ML071570475

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

CALLAWAY 2005 NRC

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM

80

(

X.

LESSON BODY:

OPL271E*3

Revision 0

Page 10 of 23

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

(

5.

ISOLATE flow'from Ruptured S/G(s):

a.

Refer to EOP for Substeps

b.

Refer to EOP for RNO

NOTE:

Isolating the ruptured SIG is required to

allow thermal stratification of the water in the

ruptured SIG. This will allow a cooling down with

the intact SIGs while maintaining RCS

subcooling. If ruptured SIG cannot be isolated

then transition to ECA-3.

Objective 5

Limits flow through the

Ruptured S/G ARV.

Limit Ruptured S/G

pressure drop by isolating

SF to TDAFW pump turbine

Contains radioactive

material in the S/G and

limits pressure drop in

ruptured S/G

Isolates MSIVs. MSIV

Bypass valves (and main

steam header if MSIV

cannot be closed) to limit

pressure drop in ruptured

S/G

Objective 7

Discuss RCS pressure,

RCS temperature, Ruptured

S/G pressure and intact

S/G pressure for response

to a ruptured S/G

CAUTION:

Refer to CAUTION in EOP

6.

MONITOR Ruptured S/G(s) level:

a.

Refer to EOP for Substeps

b.

Refer to EOP for RNO

7.

VERIFY Ruptured S/G ISOLATED from Intact

S/G(s).

a.

Refer to EOP for Substeps

b.

Refer to EOP for RNO

Caution regarding feeding a

ruptured S/g and using it for

cooldown

To reduce feed flow to the

ruptured steam generators

to minimize the potential for

steam generator overfill.

To establish and maintain a

water level in the ruptured

steam generators above the

top of the U-tubes in order

to promote thermal

stratification to prevent

ruptured steam generator

depressurization.

Allows cooldown of the

RCS while maintaining

subcooling. This allows

thermal stratification of

ruptured S/G water level

and permits equalization of

RCS and S/G pressure to

stop leak flow

(

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

48. 055 EK3.01 001

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the minimum amount of time and reason why

the station batteries (and load shedding instructions) are designed to ensure DC power

is available after a loss of all AC power?

Time

Reason

A.

2 Hours

station blackout rule

B.

2 Hours

technical specification requirement

C!"

4 Hours

station blackout rule

D.

4 Hours

technical specification requirement

a. Incorrect, batteries are rated (with load shedding) for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , without chargers to

provide necessary DC power to maintain BOTH reactors at hot shutdown after a

loss of ALL AC sources

b. Incorrect, betiettes are rated (with load shedding) for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , without chargers to

provide necessary DC power to maintain BOTH reactors at hot shutdown after a

loss of ALL AC sources

c.

Correct.

d. Incorrect, batteries are rated (with load shedding) for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , without chargers to

provide necessary DC power to maintain BOTH reactors at hot shutdown after a loss of

ALL AC sources

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:31 PM

91

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the reasons forthe following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout Length of time forwhich battery

capaci ty is designed

(

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

48

RO 2.7

FSAR 8.0 Electric Power, 8.1.4 Design Basis

(

Proposed references to be provided to appiicants during examination:

Learning Objective:

OPL271 ECA-D.O, Obj 3.a

OPL273C0527, Obj 5

Question Source:

Bank

Question History:

2004 NRC Exam

Question Cognitive Level:

Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.8

Comments:

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

BANK

LOWER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH 2004 NRC EX

SEQUOYAH

YES

Monday, March 12,20072:35:31 PM

92

(

ECA-O.OStudent Handout

Revision 0

Page 3 of 11

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student shall demonstrate

an understanding of the ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power by successfully completing a

written examination with a score of 80 percent or greater.

B. Enabling Objectives

1. Explain the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to a

Loss of All AC Power. (EPE 055 EK1 )

a.

Effect of battery discharge rates on capacity

b.

Natural Circulation Cooling

2. Explain the interrelations between a Loss of All AC Power and the following.

(EPE 055 EK2)

a. Valves

b. Sensors, detectors and indicators

c.

Controllers and positioners

d., Pumps

e.- Motors

f.

Heat exchangers and

g.

Breakers, relays, and disconnects

3.

Explain the reasons for the following responses as they apply to a Loss of All AC

Power. (EPE 055 EK3)

a. Length of time for which battery capacity is designed

b. Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power

4.

Discuss the operation and monitoring of the following as they apply to a Loss of

All AC Power (EPE 055 EA1)

a.

In-core thermocouple temperatures

b.

Manual EDG start

c.

Manual Main Turbine jacking

d.

Reduction of loads on the battery

e.

Battery, when approaching fully discharged

f.

Restoration of power with one EDG

g.

Restoration of power from offsite

5.

Determine and interpret the following as they apply to a Loss of All AC Power

(station blackout). (EPE 055 EA2)

a.

Existing valve positioning on a loss of instrument air system

b.

RCS core cooling through natural circulation cooling to SIG cooling

c.

Actions necessary to restore power

d.

Instruments and controls operable with only DC battery power available

e. When battery is approaching fully discharged

f.

Faults and lockouts that must be cleared prior to re-energizing buses

(

OPL271ECA-O.O

Revision 1

Page 21 of 21

APPENDIX B

Battery Capacity during SBe Event

125v DC Battery Capacity (FSAR requirements)

Capacity and Load Shed:

Can supply all connected loads for 45 minutes

Can supply all SBe load for an additional 195 minutes

10CFR50.63 requires SON to mitigate a Station Blackout event within 4

hours

45 min + 195 min =240 min or 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Load shed must be accomplished within 45 minutes

AC power must be restore within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to recharge batteries

Capaci ty is verified by load test

Battery recharging:

Recharged within :s12 hrs following 30 minutes of AC loss while supplying

normal and accident loads

Recharged within :s36 hrs following 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of AC loss while supplying

normal loads

Single failure capacity during a loss of ALL Standby AC:

Three batteries can supply all loads required for safe shutdown of both units

Th.ree batteries can supply essential loads to maintain the plant in safe

shutdown

250v DC Battery Capacity (FSAR requirements)

Used during an SBO event to restore AC offsite power

Capacity to supply required load at the end of a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months SBO event

Capacity is verified by analysis

(

ECA-O.OStudent Handout

Revision 0

Page 7 of 11

5. Select recovery procedure after AC power restoration.

E. Step Discussion

See EPM-3-ECAO.0 for detailed step bases

1.

Step 1 suspends FRP implementation since they assume that at least one train of

shutdown boards is energized. Status trees are monitored for information only.

Once AC power is restored. either ECA-0.1 or ECA-0.2 will resume FRP

implemen tation at the appropriate time.

Without AC power, the ECCS pumps are inoperable and the FRPs are ineffective

2.

Steps 2 and 3 verify reactor and turbine trips. Though these steps appear

redundant to E-O's immediate actions, keep in mind that ECA-O.Ocan be entered at

any time that both trains of shutdown boards are observed to be deenergized

(either by "rules of usage" or by foldout page transition). Thus, it is possible to

enter this procedure before E-Oimmediate actions have been performed.

For example, it is possible to enter E-O, look at foldout page, and immediately

transition to ECA-O.O before performing E-OStep 1

3.

Step 4 records present time as a handy reference. To comply with the 4-hour

battery coping requirement per 10CFR50.63, certain DC load shed actions must be

performed within 45 minutes following the loss of all AC power event.

Refer to 10CFR50.63 and plant modification DCN M09120A

4.

Step 9 checks the TO AFW pump flow interlock that requires that flow be less than

a certain setpoint to allow taking manual speed control of the TO AFW pump.

5.

Step 10 attempts emergency start before normal start because emergency start

can be done from the horseshoe area of the control room, while normal start

requires a trip back to M-26.

If at least one shutdown board on this unit is energized, then resume FRP

implementation and return to procedure and step in effect

6. Step 11 is a continuous action step. If this step is reached, initial attempts to

energize at least one train of shutdown boards have been unsuccessful. If power is

subsequently restored to at least one train of shutdown boards at any time after

this. the operator should proceed to Step 32 to begin recovery actions.

(

c

c.

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

49. 056 G2.4.3 1 001

Given the following plant conditions:

Unit 1 is at 80% power.

-

The following alarm is received:

1-AR-M1-B, B3, 6900V UNIT BD 1C FAILURE OR UNDERVOLTAGE

Unit Board 1C has an 86-1C flag on the Alternate Feeder Breaker

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the unit condition and the actions required?

A'!' Unit Board 1C Failure; The unit should have tripped; Trip the reactor and enter E-O,

Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

B. Unit Board 1C Failure; The board should have transferred to the normal feeder;

Verify the normal feeder is closed and operate the alternate feeder control switch to

clear the disagreement light

C. Loss of Off-Site power to Unit Board 1C; The unit should have tripped ; Trip the

reactor and r::nter E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection .

D. Loss of Off-Site power to Unit Board 1C; The board should have transferred to the

normal feeder; Verify the normal feeder is closed and operate the alternate feeder

control switch to clear the disagreement light.

A. Correct. Unit should have tripped on loss of #3 RCP. If undervoltage was the

cause, the bus should have transferred and there will not be an 86 on it

B. Incorrect. Transfer would only occure for undervoltage

C. Incorrect. LOOP incorrect because of the red flag on the alternate feed, and the

pre sence of no otgher alarms

D. Incorrect. LOOP incorrect due to red flag and no other alarms. If it was a loss of

off-site feed, bus would transfer

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:31 PM

93

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Emergency Procedures I Plan Knowledge of annunciatorsalarms andindications, and useof the response instructions.

(

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:.

49

R03.3

AR-M1B, B3

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

OPL271AOP-P.01, B.7

New

Question Cognitive Level:

Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.7

Comments:

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

NEW

HIGHER

AOP-P.01, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER.

4/2007

Source IfBank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:31 PM

94

(

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

OPL271AOP-P.01

Revision 1

Page 3 of 26

1.0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months (s)

(

II.

COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING

III. LESSON TITLE: AOP-P.01, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Term inal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scena rios, the requirements of

B.

Enabling Objectives:

Objectives

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities

associated with Loss of Offsite Power that are rated z 2.5 during Initial License

Training for and 2':-3.0 during License Operator Requal ification Training the

appropriate position as identified in Appendix A.

1.

State the purpose/goa l of this AOP-P.01.

2.

Describe the AOP-P.01 entry conditions.

a.

Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

AOP-P.01 entry conditions.

b.

Describe the ARP reauirements associated with AOP-P.01 entry conditions.

c.

Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-P.01

entry conditions.

d.

Describe the plant parameters that may indicate a Loss of Offsite Power.

3.

Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into

AOP-P.01.

4.

Upon entry into AOP*P.01 , diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the

appropriate procedural section for response.

5.

Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-P.01.

6.

Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-P.01.

7.

Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

8.

Given a set of initial plant cond itions use AOP-P.01 to correctlv:

a.

Recognize entry conditions.

(

OPL271AOP-P.01

Revision 1

Page 4 of 26

Objectives

b.

Identify required actions.

c.

Respond to Contingencies.

d.

Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.

9.

Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance of

AOP-P.01.

10.

Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to,

during and after the abnormal condition.

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

50. 057 AK3.01001

(

Given the following plant conditions:

-

Unit 1 is at 100% RTP

-

A loss of 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-IV occurs.

-

A reactor trip does NOT occur.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes action required and the reason for the action

in accordance with AOP-P.03. Loss of Unit 1 Vital Instrument Power Board?

A'! Place rod control in MANUAL due to loss of Auctioneered Tavg input; Control #4

Feedwater Reg Valve manually due to loss of AUTO control.

B. Place rod control in MANUAL due to loss of Auctioneered Tavg input; Control #2

Feedwater Reg Valve manually due to loss of AUTO control.

C. Place rod control in MANUAL due to loss of Tref input; Control #4 Feedwater Reg

Valve manually due to loss of AUTO control.

D. Place rod control in MANUAL due to loss of Tref input; Control #2 Feedwater Reg

Valve manually due to loss of AUTO control.

A. Correct. Loss ofAuctioneeered Tavg would cause rod motion, so rods are placed in

Manual. #4 FRV is also operated manually due to loss of control

B. Incorrect.

Wrong FRV

C. Incorrect. Tref comes from board 1-1. Would be cause to place rods in manual, but

Tref input is not lost. Correct FRV

D. Incorrect. Tref and #2 FRV are both incorrect for loss of board 1-IV

(

Monday. March 12,20072:35:31 PM

95

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the reasons for thefollowing responses as they apply to theLoss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Actions contained in

EOP for loss of vitalac electrical instrument bus

(

QuesUon No.

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference: .

50

RO 4.1

AOP P.03

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

OPL271AOP-P.03 & 04, B.3

New

Question Cognitive Level:

Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.7

Comments:

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

NEW

HIGHER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:31 PM

96

(

OPL271AOP-P.03 & P.04

Revis ion 0

Page 3 of 24

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II,

COURSE:

LIC ENSE TRAINING

III.

LESSON TITLE:

AOP-P.03 & .04, LOSS OF 120V AC VITAL INSTRUMENT POWER

BOARDS

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

2.0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months (s)

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A.

Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

AOP-P.03 & .04, LOSS OF 120V AC VITAL INSTRUMENT POWER BOARDS.

B.

Enabling Objectives:

Objectives

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities associated

with Loss of a Vital Instrument Power Board that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial License

Training and z 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the

appropriate position as identified in Appendix A.

1.

State the purpose/goal of this AOP-P.03 & -P.04.

2.

Describe the AOP-P.03 & -P.04 entry conditions.

a.

Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

AOP-P.03 & -P.04 entry conditions.

b.

Describe the ARP requ irements associated with AOP-P.03 & *P.04 entry

conditions.

c.

Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-P.03 &

-P.04 entry cond itions.

d.

Describe the plant parameters that may indicate a Loss of a Vital Instrument

Power Board.

3.

Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-P.03

& -P.04.

4.

Upon entry into AOP-P.03 & -P.04, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to

the appropriate procedural section for response.

(

OPL271AOP-P.03 & P.04

Revision 0

Page 4 of 24

5.

Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-

P.03 & -P.04.

6.

Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-P.03 &

-P.04.

7.

Describe the cond itions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

tran sitions to other procedures .

8.

Given a set of initial plant condi tions use AOP-P.03 & -P.04 to correctly:

a.

Recognize entry conditions.

b.

Identify required actions.

c.

Respond to Contingencies.

d.

Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.

9.

Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance

of AOP-P.03 & -P.04.

10.

Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior

to, durino and after the abnormal cond ition.

(

LOSS OF UNIT 1 VITAL INSTRUMENT

AOP-P.03

POWER BOARD

Rev. 19

I STEP I

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

2.4

Loss of 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-IV

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

1.

CHECK reactor TRIPPED

Reactor Trip REQUIRED.

GO TO E-O. Reactor Trip or Safety

Injection WHILE continuing in this

procedure.

PERFORM the following:

a.

ENSURE 1-FIC-3-103 SG-4 Main FW

Reg Valve flow controller in MANUAL

AND

CONTROL S/G level(s) on program.

c

2.

EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for

applicability:

3.8.2.1, AC Power Distribution

System, Operating

3.8.2.2, AC Power Distribution

System, Shutdown

3.7.1.2, Auxiliary Feed Water

b.

c.

ENSURE rod control in MANUAL.

MONITOR Pressurizer Level and

Pressure:

IF pressurizer ievel approaches Reactor

Trip setpoint (92%)

Pressurizer pressure approaches PORV

lift setpoint (2335 psig), THEN

TRIP Reactor and GO TO E-G, Reactor

Trip or Safety Injection WHILE

continuing in this procedure.

--~.--

Page 31 of 82

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

51 . 058 A AI.Ol 001

(

Given the following plant conditions:

-

Unit 1 is steady-state at 100% power.

-

Unit 2 is in Mode 6 with vessel upper internals removal in progress.

-

125V DC Vital Battery IV Output Breaker tripped and can't be reclosed.

Wh ich ONE (1) of the following describes the required action(s)?

A. Align 125V DC Vital Battery Charger 1-S (spare) to Vital Battery Board IV.

B ~ Align 125V DC Vital Battery Bank V and Charger 2-S (spare) to Vital Battery Board

IV.

C. Suspend core alterations on Unit 2 until 125V DC Channel IV is returned to

OPERABLE status.

D. Restore 125V DC Channel IV to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or initiate a

shutdown of Unit 1.

A. Incorrect. Not capable of being aligned.

B. Correct. per 0-SO-250-1

C. Incorrect. No TS requirement.

D. Incorrect. Wrong time requirement per TS.

(

Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:31 PM

97

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Ability to operate and lor monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Cross-tieof the affected de buswith the

altemate supply

(

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:.

51

RO 3.4

AOP-P.02

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

OPL271AOP-P.02, B.8.b

Bank

Question Cognitive Level:

Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.10

Comments:

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

BANK

HIGHER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SQNBANK

SEQUOYAH

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:31 PM

98

(

OPL271AOP-P.02

Revisiona

Page 3 of 17

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II.

COURSE:

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

LESSON TITLE:

AOP-P.02, LOSS OF 125V DC VITAL BATIERY BOARD

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

2.0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months (s)

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A.

Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to

demonstrate or explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios,

the requirements of AOP-P.02, LOSS OF 125V DC VITAL BATIERY BOARD.

B.

Enabling Objectives:

Obiectives

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities associated

with Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Board that are rated " 2.5 during Initial License

Training and z 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the

appropriate position as identified in Appendix A.

1.

State the purpose/goal of this AOP-P.02.

2.

Describe the AOP-P.02 entry conditions.

a.

Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

AOP-P.02 entrv conditions.

b.

Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-P.02 entry conditions.

c.

Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-P.02

entrv conditions.

d.

Describe the plant parameters that may indicate a Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery

Board.

3.

Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-P.02.

4.

Upon entry into AOP-P.02, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the

appropriate procedural section for response.

('

(

OPL271AOP*P.02

Revision0

Page 4 of 17

5.

Summ arize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into

AOp*P.02.

6.

Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP*P.02.

7.

Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

8.

Given a set of initial olant conditions use AOP-P.02 to correctlv:

a.

Recoonize entrv conditions.

b.

Identify required actions.

c.

Respond to Continqencies.

d.

Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.

9.

Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance

of AOp*P.02.

10.

Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior

to, durinq and after the abnormal condition.

(

LOSS OF 125V DC VITAL BATTERY BOARD

AO p*P.02

Rev. 10

I STEP I

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

2.4

Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Board IV (cont'd)

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

8.

MONITOR 125V Vital Battery Board IV

ready to be ENERGIZED

GO TO Step 12.

(

NOTE

Restoring power from a charger is preferred after a fault on the battery board.

9.

RESTORE 125V DC Vital Battery

Board IV from one of the following

USING 0-SO-250-1, 125 Volt DC Vital

Power System: [C. 1]

125V DC Battery IV

125V DC Vital Battery Charger IV

125V DC Vital Battery Charger 2-S

Spare Vital Battery IV with Battery V

(

10.

MONITOR 125V DC Vital Battery Bd IV

voltage between 125V and 140V.

11.

GO TO Step 20.

CONTINUEwith Step 12.

WHEN voltage returned to normal,

THEN

GO TO Step 20.

Page 38 of97

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

57. 062 AIG.OI 001

(

Given the following plant conditions:

Unit 1 is tripped.

The crew is performing actions of AOP-M.01, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling

Water.

ERCW Supply Header 2B to the Aux Building has been isolated to stop the leak.

0-FCV-67-152, CCS OB1/0B2 Discharge Valve to header B, has been closed.

-

A Safety Injection signal is subsequently received.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the function of 1-FCV-67-152 for these

conditions?

A. The valve will open to its 35% open position. ERCW flow will be provided from

Header 1B.

B ~ The valve will open to its 35% open position. NO ERCW flow will be provided .

C. The valve will remain closed because there is no ERCW pressure on the header.

D. The valve wi~ remain closed because there is no ERCW Pump running on the

header.

(

A. Incorrect. Since ERCW was manually isolated, no flow will be available

B. Correct. Valves open to Position A (35%)

C. Incorrect. The valves will rspond to the ESF actuation. Pressure on the header will

not affect the ESF actuation

D. Incorrect. The valves will rspond to the ESF actuation. Pumps running on the

header will not affect the ESF actuation

Monday, March 12,20072:35:32 PM

109

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledgeof the reasons for the following responses as theyapply to the Loss of NuclearService Water The conditions thatwill

initiate theautomatic openingandclosing oftheSWS isolationvalves to the nuclear service water coolers

(

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

52

R03.2

AOP-M.01, section 2.4 step 8

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level:

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

OPL271AOP-M.01, B.8.c

New

Higher

41.8

(

Commen ts:

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

NEW

HIGHER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC'!:

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:32 PM

110

('

(

OPL271AOP-M .01

Revision 0

Page 3 of 45

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II.

COURSE:

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

LESSON TITLE:

AOP-M.01 LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLIN G WATER

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

2.0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months (s)

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

AOP-M.01, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER

B. Enabling Objectives:

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities

associated with a Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water that are rated ~ 2.5

during Initial License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator

Requalification Training for the appropriate license position as identified in

AppendixA.

1.

Expiain the purpose/goal of AOP-M,01.

2.

Discuss the AOP-M.01 entry conditions.

a.

Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

AOP-M.01 entry conditions.

b.

Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-M.01 entry conditions.

c.

Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-

M.01 entry conditions.

d.

Describe the Administrative conditions that require Turbine Trip/ Reactor trip

due to Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water.

3.

Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-

M.01.

4.

Upon entry into AOP-M.01, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to

the appropriate procedurai section for response.

5.

Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-

M.01.

6.

Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-M.01.

(

OPL271AOP-M.01

Revision 0

Page 4 of 45

7.

Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

8.

Given a set of initial plant conditions use AOP-M.01 to correctly:

a.

Recognize entry conditions

b.

Identify required actions

c.

Respond to Contingencies

d.

Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes

9.

Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance of

AOP-M.01.

10.

Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to,

during and after the abnormal condition

(

LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER

Rev. 15

I STEP I

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

(

2.5

ERCW Supply.Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary Building

CAUTION:

During operation, CCP and 51 Pumps may experience bearing failure 10

minutes after loss of ERCW cooling.

1.

DISPATCH personnel to locate rupture.

2.

DISPATCH operators with radios to

perform Appendix F, Rx MOV Board

ERCW Valves. [Aux Bldg el. 749',

Rx MOV Boards].

3.

ENSURE 2A-A CCP RUNNING.

4.

STOP and LOCK OUT the following:

2B-B CCP

2B-B SI Pump

5.

DISPATCH operator to piace Aux Air

Compressor B-B in SAFE STOP.

[Aux Bldg, 734' elev, Refuel Floor)

NOTE

The following step removes all cooling water from the OB1/0B2 CCS HX.

6.

CLOSE 2-FCV-67-147, Hdr 2B to Hdr 1A

Isol Valve. [Rx MOV Bd 2B2-B

Compl. 3B].

Page 22 of 142

(

LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER

Rev. 15

I STEP I

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.5

ERCW Supply Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary BUilding (cont'd)

CAUTION 1

Crosstying A and B train ERCW supply headers should only be performed if

cooling is urgently required for Unit 1 Train B CCS related equipment.

LCO 3.0.3 may be applicable.

CAUTION 2

Opening of crosstie valve 1-FCV-67-147 (in Step 7.RNO) may result in fouling or

blockage of OB1/0B2 CCS Hx. If time permits, CCS Hx OB2 sho uld be isolated

prior to opening crosstie valve to prevent fou ling BOTH heat excha ngers.

After approx. 10 min, OB2 CCS Hx will be returned to service.

NOTE

ERCW flow on 28 header will be very low if rupture was isolated in previous step.

(

7.

CHECK ERCW Supply Hdr 28

parameters to determine if Rupture

ISOLATED:-

2-FI-67-52, at expected value

2-PI-67-488A between 78 psig and

124 psig.

a.

CLOSE 2-FCV-67-82, Aux 81dg Hdr 28

Isol Valve. [Rx MOV 8d 2B2-8

Compt. 3C]

b.

iF desired to isolate 082 CCS Hx

prior to opening crosstie valve,

THEN

PERFORM the following:

1) CLOSE 0-67-1501 CCS Hx 082 Inlet.

2) WHEN 0-67-1051 CLOSED,

THEN

OPEN 1-FCV-57-147, Hdr 1A to Hdr

28 Isol Valve. [Rx MOV 8d 1A2-A

Compt. gAl.

RECORD time

_

3) IF CCS Hx 082 indicates fouling or

flow blockage

OR 1-FCV-67-147 has been OPEN

for approximately 10 minutes,

THEN

OPEN 0-57-1501 CCS Hx 082 Inlet.

4) GO TO Substep d.---

(Step continued on next page)

Page 23 of 142

(

LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER

Rev. 15

I STEP I

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.5

ERCW Supply Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary Building (cont'd)

(

7.

(Continued)

c.

EVALUATE opening 1-FCV-67-147,

Hdr 1A to Hdr 28 1501 Valve [Rx MOV 8d

1A2-A Compl. 9AI.

RECORD time

_

d.

IF desired,

THEN

PLACE O-FCV-67-152 in the 35%

position.

e.

CLOSE the following valves:

2-FCV-67-128 . Hdr 28 Supply to

Space Coolers. AlC & Air

Compressors

[Rx MOV 8d 282-8 Compl. 6C]

2-FCV-67-123. Containment Spray

HX 28 ERCW Supply [O-M-27A]

2-FCV-67-83. Lower Compl

Cooler 20 Supply 1501 [O-M-27A]

2-FCV-67-91, Lower Compl

Cooler 28 Supply 1501 [O-M-27A]

2-FCV-67-138. Upper Compt

Cooler 28 Supply 1501[O-M-27A]

2-FCV-67-141. Upper Compt

Cooler 2D Supply 1501 [O-M-27Al

(Step continued on next page)

Page 24 of 142

(

SQ N

LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER

Rev . 15

I STEP I

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.5

ERCW Supply Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary Building (cont'd)

7.

(Continued)

f.

DISPATCH an operator to CLOSE the

following valves:

2:67-524B, Supply Hdr 2B to Inst

Room Cooler 2B

[Aux Bldg, 669' elev, Penetration

Room, above Ductwork by panel

2-L-26A].

2-67-675, ERCW 1501 to B

Shutdown Board Room A/C Water

Chiller

[Aux Bldg, elev 714' 12' up at

Col R-A-12].

2-67-521B, Hypochlorite

Treatment Circulation Line 1501

(

[elev 669' TDAFWP Rm by ERCW

supply valves]

g.

IF 1A ERCW header was aligned to

OB1/0B2 CCS HX,

THEN

GO TO Step 9.

a-

8.

ENSURE the following valves are closed:

0-FCV-67-152, CCS HX OB1/0B2 Disch

Valve to Hdr B

0-FCV-67-151, CCS HX OB1/0B2 Disch

Valve to Hdr A

[Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A Compt. 8D]

Page 25 of 142

(

LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER

Rev. 15

[ STEP I

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.5

ERCW Supply Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary BUilding (cont'd)

9.

START additional Lower Compartment

Cooling Fans and CRDM Fans as required

to maintain containment temperature.

1O.

OPERATE ERCW Pumps as necessary

to perform the following:

CONTROL pressure between 78 psig

and 124 psig.

MAINTAIN support of system loads

(

11.

REFER TO the following:

Appendix 0 , Affected Equipment List

(Header 2B)

Appendix P, Potential Tech Spec

Impacts.

12.

ENSURE all breakers reopened

USING Appendix F, Rx MOV Board

ERCW Valves.

13.

REFER to AOP-M.03, Loss of

Component Cooling Water.

14.

GO TO appropriate plant procedure.

---.--

IF ERCW header pressure is high,

THEN

EVALUATE opening ERCW supply to

Containment Spray HX and/or DG HXs

to reduce pressure.

END OF SECTION

Page 26 of 142

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

76. E04 02.1.28 001

("

Given the following plant conditions:

Reactor Trip and Safety Injection have occurred on Unit 2.

The crew has transitioned to ECA-1.2 , LOCA Outside Containment.

The leak has NOT been identified and the crew is preparing to isolate Cold Leg

Injection.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes how Cold Leg Injection is isolated, and how

to determine if the leak has been stopped in accordance with ECA-1.2?

A. Close FCV-63-93 and FCV-63-94, Cold Leg Injection Valves, simultaneously.

Verify isolation by observing pressurizer level.

B. Close FCV-63-93 and FCV-63-94 , Cold Leg Injection Valves, simultaneously.

Verify isolation by observing RCS pressure.

C. Close FCV-63-93 and FCV-63-94, Cold Leg Injection Valves, one at a time. Verify

isolation by observing pressurizer level.

D~ Close FCV-63-93 and FCV-63-94, Cold Leg Injection Valves, one at a time. Verify

isolation by oDserving RCS pressure.

A. Incorrect. Valves are closed 1 at a time, not simulataneously. RCS pressure is

checked

B. Incorrect. Correct parameter but 1 valve closed at a time

C. Incorrect. PZR level is not the parameter checked, but actions are correct.

D. Correct. Valves are closed one at a time and pressure is checked prior to

determining whether to reopen or leave closed. RCS pressure is the parameter

checked

l

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM

146

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEOUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of the purpose and function of majorsystem components and controls.

(

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

53

R03.2

ECA-1.2

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

OPL271ECA-1.2 Objective 4

New

Question Cognitive Level:

Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.10

Comments:

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

NEW

LOWER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday. March 12,20072:35:35 PM

147

x.

LESSON BODY:

e.

CHECK RCS pressure RISING.

RNO -

GO TO Step 2.

f.

GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4.

Basis:

This step instructs the operator to verify that all normally

closed valves in low pressure lines and other plant specific

lines that penetrate containment are closed. The valving

connecting the RHR System to the RCS is of particular

interest in this step since the RHR System is a low

pressure system (600 psig) connected to the high pressure

reactor coolant system (2500 psig). Therefore, a rupture or

break outside containment is most probable to occur in the

low pressure RHR System piping. These valves are

normally closed following an accident.

Normal and excess letdown valves are also checked

closed since these are plant-specific low pressure lines

which penetrate containment.

OPL271 ECA*1.2

Revision 1

Page 9 of 15

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

If pressure is rising then the

leak has been isolated from

the RCS, therefore

additional diagnosic steps

continuing attempts to

identify the leak are skipped

over. However the leak may

not be isolated from the

RWST and loss of RWST

inventory may be occurring.

If pressure is not rising then

the leak has not been

isolated from the RCS and

steps to identify the source

of the leak are to be

completed

(

2.

ATTEMPT to isolate break from RCS USING FCV-63-

93:

a.

CLOSE RHR Train A cold leg injection valve

FCV-63-93.

RNO -

GO TO Step 3.

b.

CHECK RCS pressure RISING

RNO*

PERFORM the following:

1) OPEN FCV-63-93.

2) GO TO Step 3.

To attempt to identify and

isolate a LOCA outside

containment.

This step begins instructing

the operator to sequentially

close and open all normally

opened valves in paths that

penetrate containment to

identify and isolate the

break outside containment.

c.

GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4.

Basis:

This step instructs the operator to close the isolation valve

in the low pressure injection line for Train A RHR that

connects to the RCS and penetrates containment. If the

LOCA outside containment occurred as a result of failed

check valves on the cold leg injection lines to loops 2 and

3, then this action will isolate the break from the RCS.

IF the leak is isolated from

the RCS additional

diagnosic steps continuing

attempts to identify the leak

need not be performed.

However the leak may not

be isolated from the RWST

and loss of RWST inventory

may be occurring

(

X.

LESSON BODY:

OPL271ECA-1.2

Revision 1

Page 10 of 15

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

3.

ATTEMPT to isolate break from RCS USING FCV-63-

94:

a.

CLOSE RHR Train B cold leg injection valve

FCV-63-94.

RNO -

GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4.

b.

CHECK RCS pressure RISING .

RNO -

OPEN FCV-63-94.

To attempt to identify and

isolate a LOCA outside

containment.

(

(,

Basis:

This step instructs the operator to close the isolation valve

in the low pressure injection line for Train B RHR that

connects to the RCS and penetrates containment. If the

LOCA outside containment occurred as a result of failed

check valves on the cold leg injection lines to loops 1 and

4, then this action will isolate the break from the RCS.

CAUTION L

After the break is isolated from the RCS, loss

-

of RWST inventory will continue until RWST

leak path is isolated.

Basis:

This caution alerts operators that continued RWST

inventory loss to the Auxiliary Building may be occurring

until the affected RHR piping is isolated.

CAUTION 2

High radiation or high temperatures in the

Auxiliary Building may prevent local

determination of break location.

Basis:

This caution alerts operators that local determination of

break location and status may not be safe or possible if

high radiation or high temperature conditions prevent

personnel access.

(

LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

ECA-1.2

Rev. 10

ISTEPIIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

2.

ATTEMPT to isolate break from RCS

USING FCV-63-93:

a. CLOSE RHR Train A cold leg injection

valve FCV-63-93.

b. CHECK RCS pressure RISING.

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. GO TO Step 3.

b.

PERFORM the following:

1) OPEN FCV-63-93.

(

c.

GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4.

3.

ATTEMPT to isolate break from RCS

USING FCV-63-94:

2)

GO TO Step 3.

(

a. CLOSE RHR Train B cold leg injection

valve FCV-63-94.

b.

CHECK RCS pressure RISING.

a. GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4.

b.

OPEN FCV-63-94.

Page 4 of 6

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

77. E05 EA 1.3 001

(

Given the following plant conditions:

Unit 1 is responding to a Loss of Heat Sink per FR-H.1, Response to Loss of

Secondary Heat Sink.

~

All Steam Generator Wide Range levels are Off-Scale low.

-

RCS temperature is approximately 588°F and rising slowly.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the preferred method of initiating Auxiliary

Feed flow for these conditions?

A. Feed at the highest possible rate to one S/G to preclude initiation of RCS Bleed and

Feed.

B. Feed at the minimum required flow to prevent possible SG tube failures.

C~ Feed at the highest possible rate to one S/G to reestablish SG inventory and

secondary heat sink.

D. Feed at the minimum required flow to establish a controllable cooldown rate and

prevent loss of RCS inventory.

(

A. Incorrect. Bleed and Feed would already be initiated under these conditions.

B. Incorrect. Tube failures are the primary concern when initiating feed, but for these

conditions, restoration of 1 SG as soon as possible is the priority

C.Correct. If RCS temp is rising with no inventory, AFW flow should be directed to one

SG at the max rate in an attempt to recover heat sink. This minimizes the chance for

multiple tube failures as wefl as the quickest way to recover at least 1 SG as heat sink.

At this point, bleed and feed should already be initiated.

D. Incorrect. On a loss of heat sink, cooldown rate is not the priority. The RCS has

already heated up. Loss of inventory is a concern due to potential tube failures, but

addressed by feeding only 1 SG

Monday, March 12,20072:35:35 PM

148

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the reasons forthe following responses as they applyto the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) Desiredoperating results

during abnormal and emergency situations.

(

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference: .

54

R03.8

FR-H.1 BO

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

OPL271 FR-H.1 Objective 4

Question Source:

Bank

Question History:

WTSI Various previous NRC

Question Cognitive Level:

Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.10

Comments:

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

BANK

HIGHER

4/200 7

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

WTSI

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM

149

(

c

OPL271FR-H.1

Revision 1

Page 3 of 18

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II.

COURSE:

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

LESSON TITLE:

FR-H.1, LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios , the requirements of

FR-H.1, Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink.

B. Enabling Objectives

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities

- associated with FR-H.1 , Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, that are rated ;0, 2.5

during Initial License Training and ;0, 3.0 during License Operator

Requalification Training for the appropriate license position as identified in

Appendix A.

1.

Explain the purpose/goal of FR-H.1.

2.

Discuss the FR-H.1 entry conditions.

a.

Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

FR-H.1 entry conditions.

b.

Describe the requirements associated with FR-H.1 entry conditions.

3.

Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into FR-H.1.

4.

Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of FR-H.1.

5.

Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

6.

Given a set of initial plant conditions use FR-H.1 to correctly:

a.

Identify required actions

b.

Respond to Contingencies

c.

Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes

7.

Apply GFE and system response concepts to the performance of FR-H.1

conditions .

(

X.

LESSON BODY:

30.

ATTEMPT to align condensate tlowoatn to

S/G(s):

a.

Refer to FR-H.1 for Substeps

b.

Refer to FR-H.1 for RNO

NOTE: When condensate flowpath is

established, depressurize SIG at maximum rate

using SIG ARVs until flow is established. Dump

steam from additional SIGs as necessary.

CAUTION:

Refer to CAUTION in FR-H.1

NOTE: Reestablishment of the secondary heat

sink will permittermination of the bleed and feed

heatremoval method and establish stabilized

plant conditions.

31.

CONTROL feed flow to S/G:

a.

Refer to FR-H.1 for Substeps

b.

Refer to FR-H.1 for RNa

NOTE: If SIG being fed is NOT intact then

establish feed flow to an intact SIG and isolate

the affected SIG.

32.

DETERMINE if secondary heat sink restored:

a.

Refer to FR*H.1 for Substeps

b.

Refer to FR-H.1 for RNO

33.

CHECK RCS temperatures:

a.

Refer to FR-H.1 for Substeps

b.

Refer to FR-H.1 for RNO

34.

VERIFY reactor head vent valves CLOSED.

a.

Refer to FR-H.1 for RNO

OPL2 71FR-H.1

Revision 1

Page 13 of 18

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Attempts to establish

secondary heat sink in at

least one SG may have

been initiated in previous

steps before initiation of

bleed and feed heat

removal. These attempts

should be continued until a

secondary heat sink is

restored.

Control feedwater flow

ratesto limit RCS shrinkage

and pressure transients.

If CETs are rising, the

maintain maximum feed

flow to one SIG WR level

until 10%. If S/G W R level

is <10% control feed flow

between 25 and 100 gpm to

restore S/G level and limit

thermal stresses.

Assumes secondary heat

sink is restored and begins

recovery from feed and

bleed. If heat sink is NOT

restored, then GO TO step

29 and continue attempts to

restore secondary heat sink

Checks adequate heat sink

is restored and begins

recovery from feed and

bleed

Begins termination of feed

and bleed

(

LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK

FR-H.1

Rev. 17

ISTEPIIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

CAUTION

Controlling feedwater flow rates during S/G level recovery will limit RCS

shrinkage and pressure transients.

(

!

31.

CONTROL feed flow to S/G:

a.

CHECK Core Exit TCs STABLE or

DROPPING.

a.

ESTABLISH maximum available

feed flow to one S/G.

WHEN wide range level

greater than 10% [30% ADVJ,

THEN

PERFORM Substep 31.c.

GO TO Substep 31.d.

l

(Step continued on next page.)

I

Page 37 of 45

(

LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK

FR-H.1

Rev. 17

ISTEPII ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

(

31.

b. CHECK wide rang e level

b.

CONTROL feedwater flow to dry S/G

on selected S/G

as follows:

greater than 10% [30% ADVj

1)

IF AFW flow is available,

THEN

CONTROL feed flow to one S/G

between 25 and 100 gpm.

2)

IF only condensate' flow available,

THEN

CONTROL condensate flow as

low as achievable while

maintaining the following:

Core Exit TCs DROPPING

wide range S/G level RISING.

3) WHEN wide range level

greater than 10% [30% ADVj ,

THEN

PERFORM Substep 31.c.

GO TO Substep 31.d.---

c.

CONTROL S/G feed flow as

necessary to restore narrow range

level in selected S/G

between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%.

d. NOTIFY Chern Lab to sample S/G

being fed for activity.

(Step continued on next page.)

Page 38 of 45

(

LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK

FR -H.1

Rev. 17

(

ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

31.

e.

MONITOR if S/G being fed is

INTACT:

NO abnormal radiation

S/G pressure CONTROLLED

or RISING.

f.

NOTIFY TSC to determine recovery

methods for any remaining dry SIGs

(S/Gs with wide range level

less than 10% [30% ADV]) .

32.

DETERMINE if secondary heat sink

restored :

a. CHECK narrow range level

in at least one SIG

greater than 10% [25% ADVj.

33.

CHECK RCS temperatures :

Core exit T/Cs DROPPING

RCS T-hot DROPPING.

[ IRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

e.

IF S/G is NOT INTACT,

THEN

PERFORM the following:

1)

ESTABLISH feed flow to another

intact SIG.

2)

ISOLATE affected SIG.

a. GO TO Step 29.

GO TO Step 29.

Pag e 39 of 45

---_._- -

-

-_ .,-- -- ..- ---

.

QUESTIONS REPORT

forSEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

(

80. Ell EK3.2 001

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the reason and limits required for RCS

depressurization in accordance with ECA-1 .1, Loss Of RHR Sump Recirculation?

A~ To minimize RCS leakage, depressurize the RCS until Pressurizer level is> 65%

OR RCS Subcooling is between 40°F and 50°F.

B. To increase SI Injection flow, depressurize the RCS until Pressurizer level is > 54%

AND RCS Subcoollnq is between 20°F and 30°F.

C. To ensure CL Accumulator Injection, depressurize the RCS until Pressurizer level is

> 65% AND RCS Subcooling is between 40*F and 50*F.

D. To allow RHR to be placed in service, depressurize the RCS until Pressurizer level

is> 54% OR RCS Subcooling is between 20°F and 30*F.

A.

Correct. The depressurization is performed to decrease leakage, therefore

decreasing makeup requirements.

B.

Incorrect. SI injection flow may not increase because there may be no water

source.

C.

lncortect. Setup for accumulator injection is performed later in the procedure

after SG depressurization.

D.

Incorrect. RHR will not be placed in service until after the cooldown and

depressurization are performed, later in the procedure.

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they applyto the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) Normal.

abnormal and emergency operating procedures associatedwith (Lossof Emergency Coolant Recirculation).

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

55

R03.5

ECA-1 .1 and basis

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

OPL271 ECA-1 .1 Objective 4

Question Source:

Question History:

Bank

WTSI Last Exam VCS 06 Audit

Question Cognitive Level:

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Comments:

Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:35 PM

Lower

41.10

154

SEQUOYAH

NO

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

BANK

Source If Bank:

WTSI

LOWER

Difficulty:

Plant:

4/2007

Last 2NRC?:

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM

155

(

OPL271ECA-1.1

Revision 1

Page 3 of 18

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II.

COURSE :

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

LESSON TITLE:

EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE ECA-1.1. "Loss of RHR

Sump Recirculation"

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (s)

V.

TRAININ G OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

ECA-1.1, "Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation"

B. Enabling Objectives:

o.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities

associated with Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation that are rated ~ 2.5 during

Initial License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator Requalification

Training for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.

1.

Explain the purpose/goal of ECA-1.1.

2.

Discuss the ECA-1.1 entry conditions.

a.

Describe the setpoints, interiocks, and automatic actions associated with

ECA-1.1 entry conditions.

b.

Describe the requirements associated with ECA-1.1 entry conditions.

3.

Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into ECA-1.1.

4.

Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of ECA-1.1.

5.

Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

6.

Given a set of initial plant conditions use ECA-1.1 to correctly:

a.

Identify required actions

b.

Respond to Contingencies

c.

Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes

7.

Apply GFE and system response concepts to the performance of ECA-1.1

conditions.

(

x.

LESSON BODY:

27.

DEPRESSURIZE RCS to reduce RCS suocoouns:

a.

Refer to EOP for Substeps

b.

Refer to EOP for RNO

28.

DETERMINE if RHR should be placed in

service:

a.

Refer to EOP for Substeps

b.

Refer to EOP for RNO

29.

MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated:

a.

Refer to EOP for Substeps

b.

Refer to EOP for RNO

30.

MONITOR if RCPS should be stopped:

a.

Refer to EOP for Substeps

b.

Refer to EOP for RNO

31.

CHECK RCS temperature greater than 200°F.

a.

Refer to EOP for RNO

32.

CHECK RWST level less than <8%.

a.

Refer to EOP for RNO

33.

PLACE pumps taking suction from RWST in

PULL TO LOCK:

a.

Refer to EOP for Substeps

OPL271 ECA-1.1

Revision 1

Page 12 of 18

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Decreases RCS pressure to

limit break flow for a small

break flow if in progress.

Terminate depressurization

when RCS subcooling

requirements are met or

PZR level increases that

might limit further pressure

decreases

If prerequisite requirements

for RHR system operation

are met and TSC concurs

then place RHR cooling in

service

Isolates or vents CLA to

prevent injection of nitrogen

into RCS. Traps nitrogen in

CLA after all available water

has been injected into RCS.

Continuous action step.

Stops RCPs when RCS

pressure is to low to support

RCP seal operation

Objective 5

If RCS temperature is

<200°F skip steps 31 - 40

which depressurizes the

S/G to lower RCS

temperature

Objective 5

If RCS temperature is

>200°F and water is still left

in the RWST then GO TO

step 1 and continue core

cooling by injection from the

RWST

Prevents cavitation of these

pumps for empty RWST

ECA-1.1

Rev. 11

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

LOSS OF RHR SUMP RECIRCULATlON

\\iL-

..L-

---I

ISTEP IIACTlONIEXPECTED RESPONSE

(

NOTE

Upper head voiding may occur during RCS depressurization if no RCPs

are running. This may result in rapidly rising pressurizer level.

27.

DEPRESSURIZE RCS to reduce

RCS subcooling:

..,, \\

I

i,

B. CHECK RCS subcooling based on

core exit TICs greater than 50°F.

B. GO TO Step 28.

b. USE normal pressurizer spray.

b. USE one pressurizer PORV.

(

IF ReS CANNOT be depressurized

USING any pressurizer PORV,

THEN

ESTABLISH auxiliary spray USING

EA-62-4, Establishing Auxiliary Spray.

C.

DEPRESSURIZE RCS

UNTIL either of the following

conditions SATISFIED:

RCS subcooltnq

based on core exit TICs

between 40°F and 50°F.

C. IF RCS subcooling less than 40°F,

THEN

RAISE RCS makeup flow

to restore subcooling.

Pressurizer level

greater than 65%.

d. WHEN either condition

In Substep 27.c Is met,

THEN

STOP RCS depressurization.

(

I

Page 19 of 38

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

81. EI2G2.4.31 001

(

Given the following plant conditions:

".

A steam line rupture has occurred on Unit 1.

-

The crew was unable to isolate SGs.

ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, is in progress.

-

The crew has taken action to minimize the plant cooldown .

-

AFW flow to S/Gs 1, 3 and 4 are currently at 25 gpm.

-

The following alarms are received:

1-AR-M3-C3, STM GEN #1 LEVEL LOW

1-AR-M3-C5, STM GEN #3 LEVEL LOW

1-AR-M3-C6, STM GEN #4 LEVEL LOW

Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required?

A. Raise AFW flow to #1, #3, and #4 SGs to ensure NR level remains above 10%

B. Raise AFW flow to #1, #3, and #4 SGs to ensure NR level remains above 50%

C~ Maintain AFW flow at its current value. When Thot starts to rise, raise AFW flow.

(

D. Maintain AFW flow at its current value. When 3 of 4 SGs are at the applicable

setpoint, take action in accordance with FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary

Heat Sink.

A. Incorrect. After throttling to minimize RCS cooldown, even if levels are low, AFW

remains throttled until That begins to rise. At that point, AFW is throttled just enough to

stabilize temperature. Credible because 10% is the lower limit that level is checked at

B. Incorrect. After throttling to minimize RCS cooldown, even if levels are low, AFW

remains throttled until That begins to rise. At that point, AFW is throttled just enough to

stabilize temperature. Credible because 50% is the upper limit that level is checked at

C. Correct.

D. Incorrect. Since this an operator induced reduction of AFW flow, FR-H.1 actions

would not be performed

Monday, March 12, 20072:35:36 PM

156

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Emergency Procedures I Plan Knowtedge of annunciatorsalarms andindications. and use of the response instructions

(

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 1

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

56

R03.3

ECA-2.1. AR M3

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level:

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

OPL271 ECA-2.1, B.6.a

New

Higher

41.10

(

Comments:

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

NEW

HIGHER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM

157

(

OPL271 ECA-2.1

Revision 1

Page 3 of 46

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING -LICENSED

II.

COURSE:

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

LESSON TITLE:

ECA-2.1 , "UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM

GENERATORS"

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (s)

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators

B. Enabling Objectives:

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities

- associated with Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators that

are rated <: 2.5 during Initial License Training and <: 3.0 during License

Operator Requalification Training for the appropriate license position as

identified in Appendi x A.

1.

Explain the purpose/goal of ECA-2.1.

2.

Discuss the ECA-2.1 entry conditions.

a.

Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

ECA-2.1 entry conditions.

b.

Describe the requirements associated with ECA-2.1 entry conditions.

3.

Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into ECA-

2.1.

4.

Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of ECA-2.1.

5.

Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

6.

Given a set of initial plant conditions use ECA-2.1 to correctly:

a.

Identify required actions

b.

Respond to Contingencies

c.

Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes

(

OPL271 ECA-2.1

Revision 1

Page 4 of 46

7.

Discuss the reasons for maintaining a minimum flow to the S/Gs with levels less

than 10% during the uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs.

8.

Apply GFE and system response concepts to the performance of ECA-2.1

conditions.

OBJECTIVES TO BE COVERED IN THESE SEQUOYAH OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAMS

I

OBJECTIVE I NONLICENSED

LICENSE TRAINING

NO.

SRO

REQUAUSPECIAL

OPERATORS

O.

X

1.

X

2.

X

3.

-

X

4.

X

5.

X

6.

X

7.

X

8.

X

NOTE: The following approval is required for License Requalification and special training only:

Training Program

Sequoyah Operator Training Manager

I

Date

Sequoyah Operations Manager

I

Date

UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF

ALL STEAM GENERATORS

ECA-2.1

Rev. 9

ISTEP IIACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE

IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

NOTE

Reducing total feed flow to less than 440 gpm, as directed in this procedure,

does NOT require implementation of FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink,

as long as a total feed flow capability of 440 gpm is available.

2.

CONTROL feed flow to minimize

RCS cooldown:

(

a. CHECK T-cold cooldown rate

less than 100°F/hr.

b. MONITOR SIG narrow range levels

less than 50%.

c. MONITOR SIG narrow range levels

greater than 10% [25% ADVj.

d. MONITOR T-hot indications

STABLE or DROPPING.

a. REDUCE feed flow to 25 gpm

to each S/G.

OPEN MD AFW pump recirc valves

FCV-3-400 and FCV-3-401

as necessary to control flow.

GO TO Substep 2.c (AER column).

b. CONTROL feed flow to maintain SIG

narrow range levels less than 50%.

c. MAINTAIN feed flow to affected S/G(s)

greater than or equal to 25 gpm

UNTIL level greater than

10% [25% ADV].

d. IF RCS T-hot is rising,

THEN

STABILIZE RCS T-hot:

RAISE feed flow

DUMP steam.

Page 5 of 34

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

2. 001 AA2.04 001

(

Given the following plant conditions:

Unit 1 is at 90% power.

Which ONE (1) of the following sets of parameters will increase during an inadvertent

continuous control rod withdrawal event?

A. Reactor Power and Charging Flow

B. RCS Hot Leg Temperature and Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio

C. OT Delta T Setpoint and Main Steam Header Pressure

D~ RCS Hot Leg Temperature and Reactor Power

A-Incorrect. Charging flow will decrease because pressurizer level will increa se due to

heatup. Credible because the parameter does change ans reactor power does rise

B-incorrect because DNBR gets lower (Closer to DNB) as temperature rises. Credible

because tempereture does rise.

(

C-Incorrect. OT Delta T setpoint will decrease in relation to Tavg increasing. Credible

because the parameter changes, and steam pressure does rise.

D-Correct. Hot leg temperature rises, as does reactor power, due to the positive

reactivity being added. OT and OP delta T setpoints will lower as power and

temperature rise

Monday, March 12, 20072:35:27 PM

3

QUESTIONS REPORT

fo r SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply tothe Continuous Rod Withdrawal: Reactor power and its trend

(

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference: .

57

R0 4.2

T&AA

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

OPL271CGFES Attachment 16 Objective 20

Question Source:

Bank

Question History:

Robinson 2007 Editorially Modified

Question Cognitive Level:

Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.5

(

Comments:

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

BANK

HIGH ER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

ROBINSON 2007 NRC

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 20072:35:27 PM

4

(

PWR

INSTRUCTOR GUIDE

VOLUME: REACTOR THEORY

TIME8 HRS

INSTRUCTOR GUIDE: REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS

REV 2

OBJECTIVES

15. Expl ain the characteristics to look for when the point of adding heat is reached.

16. Describe reactor power response after reaching the point of adding heat.

17. 18. Describe the monitoring and control of reactor power and primary temperature from 0% to

15% (Babcock & Wilcox Plants).

19. Describe the means by which reactor power will be increased to rated power.

20. Expl ain the effects of control rod motion or boration/dilution on reactor power.

21 . Describe the monitoring and control ofT,,,, Tref, and power during power operation.

(

22. Explain the relationship between steam flow and reactor power given specific conditions.

23. Explain reactor response to a control rod insertion.

24. Explain the shape of the curve of reactor power versus time after a reactor trip.

25. Defi ne decay heat.

26. Exp lain the relationship between decay heat generation and:

a.

Power level history

b.

Power production

c.

Time since reactor shutdown

PWR / REACTOR THEORY / CHAPTER

8

JREACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS

30f99

REV2

(

'INSTRUCTOR GUIDE

A. Reactor power is maintained at

approximately 2% while secondary plant is

prepared for power operations

KEY POINTS, AIDS,

QUESTIONS/ANSWERS

1.

When turbine generator is ready for

startup, reactor operator withdraws

control rods as necessary to establish

approximately 7-15% power

2.

Steam is bled directly to condenser by

steam dump system to maintain steam

pressure

3.

As turbine generator draws more

steam, steam dump system

automatically reduces amount of steam

being bled.to condenser

-

4. ReS temperature and reactor power are

(

maintained at approximately constant

levels

5.

When turbine generator load has

increased to match reactor power,

steam dumps will be fully elosed

6.

Power escalation continues by

gradually opening main turbine

governor valves.

B. When power is increased above 15%,

contro l rods may be placed in automatic

control

Objective 18

Objective 19 and 20

(

PWR I REACTOR THEORY I CHAPTER

8

I REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS

60 0f99

It! t 999 GENERAL PHYSICS CORP ORATION

REV 2

(

I INSTRUCTOR GUIDE

I. The control rods will step out

automatically to raise Tm in

accordance with ramped T.veversus

power program (Figure 8-18)

2.

Values shown are for typical 4-100p

Westinghouse plant

3.

Actual values will vary from plant to

plant

C. Figure 8-18 is representative for many

Westinghouse plants and is similar to that

of CE stations as well

I.

In general, CE station will tend to hold

Tcoldas constant as possible, whereas

Westinghouse plant will often have

Tco1d drop as function ofreactor power

2. However, in some cases, Tco1dwill

actually rise somewhat, as denoted in

Figure 8-18

D. The key for both Westinghouse and CE

stations, however, is that T.vcwill rise (or

slide) as function ofreactor power, as

shown in Figure 8-I8

E. The reason for sliding Tave upward (or

holding Tcold constant) is to enable steam

pressure to remain higher at 100% turbine

load

KEY POINTS, AIDS,

QUESTIONS/ANSWERS

Figure 8-18 I TP 8-58

'*.

./

-

,~

~

y-

_!.

. O'

..-

PWR I REACTOR THEORY I CHAPTER

8

I REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS

61 of99

REV 2

(

(,

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Assuming the rod can be moved, which ONE (1) of the following is the speed at which

the rod will move when it is realigned?

A. 32 steps per minute

B~ 48 steps per minute

C. 64 steps per minute

D. 72 steps per minute

A. Incorrect. 32 SPM is part of the variable speed for auto rod control 3-5 deg F

mismatch.

-

B. Correct. Control Bank in Manual or Bank Select will initiate motion at 48 SPM

C. Incorrect. 64 SPM is for Shutdown Banks

D. Incorrect. 72 SPM is maximum variable speed

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:27 PM

11

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Ability to determine and interpret the followIng as they apply to the Inoperable { Stuck Control Rod: Difference between Jog and run

rod speeds, effect on CRDM of stuck rod

(

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

58

R02.5

Rod Control SO, pg 38

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

OPL271AOP-C.01 Objective 5

OPT200RDCNT Objective 4.e

New

Question Cognitive Level:

Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.6

(

Comments:

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

NEW

LOWER

412007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:27 PM

12

(

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

OPL271AOP-C.01

Revision 0

Page 3 of 28

II.

COURSE:

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

LESSON TITLE:

AOP-C.01, ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

2.0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months (s)

(

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

AOP-C.01, ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

B. Enabling Objectives:

Objectives

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities

associated with Continuous Rod Withdrawal, Dropped Control Rod, and

Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod that are rated <: 2.5 during Initial License Training

and <: 3.0 during License Operator Requaiification Training for the appropriate

position as identified in Appendix A.

l.

State the purpose/goal of this AOP-C.01 .

2.

Describe the AOP-C.01 entry conditions.

a.

Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated

with AOP-C.01 entry conditions.

b.

Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-C.01 entry

conditions.

c.

Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with

AOP-C.01 entry conditions.

d . Describe the plant pa rameters that may indicate rod control failure.

3.

Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-

C.01.

4.

Upon entry into AOP-C.01, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the

appropriate procedural section for response.

5.

Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-C.01.

6.

Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-C.01.

(

x.

LESSON BODY:

mm.ADJUST PLANT TURBINE LOAD AS

REQUIRED .

OPL271AOP-C.01

Revision 0

Page 16 of 28

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

nn. GO TO APPROPRIATE PLANT PROCEDURE

This is the endpoint of

CASE 2.

E.

Case 3 - Misaligned shutdown/control rod(s) or bank

Objective 8, Case Study

Single misaligned control rod, from 60% reactor power.

1.

Mitigating Strategy

Objective 5

If >1 rod misaligned then trip the reactor or

shutdown the unit as required

If oniy 1 rod is misaligned, then realign the

misaligned rod

Stabilize the plant

Monitor QPTR within limits

Reduce load to <75% power in preparation for re-

alignment

Correct the initiating cause

(

Realign the misaligned rod or bank

Update ICS. PIA converter, and bank overlap as

required

Restore control rods to AUTO

Adjust turbine load as required.

2.

Diagnosis

a.

Symptoms - QPTR alarms, Power Range channel

Objective 2

deviation alarm.

3.

Procedure flow path.

(

a.

Evaluate Tech Specs for applicability

b.

Diagnosis step.

(1)

This step offers little in the form of

diagnostic steps. rather directs the crew

to the proper section once the failure is

determined.

(2)

Once misaligned rod is diagnosed. GO

TO SECTION 2.3

Tech Specs will be

discussed later in this

lesson

Use diagnostic table in

Section 2 of AOP

Objective 4

(

OPT2 00RDCNT

Rev. 2

Page 3 of73

I.

PROGRAM :

OPERATOR TRAINING

II.

COURSE:

SYSTEMS TRAINING

III.

TITLE:

ROD CONTROL SYSTEM (RDCNT)

(

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON: 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months lecture; 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months simulator demonstration;

I hour self-study/workshop

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Tcrminal Objective:

Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to

apply the knowledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated with

the Rod Control system in the plant and on the simulator.

B. Enabling Objectives:

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities

associated with the Rod Control System that are rated > 2.5 during Initial License

training for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.

1.- -State the purpose/functions of the Rod Control System as described in the SQN

FSAR.

2.

State the design basis of the Rod Control System in accordance with the SQN

FSAR.

3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the

Rod Control System as illustrated on the simplified system drawing.

4.

Describe the following items for each major component in the Rod Control

System as described in this lesson:

a. Location

b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)

c. Support equipment and systems

d. Normal operating parameters

e. Component operation

f. Controls

g. Interlocks (including setpoints)

h. Instrumentation and Indications

1. Protective features (including setpoints)

j. Failure modes

k. Unit differences

1. Types of accidents for which the Rod Control System components are designed

m. Location ofcontrols and indications associated with the Rod Control System in

the control room and auxiliary control room

(

Rod Control System

Pulser, Continued

SQN.085.RDCNT

Rev. 0

Page 38 of 100

Major Components

(

Process signals

The table below describes the process signals of the two pulsers.

Pulser

Signal

Mode

Description

Va riable Rate

Auto

receives a speed signal from the

Pulser

Reactor Control Unit

Input

Manual on an

receives a speed signal from a

individual control

manual speed adjust resistor in

bank

the Process cabinets set for 48

SPM.

Shutdown Bank

receives a speed signal from a

(SBA and SBB

manual speed adjust resistor in

only)

the Process Cabinet set for 64

SPM.

Auto

8-72 spm (48-432 pulses/min)

Output

Manual or

48 sprn (288 pulses/min)

individual control

-

bank

Shutdown Bank

64 spm (372 pulses/min)

Signal

Description

Constant Rate

Input

receives a speed signal from a speed adjusting

Pulser

resistor in the SCD logic circuit of the Logic

Cabinet.

Output

64 spm (64 pulses/min)

Shutdown banks

The first variable-rate pulser controls shutdown banks A and B because they are

contained in the same power cabinets as the control banks. The constant rate

pulser only controls shutdown banks C and D.

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

37. 028 AK3.05 001

(

Given the following plant conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power.

Load is being reduced to 50% to remove a Main Feedwater Pump from service.

Pressurizer Level Control is selected to L1-68-339

The Pressurizer Level Master Controller setpoint fails at its current value.

The load reduction is initiated.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the action that will be taken, and the reason

for those actions?

A. Change the pressurizer level channel input to the master controller and restore

Letdown because the backup level channel will cause a letdown isolation.

By Take manual control of, and reduce Charging flow because actual pressurizer level

will be higher than program level for the actual power level as load is decreased.

C. Take manual control of, and raise Charging flow because actual pressurizer level

will be lower than program level for the actual power level as load is decreased.

(

D. Change the pressurizer level channel input to the master controller and restore

Letdown because the controlling level channel will cause a letdown isolation.

A. Incorrect. Changing input will not affect the controller because the setpoint has

failed, not the input

B. Correct.

C. Incorrect. Charging fiow must be reduces because level will be artificially high

D. Incorrect. Changing input will not affect the controller because the setpoint has

failed. Letdown will not isolate because actual/eve/ will indicate the same on all

channels

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM

70

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply tothe Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: Actions

contained in EOP for PZR level malfunction

(

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

59

R03.7

1-AR-M5-A E-4

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Leaming Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level:

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Comments:

OPT200.PZRLCS Objective 5.d

New

Higher

41.10

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

NEW

HIGHER

412007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12,20072:35:30 PM

71

(

OPT200.PZRLCS

Rev. 2

Page 4 of 80

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):

B. Enabling Objectives (Cont'd):

5.

Describe the operation of the Pressurizer Level Control System as it relates to the

following:

a. Precautions and limitations

b. Major steps performed while placing the Pressurizer Level Control System in service

c. Alarms and alarm response

d. How a component failure will affect system operation

e. How a support system failure will affect the Pressurizer Level Control System operation

f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation

6.

Describe the administrative controls and limits for the Pressurizer Level Control System:

a. State Tech Specs/TRM LCOs that govern the Pressurizer Level Control System

b. State the:::1 hour action limit TS LCOs

c. Given the conditions/status of the Pressurizer Level Control System components and the

appropriate sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability requirements are met and

what actions are required

7.

Discuss related Industry Events:

a.

Event Title: SQ970649PER - V-I pressurizer was drained below 25% actual level

while decreasing level from solid water conditions

(

VI.

TRAINING AIDS:

A. Computer.

B. Computer Display Projector & Controls.

C. Local Area Network (LAN) Access.

D. Simulator (if available)

('

(

OPT200.PZRLCS

Rev. 2

Page 46 of 80

Level Alarms

> 1*AR*55*M5*A (E4)

LS-68-339E/F +5% of span above level

program

bj.5

X.

LESSON BODY:

Alarms: Review alarms using the slide above.

Refer to the appropriate annunciator response procedure for full details

including setpoints, alarms sources, and operator actions.

Bases for energizing heaters on +5% level deviation:

The level deviation-high is assumed to be an insurge produced by a

decrease in load, introducing subcooled water enters the pressurizer.

If a subsequent outsurge were to occur, the subcooled water would not

assist in maintaining pressure by flashing to steam.

It is conservatively assumed that a subsequent outsurge will occur,

therefore, the backup heaters are energized as an anticipatory measure.

('

Source

Setpoint

32

(E-4)

SER 367

1*LS*68*339E/F

5% of span above level

program

LS-68-339E/F

PRESSURIZER

LEVEL HIGH

BACKUP HTRS ON

(

Probable

Causes

Corrective

Actions

References

1.

Charging and/or letdown flow mismatch.

2.

Instrument malfunction of level or Tavg.

3.

Load transient condition.

[1] CONFIRM instrumentation by CHANNEL CHECK

[2] IF instrument has failed , THEN

GO TO AOP-1.04, Pressurizer Instrument Malfunction.

[3] IF instrument has not failed, THEN

ENSURE level is returning to program 1-LR-68-339 with

appropriate charging and letdown.

[4] IF RCS pressure ~ 2265 psig, THEN

DEENERGIZE backup heater 1C, [C.1]

[5] EVALUATE Technical Specifications (3.3.1 and 3.3.2).

45B65 5-05A-0,

45N657-15 ,

47B601-68-45

1

i

1-AR-MS-A

Page 39 of 43

Rev. 29

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

1. 059 AK I.02 001

(

Given the following plant conditions:

An accidental spill of the Monitor Tank has occurred in the Aux Building.

Radiation levels in the area of the spill are 40 mr per hour at 30 em.

Contamination levels on the floor around the tank are 1.2E6 DPM/100 cm2

Which ONE (1) of the following describes (1) the major radiation concern for the spill,

and (2) the postinqs applied to the area?

A. (1) Area radiation is a gamma concern; Contamination is a gamma concern

(2) Radiation area; Contamination area

Bt (1) Area radiation is a gamma concern; Contamination is a beta concern

(2) Radiation area; High Contamination area

C. (1) Area radiation is a beta concern; Contamination is a gamma concern

(2) High Radiation area; Contamination area

D. (1) Area radiation is a beta concern ; Contamination is a beta concern

(2) High Radiation area; High Contamination area

(

A. Incorrect. This area should be posted as a high contamination area

B. Correct. Area radiation is typically gamma, while contamination is beta radiation.

Less than 100 mr per hour is a radiation area. Greater than 50,000 DPM/100 cm2 is a

contaminated area. Greater than 50,000 dpm/100 cm2 is a high contamination area

C. Incorrect. Concerns for the effects are reversed, and postings are incorrect

D. Incorrect. Concerns for effects of area is incorrect and posting for radiation is

incorrect

Monday, March 12,20073:24:52 PM

1

(

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the operational implicationsof the followingconcepts as they apply to Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release:

Biological effects on humans of various typesof radiation, exposure levels that are acceptable for nuclear power plant personnel,

and the unitsused for radiation-intensity measurements and forradiation exposure levels

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

60

R0 2.6

SPP-5.1, RCI-15

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

Question Cognitive Level:

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Comments:

RWT-010,

New

Higher

41.12

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

NEW

HIGHER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 3:24:52 PM

2

(

TVAN STANDARD

PROGRAMS AND

PROCESSES

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS

SPP-5.1

Rev. 5

Page 32 of 33

(

Lens Dose Equivalent (LDE) - Applies to the external exposure of the lens of the eye and is

taken as the dose equivalent at a tissue depth of 0.3 centimeter (300 mg/cm').

Licensee - Means the holder of a license.

Member of the Public - Any individual except when that individual is receiving an occupational

dose.

Occupational Dose - The dose received by an individual in the course of employment in which

the individual"s assigned duties involve exposure to radiation and/or radioactive material from

licensed and unlicensed sources of radiation, whether in the possession of the licensee or other

person. Occupational dose does not include dose received from background radiation, as a

patient from medical practices, or from voluntary participation in medical research , or as a

member of the public.

On-The-Job Training (OJT) - Performance of duties, commensurate with the level to which the

training will be credited, under the direction of appropriately experienced personnel.

Planned Special Exposure (PSE) - An infrequent exposure to radiation, separate from and in

addition to the annual dose limits.

RADCON Instrument * Any RAOCON instrument used (not including installed facility radiation

monitoring-system) to measure radiation exposure, exposure rate, dose, dose rate, dose

equivalent, or dose equivalent rate or to assess airborne or surface contamination. Instruments

utilized in the external and internal dosimetry programs are excluded from this definition.

RADCON Technician - A technician qualified in radiation protection and serving in a responsible

position per ANSI N18.1-1971.

Radiation Area - An area, accessible to individuals, in which radiation levels could result in an

individual receiving a dose equivalent in excess of 5 mrem in one hour at 30 cm from the

radiation source or from any surface that the radiation penetrates.

Radiation Work Permit (RWP) * A document for ccntrolling the radiological aspects of work.

Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) - An area within (or that may coincide with) the

Restricted Area (defined in 10 CFR 20.1003) boundaries that may have increasing radiological

hazards.

Removable Contamination - Contamination which may be easily transferred to personnel or

surfaces through casual contact.

Response Check - Exposure of the instrument to radiation in a reproducible geometry such that

a reading is obtained for each scale or decade normally used in order to verify that the

instrument response is acceptable for performing surveys.

Restricted Area - Any area access to which is limited by the licensee for purposes of protection

of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials (10 CFR 20.1003).

(

-,

TVAN STANDARD

PROGRAMS AND

PROCESSES

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS

SPP-5.1

Rev. 5

Page 31 of 33

(

c

Declared Pregnant Woman - Means a woman who has voluntarily informed the licensee, in

writing, of her pregnancy and the estimated date of conception. The declaration remains in

effect until the declared pregnant woman withdraws the declaration in writing or is no longer

pregnant.

Deep Dose Equivalent (DOE) * Applies to external whole-body exposure. The dose equivalent

at a tissue depth of 1 cm (1000 mg/cm').

Derived Air Concentration (DAC) - The concentration of a given radionuclide in air which, if

breathed by the reference man for a working year of 2000 hours0.0231 days 0.556 hours 0.00331 weeks 7.61e-4 months under conditions of light work

(inhalation rate 1.2 cubic meters of air per hour), results in an intake of one ALI. For modes of

intake other than inhalation, an equivalent DAC-hr shall be determined and included as DAC-hrs

in the individual 's dose tracking record. The equivalent DAC-hr is equal to the number of hours

of exposure at the DAC (i.e., DAC-hrs exposure which would result in an equivalent intake of

radioactive material as has been observed in a particular exposure incident). This permits the

comparison of intake by inhalation with other modes of intake (ingestion, injection, absorption ,

etc.). 2000 DAC-hr is equal to one ALI.

Dose* A generic term that means absorbed dose, dose equivalent, effective dose equivalent,

committed dose equivalent, committed effective dose equivalent , or total effective dose

equivalent.jas defined in applicable sections of 10 CFR 20.

NOTE

For purposes of this document and implementing procedures, radiation exposure as

expressed in units of Rlhr and subunits, thereof, is equivaient to dose (rad) and dose

equivalent (rem). Based on ANSI N13.11 development and terminology, any acute dose

greater than 10 rem is generally denoted in units of rad, since that level is considered as

the accident range of personnel exposure. Any dose less than that level is considered

the protective range of personnel exposure.

Experience - As used in this document and ANSI N18.1-1971and ANSI/ANS-3.1 (1981), actual

applicable working experience performing duties commensurate with the position. Observation

of others is not considered experience. Up to 12 months of OJT may be credited toward

experience on a one-for-one basis.

Fixed ccntamtnattcn- Contamination which is not transferred through casual contact and is not

detected by smear survey. It may become removable through operations such as grinding,

welding , etc.

High Radiation Area- An area, accessible to individuals, in which radiation levels from radiation

sources external to the body could result in an individual receiving a dose equivalent in excess

of 100 mrem in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months at 30 centimeters from the radiation source or 30 centimeters from any

surface that the radiation penetrates.

Hot Particle* A single discrete object (particle) generally difficult to see (usually <100 micron)

with the naked eye, and at least 0.1 microcuries of radioactivity. It is either an activated

corrosion/wear product or fuel fragment with high specific activity. For the purpose of an

approximate field calculation, any discrete particle surveyed with a standard frisker probe

(HP"260, HP-210, etc.) and found to have levels of greater than or equal to 20,000 cpm, shall be

considered a hot particle.

Individual Monitoring Devices (individual monitoring equipment) * Means devices designed to

be worn by a single individual for the assessment of dose equivalent such as film badges,

thermoluminescence dosimeters (TLDs), pocket ionization chambers, and personal ("lapel") air

sampling devices .

c

(

Screen post6

Screen TCPTV

Define and recognize a

Radioactive Materials Area.

Screen TCPTW

tml cr 99-0072

Screen TCPTX

Screen TerTY

Screen post9

Define lind recognize a

Radiation Area.

Screen postl 0

RWTOIO

Revision 9

Page 86 of 100

POSTED AREAS

Radioactive Materials Area

Any area or room in which radioactive material is used, stored, or transferred.

In addition to the yellow and magenta colors and tri-hlades, tbe word CAUTION

or DANGER will appear on posting.

All radioactive materials shall be stored in designated radioactive material

storage area or room with the posting "Caution, Radioactive Material."

All

radioactive material shall be labeled with a "Caution, Radioactive Material' tag.

You must notify RADCON prior to placement or removal of radioactive material

from a radioactive material storage area.

Unlabeled radioactive material shall not be left unattended.

If you find a radiological material container which is torn, unsealed, unlabeled,

or unattended, call RADCON.

All items which

have been

used

in

a contaminated

area or

potentially

contaminated system are considered contaminated until surveyed and released

by RADCON.

These items shall be placed in a sealed yellow container/bag containing the

radioactive material symbol.

Containers with radioactive liquids require special care. RADCON may perform

surveys during the movement.

These items should be transported in a rigid

device such as a bucket, drum or cart if there is potential for the primary

container to be damaged and leak.

Radioactive material which is being transported from one RCA to another

through a clean area will normally be escorted by RADCON, except when

properly bagged hand tools or protective clothing, certain chemistry samples,

and materials are transported by other authorized persons.

You must maintain control of radioactive material in your possession while

frisking or getting undressed upon exiting a contamination zone.

Ensnre you place the radioactive material away from otber personnel.

Radiation Area

An accessible area in which a person could receive a deep dose in excess of 5

mrem in one hour (5 mrem /hr) at 30 centimeters (about 1 foot) from the source.

The word "caution" will appear on the radiological posting.

Entry requirements are the same for Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA)

entry.

(

Screen postll

trn2 cr 99-0004

Define and recognize a High

Radiation Arca.

Screen postl]

ScreenpostIJ

Screen post14

Screen postl5

Screen PlJ.'il/7

Screen post/8

Screen post19

Define and recognize a

l ocked lligh Rad iation Area

Screenpost/9a

Screen qutzl

(rn ] cr 99-0083

RWTOIO

Revision 9

Page 87 of 100

High Radiation Area

An accessible area in which ra diatio n levels from radiation sources external to

the bod)" could result in an individual receiving a dose eq uiva lent in excess of 100

mrem in 1 hou r (100 mremlhr) at 30 cent imeters (about 1 foot) from the

radiation

source

or 30

centimeters

from

any surface

that

the

radiation

penetrates.

The word "'caution" or "danger" wlll appear on the standard radio logical

posting.

Entry requirements for a High Radiation Area :

All RCA entrance requirements apply.

Either a dose warning device, dose rate meter, or RADCO N coverage. Any

entry into a high ra dia tion area without one of these items will subject the

individual and TVAN to an i"H.C violation!!!!

Notify the RADCON group prior to ANY ent ry into a High Radiation Area .

Any entry into a High Rad iat ion Area WITHOUT the ability to kee p track of

dose

rates

is a

serious violation of plant

procedure and

may cause

an

overexposu re.

Areas where dose rates are greater than 1000mremlbr at 30 cm fro m the source

sha ll be posted as a Locked

High Radiation Area and locked (wit h a key

controlled by RadCo n).

If the a rea can not be locke d, a continuous attenda nt (door watch) must be

present.

The door watch will be briefed in Lockcd IIigh Radiation Area

door watch req uirements.

If it becomes necessary to lock area s that do not have a permanent enclosure,

a temporary enclosure may be install ed aroun d the area and locked with a

High Radiation Area padlock.

Elect ronic surveillance may also be used to prevent unau thorized entries.

OUESTION: The room you are working in has a dose rate of 50 mremlhr. It should

be posted as a high radiation area.

True

or

False

Screenqutztc

A" SWER: False. Thc room should be posted as a radiation area. A High Radiation

Area has dose rates in excess of 100 mrem/hr.

A.

B.

C.

(

RCI-15

RADIOLOGICAL POSTINGS

Revision 15

Page 10 of 13

6.0

REQUIREMENTS

(Continued)

D.

Positive engineering controls may be necessary to ensure that

airborne radioactivity does not spread to other plant areas.

Ventilation systems in affected rooms should be operable and

maintain a negative pressure differential. Items such as glove

bags or containment tents may be utilized to confine the source of

airborne radioactivity and portable ventilation systems may be

used to control the spread of generated airborne radioactivity.

Airborne Radioactivity Areas must be promptly posted and

necessary precautions taken to ensure that the airborne

radioactivity is confined within the posted area.

6.12

Contamination Area

1OCFR20 does not define criteria for establishing or posting of a

Contamination Area. The criterion of ~ 1,000 dpm/100 cm' of

transferrable contamination is used to define this establishment

and posting .

A Contamination Area is an area , accessible to individuals, in

which transferrable contamination levels are ~ 1000 dpm/100 ern",

Each Contamination Area shall be posted with a conspicuous sign

or signs bearing the standard radiation symbol and the words

Caution - Contamination Area.

D.

The entrance/exit for a Contaminatio n Area is identified by the use

of a step-off-pad (SOP). Directions printed or written on the SOP

instruct individuals exiting the area to remove contaminated

clothing prior to stepping onto the SOP, to prevent the spread of

contamination outside of the posted Contamination Area.

E.

It may impractical to post and establish all Contamination Areas as

described above. Due to space limitations and physica l properties,

some areas such as floor drains or sample/instrument panels may

be identified with radiation tape and/or radiation caution tags .

6.13

High Contamination Area

A.

1OCFR20 does not define criteria for establishing or posting of a

High Contamination Area . The criterion of ~ 50,000 dpm/100 cm'

of transferrable contamination in the general area is used to define

this establishment and posting.

B.

A High Contamination Area is an area , accessible to individuals, in

which transferrable contamination levels in the general area are

~ 50,000 dpm/100 ern".

(

Screen treld

Characterize the methods of

shielding alpha radia tion.

Screen trele

Chara cterize the exp osu re

ha zard of alpha radiation.

u

. u

RWTO IO

Revision 9

Page 140fi 00

Alpha particles can be shielded by a piece of paper, by the dead

layer of skin on the surface of the body, or by clothing.

However, because alpha particles are highly energetic, they can

damage the softer internal tissues if deposited for a period of time.

We say then , that it is primarily an INTER:'iAL HAZARD.

Screen tretp

Stare the four types ( I f

radiation found in a

commercial nuclea r power

plant.

Y Gamma Radiation

Gamma radiation has no electrical charge or mass. It's a wave of pure

ENERGY!

(

Screen trel q

Cha racterize where ga mma

radiati on is found.

Screentrelr

Ch aracterize gamm a ra dtatlon

by its penetrat ing ability.

.reen trets

C haracterize th e methods of

shielding gam ma radiation.

Screen trelt

Characterize the exposure

hazard or gamma radiation.

ld entffy the type of radiation

thai contributes the most too a

worker's dose.

y

Sources include fission, fission products, and activation products.

Gamma radiation is a VERY penetrating form of wave ra diation.

Gamma ray can easily penetrate the walls of piping

containing radioactive materials.

Gamma radiation can be REDUCED by shielding the source of the

radiation with very dense material such as lead, steel, or concrete.

Gamm a radi ation is an extremely penetrating wave that is an

external hazard to the whole body. The majority of nuclear plant

worker dose is from G AM~IA radiation.

(

Screen trelf

State the four types of

rad iation found In a

commercial nu clear power

plant.

Screen trelg

Charact erize where beta

radialion is found.

~

Beta Radiation

Beta radiation is made up of high speed particles with a negat ive electrical

charge which originate from the nucleus of an atom.

Source of most beta particles is from activated corrosion and fission

products.

('

(

Scum IreJlr

Characterize beta radiation by

its penetrating ability.

Scree"trelI

Characterize the methods of

shielding beta radiation.

Screen ttelj

Characterize the exposure

hazard of beta radiation.

Screen trelk

State the four types of radiation

found in a commercial nuclear

power plant.

Screen/fell

Characterize where neutron

radiation is found.

~TeelJ trelm

Characterize neutron radiation

by its penetrating ability.

Screen treln

Characterize the methods of

shielding neutron radiation.

Screen trelo

Characterize the exposure

hazard of neutron radiation.

Screen quizl

1m2 cr 99-0083

RWTOIO

Revision 9

Page 15 of 100

Penetration in air is usually limited to a few feet, but beta particles

have more penetrating power than alpha particles.

The best shielding for beta is a few layers of lightweight plastic or

light metal.

Eyes and skin can be affected by beta radiation, but normally it eau

only penetrate a few layers of skin.

Personnel would have to work fairly close to a beta source

to receive much exposure.

11 Neutron Radiation

Neutron particles are part of the atomic nucleus that has been freed by

either decay or fission. Neutrons have no electrical charge.

Fission process creates neutron particles.

Neutron particles are very penetrating.

They are best shielded by water, concrete, or thick polyethylene.

Due to the high-penetration capabilities of neutron radiation, it is

an external hazard to the whole body.

Neutron exposure mainly occurs when in close proximity to

the reactor only while it is operating.

OUESTION: Most ionizing radiation dose at the station is from this type ofradiation:

alpha

or

beta

or

neutron

or

gamma

Screen quiz2d

ANS'VER: Gamma radiation is very penetrating and is located at various locations in the

plant, therefore causing most of our dose.

(

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

1. 060 AK1.01 001

Which ONE (1) of the following COMPLETELY lists ALL of the exhaust locations

monitored for airborne effluents that are potential sources of geaseous waste, and the

units that the effluents are measured in?

A. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust for each unit, an Auxiliary Building Exhaust and a

Shield Building Exhaust for each unit: measured in counts per minute.

B~ Condenser Vacuum Exhaust for each unit, a Service Building Exhaust, an Auxiliary

Building Exhaust and a Shield Building Exhaust for each unit; measured in counts

per minute .

C. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust for each unit, an Auxiliary Building Exhaust and a

Shield Building Exhaust for each unit; measured in mRem per hour.

D. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust for each unit, a Service Building Exhaust, an Auxiliary

Building Exhaust and a Shield Building Exhaust for each unit; measured in mRem

per hour.

A. Incorrect. A /~o have a service building exhaust.

B. Correct.

(

C. Incorrect. Also have a service building exhaust, and measured in CPM

D. Incorrect. Measured in CPM, but a/l monitors are included

Monday, March 12, 2007 3:36:57 PM

1

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the operational implications of the followingconcepts as they apply to Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release:

Types of radiation, theirunits of intensity, and thelocation of sourcesof radiation in a nuclear power plant

(-,

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating :

Technical Reference: '

61

RO 2.5

OPT200.RM

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

OPT200.RM, Obj 4

Question Source:

Modified

Question History:

SQN ODCM B.2-2

Question Cognitive Level:

Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.13

Comments:

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

MODIFIED

LOWER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Lasl 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 3:36:57 PM

2

(

OPT200.RM

Rev. 2

Page 10 of 166

ENABLING OBJECTIVES

4. Describe the following characteristics of

each major component in the Radiation

Monitoring System:

Location

Power supply (include control power as applicable)

Support equipment and systems

Normal operating parameters

Component operation

Controls

Interlocks (including setpoints)

Instrumentation and Indications

I.

INTRODUCTION

C.

Lesson Purpose and Significance

This lesson does not include a detail study of all the theory behind radiation and

the principles used to measure it.

Radiation Monitor Student Handout (includes General Background on Radiation

Detection Principles) gives information concerning types of radiation, interaction

with matter, detection of radiation and types of detectors.

Instructor Note: Have the students refer to this handout if there is a need to review these

principles. This handout should be in the students hands a day previous to the

class for review.

OPT200.RM

Rev. 2

Page 69 of 166

Condenser Vacuum Pump Exhaust Monitors

1,2-RE-90-99 & 119, & 1,2-RE-90-255 & 256

Continuously monitors mechanical vacuum

pump air exhaust for an indication of a

primary-to-secondary leak.

Two low range monitors, 1,2-RE-90-99 &

119, & two accident monitors RE-90-255 &

256

RE-90-99/119 alarm on detectable radiation

in the condenser exhaust - first indication of a

primary to secondary leak.

EO-4

(

X.

LESSON BODY

D.

Major Components

4.

Process and Effluent Gas Monitors

Condenser Vacuum Pump Exhaust Monitors 1, 2-RE-90-119, 1,2-RE-90-99, 1,2-

RE-90-255, 1,2-RE-90-256

Continuously monitor the mechanical vacuum pump air exhaust for an indication

of a primary-to-secondary leak.

Two low range monitors, 1,2-RE-90-99 and I,2-RE-90-119, and two accident

monitors RE-90-255 & 256 (mid & high range) - overlapping ranges

RE-90-99 or 119 continuously samples the condenser vacuum pump exhaust to

monitor noble gas concentrations for indications of primary to secondary leakage

and for evaluations ofradioactivity released to the environment.

Cover the same range of concentrations - both monitors should not be in

service at the same time due to flow limitations on the condenser vacuum

pump exhaust.

alarm on any detectable reading of radiation in the condenser exhaust -

first indication of a primary to secondary leak.

RE-90-255 & 256, provides detection of noble gases over the entire range of

concentrations from normal operations to accident conditions.

99 & 119 located on el. 732 of the turbine bldg.

Power Supply:- 480 V C&A Vent Board

Instrumentation: Radiation process & area monitor power dist panel

(

OPT200.RM

Rev. 2

Page 74 of 166

Shield Building Ventilation Monitors RM/RE-90-

400 I RE-90-402 & RE-90-260 I 261

The shield building vent stack effluent discharge

is monitored by two separate radiation

monitoring systems

- RE-90-400/402

- RE-90-260/261

Each system has its own pumps and detectors.

Flow through both systems is controlled by flow

control valves that receive inputs from a micro-

computer Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM)

EO-4

l

X.

LESSON BODY

D.

Major Components

4.

Process and Effluent Gas Monitors

Shield Building Ventilation Monitors RMIRE-90-400, RE-90-402, RE-90-260, RE-90-

261

The shield building vent stack effluent discharge is monitored by two separate

radiation monitoring systems, the RE-90-400/402 & RE-90-260/261.

Each system has its own pumps and detectors.

Flow through these two systems is controlled by flow control valves which receive

inputs from a micro-computer Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM).

(

OPT200.RM

Rev. 2

Page 89 of 166

Auxiliary Building Vent Monitor channel

0-RE-90-101

Noble gas monitor - Beta scintillation detector

Particulate & radioiodine is collected with removable filter

&analyzed remotely

Sampling probe assembly fitted with seventy-two sample

nozzles - air adjusted manually

Noble gas channel automatically initiates auxiliary

building vent isolation and startup of the Auxiliary

Building gas treatment system (ABGTS)

Both trains are blocked with HS-90-136A3 (Buffered

signal for isolation between trains) on M-12

EO-4

(

X.

LESSON BODY

D.

Major Components

4.

Process and Effluent Gas Monitors

Auxiliary Building Vent Monitor channel O-RE-90-101

Monitors for noble gases

Particulate radioactivity and radioiodine is collected with a removable filter and

analyzed remotely.

Beta scintillation detector

Utilizes a sampling probe assembly fitted with seventy-two sample nozzles

Nozzles geometrically arranged to allow taking a representative sample of

effluent

Air velocity is manually adjusted to effect isokinetic sampling from the

vent

The sample taken from the duct is too large to be routed directly to the

particulate and iodine filters, therefore a sub-sample is taken from the main

sample line.

At setpoint the noble gas channel automatically initiates auxiliary building vent

isolation and startup ofthe Auxiliary Building gas treatment system (ABGTS)

Both trains are blocked with HS-90-136A3 (Buffered signal for isolation

between trains) on M-12

(

OPT200 .RM

Rev. 2

Page 92 of 166

Service Building Vent Monitor O*RE*90*132

Possible sources of contaminants in the vent

system are exhaust from the radiochemical lab,

titration room, counting room, & decontamination

rooms .

Indicated & annunciated in MCR (M-12) - high

radiation & instrument malfunction

Power Supply: 480-volt C&A vent board 1A1-A.

Instrument Power:120 vac radiation. process &

area monitoring DBT panel 1, bkr 14.

aDCM 1.1.2: Requires operability of noble gas

activity & flow rate monitor.

EO-4

(

(,

X.

LESSON BODY

D.

Major Components

4.

Process and Effluent Gas Monitors

Service Building Vent Mo nitor channel O-RE-90-132

Possible sources ofcontaminants in the vent system are exhaust from the

radiochem ical lab, titration room, counting room, and decontamination rooms.

Indicated & annunciated in MCR (M-12) - high radiation & instrument

malfunction

Power Supply: 480-volt C&A vent board IAI-A.

Instrument Power:120 vac rad. process & area monitoring DBT panel !, bkr 14.

ODCM 1.1.2

Drawing 47W6! 0-90-!

(

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

62. 068 AK2.02 001

Given the following plant conditions:

-

Unit 1 is at 100% RTP when a fire occurs in the cable spreading room.

-

Due to the large amount of smoke in the main control room, it is decided by the

Shift Manager that the main control room must be abandoned.

Which ONE (1) of the following responses below describes the proper operating crew

actions for the given conditions?

A'! Trip the reactor and verify reactor tripped prior to abandoning the Main Control

Room.

B. Place HS-13-204 and 205 (M-15) to TRIP and proceed to the Aux Control Room .

Verify the reactor is tripped in the Aux Control Room.

C. Evacuate the Main Control Room and take E-O to the Aux Control Room . Trip the

reactor locally by opening the reactor trip breakers at the MG set room .

D. Announce over the PA to evacuate the Main Control Room and proceed to the Aux

Control Ro0':!.1. Trip the reactor locally by opening the control rod MG set breaker at

the 480V Unit boards.

C

A. Correct. Section 2.1 step 1

B. Incorrect. Aux Control Room would have indication of whether reactor is tripped, but

the trip would be verified in the MCR

C. Incorrect. EOPs are not applicable when evacuating MCR

D. Incorrect. AOP-C.04 does not have option for tripping reactor from 480V Unit

boards

(,

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:33 PM

118

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledgeof the interrelations betweenthe Control Room Evacuation and the following: Reactor trip system

(

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

62

R03.7

AOP C.04

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

OPL271AOP-C.04, B.6

Question Source:

Bank

Question History:

SON Bank

Question Cognitive Level:

Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.10

Comments:

(

Source:

BANK

Source If Bank:

SQN IlANK

Cognitive Level:

LOWER

Difficulty:

Job Position:

Plant:

SEQUOYAH

Date:

4/2007

Last 2 NRC'?:

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:33 PM

119

(

OPL271AOP-C.04

Revision 1

Page 3 of 26

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II.

COURSE:

LICENSE TRAINiNG

III.

LESSON TITLE:

AOP-C .04, SHUTDOWN FROM AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months (s)

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective :

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios , the requirements of AOP-

C.04, SHUTDOWN FROM AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM.

B. Enabling Objectives:

Obiectives

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities

associated with Shutdown from the Auxiliary Control Room that are rated <: 2.5

during Initial License Training and <: 3.0 during License Operator Requalification

Training for the appropriate position as identified in Appendix A.

1.

State the purpose/goal of this AOP-C.04.

2.

Describe the AOP-C.04 entrv conditions.

a.

Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

AOP-C.04 entry conditions .

b.

Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-C.04 entry

conditions.

c.

Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-

C.04 entrv conditions.

d.

Describe the plant parameters that may indicate a Shutdown from the

Auxiliary Control Room is required.

3.

Upon entry into AOP-C.04, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the

appropriate procedural section for response.

4.

Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-C.04.

5.

Describe the actions that must be taken before abandoning the main control room,

including a basis for each action.

6.

Explain the staffing requirements for unit abandonment per AOP-C.04.

7.

Describe the types of equipment that are on the various checklists associated with

AOP-C.04

8.

Describe the actions that may be necessary if procedure steos are taken before all

(

OPL271AOP-C.04

Revision 1

Page 4 of 26

Objectives

checklists are complete .

9.

Describe the bases for the limits, notes, cautions of AOP-C.04.

10.

Describe actions per AOP-C.04, that are required to:

a. Maintain Plant in Hot Shutdown

b. Cooldown plant form Aux. Control Room

c. Return to Main Control Room

11.

Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

12.

Given a set of initial plant conditions use AOP-C .04 to correctly:

a.

Recoanize entrv conditions.

b.

Identify required actions.

c.

Respond to Continoencies.

d.

Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.

13.

Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance of

AOP-C:04.

14.

Discuss the parameters to be considered by the SED when making a REP

classification during a control room evacuation.

15.

Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to,

durinq and after the abnormal condition.

(

SQ N

SHUTDOWN FRO M AUXILIARY CONTROL ROO M

AOP*C .04

Rev. 13

I STEP I

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

2.1

Control Room Abandonment

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

(

NOTE

EOPs are NOT applicable when evacuating MCR.

1.

ENSURE reactor TRIPPED. [M-4]

2.

ENSURE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valve

handswitches in CLOSE. [M-4]

3.

DISPATCH CRO with radio and Appendix Z

to perform the following:

a.

GO TO AOP-C.04 Cabinet.

[6.9KV Shutdown Board Rm A]

b.

ENSURE personnel dispatched

to perform applicable checklists and

appendices USINGAppendix Z,

Task Assignment Sheet.

4.

ENSURE one CCP placed in

PULL TO LOCK.

Page 4 of 183

(

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

67. 074 EA I.08 001

Given the following plant conditions:

The crew is responding to a LOCA.

Due to equipment failures, the crew has entered FR-C.1, Response to

Inadequate Core Cooling.

Which ONE (1) of the following methods is the highest priority in restoring the Core

Cooling CSF?

A. Depressurize the RCS by venting to Containment.

B. Initiate RHR flow to provide maximum cooling flow.

C. Rapidly depressurize the secondary to facilitate RCS depressurization.

D~ Start available CCP and Sl pumps and align ECCS valves as necessary.

A. Incorrect. Depressurizing the RCS to Cntmt is a last resort.

B. Incorrect. RHR flow would be established after significant depressurization has

occurred.

Thsi would not be the primary plan to establish core cooling

C. Incorrect. Would perform once it was determined that HPI is unavailable

D. Correct. Top priority is to establish HPI if possible, although HPI failure most likely

led to entry to this procedure

Ability to operate andmonitor the following as they applyto a Inadequate Core Cooling: HPI System

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

63

R04.2

FR-C.1

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

OPL271 FR-C.1 , B.3

Question Source:

Bank

Question History:

SQN Bank

Question Cognitive Level:

Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Comments:

Monday, March 12,20072:35:34 PM

41.10

128

SEQUOYAH

NO

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

BANK

Source If Bank:

SQN BANK

LOWER

Difficulty:

Plant:

4/2007

Last 2 NRC?:

Monday, March 12, 20072:35:34 PM

129

(

OPL271 FR-C.1

Revision 1

Page 3 of 16

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II.

COURSE:

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

LESSON TITLE:

FR-C .1 , INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

FR-C.l , INADEQUATE CORE COOLING.

B.

Enabling Objecti ves

Obiectives

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities

associated with Inadequate Core Cooling that are rated <: 2.5 during Initial License

Training and <: 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the

appropriate position as identified in Appendix A

I.

State the purpose/goal of this FR-C.1.

2.

Describe the FR-C.1entrv conditions.

a.

Describe the plant parameters and setpoints associated with FR-C.1

entrv conditions.

b.

Demonstrate an understanding of the use of F-O, Status Trees to

indicate when FR-C.1 must be implemented.

3.

Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into FR-C.1.

4.

Describe the bases for ail limits, notes, cautions, and steps of FR-C.1.

5.

Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

6.

Given a set of initial plant conditions use FR-C.1 to correctlv:

a.

Recoanize entry conditions.

b.

Identifv reauired actions.

c.

ResDond to Continaencies.

d.

Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.

7.

Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to,

durina and after the abnormal condition.

(

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

EOI PROGRAM MANUAL

FUNCTION RESTORATION PROCEDURE

FR-C.1

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

Revision 12

QUALITY RELATED

D. A. PORTER

PREPARED/PROOFREAD BY:

~:>"...!--,=,,-,'-'....'=!,-,----

_

OPERATIONS

RESPONSI BLE ORGANIZATION : __""'--':!.>!"-'-!.'="-'-"'----

_

(

TOM MARSHALL

EFFECTIVE DATE:

01/09/2007

APPROVED BY:

---'-'~="-"='.!....!!2!:.!:...

_

REVISION

DESCRIPTION:

Revised to update E-1 step number reference.

This procedure contains a Handout Page (2 copies).

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

HANDOUT

Page 1 of 1

STEP

ACTION

1.

MONITOR RWST level greater than 27%.

10.

MONITOR if hydrogen igniters and recombiners should be turned on.

10.a.4) WHEN hydrogen analyzers have been in ANALYZE for at least 5 minutes,

RNO

THEN PERFORM substeps 1O.b through 10.e.

10.d.

WHEN ice condenser AHU breakers have been opened,

THEN ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters.

11.

MONITOR CST level greater than 5%.

12.

MAINTAIN Intact S /G narrow range levels between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%.

12.a.

MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 440 gpm

RNO

UNTIL level greater than 10% [25% ADV] in at least one S/G.

14.a.

WHEN pressurizer pressure less than 1960 psig,

THEN BLOCK low steamline pressure SI.

15.

MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated. (RCS pressure less than 100 psig)

Page 1a of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR -C.1

Rev. 12

HANDOUT

Page 1 of 1

ACTION

STEP I

1.

MONITOR RWST level greater than 27%.

10.

MONITOR if hydrogen igniters and recombiners should be turned on.

10.a.4) WHEN hydrogen analyzers have been in ANALYZE for at least 5 minutes.

RNO

THEN PERFORM substeps 10.b through 10.e.

10.d.

WHEN ice condenser AHU breakers have been opened,

THEN ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters.

11.

MONITOR CST level greater than 5%.

12.

MAINTAIN Intact SIG narrow range levels between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%.

12.a.

MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 440 gpm

RNO

UNTIL level greater than 10% [25% ADV] in at least one 8/G .

14.a.

WHEN pressurizer pressure less than 1960 psig.

THEN BL OCK low steamline pressure 81.

15.

MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated. (RCS pressure less than 100 psig)

(

Page 1b of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

1.0 PURPOSE

This procedure provides actions to restore core cooling.

2.0 SYMPTOMS AND ENTRY CONDITIONS

2.1 ENTRY CONDITIONS

FR-O

Status Trees:

F-O.2, Core Cooling REO condition:

Core exit TICs greater than 1200°F.

F-O.2, Core Cooling REO condition:

Core exit TICs less than 1200°F

AND

Res subcooling less than 40°F

AND

All RCPs stopped

AND

Core exit TICs greater than 700°F

AND

RVLIS lower range less than 42%.

3.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS

Page 2 of22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

ISTEPII ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

1.

MONITOR RWST level

greater than 27%.

II RESPONSENOT OBTAINED

IF RHR pumps aligned to RWST,

THEN

GO TO ES-1 .3, Transfer to RHR

Containment Sump.

--~.--

CAUTION

Running RHR pumps for greater than 100 minutes with miniflow valves

open and NO CCS flow to RHR heat exchangers could result in pump

damage .

(

2.

CHECK RHR pump status:

a. CHECK RHR pumps RUNNING.

b. CHECK CCS ALIGNED

to RHR heat exchangers.

a. GO TO Step 3.

b. ALIGN CCS to RHR heat

exchangers.

Page 3 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

(

ISTEPIIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

3.

ENSURE ECCS valves aligned

as appropriate:

REFER TO EA-63-5, ECCS Injection

Mode Alignment

REFER TO ES-1.3, Transfer to RHR

Containment Sump

REFER TO ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot

Leg Recirculation.

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

CAUTION

SI pump operation with miniflow isolated and RCS pressure

greater than 1500 psig could result in SI pump damage.

(

4.

VERIFY ECCS flow:

VERIFY CCP flow through CCPIT.

VERIFY SI pump flow.

VERIFY RHR pump flow.

START pumps and ALIGN valves

as necessary.

Page 4 of22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

(

ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

5.

CHECK RCP support condition s

AVAILABLE:

REFER TO EA-68-2, Establishing

RCP Start Conditions.

6.

CHECK CLA isolation valve status:

a. Power to CLA isolation valves

AVAILABLE.

b. CLA isolation valves OPEN.

7.

CHECK core exitT/Cs

less than 1200"F.

IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

ESTABLISH conditions for starting an

RCP USING EA-68-2, Establishing RCP

Start Conditions.

a. DISPATCH personnel to restore

power to CLA isolation valves

USING EA-201-1, 480V Board Room

Breaker Alignments.

b. OPEN CLA isolation valves

UNLESS closed after CLA discharge.

GO TO Step 10.

Page 5 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

(

c...

ISTEPII ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

8.

CHECK RVLlS lower range indication:

a. CHECK NO Reps RUNNING.

b. CHECK RVLlS lower range indication

greater than 42%.

c. RETURN TO procedure and step

in effect.---.--

IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. IF any Reps running,

THEN

RETURN TO procedure and step

in effect.--.*--

b. IF RVLlS lower range indication

rising,

THEN

GOTO Step 3.

IF RVLlS lower range indication

stable or dropping,

THEN

GOTO Step 9.

Page 6 of 22

(

INAD EQUATE CORE COOLING

FR*C.1

Rev. 12

ISTEPIIACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE

9.

CHECK Core Exit TICs:

IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. CHECK Core Exit TIC temperatures

a. IF Core Exit TICs dropping,

less than 700°F.

THEN

GO TO Step 3. ---

IF Core Exit TICs stable or rising.

THEN

GO TO Step 10.

C

=---

b. RETURN TO procedure and step

in effect. *

Page 7 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

(

ISTEPII ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

10.

MONITOR if hydrogen igniters and

recombiners should be turned on:

a. CHECK hydrogen concentration

measurement AVAILABLE:

Hydrogen analyzers

have been in ANALYZE

for at least 5 minutes.

b.

CHECK containment hydrogen

concentration less than 6%.

c.

DISPATCH personnel to open ice

condenser AHU breakers

USING EA-2D1 -1, 48D V Board Room

Breaker Alignments.

IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. PERFORM the following:

1) PLACE HS-43-2DDA in

ANALYZE [M-1D].

2) PLACE HS-43-21DA in

ANALYZE [M-1D].

3) RECORD present time:

4) WHEN hydrogen analyzers

have been in ANALYZE

for at least 5 minutes,

THEN

PERFORM substeps 1D.b

through 1D.e.

5) GO TO Step 11.

b. CONSULT TSC.

GO TO Step 11.

(Step continued on next page.)

Page 8 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev . 12

(

ISTEPIIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

10,

d.

WHEN ice condenser AHU breakers

have been opened,

THEN

ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters [M-10]:

HS-268-73 ON

HS-268-74 ON,

e. CHECK containment hydrogen

concentration less than 0,5%,

11.

MONITOR CST level greater than 5%.

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

e. PLACE hydrogen recombiners in

service USING EA-268-1, Placing

Hydrogen Recombiners in Service,

IF hydrogen recombiners

NOT available,

THEN

CONSULT TSC.

ALIGN AFW suction to ERCW

USING EA-3-9, Establishing Turbine

Driven AFW Flow, and EA-3-10,

Establishing Motor Driven AFW Flow.

Page 9 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

ISTEPII ACTIO NIEXPECTED RESPONSE

IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

CAUTION

Use of a Faulted or Ruptured SIG during the following steps

should NOT be considered UNLESS no intact SIG is available.

12.

MAINTAIN Intact S/G narrow range

levels:

a. Greater than 10% [25% ADV].

b. Between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%.

a. MAINTAIN total feed flow

greater than 440 gpm

UNTIL level greater than 10%

[25% ADV] in at least one S/G.

IF total feed flow

greater than 440 gpm

CANNOT be established,

THEN

PERFORM the following:

1) CONTINUE attempts to establish

heat sink in at least one SIG

USING AFW, main feedwater, or

condensate system.

2) GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

Pag e 10 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

(

ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

13.

CHECK RCS inventory loss paths:

a.

Power to pressurizer PORV block

valves AVAILABLE.

b. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED.

c.

At least one block valve OPEN.

d. Normal letdown valves CLOSED:

FCV-62-69

FCV-62-70

FCV-62-72

FCV-62-73

FCV-62-74

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. DISPATCH personnel to restore

power to block valves

USING EA-201-1. 480 V Board Rm

Breaker Alignments.

b. CLOSE pressurizer PORVs.

IF any pressurizer PORV

CANNOT be closed.

THEN

CLOSE its block valve.

c. OPEN one block valve UNLESS it

was closed to isolate an open PORV.

d. CLOSE valves.

(

(Step continued on next page.)

Page 11 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

ISTEPIIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

13.

e. Excess letdown valves CLOSED:

e.

CLOSE valves.

FCV-62-54

FCV-62-55

f.

Reactor vessel head vent valves

f.

CLOSE valves.

CLOSED:

FSV-68-394

FSV-68-395

FSV-68-396

(

FSV-68-397

g. RCS and pressurizer sample valves

g.

CLOSE valves.

CLOSED: [status panels 6K and 6L]

FCV-43-3 or FCV-43-2

FCV-43-12 or FCV-43-11

FCV-43-23 or FCV-43-22

h. Post-accident sample valves

h. CLOSE valves.

CLOSED: [M-10]

FSV-43-25 0 or FSV-43-251

FSV-43-309 or FSV-43-310

(,

Page 12 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

NOTES

S/G depressurization at the maximum rate may cause S/G narrow range

levels to drop to less than 10% [25% ADV]. This is acceptable during

an inad equate core cooling condi tion.

Blocking low steamline pressure SI as soon as pressurizer pressure is

iess than 1960 psig will prevent an inadvertent MSIV closure and keep

the condens er ava ilable for steam dump.

After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline

isolation will occu r if the high stea m pressure rate is exceeded.

(

14.

DEPRESSURIZE Intact S/Gs to reduce

RCS pressure to less than 100 psig:

a . WHEN RCS pressure

less than 1960 psig,

THEN

PERFORM the following:

1) BLOCK low steamline pressure

SI.

2) CHECK STEAMLI NE PRESS

ISOLISI BLOCK RATE ISOL

ENABLE permissive LIT.

[M-4A, A4)

(Step continued on next page.)

Page 13 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

ISTEPIIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

14 .

b. DUMP steam to condenser

at maximum achievable rate:

1)

ENSURE steam dumps in steam

pressure mode.

2)

ADJUST steam dump demand to

FULLY OPEN three cooldown

valves.

3)

WHEN T-avg is less than 540cF,

THEN

BYPA SS steam dump interlock.

c. CHECK RCS pressure

less than 100 psig.

(

d.

STOP S/G depressurization.

IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAI NED

b. DUMP steam at maximum rate

USING Intact S/G atmospheric

relief(s).

IF local control of atmospheric

relief(s) is necessary,

THEN

DISPATCH personnel to dump steam

USING EA-1-2, Local Control of

S/G PORVs.

c.

IF RCS pressure dropping,

THEN

GO TO Caution prior to Step 12.

IF RCS pressure stable or rising,

THEN

GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

Page 14 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

(

ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

15.

MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated :

a.

CHECK RCS pressure

less than 100 psig.

b. RESET SI and

CHECK the followi ng:

AUTO S.1. BLOCKED

permissive LIT. [M-4A, C4]

S.1. ACTUATED

permissive DARK. [M-4A, D4]

c.

CLOSE CLA isolation valves.

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a.

GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

c. PERFORM the following:

1)

RESET Phase B.

2)

ESTABLISH control air to

containment USING EA-32-1,

Establishing Control Air to

Containment.

3) VENT any unisolated CLA

USING EA-63-1, Venting

Unisolated Cold Leg

Accumulator.

IF any CLA CANNOT be isolated

or vented ,

THEN

CONSULT TSC to determine

contingency actions.

Page 15 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

ISTEPIIACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE

16.

STOP all RCPs.

17.

DEPRESSURIZE Intact SIGs

to atmospheric pressure:

a. DUMP steam to condenser

at maximum rate.

18.

VERIFY ECCS flow:

CCP flow through CCPIT

SI pump flow

RHR pump flow.

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAI NED

a. DUMP steam at maximum rate

USING Intact SIG atmospheric

relief(s).

IF local control of atmospheric

relief(s) is necessary,

THEN

DISPATCH personnel to dump steam

USING EA-1-2. Local Control of

SIG PORVs.

CONTINUE efforts to establish

ECCS flow.

IF core exit TICs less than 1200°F.

THEN

GO TO Step 17.

--_-.--

IF core exit TICs greater than 1200°F.

THEN

GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

Page 16 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

(

ISTEPI[ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

19.

CHECK core cooling:

a. Core exit TICs less than 1200°F.

b. At least two RCS T-hot indications

less than 350°F.

c. RVLlS lower range indication

greater than 64%.

20.

GO TO E-1. Loss of Reactor or

Secondary Coolant, Step 15.

--...--

IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

b. GO TO Step 17.

-_...~

c. GO TO Step 17.

---~

Page 17 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

ISTEPII ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

NOTE

RCP damage due to absence or loss of normal support conditions is an

acceptable consequence in this procedure.

21.

CHECK if RCPs should be started:

a. CHECK core exit TICs

greater than 1200°F.

a. GO TO Step 22.

(

b. CHECK if idle RCS loop available:

S/G narrow range level

greater than 10% [25% ADV]

AND

RCP in associated loop

AVAILAB LE and STOPPED.

c. START RCP in one idle loop.

d. GO TO Substep 21.a.

b. PERFORM the following :

1) OPEN all pressurizer PORVs

and block valves.

2) IF core exit T/Cs remain

greater than 1200°F,

THEN

OPEN reactor vessel head vents:

FSV-68-394

FSV-68-395

FSV-68-396

FSV-68-397.

3)

GO TO Step 22.---

Page 18 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev . 12

ISTEPIIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

22.

DEPRESSURIZE Intact S /Gs

to atmospheric pressure :

a. DUMP steam to condense r

at maximum rate.

23 .

CHECK Core Exit TICs

less than 1200°F.

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. DUMP steam at maximum rate

USING Intact S/G atmospheric

relief(s).

IF local control of atmospheric

relief(s) is necessary ,

THEN

DISPATCH personnel to dump steam

USING EA-1-2, Local Control of

S/G PORVs.

IF NO intact SG available,

THEN

USE Faulted or Ruptured S/G.

IF core exit T/Cs dropping,

THEN

GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

--~

IF at least 5 core exit TICs

greater than 1200°F and rising

AND RCPs running in all available

RCS cooling loops,

THEN

GO TO SACRG-1, Severe Accident

Controi Room Guideline

Initial Response.

--~.--

Page 19 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

ISTEPIIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

24.

DETERMINE if CLAs should be isolated:

a. CHECK at least intermittent

RHR injection flow.

b. RESET Sl and

CHECK the following:

AUTO S.1. BLOCKED

permissive LIT. [M-4A, C4j

& 1. ACTUATED

permissive DARK. [M-4A, D4]

c.

CLOSE all CLA isolation valves.

IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. GO TO Step 26.

c. PERFORM the following:

1) RESET Phase B.

2) ESTABLISH control air to

containment USING EA-32-1,

Establishing Control Air to

Containment.

3) VENT any unisolated CLA

USING EA-63-1, Venting

Unisolated Cold Leg Accumulator.

IF any CLA CANNOT be isolated

or vented,

THEN

CONSULT TSC to determine

contingency actions.

Page 20 of 22

(

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

(,

ISTEPII ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

25.

DETERMINE if RCPs should be stopped:

a. CHECK at least two T-hot indications

less than 350°F.

b. STOP all RCPs.

26.

VERIFY ECCS flow:

CCP flow through CCPIT

SI pump flow

RHR pump flow.

27.

CHECK core cooling:

a. At least two ReS T-hot indications

less than 350°F.

b.

NO RCPs RUNNING.

c. RVLlS lower range indication

greate r than 64%.

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. GO TO Step 26.

CONTINUE efforts to establish

ECCS flow.

GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

a. GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

___:e--

b. STOP all RCPs.

c. GO TO Note prior to Step 21.

-_....----

Page 21 of 22

('

INADEQUATE CORE COOLING

FR-C.1

Rev. 12

(

(.

ISTEPII AC TION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

28.

CHECK RCS Vent paths ISOLATED:

a. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED.

b. Reactor vessel head vent valves

CLOSED:

F-SV-68-394

FSV-68-395

FSV-68-396

FSV-68-397

29.

GO TO E-1, Loss of Reactor or

Secondary Coolant, Step 15.

--~.--

II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

a. CLOSE Pressurizer PORVs.

IF any Pressurizer PORV

CANNOT be closed ,

THEN

CLOSE its block valve .

b. CLOSE valves.

END

Page 22 of 22

(

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

75. E02 EA1.3 001

Given the following plant conditions:

A steam break has occurred inside containment.

Reactor trip and containment high-high pressure have actuated.

-

The faulted SIG has completely blown down.

-

The crew has entered ES-1.1, SI Tennination.

One containment spray pump is in service.

If containment pressu re is 2.5 psig, Which ONE (1) of the following correctly describes

the status of the CCPs and Containment Spray pump when the crew transitions from

ES-1.1 to the appropriate plant procedure?

Containment Spray Pump

(

A. 1 CCP injecting via CCPIT

B. 1 CCP injecting via CCPIT

C. 1 CCP injecting via seal injection

and normal charging

D~ 1 CCP injecting via seal injection

and norma l charging

In Service

Stopped and placed in A-AUTO

Stopped and placed in A-Auto

In Service

A. Incorrect. Meet SI termination criteria; therefore, second CCP removed from service

and normal charging established.

B. Incorrect. Meet SI termination criteria; therefore, second CCP removed from service

and normal charging established. Containment pressure is > 2 psid; therefore, CS

is not stopped.

C. Incorrect. Containment pressure is > 2 psid; therefore, CS is not stopped.

D. Correct. Meet Sf termination criteria; therefore, second CCP removed from service

and normal charging established. Containment pressure is > 2 psid; therefore, CS

is not stopped.

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM

144

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Ability to operate and/ or monitor the following as they apply to the (5 1Termination) Desired operating results during abnormal and

emergency situations.

(

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

64

R03.8

ES-l .1

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

OPL271 ES-1.1 , Objective 6

OPL273C502C; Obj. 8.i, 8.j

Question Source:

Bank

Question History:

SQN ES-1.1.B.1-2

Question Cognitive Level:

Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41 .10

Comments:

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

BANK

HIGHER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH BANK

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM

145

(

X.

LESSON BODY:

Knowledge:

No preference is given about which pumps to start to

establish ECCS flow although an individual plant may have

a preference. The operator has the option of using either

an SI pump or aCCP. If the operator selects to use a

CCP, then he must align the suction and discharge of the

pump to the safety injection mode and isolate the normal

charging suction and discharge paths.

13. MONITOR if containment spray should be stopped:

a.

CHECK any containment spray pump RUNNING.

- RNO- GO TO Step 14.

b. CHECK containment pressure less than 2.0 psig

RNO- GO TO Step 14

c.

RESET containment spray signal.

d.

STOP containment spray pumps and PLACE in A-

AUTO.

e.

CLOSE containment spray discharg e valves FCV-

72-2 and FCV-72-39.

Basis:

Spray pumps are automatically actuated on Hi-Hi

containment pressure. In E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety

Injection, the operator verifies that the Containment Spray

System is operating if it is required. During a LOCA, the

need for continued operation of the spray system is

monitored by this step in ES*1.1. After containment

pressure is reduced, the pumps can be stopped to prevent

RWST depletion. If at any time the containment pressure

increases above the pressure setpoint, the ORANGE path

of the Containment Status Tree sends the operator to FR-

Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, which

checks the need for containment spray and verifies that

the spray system is operational if it is required.

OPl271ES-1.1

Revision 0

Page 18 of 39

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Knowledge:

This step is a continuous

action step.

If conditions deteriorate

and the operator is

required to manually start

ECCS pumps to restore

RCCS subcooling or

pressurizer level, the

operator should leave the

ECCS pumps on until the

SI reduction criteria is

met in the appropriate

step.

To stop containment spray

pumps if running and no

longer needed.

Knowledge:

This step is a continuous

action step.

(

X.

LESSON BODY:

6.

CHECK RCS pressure STABLE or RISING.

RNO - ENSURE pressurizer spray valves

CLOSED.

IF RCS pressure continues to drop,

THEN GO TO ES-1.2 Post LOCA

Cooldown and Depressurization.

Basis:

All but one CCP was stopped in the previous step. RCS

pressure stable or increasing confirms that ECCS flow is

adequate for the operator to maintain control using one

CCP. The operator will then be ready to align the CCP to

the normal charging flow path. If RCS pressure is

decreasing, then the operator will go to ES-1.2, Post

LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, for additional

actions.

If RCS pressure is being reduced by pressurizer spray

(initiated in £-1 to assist in increasing pressure level). then

the pressure behavior is not a true indication of leak flow

versus injection flow. Furthermore, if RCS pressure is

decreasing after all but one CCP is stopped, the operator

is directed to ES-1.2 on the premise that leak flow cannot

be countered by flow from one CCP. This would be an

inappropriate transition if pressurizer spray is causing the

pressure decrease. The operator should terminate spray

flow if necessary to prevent pressure from decreasing.

7.

ISOLATE CCPIT:

a.

CLOSE CCPIT inlet valves FCV-63-39 and FCV-63-

40.

b.

CLOSE CCPIT outlet valves FCV-63-25 and FCV-

63-26 .

Basis:

Normal charging and the CCPIT injection lines are parallel

flow paths from the discharge of the CCPs. CCPIT

isolation enables the normal charging path to be used.

Closing the inlet valves first prevents any pressure surge

in the CCPIT.

OPL271 ES-1.1

Revision 0

Page 13 of 39

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

To ensure that control is

being maintained after

stopping all but one CCP.

To stop injection flow to the

ReS through the CCPIT.

(

X.

LESSON BODY:

8.

ESTABLISH charging flow

a.

CLOSE seal water flow control valve FCV*62-89.

b.

OPEN charging isolation valves FCV-62-90 and

FCV-62-91 .

c.

ENSURE normal or alternate charging isolation

valve FCV-62-86 or FCV-62-85 OPEN.

d.

ESTABLISH desired charging flow USING seal

water and charging flow control valves FCV-62-89

and FCV-62-93.

Basis:

Proper alignment of the charging path allows flow to be

controlled in the normal manner. Charging flow is

established by closing the charging line hand control

valve, opening the charging line isolation valves and then

establishing the desired charging flow by adjusting the

charging line flow control valve and the charging line hand

control valve.

The substeps in this step arranged to maintain seal

injection flow and to introduce charging cautiously through

the charging line.

9.

CONTROL charging flow to maintain pressurizer level

RNO - IF pressurizer level is dropping, THEN

PERFORM the following:

a. IF any SIG is faulted, THEN DO

NOT CONTINUE this procedure

UNTIL faulted SIG depressurization

stops OR pressurizer level can be

maintained.

OPL271 ES-1.1

Revision 0

Page 14 of 39

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

To properly establish a

charging path and sufficient

flow to ensure cooling for

the charging pumps.

To establish maintenance

of pressurizer level as the

criteria for adjusting

charging flow.

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

82. E13 EK2.! 001

(

Given the following plant conditions:

-

The crew entered FR-H.2, "Steam Generator Overpressure", due to an

overpressure condition on S/G #2.

-

SG #2 pressure is 1170 psig.

-

S/G #2 narrow range level is 72%.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the appropriate actions, in sequence, to

mitigate this event in accordance with FR-H.2?

A. Verify Feedwater Isolation and initiate SG Slowdown.

S~ Verify Feedwater Isolation and attempt to dump steam from the affected SG.

C. Isolate AFW flow and initiate SG Slowdown.

D. Isolate AFW flow and attempt to.dump steam from the affected SG

A.

Incorrect. First action is correct, but SG blowdown is a later action, or an action

that would be-performed in FR-H.3

(

B. Correct.

C. Incorrect. AFW is isolated later if pressure cannot be brought under control by

dumping steam. Additionally, SG blowdown is a later action

D. Incorrect. AFW is isolated later; attempting to dump steam is correct.

Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:36 PM

158

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Steam Generator Overpressure) and the following: Components, and functions of

control andsafetysystems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automaticand manual features

C'

Question No.

Tier 1 Group 2

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

65

R03.0

FR-H.2

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

Learning Objective:

OPL271FR-H.2, Obj . 5

Question Source:

Bank

Question History:

New

Question Cognitive Level:

Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.10

None

(

(,

Comments:

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Da te:

NEW

HIGHER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM

159

(-,

(

OPL271 FR-H.2

Revision 1

Page 3 of 17

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II.

COURSE:

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

LESSON TITLE:

FR-H.2, STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURE

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

the FR-H.2 , Steam Generator Overpressure.

B. Enabling Objectives

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities

associated FR-H.2, Steam Generator Overpressure, that are rated ~ 2.5

~uring Initial License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator

Requalification Training for the appropriate license position as identified in

Appendix A.

1.

Explain the purpose/goal of FR-H.2.

2.

Discuss the FR-H.2 entry conditions.

a.

Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automati c actions associated with

FR-H.2 entry conditions .

b.

Describe the requirements associated with FR-H.2 entry conditions .

3.

Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into FR-H.2.

4.

Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of FR-H.2.

5.

Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures.

6.

Given a set of initial plant conditions use FR-H.2 to correctly:

a.

Identify required actions

b.

Respond to Contingencies

c.

Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes

7.

Apply GFE and system response concepts to the performance of FR-H.2

conditions.

(

X.

LESSON BODY:

4. ATIEMPT to dump steam from affected S/G(s):

Atmospheric reliefs

MSIV bypass valves

Steam supply valves to TO AFW pump

RNO -

DISPATCH personnel to dump

steam USING EA-1-2, Local

Control of SIG PORVs.

GO TO Step 6.

Basis:

Releasing steam will result in depressurization of the

affected SG. Steam can be released through SG

PORVs, main steamlln e isolation bypass valves , the

steam suppty valve to the turbine-driven AFW pump,

or any 6lher available path. Th e SG PORVs. main

steamline isolation bypass valves, and steam suppl y

valve to the turbine-driven AFW pump each should

have sufficient capacity and controllability to

depressurize the affected S/G smoothly. If no steam

path can be established. the operator is directed to

Step 6 to further address the SG overpressure

conditio n.

OPL271 FR-H.2

Revision 1

Page 11 of 17

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

To attempt

depressurization of the

affected scci by

releasing steam from

the affected scei

RNO - IF no release

path. available, skip

over step to check

affected S/G pressure

dropping, since steam

is not being released

(

STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURE

FR-H.2

Rev. 6

ISTEP II ACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE

3.

CHECK affected S/G(s) narrow range

level less than 84% [80% AOV].

IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

GO TO FR-H.3, Steam Generator High

Level.---.--

(

CAUTION

NOTE

Releasing steam from an overfilled SIG could result-in damage to

downstream steamline components. An "overfilled S/G" is any SIG

.whose narrow range level has exceeded 84% [80%-.ADV] at any time.

MSIV isolation reset may be necessary to open MSIV bypass valves.

4.

ATIEMPT to dump steam

from affected S/G(s):

Atmospheric reliefs

MSIV bypass valves

Steam supply valves

to TO AFW pump

P"np 4 of 7

DISPATCH personnel to dump steam

USING EA-1-2, Local Control of SIG

PORVs.

GO TO Step 6.

c

(

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

86. G2.1.2 001

OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations, describes the" Departure From License Condition"

which can be invoked to protect the health and safety of the public.

Which ONE (1) of the following conditions must ALWAYS be met when departing from

a license condition or technical specification in accordance with 10 CRF 50.54 (x) and

(y)?

A'!' The action must be approved by a licensed SRO prior to taking the action.

B. The action must be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Emergency Plan.

C. The NRC must be notified prior to the action and must concur with the action to be

taken.

D. The action must be necessary to prevent equipment damage or personnel injury

AND the Plant Manager must be notified prior to taking the action.

A Correct.

B incorrect. Although the unit is most likely in the E-Plan, it is not a requirement prior to

invoking 10CFR50.54(x)

C incorrect. NRC concurrence is not required for the action; they must be notified as

soon as possible but no more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months prior.

o incorrect. Preventing damage or injury is a reason for invoking the rule, but Plant

Manager concurrence or approval is not required

Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plantoperation.

Question No.

Tier 3 Group 1

ImportanceRating:

Technical Reference:

66

RO 3.0

OPDP-1, Appendix F

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

OP1271C209, B.8

Bank

Question Cognitive Level:

Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.10

Comments:

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM

165

SEQUOYAH

NO

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

BANK

Source If Bank:

WTSI

LOWER

Difficulty:

Plant:

4/2007

Last 2 NRC?:

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36PM

166

(

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING

OPL271C209

Revision 10

Page 3 of 53

II.

COURSE:

LICENSED TRAINING & NON LICENSED

III.

LESSON TITLE:

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (OPDP-1, SPP-10.0, ODM)

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A.

Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of this lesson, the student will have reviewed the "Conduct of

Operations" procedures and will demonstrate an understanding of these

procedures and other material presented by passing a written examination as

outlined by program procedure.

B.

Enabling Objectives:

Each student will understand the following

The requirements for proper communications including repeat back

communications utilizing radios, telephones, and the PA system.

Proper Operations notifications requirements.

The requirements of pre-evolution briefings.

Control room activities including conduct. access, and control room

surveiilance areas.

The shift routines (rounds) and operating practices.

Operating policies including manipuiation of controls that directly affect

reactor reactivity or power level.

Operations department specific duties, organization and administration

The control of equipment and system status control requirements including

equipment status change authorization (maintenance. testing, return to

operability. etc.); equipment and system alignments and Technical

Specification compliance (Normal and 50.54X).

1.

(

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Log keep ing requirements to include which records are QA and which are

not QA records.

10.

The shift turnover requirements and processes.

(

11.

Operations responsibilities relative to plant chem istry inciuding

communications with plant chemistry personnel.

(

12.

OPL271C209

Revision 10

Page 4 of 53

The required reviews for Operations.

Example: Procedure changes;

equipment design changes; license changes; industry experience

information.

13.

Operating orders such as standing orders and shift orders.

14.

Plant operating procedures relative to the conventions of use and procedure

compliance.

15.

Requirements for Surveillance Testing by Operations department.

16.

The requirements for operator aids including definitions, examples of

operator aids, posting requirements, responsibilities, documenting and

processing, and reviews.

17.

18.

19.

20.

(

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

The requirements for equipment labeling and method for requesting labels

be installed.

The requirements for Operations teamwork including responsibilities, on-

shift team members, response to events, training, and feedback.

The requirements for Self-Checking.

The requirements for active and inactive licenses (SRO and RO) including

how to activate an inactive license to an active license.

The requirements for Operations key control.

Requirements for record keeping including ability to distinguishing between

QA and non QA records.

The actions to be taken when an instrument failure is suspected .

The differences between the expected response to alarms during steady

state conditions and during transients.

The conditions resulting in an operator workaround .

(

" .

(

TVAN Standard

Conduct of Operations

OPDP-1

Department

Rev. 0006

Procedure

Paae 37 of 98

Appendix F

(Page 1 of 4)

Plant Operating Procedures

A.

Procedure Compliance

1,

Plant equipment shall be operated in accordance with written approved procedures as

discussed in SPP-2.2, Administration of Site Technical Procedures.

2.

Appendix F, section E, contains expectations for procedure usage. Procedure users should

use it to evaluate their own conduct.

B.

Precautions, Limitations and Initial Conditions

1.

All applicable Precautions and Limitations, Initial Conditions, and all procedure sections to

be performed SHALL be reviewed prior to performance:

IF a procedure is in progress to maneuver the plant AND the direction of that maneuver is

changed, THEN all P/Ls of the applicable procedure(s) SHALL be re-reviewed prior to

continuing with the evolution.

2.

IF a procedure in progress is suspended OR exited prior to completion, THEN the following

SHALL be verified prior to recommencement:

a.

Initial conditions

b.

Precautions and limitations

C.

Procedure Place keeping

1.

Place keeping is an effective tool for reducing human error and maintaining status control

by maintaining positive control of steps, especially following delays and interruptions. Place

keeping includes the following:

a.

Marking each step of a procedure as it is performed,

b.

Marking steps that are not applicable, and

c.

Marking each step of a clearance order as it is performed.

2.

Examples of acceptable methods for marking up a procedure including initialing each step

as it is performed, marking off the steps by checking them off, or using the place keeping

boxes on those procedures where they have been provided.

3.

The following practices may be used to enhance place keeping:

a.

Re-reading the previous several steps after being distracted.

b.

Identifying the last procedure page to be performed by marking it as "LAST

PAGE."

(

TVAN Standard

Conduct of Operations

OPDP-1

Department

Rev. 0006

Procedure

Paqe 38 of 98

Appendix F

(Page 2 of 4)

Plant Operating Procedures

c.

Circling a step that is in progress and slashing through the circle when the step

is complete .

d.

Marking completion of a procedure page in the bottom margin on the page.

e.

Marking steps that will not be performed in advance or during the Pre-Job Brief.

4.

Place keeping shall be used, unless the procedure classification is "information only."

5.

During implementation of the Abnormal or Emergency Operating Procedure, place keeping

shall be used (immediate actions and prudent operator actions are exempt when

performed. Place keeping shall be used during verification of those actlons.),

6.

To facilitate place keeping for clearance orders, a separate sheet should be provided for

independent verifications.

7.

Erasable markers, page protectors or clear cover sheets can be used to facilitate place

keeping during routine activities that do not require archival records retention . When the

evolution is complete d the mark can be wiped off. In cases where procedures require

signatures or initials those are used instead of erasable markers.

8.

For evolutions that are not completed by the end of shift, the marked up pages shall be

included in the shift turnover process for the applicable watch station. The status of

procedure completion should be reported to the control room. At the end of the evolution,

any procedures not required for retention as archival records may be discarded.

D.

Alternative Place Keeping - ReaderlWorker

Place keeping via a 'ReaderlWorker' method may be used to facilitate place keeping under

conditions in harsh environment such as working in a contaminated zone or worki ng in a

situation where worker cannot support/hold paper work . In these cases a second person is

allowed to sign off a step as completed only when in direct contact with the performer. When a

second person is required, the second individual should sign "for" the performer, such as

"JCSfTMM."

E.

Use of 10 CFR 50.54 (x) and (y)

1.

Operations personnel SHALL NOT give or accept directions or guidance that conflicts with

approved procedures, Technical Specifications, or a License Condition, with the exception

of those actions pursuant to 50.54 (x) and (y).

2.

All actions that occur per 50.54 (x) and (y) SHALL be approved by a licensed Senior

Reactor Operator and those actions SHALL be immediately reported to the Operations

Manager, Plant Manager, and Site Vice President and documented via PER.

(

TVAN Standard

Conduct of Operations

OPDP*1

Department

Rev. 0006

Procedure

Paae 39 of 98

Appendix F

(Page 3 of 4)

Plant Operating Procedures

3.

Operations personnel MAY take responsible action that departs from a License Condition or

Technical Specification pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 (x) and (y), within the limits of the

following:

a.

The provision must be invoked in order to take necessary actions.

b.

IF an emergency protective action is needed AND NO action consistent with the

license is immediately apparent that can provide adequate or equivalent

protection, THEN personnel are obligated to take protective action under this

provision.

c.

Use of the provision does NOT require NRC concurrence. IF time permits, THEN

NRC Operations Center telephone notification should be made before action is

taken . IF time does NOT permit, THEN NRC Operations Center telephone

notification SHALL be made as soon as possible but not to exceed one hour per

SEP-3.5 and NuReg-1022.

d.

Provision does NOT apply where time permits NRC amendment to Technical

Specifications or License Condition.

e.

Provision SHALL NOT be used to prevent damage to the plant or machinery

unless such damage is tied to a possible adverse effect on public health and

safety.

f.

Provision ONLY applies to emergencies where license compliance poses a

barrier to effective protective action, and rapid action is needed to protect public

health and safety.

g.

Immediate threat of injury to personnel is appropriate justification for the use of

the provision.

h.

Use of the provision is NOT tied to the declaration of any emergency

classification in the Emergency Plan. Since emergencies can develop rapidly,

use of the provision should NOT be encumbered by administrative prerequisites.

(

TVAN Standard

Conduct of Operations

OPDP-1

Department

Rev. 0006

Procedure

Pace 40 of 98

Appendix F

(Page 4 of 4)

Plant Operating Procedures

F.

Expectations

1.

Operators may use Appendix "F" to evaluate their own conduct. Supervisors should use

the same when evaluating operators against the expectation.

2.

During Procedure Use:

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

(

f.

g.

h.

i.

j.

k.

I.

m.

n.

o.

p.

q.

Verifies correct procedure and revision is being used (Ve rifies For Use).

Reviews appropriate portion of procedure, and ensures prerequisites are met before

continu ing.

Reviews precautions and ensures they are understood by step performers.

Ensures a pre-evolution briefing is conducted lAW pre-job checklist.

Ensures appropriate personnel are available or informed. as necessary, before

starting.

Ensures that instruments are chec ked for calibration and documented as required .

Applies proper usage requirements as denoted on procedure (e.g., conti nuous use).

Stops and notifies supervisor if it cannot be performed as written and initiates change

if needed.

Applies Self Check, QV&V and Touch STAR .

Applies place keeping tools as appropriate.

Meets applicabie verification requirements during procedure use.

Initiates appropriate documentation as required for problems in procedures.

Properly completes all steps (e.g., performs action prior to sign off) .

All required sign-ofts and record pages are completed by appropriate personnel (no

blanks).

Stops and notifies supervision if component not aligned per procedure (e.g., valve is

to be opened, but found already open).

Does not move on without first signing each completed step as appropriate.

Reviews entire procedure for completeness prior to conclud ing the task is complete.

(

-,

(

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

85. G2.1.18 001

Which ONE (1) of the following describes when a 'LATE ENTRY' is required in

eSOMS, and the procedure used to enter a 'LATE ENTRY'?

A. Required any time required information is not entered at time of event; enter actual

time of event, the words 'LATE ENTRY', and the event description.

B. Required any time required information was not entered at time of previous

approval of logs; enter actual time of event, the words 'LATE ENTRY', and the

event description.

C. Required any time required information is not entered at time of event; enter time of

entry, the words 'LATE ENTRY', actual time of event, and event description.

D~ Required any time required information was not entered at time of previous

approval of logs; enter current time, the words 'LATE ENTRY', actual time of event,

and event description.

A. Incorrect. Late entries are only required after they are found when approval has

been made without the original entry of event (For instance, after shift turnover it is

found that an enJ!y was not made)

B. Incorrect. Partially correct, but the time of entry must also be included

C. Incorrect. Partially correct as far as action is required, but the late entry is only

required after an approval of logs has taken place

D. Correct.

Ability to make accurate, clear and concise togs, records,status boards, and reports.

Question No.

Tier 3 Group 1

ImportanceRating:

Technical Reference:

67

R02.9

OPDP-1, Appendix E, section E

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

OPL271C209 Objective 9

New

Question Cognitive Level:

Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41 .10

(~ _

Comments:

Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM

163

SEQUOYAH

NO

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

NEW

Source If Bank:

LOWER

Difficulty:

Plant:

4/2007

Last 2 NRC?:

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM

164

(

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING

OPL271C209

Revision 9

Page 3 of 53

II.

COURSE :

LICENSED TRAINING & NON LICENSED

III.

LESSON TITLE:

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (OPDP-1, SPP-10.0, ODM)

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A.

Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of this lesson, the student will have reviewed the "Conduct of

Operations" procedures and will demonstrate an understanding of these

procedures and other material presented by passing a written examination as

outlined by program procedure.

B.

Enabling Objectives:

Each student will unde rstand the following

Proper Operations notifications requirements.

The requirements for proper communications including repeat back

communications utilizing radios, telephones, and the PA system.

The requirements of pre-evolution briefings.

Control room activities including conduct, access, and control room

surveillance areas.

The shift routines (rounds) and operating practices.

Operating policies including manipulation of controls that directly affect

reactor reactivity or power level.

-

Operations department spe cific duties, organization and administration

The control of equipment and system status control requirements including

equipment status change authorization (maintenance, testing, return to

operability, etc. ); equipment and system alignments and Technical

Specification compliance (Normal and 50.54X).

9.

Log keeping requirements to include which records are QA and which are

not QA records.

1.

(

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

10.

The shift turnover requirements and processes.

11.

Operations responsibilities relative to plant chemistry including

communications with plant chemistry personnel.

(

x.

LESSON BODY:

OPL271C209

Revision 9

Page 10 of 53

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

F. Control of Equ ipment, System Status and

OPDP-l Appendix D,

Clearances.

Objective 8

1.

Status Change Authorization and Reporting.

2.

Equipment and System Alignm ents.

3.

Clearances

4.

Observations

Form 1&2,

G. Logkeeping.

OPDP-! Attachment E,

Proper logkeeping is of major importance to every

App endi x 1, Back To Basic

person on shift. Proper logkeeping provides three

Fundamentals, :Logkceping

functions:_( l) a record of what was done and if the

expected response was obtained, (2) a record for

Objective 9.

(

current plant status, and (3) a record for subsequent

evaluation ofthe status ofthe plant.

1.

Establishment of Operating Logs.

2.

Timeliness of Record ings.

3.

Information to be Recorded.

4.

Legibility.

5.

Corrections.

6.

Log Review.

7.

Observati ons

Form 1

H. Plant Operating Procedures.

OPDP-l Attachment F,

I.

Procedure Compliance.

Objective 14

2. Precautions, Limitations and Initial Conditions

C

3. Procedure Place Keeping.

4.

Use of 10 CFR 50.54 (x) and (y)

Obj ective 8

(

TVAN Standa rd

Conduct of Operations

OPDP-1

Department

Rev. 0007

Procedure

Pac e 36 of 98

Appendix E

(Page 3 of 3)

Log Keeping

2.

To aid in event reconstruction, as much significant information as possibie should be logged

during emergencies and abnormal or unexpected events. However, log keeping should not

take precede nce over controlling and monitoring the plant.

D.

Legibility

Log entries shall be made in a manner such that they can be easily read and understood.

Additionally, the log entries should be readily reproducible with standard photocopy machines.

E.

Corrections .

1.

Corrections shall be made by editing the appropriate log entry, or shall be made by placing

a single line through the incorrect entry, writing in the correct entry. initialing, and dating in a

nearby space .

2.

Spell checking and related corrections on eSOMS narrative logs does not require initialing

and dating when done before official approval and printing.

3.

All corrections to approved computer printed documents shali be initialed and dated and

approved by the SM.

4.

Late entries (past shift turnover) shall be annotated by placing the current time and the

Words "LATE ENTRY' , followed by the time the entry should have been made, and then

the entry.

F.

Log Review

The previous shifts logs shall be reviewed prior to assuming watch. Operating logs shall be

reviewed by the SM/US. These reviews normally would occur shortly before shift relief and

should ensure that entries are accurate and adequate , and that no open ended entries remain.

Additionally, the Operations Superintendent, or his designee should review the operating logs on

a daily basis when he is on site.

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

87. G2.1.21 001

(

You are preparing to perform a control rod exercise surveillance on your shift.

BSL is not operating.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the correctlocation(s) to obtain the current

controlled copy revision of the procedure?

Control Room ...

A. ONLY

B. and OFO ONLY

C~ and WCC ONLY

D. OFO AND WCC

A. Incorrect. WCC also has controlled copies.

B. Incorrect. Copies in the OFO are not controlled

(

C. Correct.

D. Incorrect. Copies in the OFO are not controlled

Abilityto obtain and verify controlled procedure copy.

Question No.

Tier 3 Group 1

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

68

RO 3.1

SPP-2.2

ODM-1.0 Appendix D

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

OPL27SPP-2.2 Objective 2 and 5

Bank

Question Cognitive Level:

Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Comments:

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM

41.10

167

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

NEW

Source If Bank:

LOWER

Difficulty:

Plant:

SEQUOYAH

4/2007

Last 2 NRC?:

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:37 PM

168

(

OPL271SPP-2.2

Revision 1

Page 3 of 31

I.

P.BO.G.BAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING

II.

C~JJBSE :

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

L£SSONID1.E:

SPP-2.2, ADMINISTRATION OF SITE TECHNICAL PROCEDURES

IV.

La-lGTH OF LESS-QNLCQJJIlS.E:

1 Hour

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able 10 demonstrate or

explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, an understanding

of SPP-2.2 "Administration of Site Technical Procedures" and OPDP-1 Attachment

F "Plant Operating Procedures."

B. Enabling Objectives:

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities

associated with Rules of Procedure Use that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial

License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training

for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A

1.

Discuss 1he purpose of SPP-2.2.

2.

Discuss management philosophy for procedure use and adherence .

3.

List the four levels of use for technical procedures including examples of each

level.

4

Give examples when a procedure step may be marked not applicable (N/A).

5

Describe the procedure revision process.

6

Briefly define a minor/editorial change.

7

Describe the conditions under which personnel may take reasonable action

within the scope of their training that departs from procedu re.

8

Explain how to obtain and verify controlled procedure copy.

Revision 1

Page 7 of 31

}LJ.ESSJ:)tUW.Dj':

;--'ltlS.IRU_CI OaNQTES

(

A. SPP-2.2 Scope:

Procedures which fall under the scope of this SPP are

those procedures that involve manipulation, monitoring

or analysis of plant equipment or processes . These

procedures will be prepared, reviewed, revised and

approved in accordance with this SPP.

B . Use and Adherence:

1. Procedure users are responsible for:

a.

Following current approved procedures or

obtaining approval for necessary changes

before proceeding.

b. Understanding the expected responses before

performing actions in a procedure and ensuring

these responses occur.

c.

Maintaining safe plant operation. In situations

where procedures are inaccurate or

inappropriate, safety takes precedence over

procedure adherence.

d.

Stop performance if the procedure:

Cannot be performed or completed as

written.

Is determined to be inadequate for the

intended use.

Is determined to be technically incorrect.

Conflicts with another procedure, or would

be in violation of approved and controlling

documents.

Produces unexpected results.

The Operations

Department's Emergency

Operating Instruction

Program will administer the

development, review, and

approval for EOl's and

supporting documents.

Objective #2

NOTE: Typographical

errors do not require

stopping procedure

performance. These errors

should be noted and

corrected following

performance of the

procedure. This does not

apply to changes in

component identifiers,

numerical units, values,

limits, work sequence or

where the potential exists

for improper operation of

piant equipment.

(

OPL271SPP-2.2

Revision 1

Page 14 of 31

(

2. Procedure changes are normally processed in

Business Support Library(BSL). If BSL is not

available or the change is urgent, a description of

the change or a marked up copy of the procedure

and form SPP-2.2-1, "Procedure Control Form

(PCF)" should be forwarded to the organization

responsible for the procedure (sponsor).

NOTE: Hard copy peFs are not required when

using BSL to process the procedure. BSL

controls and the audit trail generated by

BSL serve as the documentation that

appropriate reviews and approvals have

occurred.

3. The sponsor shall evaluate and determine the

disposition of requested changes as appropriate:

a. If mange not needed, returns the request with

ane xplanation of why not needed.

b. If the change is needed, assign a responsible

individual to prepare the draft in accordance with

this procedure, or ....

c. Place the request in a revision file to be

incorporated at next revision.

4.

The preparer shall:

a. Obtain a number for a new procedure from the

responsible organization or Management

Services (MS).

b. Ensure the procedure number has not been

used previously.

c.

Determine if the revision to the procedure is

minor or editorial using the guidelines of Section

3.5.

d . Determ ine with plant management if the revision

must be processed as an urgent change.

Objective #5

PCFs are required for other

situations where BSL audit

trails are not available to

document review and

approval requirements and

for any handwritten

changes.

(

TVAN STANDARD

PROGRAMS AND

PROCESSES

ADMINISTRATION OF SITE TECHNICAL

PROCEDURES

SPP-2.2

Rev. 13

Page 12 of 38

(

NOTE NIA is NOT to be used to bypass steps that are inadequately or

improperly written or to be used in lieu of a procedure change.

Section Manager or Designee of Responsible Organization

3.3.7

Procedure steps which do not meet criteria 3.3.1 through 3.3.6 and are not

required to be performed because of plant conditions or are controlled by

another procedure previousiy fulfilled may be NIA'd by the Section Manager or

Designee of the responsible organization. Concurrence is documented by

initialing and dating the NIA'd steps. The Section Manager's or Designee's

decision to NIA steps shall be based on evaluation of whether the procedure still

fulfills all intended objectives.

3.4

New Procedu res. Revisions. and Cancellations (See Appendix A and B)

3.4.1

Anyone can request a new procedure, revision, or cancellation. Cancelled

procedures must follow same process as revised procedures.

3.4.2

Procedure changes are normally processed in Business Support Library (BSL).

If BSL is not available or the change is deemed urgent by plant management, a

description of the changes or a marked up copy of the procedure and Form

SPP-2.2-1, "Procedure Controi Form (PCF)" should be forwarded to the

organization responsible for the procedure (sponsor).

NOTE

Hard copy PCFs are not required when using BSL to process the

procedure. BSL controls and the audit trail generated by BSL serve as

the documentation that appropriate reviews and approvals have

occurred.

PCFs are required for other situations where BSL audit trails are not available to

document review and approval requirements and for any handwritten changes.

3.4.3

The sponsor shall evaluate and determine the disposition of requested changes

as appropriate:

A.

If the change is not needed, return the request and explain the reason.

B.

If the change is needed. assign a responsible individual to prepare the

draft in accordance with this procedure. or

C.

Place the request in a revision file awaiting the next appropriate

revision.

3.4.4

The preparer shall, as appropriate:

A.

Obtain a number for a new procedure from the responsible organization

or Management Services (MS). It is the responsibility of the preparer to

ensure the procedure number has not been used previously.

B.

Determine if the revision to the procedure is minor or editorial using the

guidelines in Section 3.5.

c

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

89. G2.2.12 001

You have been directed to perform a Surveillance Test that is part of a Post

Maintenance Test.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes a condition where a step in the test may be

marked "N/A" in accordance with SPP-2.2, Administration of Site Technical

Procedures?

A. To designate change of conditions or intent of the test.

B. To change incorrect procedure step descriptions that do NOT change intent.

C\\'" To designate procedure sections that are not being used as part of the PMT.

D. To identify or change faulted procedure step logic or incorrect procedure guidance

in relation to the performance of the PMT.

A Incorrect. using NIA to change conditions or ignore precautions is forbidden.

Procedure Rev required.

B Incorrect.

Using N/A to change step descriptions is forbidden.

C Correct. N/A l]1ay be used when performing partial PMTs to designate components

that will not be used in the test.

o Incorrect. Specifically forbidden to N/A incorrect sequence

Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(

Question No.

Tier 3 Group 2

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

69

R03.0

SPP-2.2, section 3.3

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

OPL271 SPP-2.2 Objective 4

Question Source:

Bank

Question History:

Harris 2005 Editorially Modified

Question Cognitive Level:

Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content

41 .10

Comments:

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:37 PM

171

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

BANK

Source lf Bank:

HARRIS 2005 NRC

LOWER

Difficulty:

Plant:

SEQUOYAH

4/2007

Last 2 NRC?:

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:37 PM

172

(

OPL271SPP-2.2

Revision 1

Page 3 of 31

I.

ffiQGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING

II.

C-OJlBSE:

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

LES.SOliIIILE:

SPP-2.2, ADMINISTRATION OF SITE TECHNICAL PROCEDURES

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSONICOllBS.E:

1 Hour

V.

IBAlMlMG.J:lBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations andlor simulator scenarios, an understanding

of SPP-2.2 "Administration of Site Technical Procedures" and OPDP-1 Attachment

F "Plant Operating Procedures."

B. Enabling Objectives:

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities

associated with Rules of Procedure Use that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial

License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training

for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A

1.

Discuss the purpose of SPP-2.2.

2.

Discuss management philosophy for procedure use and adherence .

3.

List the four levels of use for technical procedures including examples of each

level.

4

Give examples when a procedure step may be marked not applicable (NIA).

5

Describe the procedure revision process.

6

Briefly define a minorleditorial change.

7

Describe the conditions under which personnel may take reasonabie action

within the scope of their training that departs from procedure .

8

Explain how to obtain and verify controlled procedu re copy.

c

OPL271 SPP-2.2

Revision 1

Page 12 of 31

X~LESSQt:LB_ODY-'-':~

.-------.JILUN""S..LT,aUCTOB NOTES-

Periodically referenced during task performance

to verify that each segment of the procedure has

been performed .

When required, appropriate sign-offs are

completed to verify that each segment of the

procedure has been completed

A segment is a portion of a

procedure that

accomplishes a complete

function, such as alignment

of a pump to a system, or

disassembly of a pump.

(

3.

Information Use procedures direct activities with the

Example: GOI-6

following characteristics:

Frequently performed or not complex.

Entire activity can normall y be performed from

memory.

The task is within the knowledge and skills of

experienced individuals and/or task qualified

personnel.

Rules of Use:

When performing procedures from memory,

procedures should be reviewed periodically (for

example, before performance or during

continuing training ).

The procedure shall be reviewed following

revisions that affect the performance of the

activity.

The procedure user is responsible for results

obtained when not referring to the procedure.

(

4.

Multiple Usage Level procedures:

If different sections of the procedure require

different levels of use, the procedure is identified as

multiple use and the classification of the individual

sections is identified on the cover sheet or in the

procedure.

F. Use of Not Applicable (N/A):

1. When performing technical procedures, performers

may use N/A in lieu of sign-off required by Section

3.2 (SPP-2 .2) only when it is clearly appropriate.

Example: Various

Maintenance

Procedures

Objective #4

c

OPL271SPP-2.2

Revision 1

Page 13 of 31

X--L_ESS~--O"",D,-,-Y~:

.-_ !I ~SIRUCTO RKOIES _

2.

N/A is NOT to be used to bypass steps that are

inadequately or improperly written or to be used in

lieu of a procedure change.

3.

The following criteria shall be applied to determine

when a step may be marked N/A:

The procedure specifically allows a step(s) to be

marked N/A under specified conditions .

For procedures used to accomplish activities like

post-maintenance tests, exact steps to be

performed will often be specified . When specific

steps are specified , all other steps may be

marked N/A.

Nonappli cable unit steps in a multiple unit

procedure shall be marked N/A.

(

Procedures providing alternate steps dependen t

on specified conditions allow the steps not

required to be N/A*d.

Example: If the acceptance

criteria was met, go to step

3.7. If the acceptance

criteria was not met,

continue with step 3.3. In

this example, N/A Steps 3.3

through 3.6 if the

acceptance criteria was met.

c

QC (witness/notification) holdpoints cannot be

N/A'd without Nuclear Assurance approval.

When using only specific sections of an

instruction as delineated in the controlling work

document, then unused sections may be N/A'd.

Procedure steps which are obviously not

required to be performed may be N/A'd with

concurrence of the supervisor (management or

engineering supervisory level) responsible for

conduct of the activity or procedure.

G. New Procedures, Revisions and Cancellations:

1. Anyone can request a new procedure, revision, or

cancellation. Cancelled procedures must follow the

same process as revised procedures.

Concurrence is documented

by initiaiing and dating the

N/A'd steps.

(

TVAN STANDARD

PROGRAMS AND

PROCESSES

ADMINISTRATION OF SITE TECHNICAL

PROCEDURES

SPP*2.2

Rev. 13

Page 11 of 38

(

3.3

Entire activity can normally be accomplished from memory,

Within the knowledge and skills of experienced individuals and/or task

qualified personnel.

When performing procedures from memory, procedures should be

reviewed periodically (for example, before performance or during

continuing training). Also, the procedure shall be reviewed following

revisions that affect the performance of the activity. These reviews

ensure that the activities are being performed correctly and that no

procedure revisions have been overlooked.

The procedure user is responsible for results obtained when not referring

to the procedure .

3.2.4

Multiple Usage Levels Pro cedure

If different sections of the procedure require differen t levels of use, the

procedure is identified as multiple use and the classification of the individual

sections is identified on the cover sheet or in the procedure.

Use of Not Applicable IN/A)

When performing technical procedures, performers may use N/A in lieu of sign-off

required by Section 3.2 only when it is clearly appropriate. The following criteria shall be

applied to determine when a step may be marked N/A.

Performer

3.3.1

The procedure specifically allows a step(s) to be marked N/A under specified

conditions.

3.3.2

For procedures used to accomplish activities like post-maintenance tests, exact

steps to be performed will often be specified. When specific steps are specified,

all other steps may be marked N/A.

3.3.3

Non-applicable unit steps in multiple unit procedures shall be marked NIA.

3.3.4

Procedures providing alternative steps dependent on specified conditions allow

the steps not required to be N/A'd.

EXAMPLE

If the acceptance criteria was met. go to Step 3.7. If the

acceptance criteria was not met, continue with Step 3.3.

In this example, N/A Steps 3.3 through 3.6 if the acceptance criteria is met.

3.3.5

Quality Control (QC) (witness/notification) holdpoints cannot be N/A'd without

Nuclear Assurance approval in accordance with NADP-1, Conduct of Quality

Assessment and Inspection.

3.3.6

When using only specific sections of an instruction as delineated in the

controlling work document, then unused sections may be NIA'd.

c

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

90. 02.2.23001

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the requirement for LCO tracking in

accordance with OPDP-8, Limiting Conditions for Operations Tracking?

The official log for LCOs is the...

A. Unit Log. All LCO entries are also required to be documented in the LCO Tracking

Log.

B:o' Unit Log. ONLY LCO entries that will remain in effect past the assigned shift are

required to be documented in the LCO Tracking Log.

C. LCO Tracking Log. All LCO entries are also required to be documented in the Unit

Log.

D. LCO Tracking Log. ONLY LCO entries that will remain in effect past the assigned

shift are required to be documented in the Unit Log.

A incorrect. LCO may entries may be put in LCO Tracking log but the only ones

required are the entries that will go past the end of the shift

B Correct

C incorrect. The Unit Log is required at all times for all entries as the primary log.

o incorrect. The Unit Log is required as the official log

Ability to track limitingconditions for operations.

(

Question No.

Tier 3 Group 2

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

70

R02.6

OPDP-8

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

OPS2710PDP-8 Objective 6

New

Question Cognitive Level:

Lower

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.10

Comments:

Monday. March 12.20072:35:37 PM

173

SEQUOYAH

NO

(-,

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

NEW

Source If Bank:

LOWER

Difficulty:

Plant:

4/2007

Last 2 NRC?:

Monday, March 12,20072:35:37 PM

174

(

OPL2710PDP-8

Revision 0

Page3 of 13

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II.

COURSE:

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

LESSON TITLE:

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS TRACKING

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (s)

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simuiator scenarios , the requirements of

OPDP-8, LIMITiNG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS TRACKING.

B. Enabling Objectives:

o.

-Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and

Abilities associated with Limiting Conditions For Operations Tracking

th at are rated <: 2.5 during Initial License Training and <: 3.0 during

License Operator Requalification Training for the appropriate

license position as identified in Appendix A.

1.

Describe purpose of this procedure.

2.

Describe Precautions and Limitations listed in this procedure.

3

What are the requirements of the responsibilities section in this

procedure.

4.

Describe requirements for T5 LCO Evaluations.

5.

Describe requirements for LCO Tracking Logs.

6.

What are the documentation requirements for LCO entries and exits.

7.

Describe the difference between an Active LCO vs an Information ONLY LCO.

8.

Describe the information that must be entered into the LCO Tracking Logs.

(

X.

LESSON BODY

F. Require Documentation - Review the following:

1. What determines whether an LCO entry is made in

the Unit Log ONLY or the Unit Log and LCO

Tracking Log?

2. What information is required to be entered into the

Unit Log, when an LCO is entered?

3.

During performance of Sis for which a status sheet

is provided, what acceptable method may be used

in lieu of logging each individual LCO in the Unit

Log?

G. Definitions- review the definitions in this section.

1.

Describe the difference between an Active LCO vs

an Information ONLY LCO?

H. Appendix"Aand LCO Tracking LOG - Review the

following:

1.

For LCOs which have an indefinite expiration date,

what is entered into the expiration date column.?

OPL2710PDP-8

Revi sion 0

Page 9 of 13

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Objecfive 6

Refer to Section 3.5

Refer to Section 3.5.1

Refer to Section 5.0

Objective 7

Refer to Appendix A and

Form OPDP-8-1

Objecfive 8

Refe r to Appendix A

Section 2.3

(

TVAN STANDARD

DEPARTMENT

PROCEDURE

OPDP-8

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION TRACKING

Rev. 1

Page 7 of 24

(

4.0

3.4

LCO Trac king Log

A.

Each unit shall maintain a Unit LCO Tracking Log. Each unit shall also

track Common LCOs for common equipment that affects operability.

The US is responsible for maintaining the LCO Tracking Log(s).

B.

Each LCO Tracking Record shall be assigned a unique identification

number.

C.

Active LCOs shall be tracked and passed from shift to shift as part of the

shift turnover.

3.5

Reguirements for Documentation

Detailed requirements for documentation related to this procedure are contained in

attachments. as identified below:

3.5.1

Unit Log

For short-term LCO entries. the associated Unit Log will be used for

documenting LCO entry provided the LCO is exited before the end of the

assigned shift. LCO entries in the Unit Log should contain the LCO reference

number. component description. a brief description of the activity requiring the

LCO entry, and compensatory measures required while the LCO is in effect.

For performance of surveillance instructions for which a status sheet is provided.

the US/designee may track individual component out-of-service times and

corresponding LCOs on the provided attachment in lieu of logging each

individual LCO in the Unit Log. The individual performing the procedure is

responsible for notifying the US/designee when equipment is made inoperable

and when it is placed back in service. Active LCOs that will extend past the end

of the shift shall be entered in the LCO Tracking Log.

RECORDS

(

4.1

QA Records

The Unit Log referenced in this procedure is a QA record.

4.2

Non-QA Record s

Form OPDP-8-1. "LCO Tracking Log"

5.0

DEFINITIONS

Active Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) * A condition specified in the plant Technical

Specifications (TS) which limits unit operations. An LCO may be entered by equipment

malfunction or a change in a unit parameter. An LCO implies all LCOs contained in the plant's

TS, Offside Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), Technical Requirements Manual (TR) and the

Fire Protection Report (FPR), if applicable. If an LCO is not met, the associated ACTION

requirements shall be met.

Information Only LCO * A method of tracking an equipment malfunction or change in plant

parameter which would restrict unit operation in another plant condition. An INFORMATION

LCO may prevent a change in plant state/mode or may become an ACTIVE LCO for the current

plant condition should other TS-related equipment or redundant safety-related equipment

become inoperable.

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

91. G2.2.26 001

(

Given the following timeline for Unit 1 operation:

-

4/22 @ 0900

Entered HOT STANDBY (reactor was tripped from 20% power

during shutdown)

-

4/22 @ 1100

Entered HOT SHUTDOWN

-

4/23 @ 0600

Entered COLD SHUTDOWN

-

4/23 @ 2300 .Entered REFUELING

Which ONE (1) of the following times would be the earliest time that irradiated fuel

movement in the reactor vessel is allowed?

M 4/26 @ 1300

B. 4/26 @ 1500

C. 4/27 @ 0800

D. 4/28 @ 0100

A. Correct. TS 3.9.3 specifies 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months from critical. In this case, achieving Hot

Standby.

-

(

c.

B. Incorrect. This is 100 hrs from Hot Shutdown.

C. Incorrect.

This is 100 hrs from Cold Shutdown.

D. Incorrect.

This is 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months from Refueling.

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:37 PM

175

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 * NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.

(

Question No.

Tier 3 Group 2

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

71

R02.5

TS 3.9.3

(

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

OPT200.FH Objective 6.a

Question Source:

Bank

Question History:

Sequoyah FH-B.5.C-11 ,

Developed from Kewaunee NRC 2000 exam

Question Cognitive Level:

Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.10, 43.2

Comments:

/

\\

v.,

Source:

Cogn itive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

BANK

HIGHER

412007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

SEQUOYAH BANK

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 20072:35:37 PM

176

(

V.

OPT200.FH

Rev. 3

Page 4 of62

TRAINI NG OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):

B. Learning Ob jectives (Cont'd):

5.

Describe the operation ofthe Fuel Handling system as it relates to the follow ing:

a. Precautions and limitations

b. Major steps performed while refueling.

c. Alarms and alarm responsc .

d. How a component failure will affect system operation

e. How a support system failure will affect Fuel Handling system operation

6.

Describe the administrative controls and limits for the Fuel Handling system as

explained in this lesson:

a. State Tech Specs/Tk.M LCOs that govern the Fuel Handling Systems.

b. State the :":1 hour action limit TS LCOs

c. Given the conditions/status ofthe Fuel Handling system components and the

appropriate sectio ns of the Tech Spec, determine if operability requirements are

met and what actions are required

7.

Discuss related Industry Events:

a. SQN LER93016 Tilted Fuel Assembly

b. SQN-LER 2-93 -3 Equipment Hatch not closed during Fuel Movement

c. SQN-NOV 94-11 Non-conservative Fuel Handling Practices

d. SOER 85-0 I Reactor Cavity Seal Failure, Connecticut Yankee

c. OE81 12 Movement ofirradiatcd fuel with Ventilation system inop, Dresden 2

f. SOER 94-2 Boron dilution Events in PWRs

(

VI.

TRAINING AIDS:

A.

Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access

B.

Computer projector

x.

LESSON BODY:

(

OPT200.FH

Rev. 3

Page 53 of62

Administrative Topics

State Tech SpecslTRM LCOs that govern

the Fuel Handling System

-

Section 9 Refueling Operations

State the TS LCOs that have an

"Immediately Suspend Core Alterations"

action limit

Enabling Objecti ve 6

Point out to students the Section 9 of TS and TRl\\,l

Refer to a copy of SQN Technical Specifications for the details of the LCO, applicability,

actiorus), surveillanee(s) and basis for each

Tech Specs

The follow ing is a listing of Tech Specs identified for the FH system.

3.9 .1

Boron concentration *'

3.9.2

Source Ranze Monitors *

3.9.3

Subcritica l 100 hrs,

3.9.4

Containment Penetrtions *

3.9.8.1

RHR operation

3.9.8.2

2 RHR Operable *

3.9.9

Containment Vent

3.9.10

23 ft. of water Reactor vessel flange'

3.9. 11

23 ft. watc in storage racks

3.9.12

OneABGTS

TRM

3.9.5

Direct communication

3.9.6

Manipulator Crane

Core loading will be suspended, pending evaluation by the Refueling SROIFHS and Reactor

Engineering underthefollowing circumstances:

]fthere occurs on anyone responding nuclearchannel an unexpected increase in

count rate by a factorof five.

An unexpected increase incount rate by a factorof two on all responding channels.

If RCS temperature drops below 50°F.

Communicationbetween the control room, containment ortheSFP is lost.

If water clarity prevents the operator from viewing the Bottom Core Plate during core reload

(

REFUELI NG OPERATIONS

3/4 9.3 DECAY TIME

LIMITI NG CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.3 The reactor shall be subcritical for at least 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months .

APPLICABILITY:

During movement or irradiated fuel in the reactor pressu re vessel.

AC TION :

With the reactor subcritical for less than 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months , suspend all operations involving movement of

irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQU IREMENTS

4.9.3 The reactor shall be determined to have been subcritical for at least 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months by verification of the

date and time of subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuei in the reactor pressure vessel.

..-"'\\

.,

)

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1

3/4 9-3

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

95 . G2.3.2 001

(

Given the following plant conditions:

Dose rate at job location is 90 mrem/hr.

Airborne Radioactivity Area from particulates due to weld grinding:

Total Internal dose for the job if respirator is worn is 0 mrem.

Total Internal dose for the job if no respirator is worn is 65 mrem.

Time to complete job while wearing a respirator is 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

Time to complete job without wearing a respirator is 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .

Which ONE (1) of the following describes whether a respirator will be worn, and why?

A'!' No, wearing a respirator will raise total exposure.

B. Yes, wearing a respirator will lower total exposure.

C. No, a respirator is not required unless the internal dose will exceed 40 DAC.

D. Yes, a respirator must be worn anytime particulate airborne radiation is present due

to grinding .

(

c

A Correct. 290 total mRem

B incorrect. 315 total mRem

C incorrect. Respirators are worn to minimize dose. 40 DAC hours is not a restriction

or requirement for their use

D incorrect. Although respirators may be worn for grinding, it would not be worn if it

results in extra dose.

Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:38 PM

183

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of facility ALARAprogram.

(

Question No.

Tier 3 Group 3

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

72

R02.5

RCI-04

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

OPL271 C260 Objective 8,9

Question Source:

Modified

Question History:

Various WTSI Exams

Question Cognitive Level:

Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41 .12

Comments:

(

Source:

MODIFIED

Source IfBank:

Cognitive Level:

HIGHER

Difficulty:

Job Position:

Plant:

SEQUOYAH

Date:

4/2007

Last 2 NRC'!:

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:38 PM

184

(

8.

Identify the requirements for the implementation of a successful ALARA program.

OPL2 71C260

Revision 9

Page 4 of 45

(

9.

Identify the respons ibilities ofthc following concerning the ALARA program:

a.

Rad Protection Management.

b.

Plant Supervision,

c.

Plant Employee.

10.

Identify the process for preparing a Radiation Work Permit (RWP)

The following list contains knowledge and ability statements (KlAs) from The Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for

Nuclear Power Plant Operators: Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) l\\'UREG-I I22, Revision 2 that are applicable to

the Initial Licensed Candidate training program. As such, questioning in these areas will be included on any testing in

preparation of, or included in obtaining either RO or SRO NRC license.

IOCFRSS

IMPORTANCE

KJA#

KIA Sta tcnrcnt

Sect. Linkts)

RO/SRO

G 2.3.1

Knowledge of IOCFR20 and related facility radiation protection

41.1 2 /43.4 .

2.6/3.0

requirements.

45 .9 /45 .10

G 2.3.2

Knowledge of facility ALARA program.

41.1 2 /43.4 1

2.5/2.9

45.9 / 45. 10

G 2.3.4

Knowledge of radiation exposure limits and contamination control,

43.4 145.10

2.5/3.1

including permissible levels in excess of those authorized.

G 2.3.5

Knowledge of use and function of personne! monitoring equipment.

41.11 /45.9

2.3/2.5

G 2.3.7

Knowledge of the process for preparing a radiation work permit.

41.10 /45 .12

2.0/3.3

G2.3.10

Abilit y to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation

43.4 / 45.10

2.9/3. 3

and guard against personnel exposure.

c

(

XI.

LESSON BODY:

c)

Allows the pinpointing of high dose jobs so that concentrated

efforts can be used to reduce them in the future.

d)

Provides data for managers and engineers to compare benefits

of modification versus the cost in person-rem for a plant

modification.

b.

Need for ALARA is based on the following assumptions:

1)

Any change in the body brought on by ionizing radiation is

potentially detrimental.

2)

Any dose in any amount is a potential hazard.

3)

Every molecule in every cell is part of a delicate system,

10

balance with others, that is easily disrupted by radiation.

c.

Implementation of a successful ALARA program requires:

I)

Management commitment and support.

2)

Careful design of facilities and equipment.

3)

Well-trained, corrunitted, and aware workers.

d.

Organizational responsibility

OPL271C260

Revision 9

Page 20 of 45

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Obj.8

I)

Plant Rad Protection Manager (Staff) Responsibilities

Obj.9

a)

Takes the lead in implementing ALARA and insures that goals

and performance against those goals, as assessed periodically

are made available.

b)

Is responsible for an effective program as required by

procedure.

c)

Maintains awareness of location, operation andjobs that give

radiation dose.

d)

Participates in job planning and procedural development.

e)

Ensures that respiratory protection, protective clothing and

survey equipment are specified for each job.

(

f)

Provides for training in radiation protection.

2)

Plant Supervision

Obj.9

(

XI.

LESSON BODY:

a)

Implements procedures within their respective areas to

minimize radiation dose.

b)

Ensures that employees follow procedures and work orders

(First line supervisors are of utmost importance in creating

the proper attitude among their crews and greatly influence

the achievement of ALARA).

3)

Individual Employee - Most Important

a)

Responsible for reducing his/her own radiation dose.

b)

Follows all plant procedures and Rad Protection instructions.

c)

Reports all radiation hazards and any suggestions for

reducing hazards to Rad Protection or their supervisor.

e .

ALARA Program details

l)

Key Components.

a)

ALARA policy and management commitment.

b)

Worker and line management commitment.

c)

Collective dose database system.

d)

ALARAjob reviews.

e)

ALARA design review.

t)

ALARA coordinator.

g)

Goals and associated tracking system.

2)

Employee incentives to reduce dose.

a)

Awareness of risk to promote safety.

b)

Recogn ition.

c)

Prestige.

d)

Sense of involvement.

e)

Receiving feedback (positive/negative).

1)

Managements concern.

OPL271C260

Revision 9

Page2 1of45

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Obj.9

Stress: No program can

work without individual

commitment

Review latest annual

ALARA Report

These have been successful

in the industry.

(

RCI-04

Respiratory Protection Program

Revision 46

Page160f1 6

Appendix C

Air and Loose Surface Rad ioactive Contamination Levels for Evaluating

Respiratory Protection (Recommended)

Air

Concentration Levels

(,"Ci/CC Air)

Alpha and Beta-GammaIA,BJ

< 1 DAC

1 to 20 DAC

> 20 to 700 DAC

> 700 DACle )

Recommended ActionlDJ

Respirators are to be considered when entering an

identified Airborne Radioactivity Area

Full face respirator required or complete evacuation of

personnel from area

Supplied air devices or complete evacuation of

personnel from area

SCBA

(

Not es

A

Only supplied:air and SCBA provide protection for halogens.

B

Gamma scan for radionuclide determination is recommended.

C

In this concentration range, the immersion dose rate may be significant.

D

A TEDE evaluation is required when the criteria of RCI-14 for a TEDE evaluation are met. This

evaluation considers total dose to an individual due to use or non-use of respirators.

Loose Surface

Concentration Levels

(dpm/100 em')

Beta-Gamma

1,000 to 50,000

> 5,000 dpm total

(fixed and transferrable activity)

50,000 to 100,OOOIE)

> 100,000IA)

Recommended Action

Normally none; however unique or special cases may

arise and will require evaluation.

Evaluate each welding, grinding, burning, or cleaning

task using volatile liquid for respiratory protection.

Evaluate each non-inspection (physical maintenance)

task for respiratory protection. Inspections or similar

tasks normally will not require a protection method.

Inspections and physical maintenance normally require

a protection method or engineering controls.

(

Notes

E

Additional considerations, such as the condition of the surface (e.g., dry versus oil, grease, etc.) and

data gathered by air sampling while personnel are within the area will affect respiratory protection

determinations.

r>

r>.

."

TEDE ALARA WORKSHEET

RCI-14 Att 04

Eft Date 03/18/04

Paqe 1 of 1

TEDE ALARA Worksheet

RWP Number(s)

___ DAC-hrs

_ _ _ _

hours

mrem

____ mrem

___

DAC

_

DAC-hrs

mrem

____ mrem

DAC

_

DAC-hrs

_ _ __ mrem

mrem

____ mrem

External Dose

Corrected External Dose

Internal Dose

Internal Dose Saved

, I

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

L.

M.

N.

O.

P.

Q .

Estimated Dose With Respiratory Protection

Number of hours in work area per day by a single individual

(Hours) x (Work area dose rate __ mrem/hr)

(External dose in mrem) x (1.15 IF IA)

Measured DAC or anticipated DAC

[(Hours) x (DAC)J.,. (Respirator APF Ie,)

(DAC-hrs) x (2.5 mremIDAC-hr)

TEDE ~ (Step C) + (Step F)

Estimated Dose Without Respiratory Protection or Engineering Controls

[Hours (Step A)] x [DAC (Step D)J

[DAC- hrs (Step H)] x [2.5 mrem/DAC-hrj

TEDE ~ (Step B) + (Step I)

Estimated Dose Without Respiratory Protection and With Engineering Controls

List feasible engineering controls for this application:

Estimated DAC after applicati on of engineering controls

{Hours (Step A)Jx [DAC (Step L)]

[DAC-hrs (Step M)Jx [2.5 mrem/DAC-hr]

Estimated dose to single individual per day to implement engineering controls

(

mrem) + (Number of days for the task)

[mrem (Step I)l - [mrem (Step N)]

TED E ~ [(Step B) + (Step N) + (Step 0 )] - [Step P]

TEDE Selection:

Step G

Step J

Step Q

(Circle one)

Identify items whic h override TEDE selection:

Hot particle presence - Heat stress - Industrial contaminants

Visibility - Confined space - High elevation - Comms - Other

(Circle one)

TEDE Selection Override:

Yes / No

Prepared By / Date

Approved By I Date

NOTES

A

Work Inefficiency Factor (IF) due to use of respiratory protection

B

Assigned Protection Factors (APF): Air purifying respirator - 100 Airline masklhood - 1.000 SCBA - 10.000

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

1. G2.3.1O00 1

(

Given the following plant conditions:

A rapid load reduction from 100% power to 60% power was performed on Unit 1

approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months ago.

Indication on Auxiliary Building Area Radiation Monitors. 1-RR-90-1A, and

0-RR-90-1 B are rising.

Chem istry confirms that RCS 1-131 activity exceeds Technical Specification

limit of acceptable operation.

The US directs a plant shutdown to be performed.

Which ONE (1) of the following post shutdown actions is subsequently performed to

limit the release of activity?

A. MSIVs are closed

B~ RCS temperature is reduced below 500°F

C. SIG PORV setpoints are raised

D. Maximum Condensate Polishers are placed in service

(

A is incorrect because closing MSlVs does not prevent rad release from SG ADVs

B is correct. Raise letdown to clean up RC system, and reduce temp IAW TS

C is incorrect.

Would not stop a release from SV

o is incorrect. Cation Demin may be placed in service on Letdown, but placing

Condensate Demins in service would still not minimize a release off-site if SV or SG

ADV lifted

Monday, March 12, 2007 3:43:00 PM

1

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel exposure.

(

Question No.

Tier 3 Group 3

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

73

R02.9

TS 3.4.8, AOP R.06

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

OPL271AOP-R.06 Objective 6 and 9

Question Source:

Bank

Question History:

WTSI Bank

Question Cognitive Level:

Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.10

(

Comments:

Source:

Cognitive Lev el:

Job Position:

Date:

BANK

HIGHER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC?:

WTSI

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 3:43:00 PM

2

(

OPL271AOp*R06

Revision 0

Page 3 of 15

I.

PROGRAM :

OPERATOR TRAINING* LICENSED

II.

COURSE:

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

LESSON TITLE:

AOP-R.06 HIGH RCS ACTIVITY

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

1.0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months (s)

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or

explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of

AOP-R.06 HIGH RCS ACTIVITY.

B. Enablin.9 Objectives:

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 11 22 Knowledge's and Abilities

associated with High RCS Activity that are rated 2: 2.5 during Initial License

Training and 2: 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the

appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.

1.

Explain the purpose/goal of AOP-R06.

2.

Discuss the AOP-R06 entry conditions.

a.

Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

AOP-R06 entry conditions.

b.

Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-R06 entry conditions.

c.

Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-

R.06 entry conditions.

d.

Describe the Administrative conditions that require Turbine Trip/ Reactor trip

due to Reactor Coolant Pumo Malfunctions.

3.

Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-

R.06.

4.

Upon entry into AOP-R06, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to

the appropriate procedural section for response.

5.

o Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-

R.06.

6.

Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-R06.

(

OPL271AOP-R06

Revision 0

Page 4 of 15

7.

Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and

transitions to other procedures .

8.

Given a set of initial plant conditions use AOP-R06 to correctly:

a.

Recognize entry conditions

b.

Identify required actions

c. .

Respond to Contingencies

d.

Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes

9.

Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance of

AOP-R06.

10.

Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to,

during and after the abnormal condition

(

A.

B.

C.

Purpose

1.These instructions provide the actions necessary to

mitigate the effects of high RCS activity or failed fuel.

Overview - Symptoms and Entry Conditions

1.

Annunicators may indicate a fuel cladding or high

activity in the RCS

See AOP for listing of annunicators

2.

Deviations or unexpected indications on any of the

following may indicate fuel cladding failure or high

activity in the RCS

a.

Rising radiation monitor indications

b.

Rising activity in Chem Lab reactor coolant sample

c.

Simultaneous increases in Condenser Vacuum

Exhaust and Lower Containment radiation monitor

count rates

3.

No entry conditions from other procedures

4.

AOP only has one Operator Action section

Big picture is identification of activity, ensuring

compliance with TIS and REP, making notifications,

protecting personnel and initiating cleanup.

Section 2.0, Operator Actions

1.

Section 2.0, Step 1 - Evaluate Tech Specs for

applicability.

3.4.8, Specific Activity

2.

Section 2.0, Step 2. EVALUATE EPIP-1 , Emergency

Plan Initiating Matrix.

CAUTION:

RCS sample may have high activity

OPL271AOP-R.06

Revision°

Page 8 of 15

Objective 1

Objective 2

The crew may be made

aware of an increasing

trend in RCS activity

condition through reports

from the Chem Lab

Objective 5

Objectives 3, 4, 6, 8

Step performance should

ensure that Tech Specs are

satisfied or that sufficient

compensatory actions are

taken.

EAL designator 2.4, Fuel

Ciad Degredation,

addresses NOUE on RCS

activity exceeding LCO and

designator 1.1, Fuel Clad

Barrier, addresses RCS

activity in 1.1.2

Serves as a warning to

personnel drawing samples

(

X.

LESSON BODY:

9.

Section 2.0, Step 8. GO TO appropriate plant

procedure

OPL271 AOP-R.06

Revision 0

Page 10 of 15

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Objective 7

The crew is directed back to

whatever procedure was in

effect prior to detection of

the high activity condition.

It should be noted that

the evaluation of TS 3.4.8

MA YSTILL RESUL TIN A

PLANT SHUTDOWN.

(

D.

Technical Specifications

TS 3.4.8, Specify Activity

Objective 9

(

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

314.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

LIMITING COND ITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.8 The specific activity of the primary coolant shall be limited to:

a.

Less than or equal to 0.35 microcurieslgram DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131, and

b.

Less than or equal to 100lE microcuries/gram.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,3, 4 and 5

ACTION :

MODES 1,2 and 3*

a.

With the specific activity of the primary coolant greater than 0.35 microcuries/gram

DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 for more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months during one continuous time

interval or exceeding the limit line shown on Figure 3.4-1, be in at least HOT

STANQ6Y with T". less than 500'F within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable.

'~' '-,

(

b.

With the specific activity of the primary coolant greater than 100fE

microcuries/gram, be in at least HOT STANDBY with Tav. less than 500'F within

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5

a.

With the specific activity of the primary coolant grellter than

-v.:

0.35 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 or greater tha'if 100fE

microcuries/gram, perform the sampling and analysis requirements 6f item 4a of

Table 4.4-4 until the specific activity of the primary coolant is restored to within its

limits.

"With Tavg greater than or equal50o"F.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1

3/4 4-19

April 11, 2005

Am endment No. 36, 117, 237,301

(

!

I

t

(

150

"

H-H

I

- -}J ~

I

I I

J

I

UNACCEPTABLE

OP ERATION

It+

I

- ,

I

I

,

I

I I

""

I

!

I

,

~

I

,

,

I ,

I

'

!

I

!

I

,

I

,

I

-'I

I

I '

I

'

I

1 ,

I

I '

I

R241

30

40

50

60

70

PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER

80

so

100

(,

FIGURE 3.4-1

DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 Primary Coolant Sp ecific Activity limit Versus

Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER with th e Primary Co olant Spe ci fi c

Activity > 0.35 "Ci/gram Do se Equivalent 1-131

I R241

SEQIJOYAH - UNIT 1

3/44-22

November 17, 1998

Amendment No. 237

HIGH RCS ACTIVITY

(

I

AOP-R.06

Rev. 9

(

I STEP I

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

2.0

OPERATOR ACTIONS

1.

EVALUATE the following Tech Spec and

Technical Requirement for applicability:

TS 3.4.8, Specific Activity

2.

EVALUATE EPIP-1, Emergency Plan

Classification Matrix.

CAUTION:

RCS sample may have high activity.

3.

REQUEST Chem Lab to perform following:

a.

SAMPLE for activity levels:

Initial RCS

RCS at 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months intervals until

activity levels are stable.

Outlet of mixed bed

AND

b.

REQUEST Chem Lab recommendations

based on sample results.

4.

NOTIFY Reactor Engineering to

implement O-TI-NUC-OOO-003.0, Fuel

Integrity Assessment Program, due to

possible failed fuel.

Page 30f7

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

97. G2.4.25 002

Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 1 is in a refueling outage; Unit 2 is at 100% power

- Weld repairs scheduled on 2A-A charging pump.

The following lines are observed on the 0-M-29 "Blue Goose" and printer:

2D43 A 50 IN 07-Nov-02 09:15 ZONE 85 CHARGING PUMP ROOM 2A CROSS ZONE

W/ZONE 82 ACTUATES FSV-26-191;

2D46 A 50 IN 07-Nov-02 09:16 ZONE 82 U2 SI & CHARGING PUMP ROOMS CROSS

ZONE W/ZONES 83, -84, -85, 86, & 87 ACTUATES FSV-26-191 ZN LOCATED IN PNL 0*L*606;

2H38 A 50 IN 07-Nov-02 09:16 PNL 0-L-670/ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP A RUNNING ZONE

528 FIRE PUMP HOUSE RM A NOT OPERATIONALLY REQUIRED ZONE SEND OPERATOR

TO PUMP.

No other alarms or reports from the field are received.

0-FCV-26-191 is Aux Building el 669' Pre-action Valve.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the probable cause of the alarms and the correct

action to tak

(

c.

A. Alarms consistent with taking

fire protection out of service

to perform work on 1A-A

charging pump.

B. Trouble in 2A charging pump

room fire protection but no

actuation has occurred.

Cl" Conditions in 2A charging pump

room have caused cross-zone

operation and actuated FSV-26-191

which started the electric

driven fire pump.

D. Conditions in 2A charging pump

room have caused cross-zone

operation and actuated FSV-26-191

and caused water spray into the room.

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:38 PM

No actions required.

Dispatch AUO/Fire Ops to confirm

Alarm is real; If no fire confirmed in

area, notify Fire Ops of condition

and have alarms, electric driven fire

pump, and FSV-26-191 returned to

normal.

Dispatch AUO/Fire Ops to confirm

Alarm is real; If no fire confirmed in

area, notify Fire Ops of condition

and have alarms, electric

driven fire pump, and FSV-26-191

returned to normal.

Notify the fire brigade to respond to

the fire. Notify Shift Manager to

evaluate the REP.

187

QUESTIONS REPORT

for 8EQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

(

A.

Incorrect. Fire detection would normally not be taken out of service for

welding activities.

B.

Incorrect. Actuation has occurred.

C.

Correct.

D.

Incorrect. Sprinkler heads did not actuate as indicated by Alarm 2H38.

Knowledge of fire protection procedures.

Question No.

Tier 3 Group 4

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

74

R02.9

0-80-13-1

0-AR-M-29

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

Applicable drawings

(

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

Question History:

OPT200.HPFP B.16.c, 17.a, c, 18.b

Bank

Sequoyah FPS-3

Question Cognitive Level:

Higher

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

41.10

Comments:

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

BANK

HIGHER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

Last 2 NRC? :

SEQUOYAH BANK

SEQUOYAH

NO

Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:38 PM

188

(

OPT200.HPFP

Revis ion 0

Page 4 of 11

a.

High pressure service water (086K 1.0I)

b.

Raw service water (086K1.02)

c.

AFW system (086KI.03)

10 State the electrical and/or control air supplies to high pressure fire protection system's

components. (KIA 086K2)

II Given a high pressure fire protection system/component malfunction, analyze its affect

on the plant systems listed. (KIA 086K3)

a.

Shutdown capability with redundant equipment (086K3.01)

12 Explain the following high pressure fire protection system design features and/or

interlocks. (KIA 086K4)

a.

Adequate supply of water for FPS (086K4.01)

b.

Maintenance of fire header pressure (086 K4.02)

c.

Detection and location of fires (OS6K4.03)

d.

Personnel safety (OS6K4.04)

c.

COl (OS6K4.06)

f.

Main Turbine/Generator Protection (086K4.07)

13 Explain the following operational implications as they apply to high pressure fire

protection system. (KIA 086K5)

a.

Effect of COl on fire (078 K5.01)

b.

Effect of water spray on electrical components (086K5.03)

-:..- c.

Hazards to personnel as a result of fire type and methods of protection (086K5.04)

14 Given a malfunction of listed plant systems/components, analyze its effect on the high

pressure fire protection system. (K/A 086K6)

a.

Pumps (OS6K6.0I)

b.

Valves (086K6.02)

c.

rvtoters (086K6.03)

d.

Fire, smoke, and heat detectors (OS6K6.04)

15.

Given a plant situation, prevent exceeding operational design limits by predicting and/or

monitoring, as applicable, changes in parameters that are associated with the operating

controls of the high pressure fire protection system. (KIA 086A I)

a.

Fire header pressure (086.A1.0I)

b.

Fire water storage tank level (086.AI.02)

c.

Fire doors (OS6.AI.03)

d.

Fire dampers (086.Al .04)

e.

FPS lineups (086.A1.05)

16.

Given a plant situation for the high pressure fire protection system, (i) predict the impact

on plant operation, and (ii) based on the impact, apply procedura l guidance to correct,

control, or mitigate the consequence of the situation. (KIA086A2)

a.

Manual shutdown of the FPS (086.A2.01)

b.

Low FPS header pressure (086.A2.02)

c.

Inadvertent actuation of the FPS due to circuit failure or welding (086.A2.03)

d.

Failure to actuate the FPS when required, resulting in fire damage (086.A2.04)

17.

Given a plant situation, demonstrate the ability to monitor the automatic operation of the

high pressure fire protection system. (KIA 086A3)

a.

Starting mechanisms of fire water pumps (086.A3.01)

b.

Actuation of the FPS (086.A3.02)

c.

Actuation of the fire detectors (086.A3.03)

18.

Given a plant situation for the high pressure fire protection system, demonstrate the

ability to monitor and, as appropriate, perform manual operation of the system in the

control room. (KIA086A4)

(

a.

Fire water pumps (086.A4.01)

b.

Fire detection panels (086.A4.02)

c.

Fire alarms switch (086.A4.03)

d.

Fire water storage tank makeup pumps (086.A4.04)

e.

Deluge valves (086.A4.05)

OPT200.HPFP

Revision 0

Page 5 of 11

(

X.

LESSON BODY:

II . Given a high pressure fire protection system/component

mal funct ion. analyze its affec t on the plant systems listed.

(KIA 086K3)

a.

Shutdown capability with redundant equipment (086K3.0 1)

12. Exp lain the follow ing high pressure fire protection system

design features and or interlocks. (KI A 086K4)

a.

Adequate supply of water for FPS (086K4.01)

b.

Maintenance of fire header pressure (086 K4.02)

c.

Detection and location of fires (086K4.03)

d.

Personnel safety (086K4.04)

e.

CO2 (086K4.06)

f.

Main Turbine/Generator Protection (086K4.07)

13. Explain the following operational implications as they apply to

high pressure fire protection system. (KIA 00 1K5)

a.

Effcct of CO, on fire (078 K5.01)

b.

Effect of water spray on electrical components (086K5.03)

c.

Hazards-to personnel as a result of fire type and methods of

protection (086K5 .02)

14. Giv en a malfunction of listed plant systems/components,

analyze its effect on the high pressure fire protection system.

(KIA 086K6)

d.

Pumps (086K6.0 I)

e.

Valves (086K6.02)

f.

Motors (086K6.03)

g.

Fire, smoke, and heat detectors (086K6.04)

15. Given a plant situation, prevent exceeding operational design

limits by predicting and/or monitoring, as applicable, changes

in parameters that are associated with the operating controls of

the high pressure fire protection system. (KIA 086AI)

a.

Fire header pressure

a.

Fire water storage tank level

a.

Fire doors

a.

Fire dampers

a.

FPS lineups

16. Given a plant situation for the high pressure fire protection

system, (i) predict the impact on plant operation, and (ii) based

on the impact, apply procedural guidance to correct, control, or

mitigate the consequence of the situation. (KIA 086A2)

a.

Manual shutdown of the FPS

a.

Low FPS header pressure

a.

Inadvert ent actuation of the FPS due to circuit failure or

welding

OPT200.HPFP

Re vision 0

Page 9 of 11

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Objective I I

Student handout, drawings,

FSAR, AOPs

Objective 12

FSAR, Student Handout

Objective 13

Student Research, FSAR,

Student Handout, Attachment

7

Objective 14

FSAR, Student Handout,

Student Research, AOPs

Objective 15

System Description, Drawings

Procedures

Objective 16

System Description, Drawings

Procedures

X.

LESSON BODY:

a.

Failure to actuate the FPS when required, resulting in fire

damage

17. Given a plant situation, demonstrate the ability to monitor the

automatic operation of the high pressure fire protection system.

(KIA 086A3)

a.

Starting mechanisms of fire water pumps

b.

Actuation of the FPS

c.

Actuation of the fire detectors

18. Given a plant situation for the high pressure fire protection

system, demonstrate the ability to monitor and, as appropriate,

perform manual operation of the system in the control room.

(KIA 086A4)

a.

Fire water pumps

b.

Fire detection panels

c.

Fire alarms switch

d.

Fire water storage tank makeup pumps

e.

Deluge.:'alves

OPT200.HPFP

Revision 0

Page 10 of 11

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

Objective 17

System Description, Drawings

Objective 18

System Description, Drawings

Procedures

B.

Review evolutions in 0-SO-13/26 series procedures that address

tasks required for program by task checklist.

(

c.

If applicable, present any recent industry events.

Student Handout, 0-SO-13-1,

0-SO-26-1, 2, Obj #7

Student Handout

(

Source

CROSS ZONE

Setpoin t

Alarm message in

RED on CRT.

4

O-M-29 CRT

ZONE #

MCR PRINTER

CROSS ZONE

Probable

1.

Potential FIRE condition exists.

Causes

2.

Fire detector senses an 'alarm' condition.

3.

Equipment malfunction (e.g. dust, humidity, jarring).

Co rrective

[1] WHEN O-M-29 console is in 'ALARM', THEN

Actions

ACKNOWLEDGE alarm by depressing the SEND key.

[2] READ the PRINTER message in its ENTIRETY.

(

[3] IF a CROSS ZONE alarm is received, THEN

[a]IMMEDIATELY DISPATCH the Fire Brigade in

accordance with AOp*N.01.

[b] CONFIRM alarm is REAL.

[c] ENSURE Fire alarm is LOCKED-IN.

[d] ANNOUNCE location of fire over the paging system.

[4] IF a Diesel Generator Room CO2 CROSS ZON E alarm is

received and the Diesel Generator is running from a non

emergency condition, THEN

EMERGENCY STOP the effected Diesel Generator.

Continued

(,

o

I

O-AR.M-29

Page 6 of 18

Rev. 8

(

Source

4

Setpoint

CROSS ZONE

CONTINUED

Alarm message in

RED an CRT.

0*M*29 CRT

ZONE #

MCR PRINTER

CROSS ZONE

(

NOTE 1

NOTE 2

NOTE 3

Refe rences

An Auxiliary Building Ventilation shutdown due to smoke

detector cross zone is not an ABI or ESF. It only stops

AB Supply, Exhaust and Fuel Handling Exhaust Fans.

Do NOT manually actuate ABI per Engineering

recommendation due to potential for damaging charcoal

filters.

AB Ventilation fans can not be started if either Unit's

smoke detection cross zones are actuated.

FIRE OPS must bypass zone modules to allow reset

with [1*HS*30*1 0201.

[5] IF a Auxiliary Building Supply Duct CROSS ZONE alarm is

received, THEN

[a] PLACE all AB Ventilation Fans in PTL until1-HS-30-102D

can be reset.

[b] RESET zones.

[c]IF zones will not reset, THEN

NOTIFY Fire Ops to bypass zone modules using

0-PI-FPU-013-001 .0.

[d] RESTORE normal AB Ventilation using 0-SO-30-10,

Section 8.3.

[6] GO TO 0-SO-13-1 Section [6.0].

47W611-13-1 through 7, 47W611-30-5 and 6,

45W657-31 and 32

o

I

O.AR-M-29

Page 7 of 18

Rev. 8

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

100. G2.4 .9 001

(

Given the following plant conditions:

-

Unit 1 is in Mode 5.

-

RCS temperature is 195°F.

-

RCS pressure is 325 psig.

-

Train "A" RHR in service.

-

Train "B" RHR out of service for surveillance testing.

-

SGs #2 and #3 are intact and at 33% NR.

-

RCS is intact.

-

Pressurizer level at 30% cold cal.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the preferred method of core cooling if a loss of RHR

shutdown cooling occurs with RCS temperature rising?

A. RWST fill to RCS ; bleed through cold leg manway.

B. Normal charging to RCS; bleed through hot leg manway.

C~ Natural or forced RCS flow while steaming intact S/Gs .

D. Normal charging to RCS; bleed through the PZR PORVs.

(

A. Incorrect; With RCS intact, steaming will be the preferred method. Cold leg

manway will not be open.

B. Incorrect; Hot leg manway not open if in Mode 5 with RCS pressure higher than

atmospheric.

C. Correct. AOP-R.03 Section 2.3 will transition to Section 2.6 due to the inability to

restore RHR shutdown cooling. The stem states that the RCS is intact. With one

RHR train operable, TS 3.4.1.4 requires the two-SG level requirement to meet TS

heat sink requirements. #s 2 and 3 SGs satisfy the TS requirement as stated.

Therefore, Section 2.3 Step 7 RNO transitions to Section 2.6 since forced flow

cannot be re-established. Section 2.6 steps 5, 6, and 9.a are satisfied. Ptr level

greater than 20% cold cal satisfies step 7. Whether forced flow is established or

not, step 9 uses steaming from intact SGs.

D. Incorrect; Could potentially be used if required but would be an alternate heat

removal, not preferred.

Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:39 PM

193

QUESTIONS REPORT

for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT

Knowledge of low power I shutdown implications in accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies.

(

-,

Question No.

Tier 3 Group 4

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

75

R03.3

AOP-R03

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

None

Learning Objective:

OPL271C358, Obj. B.2

OPL271AOP-R03; 4

Question Source:

Bank

Question History:

Sequoyah AOP R.02.B.2-4

Question Cognitive Level:

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

Comments:

Higher

41 .10

(

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

BANK

HIGHER

4/2007

Source If Bank:

Difficulty:

Plant:

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OPL271AOP-R03

Revision 1

Page 3 of 37

I.

PROGRAM:

OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED

II.

COURSE:

LICENSE TRAINING

III.

LESSON TITLE:

AOP-R03, RHR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION

IV.

LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months

V.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

A. Terminal Objective:

Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate

or explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the

requirements of AOP-R03, RHR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.

B. Enabling Objectives

Obiectives

O.

Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowiedge's and abilities associated

with RtlR SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONs that are rated 2: 2.5 during Initial License

Training and ;:c 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the

appropriate position as identified in Appendix A.

1.

State the purpose/goal of this AOP-R03.

2.

Describe the AOP-R 03 entry conditions.

a.

Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with

AOP-R03 entry conditions.

b.

Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-R03 entrv conditions.

c.

Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-R 03

entry conditions.

d.

Describe the plant parameters that may indicate an RHR System Malfunction.

3.

Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-R.03.

4.

Upon entry into AOP-R03, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the

appropriate procedural section for response.

5.

Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-R03.

6.

Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-R 03.

OPL271 AOP-R.03

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X.

LESSON BODY:

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

3.

CHECK at least one 6.9 KV Shutdown board

Objective 7

ENERGIZED on this unit.

Transition to section 2.8 for

a.

Refer to AOP for Substeps

RCS alternate heat sink

without power

NOTE:

Refer to NOTE in AOP

Describes availability of

hydrogen igniters and

containment air return fans

4.

EVALUATE placing one train of Hydrogen

SRO decision to place

Igniters and one Air Return Fan in service:

igniters and air return fans

a.

Refer to AOP for Substeps

on as necessary to prevent

explosive concentrations

NOTE:

Refer to NOTE in AOP

If needed for containment

cooling, ERCW

containment isolation valves

may be re-opened as

necessary if ERCW piping

is intact

(

5.

START starting available upper and low er

Review Appendix B

compartment coolers USING Appendix B.

6.

CHECK RCS INTACT:

Checks to determine if RCS

a.

Refer to AOP for Substeps

can be refilled so S /G can

b.

Refer to AOP for RNO

be used as heat sink. If

RCS cannot be refilled GO

TO step 11 for RCS feed

and bleed cooling mode

7.

VERIFYseconcarv heat sink AVAILABLE:

Checks to determine if S /G

a.

Refer to AOP for Substeps

can be used as heat sink.

b.

Refer to AOP for RNO

If S /G cannot be used GO

TO step 11 for RCS feed

and bleed cooling mode

CAUTION:

Refer to CAUTION in AOP

Informs operator of

potential effect of steam on

RCS level indications if

RCS temperature is >200oF

8.

REFILL RCS UNTIL either of the following

RCS refill stop criteria

conditions satisfied:

a.

Refer to AOP for Substeps

C

OPL271AOP-R.03

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X.

LESSON BODY:

INSTRUCTOR NOTES

NOTE:

Refer to NOTE in AOP

Gives preferred starting

order of RCPs for PZR

spray

9.

ATIEMPT to start one RCP;

Forced RCS flow is

a.

Refer to AOP for Substeps

preferred over natural

b.

Refer to AOP for RNO

circulation if RCP can be

started. If NOT then GO

TO step 10 for natural

circulation cooling

10.

ESTABLISH seconcarv heat sink:

If feed and bleed cooling of

a.

Refer to AOP for Substeps

S/G can be established GO

b.

Refer to AOP for RNO

TO step 15 to prepare for

exit of procedure. If NOT

continue attempts establish

feed and bleed

11.

DETERMINE proper step to initiate a feed

Objective 7

and b leed cooling methOd:

Three options for feed and

(

a.

Refer to AOP for Substeps

bleed of RCS.

b.

Refer to AOP for RNO

If feed and bleed cannot be

established , consider

dumping CLA and IF the

RX vessel head is removed

GO TO section 2.7, RCS

alternate heat sink using

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling

12.

PERFORM the following to cool RCS via S/G

Objective 7

cold leg man way:

If feed and bleed is

a.

Refer to AOP for Substeps

successful GO TO step 15

b.

Refer to AOP for RNO

to prepare for exit of

procedure. If NOT, go back

to step 11 and select

another feed and bleed

method

13.

PERFORM the following to cool RCS via SG

Objective 7

hot leg man way:

If feed and bleed is

a.

Refer to AOP for Substeps

successful GO TO step 15

b.

Refer to AOP for RNO

to prepare for exit of

c.

If CCPIT flow or SI flow is established then

procedure. If NOT, go back

GO TO step 14.d to ensure suction

to step 11 and select

(

available to CCPS

another feed and bleed

method

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SON

RHR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION

AOP-R.03

Rev. 16

I STEP I

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2.6

RCS Alternate Heat Sink Using Steam Generators (continued)

6.

CHECK RCS INTACT:

Reactor vessel HEAD ON and bolts

TENSIONED.

AND

RCS and pressurizer vent paths

ISOLATED.

7.

VERIFY secondary heat sink

AVAILABLE:

All S/G nozzle dams REMOVED

All S/G manways CLOSED

Two S /Gs capable of maintaining

narrow range level

GO TO Step 11.

CAUTION

Boiling in RCS could result in false high level indication due to steam

flow through surge line. RCS makeup flow should NOT be terminated

based upon high level if core exit TICs are greater than 200°F.

8.

REFILL RCS UNTIL either of the

following conditions satisfied:

RHR cooling RESTORED.

Pressurizer level greater than

50% cold cal (el. 733').

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