terminate spray

flow if necessary to prevent pressure from decreasing.

7. ISOLATE CCPIT : To stop injection flow to the

a. CLOSE CCPIT inlet valves FCV-63-39 and FCV-63- ReS through the CCPIT .

40.

b. CLOSE CCPIT outlet valves FCV-63-25 and FCV-

63-26 .

Basis:

Normal charging and the CCPIT injection lines are parallel

flow paths from the discharge of the CCPs. CCPIT

isolation enables the normal charging path to be used.

Closing the inlet valves first prevents any pressure surge

in the CCPIT.

(

OPL271 ES-1.1

Revision 0

Page 14 of 39

(

X. LESSON BODY : INSTRUCTOR NOTES

8. ESTABLISH charging flow To properly estab lish a

a. CLOSE seal water flow control valve FCV*6 2-89. charging path and sufficient

b. OPEN charging isolation valves FCV-62-90 and flow to ensure cooling for

FCV-62-91 . the cha rging pumps.

c. ENSURE normal or alternate charging isolation

valve FCV-62- 86 or FCV-62-85 OPEN.

d. ESTABLISH desired charging flow USING seal

water and charging flow control valves FCV-62-89

and FCV-62-93.

Basis:

Proper alignment of the charging path allows flow to be

controlled in the normal manner. Charging flow is

established by closing the charging line hand control

valve, opening the charging line isolation valves and then

establishing the desired charging flow by adjusting the

charging line flow control valve and the charging line hand

control valve.

The substeps in this step arranged to maintain seal

injection flow and to introduce charging cautiously through

the charging line.

( To establish maintenance

9. CONTROL charging flow to maintain pressurizer level

of pressurizer level as the

RNO - IF pressurize r level is dropping, THE N criteria for adjusting

PERFORM the following: charging flow.

a. IF any SIG is faulted, THEN DO

NOT CONTINUE this procedure

UNTIL fault ed SIG depressurization

stops OR pressurizer level can be

maintained.

(

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

82. E13 EK2.! 001

( Given the following plant conditions:

- The crew entered FR-H.2, "Steam Generator Overpressure", due to an

overpressure condition on S/G #2.

- SG #2 pressure is 1170 psig .

- S/G #2 narrow range level is 72%.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the appropriate actions, in sequence, to

mitigate this event in accordance with FR-H.2?

A. Verify Feedwater Isolation and initiate SG Slowdown.

S~ Verify Feedwater Isolation and attempt to dump steam from the affected SG.

C. Isolate AFW flow and initiate SG Slowdown .

D. Isolate AFW flow and attempt to.dump steam from the affected SG

A. Incorrect. First action is correct, but SG blowdown is a later action, or an action

that would be-performed in FR-H.3

( B. Correct.

C. Incorrect. AFW is isolated later if pressure cannot be brought under control by

dumping steam. Additionally, SG blowdown is a later action

D. Incorrect. AFW is isolated later; attempting to dump steam is correct.

Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:36 PM 158

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Steam Generator Overpressure) and the following: Componen ts, and functions of

C' control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features

Question No. 65

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating: R03.0

Technical Reference : FR-H.2

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271FR-H.2, Obj . 5

Question Source: Bank

Question History: New

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments:

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficu lty:

( Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Da te: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? : NO

(,

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 159

OPL271 FR-H.2

Revision 1

Page 3 of 17

(-,

I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II. COURSE : LICENSE TRAINING

III. LESSON TITLE: FR-H.2, STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURE

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: .5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objecti ve:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios , the requirements of

the FR-H.2 , Steam Generator Overpres sure.

B. Enabling Objecti ves

O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowled ge's and Abilities

associated FR-H .2, Steam Generator Overpressure, that are rated ~ 2.5

~uring Initial Licens e Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator

Requa lification Tra ining for the appro priate license position as identified in

Appendix A.

(

1. Explain the purpose/goal of FR-H.2.

2. Discuss the FR-H.2 entry conditions.

a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automati c actions associated with

FR-H.2 entr y conditions .

b. Describe the requirements asso ciated with FR-H.2 entry conditions .

3. Summarize the mitigating strateg y for the failure that initiated entry into FR-H.2.

4. Describe the bases for all limits, notes , cautions, and steps of FR-H.2.

5. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

6. Given a set of initial plant conditions use FR-H.2 to correctly:

a. Identify required actions

b. Respond to Contingencies

c. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes

7. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the performance of FR-H.2

conditions.

OPL271 FR-H .2

Revision 1

Page 11 of 17

(

X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

4. ATIEMPT to dump steam from affected S/G(s): To attempt

Atmospheric reliefs depressurization of the

OR affected scci by

MSIV bypass valves releasing steam from

OR the affected scei

Steam supply valves to TO AFW pump

RNO - DISPATCH personnel to dump

steam USING EA-1-2, Local

Control of SIG PORVs.

GO TO Step 6. RNO - IF no release

path. available, skip

Basis: ov er step to check

Releasing steam will result in depressurization of the affected S/G pressure

affected SG. Stea m can be released through SG dropping , since steam

PORVs, ma in steamlln e isolation bypa ss valves , the is not being released

steam suppty val ve to the turbine-driven AFW pump,

or any 6lher avail able path. Th e SG PORVs. main

steamline isolation bypass valves, and steam suppl y

( va lve to the turbin e-driven AFW pump eac h should

ha ve sufficient capac ity and cont rollability to

depressurize th e affected S /G smoothly. If no steam

path ca n be est ablished . the operator is dire cted to

Step 6 to further address the SG overpressure

conditio n.

(

FR-H.2

( SQN STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURE

Rev. 6

ISTEP II ACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE I IRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

3. CHECK affected S/G(s) narrow range GO TO FR-H .3, Steam Generator High

level less than 84% [80% AOV].

---.--

Level.

CAUTION Releasing steam from an overfilled SIG cou ld result -in damage to

downstream steamline components. An " overfi ll ed S/G" is any SIG

.whose narrow range level has exceeded 84% [80 %-.ADV] at any time .

NOTE MSIV isolation reset may be necessary to open MSIV bypass valves.

(

4. ATIEMPT to dump steam DISPATCH personnel to dump steam

from affecte d S/G(s): USING EA-1-2, Local Control of SIG

PORVs.

Atmospheric reliefs

GO TO Step 6.

MSIV bypass valves

Steam supply valves

to TO AFW pump

P"np 4 of 7

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

c 86. G2.1.2 001

OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations, describes the" Departure From License Condition"

which can be invoked to protect the health and safety of the public.

Which ONE (1) of the following conditions must ALWAYS be met when departing from

a license cond ition or technical specification in accordance with 10 CRF 50.54 (x) and

(y)?

A'!' The action must be approved by a licensed SRO prior to taking the action.

B. The action must be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Emergency Plan.

C. The NRC must be notified prior to the action and must concur with the action to be

taken.

D. The action must be necessary to prevent equipment damage or personnel injury

AND the Plant Manager must be notified prior to taking the action.

A Correct.

B incorrect. Although the unit is most likely in the E-Plan , it is not a requirement prior to

invoking 10CFR50.54(x)

C incorrect. NRC concurrence is not required for the action; they must be notified as

soon as possible but no more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months prior.

( o incorrect. Preventing damage or injury is a reason for invoking the rule, but Plant

Manager concurrence or approval is not required

Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation .

Question No. 66

Tier 3 Group 1

Importance Rating: RO 3.0

Technical Reference: OPDP-1, Append ix F

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OP1271C209, B.8

Question Source: Bank

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level: Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments:

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 165

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Source: BANK Source If Bank: WTSI

( Cognitive Level: LOWER

Job Position: RO

Difficulty:

Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO

(

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 166

OPL271C209

Revision 10

Page 3 of 53

( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING

II. COURSE: LICENSED TRAINING & NON LICENSED

III. LESSON TITLE: CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (OPDP-1, SPP-10.0, ODM)

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of this lesson, the student will have reviewed the "Conduct of

Operations" procedures and will demonstrate an understanding of these

procedures and other material presented by passing a written examination as

outlined by program procedure.

B. Enabling Objectives:

Each student will understand the following

1. Operations department specific duties, organization and administration

2. Operating policies including manipu iation of controls that directly affect

( reactor reactivity or power level.

3. The shift routines (rounds) and operating practices.

4. Control room act ivities including conduct. access, and control room

surveiilance areas.

5. The requirements of pre -evolution briefings.

6. The requ irements for proper communications including repeat back

communications utilizing radios, telephones, and the PA system .

7. Proper Operations notifications requirements.

8. The control of equipment and system status control requ irements including

equipment status change authorization (maintenance. testing, return to

operability. etc.); equipment and system alignments and Technical

Specificat ion compliance (Normal and 50.54X).

9. Log keep ing requ irements to include which records are QA and which are

not QA records.

10. The shift turnover requirements and processes.

( 11. Operations responsibilities relative to plant chem istry inciuding

communications with plant chemistry personnel.

OPL271C209

Revision 10

Page 4 of 53

( 12. The required reviews for Operations. Example: Procedure changes;

equipment design changes; license changes; industry experience

information.

13. Operating orders such as standing orders and shift orders.

14. Plant operating procedures relative to the conventions of use and procedure

compliance .

15. Requirements for Surveillance Testing by Operations department.

16. The requirements for operator aids including definitions, examples of

operator aids, posting requirements, responsibilities, documenting and

processing, and reviews.

17. The requirements for equipment labeling and method for requesting labels

be installed .

18. The requirements for Operations teamwork including responsibilities, on-

shift team members , response to events, training , and feedback.

19. The requirements for Self-Checking.

20. The requirements for active and inactive licenses (SRO and RO) including

how to activate an inactive license to an active license.

(

21. The requirements for Operations key control.

22. Requirements for record keeping including ability to distinguishing between

QA and non QA records.

23. The actions to be taken when an instrument failure is suspected .

24. The differences between the expected response to alarms during steady

state conditions and during transients.

25. The conditions resulting in an operator workaround .

TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations OPDP-1

(" .

Department

Procedure

Rev. 0006

Paae 37 of 98

Appendix F

(Page 1 of 4)

Plant Operating Procedures

A. Procedure Compliance

1, Plant equipment shall be operated in accordance with written approved procedures as

discussed in SPP-2.2, Administration of Site Technical Procedures.

2. Appendi x F, section E, contains expectations for procedure usage. Procedure users should

use it to evaluate their own conduct.

B. Precautions , Limitations and Initial Conditions

1. All applicable Precautions and Limitations, Initial Conditions, and all procedure sections to

be performed SHALL be reviewed prior to performance:

IF a procedure is in progress to maneuver the plant AND the direction of that maneuver is

changed , THEN all P/Ls of the applicable procedure(s) SHALL be re-reviewed prior to

continuing with the evolution.

2. IF a procedure in progress is suspended OR exited prior to completion, THEN the following

SHALL be verified prior to recommencement:

(

a. Initial conditions

b. Precautions and limitations

C. Procedure Place keeping

1. Place keeping is an effective tool for reducing human error and maintaining status control

by maintaining positive control of steps, especially following delays and interruptions. Place

keeping includes the following:

a. Marking each step of a procedure as it is performed,

b. Marking steps that are not applicable, and

c. Marking each step of a clearance order as it is performed.

2. Examples of acceptable methods for marking up a procedure including initialing each step

as it is performed , marking off the steps by checking them off, or using the place keeping

boxes on those procedures where they have been provided.

3. The following practices may be used to enhance place keeping:

a. Re-reading the previous several steps after being distracted.

b. Identifying the last procedure page to be performed by marking it as "LAST

PAGE."

TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations OPDP-1

( Department

Procedure

Rev. 0006

Paqe 38 of 98

Appendix F

(Page 2 of 4)

Plant Operating Procedures

c. Circling a step that is in progress and slashi ng through the circle when the step

is complete .

d. Marking completion of a procedure page in the bottom margin on the page.

e. Marking steps that will not be performed in advance or during the Pre-Job Brief.

4. Place keeping shall be used, unless the procedure classification is "information only."

5. During implementation of the Abnormal or Emergency Operating Procedure, place keeping

shall be used (immediate actions and prudent op erator actions are exempt when

performed. Place keeping shall be used during verification of those actlons. ),

6. To facilitate place keeping for clearance orders, a separate sheet should be provided for

independent verifications .

7. Erasable markers, page protectors or clear cover sheets can be used to facilitate place

keeping dur ing routine activities that do not require archival records retention . When the

( evolution is complete d the mark can be wiped off. In cases where procedure s require

signatures or initials those are used instead of erasable markers.

8. For evolutions that are not completed by the end of shift, the marked up pages shall be

included in the shift turnover process for the applicable watch station. The status of

procedure completion should be reported to the control room. At the end of the evolution,

any procedures not required for retention as archival records may be discarded.

D. Alternative Place Keeping - ReaderlWorker

Place keeping via a 'ReaderlWorker' method may be used to facilitate place keeping under

condi tions in harsh environment such as working in a contaminated zone or worki ng in a

situation where worker cannot support/hold paper work . In these cases a second person is

allowed to sign off a step as comp leted only when in direct conta ct with the performer. When a

second perso n is required, the second individual should sign "for" the performer, such as

"JCSfTMM."

E. Use of 10 CFR 50.54 (x) and (y)

1. Operations personnel SHALL NOT give or accept directions or guidance that conflic ts with

appr oved procedures, Technical Specifications , or a License Condition, with the exception

of those actions pursuant to 50.54 (x) and (y).

2. All actions that occur per 50.54 (x) and (y) SHALL be approved by a licensed Senior

Reactor Operator and those actions SHALL be immediately reported to the Operations

Manager, Plant Manager, and Site Vice President and documented via PER.

TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations OPDP*1

( Department

Procedure

Rev . 0006

Paae 39 of 98

Appendix F

(Page 3 of 4)

Plant Operating Procedures

3. Operations personnel MAY take responsible action that departs from a License Condition or

Technical Specification pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 (x) and (y), within the limits of the

following:

a. The provision must be invoked in order to take necessary actions .

b. IF an emergency protective action is needed AND NO action consistent with the

license is immediately apparent that can provide adequate or equivalent

protection, THEN personnel are obligated to take protective action under this

provision.

c. Use of the provision does NOT require NRC concurrence. IF time permits, THEN

NRC Operations Center telephone notificat ion should be made before action is

taken . IF time does NOT permit, THEN NRC Operations Center telephone

notification SHALL be made as soon as possible but not to exceed one hour per

SEP-3.5 and NuReg-1022.

d. Provision does NOT apply where time permits NRC amendment to Technical

( Specifications or License Condition.

e. Provision SHALL NOT be used to prevent damage to the plant or machinery

unless such damage is tied to a possible adverse effect on public health and

safety.

f. Provision ONLY applies to emergencies where license compliance poses a

barrier to effective protective action , and rapid action is needed to protect public

health and safety.

g. Immediate threat of injury to personnel is appropriate justification for the use of

the provision.

h. Use of the provision is NOT tied to the declaration of any emergency

classification in the Emergency Plan. Since emergencies can develop rapidly,

use of the provision should NOT be encumbered by administrative prerequisites.

TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations OPDP-1

( Department

Procedure

Rev. 0006

Pace 40 of 98

Appendix F

(Page 4 of 4)

Plant Operating Procedures

F. Expe ctat ions

1. Operators may use App endix "F" to eva luate their own cond uct. Supe rvisors shoul d use

the same wh en eva luating ope rators against the ex pectation.

2. During Procedure Use:

a. Verifies correct procedure and revision is being used (Ve rifies For Use ).

b. Revie ws appropriate portion of procedure, and ensures prerequ isites are met before

continu ing.

c. Reviews precauti ons and ensures they are understood by step performers.

d. Ensures a pre-evolution briefing is conducted lAW pre-job check list.

e. Ensures appropriate personnel are available or informed. as necessary, before

starting .

( f. Ensures that instruments are chec ked for calibration and documented as required .

g. Applies proper usage requireme nts as denoted on procedure (e.g., conti nuous use).

h. Stops and notifies supervisor if it cannot be performed as written and init iates change

if needed.

i. Applies Self Check, QV&V and Tou ch STAR .

j. A pplies place keeping tools as appropriate.

k. Meets applicabie ver ification requirements during procedure use.

I. Initiates appropriate documen tation as required for problems in procedures.

m. Properly completes all steps (e.g., performs action prior to sign off) .

n. All requ ired sign-ofts and record pages are completed by appropriate personnel (no

blanks).

o. Stops and notifies supervision if component not aligned per procedure (e.g., valve is

to be opened , but found already open ).

p. Does not move on without first sign ing each completed step as appropriate .

q. Reviews entire procedure for completeness prior to conclud ing the task is complete.

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

85 . G2.1.18 001

(-,

Which ONE (1) of the following describes when a 'LATE ENTRY' is required in

eSOMS , and the procedure used to enter a 'LATE ENTRY'?

A. Required any time required information is not entered at time of event; enter actual

time of event, the words 'LATE ENTRY', and the event description.

B. Required any time required information was not entered at time of previous

approval of logs; enter actual time of event , the words 'LATE ENTRY', and the

event description .

C. Required any time required information is not entered at time of event; enter time of

entry, the words 'LATE ENTRY', actual time of event , and event description .

D~ Required any time required information was not entered at time of previous

approval of logs ; enter current time, the words 'LATE ENTRY', actual time of event,

and event description.

A. Incorrect. Late entries are only required after they are found when approval has

been made without the original entry of event (For instance, after shift turnover it is

found that an enJ!y was not made)

B. Incorrect. Partially correct, but the time of entry must also be included

C. Incorrect. Partially correct as far as action is required, but the late entry is only

( required after an appro val of logs has taken place

D. Correct.

Ability to make accurate, clear and concise togs, records, status boards, and reports.

Question No. 67

Tier 3 Group 1

Importance Rating: R02.9

Technical Reference: OPDP-1, Appendix E, section E

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271C209 Objective 9

Question Source: New

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level: Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .10

(~_ Comments:

Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 163

QUESTION S REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

( Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

LOWER

Difficulty:

Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO

(

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35 :36 PM 164

OPL271C209

Re vision 9

Page 3 of 53

( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING

II. COURSE : LICENSED TRAIN ING & NON LICENSED

III. LESSON TITLE: CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (OPDP-1, SPP-10.0, ODM )

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completi on of this lesson, the student will have reviewed the "Conduct of

Operations" pro cedures and will demonstrate an understanding of these

procedures and other material presented by passing a written examination as

outlined by program procedure .

B. Enabling Objectives:

Each student will unde rstand the following

1. - Operations department spe cific duties, org anization and administration

( 2. Operating policies including manipulation of controls that directly affect

rea ctor rea ctivity or powe r level.

3. The shift routines (rounds) and operating practices.

4. Control room activities including conduct, acces s, and control room

surveillance areas.

5. The requirements of pre-evolution briefings.

6. The requ irements for proper communications including repeat back

communications utilizing radios, telephones, and the PA system.

7. Proper Operations notifications requirements.

8. The control of equipment and system status control requirements including

equipment status change authorization (maintenance , testing, return to

operability, etc. ); equipment and system alignments and Technical

Specification compliance (Normal and 50.54X).

9. Log keeping requirements to include which records are QA and which are

not QA records.

10. The shift turnover requirements and processes .

11. Operations responsibilities relative to plant chemistry including

comm unications with plant chemistry personnel.

O PL271C209

Revis io n 9

Pa ge 10 of 53

(

x. LESSON BODY: INST RUCTOR NOT ES

F. Co ntro l o f Equ ipment, System Status and OPD P-l Appendix D,

Clearances. Objectiv e 8

1. Status Change Authorization and Report ing.

2. Equipment and System Alignm ents.

3. Clearances

4. Observations Form 1&2,

G. Logkeeping. OPDP-! Attachment E,

Prop er logkeeping is of maj or imp ortance to every App endi x 1, Back To Basic

person on shift. Proper logkeeping provides three Fundamentals, :Logkceping

function s:_( l) a record of what was done and if the

expected response was obt ained, (2) a record for Objective 9 .

current plant statu s, and (3) a record for subs equent

( evaluation of the statu s of the plant.

1. Establishment of Operating Logs.

2. T imeliness of Record ings.

3. Inform ation to be Recorded.

4. Legibility.

5. Correction s.

6. Log Review.

7. Observati ons Form 1

H . Plan t Operating Procedures. OPDP-l Attachment F,

I. Procedure Compliance. Objective 14

2. Precautions, Limitations and Initial Conditions

C 3. Procedure Pla ce Keeping.

4. Use of 10 CFR 50.54 (x) and (y) Obj ective 8

TVAN Sta nda rd Conduct of Operatio ns OPDP-1

( Depa rt ment

Proc ed ur e

Rev. 0007

Pac e 36 of 98

Appendix E

(Pag e 3 of 3)

Log Keeping

2. To aid in event reconstruction, as much significant information as possibie should be logged

during emergencies and abnormal or unexpected events. However, log keeping should not

take precede nce over controlling and monitoring the plant.

D. Legibility

Log entries shall be made in a manner such that they can be easily read and underst ood.

Add itionally, the log entries should be readily reproducible with standard photocopy machine s.

E. Corrections .

1. Correct ions shall be made by editing the appropriate log entry, or shall be made by placing

a single line through the incorrect entry, writing in the correct entry. initialing, and dating in a

nearby space .

2. Spell checking and related corrections on eSOMS narrative logs does not require initialing

and dating when done before official approval and printing.

( 3. All corrections to approved computer printed documents shali be initialed and dated and

approved by the SM.

4. Late entries (past shift turnover) shall be annotated by placing the current time and the

Words "LATE ENTRY' , followed by the time the entry should have been made, and then

the entry .

F. Log Review

The previous shifts logs shall be reviewed prior to assuming watch. Operating logs shall be

reviewed by the SM/US . These reviews normally would occur shortly before shift relief and

shou ld ensure that entries are accurate and adequate , and that no open ended entries remain.

Additionally , the Operations Superintendent, or his designee should review the ope rating logs on

a daily basis when he is on site.

(

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

87. G2.1.21 00 1

( You are preparing to perform a control rod exercise surveillance on your shift.

BSL is not operating.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the correctlocation(s) to obtain the current

controlled copy revision of the procedure?

Control Room ...

A. ONLY

B. and OFO ONLY

C~ and WCC ONLY

D. OFO AND WCC

A. Incorrect. WCC also has controlled copies.

B. Incorrect. Copies in the OFO are not controlled

C. Correct.

(

D. Incorre ct. Copies in the OFO are not controlled

Abilityto obtain and verify controlled procedure copy.

Question No. 68

Tier 3 Group 1

Importance Rating: RO 3.1

Technical Reference: SPP-2.2

ODM-1 .0 Appendix D

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

Learning Objective: OPL27SPP-2.2 Objective 2 and 5

Question Source: Bank

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level: Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments:

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 167

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

( Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

LOWER

Difficulty:

Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO

(

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:37 PM 168

OPL271SPP -2.2

Revisio n 1

Page 3 of 31

(

I. P.BO.G.BAM : OP ERATOR TRAINING

II. C~JJBSE : LICENSE TRAINING

III. L£SSONID1.E: SPP-2.2, ADMIN ISTRATION OF SITE TECHNICAL PROCEDURES

IV. La-lGTH OF LESS-QNLCQJJIlS.E: 1 Hour

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon com pletion of License Training, the participant shall be able 10 demonstrate or

explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, an understanding

of SPP-2 .2 "Administration of Site Technical Procedures" and OPDP-1 Attachme nt

F "Plant Operating Procedures."

B. Enabling Objectives:

O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities

associated with Rules of Procedure Use that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial

License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator Requalificat ion Training

( for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A

1. Discuss 1he purpose of SPP-2.2.

2. Discuss manage ment philoso phy for procedure use and adherence .

3. List the four levels of use for technical procedures including examples of each

level.

4 Give example s when a procedure step may be marked not applicable (N/A).

5 Describe the procedure revisio n process .

6 Briefly define a minor/editorial change .

7 Describe the conditions under which personnel may take reasonable action

withi n the scope of their training that departs from procedu re.

8 Explain how to obtain and ve rify controlled procedure copy.

(

Revision 1

Page 7 of 31

}LJ.ESSJ:)tUW.Dj': ------;--'ltlS.IRU_CI OaNQTES

A . SPP-2.2 Scope: The Oper ations

( Pro cedures which fall under the scope of this SPP are

Department's Emergency

Operating Instruction

those procedures that involve manipulation, monitoring Program will administer the

or anal ysis of plant equipment or processes . These development, review, and

pro cedur es will be prepared, reviewed , revised and approval for EO l's and

appro ved in accordance with this SPP. supporting documents.

B . Use and Adherence: Objective #2

1. Procedure users are responsible for :

a. Following current approved procedures or

obta ining approval for necessary changes

before proceeding.

b . Understanding the expected respo nses before

perfo rming actions in a procedure and ensuring

these responses occur.

c. Maintaining safe plant opera tion. In situations

where procedures are inaccurate or

inappropriate, safety takes precedence over

( pro cedure adherence.

d. Sto p performance if the procedu re:

NOTE : Typographical

Cannot be performed or completed as errors do not require

written. stopping procedure

performance. Th ese errors

Is determined to be inadequa te for the should be noted and

intended use. corrected following

perfo rmance of the

Is determined to be technically incorrect. procedure. This does not

apply to changes in

Conflicts with another procedure, or would com ponent identifiers,

be in violation of appro ved and controlling numerical units, values,

documents. limits, work seque nce or

where the potential exists

Produces unexpected results. for improper ope ration of

piant equipment.

OPL271 SPP-2.2

Revision 1

Page 14 of 31

(

2 . Procedure changes are normally processed in Objecti ve #5

Business Support Library(BSL). If BSL is not

available or the change is urgent, a description of

the chan ge or a marked up copy of the procedure

and form SPP-2.2-1, "Procedure Control Form

(PCF)" shou ld be forwarded to the organization

responsible for the procedure (sponsor).

PCFs are required for other

NOTE: Hard copy peFs are not required when situations where BSL audit

using BSL to process the procedure. BSL trails are not available to

controls and the audit trail generated by document review and

BSL serve as the documentation that approval requirements and

appropriate reviews and approvals have for any handwritten

occu rred. change s.

3. The sponsor shall evaluate and determine the

disposition of requested changes as appropriate:

a. If mange not needed, returns the request with

ane xplanati on of why not needed.

( b. If the change is needed, assign a responsible

individual to prepare the draft in accordance with

this procedure, or . ...

c. Place the request in a revision file to be

incorporated at next revision.

4. The preparer shall:

a. Obtain a number for a new procedure from the

responsible organization or Management

Services (MS ).

b. Ensure the procedure number has not been

used previously.

c. Determ ine if the revision to the procedure is

minor or editorial using the guidelines of Section

3.5.

d . Determ ine with plant managemen t if the revision

must be processed as an urgent change .

TVAN STANDARD SPP-2.2

PROGRAMS AND ADMINISTRATION OF SITE TECHNICAL Rev. 13

( PROCESSES PROCEDURES Page 12 of 38

NOTE NIA is NOT to be used to bypass steps that are inadequately or

improperly written or to be used in lieu of a procedure change.

Section Manager or Designee of Responsible Organization

3.3.7 Procedure steps which do not meet criteria 3.3.1 through 3.3.6 and are not

required to be performed because of plant conditions or are controlled by

another procedure previousiy fulfilled may be NIA'd by the Section Manager or

Designee of the responsible organization. Concurrence is documented by

initialing and dating the NIA'd steps. The Section Manager's or Designee's

decision to NIA steps shall be based on evaluation of whether the procedure still

fulfills all intended objectives.

3.4 New Procedu res. Revisions. an d Cancell at ions (See Appen dix A and B)

3.4.1 Anyone can request a new procedure, revision, or cancellation. Cancelled

procedures must follow same process as revised procedures.

3.4.2 Procedure changes are normally processed in Business Support Library (BSL).

If BSL is not available or the change is deemed urgent by plant managem ent, a

description of the changes or a marked up copy of the procedure and Form

SPP-2.2-1, "Procedure Controi Form (PCF)" should be forwarded to the

organization responsible for the procedure (sponsor).

NOTE Hard copy PCFs are not required when using BSL to process the

( procedure. BSL controls and the audit trail generated by BSL serve as

the documentation that appropriate reviews and approvals have

occurred.

PCFs are required for other situations where BSL audit trails are not available to

document review and approval requirements and for any handwritten changes.

3.4.3 The sponsor shall evaluate and determine the disposition of requested changes

as appropriate:

A. If the change is not needed, return the request and explain the reason.

B. If the change is needed. assign a responsible individual to prepare the

draft in accordance with this procedure. or

C. Place the request in a revision file awaiting the next appropriate

revision.

3.4.4 The preparer shall, as appropriate:

A. Obtain a number for a new procedure from the responsible organization

or Management Services (MS). It is the responsibility of the preparer to

ensure the procedure number has not been used previously.

B. Determine if the revision to the procedure is minor or editorial using the

guidelines in Section 3.5.

(

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

c 89. G2.2.12 001

You have been directed to perform a Surveillance Test that is part of a Post

Maintenance Test.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes a condition where a step in the test may be

marked "N/A" in accordance with SPP-2.2, Administration of Site Technical

Procedures?

A. To designate change of conditions or intent of the test.

B. To change incorrect procedure step descriptions that do NOT change intent.

C\'" To designate procedure sections that are not being used as part of the PMT.

D. To identify or change faulted procedure step logic or incorrect procedure guidance

in relation to the performance of the PMT.

A Incorrect. using NIA to change conditions or ignore precautions is forbidden.

Procedure Rev required.

B Incorrect. Using N/A to change step descriptions is forbidden .

C Correct. N/A l]1ay be used when performing partial PMTs to designate components

that will not be used in the test.

o Incorrect. Specifically forbidden to N/A incorrect sequence

( Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

Question No. 69

Tier 3 Group 2

Importance Rating: R03.0

Technical Reference: SPP-2.2, section 3.3

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271 SPP-2.2 Objective 4

Question Source: Bank

Question History: Harris 2005 Editorially Modified

Question Cognitive Level: Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content 41 .10

Comments:

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:37 PM 171

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Source: BANK Source lf Bank: HARRIS 2005 NRC

( Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

LOWE R

Difficulty:

Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO

(

Mon day, March 12, 2007 2:35:37 PM 172

OPL271 SPP-2.2

Revision 1

Page 3 of 31

( I. ffiQGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING

II. C-OJlBSE: LICENSE TRAINING

III. LES.SOliIIILE: SPP-2 .2, ADMINISTRATION OF SITE TECHNICAL PROCEDURES

IV. LENGTH OF LESSONICOllBS.E: 1 Hour

V. IBAlMlMG.J:lBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluat ions andlor simulator scenarios, an understanding

of SPP-2.2 "Administration of Site Technical Procedures" and OPDP-1 Attachment

F "Plant Operating Procedures."

B. Enabling Objectives:

O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities

associated with Rules of Procedure Use that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial

License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training

( for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A

1. Discuss the purpose of SPP-2.2.

2. Discuss management philosophy for procedure use and adherence .

3. List the four levels of use for technical procedures including examples of each

level.

4 Give examples when a procedure step may be marked not applicable (NIA) .

5 Describe the procedure revision process.

6 Briefly define a minorleditorial change .

7 Describe the conditions under which personnel may take reasonabie action

within the scope of their training that departs from procedure .

8 Explain how to obtain and verify controlled procedu re copy.

OPL271 SPP-2 .2

Revision 1

c X ~LESSQt:LB_ODY-'-':~

Page 12 of 31

.-------.JILUN""S..LT,aUCTOB NOTES-

Periodically referen ced during task performance

to verify that each segment of the procedure has A segment is a portion of a

been performed . procedure that

accomplishes a complete

When required, appropriate sign-offs are function, such as alignment

completed to verify that each segment of the of a pump to a system , or

procedure has been completed disassembly of a pump.

3. Information Use procedures direct activities with the Example: GOI-6

follo wing characteristics:

Frequently performed or not comple x.

Entire activity can normall y be performed from

mem ory.

The task is within the knowledge and skills of

experienced individuals and/or task qualified

personnel.

Rules of Use:

(

Wh en performing procedures from memory,

procedures should be reviewed periodically (for

example, before performan ce or during

continuing training ).

The procedure shall be reviewed following

revisions that affect the performance of the

activity.

The procedure user is responsible for results

obtained when not referring to the procedure.

4. Multiple Usage Level procedures: Example : Various

Maintenance Procedures

If different sections of the procedure require

different levels of use, the procedure is identified as

multiple use and the classification of the individual

sections is identified on the cover sheet or in the

procedure.

F. Use of Not Applicable (N/A): Objecti ve #4

1. When performing technical procedures, performers

( may use N/A in lieu of sign-off required by Section

3.2 (SPP-2 .2) only when it is clearly appropriate.

OPL271 SPP-2.2

Revision 1

c X--L_ESS~--O"",D,-,-Y~:

Page 13 of 31

.-_!I ~SIRUCTO RKOIES _

2. N/A is NOT to be used to bypass steps that are

inadequately or improperl y written or to be used in

lieu of a procedure change.

3. The follo wing criteria shall be applied to determine

when a step may be marked N/A:

The procedure specificall y allows a step(s) to be

marked N/A under specified conditions .

For procedures used to accomplish activities like

post-maintenance tests, exact steps to be

performed will often be specified . When specific

steps are specified , all other steps may be

marked N/A.

Nonappli cable unit steps in a multiple unit

procedure shall be marked N/A.

Example: If the accept ance

Procedures providing alternate steps dependen t criteria was met, go to step

on specified conditions allow the steps not 3.7. If the acceptance

( required to be N/A*d. criteria was not met,

continue with step 3.3. In

this example, N/A Steps 3.3

through 3.6 if the

acceptance criteria was met.

QC (witness/notification) holdpoints cannot be

N/A'd without Nuclear Assurance approval.

When using only specific sections of an

instruction as delineated in the controlling work

document, then unused sections may be N/A'd.

Procedure steps which are obviously not

required to be performed may be N/A'd with

concurrence of the supervisor (mana gement or Concurrence is documented

engineering supervisory level) responsible for by initiaiing and dating the

conduct of the activity or procedure. N/A'd steps.

G. New Procedures, Revisions and Cancellations:

1. Anyone can request a new procedure, revision , or

cancellation . Cancelled procedures must follow the

c same process as revised procedures.

TVAN STANDARD SPP* 2.2

PROGRAMS AND ADMINISTRATION OF SITE TECHNICAL Rev. 13

( PROCESSES PROCEDURES Page 11 of 38

Entire activity can normally be accomplished from memory,

Within the knowledge and skills of experienced individuals and/or task

qualified personnel.

When performing procedures from memory, procedures should be

reviewed periodically (for example, before performance or during

continuing training). Also, the procedure shall be reviewed following

revisions that affect the performance of the activity. These reviews

ensure that the activities are being performed correctly and that no

procedure revisions have been overlooked.

The procedure user is responsible for results obtained when not referring

to the procedure .

3.2.4 Multiple Usage Lev els Pro cedure

If different sections of the procedure require differen t levels of use, the

procedure is identified as multiple use and the classification of the individual

sections is identified on the cover sheet or in the procedu re.

3.3 Use of Not Appli cabl e IN/A)

( When performing technical procedur es, performers may use N/A in lieu of sign-off

required by Section 3.2 only when it is clearly appropriate . The following criteria shall be

app lied to determine when a step may be marked N/A.

Performer

3.3.1 The procedure specifically allows a step(s) to be marked N/A under specified

conditions.

3.3.2 For procedures used to accomplish activities like post-maintenance tests, exact

steps to be performed will often be specified. When specific steps are specified,

all other steps may be marked N/A.

3.3 .3 Non-applicable unit steps in multiple unit procedures shall be marked NIA.

3.3.4 Procedures providing alternative steps dependent on specified conditions allow

the steps not required to be N/A'd.

EXAMPLE If the acceptan ce criteria was met. go to Step 3.7. If the

acceptance criteria was not met, continue with Step 3.3.

In this example, N/A Steps 3.3 through 3.6 if the acceptance criteria is met.

3.3.5 Quality Control (QC) (witness/notification) holdpoints cannot be N/A'd without

Nuclear Assurance appro val in accordance with NADP-1, Conduct of Quality

Assessment and Inspection.

3.3 .6 When using only specific sections of an instruction as delineated in the

controlling work document, then unused sections may be NIA'd.

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

90. 02 .2.23001

c Which ONE (1) of the following describes the requirement for LCO tracking in

accordance with OPDP-8, Limiting Conditions for Operations Tracking?

The official log for LCOs is the ...

A. Unit Log . All LCO entries are also required to be documented in the LCO Tracking

Log.

B:o' Unit Log. ONLY LCO entries that will remain in effect past the assigned shift are

required to be documented in the LCO Tracking Log.

C. LCO Tracking Log. All LCO entries are also required to be documented in the Unit

Log.

D. LCO Tracking Log . ONLY LCO entries that will remain in effect past the assigned

shift are required to be documented in the Unit Log.

A incorrect. LCO may entries may be put in LCO Tracking log but the only ones

required are the entries that will go past the end of the shift

B Correct

C incorrect. The Unit Log is required at all times for all entries as the primary log.

o incorrect. The Unit Log is required as the official log

( Ability to track limiting conditions for operation s.

Question No. 70

Tier 3 Group 2

Importance Rating: R02.6

Technical Reference: OPDP-8

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPS2710PDP-8 Objective 6

Question Source: New

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level: Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments:

Monday. March 12.20072:35:37 PM 173

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Source: NE W Source If Bank:

(-, Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:

Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO

(

Monday, March 12,20072:35:37 PM 174

OPL2710PDP-8

Revision 0

Page 3 of 13

(

I. PROGRAM : OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING

III. LESSON TITLE: LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS TRACKING

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (s)

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simuiato r scenarios , the requirements of

OPDP-8, LIMITiNG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS TRACKING.

B. Enabling Objectives:

o. -Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and

Abilities associated with Limiting Conditions For Operations Tracking

th at are rated <: 2.5 during Initial License Training and <: 3.0 during

( License Operator Requalification Training for the appropriate

license position as identified in Appendix A.

1. Describe purpose of this procedure.

2. Describe Precautions and Limitations listed in this procedure.

3 What are the requirements of the responsibilities section in this

procedure.

4. Describe requirements for T5 LCO Evaluations.

5. Describe requirements for LCO Tracking Logs.

6. What are the documentation requirements for LCO entries and exits.

7. Describe the difference between an Acti ve LCO vs an Information ONLY LCO.

8. Describe the information that must be entered into the LCO Tracking Logs.

OPL2710PDP-8

Revi sion 0

Page 9 of 13

(

X. LESSON BODY INSTRUCTOR NOTES

F. Require Documentation - Review the following: Objecfive 6

Refer to Section 3.5

1. What determines whether an LCO entry is made in Refer to Section 3.5.1

the Unit Log ONLY or the Unit Log and LCO

Tracking Log?

2. What information is required to be entered into the

Unit Log , when an LCO is entered?

3. During perform ance of Sis for which a status sheet

is provided, what acceptable method may be used

in lieu of logging each individual LCO in the Unit

Log?

G. Definitions- review the definitions in this section. Ref er to Section 5.0

1. Describe the difference between an Active LCO vs Objective 7

an Informa tion ONLY LCO?

H. Appendix "A and LCO Tracking LOG - Review the Refer to Appendix A and

following: Form OPDP-8-1

(

1. For LCO s which have an indefinite expiration date, Objecfive 8

what is entered into the expiration date column.? Refe r to Appendix A

Sect ion 2 .3

(

TVAN STANDARD OPDP-8

DEPAR TMENT LIMITI NG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION TRACKING Rev. 1

( PROCEDURE Page 7 of 24

3.4 LCO Trac king Log

A. Each unit shall maintain a Unit LCO Tracking Log. Each unit shall also

track Common LCOs for common equipment that affects operability.

The US is responsible for maintaining the LCO Tracking Log(s).

B. Each LCO Tracking Record shall be assigned a unique identification

number.

C. Active LCOs shall be tracked and passed from shift to shift as part of the

shift turnover.

3.5 Reguirements for Documentation

Detailed requirements for documentation related to this procedure are contained in

attachments. as identified below:

3.5.1 Unit Log

For short-term LCO entries. the associated Unit Log will be used for

documenting LCO entry provided the LCO is exited before the end of the

assigned shift. LCO entries in the Unit Log should contain the LCO reference

number. component description. a brief description of the activity requiring the

LCO entry, and compensatory measures required while the LCO is in effect.

For performance of surveillance instructions for which a status sheet is provided.

the US/designee may track individual component out-of-service times and

( corresponding LCOs on the provided attachment in lieu of logging each

individual LCO in the Unit Log. The individual performing the procedure is

responsible for notifying the US/designee when equipment is made inoperable

and when it is placed back in service. Active LCOs that will extend past the end

of the shift shall be entered in the LCO Tracking Log.

4 .0 RECORDS

4.1 QA Records

The Unit Log referenced in this procedure is a QA record.

4.2 Non-QA Record s

Form OPDP-8-1. "LCO Tracking Log"

5.0 DEFINITIONS

Active Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) * A condition specified in the plant Technical

Specifications (TS) which limits unit operations. An LCO may be entered by equipment

malfunction or a change in a unit parameter. An LCO implies all LCOs contained in the plant's

TS, Offside Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), Technical Requirements Manual (TR) and the

Fire Protection Report (FPR), if applicable. If an LCO is not met, the associated ACTION

requirements shall be met.

Information Only LCO * A method of tracking an equipment malfunction or change in plant

parameter which would restrict unit operation in another plant condition. An INFORMATION

LCO may prevent a change in plant state/mode or may become an ACTIVE LCO for the current

plant condition should other TS-related equipment or redundant safety-related equipment

become inoperable.

(

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

91 . G2 .2.26 001

( Given the following timeline for Unit 1 operation :

- 4/22 @ 0900 Entered HOT STANDBY (reactor was tripped from 20% power

during shutdown)

- 4/22 @ 1100 Entered HOT SHUTDOWN

- 4/23 @ 0600 Entered COLD SHUTDOWN

- 4/23 @ 2300 .Entered REFUELING

Which ONE (1) of the following times would be the earliest time that irradiated fuel

movement in the reactor vessel is allowed?

M 4/26 @ 1300

B. 4/26 @ 1500

C. 4/27 @ 0800

D. 4/28 @ 0100

A. Correct. TS 3.9.3 specifies 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months from critical. In this case , achieving Hot

Standby. -

( B. Incorrect. This is 100 hrs from Hot Shutdown.

C. Incorrect. This is 100 hrs from Cold Shutdown.

D. Incorrect. This is 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months from Refueling.

c.

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:37 PM 175

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 * NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.

( Question No. 71

Tier 3 Group 2

Importance Rating: R02.5

Technical Reference: TS 3.9.3

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPT200.FH Objective 6.a

Question Source: Bank

Question History: Sequoyah FH-B.5.C-11 ,

Developed from Kewaunee NRC 2000 exam

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10, 43.2

Comments :

(

Source: BANK Source If Bank: SEQ UOYAH BANK

Cogn itive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: RO Plant: SEQ UOYAH

Dat e: 412007 Last 2 NRC ?: NO

/

\ v.,

Monday, March 12, 20072 :35:37 PM 176

OPT200.FH

Rev. 3

Page 4 of62

(

V. TRAINI NG OBJECTI VES (Cont'd):

B. Learning Ob jectives (Co nt'd):

5. Describe the operation of the Fuel Handling system as it relates to the follow ing:

a. Precautions and limitations

b. Major steps performed while refuelin g.

c. Alarms and alarm responsc .

d. How a component failure will affect syst em operation

e. How a support system failure will affec t Fuel Hand ling system operation

6. Describe the administrative contro ls and limits for the Fuel Handling system as

explained in this lesson:

a. State Tech Specs/Tk.M LCOs that govern the Fuel Handlin g Systems.

b. State the :": 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months action limit TS LCOs

c. Given the condit ions/status of the Fuel Han dling system co mpo nents and the

appropriate sectio ns of the Tec h Spec, determin e if operability requirements are

met and what act ions are req uired

7. D iscu ss related Industry Events:

a. SQN LE R930 16 Tilted Fuel Assembly

( b. SQN-LER 2-93 -3 Equipment Hatch not closed during Fuel Moveme nt

c. SQN-NOV 94- 11 Non-co nser vat ive Fuel Handlin g Practices

d. SOE R 85-0 I Reactor Cav ity Sea l Failure, Connecticut Yankee

c. OE81 12 Move ment of irradiatcd fuel with Vent ilatio n syste m inop, Dresden 2

f. SOER 94-2 Boron dilution Events in PWRs

VI. TRAINI NG AIDS:

A. Clas sroom Com puter and Local Area Netwo rk (LAN) Access

B. Computer projector

(

OPT200.FH

Rev. 3

( Page 53 of62

Administrative Topics

State Tech SpecslTRM LCOs that govern

the Fuel Handling System

- Section 9 Refueling Operations

State the TS LCOs that have an

"Immediately Suspend Core Alterations"

action limit

Ena bling Objecti ve 6

( x. LESSON BODY :

Point out to students the Secti on 9 o f TS and T Rl\,l

Refer to a copy of SQN Tec hn ica l Specifications for the deta ils of the LCO, applicability,

actiorus), surveillane e(s) and basis for each

Tech Sp ecs T he follow ing is a listing of Tech Specs identified for the FH sys tem.

3.9 .1 Boron concentration *'

3.9.2 Source Ranze Monitors *

3.9.3 Subcritica l 100 hrs,

3.9.4 Co ntainme nt Penetrt ions *

3.9.8.1 RHR opera tion

3.9.8.2 2 RHR Operab le *

3.9.9 Containment Vent

3.9.10 23 ft. of wa ter Reactor vessel flange'

3.9. 11 23 ft. watc in stora ge racks

3.9.12 On eABGTS

T RM

3.9.5 Direct communication

3.9.6 Manipulator Crane

Core loading will be suspended, pending evaluation by the Refueling SROIFHS and Reactor

Engineering under the following circumstances:

( ]f there occurs on anyone resp onding nuclear channel an unexpected increase in

count rate by a factor of five.

An unexpected increase in count rate by a factor of two on all responding channels.

If RCS temperature drops below 50°F.

Communication between the control room, containment or theSFP is lost.

If water clarity prevents the operator from viewing the Bottom Core Plate during core reload

R EFUELI NG OPE RATION S .. -"'\

(

3/ 4 9.3 DE CAY TIME

LIMITI NG CONDITION FO R O PERATI ON

3.9.3 Th e reactor shall be subcritical for at least 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months .

APPLI CABILI TY: Duri ng movement or irradiated fuel in the reactor pressu re vessel.

AC TION :

With the reactor subcritical for less than 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months , suspend all operatio ns involving movement of

irrad iated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. The prov isions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SU RVEILLANCE REQU IREMENT S .,

4.9.3 T he reactor shall be determined to have been subcritical for at least 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months by verification of the

date and time of subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuei in the reactor pressure vessel.

)

(

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 9-3

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

95 . G2.3 .2 001

( Given the following plant conditions:

Dose rate at job location is 90 mrem/hr.

Airborne Radioactivity Area from particulates due to weld grinding :

Total Internal dose for the job if respirator is worn is 0 mrem.

Total Internal dose for the job if no respirator is worn is 65 mrem.

Time to complete job while wearing a respirator is 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

Time to complete job without wearing a respirator is 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

Which ONE (1) of the following describes whether a respirator will be worn, and why?

A'!' No, wea ring a respirator will raise total exposure .

B. Yes, wearing a respirator will lower total exposure.

C. No, a respirator is not required unless the internal dose will exceed 40 DAC.

D. Yes, a respirator must be worn anytime particulate airborne radiation is present due

to grinding .

A Correct. 290 total mRem

( B incorrect. 315 total mRem

C incorrect. Respirators are worn to minimize dose. 40 DAC hours is not a restriction

or requirement for their use

D incorrect. Although respirators may be worn for grinding, it would not be worn if it

results in extra dose.

c

Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35 :38 PM 183

QUESTIONS REPORT

for S EQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of facility ALARA program.

( Question No. 72

Tier 3 Group 3

Importance Rating: R02 .5

Technical Reference: RCI-04

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271 C260 Objective 8, 9

Question Source: Modified

Question History: Various WTSI Exams

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .12

Comments :

MODIFIED Source If Bank:

( Source:

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC'!: NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:38 PM 184

OPL2 71C2 60

Revi sion 9

Page 4 o f 45

(

8. Identify the requirements for the implementation of a successful ALARA program.

9. Identify the respons ibilities ofthc following concerning the ALARA program:

a. Rad Protecti on Management.

b. Plant Supervision,

c. Plant Empl oyee .

10. Identify the proce ss for preparing a Radiation Work Permit (RWP)

The following list contains knowledge and ability statements (KlAs) from Th e Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for

Nuclear Power Plant Operators: Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) l\'UREG-I I2 2, Revision 2 that are applicable to

the Initial Lice nsed Candidate training program. As such, questioning in these areas will be included on any testing in

preparation of, or included in obtaining either RO or SRO NRC license.

I OC FRSS IM PORTANC E

KJA# K IA Sta tc nrcnt Se ct. Linkts) RO/SR O

G 2.3. 1 Knowledge of IOCFR20 and related facility radiation protection 41.1 2 /4 3.4 . 2.6/3.0

( G 2.3.2

requ irements.

Knowledge of facility ALARA program.

45 .9 /45 .10

41.1 2 /43.4 1 2.5/2.9

45.9 / 45. 10

G 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits and contamination control, 43.4 1 45 .10 2.5/3 .1

incl uding permissible levels in excess of those authorized.

G 2.3.5 Knowledge of use and function of personne! monit oring equipment. 41.11 /45 .9 2.3/2.5

G 2.3.7 Kn owledge of the process for preparing a radi ation work permit. 41.10 /45 .12 2.0 /3 .3

G2 .3. 10 Abilit y to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation 43.4 / 45 .10 2.9/3. 3

and guard against personnel exposure.

(

OPL271C260

Revision 9

c XI. LESSON BODY:

Page 20 of 45

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

c) Allows the pinpointing of high dose jobs so that concentrated

efforts can be used to reduce them in the future.

d) Provides data for managers and engineers to compare benefits

of modification versus the cost in person-rem for a plant

modification.

b. Need for ALARA is based on the following assumptions:

1) Any change in the body brought on by ionizing radiation is

potentially detrimental.

2) Any dose in any amount is a potential hazard.

3) Every molecule in every cell is part of a delicate system, 10

balance with others, that is easily disrupted by radiation.

c. Implementation of a successful ALARA program requires: Obj.8

I) Management commitment and support.

( 2) Careful design of facilities and equipment.

3) Well-trained, corrunitted, and aware workers.

d. Organizational responsibility

I) Plant Rad Protection Manager (Staff) Responsibilities Obj.9

a) Takes the lead in implementing ALARA and insures that goals

and performance against those goals, as assessed periodically

are made available.

b) Is responsible for an effective program as required by

procedure.

c) Maintains awareness of location, operation andjobs that give

radiation dose.

d) Participates in job planning and procedural development.

e) Ensures that respiratory protection, protective clothing and

survey equipment are specified for each job.

Provides for training in radiation protection.

( f)

2) Plant Supervision Obj.9

OP L271C260

Revision 9

Page2 1of45

( XI. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

a) Implements procedures within their respective areas to

minimize radiation dose .

b) Ensures that employees follow proced ures and work orders

(First line supervisors are of utmost importance in creating

the proper attitude among their crews and greatly influence

the achievement of ALARA).

3) Individual Employee - Most Important Obj.9

Stress: No program can

a) Responsible for reducing his/her own radiat ion dose . work without individual

commitment

b) Follow s all plant procedures and Rad Protection instructions.

c) Report s all radiation hazards and any suggestions for

reduc ing hazards to Rad Protection or their supervisor.

e . AL ARA Progra m details

l) Key Components.

( a) ALARA policy and manageme nt commitment.

b) Work er and line manage ment commitment.

c) Collective dose database system .

d) ALARAjob reviews.

e) ALARA design review.

t) ALARA coordinator.

Review latest annua l

g) Goals and associated tracking system. ALARA Report

2) Empl oyee incentives to reduce dose. These have been successful

in the industry.

a) Awareness of risk to promote safety.

b) Recogn ition.

c) Prestige.

d) Sense of involvement.

( e) Rece iving feedback (positive/negative).

1) Managements concern.

RCI-04

( SQN Respiratory Protection Program Revision 46

Page160f1 6

Appendix C

A ir and Loose Surface Rad ioactive Contamination Levels for Evaluating

Respiratory Protection (Recommended)

A ir

Concentration Levels

(,"Ci/CC Air)

Alpha and Beta-GammaIA,BJ Recommended Action lDJ

< 1 DAC Respirators are to be considered when entering an

identified Airborne Radioactivity Area

1 to 20 DAC Full face respirator required or complete evacuation of

personnel from area

> 20 to 700 DAC Supplied air devices or complete evacuation of

personnel from area

> 700 DACle ) SCBA

Not es

A Only supplied:air and SCBA provide protection for halogens.

B Gamma scan for radionuclide determination is recommended.

( C In this concentration range, the immersion dose rate may be significant.

D A TEDE evaluation is required when the criteria of RCI-14 for a TEDE evaluation are met. This

evaluation considers total dose to an individual due to use or non-use of respirators.

Loose Surface

Concentrati on Levels

(dpm/100 em')

Beta-Gamma Recommended Action

1,000 to 50,000 Normally none; however unique or special cases may

arise and will require evaluation.

> 5,000 dpm total Evaluate each welding, grinding, burning, or cleaning

(fixed and transferrable activity) task using volatile liquid for respiratory protection.

50,000 to 100,OOOIE) Evaluate each non-inspection (physical maintenance)

task for respiratory protection. Inspections or similar

tasks normally will not require a protection method.

> 100,000IA) Inspections and physical maintenance normally require

a protection method or engineering controls.

Notes

E Additional considerations, such as the condition of the surface (e.g., dry versus oil, grease, etc.) and

data gathered by air sampling while personnel are within the area will affect respiratory protection

determinations.

(

r> r>.

."

RCI-14 A tt 04

SQN TEDE ALARA WORKS HEET Eft Date 03/18/04

Paqe 1 of 1

TEDE ALARA Worksh eet

RWP Number(s)

Estimated Dose W ith Res piratory Protection

A. Number of hour s in work area per day by a single individual _ _ _ _ hours

B. (Hours) x (Wo rk area dose rate _ _ mrem/hr) ,I External Dose mrem

C. (Externa l dose in mrem) x (1.15 IF IA) Corrected External Dose mrem

D. Measured DAC or anticipated DAC _ __ DAC

E. [(Hours) x (DAC) J.,. (Respirator A PF Ie,) _ _ _ DAC-hrs

F. (DAC- hrs) x (2.5 mremIDAC-hr) Internal Dose mrem

G. TE DE ~ (Step C) + (Step F) ____ mrem

Estimated Dose Without Res piratory Protection or Engineering Controls

H. [Hours (Step A)] x [DAC (Step D)J _ _ _ DAC-hrs

I. [DAC- hrs (Step H)] x [2.5 mrem/DAC-hrj Internal Dose mrem

J. TEDE ~ (Step B) + (Step I) ____ mrem

Estimated Dose W ithout Respiratory Protection and With Eng ineering Controls

K. List feasible engineering contro ls for this application:

L. Estimated DAC afte r applicati on of engineering controls DAC

M. {Hours (Step A)J x [DAC (Step L)] _ _ _ DAC-hrs

N. [DAC-hrs (Step M)J x [2.5 mrem/DAC-hr] Internal Dose _ _ __ mrem

O. Estimated dose to single individual per day to implement engineering controls

( mrem) + (Number of days for the task) mrem

P. [mr em (Step I)l - [mrem (Step N)] Internal Dose Saved mrem

Q. TED E ~ [(Step B) + (Step N) + (Step 0 )] - [Step P] ___ _ mrem

TEDE S el ection : Step G Step J Step Q (Circle one)

Identify items whic h override TEDE selection : Hot partic le presence - Heat stress - Industrial contaminants

Visibilit y - Confined space - High elevation - Comm s - Other

TEDE Selection O verride : Yes / No (Circle one)

Prepared By / Date Approved By I Date

NOTES

A Work Inefficiency Facto r (IF) due to use of respiratory protection

B Assig ned Protection Factors (A PF): Air purifying respirator - 100 Airline masklhood - 1.000 SCBA - 10.000

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

1. G2.3.1O 00 1

( Given the following plant conditions:

A rapid load reduction from 100% power to 60% power was performed on Unit 1

approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ago.

Indication on Auxiliary Building Area Radiation Monitors. 1-RR-90-1A , and

0-RR-90-1 B are rising.

Chem istry confirms that RCS 1-131 activity excee ds Technical Specification

limit of acceptable operation.

The US directs a plant shutdown to be performed.

Which ONE (1) of the follow ing post shutdown actions is subsequent ly performed to

limit the release of activity?

A. MSIVs are closed

B~ RCS temperature is reduced below 500°F

C. SIG PORV setpoints are raised

D. Maximum Condensate Polishers are placed in service

( A is incorrect because closing MSlVs does not prevent rad release from SG ADVs

B is correct. Raise letdown to clean up RC system, and reduce temp IA W TS

C is incorrect. Would not stop a release from SV

o is incorrect. Cation Demin may be placed in service on Letdown, but placing

Condensate Demins in service would still not minimize a release off-site if SV or SG

ADV lifted

Monday, March 12, 2007 3:43:00 PM 1

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel exposure.

( Question No. 73

Tier 3 Group 3

Importance Rating: R02.9

Technical Reference: TS 3.4.8, AOP R.06

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-R.06 Objective 6 and 9

Question Source: Bank

Question History: WTSI Bank

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments:

Source : BANK Source If Bank: WTSI

Cognitive Lev el: HIGHER Difficulty:

RO SEQUOYAH

( Job Position:

Date: 4/2007

P lant:

Last 2 NRC?: NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 3:43:00 PM 2

OPL271AOp*R06

Revision 0

Page 3 of 15

( I. PROGRAM : OPERATOR TRAINING* LICENSED

II. COURSE : LICENSE TRAINING

III. LESSON TITLE: AOP- R.06 HIGH RCS ACTIVITY

IV. LENGTH OF L ESSON/COURSE: 1.0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months (s)

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon com pletion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

AOP-R.06 HIGH RCS ACTIVITY.

B. Enablin.9 Objectives:

( O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 11 22 Knowledge's and Abilities

associated with High RCS Activity that are rated 2: 2.5 during Initial License

Training and 2: 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Traini ng for the

appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.

1. Explain the purpose/goal of AOP-R06.

2. Discuss the AOP-R06 entry conditions.

a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

AOP-R 06 entry conditions .

b. Describe the ARP requiremen ts associated with AOP-R06 entry conditions.

c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-

R.06 entry conditions.

d. Describe the Administrative conditions that require Turbine Trip/ Reactor trip

due to Reactor Coolant Pumo Malfunctions.

3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-

R.06.

4. Upon entry into AOP-R06, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to

the appropriate procedural section for response.

5. o Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-

R.06.

6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-R06.

OPL271AOP -R06

Revision 0

Page 4 of 15

( 7. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions wit hin this procedure and

transitions to other procedures .

8. Given a set of initial plant conditions use AOP-R06 to correctly:

a. Recognize entry conditions

b. Identify requ ired actions

c. . Respond to Contingencies

d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes

9. Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance of

AOP-R06.

10. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnorma l condition - prior to,

during and after the abno rmal condition

(

Revision °

OPL271AOP-R.06

Page 8 of 15

(

A. Purpose Objective 1

1. These instructions provide the actions necessary to

mitigate the effects of high RCS activity or failed fuel.

B. Overview - Symptoms and Entry Conditions Objective 2

1. Annunicators may indicate a fuel cladding or high The crew may be made

activity in the RCS aware of an increasing

trend in RCS activity

See AOP for listing of annunicators condition through reports

from the Chem Lab

2 . Deviations or unexpected indications on any of the

following may indicate fuel cladding failure or high

activity in the RCS

a. Rising radiation monitor indications

b . Rising activity in Chem Lab reactor coolant sample

c. Simultaneous increases in Condenser Vacuum

Exhaust and Lower Containment radiation monitor

count rates

3. No entry conditions from other procedures

( 4. AOP only has one Operator Action section Objective 5

Big picture is identification of activity, ensuring

compliance with TIS and REP, making notifications,

protecting personnel and initiating cleanup .

C. Section 2.0, Operator Actions Objectives 3, 4, 6, 8

1. Section 2.0, Step 1 - Evaluate Tech Specs for

applicability. Step performance should

ensure that Tech Specs are

3.4.8, Specific Activity satisfied or that sufficient

compensatory actions are

taken.

2. Section 2.0, Step 2. EVALUATE EPIP-1 , Emergency EAL designator 2.4, Fuel

Plan Initiating Matrix. Ciad Degredation,

addresses NOUE on RCS

activity exceeding LCO and

designator 1.1, Fuel Clad

Barrier, addresses RCS

activity in 1.1.2

CAUTION: Serves as a warning to

personnel drawing samples

RCS sample may have high activity

OPL271 AOP-R.06

Revision 0

Page 10 of 15

( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

9. Section 2.0, Step 8. GO TO appropriate plant Objective 7

procedure

The crew is directed back to

whatever procedure was in

effect prior to detection of

the high activity condition.

It should be noted that

the evaluation of TS 3.4.8

MA Y STILL RESUL T IN A

PLANT SHUTDOWN.

D. Technical Specifications Objective 9

TS 3.4.8, Specify Activity

(

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

( 314.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY '~' ' -,

LIMITING COND ITION FOR OPERATI ON

3.4.8 The specific activity of the primary coolant shall be limited to:

a. Less than or equal to 0.35 microcurieslgram DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 , and

b. Less than or equa l to 100lE microcuries/gram.

APPLICAB ILITY: MODES 1, 2,3, 4 and 5

ACTION :

MODES 1,2 and 3*

a. W ith the specific activity of the prim ary coolant greater than 0.35 microcuries/gram

DOSE EQU IVALENT 1-131 for more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months during one continuous time

interval or exceeding the limit line shown on Figure 3.4-1, be in at least HOT

STANQ6Y with T". less than 500'F within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . LCO 3.0.4.c is applicabl e.

b. With the specific activity o f the primary cool ant greater than 100fE

( microcuries/gram, be in at least HOT STANDBY with Tav. less than 500'F within

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5

a. With the specific activity o f the primary coolant grellter than -v.:

0.35 microc uries/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 or gr eater tha'if 100fE

microc uries/gram, perform the sampling and analysis requirements 6f item 4a of

Table 4.4-4 until the specific activity of the pr imary coolant is restored to within its

limits.

"With Tavg g reater than or equal50o"F.

April 11, 2005

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 4-1 9 Am endment No. 36, 117, 237,301

(

! I t

I I

" I I

! I ;

, ~ I

, :

,

I ,

J I I I I I I I I ' !

UNAC CEPTABLE I I !

I : :

OP ERATION

,

I

t+ :

I

,

, I

150

H-H I

- -}J ~

I

( I

I

I I I I

I I I I I I

-, I I I

I ; I ,

, I -'I

I I

I '

I

I I '

I I I

1 ,

I I

""

I

I '

I I

R241

I

I I I

30 40 50 60 70 80 so 100

PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER

FIGURE 3.4 -1

DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 Primary Coolant Sp ecific Acti vity limit Versu s

(, Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER w ith th e Primary Co olant Spe ci fi c

Activity > 0.35 "Ci/gram Do se Equival ent 1-131 I R241

November 17, 1998

SEQIJOYAH - UNIT 1 3/44-22 Amendment No. 237

( SQN HIGH RCS ACTIVITY

AOP-R.06

Rev. 9

I

I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS

1. EVALUATE the following Tech Spec and

Technical Requir ement for applicability:

TS 3.4.8, Specific Activity

2. EVALUATE EPIP-1, Emergency Plan

Classification Matrix.

CAUTION: RCS sample may have high activity.

( 3. REQUEST Chem Lab to perform following:

a. SAMPLE for activity levels:

Initial RCS

RCS at 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months intervals until

activity levels are stable.

Outl et of mixed bed

AND

b. REQUEST Chem Lab recommendations

based on sample results.

4. NOTIFY Reactor Engineering to

implement O-TI-NUC-OOO-003.0, Fuel

Integrity Assessment Program, due to

possible failed fuel.

(

Page 30f7

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

97. G2.4.25 002

Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 1 is in a refueling outage; Unit 2 is at 100% power

- Weld repairs scheduled on 2A-A charging pump.

The following lines are observed on the 0-M-29 "Blue Goose" and printer:

2D43 A 50 IN 07-Nov-02 09:15 ZONE 85 CHARGING PUMP ROOM 2A CROSS ZONE

W/ZONE 82 ACTUATES FSV-26-191;

2D46 A 50 IN 07-Nov-02 09:16 ZONE 82 U2 SI & CHARGING PUMP ROOMS CROSS

ZONE W/ZONES 83, -84, -85, 86, & 87 ACTUATES FSV-26-191 ZN LOCATED IN PNL 0*L*606;

2H38 A 50 IN 07-Nov-02 09:16 PNL 0-L-670/ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP A RUNNING ZONE

528 FIRE PUMP HOUSE RM A NOT OPERATIONALLY REQUIRED ZONE SEND OPERATOR

TO PUMP .

No other alarms or reports from the field are received .

0-FCV-26-191 is Aux Building el 669' Pre-action Valve.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the probable cause of the alarms and the correct

action to tak

A. Alarms consistent with taking No actions required .

( fire protection out of service

to perform work on 1A-A

charging pump.

B. Trouble in 2A charging pump Dispatch AUO/Fire Ops to confirm

room fire protection but no Alarm is real; If no fire confirmed in

actuation has occurred. area, notify Fire Ops of condition

and have alarms , electric driven fire

pump, and FSV-26-191 returned to

normal.

Cl" Conditions in 2A charging pump Dispatch AUO/Fire Ops to confirm

room have caused cross-zone Alarm is real; If no fire confirmed in

operation and actuated FSV-26-191 area, notify Fire Ops of condition

which started the electric and have alarms, electric

driven fire pump. driven fire pump, and FSV-26-191

returned to normal.

D. Conditions in 2A charging pump Notify the fire brigade to respond to

room have caused cross-zone the fire. Notify Shift Manager to

operation and actuated FSV-26-191 evaluate the REP.

and caused water spray into the room.

c.

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:38 PM 187

QUESTIONS REPORT

for 8EQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

( A. Incorrect. Fire detection would normally not be taken out of service for

welding activities.

B. Incorrect. Actuation has occurred.

C. Correct.

D. Incorrect. Sprinkler heads did not actuate as indicated by Alarm 2H38.

Knowledge of fire protection procedures.

Question No . 74

Tier 3 Group 4

Importance Rating: R02.9

Technical Reference: 0-80-13-1

0-AR-M-29

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examina tion: Appli cable drawings

Learning Objective: OPT200 .HPFP B.16.c, 17.a, c, 18.b

Question Sourc e: Bank

( Question History: Sequoyah FPS-3

Question Cognitive Level : Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10

Comments:

So urce : BANK Source If Bank: SEQUOYAH BANK

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date : 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? : NO

(

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:38 PM 188

OPT200.HPFP

Re vis ion 0

Pag e 4 of 11

(

a. High pressure service water (086K 1.0I)

b. Raw service water (08 6K 1.02)

c. AFW system (086KI.03)

10 State the electrical and/or control air supplies to high pressure fire protection system's

components. (KIA 086K2 )

II Given a high pressure fire protection system/component malfunction, analyze its affect

on the plant systems listed. (KIA 086K3)

a. Shutdown capability with redundant equipment (086K3.01)

12 Expla in the following high pressure fire protection system design features and/o r

interlocks. (KIA 086K4)

a. Adequate supply of water for FPS (086K4.01)

b. Maintenance of fire header pressure (086 K4.02)

c. Detection and location of fires (OS6K4.03)

d. Personnel safety (O S6K4.04)

c. COl (OS6K4.06)

f. Main Turbine/Generator Protection (086K4.07)

13 Explain the following operational implicat ions as they apply to high pressure fire

protection system. (KIA 086K5)

a. Effect of COl on fire (078 K5.01)

b. Effect of water spray on electrical compone nts (086K5.03)

-:..- c. Hazards to personnel as a result of fire type and methods of protection (086K 5.04)

14 Given a malfunction of listed plant systems/components, analyze its effect on the high

pressure fire protection system. (K/A 086K6)

( a. Pumps (OS6K6.0 I)

b. Valves (086K6.02)

c. rvtote rs (086K6.03)

d. Fire, smoke, and heat detect ors (OS6K6.04)

15. Given a plant situation, prevent exceeding operational design limits by predicting and/or

monitoring, as applicable, changes in parameters that are associa ted with the operating

controls of the high pressure fire protect ion system. (KIA 086A I)

a. Fire header pressure (086.A1.0 I)

b. Fire water storage tank level (086 .A I .02)

c. Fire doors (OS6.A I.03)

d. Fire dampers (086.Al .04)

e. FPS lineups (086.A1.05)

16. Given a plant situation for the high press ure fire protection system, (i) predict the impact

on plant operation, and (ii) based on the impact, apply procedura l guidance to correct,

control, or mitigate the consequence of the situation. (KIA086A2)

a. Manual shutdown of the FPS (086.A2.01)

b. Low FPS header pressure (086.A2.02)

c. Inadvertent actuation of the FPS due to circuit failure or welding (086.A2.03)

d. Failure to actuate the FPS when required, resulting in fire damage (086.A2.04)

17. Given a plant situation, demonstrate the ability to monitor the automatic operation of the

high pressure fire protection system. (KIA 086A3)

a. Starting mechanisms of fire water pumps (086.A3.01)

b. Actuation of the FPS (086.A3.02)

c. Actuation of the fire detectors (086.A3.03)

18. Given a plant situation for the high pressure fire protec tion system, demonstrate the

abili ty to monitor and, as appropr iate, perform manual operation of the system in the

control room. (KIA086A4)

OPT2 00.HPFP

Revision 0

Page 5 of 11

( a. Fire water pumps (086.A4.01)

b. Fire detection panels (086.A4.02)

c. Fire alarms switch (086.A4.03)

d. Fire water storage tank makeup pumps (086.A4.04)

e. Deluge valves (086.A4.05)

(

OPT200 .HPFP

Re vis io n 0

Pag e 9 of 11

( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

II . Given a high pressure fire protection system/component Objective I I

mal funct ion. ana lyze its affec t on the plant systems listed . Student handout, dr awings,

(KIA 086K3) FSAR, AO Ps

a. Shutdow n capability w ith redundant equipment (086 K3.0 1)

12. Exp lain the follow ing high pressure fire protection sys tem Objec tive 12

design features and or interlocks. (KI A 086K4) FSAR, Studen t Handout

a. Adequate supply of water for FPS (086K4.0 1)

b. Maintenance of fire header pressure (086 K4.02)

c. Detection and location of fires (086K4.03)

d. Personnel safet y (086K4.04)

e. CO 2 (086K4.06)

f. Main Turbine/Generator Protection (086 K4.07 )

13. Explain the follow ing operational impli cations as they apply to Objective 13

hig h pressure fire prote ction system. (KIA 00 1K5) Studen t Research, FSAR,

a. Effcct o f CO, on fire (07 8 K5.0 1) Student Handout, Attachment

7

b. Effect of water spray on electrical components (086 K5.03)

c. Hazards-to personnel as a result of fire type and methods of

protection (086K5 .02)

( 14 . Giv en a malfu nct ion of listed plan t system s/components, Objective 14

ana lyze its effect on the high pressure fire prot ection system. FS AR, Student Handout,

(KIA 086 K6) Student Research, AOPs

d. Pumps (086K6.0 I)

e. Valves (086K6 .02)

f. Motors (086K6 .03)

g. Fire, smoke, and heat detectors (086K6.04)

15. Given a plant s ituat ion, prevent exceeding operati onal design Objective 15

limit s by predicting and/or monitor ing, as app licable, cha nge s System Description, Drawings

in parameters that are associated with the ope rating controls of Procedures

the high press ure fire protection system. (KI A 086 A I )

a. Fire hea der pressure

a. Fire water storage tank level

a. Fire doors

a. Fire dampers

a. FPS lineups

16. G iven a plant situation for the high pressure fire protection Objective 16

system, (i) predict the impact on plant operat ion, and (ii) based System Des cription, Drawings

on the impact, appl y procedural guidance to corr ect, control , or Procedures

mitigate the consequence of the situation. (KIA 086A2)

a. Manual shutdown of the FPS

a. Low FPS header pressure

a. Inadvert ent actuation of the FPS due to circ uit failure or

we lding

OPT200.HPFP

Revision 0

Page 10 of 11

X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

a. Failure to actuate the FPS when requ ired, resulting in fire

damage

17. Given a plant situation, demonstrate the ability to monitor the Objective 17

automatic operation of the high pressure fire protection system. System Description, Drawings

(KIA 086A3)

a. Starting mechanisms of fire water pumps

b. Actuation of the FPS

c. Actuation of the fire detectors

18. Given a plant situation for the high pressure fire protection Objective 18

system, demon strate the ability to monitor and, as appropriate, System Description, Drawings

perform manual operation of the system in the control room. Procedures

(KIA 086A4)

a. Fire wa ter pumps

b. Fire detection panels

c. Fire alarms switch

d. Fire water storage tank makeup pumps

e. Deluge.:'alves

B. Review evolutions in 0-SO-13/26 series procedures that addres s Student Handout, 0-SO-13-1,

tasks required for program by task checkli st. 0-SO-26-1, 2, Obj #7

(

c. If applicable, present any recent indu stry events. Student Handout

(

4

(

Source Se tpoin t

O-M-29 CRT

CRO SS ZONE Ala rm message in ZONE #

RED on CRT.

MCR PRINTER

CROSS ZONE

Probable 1. Potential FIRE cond ition exists.

2. Fire detect or senses an 'alarm' condition .

Causes

3. Equipment malfunction (e.g. dust , humidity, jarring).

Co rrecti ve [1] WHEN O-M-29 console is in 'ALARM ', THEN

Actions ACKNOWLEDGE alarm by depressing the SEND key.

[2] READ the PRINTE R mes sage in its ENT IRETY.

( [3] IF a CROSS ZO NE alarm is received, THEN

[a]IMMEDIATELY DISPATCH the Fire Brigade in

accordance with AOp*N .01.

[b] CONFIRM alarm is REAL.

[c] ENSURE Fire alarm is LOCKED-IN.

[d] ANNOUNCE location of fire over the paging system.

[4] IF a Diese l Generator Room CO 2 CROSS ZON E alarm is

received and the Diesel Generator is running from a non

emergency co ndition, THEN

EMER GENCY STOP the effected Diesel Generator.

Continued

(,

SQN O-AR.M-29

Page 6 of 18

o IRev. 8

4

(

Source Setpoint

0*M*29 CRT

CROSS ZONE Alarm message in ZONE #

RED an CRT.

MCR PRINTER

CROSS ZONE

CONTINUED

NOTE 1 An Auxiliary Building Ventilation shutdown due to smoke

detector cross zone is not an ABI or ESF. It only stops

AB Supply, Exhaust and Fuel Handling Exhaust Fans.

NOTE 2 Do NOT manually actuate ABI per Engineering

recommendation due to potential for damaging charcoal

filters.

NOTE 3 AB Ventilation fans can not be started if either Unit's

smoke detectio n cross zones are actuated.

FIRE OPS must bypass zone modules to allow reset

with [1*HS*30*1 0201.

[5] IF a Auxiliary Building Supply Duct CROSS ZON E alarm is

received , THEN

[a] PLACE all AB Ve ntilation Fans in PTL until1-HS-30-102 D

can be reset.

[b] RESET zone s.

[c]IF zones will not reset, THEN

NOTIFY Fire Ops to bypas s zone modules using

0-PI-FPU-013-001 .0.

[d] RESTORE normal AB Ventilation using 0-SO-30-10,

Section 8.3.

[6] GO TO 0-SO-13 -1 Section [6 .0].

Refe rences 47W611-13-1 through 7, 47W611-30-5 and 6,

45W657-31 and 32

(

SQN O.AR-M-29

Page 7 of 18

o IRev. 8

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

100. G2.4 .9 00 1

( Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 1 is in Mode 5.

- RCS temperature is 195°F.

- RCS pressure is 325 psig.

- Train "A" RHR in service.

- Train "B" RHR out of service for surveillance testing.

- SGs #2 and #3 are intact and at 33% NR.

- RCS is intact.

- Pressurizer level at 30% cold cal.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the preferred method of core cooling if a loss of RHR

shutdown cooling occurs with RCS temperature rising?

A. RWST fill to RCS ; bleed through cold leg manway.

B. Normal charging to RCS; bleed through hot leg manway.

C~ Natural or forced RCS flow while steaming intact S/Gs .

D. Normal charging to RCS; bleed through the PZR PORVs.

( A. Incorrect; With RCS intact, steaming will be the preferred method. Cold leg

man way will not be open.

B. Incorrect; Hot leg man way not open if in Mode 5 with RCS pressure higher than

atmospheric.

C. Correct. AOP-R.03 Section 2.3 will transition to Section 2.6 due to the inability to

restore RHR shutdown cooling. The stem states that the RCS is intact. With one

RHR train operable, TS 3.4 .1.4 requires the two-SG level requirement to meet TS

heat sink requirements. #s 2 and 3 SGs satisfy the TS requirement as stated.

Therefore, Section 2.3 Step 7 RNO transitions to Section 2.6 since forced flow

cannot be re-established. Section 2.6 steps 5, 6, and 9.a are satisfied. Ptr level

greater than 20% cold cal satisfies step 7. Whether forced flow is established or

not, step 9 uses steaming from intact SGs.

D. Incorrect; Could potentially be used if required but would be an alternate heat

removal, not preferred.

Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:39 PM 193

QUESTIONS REPORT

for S EQ UOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of low power I shutdown implications in accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RH R) mitigation strategies.

(-, Question No. 75

Tier 3 Group 4

Importance Rating: R03.3

Techn ical Reference: AOP-R03

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective: OPL271C358, Obj. B.2

OPL271AOP-R03; 4

Question Source: Bank

Question History: Sequoyah AOP R.02.B.2-4

Question Cognitive Level: Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .10

Comments:

( Source : BANK Sour ce If Bank: SEQUOYAH BANK

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position : RO Plant: SEQUOYAH

Date : 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO

(

Monday, March 12, 20072:35:39 PM 194

OPL271AOP-R03

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( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING

III. LESSO N TITLE : AOP-R03, RHR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE : 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

V. TRAIN ING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate

or explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the

requirements of AOP-R03, RHR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.

B. Enabling Objectives

Obiectives

O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowiedge's and abilities associated

with RtlR SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONs that are rated 2: 2.5 during Initial License

Training and ;:c 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the

approp riate position as identified in Appendix A.

(

1. State the purpose/goal of this AOP-R03.

2. Describe the AOP-R 03 entry conditions.

a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

AOP-R03 entry conditions.

b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-R03 entrv conditions.

c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-R 03

entry conditions.

d. Describe the plant parameters that may indicate an RHR System Malfunction.

3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-R.03.

4. Upon entry into AOP-R03, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the

appropriate procedural section for response.

5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-R03.

6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-R 03.

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'"

X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

3. CHECK at least one 6.9 KV Shutdown board Obj ective 7

ENERGIZED on this unit. Transition to section 2.8 for

a. Refer to AOP for Substeps RCS alternate heat sink

without power

NOTE: Refe r to NOTE i n AOP Describes availability of

hydrogen igniters and

containment air return fans

4. EVALUATE placing one train of Hyd rogen SRO decision to place

Igniters and one Air Return Fan in service: igniters and air return fans

a. Refer to AOP for Substeps on as necessary to prevent

explosive concentrations

NOTE: Refer to NOTE i n AOP If needed for containment

cooling, ERCW

containme nt isolation valves

may be re-opened as

necessary if ERCW piping

is intact

( 5. START starting availab le upper and lo w er Review Appendix B

compartment coole rs USING Appendi x B.

6. CHECK RCS INTACT: Checks to determine if RCS

a. Refer to AOP for Substeps can be refilled so S /G can

b. Refer to AOP for RNO be used as heat sink. If

RCS cannot be refilled GO

TO step 11 for RCS feed

and bleed cooling mode

7. VERIFY seconcarv heat sink AVAILABLE: Checks to determine if S /G

a. Refer to AOP for Substeps can be used as heat sink.

b. Refer to AOP for RNO If S /G cannot be used GO

TO step 11 for RCS feed

and bleed cooling mode

CAUTION: Refer to CAUTION in AOP Informs operator of

potential effect of steam on

RCS level indications if

RCS temperature is >200oF

8. REFILL RCS UNTIL either of the following RCS refill stop criteria

cond itions satisfied :

a. Refer to AOP for Substeps

C

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X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES

NOTE: Refer to NOTE in AOP Gives preferred starting

order of RCPs for PZR

spray

9. ATIEMPT to start one RCP; Forced RCS f low is

a. Refer to AOP for Substeps preferred over natural

b. Refer to AOP for RNO circulation if RCP can be

started. If NOT then GO

TO step 10 for natural

circulation cooling

10. ESTABLISH seconca rv heat sink: If feed and bleed cooling of

a. Refer to AOP for Substeps S /G can be established GO

b. Refer to AOP for RNO TO step 15 to prepare for

exit of procedure. If NOT

continue attempts establish

feed and bleed

11. DETERMINE proper step to initiate a feed Obj ective 7

and b leed cooling methOd: Three options for feed and

a. Refer to AOP for Substeps bleed of RCS.

( b. Refer to AOP for RNO If feed and bleed cannot be

established , consider

dum ping CLA and IF the

RX vessel head is removed

GO TO section 2.7, RCS

alternate heat sink using

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling

12. PERFORM the following to cool RCS via S/G Objective 7

cold leg man way: If feed and bleed is

a. Refer to AOP for Substeps successful GO TO step 15

b. Refer to AOP for RNO to prepare for exit of

procedure. If NOT, go back

to step 11 and select

anothe r feed and bleed

method

13. PERFORM the following to cool RCS via SG Objective 7

hot leg man way: If feed and bleed is

a. Refer to AOP for Substeps successf ul GO TO step 15

b. Refer to AOP for RNO to prepare for exit of

c. If CCPIT flow or SI flow is established then procedure. If NOT, go back

GO TO step 14.d to ensure suction to step 11 and select

available to CCPS another feed and bleed

( method

( SON RHR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION AOP-R.03

Rev. 16

I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.6 RCS Alternate Heat Sink Using Steam Generators (continued)

6. CHECK RCS INTACT: GO TO Step 11.

Reactor vessel HEAD ON and bolts

TE NSIONED.

AND

RCS and pressuri zer vent paths

ISOLATED.

7. VERIFY seco ndary heat sink GO TO Step 11.

AVA ILABLE:

All S /G nozzle dams REMOVED

All S /G manways CLOSED

Two S /G s capable of maintaining

narrow range level

CAUTION Boiling in RCS could result in false high level indication due to steam

flow through surge line. RCS makeup flow should NOT be terminated

based upon high level if core exit TICs are greater than 200°F.

8. REFILL RCS UNTIL either of the

following conditions satisfied:

RHR cooling RESTORED.