ML071570475
ML071570475 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Sequoyah ![]() |
Issue date: | 05/09/2007 |
From: | NRC/RGN-II |
To: | |
References | |
50-327/07-301, 50-328/07-301 | |
Download: ML071570475 (194) | |
See also: IR 05000327/2007301
Text
Draft Submittal
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SEQUOYAH APRIUMAY 2007 EXAM
EXAM NOS. 05000327/2007301
AND 05000328/2007301
APRIL 9 -11, 2007 AND
MAY 9, 2007 (written)
Reactor Operator Operator Written Exam
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
42. 038 EK3.06 001
( When performing E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, why is it important to isolate
the ruptured steam generator from the intact steam generators?
A. All of the contingencies assume that the cooldown will NOT commence until this
action is taken.
B:' Limits primary to secondary leakage on the subsequent cooldown and
depressurization.
C. Ensures that the subsequent cooldown will NOT result in a challenge to the PTS
Safety Function.
D. Ensures that the differential pressure between the intact and ruptured SGs remains
high enough to ensure early detection of subsequent failures .
A. Incorrect. Contingencies address inability to isolate ruptured SG in ECA series.
B. Correct. Cooling down the ruptured SG by depressurizing it will cause a higher OP,
and more flow, from the RCS to the SG.
C. Incorrect. Challenges to Integrity are controlled by C/O rate.
O. Incorrect. Having a OP between the ruptured and intact SGs does not ensure early
detection of add/Iional failures.
(
Monday. March 12.2007 2:35:30 P M 79
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the SGTR: Actions contained in EOP for RCS water inventory
balance. S/G tube rupture. and plant shutdown procedures
(
Ques tion No. 47
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: R04.2
Tec hnical Reference: . E-3 Basis
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Lea rning Objective: OPL271 E-3 Objective 4
Que stion Source: Bank
Question History: Callaway 2005
Que stion Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .10
Comments:
(
Source: BANK Source If Bank: CAL LAWAY 2005 NRC
Cogn itive Level: LOWER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM 80
OPL2 71E*3
Revision 0
Page 10 of 23
(
X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
5. ISOLATE flow'from Ruptured S/G(s): Obj ective 5
a. Refer to EOP for Substeps Limits flow through the
b. Refer to EOP for RNO Ruptured S/G ARV.
NOTE: Isola ting the ruptured SIG is required to Limit Ruptured S/G
allow thermal stratification of the water in the pressure drop by isolating
ruptured SIG. This will allow a coo ling down with SF to TD AFW pump turbine
the in tact SIGs while maintaining RCS Contains radioactive
subcooling. If ruptured SI G cannot be isola ted material in the S/G and
then transition to ECA-3. limits pressure drop in
ruptured S/G
Bypass valves (and main
cannot be closed) to limit
pressure drop in ruptured
S/G
Obj ect ive 7
Discuss RCS pressure,
RCS temperature, Ruptured
S/G pressure and intact
S/G pressure for response
( to a ruptured S/G
CAUTION: Refer to CAUT ION in EOP Caution regarding feeding a
ruptured S/g and using it for
cooldown
6. MONITOR Ruptured S/G(s) level: To reduce feed flow to the
a. Refer to EOP for Substeps ruptured steam generators
b. Refer to EOP for RNO to minimize the potential for
steam generator overfill.
To establish and maintain a
water level in the ruptured
steam generators above the
top of the U-tubes in order
to promote thermal
stratification to prevent
ruptured steam generator
depressurization.
7. VERIFY Ruptured S/G ISOLATED from Intact Allows cooldown of the
S/G(s). RCS while maintaining
a. Refer to EOP for Substeps subcooling. This allows
b. Refer to EOP for RNO thermal stratification of
ruptured S/G water level
and permits equalization of
RCS and S/G pressure to
stop leak flow
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
48 . 055 EK3.01 001
( Which ONE (1) of the following describes the minimum amount of time and reason why
the station batteries (and load shedding instructions) are designed to ensure DC power
is available after a loss of all AC power?
Time Reason
A. 2 Hours station blackout rule
B. 2 Hours technical specification requirement
C!" 4 Hours station blackout rule
D. 4 Hours technical specification requirement
a. Incorrect, batteries are rated (with load shedding) for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, without chargers to
provide necessary DC power to maintain BOTH reactors at hot shutdown after a
loss of ALL AC sources
b. Incorrect, betiettes are rated (with load shedding) for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, without chargers to
provide necessary DC power to maintain BOTH reactors at hot shutdown after a
loss of ALL AC sources
c. Correct.
d. Incorrect, batteries are rated (with load shedding) for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, without chargers to
provide necessary DC power to maintain BOTH reactors at hot shutdown after a loss of
ALL AC sources
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:31 PM 91
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Station Blackout Length of time for which battery
capaci ty is designed
(
Que stion No. 48
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating : RO 2.7
Technical Reference: FSAR 8.0 Electric Power, 8.1.4 Design Basis
Proposed references to be provided to appiicants during examination:
Learning Objective: OPL271 ECA-D.O, Obj 3.a
OPL273C0527, Obj 5
Question Source: Bank
Question History: 2004 NRC Exam
Que stion Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.8
Comments:
(
Source: BANK Source If Bank: SEQUOYAH 2004 NRC EX
Cognitive Level: LOWE R Difficulty:
Job Positi on: RO Plant: SEQ UOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: YES
(
Monday, March 12,20072:35:31 PM 92
ECA-O.OStudent Handout
Revision 0
Page 3 of 11
( TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student shall demonstrate
an understanding of the ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power by successfully completing a
written examination with a score of 80 percent or greater.
B. Enabling Objectives
1. Explain the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to a
Loss of All AC Power. (EPE 055 EK1 )
a. Effect of battery discharge rates on capacity
b. Natural Circulation Cooling
2. Explain the interrelations between a Loss of All AC Power and the following.
(EPE 055 EK2)
a. Valves
b. Sensors, detectors and indicators
c. Controllers and positioners
d., Pumps
e.- Motors
f. Heat exchangers and
( g. Breakers, relays, and disconnects
3. Explain the reasons for the following responses as they apply to a Loss of All AC
Power. (EPE 055 EK3)
a. Length of time for which battery capacity is designed
b. Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power
4. Discuss the operation and monitoring of the following as they apply to a Loss of
All AC Power (EPE 055 EA1)
a. In-core thermocouple temperatures
b. Manual EDG start
c. Manual Main Turbine jacking
d. Reduction of loads on the battery
e. Battery, when approaching fully discharged
f. Restoration of power with one EDG
g. Restoration of power from offsite
5. Determine and interpret the following as they apply to a Loss of All AC Power
(station blackout). (EPE 055 EA2)
a. Existing valve positioning on a loss of instrument air system
b. RCS core cooling through natural circulation cooling to SIG cooling
c. Actions necessary to restore power
d. Instruments and controls operable with only DC battery power available
e. When battery is approaching fully discharged
f. Faults and lockouts that must be cleared prior to re-energizing buses
Revision 1
Page 21 of 21
( APPE NDIX B
Battery Capacity during SBe Event
125v DC Battery Capacity (FSAR req uirements)
Capacity and Load Shed:
- Can supply all connected loads for 45 minutes
- Can supply all SBe load for an additional 195 minutes
- 10CFR50.63 requires SON to mitigate a Station Blackout event within 4
hou rs
=
- 45 min + 195 min 240 min or 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> .
- Load shed mu st be accomplished within 45 minutes
- AC power must be restore withi n 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to recharge batteries
- Capaci ty is verified by load test
Battery recharging:
- Recharged within :s12 hrs following 30 minutes of AC loss while supp lying
nor mal and acci dent loads
- Recharged within :s36 hrs following 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of AC loss while supplying
normal loads
Single failure capacity during a loss of ALL Standby AC:
- Th ree batteries can supply all loads required for safe shutdown of both units
- Th.ree batte ries can supply essential loads to maintain the plant in safe
shutdown
( 250v DC Battery Capacity (FSAR requirements)
Used during an SBO event to restore AC offsite power
Capacity to suppl y required load at the end of a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO event
Capaci ty is verified by analysis
ECA-O.OStudent Handout
Revision 0
Page 7 of 11
( 5. Select recovery procedure after AC power restoration.
E. Step Discussion See EPM-3-ECAO.0 for detailed step bases
1. Step 1 suspends FRP implementation since they assume that at least one train of
shutdown boards is energized. Status trees are monitored for informa tion only.
Once AC power is restored . either ECA-0.1 or ECA-0.2 will resume FRP
implemen tation at the appropriate time.
Without AC power, the ECCS pumps are inoperable and the FRPs are ineffective
2. Steps 2 and 3 verify reactor and turbine trips. Though these steps appear
redundant to E-O's immediat e actions, keep in mind that ECA-O.Ocan be entered at
any time that both trains of shutd own boards are observed to be deener gized
(either by "rules of usage" or by foldout page transition). Thus, it is possible to
enter this procedure before E-O immediate actions have been performed.
For example, it is possible to enter E-O, look at foldout page, and immediately
transition to ECA-O.O before perf orming E-OStep 1
3. Step 4 records present time as a handy reference. To comply with the 4-hour
battery coping requirement per 10CFR50.63, certain DC load shed actions must be
perform ed within 45 minutes following the loss of all AC power event.
( Refer to 10CFR50.63 and plant modification DCN M09120A
4. Step 9 checks the T O AFW pump flow interlock that requires that flow be less than
a certain setpoint to allow taking manual speed control of the TO AFW pum p.
5. Step 10 attempts emergen cy start before normal start because emergency start
can be done from the horseshoe area of the contro l room, while normal start
requi res a trip back to M-26 .
If at least one shutdown board on this unit is energized , then resume FRP
implementation and return to procedure and step in effect
6. Step 11 is a continuous action step. If this step is reached, initial attempts to
energize at least one train of shutdown boards have been unsuccessful. If power is
subsequ ently restored to at least one train of shutdown boards at any time after
this. the operator should proceed to Step 32 to begin recovery actions.
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
49 . 05 6 G2.4.3 1 001
( Give n the following plant conditions:
Unit 1 is at 80% power.
- The following alarm is received:
1-AR-M1-B, B3, 6900V UNIT BD 1C FAILURE OR UNDERVOLTAGE
Unit Board 1C has an 86-1 C flag on the Alternate Feeder Breaker
Which ONE (1) of the follow ing describes the unit condition and the actions required?
A'!' Unit Board 1C Failure; The unit should have tripped; Trip the reactor and enter E-O,
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
B. Unit Board 1C Failure; The board should have transferred to the normal feeder;
Ve rify the normal feeder is closed and operate the alternate feeder control switch to
clear the disagreement light
C. Loss of Off-Site power to Unit Board 1C; The unit should have tripped ; Trip the
reactor and r::nter E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection .
D. Loss of Off-Site power to Unit Board 1C; The board should have transferred to the
c normal feeder; Verify the normal feeder is closed and operate the alternate feeder
control switch to clear the disagreement light.
A. Correct. Unit should have tripped on loss of #3 RCP. If undervoltage was the
cau se, the bus should have transferred and there will not be an 86 on it
B. Incorrect. Transfer would only occure for undervoltage
C. Incorrect. LOOP incorrect because of the red flag on the alternate feed, and the
pre sence of no otgher alarms
D. Incorrect. LOOP incorrect due to red flag and no other alarms. If it was a loss of
off-site feed , bus would transfer
c.
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:31 PM 93
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Emergency Procedures I Plan Knowledge of annuncia tors alarms and indications, and use of the response instructions.
( Question No. 49
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.3
Technical Reference :. AR-M1B, B3
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-P.01, B.7
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.7
Comments :
( Source:
Cognitive Level:
NEW
HIGHER
Source If Bank:
Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:31 PM 94
OPL271AOP-P.01
Revision 1
Page 3 of 26
(
I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRA INING
III. LESSON TITLE : AOP-P.01, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON /COURSE: 1.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />(s)
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Term inal Objective:
Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scena rios, the requirements of
AOP-P.01, LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER.
B. Enabling Objectives:
Ob jectives
O. Dem onstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities
associated with Loss of Offsite Power that are rated z 2.5 during Initial License
Training for and 2':-3.0 during License Operat or Requal ification Train ing the
( appropriate position as identified in Appendi x A.
1. State the purpose/goa l of this AOP-P.0 1.
2. Des cribe the AOP-P .01 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with
AOP -P.01 entry conditions .
b. Describe the ARP reau irements associ ated with AOP-P.01 entry condit ions .
c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-P.01
entry conditions.
d. Describe the plant parameters that may indicate a Loss of Offsite Powe r.
3. Describe the initia l operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into
4. Upon entry into AOP*P.01 , diagnose the applicab le cond ition and transition to the
appropriate procedural section for response.
5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-P .01.
6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes , cautions , and steps of AOP-P.01.
7. Describe the condi tions and reason for transitions with in this proce dure and
transitions to other procedu res.
8. Given a set of initial plant cond itions use AOP-P .01 to correctlv:
a. Recognize entry conditions.
OPL271AOP-P.01
Revision 1
Page 4 of 26
(
Objectives
b. Identify required actions.
c. Respond to Contingencies.
d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes .
9. Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance of
10. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to,
during and after the abnormal condition.
(
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
50 . 057 AK3.01 001
( Give n the following plant conditions:
- Unit 1 is at 100% RTP
- A loss of 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-IV occurs.
- A reactor trip does NOT occur.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes action required and the reason for the action
in acc ordance with AOP-P.03. Loss of Unit 1 Vital Instrument Power Board?
A'! Place rod control in MANUAL due to loss of Auctioneered Tavg input; Control #4
Feedwater Reg Valve manually due to loss of AUTO control.
B. Place rod control in MANUAL due to loss of Auct ioneered Tavg input; Control #2
Feedwater Reg Valve manually due to loss of AUTO control.
C. Place rod control in MANUAL due to loss of Tref input; Control #4 Feedwater Reg
Valve manually due to loss of AUTO control.
D. Place rod control in MANUAL due to loss of Tref input; Control #2 Feedwater Reg
Valve manually due to loss of AUTO control.
A. Correct. Loss of Auctioneeered Tavg would cause rod motion, so rods are placed in
Manu al. #4 FRV is also operated manually due to loss of control
B. Incorrect. Wrong FRV
C. Incorrect. Tref comes from board 1-1. Would be cause to place rods in manual, but
Tref input is not lost. Correct FRV
D. Incorrect. Tref and #2 FRV are both incorrect for loss of board 1-IV
(
Monday. March 12,20072:35:31 PM 95
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUO YAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instru ment Bus: Actions contained in
EOP for loss of vitalac electrical instrum ent bus
(
QuesUon No. 50
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 4.1
Technical Reference: . AOP P.03
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-P.03 & 04, B.3
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.7
Comments:
Sou rce: N EW Source If Bank:
( Cogniti ve Level:
Job Position:
HIGH ER
Difficulty:
Plant: SEQUO YAH
Dat e: 4/2007 Last 2 NR C?: NO
Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:31 PM 96
OPL271AOP-P.03 & P.04
Revis ion 0
Page 3 of 24
( I. PROGRAM : OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II, COURSE : LIC ENSE TRAINING
III . LESSON TITLE: AOP-P.03 & .04, LOSS OF 120V AC VITAL INSTRUMENT POWER
BOARDS
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 2.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />(s)
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of
AOP-P.03 & .04, LOSS OF 120V AC VITAL INSTRUMENT POWER BOARDS.
B. Enabling Objectives:
Objectives
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abi lities associated
with Loss of a Vital Instrument Power Board that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial License
( Training and z 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the
appropriate pos ition as identified in Appendix A.
1. State the purpose/goal of this AOP-P .03 & -P.04.
2. Describe the AOP-P.03 & -P.04 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoi nts, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with
AOP-P.03 & -P.04 ent ry conditions .
b. Describe the AR P requ irements associated with AOP-P.03 & *P.04 entry
conditions.
c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-P.03 &
-P .04 entry cond itions.
d. Describe the plant parameters that may indicate a Loss of a Vital Instrument
Power Board.
3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-P.03
& -P .04 .
4. Upon entry into AOP-P.03 & -P.04, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to
the appropriate procedural section for response.
OPL271AOP-P.03 & P.04
Revision 0
Page 4 of 24
(
5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-
P.03 & -P.04 .
6. Describe the bases for all limits , notes , ca utions, and steps of AOP-P.03 &
-P .04.
7. Describe the cond itions and reason for transitions within this procedure and
tran sitions to other procedures .
8. Given a set of initial plant condi tions use AO P-P.03 & -P.04 to correctly:
a. Recogn ize entry conditions.
b. Identify required actions.
c. Respond to Continge ncies.
d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.
9. Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance
of AOP-P .03 & -P .04.
10. Apply GFE and system response con cepts to the abnormal co ndition - prior
to , du rino and after the ab normal cond ition.
(
(
( SQN LOSS OF UNIT 1 VITAL INSTRUMENT
POWER BOARD
Rev. 19
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.4 Loss of 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-IV
1. CHECK reactor TRIPPED PERFORM the follow ing:
Reactor Trip REQUIRED.
- GO TO E-O. Reactor Trip or Safety a. ENSURE 1-FIC-3-103 SG-4 Main FW
Injection WHILE continuing in this Reg Valve flow controller in MANUAL
procedure. AND
CONTROL S/G level(s) on program.
b. ENSURE rod control in MANUAL.
c. MONITOR Pressurizer Level and
Pressure:
IF pressurizer ievel approaches Reactor
c Trip setpoint (92%)
Pressurizer pressure approaches PORV
lift setpoint (2335 psig), THEN
TRIP Reactor and GO TO E-G, Reactor
Trip or Safety Injection WHILE
continuing in this procedure .
--~.--
2. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for
applicability:
- 3.8.2.1, AC Power Distribution
System, Operating
- 3.8.2.2, AC Power Distribution
System, Shutdown
- 3.7.1.2, Auxiliary Feed Water
Page 31 of 82
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
51 . 058 A A I.Ol 001
( Given the following plant conditions:
- Unit 1 is steady-state at 100% power.
- Unit 2 is in Mode 6 with vessel upper internals removal in progress .
- 125V DC Vital Battery IV Output Breaker tripped and can't be reclosed.
Wh ich ONE (1) of the following describes the required action(s)?
A . Align 125V DC Vital Battery Charger 1-S (spare ) to Vital Battery Board IV.
B~ Align 125V DC Vital Battery Bank V and Cha rger 2-S (spare) to Vital Battery Board
IV.
C. Suspend core alterations on Unit 2 until 125V DC Channel IV is returned to
OPERABLE status.
D. Restore 125V DC Channel IV to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or initiate a
shutdown of Unit 1.
A. Incorrect. Not capable of being aligned.
B. Correct. per 0-SO-250-1
C. Incorrect. No TS requirement.
D. Incorrect. Wrong time requirement per TS.
(
Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:31 PM 97
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to operate and lor monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Cross-tie of the affected de bus with the
altemate supply
( Question No. 51
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 3.4
Technical Reference: . AOP-P.02
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-P.02, B.8.b
Question Source: Bank
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
( Source:
Cognitive Level:
BANK
HIGHER
Source I f Bank:
Difficulty:
SQNBANK
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?:
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:31 PM 98
OPL271AOP-P.02
Revision a
Page 3 of 17
I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
( II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: AOP-P.02, LOSS OF 125V DC VITAL BATIERY BOARD
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 2.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />(s)
V. TRAINING OBJEC TIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to
demonstrate or explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios,
the requirements of AOP-P.02, LOSS OF 125V DC VITAL BATIERY BOARD.
B. Enabling Objectives:
Obiectives
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities associated
with Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Board that are rated " 2.5 during Initial License
Training and z 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the
appropriate position as identified in Appendix A.
1. State the purpose/goal of this AOP-P.02.
2. Describe the AOP-P.02 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with
AOP-P.02 entrv conditions.
( b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-P.02 entry conditions.
c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-P.02
entrv conditions.
d. Describe the plant parameters that may indicate a Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery
Board.
3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-P.02.
4. Upon entry into AOP-P.02, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the
approp riate procedural section for response.
OPL 271AOP*P .02
Revision 0
Page 4 of 17
(' 5. Summ arize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into
AOp*P.02.
6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP*P.02.
7. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and
transitions to other procedures.
8. Given a set of initial olant conditions use AOP-P.02 to correctlv:
a. Recoonize entrv conditions.
b. Identify required actions.
c. Respond to Continq encies .
d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.
9. Describe the Tech Spec and TR M actions applicable during the performance
of AOp*P.02.
10. Appl y GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior
to, durinq and afte r the abnormal condition.
(
AO p*P.02
( SQN LOSS OF 125V DC V ITAL BATTERY BOARD
Rev. 10
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.4 Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Board IV (con t'd)
8. MONITOR 125V Vital Battery Board IV GO TO Step 12.
ready to be ENERGIZED
NOTE Restoring power from a charger is preferred after a fault on the battery board.
9. RESTORE 125V DC Vital Battery
Board IV from one of the following
USING 0-SO-250-1, 125 Volt DC Vital
Power System: [C. 1]
- 125V DC Battery IV
( * 125V DC Vital Battery Charger IV
- 125V DC Vital Battery Charger 2-S
- Spare Vital Battery IV with Battery V
10. MONITOR 125V DC Vital Battery Bd IV CONTINUE with Step 12.
voltage between 125V and 140V.
WHEN voltage returned to normal,
THEN
GO TO Step 20.
11. GO TO Step 20.
(
Page 38 of97
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
57. 062 A IG.OI 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions :
Unit 1 is tripped.
The crew is perform ing actions of AOP-M .01, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling
Water.
ERCW Supply Header 2B to the Aux Building has been isolated to stop the leak.
0-FCV-67-152 , CCS OB1/0B2 Discharge Valve to header B, has been closed .
- A Safety Injection signal is subsequently received.
W hich ONE (1) of the following describes the function of 1-FCV-67-152 for these
co nditions?
A. The valve will open to its 35% open position. ERCW flow will be provided from
Header 1B.
B~ The valve will open to its 35% open position . NO ERCW flow will be provided .
C. The valve will remain closed because there is no ERCW pressure on the header.
D. The valve wi~ remain closed because there is no ERCW Pump running on the
( A. Incorrect. Since ERCW was manually isolated, no flow will be available
B. Correct. Valves open to Position A (35%)
C. Incorrect. The valves will rspond to the ESF actuation. Pressure on the header will
no t affect the ESF actuation
D. Incorrect. The valves will rspond to the ESF actuation. Pumps running on the
header will not affect the ESF actuation
Monday, March 12,20072:35:32 PM 109
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as theyapply to the Loss of NuclearService Water The conditions that will
initiate the automatic opening and closing of theSWS isolation valves to the nuclear service water coolers
(
Question No. 52
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.2
Technical Reference: AOP-M.01, section 2.4 step 8
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-M.01, B.8.c
Question Source: New
Quest ion History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.8
Commen ts:
So urce: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: HIGH ER Difficulty:
( Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC'!: NO
Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:32 PM 110
OPL271AOP-M .01
Revision 0
Page 3 of 45
('
I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: AOP-M.01 LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLIN G WATER
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 2.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />(s)
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Term inal Objective :
Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of
AOP -M.01, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities
associated with a Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water that are rated ~ 2.5
( during Initial License Train ing and ~ 3.0 during License Operator
Requalification Training for the appropriate license position as identified in
AppendixA.
1. Expiain the purpose/goal of AOP-M ,01.
2. Discuss the AOP-M .01 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks , and automatic actions associated with
AOP-M.01 entry conditions.
b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-M.01 entry conditions .
c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-
M.01 entry conditions.
d. Describe the Administra tive conditions that require Turbine Trip/ Reactor trip
due to Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water.
3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-
M.01.
4. Upon entry into AOP-M.01, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to
the appropriate procedurai section for response.
5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-
M.01.
6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-M.01.
OPL271AOP-M.01
Revision 0
Page 4 of 45
( 7. Describe the conditions and reason for transit ions within this procedure and
transitions to other procedures.
8. Given a set of initial plant conditions use AOP-M.01 to correctly:
a. Recognize entry conditions
b. Identify required actions
c. Respond to Contingencies
d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes
9. Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance of
10. App ly GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condi tion - prior to,
during and after the abnormal condition
(
( SQN LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER
Rev. 15
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.5 ERCW Supply. Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary Building
CAUTION: During operation, CCP and 51 Pumps may experience bearing failure 10
minutes after loss of ERCW cooling.
1. DISPATCH personnel to locate rupture.
2. DISPATCH operators with radios to
perform Appendix F, Rx MOV Board
ERCW Valves. [Aux Bldg el. 749',
Rx MOV Boards].
( 4. STOP and LOCK OUT the following:
5. DISPATCH operator to piace Aux Air
Compressor B-B in SAFE STOP.
[Aux Bldg, 734' elev, Refuel Floor)
NOTE The following step removes all cooling water from the OB1/0B2 CCS HX.
6. CLOSE 2-FCV-67-147, Hdr 2B to Hdr 1A
Compl. 3B].
(
Page 22 of 142
( SQN LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLI NG WATER
Rev. 15
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.5 ERCW Supply Header 2B Fail ure to Auxiliary BUilding (cont'd)
CAUTION 1 Crosstying A and B trai n ERCW supply headers should only be performed if
cooling is urgently required fo r Unit 1 Train B CCS related equipment.
LCO 3.0.3 may be applicable.
CAUTION 2 Opening of crosstie valve 1-FCV-67-147 (in Step 7.RNO) may resul t in fouling or
blockage of OB1/0B2 CCS Hx. If ti me perm its, CCS Hx OB2 sho uld be isolated
prio r to opening crosstie valve to preve nt fou li ng BOTH heat excha ngers.
After approx. 10 mi n, OB2 CCS Hx will be returned to service.
NOTE ERCW flow on 28 header will be very low if rupture was isolated in previous step.
7. CHECK ERCW Supply Hdr 28 a. CLOSE 2-FCV-67-82, Aux 81dg Hdr 28
parameters to determine if Rupture Isol Valve. [Rx MOV 8d 2B2-8
ISOLATED: - Compt. 3C]
- 2-FI-67-52, at expected value b. iF desired to isolate 082 CCS Hx
( * 2-PI-67-488A between 78 psig and
prior to opening crosstie valve,
THEN
124 psig. PERFORM the following:
1) CLOSE 0-67-1501 CCS Hx 082 Inlet.
2) WHEN 0-67-1051 CLOSED,
THEN
OPEN 1-FCV-57-147, Hdr 1A to Hdr
28 Isol Valve. [Rx MOV 8d 1A2-A
Compt. gAl.
RECORD time _
3) IF CCS Hx 08 2 indicates fouling or
flow blockage
OR 1-FCV-67-147 has been OPEN
for approximately 10 minutes,
THEN
OPEN 0-57-1501 CCS Hx 082 Inlet.
4) GO TO Substep d.
(Step continued on next page)
---
Page 23 of 142
( SQN LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER
Rev. 15
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.5 ERCW Supply Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary Building (cont'd)
7. (Continued )
c. EVALUATE opening 1-FCV-67-147 ,
Hdr 1A to Hdr 28 1501 Valve [Rx MOV 8d
1A2-A Compl. 9AI.
RECORD time _
d. IF desired,
THEN
PLACE O-FCV-67-152 in the 35%
position.
e. CLOSE the following valves:
- 2-FCV-67-128 . Hdr 28 Supply to
( Space Coolers. AlC & Air
Compressors
[Rx MOV 8d 282-8 Compl. 6C]
- 2-FCV-67-123. Containment Spray
- 2-FCV-67-83. Lower Compl
Cooler 20 Supply 1501 [O-M-27A]
- 2-FCV-67-91, Lower Compl
Cooler 28 Supply 1501 [O-M-27A]
- 2-FCV-67-138 . Upper Compt
Cooler 28 Supply 1501[O-M-27A]
- 2-FCV-67-141. Upper Compt
Cooler 2D Supply 1501 [O-M-27Al
(Step continued on next page)
(
Page 24 of 142
( SQ N LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER
Rev . 15
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.5 ERCW Supply Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary Building (cont'd)
7. (Continued) f. DISPATCH an operator to CLOSE the
foll owi ng valves:
- 2:67-524B , Supply Hdr 2B to Inst
Room Cooler 2B
[Aux Bldg, 669' elev, Penetration
Room, above Ductwork by panel
2-L-26A].
- 2-67-675 , ERCW 1501 to B
Shutdown Board Room A/C Water
Chiller
[Aux Bldg, elev 714 ' 12' up at
Col R-A- 12].
- 2-67-521 B, Hypochlorite
Treatment Circulation Line 1501
( [elev 669 ' TDAFWP Rm by ERCW
supply valves]
g. IF 1A ERCW header was aligned to
THEN
GO TO Step 9.
- a-
8. ENSURE the following valves are closed:
Valv e to Hdr B
Valv e to Hdr A
Page 25 of 142
AOP -M.01
( SQN LOSS OF ESSENTIAL RAW COOLING WATER
Rev. 15
[ STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.5 ERCW Supply Header 2B Failure to Auxiliary BUilding (cont'd)
9. START additional Lower Compartment
Cooling Fans and CRDM Fans as required
to maintain containment temperature .
1O. OPERATE ERCW Pumps as necessary IF ERCW header pressure is high,
to perform the following: THEN
EVALUATE opening ERCW supply to
- CONTROL pressure between 78 psig Containment Spray HX and/or DG HXs
and 124 psig. to reduce pressure.
- MAINTAIN support of system loads
( 11. REFER TO the following :
- Appendix 0 , Affected Equipment List
(Header 2B)
- Appendix P, Potential Tech Spec
Impacts.
12. ENSURE all breakers reopened
USING Appendix F, Rx MOV Board
ERCW Valves.
13. REFER to AOP-M.03, Loss of
Component Cooling Water.
14.
---.--
GO TO appropriate plant procedure.
END OF SECTION
Page 26 of 142
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
76. E04 02 .1.28 00 1
(" Given the follow ing plant conditions:
Reactor Trip and Safety Injection have occurred on Unit 2.
The crew has transitioned to ECA-1.2 , LOCA Outside Containment.
The leak has NOT been identified and the crew is preparing to isolate Cold Leg
Injection.
W hich ONE (1) of the following describes how Cold Leg Injection is isolated, and how
to determine if the leak has been stopped in accordance with ECA-1.2?
A . Close FCV-63-93 and FCV-63-94, Cold Leg Injection Valves, simultaneously.
Verify isolation by observing pressurizer level.
B. Close FCV-63-93 and FCV-63-94 , Cold Leg Injection Valves, simultaneously.
Verify isolation by observing RCS pressure .
C. Close FCV-63 -93 and FCV-63-94, Cold Leg Injection Valves, one at a time. Verify
isolation by observing pressurizer level.
D~ Close FCV-63-93 and FCV-63-94 , Cold Leg Injection Valves , one at a time. Verify
isolation by oDserving RCS pressure.
A. Incorrect. Valves are closed 1 at a time, not simulataneo usly. RCS pressure is
checked
B. Incorrect. Correct parameter but 1 valve closed at a time
C. Incorrect. PZR level is not the parameter checked, but actions are correct.
D. Correct. Valves are closed one at a time and pressure is checked prior to
determin ing whether to reopen or leave closed. RCS pressure is the parameter
checked
l
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM 146
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEOUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls .
( Question No. 53
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.2
Technical Reference: ECA-1.2
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271ECA-1.2 Objective 4
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: LOWER
( Job Position: RO
Difficulty:
Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? : NO
Monday. March 12,20072:35:35 PM 147
OPL271 ECA*1.2
Revision 1
Page 9 of 15
x. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
e. CHECK RCS pressure RISING. If pressure is rising then the
leak has been isolated from
RNO - GO TO Step 2. the RCS, therefore
additional diagnosic steps
f. GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4. continuing attempts to
identify the leak are skipped
Basis : over. However the leak may
This step instructs the operator to verify that all normally not be isolated from the
closed valves in low pressure lines and other plant specific RWST and loss of RWST
lines that penetrate containment are closed. The valving inventory may be occurring.
connecting the RHR System to the RCS is of particular
interest in this step since the RHR System is a low If pressure is not rising then
pressure system (600 psig) connected to the high pressure the leak has not been
reactor coolant system (2500 psig). Therefore, a rupture or isolated from the RCS and
break outside containment is most probable to occur in the steps to identify the source
low pressure RHR System piping. These valves are of the leak are to be
normally closed following an accident. completed
Normal and excess letdown valves are also checked
closed since these are plant-specific low pressure lines
which penetrate containment.
( 2. ATTEMPT to isolate break from RCS USING FCV-63- To attempt to identify and
93: isolate a LOCA outside
containment.
a. CLOSE RHR Train A cold leg injection valve
FCV-63-93. This step begins instructing
the operator to sequentially
RNO - GO TO Step 3. close and open all normally
opened valves in paths that
b. CHECK RCS pressure RISING penetrate containment to
identify and isolate the
RNO* PERFORM the following: break outside containment.
1) OPEN FCV-63-93 .
2) GO TO Step 3.
c. GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4. IF the leak is isolated from
the RCS additional
Basis: diagnosic steps continuing
This step instructs the operator to close the isolation valve attempts to identify the leak
in the low pressure injection line for Train A RHR that need not be performed.
connects to the RCS and penetrates containment. If the However the leak may not
LOCA outside containment occurred as a result of failed be isolated from the RWST
check valves on the cold leg injection lines to loops 2 and and loss of RWST inventory
3, then this action will isolate the break from the RCS. may be occurring
OPL271ECA-1.2
Revision 1
Page 10 of 15
( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
3. ATTEMPT to isolate break from RCS USING FCV-63- To attempt to identify and
94: isolate a LOCA outside
a. CLOSE RHR Train B cold leg injection valve cont ainment.
FCV-63-94.
RNO - GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4.
b. CHECK RCS pressure RISING .
RNO - OPEN FCV-63-9 4.
Basis:
This step instructs the operator to close the isolation valve
in th e low pressure injection line for Train B RHR that
connects to the RCS and penetrates containment. If the
LOC A outside containment occurred as a result of failed
check valves on the cold leg injection lines to loops 1 and
4, th en this action will isolate the break from the RCS.
CAUTION L After the break is isolated from the RCS, loss
- of RWST inventory will continue until RWST
leak path is isolated.
( Basis:
This caution alerts operators that continued RWST
inventory loss to the Auxiliary Building may be occurring
until the affected RHR piping is isolated.
CAUTION 2 High radiation or high temperatures in the
Auxiliary Building may prevent local
determination of break location.
Basis :
This caution alerts operators that local determination of
break location and status may not be safe or possible if
high radiation or high temperature conditions prevent
personn el acces s.
(,
ECA-1.2
( SQN LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT
Rev. 10
ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2. ATTEMPT to isolate break from RCS
USING FCV-63-93:
a. CLOSE RHR Train A cold leg injection a. GO TO Step 3.
valve FCV-63-93.
b. CHECK RCS pressure RISING. b. PERFORM the following:
1) OPEN FCV-63-93.
2) GO TO Step 3.
(
c. GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4.
3. ATTEMPT to isolate break from RCS
USING FCV-63-94:
a. CLOSE RHR Train B cold leg injection a. GO TO Cautions prior to Step 4.
valve FCV-63-94 .
b. CHECK RCS pressure RISING. b. OPEN FCV-63-94.
(
Page 4 of 6
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
77. E05 EA 1.3 001
( Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 1 is responding to a Loss of Heat Sink per FR-H.1, Response to Loss of
Secondary Heat Sink .
~ All Steam Generator Wide Range levels are Off-Scale low.
- RCS temperature is approximately 588°F and rising slowly.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the preferred method of initiating Auxiliary
Feed flow for these conditions?
A. Feed at the highest possible rate to one S/G to preclude initiation of RCS Bleed and
Feed.
B. Feed at the minimum required flow to prevent possible SG tube failures .
C~ Feed at the highest possible rate to one S/G to reestabl ish SG inventory and
secondary heat sink.
D. Feed at the minimum required flow to establish a controllable cooldown rate and
prevent loss of RCS inventory.
( A. Incorrect. Bleed and Feed would already be initiated under these conditions .
B. Incorrect. Tube failures are the primary concern when initiating feed, but for these
conditions, restoration of 1 SG as soon as possible is the priority
C.Correct. If RCS temp is rising with no inventory, AFW flow should be directed to one
SG at the max rate in an attempt to recover heat sink. This minimizes the chance for
multiple tube failures as wefl as the quickest way to recover at least 1 SG as heat sink.
At this point, bleed and feed should already be initiated.
D. Incorrect. On a loss of heat sink, cooldown rate is not the priority. The RCS has
already heated up. Loss of inventory is a concern due to potential tube failures , but
addressed by feeding only 1 SG
Monday, March 12,20072 :35:35 PM 148
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the reasons forthe following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) Desired operating results
during abnormal and emergency situations.
(
Question No. 54
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.8
Technical Reference: . FR-H.1 BO
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271 FR-H.1 Objective 4
Question Source: Bank
Question History: WTSI Various previous NRC
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments :
Source: BANK Source If Bank: WT SI
( Cogn itive Level: HIGHER Diffi culty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/200 7 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM 149
OPL271 FR-H.1
Revision 1
Page 3 of 18
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING
III . LESSON TITLE: FR-H.1, LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios , the requirements of
FR-H.1, Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink.
B. Enabling Objecti ves
O. Demonstrate an understand ing of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities
- associated with FR-H.1 , Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, that are rated ;0, 2.5
during Initial License Training and ;0, 3.0 during License Operator
c Requalification Training for the appropriate license position as identified in
Appendix A.
1. Explain the purpose/goal of FR-H.1.
2. Discuss the FR-H.1 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with
FR-H.1 entry conditions.
b. Describe the requirements associated with FR-H.1 entry conditions.
3. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into FR-H.1.
4. Describe the bases for all limits, notes , cautions, and steps of FR-H.1.
5. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and
transitions to other procedures.
6. Given a set of initial plant conditions use FR-H.1 to correctly :
a. Identify required actions
b. Respond to Contingencies
c. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes
7. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the performance of FR-H.1
conditions .
OPL2 71FR-H.1
Revision 1
Page 13 of 18
( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
30. ATTEMPT to align condensate tlowoatn to Attempts to esta blish
S/G(s): secondary heat sink in at
a. Refer to FR-H .1 fo r Substeps least one SG may have
b. Refe r to FR-H.1 for RNO been initiated in previous
NOTE: When condensate flowpath is steps before initiation of
established, depressurize SIG at maximum rate bleed and feed heat
using SIG AR Vs until flow is established. Dump removal. These attempts
steam from additional SIGs as necessary. should be cont inued until a
secondary heat sink is
restored.
CAUTION: Refer to CAUTION in FR-H.1 Control feedwater flow
NOTE: Reestablishment of the secondary heat ratesto limit RCS shrinkag e
sink will permittermination of the bleed and feed and press ure transients.
heatremoval method and establish stabilized
plant conditions.
31. CO NTROL feed flow to S/G: If CETs are rising, the
a. Ref er to FR-H.1 for Substeps maintain maximum feed
b. Refer to FR-H.1 for RNa flow to one SIG WR level
NOTE: If SIG being fed is NOT intact then until 10%. If S/G W R level
establish feed flow to an intact SIG and isolate is <10% control feed flow
the affected SI G. between 25 and 100 gpm to
restore S/G level and limit
thermal stresses.
32. DETERMINE if secondary heat sink resto red: Assumes seco ndary heat
a. Refer to FR*H.1 for Substeps sink is restored and begins
b. Refer to FR-H.1 for RNO recovery from feed and
bleed. If heat sink is NOT
restored, then GO TO step
29 and continue attempts to
restore secondary heat sink
33. CHECK RCS temperatures: Checks adequate heat sink
a. Refer to FR-H.1 for Substeps is restored and begins
b. Refer to FR-H .1 for RNO recovery from feed and
bleed
34. VER IFY reactor head vent valves CLOSED. Begins termination of feed
a. Refer to FR-H .1 for RNO and bleed
(
SQN LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK FR-H.1
Rev. 17
(
ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
CAUTION Controlling feedwater flow rates during S/G level recovery will limit RCS
shrinkage and pressure transients.
31. CONTROL feed flow to S/G:
a. CHECK Core Exit TCs STA BLE or a. ESTABLISH maximum available
DROPPING. feed flow to one S /G .
WHEN wide range level
greater than 10% [30% ADVJ,
THEN
PERFORM Substep 31.c.
GO TO Substep 31.d.
(
!
(Step continu ed on next page.)
I
l
Page 37 of 45
SQ N LO SS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK FR-H.1
( Rev . 17
ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPO NSE IIRESPO NSE NOT OBTAINED
31. b. CHECK wide rang e level b. CO NTROL feedwater flow to dry S/G
on selected S/G as follows:
greater than 10% [30% ADVj
1) IF AFW flow is available,
THEN
CONTRO L feed flow to one S/G
between 25 and 100 gpm .
2) IF only condensate' flow available,
THEN
CONTROL cond ensate flow as
low as achievable while
maintaining the following :
- Core Exit TCs DROPP ING
- wide range S/G level RISING.
(
3) WHEN wide range level
greater than 10% [30% ADVj ,
THEN
PERFORM Substep 31.c.
GO TO Substep 31.d.
c. CO NTROL S/G feed flow as
necessary to restore narrow rang e
level in selected S/G
---
between 10% [25 % ADV] and 50%.
d. NOTIFY Che rn Lab to sample S/G
being fed for activity.
(Step continued on ne xt page.)
Page 38 of 45
FR -H .1
SQN LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK
Rev. 17
(
ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE [ I RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
31. e . MONITOR if S/G being fed is e. IF S /G is NOT INTACT,
INTACT: THEN
PERFORM the following:
- NO abnormal radiation
- S/G pressure CONTROLL ED 1) ESTABLISH feed flow to ano ther
or RISING . intact SIG.
2) ISOLATE affected SIG .
f. NOTIFY TSC to determine recovery
methods for any remaining dry SIGs
(S/Gs with wid e range level
less than 10% [30% ADV]) .
(
32. DETER MINE if secondary heat sink
restored :
a. CHECK na rrow range leve l a. GO TO Step 29.
in at least one SIG
greate r than 10% [25% ADVj.
33. CHECK RCS tempe ratures : GO TO Step 29.
Core exit T/Cs DROPPING
RCS T-ho t DROPPING.
(
Pag e 39 of 4 5
---_._- - - -_ .,-- -- ..- --- .
QUESTIONS REPORT
forSEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
80 . Ell EK 3.2 00 1
( Which ONE (1) of the following describes the reason and limits required for RCS
depressurization in accordance with ECA-1 .1, Loss Of RHR Sump Recirculation?
A~ To minimize RCS leakage, depressurize the RCS until Pressurizer level is> 65%
OR RCS Subcooling is between 40°F and 50°F.
B. To increase SI Injection flow, depressurize the RCS until Pressurizer level is > 54%
AND RCS Subcoollnq is between 20°F and 30°F.
C. To ensure CL Accumulator Injection, depressurize the RCS until Pressurizer level is
> 65% AND RCS Subcooling is between 40 *F and 50*F.
D. To allow RHR to be placed in service, depressurize the RCS until Pressurizer leve l
is> 54% OR RCS Subcooling is between 20°F and 30*F.
A. Correct. The depressurization is performed to decrease leakage, therefore
decreasing makeup requirements.
B. Incorrect. SI injection flow may not increase because there may be no water
source.
C. lncortect. Setup for accumulator injection is performed later in the procedure
after SG depressurization .
D. Incorrect. RHR will not be placed in service until after the cooldown and
( depressurization are performed, later in the procedure.
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) Normal.
abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation).
Question No. 55
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.5
Technical Reference: ECA-1 .1 and basis
Proposed refe rences to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271 ECA-1 .1 Objective 4
Question Source: Bank
Question History: WTSI Last Exam VCS 06 Audit
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .10
Comments:
Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:35 PM 154
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: BANK Source If Bank: WTSI
( Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
LOWER
Difficulty:
Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 155
OPL27 1ECA-1.1
Revision 1
Page 3 of 18
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRA INING - LICENSED
II. COURSE : LICENSE TRAINING
III. L ESSON TITLE : EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE ECA-1.1. "Lo ss of RHR
Sump Recirculation"
IV. L ENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />(s)
V. TRAININ G OBJ ECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of
ECA-1 .1, "Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation"
B. Enabling Objectives:
B. Enabling Objectives:
o. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities
asso ciated with Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation that are rated ~ 2.5 during
( Initial License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator Requalificatio n
Training for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.
1. Explain the purpose/goal of ECA-1.1.
2. Discuss the ECA-1.1 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interiocks, and automatic actions associated with
ECA-1.1 entry conditions.
b. Describe the requirements associated with ECA-1.1 entry conditions.
3. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into ECA-1.1.
4. Describe the bases for all limits , notes, cautions, and steps of ECA-1.1.
5. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and
transitions to other procedures.
6. Given a set of initial plant conditions use ECA-1.1 to correctly:
a. Identify required actions
b. Respond to Contingencies
c. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes
7. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the performa nce of ECA-1.1
conditions.
(
OPL271 ECA-1 .1
Revision 1
Page 12 of 18
( x. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
27. DEPRESSURIZE RCS to reduce RCS suocoouns: Decreases RCS pressure to
a. Refer to EOP for Substeps limit break flow for a small
b. Refer to EOP for RNO break flow if in progress.
Terminate depressurization
when RCS subcooling
requirements are met or
PZR level increases that
might limit further pressure
decreases
28. DETERMINE if RHR should be placed in If prerequisite requirements
service: for RHR system operation
a. Refer to EOP for Substeps are met and TSC concurs
b. Refer to EOP for RNO then place RHR cooling in
service
29. MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated : Isolates or vents CLA to
a. Refer to EOP for Substeps prevent injection of nitrogen
b. Refer to EOP for RNO into RCS. Traps nitrogen in
CLA after all available water
has been injected into RCS.
( 30. MONITOR if RCPS should be stopped : Continuous action step.
a. Refer to EOP for Substeps Stops RCPs when RCS
b. Refer to EOP for RNO pressure is to low to support
RCP seal operation
31. CHECK RCS temperature greater than 200°F. Objective 5
a. Refer to EOP for RNO If RCS temperature is
<200°F skip steps 31 - 40
which depressurizes the
S/G to lower RCS
temperature
32. CHECK RWST level less than <8%. Objective 5
a. Refer to EOP for RNO If RCS temperature is
>200°F and water is still left
in the RWST then GO TO
step 1 and continue core
cooling by injection from the
33. PLACE pumps taking suction from RWST in Prevents cavitation of these
PULL TO LOCK: pumps for empty RWST
a. Refer to EOP for Substeps
(
( SQN LOSS OF RHR SUMP RECIRCULATlON
ECA-1.1
Rev. 11
\
iL - ..L- ..L- ---I
ISTEP II ACTlONIEXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
NOTE Upper head voiding may occur during RCS depressurization if no RCPs
are running. This may result in rapidly rising pressurizer level.
.. ,, \
I
27. DEPRESSURIZE RCS to reduce ,i
RCS subcooling:
B. CHECK RCS subcooling based on B. GO TO Step 28.
core exit TICs greater than 50°F.
b. USE normal pressurizer spray. b. USE one pressurizer PORV.
IF ReS CANNOT be depressurized
USING any pressurizer PORV,
( THEN
ESTABLISH auxiliary spray USING
EA-62-4 , Establishing Auxiliary Spr ay.
C. DEPRESSURIZE RCS C. IF RCS subcooling less than 40°F,
UNTIL either of the following THEN
conditions SATISFIED: RAISE RCS makeup flow
to restore subcooling.
- RCS subcooltnq
based on core exit TICs
between 40°F and 50°F.
- Pressurizer level
greater than 65%.
d. WHEN either condition
In Substep 27.c Is met,
THEN
STOP RCS depressurization.
(
I Page 19 of 38
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
81. E I2G2 .4.3 1 001
( Given the following plant conditions:
".
A steam line rupture has occurred on Unit 1.
- The crew was unable to isolate SGs.
ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, is in progress .
- The crew has taken action to minimize the plant cooldown .
- AFW flow to S/Gs 1, 3 and 4 are currently at 25 gpm.
- The following alarms are received:
1-AR-M3-C3, STM GEN #1 LEVEL LOW
1-AR-M3-C5, STM GEN #3 LEVEL LOW
1-AR-M3-C6, STM GEN #4 LEVEL LOW
Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required?
A. Raise AFW flow to #1, #3, and #4 SGs to ensure NR level remains above 10%
B. Raise AFW flow to #1, #3, and #4 SGs to ensure NR level remains above 50%
C~ Maintain AFW flow at its current value. When Thot starts to rise, raise AFW flow .
D. Maintain AFW flow at its current value . When 3 of 4 SGs are at the applicable
( setpoint, take action in accordance with FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary
Heat Sink .
A. Incorrect. After throttling to minimize RCS cooldown , even if levels are low, AFW
remains throttled until That begins to rise. At that point, AFW is throttled just enough to
stabilize temperature. Credible because 10% is the lower limit that level is checked at
B. Incorrect. After throttling to minimize RCS cooldown , even if levels are low, AFW
remains throttled until That begins to rise. At that point, AFW is throttled just enough to
stabilize temperature. Credible because 50% is the upper limit that level is checked at
C. Correct.
D. Incorrect. Since this an operator induced reduction of AFW flow, FR-H.1 actions
would not be performed
(
Monday, March 12, 20072:35:36 PM 156
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Emergency Procedures I Plan Knowtedge of annunciatorsalarms and indications. and use of the response instructions
( Question No. 56
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.3
Technical Reference: ECA-2.1. AR M3
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271 ECA-2.1, B.6.a
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments :
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: HI GHER D ifficulty:
( Job Position:
Date: 4/2007
Plant:
Last 2 NR C?:
SEQ UOYAH
NO
Monday . March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 157
OPL271 ECA-2.1
Revision 1
Page 3 of 46
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING -LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: ECA-2.1 , "UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM
GENERATORS"
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />(s)
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of
ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge 's and Abilities
- associated with Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators that
are rated <: 2.5 during Initial License Training and <: 3.0 during License
Operator Requalification Training for the appropriate license position as
identified in Appendi x A.
1. Explain the purpose/goal of ECA-2.1.
2. Discuss the ECA-2.1 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with
ECA-2.1 entry conditions.
b. Describe the requ irements associated with ECA-2.1 entry conditions .
3. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into ECA-
2.1.
4. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of ECA-2 .1.
5. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and
transitions to other procedures.
6. Given a set of initial plant conditions use ECA-2 .1 to correctly:
a. Identify required actions
b. Respond to Contingencies
c. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes
OPL271 ECA-2.1
Revision 1
Page 4 of 46
(
7. Discuss the reasons for maintaining a minimum flow to the S/Gs with levels less
than 10% during the uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs .
8. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the performance of ECA-2.1
condit ions.
OBJECTIVES TO BE COVERED IN THESE SEQUOYAH OPERATOR TRA INING PROGRAMS
OBJECTIVE I NONLICENSED LICENSE TRAINING
I NO.
O.
OPERATORS RO
X
X
REQUAUSPECIAL
1. X X
2. X X
3. - X X
4. X X
5. X X
( 6. X X
7. X X
8. X X
NOTE: The following approva l is required for License Requalification and special training only:
Training Program
Sequoyah Operator Training Manager I
Date
Sequoyah Operations Manager I
Date
(
UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ECA-2.1
ALL STEAM GENERATORS Rev. 9
ISTEP IIACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
NOTE Reducing total feed flow to less than 440 gpm, as directed in this procedure ,
does NOT require implementation of FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink,
as long as a total feed flow capability of 440 gpm is available.
2. CONTROL feed flow to minimize
RCS cooldown :
a . CHECK T-cold cooldown rate a. REDUCE feed flow to 25 gpm
less than 100°F/hr. to each S/G.
OPEN MD AFW pump recirc valves
FCV-3-400 and FCV-3-401
as necessary to control flow.
GO TO Substep 2.c (AER column).
(
b. MONITOR SIG narrow range levels b. CONTROL feed flow to maintain SIG
less than 50%. narrow range levels less than 50%.
c. MONITOR SIG narrow range levels c. MAINTAIN feed flow to affected S/G(s)
greater than 10% [25% ADVj . greater than or equal to 25 gpm
UNTIL level greater than
10% [25% ADV].
d. MONITOR T-hot indications d. IF RCS T-hot is rising,
STABLE or DROPPING. THEN
STABILIZE RCS T-hot:
- RAISE feed flow
- DUMP steam.
(
Page 5 of 34
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
2. 00 1 AA2.04 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 1 is at 90% power.
Which ONE (1) of the following sets of parameters will increase during an inadvertent
continuous control rod withdrawal event?
A. Reactor Power and Charging Flow
B. RCS Hot Leg Temperature and Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio
C. OT Delta T Setpoint and Main Steam Header Pressure
D~ RCS Hot Leg Temperature and Reactor Power
A-Incorrect. Charging flo w will decrease because pressurizer level will increa se due to
heatup. Credible because the parameter does change ans reactor power does rise
B-incorrect because DNBR gets lower (Closer to DNB) as temperature rises. Credible
because tempereture does rise.
C-Incorrect. OT Delta T setpoint will decrease in relation to Tavg increasing. Credible
( because the parameter changes, and steam pressure does rise.
D-Correct. Hot leg temp erature rises, as does reactor power, due to the positive
reactivity being added. OT and OP delta T setpoints will lower as power and
temperature rise
(
Monday, March 12, 20072:35:27 PM 3
QUESTIONS REPORT
fo r S EQU OYA H 2007 - NRC EXA M REV DRAFT
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: Reactor power and its trend
( Question No. 57
Tier 1 Group 2
Importance Rating: R0 4.2
Technical Reference: . T&AA
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271CGFES Attachment 16 Objective 20
Question Source: Bank
Question History: Robinson 2007 Editorially Modified
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.5
Comments:
Source : BANK Source If Bank: ROBINSON 2007 NRC
Cogniti ve Leve l: HIGH ER Difficulty:
( Job Position:
Date:
4/2007
Plant:
Last 2 NRC?:
SEQUOYAH
NO
Monday, March 12, 20072:35:27 PM 4
( PWR INSTRUCTOR GUIDE
VOLUME: REACTOR THEORY TIME8 HRS
INSTRUCTOR GUIDE: REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS REV 2
OBJECTIVES
15. Expl ain the characteristics to look for when the point of adding heat is reached.
16. Describe reactor power response after reaching the point of adding heat.
17. 18. Describe the monitoring and control of reactor power and primary temperature from 0% to
15% (Babcock & Wilcox Plants).
19. Describe the means by which reactor power will be increased to rated power.
20. Expl ain the effects of control rod motion or boration/dilution on reactor power.
21 . Describe the monitoring and control ofT,,,, T ref, and power during power operation.
( 22. Exp lain the relationship between steam flow and reactor power given specific conditions.
23. Exp lain reactor response to a control rod insertion.
24. Exp lain the shape of the curve of reactor power versus time after a reactor trip.
25. Defi ne decay heat.
26. Exp lain the relationship between decay heat generation and:
a. Power level history
b. Power production
c. Time since reactor shutdown
PWR / REACTOR THEORY / CHAPTER 30f99 © 1999 GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION
8
J REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS REV2
( 'INSTRUCTOR GUIDE KEY POINTS, AIDS,
QUESTIONS/ANSWERS
A. Reactor power is maintained at
approximately 2% while secondary plant is
prepared for power operations
1. When turbine generator is ready for
startup , reactor operator withdraws
control rods as necessary to establish
approximately 7- 15% power
2. Steam is bled directly to condenser by
steam dump system to maintain steam
pressure
3. As turbine generator draws more
steam, steam dump system
automatically reduces amount of steam
being bled.to condenser
-
4. ReS temperature and reactor power are
( maintained at appro ximately constant
levels
5. When turbin e generator load has
increased to match reactor power,
steam dumps will be fully elosed
6. Power escalation continues by
gradually opening main turbine
governor valves.
B. When power is increased above 15%, Objective 18
contro l rods may be placed in automatic
control
Objective 19 and 20
(
PWR I REACTOR TH EORY I CHAPTER 60 0f99 It! t 999 GENERAL PHYSICS CORP ORATION
8
I REACTOR OPERAT IONAL PHYS ICS REV 2
( I INSTRUCTOR GUIDE KEY POINTS, AIDS,
QUESTIONS/ANSWERS
I . The control rods will step out Figure 8-18 I TP 8-58
automatically to raise Tm in
acco rdance with ramped T. ve versus
power program (Figure 8-18)
- .
- ./
'
,~ -
..-
~
y-
_!. . O'
2. Values shown are for typical 4-100p
Westi nghouse plant
3. Actual values will vary from plant to
plant
C. Figure 8- 18 is representative for many
( Wes tinghouse plants and is similar to that
of CE stations as well
I. In general, CE station will tend to hold
Tcold as constant as possible, whereas
Westi nghouse plant will often have
T co1d drop as function ofreactor power
2. However, in some cases, T co1d will
actually rise somewhat, as denoted in
Figure 8-18
D. The key for both Wes tinghouse and CE
stations, however, is that T. vc will rise (or
slide) as function of reactor powe r, as
shown in Figure 8- I8
E. The reason for sliding T ave upward (or
holding Tcold constant) is to enable steam
pressure to remain higher at 100% turbine
load
PWR I REACTOR TH EORY I CHAPTER 61 of99 © 1999 GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION
8
I REACTOR OPE RAT IONAL PHYSICS REV 2
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Assuming the rod can be moved, which ONE (1) of the following is the speed at which
the rod will move when it is realigned?
A. 32 steps per minute
B~ 48 steps per minute
C. 64 steps per minute
D. 72 steps per minute
A. Incorrect. 32 SPM is part of the variable speed for auto rod control 3-5 deg F
mismatch. -
B. Correct. Control Bank in Manual or Bank Select will initiate motion at 48 SPM
( C. Incorrect. 64 SPM is for Shutdown Banks
D. Incorre ct. 72 SPM is maximum variable speed
(,
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:27 PM 11
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to determine and interpret the followIng as they apply to the Inoperable { Stuck Control Rod: Difference between Jog and run
rod speeds, effe ct on CRDM of stuck rod
(
Question No. 58
Tier 1 Group 2
Importance Rating: R02.5
Technical Reference: Rod Control SO, pg 38
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective : OPL271AOP-C.01 Objective 5
OPT200RDCNT Objective 4.e
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.6
Comments:
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
( Cognitive Level : LOWER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 412007 Last 2 NRC? : NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:27 PM 12
OPL271 AOP-C .01
Revision 0
Page 3 of 28
(
I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE : LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: AOP-C.01 , ROD CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 2.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />(s)
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Ter minal Objective:
Upon comple tion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of
AOP-C.01, ROD CONTROL SYSTE M MALFUNCTIONS
B. Enabling Objectives:
Objectives
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities
associated with Continuous Rod Withdrawal, Dropped Control Rod, and
Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod that are rated <: 2.5 during Initial License Training
and <: 3.0 during License Operator Requaiification Training for the appropriate
( position as identified in Appendix A.
l. State the purpose/goal of this AOP-C.01 .
2. Describe the AOP-C.01 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated
with AOP-C.01 entry conditions.
b. Describe the ARP requ irements associated with AOP-C.01 entry
cond itions.
c. Interpret, p rior itize , and verify associated alarms are consistent wi th
AOP-C .01 entry cond itions.
d . Describe the plan t pa ra meters that ma y indicate rod control fa ilure.
3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-
C.01.
4. Upon entry into AOP-C.01, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the
appropriate procedural section for response.
5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-C.01.
6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-C.0 1.
(
OPL271 AOP-C.01
Revision 0
Page 16 of 28
( x. L ESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
mm.ADJUST PLANT TURBINE LOAD AS
REQUIRED .
nn. GO TO APPROPRIATE PLANT PROCEDURE This is the endpoint of
CASE 2.
E. Case 3 - Misaligned shutdown/control rod(s) or bank Objecti ve 8, Cas e Study
Single misaligned control rod, from 60% reactor power.
1. Mitigating Strategy Objective 5
- If > 1 rod misaligned then trip the reactor or
shutdown the unit as required
- If oniy 1 rod is misaligned, then realign the
misaligned rod
- Stabilize the plant
- Monitor QPTR within limits
- Reduce load to <75% power in preparation for re-
alignment
- Correct the initiating cause
( * Realign the misaligned rod or bank
- Update ICS. PIA converter, and bank overlap as
required
- Restore control rods to AUTO
- Adjust turbine load as required.
2 . Diagnosis
a. Symptoms - QPTR alarms, Power Range channel Obje ctive 2
deviation alarm.
3. Procedure flow path.
a. Evaluate Tech Specs for applicability Tech Specs will be
discussed later in this
lesson
b. Diagnosis step.
(1) This step offers little in the form of Use diagnostic table in
diagnostic steps. rather directs the crew Section 2 of AOP
to the prope r section once the failure is
determined.
(2) Once misaligned rod is diagnos ed. GO Objective 4
( TO SECTION 2.3
OPT2 00RDCNT
Rev. 2
( Page 3 of73
I. PROGRAM : OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. TITLE: ROD CONTROL SYSTEM (RDCNT)
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> lecture ; 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> simul ator demonstration;
I hour self-study/workshop
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Tcrminal Objective:
Upon complet ion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to
appl y the knowledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated with
the Rod Control system in the plant and on the simul ator.
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understand ing of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities
associated with the Rod Control System that are rated > 2.5 during Initial License
trainin g for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.
1.- -State the purpose/functions of the Rod Control System as described in the SQN
FSAR.
( 2. State the design basis of the Rod Control System in accordance with the SQN
FSA R.
3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the
Rod Control System as illustrated on the simplifi ed system drawing.
4. Describe the following items for each major component in the Rod Control
System as described in this lesson:
a. Location
b. Power supply (include cont rol power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. No rmal operating parameters
e. Comp onent operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indication s
1. Protective features (including setpoint s)
j . Failu re modes
k. Unit differences
1. Typ es of acciden ts for which the Rod Control System components are designed
m. Location of controls and indications associated with the Rod Cont rol System in
( the control room and auxiliary control room
SQN.085.RDCNT
Rev. 0
( Page 38 of 100
Rod Control System Major Components
Pulser, Con tinued
Proc ess signals The table below desc ribes the process signals of the two pulsers.
Pul ser Si gnal Mod e Des crip tion
Va riable Rate Auto receive s a speed signal from the
Pulser Reactor Control Unit
Input Manual on an receive s a speed signal from a
individual control manual speed adjus t resistor in
bank the Process cabinets set for 48
SPM .
Shutdown Bank receives a speed signal from a
(SBA and SBB manual speed adjus t resisto r in
only) the Process Cabinet set for 64
SPM.
Auto 8-72 spm (48-432 pulses/min)
Output Manual or 48 sprn (288 pulses/min)
individual control
- bank
Shutdown Bank 64 spm (372 pulses/min)
Signal Description
( Constant Rate Input receives a speed signa l from a speed adjusting
Pulser resistor in the SCD logic circuit of the Logic
Cabinet.
Output 64 spm (64 pulses/min)
Shut down banks The first variable-rate pulser controls shutdown banks A and B because they are
contained in the same power cabinets as the control banks . The constant rate
pulser only controls shutdown banks C and D.
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
37. 028 AK3.05 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 1 is at 100% power.
Load is being reduced to 50% to remove a Main Feedwate r Pump from service.
Pressurizer Level Control is selected to L1-68-339
The Pressurizer Level Master Controller setpoint fails at its current value .
The load reduction is initiated.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the action that will be taken, and the reason
for those actions?
A. Change the press urizer level channel input to the master controller and restore
Letdown because the backup level channel will cause a letdown isolation .
By Take manual control of, and reduce Charging flow because actual pressurizer level
will be higher than program level for the actual power level as load is decreased.
C. Ta ke manual control of, and raise Charging flow because actual pressurizer level
will be lower than program level for the actual power level as load is decreased.
D. Change the pressurizer level channel input to the master controller and restore
Letdown because the controlling level channel will cause a letdown isolation.
( A. Incorrect. Changing input will not affect the controller because the setpoint has
failed, not the input
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect. Charging fiow must be reduces because level will be artificially high
D. Incorrect. Changing input will not affect the controller because the setpoint has
failed. Letdown will not isolate because actual/eve/ will indicate the same on all
channels
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM 70
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: Actions
contained in EOP for PZR level malfunction
(
Question No. 59
Tier 1 Group 2
Importance Rating: R03.7
Technical Reference : 1-AR-M5-A E-4
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Leaming Objective: OPT200.PZRLCS Objective 5.d
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
( Source :
Cognitive Level:
NEW
HIGHER
Source If Bank:
Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Da te: 412007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12,20072:35:30 PM 71
OPT200.PZRLCS
Rev. 2
Page 4 of 80
( V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
B. Enabling Objectives (Cont'd):
5. Describe the operation of the Pressurizer Level Control System as it relates to the
following:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed while placing the Pressurizer Level Control System in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a component failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failure will affect the Pressurizer Level Control System operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the Pressurizer Level Control System:
a. State Tech Specs/TRM LCOs that govern the Pressurizer Level Control System
b. State the:::1 hour action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of the Pressurizer Level Control System components and the
appropriate sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability requirements are met and
what actions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events:
( a. Event Title: SQ970649PER - V-I pressurizer was drained below 25% actual level
while decreasing level from solid water conditions
VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Computer.
B. Computer Display Projector & Controls.
C. Local Area Network (LAN) Access.
D. Simulator (if available)
(
OPT200 .PZRLCS
Rev . 2
Page 46 of 80
('
Level Alarms
> 1*AR*55*M5*A (E4)
- LS-68-339E/F +5% of span above level
program
bj.5
( X. LESSON BODY:
Alarms: Review alarms using the slide above.
- Refer to the appropriate annunciator response procedure for full details
including setpoints, alarms sources, and operator actions.
Bases for energizing heaters on +5% level deviation:
- The level deviation-high is assumed to be an insurge produced by a
decrease in load, introducing subcooled water enters the pressurizer.
- If a subsequent outsurge were to occur, the subcooled water would not
assist in maintaining pressure by flashing to steam.
- It is conservatively assumed that a subsequent outsurge will occur,
therefore, the backup heaters are energized as an anticipatory measure.
32 (E-4)
('
Source Setpoint
SER 367 5% of span above level
1*LS*68*339E/F program
LS-68-339E/F
PRESSURIZER
LEVEL HIGH
BACKUP HTRS ON
Probable 1. Char ging and/or letdown flow mismatch.
Causes 2. Instrument malfunction of level or Tavg .
3. Load transi ent condition.
Corrective [1] CONFIRM instrumentation by CHANNEL CHECK
Actions [2] IF instrument has failed , THEN
GO TO AOP-1.04, Pressurizer Instrumen t Malfunction.
[3] IF instru ment has not failed, THEN
( ENSURE level is returning to program 1-LR-68-339 with
appropriate charging and letdown.
[4] IF RCS pressure ~ 2265 psig , THEN
DEENERGIZE backup heater 1C, [C.1]
[5] EVALUATE Technical Specifications (3 .3.1 and 3.3.2).
References 45B65 5-05A-0,
47B60 1-68-4 5
SQN 1-AR-MS-A
Page 39 of 43
1 - - - - - - - i Rev. 29
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
1. 059 AK I.02 001
( Given the following plant conditions:
An accidental spill of the Monitor Tank has occurred in the Aux Building.
Radiation levels in the area of the spill are 40 mr per hour at 30 em.
Contamination levels on the floor around the tank are 1.2E6 DPM/100 cm 2
Which ONE (1) of the following describes (1) the major radiation concern for the spill,
and (2 ) the postinqs applied to the area?
A. (1) Area radiation is a gamma concern; Contamination is a gamma concern
(2) Radiation area; Contamination area
Bt (1) Area radiation is a gamma concern; Contamination is a beta concern
(2) Radiation area; High Contamination area
C. (1) Area radiation is a beta concern; Contamination is a gamma concern
(2) High Radiation area ; Contamination area
D. (1) Area radiation is a beta concern ; Contamination is a beta concern
(2) High Radiation area; High Contamination area
( A. Incorrect. This area should be posted as a high contamination area
B. Correct. Area radiation is typically gamma, while contamination is beta radiation.
Less than 100 mr per hour is a radiation area. Greater than 50,000 DPM/100 cm2 is a
contaminated area . Greater than 50,000 dpm/100 cm2 is a high contamination area
C. Incorrect. Concern s for the effects are reversed, and postings are incorrect
D. Incorrect. Concerns for effects of area is incorrect and posting for radiation is
incorrect
Monday, March 12,20073:24:52 PM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the operational implicationsof the following concepts as they apply to Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release:
Biological effects on humans of various types of radiation, exposure levels that are acceptable for nuclear power plant personnel,
( and the units used for radiation-intensity measurements and for radiation exposure levels
Question No. 60
Tier 1 Group 2
Importance Rating: R0 2.6
Technical Reference : SPP-5.1, RCI-15
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: RWT-010,
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.12
Comments:
( Source: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: HIG HER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 3:24:52 PM 2
TVAN STANDARD SPP-5.1
PROGRAMS AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS Rev. 5
( PROCESSES Page 32 of 33
Lens Dose Equivalent (LDE) - Applies to the external exposure of the lens of the eye and is
taken as the dose equivalent at a tissue depth of 0.3 centimeter (300 mg/cm').
Licensee - Means the holder of a license.
Member of the Publ ic - Any individual except when that individual is receiving an occupational
dose.
Occupational Dose - The dose received by an individual in the course of employm ent in which
the individual"s assigned duties involve exposure to radiation and/or radioactive material from
licensed and unlicensed sources of radiation , whether in the possession of the licensee or other
person . Occupational dose does not include dose received from background radiation, as a
patient from medical practices, or from voluntary participation in medical research , or as a
member of the public.
On -The-Job Training (OJT) - Performance of duties, commensurate with the level to which the
training will be credited , under the direction of appropriately experienced personnel.
Planned Special Exposu re (PSE) - An infreque nt exposure to radiation, separate from and in
addition to the annual dose limits.
RADCON Instrument * Any RAOCON instrument used (not including installed facility radiation
monitoring-system) to measure radiation exposure, exposure rate, dose, dose rate, dose
equivalent, or dose equivalent rate or to assess airborne or surface contamination. Instruments
utilized in the external and internal dosimetry programs are excluded from this definition.
( RADCON Technician - A technician qualified in radiation protection and serving in a responsible
position per ANSI N18.1-1971.
Rad iation Area - An area, accessible to individuals , in which radiation levels could result in an
individua l receiving a dose equivalen t in excess of 5 mrem in one hour at 30 cm from the
radiation source or from any surface that the radiation penetrates.
Radiation Work Permit (RWP) * A document for ccnt rolling the radiological aspects of work .
Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) - An area within (or that may coincide with) the
Restricted Area (defined in 10 CFR 20.1003) boundaries that may have increasing radiological
hazards.
Removable Contamination - Contamination which may be easily transferred to personnel or
surfaces through casual contact.
Response Check - Exposure of the instrument to radiation in a reproducible geometry such that
a reading is obtained for each scale or decade normally used in order to verify that the
instrument response is acceptable for performing surveys.
Restricted Area - Any area access to which is limited by the licensee for purposes of protection
of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials (10 CFR 20.1003) .
TVAN STANDARD SPP-5.1
PROGRAMS AND RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS Rev. 5
(-, PROCESSES Page 31 of 33
Declared Pregnant Woman - Means a woman who has voluntaril y informed the licensee , in
writing, of her pregnancy and the estimated date of conception. The declaration remains in
effect until the declared pregnant woman withdraws the declaration in writing or is no longer
pregnant.
Deep Dose Equivalent (DOE) * Applies to external whole-body exposure . The dose equivalent
at a tissue depth of 1 cm (1000 mg/cm').
Derived Air Concentration (DAC) - The concentration of a given radionuclide in air which , if
breathed by the reference man for a working year of 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> under conditions of light work
(inhalation rate 1.2 cubic meters of air per hour), results in an intake of one ALI. For modes of
intake other than inhalation, an equivalent DAC-hr shall be determined and included as DAC-hrs
in the individual 's dose tracking record . The equivalent DAC-hr is equal to the number of hours
of exposure at the DAC (i.e., DAC-hrs exposure which would result in an equivalent intake of
radioactive material as has been observed in a particular exposure incident). This permits the
comparison of intake by inhalation with other modes of intake (ingestion, injection, absorption ,
etc.). 2000 DAC-hr is equal to one ALI.
Dose* A generic term that means absorbed dose, dose equivalent , effect ive dose equivalent,
committed dose equivalent, committ ed effective dose equivalent , or total effective dose
equival ent.jas defined in applicable sections of 10 CFR 20.
NOTE For purposes of this document and implementing procedures, radiation exposure as
expressed in units of Rlhr and subunits, thereof, is equivaient to dose (rad) and dose
( equivalent (rem). Based on ANSI N13.11 development and terminology, any acute dose
greater than 10 rem is generally denoted in units of rad, since that level is considered as
the accident range of personnel exposure. Any dose less than that level is considered
the protective range of personnel exposure.
Experience - As used in this document and ANSI N18.1-1971and ANSI /ANS-3 .1 (1981), actual
applicable working experience performing duties commensurate with the position . Observation
of others is not considered experience. Up to 12 months of OJT may be credited toward
e xperience on a one-for-one basis.
Fixed ccntamtnattcn- Contamination which is not transferred through casual contact and is not
detected by smear survey. It may become removable through operations such as grinding ,
welding , etc .
High Radiation Area- An area, accessible to individuals , in which radiation levels from radiation
sources external to the body could result in an individual receiving a dose equivalent in excess
of 100 mrem in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at 30 centimeters from the radiation source or 30 centimeters from any
surface that the radiation penetrates .
Hot Particle* A single discrete object (particle) generally difficult to see (usually <100 micron)
with the naked eye, and at least 0.1 microcuries of radioactivity . It is either an activated
corrosion/wear product or fuel fragment with high specific activity . For the purpose of an
approximate field calculation , any discrete particle surveyed with a standard frisker probe
(HP"260 , HP-210 , etc.) and found to have levels of greater than or equal to 20,000 cpm, shall be
considered a hot particle.
Individual Monitoring Devices (individual monitoring equipment) * Means devices designed to
be worn by a single individual for the assessment of dose equivalent such as film badges,
c thermoluminescence dosimeters (TLDs), pocket ionization chambers , and personal ("lapel") air
sampling devices .
RWTOIO
c Revision 9
Page 86 of 100
Screen post6 POSTED AREAS
Screen TCPTV
Radioactive Materials Area
Define and recognize a Any area or room in which radioactive material is used, stored, or transferred.
Radioactive Materials Area . In addition to the yellow and magenta colors and tri-hlades, tbe word CA UTION
or DANGER will appear on posting.
Screen TCPTW All radioactive materials shall be stored in designated radioactive material
tml cr 99-0072 storage area or room with the posting "Caution, Radioactive Material." All
radioactive material shall be labeled with a "Caution, Radioactive Material' tag.
You must notify RADCON prior to placement or removal of radioactive material
from a radioactive material storage area.
Unlabeled radioactive material shall not be left unattended.
If you find a radiological material container which is torn, unsealed, unlabeled,
or unattended, call RADCON.
S creen TCPTX All items which have been used in a contaminated area or potentially
contaminated system are considered contaminated until surveyed and released
by RADCON.
These items shall be placed in a sealed yellow container/bag containing the
radioactive material symbol.
( Containers with radioactive liquids require special care. RADCON may perform
surveys during the movement. These items should be transported in a rigid
device such as a bucket, drum or cart if there is potential for the primary
container to be damaged and leak.
Screen TerTY Radioactive material which is being transported from one RCA to another
through a clean area will normally be escorted by RADCON , except when
properly bagged hand tools or protective clothing, certain chemistry samples,
and materials are transported by other authorized persons.
You must maintain control of radioactive material in your possession while
frisking or getting undressed upon exiting a contamination zone.
Ensnre you place the radioactive material away from otber personnel.
Screen post9 Radiation Area
Define lind recognize a
Radi ation Area.
An accessible area in which a person could receive a deep dose in excess of 5
mrem in one hour (5 mrem /hr) at 30 centimeters (about 1 foot) from the source.
The word "caution" will appear on the radiological posting.
Screen postl 0 Entry requirements are the same for Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA)
entry.
(
RWTOIO
Revision 9
( Page 87 of 100
Screen postll High Radiation Area
trn2 cr 99-0004
Defin e a nd r ecognize a High
An accessible area in wh ich ra diatio n levels fr om ra diation sources exter nal to
Radiation Arca. the bod)" could resu lt in a n indiv idua l receiving a dose eq uiva lent in excess of 100
mrem in 1 hou r (100 mremlhr) at 30 cent imet ers (abo ut 1 foot) from t he
rad iation source or 30 ce ntimeters from a ny surface that the rad ia tion
pe netra tes.
Screen postl] T he word "'caution" or "danger" wlll appear on the sta ndard radio logical
posting.
Screen postI J Entry requirem ents for a High Ra diati on Area :
Screen post14 * All RCA entra nce re quire ments apply.
Screen postl5 * Eithe r a dose warning d evice, dose rat e meter, or RADCO N coverage. Any
entry into a high ra dia tion area wit ho ut one of these items will subject the
ind ividu al a nd TVAN to an i"H.C violation!!!!
S creen PlJ.'il /7 Not ify th e RADCO N g ro up prior to ANY ent ry into a High Rad iation Area .
Screen post/8 Any entry into a High Rad iat ion Area WITH O UT th e ab ility to kee p t rac k of
dose rates is a serio us violat ion of plant procedure a nd may ca use an
overexposu re.
( Screen post19
Define an d recogn ize a
l ocked lli gh Rad iatio n Area
Areas wh ere dose rat es are greater tha n 1000 mremlbr at 30 cm fro m t he so urce
sha ll be posted as a Locked High Radiation Area a nd locke d (wit h a key
controlled by Ra dCo n).
- If the a rea can not be locke d, a contin uous atte nda nt (door wa tch) must be
present. T he door wa tc h will be briefed in Lockcd IIigh Radiation Area
door watc h req uirements.
Screen post/9a
- If it becomes necessar y to lock a rea s that d o not have a pe rma nent enclosure,
a temporary enclosure may be install ed a roun d th e area and locked wit h a
High Ra diation Area padlock.
- Elect ro nic surve illance ma y a lso be used to pr event un au tho rized entries.
Screen qutzl O UESTION: The room you are working in has a dose rate of 50 mremlhr . It should
(rn ] cr 99-0083 be posted as a high radiation area.
True or False
Screen qutzt c A" SWE R: False. Thc room should be posted as a rad iation area. A High Radiation
Area has dose rates in excess of 100 mrem/h r.
RCI-15
( SQN RADIOLOGICAL POSTINGS Revision 15
Page 10 of 13
6.0 REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
D. Positi ve engineering controls may be necessary to ensure that
airborne radioactivity does not spread to other plant areas.
Ventilation systems in affected rooms should be operable and
maintain a negative pressure differential. Items such as glove
bags or containment tent s may be utilized to confine the source of
airborne radioactivity and portable vent ilation systems may be
used to cont rol the spread of generated airborne radioactivity .
Air borne Radioactivity Areas must be promptly posted and
necessary precautions taken to ensure that the airborne
radioactivity is confined within the posted area .
6.12 Contamination Area
A. 1OCFR20 does not define criteria for establishing or posting of a
Contamination Area . The criterion of ~ 1,000 dpm/100 cm' of
transferrable contamination is used to define this establishment
and posting .
B. A Contamination Area is an area , accessible to individuals, in
which transferrable contamination levels are ~ 1000 dpm/100 ern",
( C. Each Contamination Area shall be posted with a conspicuous sign
or signs bearing the standard radiation symbol and the words
Caution - Contaminati on Area .
D. The entrance/exit for a Contaminatio n Area is ident ified by the use
of a step -off-pad (SOP). Directions printed or written on the SOP
instruct ind ividuals exiting the area to remove conta minated
cloth ing prior to stepping onto the SOP , to prevent the spread of
contamination outside of the posted Contamination Area .
E. It may impractical to post and establish all Contamination Areas as
described above. Due to space limitations and physica l properties,
some areas such as floor drains or samp le/instrume nt panels may
be identified with radiation tape and/or radiation caution tags .
6.13 High Contamination Area
A. 1OCFR20 does not define criteria for establishing or post ing of a
High Contamination Area . The criterion of ~ 50,000 dpm/100 cm'
of tra nsferrable contam ination in the general area is used to define
this establishment and posting .
B. A High Contamination Area is an area , accessible to individuals, in
which transferrable contamination levels in the general area are
~ 50,000 dpm/100 ern".
RWTO IO
Revision 9
( Page 14 0fi 00
S creen treld
u Alpha particles ca n be shielded by a piece of paper, by th e dead
C haracterize the methods of layer of skin on the su rface of the body, or by clothing.
sh ield ing alpha radia tion.
S creen trel e
.u However, becau se alpha particles are highly energetic , the y can
Cha ra cter ize the exp osu re damage the softer internal tissues if depo sited for a period of time.
ha zard of alpha radi a tion.
We say then , th at it is primarily an INTER:'i AL HAZARD.
S creen tret p
Sta re th e four typ es ( I f
Y Gamma Radiation
radia tion fou nd in a
co m me rcia l nuclea r power Gamma radi ation has no electrical charge or mass. It 's a wave of pure
plant. ENERGY!
S creen trel q
y Sources include fission, fission products, and activation products.
C ha ra cterize wh ere ga m ma
radi ati on is found .
Screen trelr
y Gamma radiation is a VERY penetrating form of wave ra diat ion.
Ch ara cter ize gamm a ra dta tlon
by its penetrat ing abili ty. Gamma ray can ea sily penetrate the walls of piping
containing radioactive materials.
( .reen trets
y Gamma radiation can be RED UCED by shield ing the source of th e
C haracte rize th e methods of radiation with very den se material such as lead , steel, o r concrete.
shiel d ing gam ma r a d ia tion.
Sc reen trelt
y Gamm a radi at ion is an extremely penetrating wave that is an
Cha ra cterize the exposure external hazard to the whole body. The majority of nuclear plant
hazard or gamma r adi ation. worker dose is from G AM~IA radiation.
ld en tffy the typ e of r a diatio n
th ai co ntr ibutes th e most too a
worker' s dose.
Screen trelf
State the four types of
~ Beta Radi ation
r ad iati on found In a
commercial nu clear po wer Beta radiation is mad e up of high speed particles with a negat ive elect rical
pla nt. charge which orig inate fr om th e nucleus of an atom.
Sc reen trelg
Source of most beta particles is from activated corrosion and fission
C haract erize w here beta products.
radiali on is foun d.
(
RWTOIO
Revision 9
(' Page 15 of 100
Scum Ire Jlr
Penetration in air is usually limited to a few feet, but beta particles
Characterize beta radiation by have more penetrating power than alpha particles.
its penetrating ability.
Scree" trelI
The best shielding for beta is a few layers of lightweight plastic or
Characterize the methods of light metal.
shielding beta radiation.
Screen ttelj
Eyes and skin can be affected by beta radiation, but normally it eau
Characterize the exposure only penetrate a few layers of skin.
hazard of beta radiation.
Personnel would have to work fairly close to a beta source
to receive much exposure.
Screen trelk
State the four types of radiation
11 Neutron Radiation
found in a commercial nuclear
power plant. Neutron particles are part of the atomic nucleus that has been freed by
either decay or fission. Neutrons have no electrical charge.
Screen/fell
Fission process creates neutron particles.
Characterize where neutron
radiation is found.
( ~TeelJ trelm
Neutron particles are very penetrating.
Characterize neutron radiation
by its penetrating ability.
Screen treln
They are best shielded by water, concrete, or thick polyethylene.
Characterize th e methods of
shielding neutron radiation.
Screen trelo
Due to the high-penetration capabilities of neutron radiation, it is
Characterize the exposure an external hazard to the whole body.
hazard of neutron radiation.
Neutron exposure mainly occurs when in close proximity to
the reactor only while it is operating.
Screen quizl OUESTION: Most ionizing radiation dose at the station is from this type of radiation:
1m2 cr 99-0083
alpha or beta or neutron or gamma
Screen quiz2d ANS'VER: Gamma radiation is very penetrating and is located at variou s locations in the
plant , therefore causing most of our dose .
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
1. 060 AK 1.01 00 1
( Which ONE (1) of the following COMPLETELY lists ALL of the exhaust locations
monitored for airborne effluents that are potential sources of geaseous waste , and the
units that the effluents are measured in?
A. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust for each unit, an Auxiliary Building Exhaust and a
Shield Building Exhaust for each unit: measured in counts per minute.
B~ Condenser Vacuum Exhaust for each unit, a Service Building Exhaust, an Auxiliary
Building Exhaust and a Shield Building Exhaust for each unit; measured in counts
per minute .
C. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust for each unit, an Auxiliary Building Exhaust and a
Shield Building Exhaust for each unit; measured in mRem per hour.
D. Condenser Vacuum Exhaust for each unit, a Service Building Exhaust, an Auxiliary
Building Exhaust and a Shield Building Exhaust for each unit; measured in mRem
per hour.
A. Incorrect. A /~o have a service building exhaust.
B. Correct.
( C. Incorrect. Also have a service building exhaust, and measured in CPM
D. Incorrect. Measured in CPM, but a/l monitors are included
Monday, March 12, 2007 3:36:57 PM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release:
Types of radiation, their units of intensity, and the location of sources of radiation in a nuclear power plant
(-,
Question No. 61
Tier 1 Group 2
Importance Rating : RO 2.5
Technical Reference: ' OPT200.RM
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learn ing Objective: OPT200.RM, Obj 4
Question Source : Modified
Question History: SQN ODCM B.2-2
Question Cognitive Level : Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.13
Comments:
( Source: MODIFIED Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Lasl 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 3:36:57 PM 2
OPT200.R M
Rev. 2
Page 10 of 166
(
ENABLING OBJECTIVES
4. Describe the following characteristics of
each major component in the Radiation
Monitoring System:
- Location
- Power supply (include control power as applicable)
- Support equipment and systems
- Normal operating parameters
- Component operation
- Controls
- Interlocks (including setpoints)
- Instrumentation and Indicat ions
( I. INTRODUCTION
C. Lesson Purp ose and Significance
This lesson does not include a detail study of all the theory behind radiation and
the principles used to measure it.
Radiation Monitor Student Handout (includes General Background on Radiation
Detection Principles) gives information concernin g types of radiation, interaction
with matter, detection of radiation and type s of detectors.
Instructor Note: Have the students ref er to this handout if there is a need to review these
p rinciples. This handout should be in the students hands a day previous to the
class fo r review.
(
OPT200.RM
Rev. 2
Page 69 of 166
Condenser Vacuum Pump Exhaust Monitors
1,2-RE-90-99 & 119, & 1,2-RE-90-255 & 256
- Continuously monitors mechanical vacuum
pump air exhaust for an indication of a
primary-to-secondary leak.
- Two low range monitors, 1,2-RE-90-99 &
119, & two accident monitors RE-90-255 &
256
- RE-90-99/119 alarm on detectable radiation
in the condenser exhaust - first indication of a
primary to secondary leak.
EO-4
( X. LESSON BODY
D. Major Components
4. Process and Effluent Gas Monitors
Condenser Vacuum Pump Exhaust Monitors 1, 2-RE-90-119, 1,2-RE-90-99, 1,2-
RE-90-255, 1,2-RE-90-256
Continuously monitor the mechanical vacuum pump air exhaust for an indication
of a primary-to-secondary leak.
Two low range monitors, 1,2-RE-90-99 and I ,2-RE-90-119, and two accident
monitors RE-90-255 & 256 (mid & high range) - overlapping ranges
RE-90-99 or 119 continuously samples the condenser vacuum pump exhaust to
monitor noble gas concentrations for indications of primary to secondary leakage
and for evaluations of radioactivity released to the environment.
Co ver the same range of concentrations - both monitors should not be in
service at the same time due to flow limitations on the condenser vacuum
pump exhaust.
alarm on any detectable reading of radiation in the condenser exhaust -
first indication of a primary to secondary leak.
- RE-90-255 & 256 , provides detection of noble gases over the entire range of
concentrations from normal operations to accident conditions.
- 99 & 119 located on el. 732 of the turbine bldg.
Power Supply :- 480 V C&A Vent Board
Instrumentation: Radiation process & area monitor power dist panel
(
OPT200.RM
Rev. 2
Page 74 of 166
(
Shield Building Ventilation Monitors RM/RE-90-
400 I RE-90-402 & RE-90-260 I 261
- The shield building vent stack effluent discharge
is monitored by two separate radiation
monitoring systems
- RE-90-400/402
- RE-90-260/261
- Each system has its own pumps and detectors.
- Flow through both systems is controlled by flow
control valves that receive inputs from a micro-
computer Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM)
EO-4
X. LESSON BODY
D. Major Compone nts
4. Process and Effluent Gas Monitors
Shield Building Ventilation Monitors RMIRE- 90-400, R E-90-402, RE-90-260, RE-90-
261
The shield building vent stack effluent discharge is monitored by two separate
radiation monitoring systems, the RE-90-400/402 & RE-90-260/261.
- Each system has its own pumps and detectors.
Flow through these two systems is controlled by flow control valves which receive
inputs from a micro-computer Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM).
l
OPT200.RM
Rev. 2
Page 89 of 166
(
Auxiliary Building Vent Monitor channel
0-RE-90-101
- Noble gas monitor - Beta scintillation detector
- Particulate & radioiodine is collected with removable filter
& analyzed remotely
- Sampling probe assembly fitted with seventy-two sample
nozzles - air adjusted manually
- Noble gas channel automatically initiates auxiliary
building vent isolation and startup of the Auxiliary
Building gas treatment system (ABGTS)
- Both trains are blocked with HS-90-136A3 (Buffered
signal for isolation between trains) on M-12
EO-4
( X. LESSON BODY
D. Major Components
4. Process and Effluent Gas Monitors
Auxiliary Building Vent Monitor channel O-RE-90-101
- Monitors for noble gases
Particulate radioactivity and radioiodine is collected with a removable filter and
analyzed remotely.
Beta scintillation detector
- Utilizes a sampling probe assembly fitted with seventy-two sample nozzles
Nozzles geometrically arranged to allow taking a representative sample of
effluent
- Air velocity is manually adjusted to effect isokinetic sampling from the
vent
The sample taken from the duct is too large to be routed directly to the
particulate and iodine filters, therefore a sub-sample is taken from the main
sample line.
At setpoint the noble gas channel automatically initiates auxiliary building vent
isolation and startup of the Auxiliary Building gas treatment system (ABGTS)
- Both trains are blocked with HS-90-136A3 (Buffered signal for isolation
between trains) on M-12
OPT200 .RM
Rev. 2
Page 92 of 166
(
Service Building Vent Monitor O*RE*90*132
- Possib le sources of contaminants in the vent
system are exhaust from the radiochemical lab,
titration room, counting room , & decontamination
rooms .
- Indicated & annunciated in MCR (M-12) - high
radiation & instrument malfunction
- Power Supply: 480-volt C&A vent board 1A1-A.
- Instrument Power:120 vac radiation. process &
area monitoring DBT panel 1, bkr 14.
- aDCM 1.1.2: Requires ope rability of noble gas
activity & flow rate monitor.
EO-4
( X. LESSON BODY
D. Major Components
4. Process and Effluent Gas Monitors
Service Building Vent Mo nitor chann el O-R E-90-132
Possible sources of contaminants in the vent system are exhaust from the
radiochem ical lab, titration room, counting room, and decontamination rooms.
- Indicated & annunciated in MCR (M-12) - high radiation & instrument
malfunction
Power Supply: 480-volt C&A vent board IAI-A.
- Instrument Power:120 vac rad. process & area monitoring DBT panel ! , bkr 14.
ODCM 1.1.2
Drawing 47W6! 0-90-!
(,
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
62 . 068 AK2.02 001
( Given the following plant conditions:
- Unit 1 is at 100% RTP when a fire occurs in the cable spreading room.
- Due to the large amount of smoke in the main control room, it is decided by the
Shift Manager that the main control room must be abandoned.
Which ONE (1) of the following responses below describes the proper operating crew
actions for the given conditions?
A'! Trip the reactor and verify reactor tripped prior to abandoning the Main Control
Room.
B. Place HS-13-204 and 205 (M-15) to TRIP and proceed to the Aux Control Room .
Verify the reactor is tripped in the Aux Control Room.
C. Evacuate the Main Control Room and take E-O to the Aux Control Room . Trip the
reactor locally by opening the reactor trip breakers at the MG set room .
D. Announce over the PA to evacuate the Main Control Room and proceed to the Aux
Control Ro0':!.1. Trip the reactor locally by opening the control rod MG set breaker at
the 480V Unit boards.
C A. Correct. Section 2.1 step 1
B. Incorrect. Aux Control Room would have indication of whether reactor is tripped, but
the trip would be verified in the MCR
C. Incorrect. EOPs are not applicable when evacuating MCR
D. Incorrect. AOP-C.04 does not have option for tripping reactor from 480V Unit
boards
(,
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:33 PM 118
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledgeof the interrelations between the Control Room Evacuation and the following: Reactor trip system
( Question No. 62
Tier 1 Group 2
Importance Rating: R03.7
Technical Reference: AOP C.04
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-C.04, B.6
Question Source: Bank
Question History: SON Bank
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
( Source:
Cogni tive Level:
BANK
LOWER
Source If Bank:
Difficulty:
SQN IlANK
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC'?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:33 PM 119
OPL271 AOP-C.04
Revision 1
Page 3 of 26
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINiNG
III. LESSON TITLE: AOP-C .04, SHUTDOWN FROM AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />(s)
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective :
Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain , using class room evaluations and/or simulator scenarios , the requirements of AOP-
C.04, SHUTDOWN FROM AUXILIARY CONTROL ROOM.
B. Enabling Objectives:
Obiecti ves
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities
associated with Shutdown from the Auxiliary Control Room that are rated <: 2.5
during Initial License Training and <: 3.0 during License Operator Requalification
( Training for the appropriate position as identified in Appendi x A.
1. State the purpose/goal of this AOP-C.04.
2. Describe the AOP-C .04 entrv conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with
AOP-C .04 entry conditions .
b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-C.04 entry
conditions.
c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-
C.04 entrv conditions.
d. Describe the plant parameters that may indicate a Shutdown from the
Auxiliary Control Room is required.
3. Upon entry into AOP-C.04, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the
appropriate procedural section for response.
4. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-C.04.
5. Describe the actions that must be taken before abandoning the main control room,
including a basis for each action.
6. Explain the staffing requirements for unit abandonment per AOP-C .04.
7. Describe the types of equipment that are on the various checklists associated with
AOP -C.04
8. Describe the actions that may be necessary if procedure steos are taken before all
OPL271AOP-C.04
Revision 1
Page 4 of 26
( Objectives
checklists are complete .
9. Describe the bases for the limits, notes, cautions of AOP-C.04.
10. Describe actions per AOP-C .04, that are required to:
a. Maintain Plant in Hot Shutdown
b. Cooldown plant form Aux. Control Room
c. Return to Main Control Room
11. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and
transitions to other procedures.
12. Given a set of initial plant conditions use AOP-C .04 to correctly:
a. Recoanize entrv conditions.
b. Identify required actions.
c. Respond to Continoencies.
d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.
13. Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance of
AOP-C:04.
14. Discuss the parameters to be considered by the SED when making a REP
( classification during a control room evacuation.
15. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to,
durinq and after the abnormal condition.
AOP*C .04
( SQ N SHUTDOWN FRO M AUXILIARY CON TROL ROO M
Rev. 13
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.1 Control Room Abandonment
NOTE EOPs are NOT applicable when evacuating MCR.
1. ENSURE reactor TRIPPED. [M-4]
2. ENSURE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valve
handswitches in CLOSE. [M-4]
3. DISPATCH CRO with radio and Appendix Z
( to perform the following:
a. GO TO AOP-C.04 Cabinet.
[6.9KV Shutdown Board Rm A]
b. ENSURE personnel dispatched
to perform applicable checklists and
appendices USING Appendix Z,
Task Assig nment Sheet.
4. ENSURE one CCP placed in
PULL TO LOCK.
Page 4 of 183
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
67. 074 EA I.08 001
( Given the following plant conditions :
The crew is responding to a LOCA.
Due to equipment failures , the crew has entered FR-C.1, Response to
Inadequate Core Cooling.
Wh ich ONE (1) of the following methods is the highest priority in restoring the Core
Cooling CSF?
A. Depressurize the RCS by venting to Containment.
B. Initiate RHR flow to provide maximum cooling flow.
C. Rapidly depressurize the secondary to facilitate RCS depressurization.
D~ Start available CCP and Sl pumps and align ECCS valves as necessary.
A. Incorrect. Depressurizing the RCS to Cntmt is a last resort.
B. Incorrect. RHR flow would be established after significant depressurization has
occurred. Thsi would not be the primary plan to establish core cooling
C. Incorrect. Would perform once it was determined that HPI is unavailable
D. Correct. Top priority is to establish HPI if possible , although HPI failure most likely
( led to entry to this procedure
Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a Inadequate Core Cooling: HPI System
Question No. 63
Tier 1 Group 2
Importance Rating: R04.2
Technical Reference: FR-C.1
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271 FR-C.1 , B.3
Question Source: Bank
Question History: SQN Bank
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
Monday, March 12,20072:35:34 PM 128
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQN BANK
( Cogni tive Level:
Job Position:
LOWER
Difficulty:
Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 20072:35:34 PM 129
OPL271 FR-C .1
Revision 1
Page 3 of 16
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: FR-C .1 , INADEQUATE CORE COOLING
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demon strate or
explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of
FR-C .l , INADEQUATE CORE COOLING.
B. Enabling Objecti ves
Obiectives
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge 's and abilities
associated with Inadequate Core Cooling that are rated <: 2.5 during Initial License
Training and <: 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the
appropriate position as identified in Appendix A
(
I. State the purpose /goal of this FR-C .1.
2. Describe the FR-C.1entrv conditions.
a. Describe the plant parameters and setpoints associated with FR-C.1
entrv conditions.
b. Demonstrate an understanding of the use of F-O, Status Trees to
indicate when FR-C .1 must be implemented.
3. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into FR-C.1.
4. Describe the bases for ail limits, notes, cautions, and steps of FR-C.1.
5. Describe the condit ions and reason for transitions within this procedure and
transitions to other procedures.
6. Given a set of initial plant conditions use FR-C .1 to correctlv:
a. Recoanize entry conditions .
b. Identifv reauired actions.
c. ResDond to Continaencies.
d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.
( 7. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to,
durina and after the abnormal condition.
(
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT
EOI PROGRAM MANUAL
FUNCTION RESTORATION PROCEDURE
FR-C.1
INADEQUATE CORE COOLING
Revision 12
QUALITY RELATED
PREPARED/PROOFREAD BY: ~:>"...!--,=,,-,'-'....'=!,-,----
D. A. PORTER _
( RESPONSI BLE ORGANIZATION : _ _OPERATIONS
""'--':!.>!"-'-!.'="-'-"'---- _
APPROVED BY: ---'-'~="-"='.!....!!2!:.!:...
TOM MARSHALL _
EFFECTIVE DATE: 01/09/2007
REVISION
DESCRIPTION : Revised to update E-1 step number reference.
This procedure contains a Handout Page (2 copies).
( SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
Rev. 12
HANDOUT
Page 1 of 1
STEP ACTION
1. MONITOR RWST level greater than 27%.
10 . MONITOR if hydrogen igniters and recombiners should be turned on.
10.a.4) WH EN hydrogen analyzers have been in ANA LYZE for at least 5 minutes ,
RNO THEN PERFORM substeps 1O.b through 10.e.
10 .d . WHEN ice condenser AHU breakers have been opened,
THE N ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters.
11. MONITOR CST level greater than 5%.
12 . MAINTAIN Intact S /G narrow range levels between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%.
12 .a . MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 440 gpm
RNO UNTIL level greater than 10% [25% ADV] in at least one S /G .
( 14 .a. WHEN pressurizer pressure less than 1960 psig,
THEN BL OCK low steamline pressure SI.
15. MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated. (RCS pressure less than 100 psig)
(
Page 1a of 22
( SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR -C .1
Rev. 1 2
HANDOUT
Page 1 of 1
STEP I ACTI ON
1. MONITOR RWST level greater than 27%.
10 . MONITOR if hydrogen igniters and recombiners should be turned on.
10.a.4) WHEN hydrogen analyzers have been in ANALYZE for at least 5 minutes.
RNO THEN PERFORM substeps 10.b through 10.e.
10.d . WHEN ice conde nser AHU breakers have been opened,
THEN ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters.
11 . MONITOR CST level greater than 5%.
12. MAINTAIN Intact SIG narrow range levels between 10% [25% ADV] and 50%.
12.a. MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 440 gpm
RNO UNTIL level greater than 10% [25% ADV] in at least one 8/G .
( 14.a. WHEN pressurizer pressu re less than 1960 psig.
THEN BL OCK low steamline pressure 81.
15. MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated. (RCS pressure less than 100 psig)
Pag e 1b of 22
( SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C. 1
Rev . 12
1.0 PURPOSE
This procedure provides actions to restore core cooling.
2.0 SYMPTOMS AND ENTRY CONDITIONS
2.1 ENTRY CONDITIONS
FR-O Status Trees :
- F-O.2, Core Cooling REO condition:
Core exit TICs greater than 1200°F.
- F-O. 2, Core Cooling REO condition:
Core exit TICs less than 1200°F
( AND
Res subcool ing less than 40°F
AND
All RCPs stopped
AND
Core exit TICs greater than 700°F
AND
RVLIS lower range less than 42%.
3.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS
Page 2 of22
( SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
Rev. 12
ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
1. MONITOR RWST level IF RHR pumps aligned to RWST,
greater than 27%. THEN
GO TO ES-1 .3, Transfer to RHR
Containment Sump.
--~.--
CAUTION Running RHR pumps for greater than 100 minutes with miniflow valves
open and NO CCS flow to RHR heat exchangers could result in pump
damage .
2. CHECK RHR pump status:
( a. CHECK RHR pumps RUNNING. a. GO TO Step 3.
b. CHECK CCS ALIGNED b. ALIGN CCS to RHR heat
to RHR heat exchangers. exchangers.
(
Page 3 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
( Rev. 12
ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
3. ENSURE ECCS valves aligned
as appropriate:
- REFER TO EA-63-5, ECCS Injection
Mode Alignment
Containment Sump
( * REFER TO ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot
Leg Recirculation.
CAUTION SI pump opera tion with min iflow isolated and RCS pressure
greater than 1500 psig could result in SI pump damage.
4. VERIFY ECCS flow: START pumps and ALIGN valves
as necessary.
- VERIFY CCP flow through CCPIT.
- VERIFY SI pump flow.
- VERIFY RHR pump flow.
(
Page 4 of22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
( Rev. 12
ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
5. CHEC K RCP support condition s ESTABLIS H condition s for starting an
AVAILABLE: RCP USING EA-68-2, Establishing RCP
Start Conditions.
- REFER TO EA-68-2, Establishing
RCP Start Conditions.
6. CHECK CLA isolation valve status :
a . Power to CLA isolation valves a. DISPATCH personnel to restore
AVAI LABLE. power to CLA isolation valves
USING EA-201-1, 480V Board Room
Breaker Alignments.
(
b . CLA isolation valves OPEN. b. OPEN CLA isolation valves
UNLESS closed after CLA discharge.
7. CHECK core exitT/Cs GO TO Step 10.
less than 1200"F.
Page 5 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
( Rev. 12
ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
8. CHECK RVLlS lower range indication:
a. CHECK NO Reps RUNNING. a. IF any Reps running ,
THEN
--.*--
RETURN TO procedure and step
in effect.
b. CHECK RVLlS lower range indication b. IF RVLlS lower range indication
greater than 42 %. rising,
THEN
GO TO Step 3.
(
IF RVLl S lower range indication
stable or droppi ng,
THEN
GO TO Step 9.
c. RETURN TO procedure and step
---.--
in effect.
c..
Page 6 of 22
SQN INAD EQ UAT E CORE COOLING FR*C.1
( Rev. 12
ISTE P IIACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
9. CHECK Core Exit TICs :
a. CHECK Core Exit TIC temperatures a . IF Core Exit TICs dropping,
less than 700°F. THEN
GO TO Step 3.
---
IF Core Exit TICs stable or rising.
THEN
GO TO Step 10.
C
b. RETURN TO procedu re and step
=---
in effect.
Page 7 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
( Rev . 12
ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
10. MONITOR if hydrogen igniters and
recomb iners should be turned on:
a. CHECK hydrogen concentration a. PERFORM the followi ng:
measurement AVAILA BLE:
1) PLACE HS-43-2 DDA in
- Hydrogen analyzers ANALYZ E [M-1D] .
have been in ANA LYZE
for at least 5 minutes. 2) PLACE HS-43-21DA in
ANALYZ E [M-1 D].
3) RECORD prese nt time:
4 ) WHEN hydrogen analyzers
have been in ANA LYZE
( for at least 5 minutes,
THEN
PERFORM substeps 1D.b
through 1D.e.
5) GO TO Step 11.
b. CHECK contain ment hydrogen b. CONSULT TSC.
concentration less than 6%. GO TO Step 11.
c. DISPATCH personnel to open ice
condenser AHU breakers
USING EA-2D1 -1, 48D V Board Room
Breaker Alig nments .
(Step continued on next page.)
Page 8 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C .1
( Rev . 12
ISTEP IIACTION /EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
10, d. WHEN ice condenser AHU breakers
have been opened,
THEN
ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters [M-10]:
- HS-268-73 ON
- HS-268-74 ON,
e. CHECK containment hydrogen e. PLACE hydrogen recombiners in
concentration less than 0,5% , service USING EA-268-1, Placing
Hydrogen Recombiners in Service,
IF hydrogen recombiners
NOT available,
THEN
CONSULT TSC.
(
11. MONITOR CST level greater than 5%. ALIGN AFW suction to ERCW
USING EA-3-9, Establishing Turbine
Driven AFW Flow, and EA-3-10,
Establishing Motor Driven AFW Flow .
Page 9 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
( Rev. 12
ISTEP II ACTIO NIEXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
CAUTION Use of a Faulted or Ruptured SIG during the following steps
should NOT be considered UNLESS no intact SIG is available.
12. MAINTAIN Intact S/G narrow range
levels:
a. Greater than 10% [25% ADV]. a. MAINTAIN total feed flow
greater than 440 gpm
UNTIL level greater than 10%
[25% ADV] in at least one S /G .
IF total feed flow
greater than 440 gpm
CANNOT be established,
THEN
PERFORM the following:
1) CONTINUE attempts to establish
heat sink in at least one SIG
condensate system.
2) GO TO Note prior to Step 21.
b. Betwee n 10% [25% ADV] and 50%.
Pag e 10 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
( Rev. 12
ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
13 . CHECK RCS inventory loss paths:
a. Power to pressurizer PORV block a. DISPATCH personnel to restore
valves AVAILABLE. power to block valves
USING EA-201-1. 480 V Board Rm
Breaker Alig nments .
b. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED. b. CLOSE pressurizer PORVs.
IF any pressurizer PORV
CANNOT be closed .
THEN
CLOSE its block valve.
c. At least one block valve OPEN. c. OPEN one block valve UNLESS it
was closed to isolate an open PORV.
(
d. Normal letdown valves CLOSED: d. CLOSE valves.
- FCV-62-69
- FCV-62-70
- FCV-62-72
- FCV-62-73
- FCV-62-74
(Step continued on next page.)
(
Page 11 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C .1
( Rev. 12
ISTEP I IACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
13. e . Excess letdown valves CLOSED: e. CLOSE valves .
- FCV-62-54
- FCV-62-55
f. Reactor vessel head vent valves f. CLOSE valves.
CLOSED:
- FSV-68-394
- FSV-68- 395
- FSV-6 8-396
- FSV-6 8-397
(
g . RCS and pressurizer sample valves g. CLOSE valves .
CLOSED: [status panels 6K and 6L]
- FCV-43-3 or FCV-43-2
- FCV-43-12 or FCV-43-11
- FCV-43-23 or FCV-43-22
h. Post-accident sample valves h. CLOSE valves .
CLOSED: [M-10]
- FSV-43-25 0 or FSV-43-251
- FSV-4 3-309 or FSV-43-310
(,
Page 12 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
( Rev. 12
ISTEP I IACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
NOTES * S/G depressurization at the max imum rate may cause S/G narrow range
leve ls to drop to less than 10% [25% ADV] . Th is is acceptable during
an inad equate core coo ling condi tion .
- Blocking low steamline pressure SI as soon as pressurizer pressure is
iess than 1960 psig will prevent an inadvertent MSIV closure and kee p
the condens er ava ilable for steam dump.
- After the low stea mline pressure SI signal is blocke d, main steamline
isolatio n will occu r if the high stea m pressure rat e is exc eed ed.
14. DEPRESSURIZE Intact S/Gs to reduce
RCS pressure to less than 100 psig :
a . WHEN RCS pressure
( less than 1960 psig ,
THEN
PERFORM the foll owi ng :
1) BLOCK low steamline pressure
SI.
2) CHECK STE AMLI NE PRESS
ISOLISI BLOCK RATE ISOL
ENABLE permissive LIT.
[M-4A, A4)
(Ste p continued on nex t page .)
Page 13 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C .1
( Rev. 12
ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAI NED
14 . b. DUMP steam to condenser b. DUMP steam at maximum rate
at ma ximum ach ievable rate: USING Intact S/G atmos pheric
relief(s).
1) ENSURE st eam dumps in steam
pressure mode. IF local control of atmospheric
relief(s) is necessary,
2) ADJUST steam dump demand to THEN
FU LLY OPEN thre e coo ldown DISPATC H personnel to dump steam
va lves. USING EA-1-2, Local Control of
S/G PORVs.
3) WHEN T-avg is less than 540 c F,
T HEN
BYPA SS steam dump interlock.
c . CHECK RCS pressure c . IF RCS press ure dropping ,
less than 100 psig. THEN
( GO TO Caution prio r to Step 12.
IF RCS pressure stable or rising,
THEN
GO TO Note prior to Ste p 21.
d. ST OP S/G depressurization.
Page 14 of 2 2
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR -C.1
( Rev. 12
ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
15 . MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated :
a. CHECK RCS pressure a. GO TO Note prior to Step 21.
less than 100 psig .
b . RESET SI and
CHECK the followi ng:
- AUTO S.1. BLOCKED
permissive LIT. [M-4A , C4]
- S.1. ACTUATED
permissive DARK. [M-4A , D4]
(
c. CLOSE CLA isolation valves. c. PERFORM the following:
1) RESET Phase B.
2) ESTABLISH control air to
containment USING EA-32-1,
Establishing Control Air to
Containment.
3) VENT any unisolated CLA
USING EA-63-1, Venting
Unisolated Cold Leg
IF any CLA CANNOT be isolated
or vented ,
THEN
CONSULT TSC to determine
contingency actions.
(
Page 15 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
( Rev . 12
ISTEP IIACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAI NED
16. STOP all RCPs.
17. DEPRESSURIZE Intact SIGs
to atmospheric pressure:
a. DUMP steam to condenser a. DUMP steam at maximum rate
at maximum rate. USING Intact SIG atmosphe ric
relief(s).
IF local control of atmospheric
relief(s) is necessary,
THEN
DISPATCH personnel to dump steam
USING EA-1-2 . Local Control of
SIG PORVs.
18. VERIFY ECCS flow: CONTINUE efforts to establish
ECCS flow.
- CCP flow through CCPIT
IF core exit TICs less than 1200°F.
OR THEN
SI pump flow
RHR pump flow.
--_-.--
GO TO Step 17.
IF core exit TICs greater than 1200°F.
THEN
GO TO Note prior to Step 21.
Page 16 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C. 1
( Rev. 12
ISTEP I [ A CTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
19. CHECK core cooling:
a. Core exit TICs less than 1200°F. a. GO TO Note prior to Step 21.
b. At least two RCS T-hot indications
less than 350°F.
-_...
b. GO TO Step 17.
~
c . RVLlS lower range indication c. GO TO Step 17.
greater than 64%.
( ---~
20. GO TO E-1. Loss of Reactor or
--...--
Secondary Coolant, Step 15.
(
Page 17 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
( Rev. 12
ISTE P II ACTION /EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAI NED
NOTE RCP damage due to absence or loss of normal support conditions is an
acceptable consequence in this procedure.
21. CHECK if RCPs should be started:
a. CHECK core exit TICs a. GO TO Step 22.
greater than 1200°F.
b . CHECK if idle RCS loop available: b. PERFORM the following :
- S/G narrow range level
1) OPEN all pressurizer PORVs
greater than 10% [25% ADV]
and block valves.
AND
2) IF core exit T/Cs remain
- RCP in associated loop greater than 1200°F,
AVAILAB LE and STOPPED. THEN
OPEN reactor vessel head vents:
- FSV-68-394
- FSV-68-395
- FSV-68-396
- FSV-68-397.
3) GO TO Step 22.
c. START RCP in one idle loop.
---
d. GO TO Substep 21.a.
(
Page 18 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
( Rev . 12
ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
22. DEPRESSURIZE Intact S /Gs
to atmospheric pressure :
a . DUMP steam to condense r a. DUMP steam at maximum rate
at maximum rate. USING Intact S /G atmosphe ric
relief(s).
IF local control of atmospheric
relief(s) is necessary ,
THEN
DISPATCH personnel to dump steam
USING EA-1-2, Local Control of
S /G PORVs.
IF NO intact SG available,
THEN
USE Faulted or Ruptu red S/G.
23 . CHECK Co re Exit TICs IF core exit T/Cs dropping ,
less than 1200°F. THEN
GO TO Note prior to Step 21.
--~
IF at least 5 core exit TICs
greate r than 1200°F and rising
AND RCPs running in all available
RCS cooling loops,
THEN
GO TO SACRG-1, Seve re Accident
Controi Room Guideline
Initial Respo nse.
--~.--
Page 19 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
( Rev. 12
ISTEP IIACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
24. DETERMINE if CLAs should be isolated:
a. CHECK at least intermittent a. GO TO Step 26.
RHR inj ection flow.
b . RESET Sl and
CHECK the following:
- AUTO S.1. BLOCKED
permissive LIT. [M-4A, C4j
- & 1. ACTUATED
permissive DARK. [M-4A, D4]
c. CLOSE all CLA isolation valves. c. PERFORM the following:
1) RESET Phase B.
2) ESTABLISH control air to
containment USING EA-32-1,
Establishing Control Air to
Containment.
3) VENT any unisolated CLA
USING EA-63-1, Venting
Unisolated Cold Leg Accumulator.
IF any CLA CANNOT be isolated
or vented,
THEN
CONSULT TSC to dete rmine
contingency actions.
Page 20 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
( Rev. 12
ISTEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
25. DETERMINE if RCPs should be stopped :
a. CHECK at least two T-hot indications a. GO TO Step 26.
less than 350°F.
b. STOP all RCPs.
26. VERIFY ECCS flow: CONTINUE efforts to establish
ECCS flow .
- CCP flow through CCPIT
GO TO Note prior to Step 21.
- SI pump flow
- RHR pump flow.
27. CHECK core cooling :
___:e--
a. At least two ReS T-hot indications a. GO TO Note prior to Step 21.
less than 350°F.
b. NO RCPs RUNNING. b. STOP all RCPs.
(,
c. RVLlS lower range indication
greate r than 64%.
-_....----
c. GO TO Note prior to Step 21.
Page 21 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING F R-C .1
(' Rev. 12
IST EP II AC TION /EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
28. CHECK RCS Ve nt paths ISOLATED:
a . Pressurizer PORVs CLOS ED. a . CLOSE Pressurizer PORVs.
IF any Pressurizer PORV
CANNOT be closed ,
THEN
CLOSE its block valve .
b. Reactor vessel head vent valves b. CLOSE valves .
CLO SED:
- FSV-68-395
( * FSV-68-396
- FSV-68-397
29 . GO TO E-1, Loss of Reactor or
Secondary Coolant, Step 15.
--~.--
END
(.
Page 22 of 22
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
75. E02 EA1.3 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
A steam break has occurred inside containment.
Reactor trip and containment high-high pressure have actuated.
- The fau lted SIG has completely blown down .
- The crew has ente red ES-1.1, SI Tennination.
One conta inment spray pump is in service.
If containment pressu re is 2.5 psig, Wh ich ONE (1) of the following correctly describes
the status of the CCPs and Conta inment Spray pump when the crew transitions from
ES-1.1 to the appropriate plant procedure?
Containment Spray Pump
A. 1 CCP injecting via CCPIT In Service
B. 1 CCP injecting via CCPIT Stopped and placed in A-AUTO
C. 1 CCP inject ing via seal injection Stopped and placed in A-Auto
and normal charging
D~ 1 CCP injecting via seal injection In Service
( and norma l charging
A. Incorrect. Meet SI termination criteria; therefore , second CCP remo ved from service
and normal charging established.
B. Incorrect. Meet SI termination criteria; therefore, second CCP remo ved from service
and normal charging established. Containment pressure is > 2 psid; therefore, CS
is not stopped.
C. Incorrect. Containment pressure is > 2 psid; therefore, CS is not stopped.
D. Correct. Meet Sf termina tion criteria; therefore , second CCP remo ved from service
and normal charging established. Containment pressure is > 2 psid; therefore , CS
is not stopped.
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM 144
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to opera te and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (5 1Termination) Desired operating results during abnormal and
emergency situations.
(
Question No. 64
Tier 1 Group 2
Importance Rating: R03.8
Technical Reference: ES-l .1
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective : OPL271 ES-1.1 , Objective 6
OPL273C502C; Obj. 8.i, 8.j
Question Source: Bank
Question History: SQN ES-1.1.B.1-2
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .10
Comments:
(
Source : BANK Source If Bank: SEQUOYAH BANK
Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
D ate: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM 145
OPl271ES-1.1
Revision 0
Page 18 of 39
(
X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
Knowledge: Knowledge:
No preference is given about which pumps to start to * This step is a continuous
establi sh ECCS flow although an individual plant may have action step.
a preference. The operator has the option of using either * If conditions deteriorate
a
an SI pump or CCP. If the operator selects to use a and the operator is
CCP, then he must align the suction and discharge of the required to manually start
pump to the safety injection mode and isolate the normal ECCS pumps to restore
charging suction and discharge paths. RCCS subcooling or
pressurizer level, the
operator should leave the
ECCS pumps on until the
SI reduction criteria is
met in the appropriate
step.
13. MONITO R if containment spray should be stopped: To stop containment spray
a. CHECK any containment spray pump RUNNI NG. pumps if running and no
longer needed .
- RNO- GO TO Step 14.
b. CHECK containment pressure less than 2.0 psig Knowledge:
This step is a continuous
( RNO- GO TO Step 14 action step.
c. RESET containment spray signal.
d. STOP containment spray pumps and PLACE in A-
AUT O.
e. CLOSE containment spray discharg e valves FCV-
72-2 and FCV-72-39.
Basis:
Spray pumps are automatically actuated on Hi-Hi
containment pressure . In E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety
Injection, the operator verifies that the Containment Spray
System is operating if it is required. During a LOCA, the
need for continu ed operation of the spray system is
monitored by this step in ES*1.1. After containment
pressure is reduced, the pumps can be stopped to prevent
RWST depletion. If at any time the containment pressure
increases above the pressure setpoint , the ORANGE path
of the Containment Status Tree sends the operator to FR-
Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, which
checks the need for containment spray and verifies that
the spray system is operational if it is required.
OPL271 ES-1.1
Revision 0
Page 13 of 39
( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
6. CHECK RCS pressure STABLE or RISING. To ensure that control is
being maintained after
RNO - ENSURE pressurizer spray valves stopping all but one CCP.
CLOSED.
IF RCS pressure continues to drop,
Cooldown and Depressurization.
Basis:
All but one CCP was stopped in the previous step. RCS
pressure stable or increasing confirms that ECCS flow is
adequate for the operator to maintain control using one
CCP. The operator will then be ready to align the CCP to
the normal charging flow path. If RCS pressure is
decreasing, then the operator will go to ES-1.2, Post
LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, for additional
actions.
If RCS pressure is being reduced by pressurizer spray
(initiat ed in £-1 to assist in increasing pressure level). then
the pressure behavior is not a true indication of leak flow
versus injection flow. Furthermore, if RCS pressure is
( decreasing after all but one CCP is stopped, the operator
is directed to ES-1.2 on the premise that leak flow cannot
be countered by flow from one CCP. This would be an
inappropriate transition if pressurizer spray is causing the
pressure decrease. The operator should terminate spray
flow if necessary to prevent pressure from decreasing.
7. ISOLATE CCPIT : To stop injection flow to the
a. CLOSE CCPIT inlet valves FCV-63-39 and FCV-63- ReS through the CCPIT .
40.
b. CLOSE CCPIT outlet valves FCV-63-25 and FCV-
63-26 .
Basis:
Normal charging and the CCPIT injection lines are parallel
flow paths from the discharge of the CCPs. CCPIT
isolation enables the normal charging path to be used.
Closing the inlet valves first prevents any pressure surge
in the CCPIT.
(
OPL271 ES-1.1
Revision 0
Page 14 of 39
(
X. LESSON BODY : INSTRUCTOR NOTES
8. ESTABLISH charging flow To properly estab lish a
a. CLOSE seal water flow control valve FCV*6 2-89. charging path and sufficient
b. OPEN charging isolation valves FCV-62-90 and flow to ensure cooling for
FCV-62-91 . the cha rging pumps.
c. ENSURE normal or alternate charging isolation
valve FCV-62- 86 or FCV-62-85 OPEN.
d. ESTABLISH desired charging flow USING seal
water and charging flow control valves FCV-62-89
and FCV-62-93.
Basis:
Proper alignment of the charging path allows flow to be
controlled in the normal manner. Charging flow is
established by closing the charging line hand control
valve, opening the charging line isolation valves and then
establishing the desired charging flow by adjusting the
charging line flow control valve and the charging line hand
control valve.
The substeps in this step arranged to maintain seal
injection flow and to introduce charging cautiously through
the charging line.
( To establish maintenance
9. CONTROL charging flow to maintain pressurizer level
of pressurizer level as the
RNO - IF pressurize r level is dropping, THE N criteria for adjusting
PERFORM the following: charging flow.
a. IF any SIG is faulted, THEN DO
NOT CONTINUE this procedure
UNTIL fault ed SIG depressurization
stops OR pressurizer level can be
maintained.
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
82. E13 EK2.! 001
( Given the following plant conditions:
- The crew entered FR-H.2, "Steam Generator Overpressure", due to an
overpressure condition on S/G #2.
- SG #2 pressure is 1170 psig .
- S/G #2 narrow range level is 72%.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the appropriate actions, in sequence, to
mitigate this event in accordance with FR-H.2?
A. Verify Feedwater Isolation and initiate SG Slowdown.
S~ Verify Feedwater Isolation and attempt to dump steam from the affected SG.
C. Isolate AFW flow and initiate SG Slowdown .
D. Isolate AFW flow and attempt to.dump steam from the affected SG
A. Incorrect. First action is correct, but SG blowdown is a later action, or an action
that would be-performed in FR-H.3
( B. Correct.
C. Incorrect. AFW is isolated later if pressure cannot be brought under control by
dumping steam. Additionally, SG blowdown is a later action
D. Incorrect. AFW is isolated later; attempting to dump steam is correct.
Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:36 PM 158
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Steam Generator Overpressure) and the following: Componen ts, and functions of
C' control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features
Question No. 65
Tier 1 Group 2
Importance Rating: R03.0
Technical Reference : FR-H.2
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271FR-H.2, Obj . 5
Question Source: Bank
Question History: New
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficu lty:
( Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Da te: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? : NO
(,
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 159
OPL271 FR-H.2
Revision 1
Page 3 of 17
(-,
I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE : LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: FR-H.2, STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURE
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: .5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objecti ve:
Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios , the requirements of
the FR-H.2 , Steam Generator Overpres sure.
B. Enabling Objecti ves
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowled ge's and Abilities
associated FR-H .2, Steam Generator Overpressure, that are rated ~ 2.5
~uring Initial Licens e Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator
Requa lification Tra ining for the appro priate license position as identified in
Appendix A.
(
1. Explain the purpose/goal of FR-H.2.
2. Discuss the FR-H.2 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automati c actions associated with
FR-H.2 entr y conditions .
b. Describe the requirements asso ciated with FR-H.2 entry conditions .
3. Summarize the mitigating strateg y for the failure that initiated entry into FR-H.2.
4. Describe the bases for all limits, notes , cautions, and steps of FR-H.2.
5. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and
transitions to other procedures.
6. Given a set of initial plant conditions use FR-H.2 to correctly:
a. Identify required actions
b. Respond to Contingencies
c. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes
7. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the performance of FR-H.2
conditions.
OPL271 FR-H .2
Revision 1
Page 11 of 17
(
X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
4. ATIEMPT to dump steam from affected S/G(s): To attempt
- Atmospheric reliefs depressurization of the
OR affected scci by
- MSIV bypass valves releasing steam from
OR the affected scei
- Steam supply valves to TO AFW pump
RNO - DISPATCH personnel to dump
steam USING EA-1-2, Local
Control of SIG PORVs.
GO TO Step 6. RNO - IF no release
path. available, skip
Basis: ov er step to check
Releasing steam will result in depressurization of the affected S/G pressure
affected SG. Stea m can be released through SG dropping , since steam
PORVs, ma in steamlln e isolation bypa ss valves , the is not being released
steam suppty val ve to the turbine-driven AFW pump,
or any 6lher avail able path. Th e SG PORVs. main
steamline isolation bypass valves, and steam suppl y
( va lve to the turbin e-driven AFW pump eac h should
ha ve sufficient capac ity and cont rollability to
depressurize th e affected S /G smoothly. If no steam
path ca n be est ablished . the operator is dire cted to
Step 6 to further address the SG overpressure
conditio n.
(
FR-H.2
( SQN STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURE
Rev. 6
ISTEP II ACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE I IRESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
3. CHECK affected S/G(s) narrow range GO TO FR-H .3, Steam Generator High
level less than 84% [80% AOV].
---.--
Level.
CAUTION Releasing steam from an overfilled SIG cou ld result -in damage to
downstream steamline components. An " overfi ll ed S/G" is any SIG
.whose narrow range level has exceeded 84% [80 %-.ADV] at any time .
NOTE MSIV isolation reset may be necessary to open MSIV bypass valves.
(
4. ATIEMPT to dump steam DISPATCH personnel to dump steam
from affecte d S/G(s): USING EA-1-2, Local Control of SIG
- Atmospheric reliefs
GO TO Step 6.
- MSIV bypass valves
- Steam supply valves
to TO AFW pump
P"np 4 of 7
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
c 86. G2.1.2 001
OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations, describes the" Departure From License Condition"
which can be invoked to protect the health and safety of the public.
Which ONE (1) of the following conditions must ALWAYS be met when departing from
a license cond ition or technical specification in accordance with 10 CRF 50.54 (x) and
(y)?
A'!' The action must be approved by a licensed SRO prior to taking the action.
B. The action must be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Emergency Plan.
C. The NRC must be notified prior to the action and must concur with the action to be
taken.
D. The action must be necessary to prevent equipment damage or personnel injury
AND the Plant Manager must be notified prior to taking the action.
A Correct.
B incorrect. Although the unit is most likely in the E-Plan , it is not a requirement prior to
invoking 10CFR50.54(x)
C incorrect. NRC concurrence is not required for the action; they must be notified as
soon as possible but no more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> prior.
( o incorrect. Preventing damage or injury is a reason for invoking the rule, but Plant
Manager concurrence or approval is not required
Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation .
Question No. 66
Tier 3 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 3.0
Technical Reference: OPDP-1, Append ix F
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OP1271C209, B.8
Question Source: Bank
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 165
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: BANK Source If Bank: WTSI
( Cognitive Level: LOWER
Job Position: RO
Difficulty:
Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 166
OPL271C209
Revision 10
Page 3 of 53
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: LICENSED TRAINING & NON LICENSED
III. LESSON TITLE: CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (OPDP-1, SPP-10.0, ODM)
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson, the student will have reviewed the "Conduct of
Operations" procedures and will demonstrate an understanding of these
procedures and other material presented by passing a written examination as
outlined by program procedure.
B. Enabling Objectives:
Each student will understand the following
1. Operations department specific duties, organization and administration
2. Operating policies including manipu iation of controls that directly affect
( reactor reactivity or power level.
3. The shift routines (rounds) and operating practices.
4. Control room act ivities including conduct. access, and control room
surveiilance areas.
5. The requirements of pre -evolution briefings.
6. The requ irements for proper communications including repeat back
communications utilizing radios, telephones, and the PA system .
7. Proper Operations notifications requirements.
8. The control of equipment and system status control requ irements including
equipment status change authorization (maintenance. testing, return to
operability. etc.); equipment and system alignments and Technical
Specificat ion compliance (Normal and 50.54X).
9. Log keep ing requ irements to include which records are QA and which are
not QA records.
10. The shift turnover requirements and processes.
( 11. Operations responsibilities relative to plant chem istry inciuding
communications with plant chemistry personnel.
OPL271C209
Revision 10
Page 4 of 53
( 12. The required reviews for Operations. Example: Procedure changes;
equipment design changes; license changes; industry experience
information.
13. Operating orders such as standing orders and shift orders.
14. Plant operating procedures relative to the conventions of use and procedure
compliance .
15. Requirements for Surveillance Testing by Operations department.
16. The requirements for operator aids including definitions, examples of
operator aids, posting requirements, responsibilities, documenting and
processing, and reviews.
17. The requirements for equipment labeling and method for requesting labels
be installed .
18. The requirements for Operations teamwork including responsibilities, on-
shift team members , response to events, training , and feedback.
19. The requirements for Self-Checking.
20. The requirements for active and inactive licenses (SRO and RO) including
how to activate an inactive license to an active license.
(
21. The requirements for Operations key control.
22. Requirements for record keeping including ability to distinguishing between
23. The actions to be taken when an instrument failure is suspected .
24. The differences between the expected response to alarms during steady
state conditions and during transients.
25. The conditions resulting in an operator workaround .
TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations OPDP-1
(" .
Department
Procedure
Rev. 0006
Paae 37 of 98
Appendix F
(Page 1 of 4)
Plant Operating Procedures
A. Procedure Compliance
1, Plant equipment shall be operated in accordance with written approved procedures as
discussed in SPP-2.2, Administration of Site Technical Procedures.
2. Appendi x F, section E, contains expectations for procedure usage. Procedure users should
use it to evaluate their own conduct.
B. Precautions , Limitations and Initial Conditions
1. All applicable Precautions and Limitations, Initial Conditions, and all procedure sections to
be performed SHALL be reviewed prior to performance:
IF a procedure is in progress to maneuver the plant AND the direction of that maneuver is
changed , THEN all P/Ls of the applicable procedure(s) SHALL be re-reviewed prior to
continuing with the evolution.
2. IF a procedure in progress is suspended OR exited prior to completion, THEN the following
SHALL be verified prior to recommencement:
(
a. Initial conditions
b. Precautions and limitations
C. Procedure Place keeping
1. Place keeping is an effective tool for reducing human error and maintaining status control
by maintaining positive control of steps, especially following delays and interruptions. Place
keeping includes the following:
a. Marking each step of a procedure as it is performed,
b. Marking steps that are not applicable, and
c. Marking each step of a clearance order as it is performed.
2. Examples of acceptable methods for marking up a procedure including initialing each step
as it is performed , marking off the steps by checking them off, or using the place keeping
boxes on those procedures where they have been provided.
3. The following practices may be used to enhance place keeping:
a. Re-reading the previous several steps after being distracted.
b. Identifying the last procedure page to be performed by marking it as "LAST
PAGE."
TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations OPDP-1
( Department
Procedure
Rev. 0006
Paqe 38 of 98
Appendix F
(Page 2 of 4)
Plant Operating Procedures
c. Circling a step that is in progress and slashi ng through the circle when the step
is complete .
d. Marking completion of a procedure page in the bottom margin on the page.
e. Marking steps that will not be performed in advance or during the Pre-Job Brief.
4. Place keeping shall be used, unless the procedure classification is "information only."
5. During implementation of the Abnormal or Emergency Operating Procedure, place keeping
shall be used (immediate actions and prudent op erator actions are exempt when
performed. Place keeping shall be used during verification of those actlons. ),
6. To facilitate place keeping for clearance orders, a separate sheet should be provided for
independent verifications .
7. Erasable markers, page protectors or clear cover sheets can be used to facilitate place
keeping dur ing routine activities that do not require archival records retention . When the
( evolution is complete d the mark can be wiped off. In cases where procedure s require
signatures or initials those are used instead of erasable markers.
8. For evolutions that are not completed by the end of shift, the marked up pages shall be
included in the shift turnover process for the applicable watch station. The status of
procedure completion should be reported to the control room. At the end of the evolution,
any procedures not required for retention as archival records may be discarded.
D. Alternative Place Keeping - ReaderlWorker
Place keeping via a 'ReaderlWorker' method may be used to facilitate place keeping under
condi tions in harsh environment such as working in a contaminated zone or worki ng in a
situation where worker cannot support/hold paper work . In these cases a second person is
allowed to sign off a step as comp leted only when in direct conta ct with the performer. When a
second perso n is required, the second individual should sign "for" the performer, such as
"JCSfTMM."
E. Use of 10 CFR 50.54 (x) and (y)
1. Operations personnel SHALL NOT give or accept directions or guidance that conflic ts with
appr oved procedures, Technical Specifications , or a License Condition, with the exception
of those actions pursuant to 50.54 (x) and (y).
2. All actions that occur per 50.54 (x) and (y) SHALL be approved by a licensed Senior
Reactor Operator and those actions SHALL be immediately reported to the Operations
Manager, Plant Manager, and Site Vice President and documented via PER.
TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations OPDP*1
( Department
Procedure
Rev . 0006
Paae 39 of 98
Appendix F
(Page 3 of 4)
Plant Operating Procedures
3. Operations personnel MAY take responsible action that departs from a License Condition or
Technical Specification pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 (x) and (y), within the limits of the
following:
a. The provision must be invoked in order to take necessary actions .
b. IF an emergency protective action is needed AND NO action consistent with the
license is immediately apparent that can provide adequate or equivalent
protection, THEN personnel are obligated to take protective action under this
provision.
c. Use of the provision does NOT require NRC concurrence. IF time permits, THEN
NRC Operations Center telephone notificat ion should be made before action is
taken . IF time does NOT permit, THEN NRC Operations Center telephone
notification SHALL be made as soon as possible but not to exceed one hour per
SEP-3.5 and NuReg-1022.
d. Provision does NOT apply where time permits NRC amendment to Technical
( Specifications or License Condition.
e. Provision SHALL NOT be used to prevent damage to the plant or machinery
unless such damage is tied to a possible adverse effect on public health and
safety.
f. Provision ONLY applies to emergencies where license compliance poses a
barrier to effective protective action , and rapid action is needed to protect public
health and safety.
g. Immediate threat of injury to personnel is appropriate justification for the use of
the provision.
h. Use of the provision is NOT tied to the declaration of any emergency
classification in the Emergency Plan. Since emergencies can develop rapidly,
use of the provision should NOT be encumbered by administrative prerequisites.
TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations OPDP-1
( Department
Procedure
Rev. 0006
Pace 40 of 98
Appendix F
(Page 4 of 4)
Plant Operating Procedures
F. Expe ctat ions
1. Operators may use App endix "F" to eva luate their own cond uct. Supe rvisors shoul d use
the same wh en eva luating ope rators against the ex pectation.
2. During Procedure Use:
a. Verifies correct procedure and revision is being used (Ve rifies For Use ).
b. Revie ws appropriate portion of procedure, and ensures prerequ isites are met before
continu ing.
c. Reviews precauti ons and ensures they are understood by step performers.
d. Ensures a pre-evolution briefing is conducted lAW pre-job check list.
e. Ensures appropriate personnel are available or informed. as necessary, before
starting .
( f. Ensures that instruments are chec ked for calibration and documented as required .
g. Applies proper usage requireme nts as denoted on procedure (e.g., conti nuous use).
h. Stops and notifies supervisor if it cannot be performed as written and init iates change
if needed.
i. Applies Self Check, QV&V and Tou ch STAR .
j. A pplies place keeping tools as appropriate.
k. Meets applicabie ver ification requirements during procedure use.
I. Initiates appropriate documen tation as required for problems in procedures.
m. Properly completes all steps (e.g., performs action prior to sign off) .
n. All requ ired sign-ofts and record pages are completed by appropriate personnel (no
blanks).
o. Stops and notifies supervision if component not aligned per procedure (e.g., valve is
to be opened , but found already open ).
p. Does not move on without first sign ing each completed step as appropriate .
q. Reviews entire procedure for completeness prior to conclud ing the task is complete.
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
85 . G2.1.18 001
(-,
Which ONE (1) of the following describes when a 'LATE ENTRY' is required in
eSOMS , and the procedure used to enter a 'LATE ENTRY'?
A. Required any time required information is not entered at time of event; enter actual
time of event, the words 'LATE ENTRY', and the event description.
B. Required any time required information was not entered at time of previous
approval of logs; enter actual time of event , the words 'LATE ENTRY', and the
event description .
C. Required any time required information is not entered at time of event; enter time of
entry, the words 'LATE ENTRY', actual time of event , and event description .
D~ Required any time required information was not entered at time of previous
approval of logs ; enter current time, the words 'LATE ENTRY', actual time of event,
and event description.
A. Incorrect. Late entries are only required after they are found when approval has
been made without the original entry of event (For instance, after shift turnover it is
found that an enJ!y was not made)
B. Incorrect. Partially correct, but the time of entry must also be included
C. Incorrect. Partially correct as far as action is required, but the late entry is only
( required after an appro val of logs has taken place
D. Correct.
Ability to make accurate, clear and concise togs, records, status boards, and reports.
Question No. 67
Tier 3 Group 1
Importance Rating: R02.9
Technical Reference: OPDP-1, Appendix E, section E
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271C209 Objective 9
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .10
(~_ Comments:
Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 163
QUESTION S REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
( Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
LOWER
Difficulty:
Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35 :36 PM 164
OPL271C209
Re vision 9
Page 3 of 53
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE : LICENSED TRAIN ING & NON LICENSED
III. LESSON TITLE: CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (OPDP-1, SPP-10.0, ODM )
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completi on of this lesson, the student will have reviewed the "Conduct of
Operations" pro cedures and will demonstrate an understanding of these
procedures and other material presented by passing a written examination as
outlined by program procedure .
B. Enabling Objectives:
Each student will unde rstand the following
1. - Operations department spe cific duties, org anization and administration
( 2. Operating policies including manipulation of controls that directly affect
rea ctor rea ctivity or powe r level.
3. The shift routines (rounds) and operating practices.
4. Control room activities including conduct, acces s, and control room
surveillance areas.
5. The requirements of pre-evolution briefings.
6. The requ irements for proper communications including repeat back
communications utilizing radios, telephones, and the PA system.
7. Proper Operations notifications requirements.
8. The control of equipment and system status control requirements including
equipment status change authorization (maintenance , testing, return to
operability, etc. ); equipment and system alignments and Technical
Specification compliance (Normal and 50.54X).
9. Log keeping requirements to include which records are QA and which are
not QA records.
10. The shift turnover requirements and processes .
11. Operations responsibilities relative to plant chemistry including
comm unications with plant chemistry personnel.
O PL271C209
Revis io n 9
Pa ge 10 of 53
(
x. LESSON BODY: INST RUCTOR NOT ES
F. Co ntro l o f Equ ipment, System Status and OPD P-l Appendix D,
Clearances. Objectiv e 8
1. Status Change Authorization and Report ing.
2. Equipment and System Alignm ents.
3. Clearances
4. Observations Form 1&2,
G. Logkeeping. OPDP-! Attachment E,
Prop er logkeeping is of maj or imp ortance to every App endi x 1, Back To Basic
person on shift. Proper logkeeping provides three Fundamentals, :Logkceping
function s:_( l) a record of what was done and if the
expected response was obt ained, (2) a record for Objective 9 .
current plant statu s, and (3) a record for subs equent
( evaluation of the statu s of the plant.
1. Establishment of Operating Logs.
2. T imeliness of Record ings.
3. Inform ation to be Recorded.
4. Legibility.
5. Correction s.
6. Log Review.
7. Observati ons Form 1
H . Plan t Operating Procedures. OPDP-l Attachment F,
I. Procedure Compliance. Objective 14
2. Precautions, Limitations and Initial Conditions
C 3. Procedure Pla ce Keeping.
4. Use of 10 CFR 50.54 (x) and (y) Obj ective 8
TVAN Sta nda rd Conduct of Operatio ns OPDP-1
( Depa rt ment
Proc ed ur e
Rev. 0007
Pac e 36 of 98
Appendix E
(Pag e 3 of 3)
Log Keeping
2. To aid in event reconstruction, as much significant information as possibie should be logged
during emergencies and abnormal or unexpected events. However, log keeping should not
take precede nce over controlling and monitoring the plant.
D. Legibility
Log entries shall be made in a manner such that they can be easily read and underst ood.
Add itionally, the log entries should be readily reproducible with standard photocopy machine s.
E. Corrections .
1. Correct ions shall be made by editing the appropriate log entry, or shall be made by placing
a single line through the incorrect entry, writing in the correct entry. initialing, and dating in a
nearby space .
2. Spell checking and related corrections on eSOMS narrative logs does not require initialing
and dating when done before official approval and printing.
( 3. All corrections to approved computer printed documents shali be initialed and dated and
approved by the SM.
4. Late entries (past shift turnover) shall be annotated by placing the current time and the
Words "LATE ENTRY' , followed by the time the entry should have been made, and then
the entry .
F. Log Review
The previous shifts logs shall be reviewed prior to assuming watch. Operating logs shall be
reviewed by the SM/US . These reviews normally would occur shortly before shift relief and
shou ld ensure that entries are accurate and adequate , and that no open ended entries remain.
Additionally , the Operations Superintendent, or his designee should review the ope rating logs on
a daily basis when he is on site.
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
87. G2.1.21 00 1
( You are preparing to perform a control rod exercise surveillance on your shift.
BSL is not operating.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the correctlocation(s) to obtain the current
controlled copy revision of the procedure?
Control Room ...
A. ONLY
B. and OFO ONLY
C~ and WCC ONLY
D. OFO AND WCC
A. Incorrect. WCC also has controlled copies.
B. Incorrect. Copies in the OFO are not controlled
C. Correct.
(
D. Incorre ct. Copies in the OFO are not controlled
Abilityto obtain and verify controlled procedure copy.
Question No. 68
Tier 3 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 3.1
Technical Reference: SPP-2.2
ODM-1 .0 Appendix D
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
Learning Objective: OPL27SPP-2.2 Objective 2 and 5
Question Source: Bank
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:36 PM 167
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
( Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
LOWER
Difficulty:
Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:37 PM 168
OPL271SPP -2.2
Revisio n 1
Page 3 of 31
(
I. P.BO.G.BAM : OP ERATOR TRAINING
II. C~JJBSE : LICENSE TRAINING
III. L£SSONID1.E: SPP-2.2, ADMIN ISTRATION OF SITE TECHNICAL PROCEDURES
IV. La-lGTH OF LESS-QNLCQJJIlS.E: 1 Hour
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon com pletion of License Training, the participant shall be able 10 demonstrate or
explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, an understanding
of SPP-2 .2 "Administration of Site Technical Procedures" and OPDP-1 Attachme nt
F "Plant Operating Procedures."
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities
associated with Rules of Procedure Use that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial
License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator Requalificat ion Training
( for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A
1. Discuss 1he purpose of SPP-2.2.
2. Discuss manage ment philoso phy for procedure use and adherence .
3. List the four levels of use for technical procedures including examples of each
level.
4 Give example s when a procedure step may be marked not applicable (N/A).
5 Describe the procedure revisio n process .
6 Briefly define a minor/editorial change .
7 Describe the conditions under which personnel may take reasonable action
withi n the scope of their training that departs from procedu re.
8 Explain how to obtain and ve rify controlled procedure copy.
(
Revision 1
Page 7 of 31
}LJ.ESSJ:)tUW.Dj': ------;--'ltlS.IRU_CI OaNQTES
A . SPP-2.2 Scope: The Oper ations
( Pro cedures which fall under the scope of this SPP are
Department's Emergency
Operating Instruction
those procedures that involve manipulation, monitoring Program will administer the
or anal ysis of plant equipment or processes . These development, review, and
pro cedur es will be prepared, reviewed , revised and approval for EO l's and
appro ved in accordance with this SPP. supporting documents.
B . Use and Adherence: Objective #2
1. Procedure users are responsible for :
a. Following current approved procedures or
obta ining approval for necessary changes
before proceeding.
b . Understanding the expected respo nses before
perfo rming actions in a procedure and ensuring
these responses occur.
c. Maintaining safe plant opera tion. In situations
where procedures are inaccurate or
inappropriate, safety takes precedence over
( pro cedure adherence.
d. Sto p performance if the procedu re:
NOTE : Typographical
- Cannot be performed or completed as errors do not require
written. stopping procedure
performance. Th ese errors
- Is determined to be inadequa te for the should be noted and
intended use. corrected following
perfo rmance of the
- Is determined to be technically incorrect. procedure. This does not
apply to changes in
- Conflicts with another procedure, or would com ponent identifiers,
be in violation of appro ved and controlling numerical units, values,
documents. limits, work seque nce or
where the potential exists
- Produces unexpected results. for improper ope ration of
piant equipment.
OPL271 SPP-2.2
Revision 1
Page 14 of 31
(
2 . Procedure changes are normally processed in Objecti ve #5
Business Support Library(BSL). If BSL is not
available or the change is urgent, a description of
the chan ge or a marked up copy of the procedure
and form SPP-2.2-1, "Procedure Control Form
(PCF)" shou ld be forwarded to the organization
responsible for the procedure (sponsor).
PCFs are required for other
NOTE: Hard copy peFs are not required when situations where BSL audit
using BSL to process the procedure. BSL trails are not available to
controls and the audit trail generated by document review and
BSL serve as the documentation that approval requirements and
appropriate reviews and approvals have for any handwritten
occu rred. change s.
3. The sponsor shall evaluate and determine the
disposition of requested changes as appropriate:
a. If mange not needed, returns the request with
ane xplanati on of why not needed.
( b. If the change is needed, assign a responsible
individual to prepare the draft in accordance with
this procedure, or . ...
c. Place the request in a revision file to be
incorporated at next revision.
4. The preparer shall:
a. Obtain a number for a new procedure from the
responsible organization or Management
Services (MS ).
b. Ensure the procedure number has not been
used previously.
c. Determ ine if the revision to the procedure is
minor or editorial using the guidelines of Section
3.5.
d . Determ ine with plant managemen t if the revision
must be processed as an urgent change .
TVAN STANDARD SPP-2.2
PROGRAMS AND ADMINISTRATION OF SITE TECHNICAL Rev. 13
( PROCESSES PROCEDURES Page 12 of 38
NOTE NIA is NOT to be used to bypass steps that are inadequately or
improperly written or to be used in lieu of a procedure change.
Section Manager or Designee of Responsible Organization
3.3.7 Procedure steps which do not meet criteria 3.3.1 through 3.3.6 and are not
required to be performed because of plant conditions or are controlled by
another procedure previousiy fulfilled may be NIA'd by the Section Manager or
Designee of the responsible organization. Concurrence is documented by
initialing and dating the NIA'd steps. The Section Manager's or Designee's
decision to NIA steps shall be based on evaluation of whether the procedure still
fulfills all intended objectives.
3.4 New Procedu res. Revisions. an d Cancell at ions (See Appen dix A and B)
3.4.1 Anyone can request a new procedure, revision, or cancellation. Cancelled
procedures must follow same process as revised procedures.
3.4.2 Procedure changes are normally processed in Business Support Library (BSL).
If BSL is not available or the change is deemed urgent by plant managem ent, a
description of the changes or a marked up copy of the procedure and Form
SPP-2.2-1, "Procedure Controi Form (PCF)" should be forwarded to the
organization responsible for the procedure (sponsor).
NOTE Hard copy PCFs are not required when using BSL to process the
( procedure. BSL controls and the audit trail generated by BSL serve as
the documentation that appropriate reviews and approvals have
occurred.
PCFs are required for other situations where BSL audit trails are not available to
document review and approval requirements and for any handwritten changes.
3.4.3 The sponsor shall evaluate and determine the disposition of requested changes
as appropriate:
A. If the change is not needed, return the request and explain the reason.
B. If the change is needed. assign a responsible individual to prepare the
draft in accordance with this procedure. or
C. Place the request in a revision file awaiting the next appropriate
revision.
3.4.4 The preparer shall, as appropriate:
A. Obtain a number for a new procedure from the responsible organization
or Management Services (MS). It is the responsibility of the preparer to
ensure the procedure number has not been used previously.
B. Determine if the revision to the procedure is minor or editorial using the
guidelines in Section 3.5.
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
c 89. G2.2.12 001
You have been directed to perform a Surveillance Test that is part of a Post
Maintenance Test.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes a condition where a step in the test may be
marked "N/A" in accordance with SPP-2.2, Administration of Site Technical
Procedures?
A. To designate change of conditions or intent of the test.
B. To change incorrect procedure step descriptions that do NOT change intent.
C\'" To designate procedure sections that are not being used as part of the PMT.
D. To identify or change faulted procedure step logic or incorrect procedure guidance
in relation to the performance of the PMT.
A Incorrect. using NIA to change conditions or ignore precautions is forbidden.
Procedure Rev required.
B Incorrect. Using N/A to change step descriptions is forbidden .
C Correct. N/A l]1ay be used when performing partial PMTs to designate components
that will not be used in the test.
o Incorrect. Specifically forbidden to N/A incorrect sequence
( Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
Question No. 69
Tier 3 Group 2
Importance Rating: R03.0
Technical Reference: SPP-2.2, section 3.3
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271 SPP-2.2 Objective 4
Question Source: Bank
Question History: Harris 2005 Editorially Modified
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content 41 .10
Comments:
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:37 PM 171
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: BANK Source lf Bank: HARRIS 2005 NRC
( Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
LOWE R
Difficulty:
Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Mon day, March 12, 2007 2:35:37 PM 172
OPL271 SPP-2.2
Revision 1
Page 3 of 31
( I. ffiQGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. C-OJlBSE: LICENSE TRAINING
III. LES.SOliIIILE: SPP-2 .2, ADMINISTRATION OF SITE TECHNICAL PROCEDURES
IV. LENGTH OF LESSONICOllBS.E: 1 Hour
V. IBAlMlMG.J:lBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain, using classroom evaluat ions andlor simulator scenarios, an understanding
of SPP-2.2 "Administration of Site Technical Procedures" and OPDP-1 Attachment
F "Plant Operating Procedures."
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities
associated with Rules of Procedure Use that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial
License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training
( for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A
1. Discuss the purpose of SPP-2.2.
2. Discuss management philosophy for procedure use and adherence .
3. List the four levels of use for technical procedures including examples of each
level.
4 Give examples when a procedure step may be marked not applicable (NIA) .
5 Describe the procedure revision process.
6 Briefly define a minorleditorial change .
7 Describe the conditions under which personnel may take reasonabie action
within the scope of their training that departs from procedure .
8 Explain how to obtain and verify controlled procedu re copy.
OPL271 SPP-2 .2
Revision 1
c X ~LESSQt:LB_ODY-'-':~
Page 12 of 31
.-------.JILUN""S..LT,aUCTOB NOTES-
- Periodically referen ced during task performance
to verify that each segment of the procedure has A segment is a portion of a
been performed . procedure that
accomplishes a complete
- When required, appropriate sign-offs are function, such as alignment
completed to verify that each segment of the of a pump to a system , or
procedure has been completed disassembly of a pump.
3. Information Use procedures direct activities with the Example: GOI-6
follo wing characteristics:
- Frequently performed or not comple x.
- Entire activity can normall y be performed from
mem ory.
- The task is within the knowledge and skills of
experienced individuals and/or task qualified
personnel.
Rules of Use:
(
- Wh en performing procedures from memory,
procedures should be reviewed periodically (for
example, before performan ce or during
continuing training ).
- The procedure shall be reviewed following
revisions that affect the performance of the
activity.
- The procedure user is responsible for results
obtained when not referring to the procedure.
4. Multiple Usage Level procedures: Example : Various
Maintenance Procedures
If different sections of the procedure require
different levels of use, the procedure is identified as
multiple use and the classification of the individual
sections is identified on the cover sheet or in the
procedure.
F. Use of Not Applicable (N/A): Objecti ve #4
1. When performing technical procedures, performers
( may use N/A in lieu of sign-off required by Section
3.2 (SPP-2 .2) only when it is clearly appropriate.
OPL271 SPP-2.2
Revision 1
c X--L_ESS~--O"",D,-,-Y~:
Page 13 of 31
.-_!I ~SIRUCTO RKOIES _
2. N/A is NOT to be used to bypass steps that are
inadequately or improperl y written or to be used in
lieu of a procedure change.
3. The follo wing criteria shall be applied to determine
when a step may be marked N/A:
- The procedure specificall y allows a step(s) to be
marked N/A under specified conditions .
- For procedures used to accomplish activities like
post-maintenance tests, exact steps to be
performed will often be specified . When specific
steps are specified , all other steps may be
marked N/A.
- Nonappli cable unit steps in a multiple unit
procedure shall be marked N/A.
Example: If the accept ance
- Procedures providing alternate steps dependen t criteria was met, go to step
on specified conditions allow the steps not 3.7. If the acceptance
( required to be N/A*d. criteria was not met,
continue with step 3.3. In
this example, N/A Steps 3.3
through 3.6 if the
acceptance criteria was met.
- QC (witness/notification) holdpoints cannot be
N/A'd without Nuclear Assurance approval.
- When using only specific sections of an
instruction as delineated in the controlling work
document, then unused sections may be N/A'd.
- Procedure steps which are obviously not
required to be performed may be N/A'd with
concurrence of the supervisor (mana gement or Concurrence is documented
engineering supervisory level) responsible for by initiaiing and dating the
conduct of the activity or procedure. N/A'd steps.
G. New Procedures, Revisions and Cancellations:
1. Anyone can request a new procedure, revision , or
cancellation . Cancelled procedures must follow the
c same process as revised procedures.
TVAN STANDARD SPP* 2.2
PROGRAMS AND ADMINISTRATION OF SITE TECHNICAL Rev. 13
( PROCESSES PROCEDURES Page 11 of 38
- Entire activity can normally be accomplished from memory,
- Within the knowledge and skills of experienced individuals and/or task
qualified personnel.
- When performing procedures from memory, procedures should be
reviewed periodically (for example, before performance or during
continuing training). Also, the procedure shall be reviewed following
revisions that affect the performance of the activity. These reviews
ensure that the activities are being performed correctly and that no
procedure revisions have been overlooked.
- The procedure user is responsible for results obtained when not referring
to the procedure .
3.2.4 Multiple Usage Lev els Pro cedure
If different sections of the procedure require differen t levels of use, the
procedure is identified as multiple use and the classification of the individual
sections is identified on the cover sheet or in the procedu re.
3.3 Use of Not Appli cabl e IN/A)
( When performing technical procedur es, performers may use N/A in lieu of sign-off
required by Section 3.2 only when it is clearly appropriate . The following criteria shall be
app lied to determine when a step may be marked N/A.
Performer
3.3.1 The procedure specifically allows a step(s) to be marked N/A under specified
conditions.
3.3.2 For procedures used to accomplish activities like post-maintenance tests, exact
steps to be performed will often be specified. When specific steps are specified,
all other steps may be marked N/A.
3.3 .3 Non-applicable unit steps in multiple unit procedures shall be marked NIA.
3.3.4 Procedures providing alternative steps dependent on specified conditions allow
the steps not required to be N/A'd.
EXAMPLE If the acceptan ce criteria was met. go to Step 3.7. If the
acceptance criteria was not met, continue with Step 3.3.
In this example, N/A Steps 3.3 through 3.6 if the acceptance criteria is met.
3.3.5 Quality Control (QC) (witness/notification) holdpoints cannot be N/A'd without
Nuclear Assurance appro val in accordance with NADP-1, Conduct of Quality
Assessment and Inspection.
3.3 .6 When using only specific sections of an instruction as delineated in the
controlling work document, then unused sections may be NIA'd.
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
90. 02 .2.23001
c Which ONE (1) of the following describes the requirement for LCO tracking in
accordance with OPDP-8, Limiting Conditions for Operations Tracking?
The official log for LCOs is the ...
A. Unit Log . All LCO entries are also required to be documented in the LCO Tracking
Log.
B:o' Unit Log. ONLY LCO entries that will remain in effect past the assigned shift are
required to be documented in the LCO Tracking Log.
C. LCO Tracking Log. All LCO entries are also required to be documented in the Unit
Log.
D. LCO Tracking Log . ONLY LCO entries that will remain in effect past the assigned
shift are required to be documented in the Unit Log.
A incorrect. LCO may entries may be put in LCO Tracking log but the only ones
required are the entries that will go past the end of the shift
B Correct
C incorrect. The Unit Log is required at all times for all entries as the primary log.
o incorrect. The Unit Log is required as the official log
( Ability to track limiting conditions for operation s.
Question No. 70
Tier 3 Group 2
Importance Rating: R02.6
Technical Reference: OPDP-8
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPS2710PDP-8 Objective 6
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
Monday. March 12.20072:35:37 PM 173
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: NE W Source If Bank:
(-, Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12,20072:35:37 PM 174
OPL2710PDP-8
Revision 0
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I. PROGRAM : OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS TRACKING
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />(s)
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simuiato r scenarios , the requirements of
OPDP-8, LIMITiNG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATIONS TRACKING.
B. Enabling Objectives:
o. -Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and
Abilities associated with Limiting Conditions For Operations Tracking
th at are rated <: 2.5 during Initial License Training and <: 3.0 during
( License Operator Requalification Training for the appropriate
license position as identified in Appendix A.
1. Describe purpose of this procedure.
2. Describe Precautions and Limitations listed in this procedure.
3 What are the requirements of the responsibilities section in this
procedure.
4. Describe requirements for T5 LCO Evaluations.
5. Describe requirements for LCO Tracking Logs.
6. What are the documentation requirements for LCO entries and exits.
7. Describe the difference between an Acti ve LCO vs an Information ONLY LCO.
8. Describe the information that must be entered into the LCO Tracking Logs.
OPL2710PDP-8
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Page 9 of 13
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X. LESSON BODY INSTRUCTOR NOTES
F. Require Documentation - Review the following: Objecfive 6
Refer to Section 3.5
1. What determines whether an LCO entry is made in Refer to Section 3.5.1
the Unit Log ONLY or the Unit Log and LCO
Tracking Log?
2. What information is required to be entered into the
Unit Log , when an LCO is entered?
3. During perform ance of Sis for which a status sheet
is provided, what acceptable method may be used
in lieu of logging each individual LCO in the Unit
Log?
G. Definitions- review the definitions in this section. Ref er to Section 5.0
1. Describe the difference between an Active LCO vs Objective 7
an Informa tion ONLY LCO?
H. Appendix "A and LCO Tracking LOG - Review the Refer to Appendix A and
following: Form OPDP-8-1
(
1. For LCO s which have an indefinite expiration date, Objecfive 8
what is entered into the expiration date column.? Refe r to Appendix A
Sect ion 2 .3
(
TVAN STANDARD OPDP-8
DEPAR TMENT LIMITI NG CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION TRACKING Rev. 1
( PROCEDURE Page 7 of 24
3.4 LCO Trac king Log
A. Each unit shall maintain a Unit LCO Tracking Log. Each unit shall also
track Common LCOs for common equipment that affects operability.
The US is responsible for maintaining the LCO Tracking Log(s).
B. Each LCO Tracking Record shall be assigned a unique identification
number.
C. Active LCOs shall be tracked and passed from shift to shift as part of the
shift turnover.
3.5 Reguirements for Documentation
Detailed requirements for documentation related to this procedure are contained in
attachments. as identified below:
3.5.1 Unit Log
For short-term LCO entries. the associated Unit Log will be used for
documenting LCO entry provided the LCO is exited before the end of the
assigned shift. LCO entries in the Unit Log should contain the LCO reference
number. component description. a brief description of the activity requiring the
LCO entry, and compensatory measures required while the LCO is in effect.
For performance of surveillance instructions for which a status sheet is provided.
the US/designee may track individual component out-of-service times and
( corresponding LCOs on the provided attachment in lieu of logging each
individual LCO in the Unit Log. The individual performing the procedure is
responsible for notifying the US/designee when equipment is made inoperable
and when it is placed back in service. Active LCOs that will extend past the end
of the shift shall be entered in the LCO Tracking Log.
4 .0 RECORDS
4.1 QA Records
The Unit Log referenced in this procedure is a QA record.
4.2 Non-QA Record s
Form OPDP-8-1. "LCO Tracking Log"
5.0 DEFINITIONS
Active Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) * A condition specified in the plant Technical
Specifications (TS) which limits unit operations. An LCO may be entered by equipment
malfunction or a change in a unit parameter. An LCO implies all LCOs contained in the plant's
TS, Offside Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), Technical Requirements Manual (TR) and the
Fire Protection Report (FPR), if applicable. If an LCO is not met, the associated ACTION
requirements shall be met.
Information Only LCO * A method of tracking an equipment malfunction or change in plant
parameter which would restrict unit operation in another plant condition. An INFORMATION
LCO may prevent a change in plant state/mode or may become an ACTIVE LCO for the current
plant condition should other TS-related equipment or redundant safety-related equipment
become inoperable.
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
91 . G2 .2.26 001
( Given the following timeline for Unit 1 operation :
- 4/22 @ 0900 Entered HOT STANDBY (reactor was tripped from 20% power
during shutdown)
- 4/22 @ 1100 Entered HOT SHUTDOWN
- 4/23 @ 0600 Entered COLD SHUTDOWN
- 4/23 @ 2300 .Entered REFUELING
Which ONE (1) of the following times would be the earliest time that irradiated fuel
movement in the reactor vessel is allowed?
M 4/26 @ 1300
B. 4/26 @ 1500
C. 4/27 @ 0800
D. 4/28 @ 0100
A. Correct. TS 3.9.3 specifies 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> from critical. In this case , achieving Hot
Standby. -
( B. Incorrect. This is 100 hrs from Hot Shutdown.
C. Incorrect. This is 100 hrs from Cold Shutdown.
D. Incorrect. This is 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> from Refueling.
c.
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:37 PM 175
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 * NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.
( Question No. 71
Tier 3 Group 2
Importance Rating: R02.5
Technical Reference: TS 3.9.3
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.FH Objective 6.a
Question Source: Bank
Question History: Sequoyah FH-B.5.C-11 ,
Developed from Kewaunee NRC 2000 exam
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10, 43.2
Comments :
(
Source: BANK Source If Bank: SEQ UOYAH BANK
Cogn itive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQ UOYAH
Dat e: 412007 Last 2 NRC ?: NO
/
\ v.,
Monday, March 12, 20072 :35:37 PM 176
OPT200.FH
Rev. 3
Page 4 of62
(
V. TRAINI NG OBJECTI VES (Cont'd):
B. Learning Ob jectives (Co nt'd):
5. Describe the operation of the Fuel Handling system as it relates to the follow ing:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed while refuelin g.
c. Alarms and alarm responsc .
d. How a component failure will affect syst em operation
e. How a support system failure will affec t Fuel Hand ling system operation
6. Describe the administrative contro ls and limits for the Fuel Handling system as
explained in this lesson:
a. State Tech Specs/Tk.M LCOs that govern the Fuel Handlin g Systems.
b. State the :": 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the condit ions/status of the Fuel Han dling system co mpo nents and the
appropriate sectio ns of the Tec h Spec, determin e if operability requirements are
met and what act ions are req uired
7. D iscu ss related Industry Events:
a. SQN LE R930 16 Tilted Fuel Assembly
( b. SQN-LER 2-93 -3 Equipment Hatch not closed during Fuel Moveme nt
c. SQN-NOV 94- 11 Non-co nser vat ive Fuel Handlin g Practices
d. SOE R 85-0 I Reactor Cav ity Sea l Failure, Connecticut Yankee
c. OE81 12 Move ment of irradiatcd fuel with Vent ilatio n syste m inop, Dresden 2
f. SOER 94-2 Boron dilution Events in PWRs
VI. TRAINI NG AIDS:
A. Clas sroom Com puter and Local Area Netwo rk (LAN) Access
B. Computer projector
(
OPT200.FH
Rev. 3
( Page 53 of62
Administrative Topics
- State Tech SpecslTRM LCOs that govern
the Fuel Handling System
- Section 9 Refueling Operations
- State the TS LCOs that have an
"Immediately Suspend Core Alterations"
action limit
Ena bling Objecti ve 6
( x. LESSON BODY :
- Point out to students the Secti on 9 o f TS and T Rl\,l
- Refer to a copy of SQN Tec hn ica l Specifications for the deta ils of the LCO, applicability,
actiorus), surveillane e(s) and basis for each
Tech Sp ecs T he follow ing is a listing of Tech Specs identified for the FH sys tem.
3.9 .1 Boron concentration *'
3.9.2 Source Ranze Monitors *
3.9.3 Subcritica l 100 hrs,
3.9.4 Co ntainme nt Penetrt ions *
3.9.8.1 RHR opera tion
3.9.8.2 2 RHR Operab le *
3.9.9 Containment Vent
3.9.10 23 ft. of wa ter Reactor vessel flange'
3.9. 11 23 ft. watc in stora ge racks
3.9.12 On eABGTS
T RM
3.9.5 Direct communication
3.9.6 Manipulator Crane
Core loading will be suspended, pending evaluation by the Refueling SROIFHS and Reactor
Engineering under the following circumstances:
( ]f there occurs on anyone resp onding nuclear channel an unexpected increase in
count rate by a factor of five.
An unexpected increase in count rate by a factor of two on all responding channels.
If RCS temperature drops below 50°F.
Communication between the control room, containment or theSFP is lost.
If water clarity prevents the operator from viewing the Bottom Core Plate during core reload
R EFUELI NG OPE RATION S .. -"'\
(
3/ 4 9.3 DE CAY TIME
LIMITI NG CONDITION FO R O PERATI ON
3.9.3 Th e reactor shall be subcritical for at least 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> .
APPLI CABILI TY: Duri ng movement or irradiated fuel in the reactor pressu re vessel.
AC TION :
With the reactor subcritical for less than 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />, suspend all operatio ns involving movement of
irrad iated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. The prov isions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SU RVEILLANCE REQU IREMENT S .,
4.9.3 T he reactor shall be determined to have been subcritical for at least 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> by verification of the
date and time of subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuei in the reactor pressure vessel.
)
(
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 9-3
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
95 . G2.3 .2 001
( Given the following plant conditions:
Dose rate at job location is 90 mrem/hr.
Airborne Radioactivity Area from particulates due to weld grinding :
Total Internal dose for the job if respirator is worn is 0 mrem.
Total Internal dose for the job if no respirator is worn is 65 mrem.
Time to complete job while wearing a respirator is 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
Time to complete job without wearing a respirator is 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes whether a respirator will be worn, and why?
A'!' No, wea ring a respirator will raise total exposure .
B. Yes, wearing a respirator will lower total exposure.
C. No, a respirator is not required unless the internal dose will exceed 40 DAC.
D. Yes, a respirator must be worn anytime particulate airborne radiation is present due
to grinding .
A Correct. 290 total mRem
( B incorrect. 315 total mRem
C incorrect. Respirators are worn to minimize dose. 40 DAC hours is not a restriction
or requirement for their use
D incorrect. Although respirators may be worn for grinding, it would not be worn if it
results in extra dose.
c
Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35 :38 PM 183
QUESTIONS REPORT
for S EQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of facility ALARA program.
( Question No. 72
Tier 3 Group 3
Importance Rating: R02 .5
Technical Reference: RCI-04
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271 C260 Objective 8, 9
Question Source: Modified
Question History: Various WTSI Exams
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .12
Comments :
MODIFIED Source If Bank:
( Source:
Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC'!: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:38 PM 184
OPL2 71C2 60
Revi sion 9
Page 4 o f 45
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8. Identify the requirements for the implementation of a successful ALARA program.
9. Identify the respons ibilities ofthc following concerning the ALARA program:
a. Rad Protecti on Management.
b. Plant Supervision,
c. Plant Empl oyee .
10. Identify the proce ss for preparing a Radiation Work Permit (RWP)
The following list contains knowledge and ability statements (KlAs) from Th e Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for
Nuclear Power Plant Operators: Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) l\'UREG-I I2 2, Revision 2 that are applicable to
the Initial Lice nsed Candidate training program. As such, questioning in these areas will be included on any testing in
preparation of, or included in obtaining either RO or SRO NRC license.
I OC FRSS IM PORTANC E
KJA# K IA Sta tc nrcnt Se ct. Linkts) RO/SR O
G 2.3. 1 Knowledge of IOCFR20 and related facility radiation protection 41.1 2 /4 3.4 . 2.6/3.0
( G 2.3.2
requ irements.
Knowledge of facility ALARA program.
45 .9 /45 .10
41.1 2 /43.4 1 2.5/2.9
45.9 / 45. 10
G 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits and contamination control, 43.4 1 45 .10 2.5/3 .1
incl uding permissible levels in excess of those authorized.
G 2.3.5 Knowledge of use and function of personne! monit oring equipment. 41.11 /45 .9 2.3/2.5
G 2.3.7 Kn owledge of the process for preparing a radi ation work permit. 41.10 /45 .12 2.0 /3 .3
G2 .3. 10 Abilit y to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation 43.4 / 45 .10 2.9/3. 3
and guard against personnel exposure.
(
OPL271C260
Revision 9
c XI. LESSON BODY:
Page 20 of 45
INSTRUCTOR NOTES
c) Allows the pinpointing of high dose jobs so that concentrated
efforts can be used to reduce them in the future.
d) Provides data for managers and engineers to compare benefits
of modification versus the cost in person-rem for a plant
modification.
b. Need for ALARA is based on the following assumptions:
1) Any change in the body brought on by ionizing radiation is
potentially detrimental.
2) Any dose in any amount is a potential hazard.
3) Every molecule in every cell is part of a delicate system, 10
balance with others, that is easily disrupted by radiation.
c. Implementation of a successful ALARA program requires: Obj.8
I) Management commitment and support.
( 2) Careful design of facilities and equipment.
3) Well-trained, corrunitted, and aware workers.
d. Organizational responsibility
I) Plant Rad Protection Manager (Staff) Responsibilities Obj.9
a) Takes the lead in implementing ALARA and insures that goals
and performance against those goals, as assessed periodically
are made available.
b) Is responsible for an effective program as required by
procedure.
c) Maintains awareness of location, operation andjobs that give
radiation dose.
d) Participates in job planning and procedural development.
e) Ensures that respiratory protection, protective clothing and
survey equipment are specified for each job.
Provides for training in radiation protection.
( f)
2) Plant Supervision Obj.9
OP L271C260
Revision 9
Page2 1of45
( XI. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
a) Implements procedures within their respective areas to
minimize radiation dose .
b) Ensures that employees follow proced ures and work orders
(First line supervisors are of utmost importance in creating
the proper attitude among their crews and greatly influence
the achievement of ALARA).
3) Individual Employee - Most Important Obj.9
Stress: No program can
a) Responsible for reducing his/her own radiat ion dose . work without individual
commitment
b) Follow s all plant procedures and Rad Protection instructions.
c) Report s all radiation hazards and any suggestions for
reduc ing hazards to Rad Protection or their supervisor.
e . AL ARA Progra m details
l) Key Components.
( a) ALARA policy and manageme nt commitment.
b) Work er and line manage ment commitment.
c) Collective dose database system .
d) ALARAjob reviews.
e) ALARA design review.
t) ALARA coordinator.
Review latest annua l
g) Goals and associated tracking system. ALARA Report
2) Empl oyee incentives to reduce dose. These have been successful
in the industry.
a) Awareness of risk to promote safety.
b) Recogn ition.
c) Prestige.
d) Sense of involvement.
( e) Rece iving feedback (positive/negative).
1) Managements concern.
RCI-04
( SQN Respiratory Protection Program Revision 46
Page160f1 6
Appendix C
A ir and Loose Surface Rad ioactive Contamination Levels for Evaluating
Respiratory Protection (Recommended)
A ir
Concentration Levels
(,"Ci/CC Air)
Alpha and Beta-GammaIA,BJ Recommended Action lDJ
< 1 DAC Respirators are to be considered when entering an
identified Airborne Radioactivity Area
1 to 20 DAC Full face respirator required or complete evacuation of
personnel from area
> 20 to 700 DAC Supplied air devices or complete evacuation of
personnel from area
> 700 DACle ) SCBA
Not es
A Only supplied:air and SCBA provide protection for halogens.
B Gamma scan for radionuclide determination is recommended.
( C In this concentration range, the immersion dose rate may be significant.
D A TEDE evaluation is required when the criteria of RCI-14 for a TEDE evaluation are met. This
evaluation considers total dose to an individual due to use or non-use of respirators.
Loose Surface
Concentrati on Levels
(dpm/100 em')
Beta-Gamma Recommended Action
1,000 to 50,000 Normally none; however unique or special cases may
arise and will require evaluation.
> 5,000 dpm total Evaluate each welding, grinding, burning, or cleaning
(fixed and transferrable activity) task using volatile liquid for respiratory protection.
50,000 to 100,OOOIE) Evaluate each non-inspection (physical maintenance)
task for respiratory protection. Inspections or similar
tasks normally will not require a protection method.
> 100,000IA) Inspections and physical maintenance normally require
a protection method or engineering controls.
Notes
E Additional considerations, such as the condition of the surface (e.g., dry versus oil, grease, etc.) and
data gathered by air sampling while personnel are within the area will affect respiratory protection
determinations.
(
r> r>.
."
RCI-14 A tt 04
SQN TEDE ALARA WORKS HEET Eft Date 03/18/04
Paqe 1 of 1
RWP Number(s)
Estimated Dose W ith Res piratory Protection
A. Number of hour s in work area per day by a single individual _ _ _ _ hours
B. (Hours) x (Wo rk area dose rate _ _ mrem/hr) ,I External Dose mrem
C. (Externa l dose in mrem) x (1.15 IF IA) Corrected External Dose mrem
D. Measured DAC or anticipated DAC _ __ DAC
E. [(Hours) x (DAC) J.,. (Respirator A PF Ie,) _ _ _ DAC-hrs
F. (DAC- hrs) x (2.5 mremIDAC-hr) Internal Dose mrem
G. TE DE ~ (Step C) + (Step F) ____ mrem
Estimated Dose Without Res piratory Protection or Engineering Controls
H. [Hours (Step A)] x [DAC (Step D)J _ _ _ DAC-hrs
I. [DAC- hrs (Step H)] x [2.5 mrem/DAC-hrj Internal Dose mrem
J. TEDE ~ (Step B) + (Step I) ____ mrem
Estimated Dose W ithout Respiratory Protection and With Eng ineering Controls
K. List feasible engineering contro ls for this application:
L. Estimated DAC afte r applicati on of engineering controls DAC
M. {Hours (Step A)J x [DAC (Step L)] _ _ _ DAC-hrs
N. [DAC-hrs (Step M)J x [2.5 mrem/DAC-hr] Internal Dose _ _ __ mrem
O. Estimated dose to single individual per day to implement engineering controls
( mrem) + (Number of days for the task) mrem
P. [mr em (Step I)l - [mrem (Step N)] Internal Dose Saved mrem
Q. TED E ~ [(Step B) + (Step N) + (Step 0 )] - [Step P] ___ _ mrem
TEDE S el ection : Step G Step J Step Q (Circle one)
Identify items whic h override TEDE selection : Hot partic le presence - Heat stress - Industrial contaminants
Visibilit y - Confined space - High elevation - Comm s - Other
TEDE Selection O verride : Yes / No (Circle one)
Prepared By / Date Approved By I Date
NOTES
A Work Inefficiency Facto r (IF) due to use of respiratory protection
B Assig ned Protection Factors (A PF): Air purifying respirator - 100 Airline masklhood - 1.000 SCBA - 10.000
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
1. G2.3.1O 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
A rapid load reduction from 100% power to 60% power was performed on Unit 1
approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> ago.
Indication on Auxiliary Building Area Radiation Monitors. 1-RR-90-1A , and
0-RR-90-1 B are rising.
Chem istry confirms that RCS 1-131 activity excee ds Technical Specification
limit of acceptable operation.
The US directs a plant shutdown to be performed.
Which ONE (1) of the follow ing post shutdown actions is subsequent ly performed to
limit the release of activity?
A. MSIVs are closed
B~ RCS temperature is reduced below 500°F
C. SIG PORV setpoints are raised
D. Maximum Condensate Polishers are placed in service
( A is incorrect because closing MSlVs does not prevent rad release from SG ADVs
B is correct. Raise letdown to clean up RC system, and reduce temp IA W TS
C is incorrect. Would not stop a release from SV
o is incorrect. Cation Demin may be placed in service on Letdown, but placing
Condensate Demins in service would still not minimize a release off-site if SV or SG
ADV lifted
Monday, March 12, 2007 3:43:00 PM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel exposure.
( Question No. 73
Tier 3 Group 3
Importance Rating: R02.9
Technical Reference: TS 3.4.8, AOP R.06
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-R.06 Objective 6 and 9
Question Source: Bank
Question History: WTSI Bank
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
Source : BANK Source If Bank: WTSI
Cognitive Lev el: HIGHER Difficulty:
RO SEQUOYAH
( Job Position:
Date: 4/2007
P lant:
Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 3:43:00 PM 2
OPL271AOp*R06
Revision 0
Page 3 of 15
( I. PROGRAM : OPERATOR TRAINING* LICENSED
II. COURSE : LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: AOP- R.06 HIGH RCS ACTIVITY
IV. LENGTH OF L ESSON/COURSE: 1.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />(s)
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon com pletion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of
B. Enablin.9 Objectives:
( O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 11 22 Knowledge's and Abilities
associated with High RCS Activity that are rated 2: 2.5 during Initial License
Training and 2: 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Traini ng for the
appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.
1. Explain the purpose/goal of AOP-R06.
2. Discuss the AOP-R06 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with
AOP-R 06 entry conditions .
b. Describe the ARP requiremen ts associated with AOP-R06 entry conditions.
c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-
R.06 entry conditions.
d. Describe the Administrative conditions that require Turbine Trip/ Reactor trip
due to Reactor Coolant Pumo Malfunctions.
3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-
R.06.
4. Upon entry into AOP-R06, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to
the appropriate procedural section for response.
5. o Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-
R.06.
6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-R06.
OPL271AOP -R06
Revision 0
Page 4 of 15
( 7. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions wit hin this procedure and
transitions to other procedures .
8. Given a set of initial plant conditions use AOP-R06 to correctly:
a. Recognize entry conditions
b. Identify requ ired actions
c. . Respond to Contingencies
d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes
9. Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance of
10. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnorma l condition - prior to,
during and after the abno rmal condition
(
(
Revision °
OPL271AOP-R.06
Page 8 of 15
(
A. Purpose Objective 1
1. These instructions provide the actions necessary to
mitigate the effects of high RCS activity or failed fuel.
B. Overview - Symptoms and Entry Conditions Objective 2
1. Annunicators may indicate a fuel cladding or high The crew may be made
activity in the RCS aware of an increasing
trend in RCS activity
See AOP for listing of annunicators condition through reports
from the Chem Lab
2 . Deviations or unexpected indications on any of the
following may indicate fuel cladding failure or high
activity in the RCS
a. Rising radiation monitor indications
b . Rising activity in Chem Lab reactor coolant sample
c. Simultaneous increases in Condenser Vacuum
Exhaust and Lower Containment radiation monitor
count rates
3. No entry conditions from other procedures
( 4. AOP only has one Operator Action section Objective 5
Big picture is identification of activity, ensuring
compliance with TIS and REP, making notifications,
protecting personnel and initiating cleanup .
C. Section 2.0, Operator Actions Objectives 3, 4, 6, 8
1. Section 2.0, Step 1 - Evaluate Tech Specs for
applicability. Step performance should
ensure that Tech Specs are
- 3.4.8, Specific Activity satisfied or that sufficient
compensatory actions are
taken.
2. Section 2.0, Step 2. EVALUATE EPIP-1 , Emergency EAL designator 2.4, Fuel
Plan Initiating Matrix. Ciad Degredation,
activity exceeding LCO and
designator 1.1, Fuel Clad
Barrier, addresses RCS
activity in 1.1.2
CAUTION: Serves as a warning to
personnel drawing samples
RCS sample may have high activity
OPL271 AOP-R.06
Revision 0
Page 10 of 15
( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
9. Section 2.0, Step 8. GO TO appropriate plant Objective 7
procedure
The crew is directed back to
whatever procedure was in
effect prior to detection of
the high activity condition.
It should be noted that
the evaluation of TS 3.4.8
MA Y STILL RESUL T IN A
PLANT SHUTDOWN.
D. Technical Specifications Objective 9
TS 3.4.8, Specify Activity
(
(
( 314.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY '~' ' -,
LIMITING COND ITION FOR OPERATI ON
3.4.8 The specific activity of the primary coolant shall be limited to:
a. Less than or equal to 0.35 microcurieslgram DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 , and
b. Less than or equa l to 100lE microcuries/gram.
APPLICAB ILITY: MODES 1, 2,3, 4 and 5
ACTION :
MODES 1,2 and 3*
a. W ith the specific activity of the prim ary coolant greater than 0.35 microcuries/gram
DOSE EQU IVALENT 1-131 for more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> during one continuous time
interval or exceeding the limit line shown on Figure 3.4-1, be in at least HOT
STANQ6Y with T". less than 500'F within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. LCO 3.0.4.c is applicabl e.
b. With the specific activity o f the primary cool ant greater than 100fE
( microcuries/gram, be in at least HOT STANDBY with Tav. less than 500'F within
6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
MODES 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
a. With the specific activity o f the primary coolant grellter than -v.:
0.35 microc uries/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 or gr eater tha'if 100fE
microc uries/gram, perform the sampling and analysis requirements 6f item 4a of
Table 4.4-4 until the specific activity of the pr imary coolant is restored to within its
limits.
"With Tavg g reater than or equal50o"F.
April 11, 2005
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 4-1 9 Am endment No. 36, 117, 237,301
(
! I t
I I
" I I
! I ;
, ~ I
, :
- ,
I ,
J I I I I I I I I ' !
UNAC CEPTABLE I I !
I : :
OP ERATION
,
I
t+ :
I
,
,
, I
150
H-H I
- -}J ~
I
( I
I
I
I
I I I I
I I I I I I
-, I I I
I ; I ,
, I -'I
I I
I '
I
I I '
I I I
1 ,
I I
""
I
I '
I I
R241
I
I
I I I
30 40 50 60 70 80 so 100
PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER
FIGURE 3.4 -1
DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131 Primary Coolant Sp ecific Acti vity limit Versu s
(, Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER w ith th e Primary Co olant Spe ci fi c
Activity > 0.35 "Ci/gram Do se Equival ent 1-131 I R241
November 17, 1998
SEQIJOYAH - UNIT 1 3/44-22 Amendment No. 237
Rev. 9
I
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS
1. EVALUATE the following Tech Spec and
Technical Requir ement for applicability:
- TS 3.4.8, Specific Activity
2. EVALUATE EPIP-1, Emergency Plan
Classification Matrix.
CAUTION: RCS sample may have high activity.
( 3. REQUEST Chem Lab to perform following:
a. SAMPLE for activity levels:
- Initial RCS
- RCS at 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> intervals until
activity levels are stable.
- Outl et of mixed bed
AND
b. REQUEST Chem Lab recommendations
based on sample results.
4. NOTIFY Reactor Engineering to
implement O-TI-NUC-OOO-003.0, Fuel
Integrity Assessment Program, due to
possible failed fuel.
(
Page 30f7
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
97. G2.4.25 002
Given the following plant conditions:
- Unit 1 is in a refueling outage; Unit 2 is at 100% power
- Weld repairs scheduled on 2A-A charging pump.
The following lines are observed on the 0-M-29 "Blue Goose" and printer:
2D43 A 50 IN 07-Nov-02 09:15 ZONE 85 CHARGING PUMP ROOM 2A CROSS ZONE
W/ZONE 82 ACTUATES FSV-26-191;
2D46 A 50 IN 07-Nov-02 09:16 ZONE 82 U2 SI & CHARGING PUMP ROOMS CROSS
ZONE W/ZONES 83, -84, -85, 86, & 87 ACTUATES FSV-26-191 ZN LOCATED IN PNL 0*L*606;
2H38 A 50 IN 07-Nov-02 09:16 PNL 0-L-670/ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP A RUNNING ZONE
528 FIRE PUMP HOUSE RM A NOT OPERATIONALLY REQUIRED ZONE SEND OPERATOR
TO PUMP .
No other alarms or reports from the field are received .
0-FCV-26-191 is Aux Building el 669' Pre-action Valve.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the probable cause of the alarms and the correct
action to tak
A. Alarms consistent with taking No actions required .
( fire protection out of service
to perform work on 1A-A
charging pump.
B. Trouble in 2A charging pump Dispatch AUO/Fire Ops to confirm
room fire protection but no Alarm is real; If no fire confirmed in
actuation has occurred. area, notify Fire Ops of condition
and have alarms , electric driven fire
pump, and FSV-26-191 returned to
normal.
Cl" Conditions in 2A charging pump Dispatch AUO/Fire Ops to confirm
room have caused cross-zone Alarm is real; If no fire confirmed in
operation and actuated FSV-26-191 area, notify Fire Ops of condition
which started the electric and have alarms, electric
driven fire pump. driven fire pump, and FSV-26-191
returned to normal.
D. Conditions in 2A charging pump Notify the fire brigade to respond to
room have caused cross-zone the fire. Notify Shift Manager to
operation and actuated FSV-26-191 evaluate the REP.
and caused water spray into the room.
c.
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:38 PM 187
QUESTIONS REPORT
for 8EQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
( A. Incorrect. Fire detection would normally not be taken out of service for
welding activities.
B. Incorrect. Actuation has occurred.
C. Correct.
D. Incorrect. Sprinkler heads did not actuate as indicated by Alarm 2H38.
Knowledge of fire protection procedures.
Question No . 74
Tier 3 Group 4
Importance Rating: R02.9
Technical Reference: 0-80-13-1
0-AR-M-29
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examina tion: Appli cable drawings
Learning Objective: OPT200 .HPFP B.16.c, 17.a, c, 18.b
Question Sourc e: Bank
( Question History: Sequoyah FPS-3
Question Cognitive Level : Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
So urce : BANK Source If Bank: SEQUOYAH BANK
Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date : 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? : NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:38 PM 188
OPT200.HPFP
Re vis ion 0
Pag e 4 of 11
(
a. High pressure service water (086K 1.0I)
b. Raw service water (08 6K 1.02)
c. AFW system (086KI.03)
- 10 State the electrical and/or control air supplies to high pressure fire protection system's
components. (KIA 086K2 )
II Given a high pressure fire protection system/component malfunction, analyze its affect
on the plant systems listed. (KIA 086K3)
a. Shutdown capability with redundant equipment (086K3.01)
- 12 Expla in the following high pressure fire protection system design features and/o r
interlocks. (KIA 086K4)
a. Adequate supply of water for FPS (086K4.01)
b. Maintenance of fire header pressure (086 K4.02)
c. Detection and location of fires (OS6K4.03)
d. Personnel safety (O S6K4.04)
c. COl (OS6K4.06)
f. Main Turbine/Generator Protection (086K4.07)
13 Explain the following operational implicat ions as they apply to high pressure fire
protection system. (KIA 086K5)
a. Effect of COl on fire (078 K5.01)
b. Effect of water spray on electrical compone nts (086K5.03)
-:..- c. Hazards to personnel as a result of fire type and methods of protection (086K 5.04)
14 Given a malfunction of listed plant systems/components, analyze its effect on the high
pressure fire protection system. (K/A 086K6)
( a. Pumps (OS6K6.0 I)
b. Valves (086K6.02)
c. rvtote rs (086K6.03)
d. Fire, smoke, and heat detect ors (OS6K6.04)
15. Given a plant situation, prevent exceeding operational design limits by predicting and/or
monitoring, as applicable, changes in parameters that are associa ted with the operating
controls of the high pressure fire protect ion system. (KIA 086A I)
a. Fire header pressure (086.A1.0 I)
b. Fire water storage tank level (086 .A I .02)
c. Fire doors (OS6.A I.03)
d. Fire dampers (086.Al .04)
e. FPS lineups (086.A1.05)
16. Given a plant situation for the high press ure fire protection system, (i) predict the impact
on plant operation, and (ii) based on the impact, apply procedura l guidance to correct,
control, or mitigate the consequence of the situation. (KIA086A2)
a. Manual shutdown of the FPS (086.A2.01)
b. Low FPS header pressure (086.A2.02)
c. Inadvertent actuation of the FPS due to circuit failure or welding (086.A2.03)
d. Failure to actuate the FPS when required, resulting in fire damage (086.A2.04)
17. Given a plant situation, demonstrate the ability to monitor the automatic operation of the
high pressure fire protection system. (KIA 086A3)
a. Starting mechanisms of fire water pumps (086.A3.01)
b. Actuation of the FPS (086.A3.02)
c. Actuation of the fire detectors (086.A3.03)
18. Given a plant situation for the high pressure fire protec tion system, demonstrate the
abili ty to monitor and, as appropr iate, perform manual operation of the system in the
control room. (KIA086A4)
OPT2 00.HPFP
Revision 0
Page 5 of 11
( a. Fire water pumps (086.A4.01)
b. Fire detection panels (086.A4.02)
c. Fire alarms switch (086.A4.03)
d. Fire water storage tank makeup pumps (086.A4.04)
e. Deluge valves (086.A4.05)
(
OPT200 .HPFP
Re vis io n 0
Pag e 9 of 11
( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
II . Given a high pressure fire protection system/component Objective I I
mal funct ion. ana lyze its affec t on the plant systems listed . Student handout, dr awings,
a. Shutdow n capability w ith redundant equipment (086 K3.0 1)
12. Exp lain the follow ing high pressure fire protection sys tem Objec tive 12
design features and or interlocks. (KI A 086K4) FSAR, Studen t Handout
a. Adequate supply of water for FPS (086K4.0 1)
b. Maintenance of fire header pressure (086 K4.02)
c. Detection and location of fires (086K4.03)
d. Personnel safet y (086K4.04)
e. CO 2 (086K4.06)
f. Main Turbine/Generator Protection (086 K4.07 )
13. Explain the follow ing operational impli cations as they apply to Objective 13
hig h pressure fire prote ction system. (KIA 00 1K5) Studen t Research, FSAR,
a. Effcct o f CO, on fire (07 8 K5.0 1) Student Handout, Attachment
7
b. Effect of water spray on electrical components (086 K5.03)
c. Hazards-to personnel as a result of fire type and methods of
protection (086K5 .02)
( 14 . Giv en a malfu nct ion of listed plan t system s/components, Objective 14
ana lyze its effect on the high pressure fire prot ection system. FS AR, Student Handout,
(KIA 086 K6) Student Research, AOPs
d. Pumps (086K6.0 I)
e. Valves (086K6 .02)
f. Motors (086K6 .03)
g. Fire, smoke, and heat detectors (086K6.04)
15. Given a plant s ituat ion, prevent exceeding operati onal design Objective 15
limit s by predicting and/or monitor ing, as app licable, cha nge s System Description, Drawings
in parameters that are associated with the ope rating controls of Procedures
the high press ure fire protection system. (KI A 086 A I )
a. Fire hea der pressure
a. Fire water storage tank level
a. Fire doors
a. Fire dampers
a. FPS lineups
16. G iven a plant situation for the high pressure fire protection Objective 16
system, (i) predict the impact on plant operat ion, and (ii) based System Des cription, Drawings
on the impact, appl y procedural guidance to corr ect, control , or Procedures
mitigate the consequence of the situation. (KIA 086A2)
a. Manual shutdown of the FPS
a. Inadvert ent actuation of the FPS due to circ uit failure or
we lding
OPT200.HPFP
Revision 0
Page 10 of 11
X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
a. Failure to actuate the FPS when requ ired, resulting in fire
damage
17. Given a plant situation, demonstrate the ability to monitor the Objective 17
automatic operation of the high pressure fire protection system. System Description, Drawings
(KIA 086A3)
a. Starting mechanisms of fire water pumps
b. Actuation of the FPS
c. Actuation of the fire detectors
18. Given a plant situation for the high pressure fire protection Objective 18
system, demon strate the ability to monitor and, as appropriate, System Description, Drawings
perform manual operation of the system in the control room. Procedures
(KIA 086A4)
a. Fire wa ter pumps
b. Fire detection panels
c. Fire alarms switch
d. Fire water storage tank makeup pumps
e. Deluge.:'alves
B. Review evolutions in 0-SO-13/26 series procedures that addres s Student Handout, 0-SO-13-1,
tasks required for program by task checkli st. 0-SO-26-1, 2, Obj #7
(
c. If applicable, present any recent indu stry events. Student Handout
(
4
(
Source Se tpoin t
O-M-29 CRT
CRO SS ZONE Ala rm message in ZONE #
RED on CRT.
MCR PRINTER
CROSS ZONE
Probable 1. Potential FIRE cond ition exists.
2. Fire detect or senses an 'alarm' condition .
Causes
3. Equipment malfunction (e.g. dust , humidity, jarring).
Co rrecti ve [1] WHEN O-M-29 console is in 'ALARM ', THEN
Actions ACKNOWLEDGE alarm by depressing the SEND key.
[2] READ the PRINTE R mes sage in its ENT IRETY.
( [3] IF a CROSS ZO NE alarm is received, THEN
[a]IMMEDIATELY DISPATCH the Fire Brigade in
accordance with AOp*N .01.
[b] CONFIRM alarm is REAL.
[c] ENSURE Fire alarm is LOCKED-IN.
[d] ANNOUNCE location of fire over the paging system.
[4] IF a Diese l Generator Room CO 2 CROSS ZON E alarm is
received and the Diesel Generator is running from a non
emergency co ndition, THEN
EMER GENCY STOP the effected Diesel Generator.
Continued
(,
SQN O-AR.M-29
Page 6 of 18
o IRev. 8
4
(
Source Setpoint
0*M*29 CRT
CROSS ZONE Alarm message in ZONE #
RED an CRT.
MCR PRINTER
CROSS ZONE
CONTINUED
NOTE 1 An Auxiliary Building Ventilation shutdown due to smoke
detector cross zone is not an ABI or ESF. It only stops
AB Supply, Exhaust and Fuel Handling Exhaust Fans.
NOTE 2 Do NOT manually actuate ABI per Engineering
recommendation due to potential for damaging charcoal
filters.
NOTE 3 AB Ventilation fans can not be started if either Unit's
smoke detectio n cross zones are actuated.
FIRE OPS must bypass zone modules to allow reset
with [1*HS*30*1 0201.
[5] IF a Auxiliary Building Supply Duct CROSS ZON E alarm is
received , THEN
[a] PLACE all AB Ve ntilation Fans in PTL until1-HS-30-102 D
can be reset.
[b] RESET zone s.
[c]IF zones will not reset, THEN
NOTIFY Fire Ops to bypas s zone modules using
0-PI-FPU-013-001 .0.
[d] RESTORE normal AB Ventilation using 0-SO-30-10,
Section 8.3.
[6] GO TO 0-SO-13 -1 Section [6 .0].
Refe rences 47W611-13-1 through 7, 47W611-30-5 and 6,
45W657-31 and 32
(
SQN O.AR-M-29
Page 7 of 18
o IRev. 8
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
100. G2.4 .9 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
- Unit 1 is in Mode 5.
- RCS temperature is 195°F.
- RCS pressure is 325 psig.
- Train "A" RHR in service.
- Train "B" RHR out of service for surveillance testing.
- SGs #2 and #3 are intact and at 33% NR.
- RCS is intact.
- Pressurizer level at 30% cold cal.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the preferred method of core cooling if a loss of RHR
shutdown cooling occurs with RCS temperature rising?
A. RWST fill to RCS ; bleed through cold leg manway.
B. Normal charging to RCS; bleed through hot leg manway.
C~ Natural or forced RCS flow while steaming intact S/Gs .
D. Normal charging to RCS; bleed through the PZR PORVs.
( A. Incorrect; With RCS intact, steaming will be the preferred method. Cold leg
man way will not be open.
B. Incorrect; Hot leg man way not open if in Mode 5 with RCS pressure higher than
atmospheric.
C. Correct. AOP-R.03 Section 2.3 will transition to Section 2.6 due to the inability to
restore RHR shutdown cooling. The stem states that the RCS is intact. With one
RHR train operable, TS 3.4 .1.4 requires the two-SG level requirement to meet TS
heat sink requirements. #s 2 and 3 SGs satisfy the TS requirement as stated.
Therefore, Section 2.3 Step 7 RNO transitions to Section 2.6 since forced flow
cannot be re-established. Section 2.6 steps 5, 6, and 9.a are satisfied. Ptr level
greater than 20% cold cal satisfies step 7. Whether forced flow is established or
not, step 9 uses steaming from intact SGs.
D. Incorrect; Could potentially be used if required but would be an alternate heat
removal, not preferred.
Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:39 PM 193
QUESTIONS REPORT
for S EQ UOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of low power I shutdown implications in accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RH R) mitigation strategies.
(-, Question No. 75
Tier 3 Group 4
Importance Rating: R03.3
Techn ical Reference: AOP-R03
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271C358, Obj. B.2
OPL271AOP-R03; 4
Question Source: Bank
Question History: Sequoyah AOP R.02.B.2-4
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .10
Comments:
( Source : BANK Sour ce If Bank: SEQUOYAH BANK
Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:
Job Position : RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date : 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 20072:35:39 PM 194
OPL271AOP-R03
Revision 1
Page 3 of 37
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSO N TITLE : AOP-R03, RHR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE : 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
V. TRAIN ING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate
or explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the
requirements of AOP-R03, RHR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.
B. Enabling Objectives
Obiectives
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowiedge's and abilities associated
with RtlR SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONs that are rated 2: 2.5 during Initial License
Training and ;:c 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the
approp riate position as identified in Appendix A.
(
1. State the purpose/goal of this AOP-R03.
2. Describe the AOP-R 03 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with
AOP-R03 entry conditions.
b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-R03 entrv conditions.
c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-R 03
entry conditions.
d. Describe the plant parameters that may indicate an RHR System Malfunction.
3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-R.03.
4. Upon entry into AOP-R03, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the
appropriate procedural section for response.
5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-R03.
6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-R 03.
OPL271 AOP-R.03
Revision 1
Page 25 of 37
(
'"
X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
3. CHECK at least one 6.9 KV Shutdown board Obj ective 7
ENERGIZED on this unit. Transition to section 2.8 for
a. Refer to AOP for Substeps RCS alternate heat sink
without power
NOTE: Refe r to NOTE i n AOP Describes availability of
hydrogen igniters and
containment air return fans
4. EVALUATE placing one train of Hyd rogen SRO decision to place
Igniters and one Air Return Fan in service: igniters and air return fans
a. Refer to AOP for Substeps on as necessary to prevent
explosive concentrations
NOTE: Refer to NOTE i n AOP If needed for containment
cooling, ERCW
containme nt isolation valves
may be re-opened as
necessary if ERCW piping
is intact
( 5. START starting availab le upper and lo w er Review Appendix B
compartment coole rs USING Appendi x B.
6. CHECK RCS INTACT: Checks to determine if RCS
a. Refer to AOP for Substeps can be refilled so S /G can
b. Refer to AOP for RNO be used as heat sink. If
RCS cannot be refilled GO
TO step 11 for RCS feed
and bleed cooling mode
7. VERIFY seconcarv heat sink AVAILABLE: Checks to determine if S /G
a. Refer to AOP for Substeps can be used as heat sink.
b. Refer to AOP for RNO If S /G cannot be used GO
TO step 11 for RCS feed
and bleed cooling mode
CAUTION: Refer to CAUTION in AOP Informs operator of
potential effect of steam on
RCS level indications if
RCS temperature is >200oF
8. REFILL RCS UNTIL either of the following RCS refill stop criteria
cond itions satisfied :
a. Refer to AOP for Substeps
C
OPL27 1AOP-R.03
Revision 1
Page 26 of 37
(
X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
NOTE: Refer to NOTE in AOP Gives preferred starting
order of RCPs for PZR
spray
9. ATIEMPT to start one RCP; Forced RCS f low is
a. Refer to AOP for Substeps preferred over natural
b. Refer to AOP for RNO circulation if RCP can be
started. If NOT then GO
TO step 10 for natural
circulation cooling
10. ESTABLISH seconca rv heat sink: If feed and bleed cooling of
a. Refer to AOP for Substeps S /G can be established GO
b. Refer to AOP for RNO TO step 15 to prepare for
exit of procedure. If NOT
continue attempts establish
feed and bleed
11. DETERMINE proper step to initiate a feed Obj ective 7
and b leed cooling methOd: Three options for feed and
a. Refer to AOP for Substeps bleed of RCS.
( b. Refer to AOP for RNO If feed and bleed cannot be
established , consider
dum ping CLA and IF the
RX vessel head is removed
GO TO section 2.7, RCS
alternate heat sink using
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
12. PERFORM the following to cool RCS via S/G Objective 7
cold leg man way: If feed and bleed is
a. Refer to AOP for Substeps successful GO TO step 15
b. Refer to AOP for RNO to prepare for exit of
procedure. If NOT, go back
to step 11 and select
anothe r feed and bleed
method
13. PERFORM the following to cool RCS via SG Objective 7
hot leg man way: If feed and bleed is
a. Refer to AOP for Substeps successf ul GO TO step 15
b. Refer to AOP for RNO to prepare for exit of
c. If CCPIT flow or SI flow is established then procedure. If NOT, go back
GO TO step 14.d to ensure suction to step 11 and select
available to CCPS another feed and bleed
( method
( SON RHR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION AOP-R.03
Rev. 16
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.6 RCS Alternate Heat Sink Using Steam Generators (continued)
6. CHECK RCS INTACT: GO TO Step 11.
- Reactor vessel HEAD ON and bolts
TE NSIONED.
AND
- RCS and pressuri zer vent paths
ISOLATED.
7. VERIFY seco ndary heat sink GO TO Step 11.
AVA ILABLE:
- All S /G nozzle dams REMOVED
- All S /G manways CLOSED
- Two S /G s capable of maintaining
narrow range level
CAUTION Boiling in RCS could result in false high level indication due to steam
flow through surge line. RCS makeup flow should NOT be terminated
based upon high level if core exit TICs are greater than 200°F.
8. REFILL RCS UNTIL either of the
following conditions satisfied:
- RHR cooling RESTORED.
- Pressurizer level greater than
50% cold cal (el. 733').
Page 56 of93
AOp*R.03
Rev . 16
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.6 RCS Alternate Heat Sink Using Steam Generators (continued)
NOTE : To optimize normal pressurizer spray , the preferred RCP starting orde r is: 2,1,4,3.
9. ATIEMPT to start one RCP:
a. ESTABLISH RCP start conditions a. GO TO Step 10.
USING 1(2)-SO-68-2, Reactor
Coolant Pumps.
b. START one Rep.
( 10. ESTABLISH secondary heat sink: CONTINUE attempts to establish
secondary heat sink.
a. ENSURE at least two S/G narrow
range levels greater than 10%. GO TO Step 11.
b. CONTROL S /G atmosp heric relief
valves to maintain RCS
temperat ure.
c. USE AF W and SGBD to feed and
bleed AVAILABLE S/Gs.
d. VERIFY Core Exit TICs DROPPIN G
or STABLE.
e. GO TO Step 15.
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