Information Notice 1990-69, Adequacy of Emergency and Essential Lighting

Adequacy of Emergency and Essential Lighting

ML031130214
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	10/31/1990
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-90-069, NUDOCS 9010250054
Download: ML031130214 (10)

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 31, 1990 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE NO. 90-69: ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY

AND ESSENTIAL

LIGHTING

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

This information

notice is intended to alert addressees

to a possible problem concerning

the adequacy of emergency

and essential

lighting at commercial

power reactor facilities.

It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice do not constitute

NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

i Description

of Circumstances:

On March 3, 1989, Unit 3 at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating

Station experi-enced a reactor/turbine

trip, main steam isolation, containment

isolation, and safety injection

as a result of a grid-induced

load rejection

event. This event included three significant

system failures:

(1) half of the steam bypass control system malfunctioned;

(2) the atmospheric

dump valves (ADYs) failed to operate from the control room and the remote shutdown panel; and (3) the emergency

lighting in the main steam support structure (MSSS) failed, hampering the operators

in their attempt to cope with the ADY failures.

Being unable to maintain pressure control on the secondary

side by operating

the ADVs from the control room or the remote shutdown panel, plant personnel

attempted

to establish local (manual) control of the ADYs in the MSSS. When operators

first entered the MSSS, they found no direct lighting.

Normal lighting was lost due to the loss of power to the non-Class

1E electrical

busses in the plant. The emergency lighting was not properly positioned

in the north MSSS room (containing

the ADVs for the No. 1 steam generator)

to provide adequate lighting for the operators

to perform their required activities

and was not functioning

at all in the south MSSS room (containing

ADVs for the No. 2 steam generator).

Because of a burned-out

light bulb, plant personnel

could not restore essential lighting (from Class 1E power sources) in the south MSSS room."C-( 01200543 IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 During the NRC inspection

(50-530/89-13)

conducted

by an augmented

inspection

team (AIT) sent to examine the event at Palo Verde, the staff found deficien-cies in the licensee's

maintenance

and testing of emergency

and essential lighting.

The team discovered

that plant personnel

had waived the quarterly preventive

maintenance (PM) tasks on the MSSS emergency

and essential

lights for five consecutive

quarters.

By grouping the lights in the MSSS with the lights in the containment

building, which were inaccessible

during power operations, the PM tasks were waived for the MSSS lights during each of these periods along with the containment

lights. NRC inspections

further revealed that the licensee, prior to the performance

of the 8-hour lighting unit dis-charge test, performed

preventive

maintenance (i.e., battery replacement, addition of electrolyte, cleaning of battery terminals, and battery charging)on the lighting unit battery. This preventive

maintenance

practice resulted in not verifying

the performance

of the 8-hour emergency

lighting units in the Was found" condition.

The inspections

also revealed that the licensee had failed to implement

the relevant portions of its quality assurance

program for emergency

lighting.

Because of these failures, the emergency

lighting was not properly tested, and deficiencies

were not properly corrected.

After the event, plant personnel

reconstructed

the design bases of the lighting system and conducted

walkdown inspections

of the emergency

and essen-tial lighting in the plant. In some instances, the licensee found the lighting to be inadequate

to perform the required tasks because the original design did not require emergency

lights or because the emergency

lights provided inade-quate illumination.

In addition, the licensee identified

many areas that required the installation

of or modification

to lighting to meet the licensee's

design bases and the requirements

in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R.Background:

At Palo Verde, the essential

lighting system is an integral part of the normal lighting system that provides illumination

if the normal lighting system fails.The essential

lighting system is rated non-Class

lE but is powered from Class lE sources. The system provides lighting in the control room, in the shutdown panel area, in the main walkways and stairs, in the Class lE switchgear

rooms, in areas having Class lE equipment, and in areas used for the safe shutdown of the reactor. Upon loss of the normal lighting system, the essential lighting system provides adequate illumination

for the safe shutdown of the reactor. The system receives power from two redundant

and independent

Class 1E ac busses. Each redundant

Class 1E ac bus supplies power to 50 percent of the essential

lighting in the vital areas. The diesel generators

provide backup power.

IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 The emergency

lighting system receives dc power from two redundant

Class lE batteries

through inverters

and provides illumination

for the control room, the auxiliary

electrical

equipment

rooms, the stairways, and the points leading to plant exits. The system is normally deenergized

and is automatically

energized

upon loss of ac power to the normal system. The emergency

lighting system is also composed of 8-hour and li-hour (individually

battery-powered)

emergency

lighting units. The 8-hour emergency

lighting units are designed to meet the technical

requirements

of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.J which requires that emergency

lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply be provided in all areas needed for operation

of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto. The li-hour emergency

lighting units are installed

to meet the requirements

of the Life Safety Code. These lighting units are generally

installed

in plant locations

to accommodate

the safe evacuation

of personnel

in the event of a fire in such areas.Discussion:

During the Palo Verde event, the inadequate

lighting conditions

significantly

complicated

the licensee's

efforts to cope with the initial failure of the ADVs, which delayed the commencement

of the controlled

removal of decay heat as called for by the emergency

operating

procedures.

It is important

to note that adequate PM and routine testing programs for essential

and emergency

lighting systems are helpful in ensuring adequate illumination

for the operation

of safe shutdown equipment.

Emergency

lighting is a key fire protection

feature associated

with supporting

post-fire

safe shutdown operations.

The exercise of good engineering

design practices

that conform to industry standards

ensures the ability of the lighting system to provide adequate station lighting in all vital areas during all types of accident or transient

conditions.

The implementation

of an effective

PM and testing program which demonstrates

lighting system operability

is important.

Emergency

lighting PM programs recommended

by manufacturers

generally

include routine monitoring

of the battery condition

for each lighting unit, periodic load testing to verify that the lighting unit and its associated

charger are functioning

properly, and a periodic "as found" 8-hour lighting unit discharge test. In addition, the Palo Verde event identified

that the inadvertent

repositioning

of the emergency

lighting fixtures can cause inadequate

illumina-tion and that routine verification

of emergency

lighting fixture orientation

can ensure that emergency

lighting is effective.

IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi,'rectoor

Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts:

N. K. Trehan, NRR (301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR (301) 492-3062 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

Attachment

1 IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 90-68 90-67 90-66 Stress Corrosion

Cracking of Reactor Coolant Pump Bolts Potential

Security Equipment Weaknesses

Incomplete

Draining and Drying of Shipping Casks High Radiation

Hazards From Irradiated

Incore Detectors

and Cables Recent Orifice Plate Problems Potential

for Common-Mode

Failure Of High Pressure Safety Injection

Pumps or Release of Reactor Coolant Outside Containment

During A Loss-Of-Coolant

Accident Management

Attention

to the Establishment

and Main-tenance of A Nuclear Criticality

Safety Program 10/30/90 10/29/90 10/25/90 10/5/90 10/5/90 10/4/90 10/3/90 88-63, Supp. 1 90-65 90-64 90-63 All holders of OLs or CPs for pres-surized water reactors (PWRs).All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors and Category I fuel facilities.

All holders of OLs for nuclear power reactors and all registered

users of NRC approved waste shipping packages.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pres-surized-water

reactors.All fuel cycle licensees

possess-ing more than critical mass quantities

of special nuclear material.OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit

IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR (301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR (301) 492-3062 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

• CHBerlinger

10/18/90 RPB:ADM*TechEd 10/18/90 AD/AD45*BABoger 10/09/90 D/PD5 PD5:DRSP:NRR

• JEDyer *SRPeterson

10/09/90 09/24/90 OGCB:DOEA:NRR

• PCWen 09/24/90 SELB:DST:NRR

• NKTrehan 09/24/90 C/SELB:DST:NRR

• FRosa 09/25/90 C/SPLB:DST:NRR

• CMcCracken

10/03/90 D/DST: NRR*AThadani 10/03/90 DOCUMENT NAME: IN 90-69 IN 90-XX October xx, 1990 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR (301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR (301) 492-3062 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices Document Name: INADQUATE

LIGHTING*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR

CERossitt col/o9 J I RPB:AD A D/A5A 9"e CHB e TEd j h ABoger EDyer 10/10/990

O M l 91O/q /9,*OGC :DOEA:F R *SELB:DST:NRR

• C/SELB:DST:yRg

/SPLB:DST:NRR

PCWen NKTrehan FRosa ( IWCMcCracken

09/24/90 09/24/90 09/25/90 ' 1 og /90*PD5:DRSP:NRR

SRPeterson

09/24/90 /t10(s

IN 90-XX September

xx, 1990 Discussion:

During the Palo Verde event, the inadequate

lighting conditions

significantly

complicated

the licensee's

efforts to cope with the initial ADVs failure.However, the plant personnel

were eventually

able to open two ADVs and, thereby, commence a controlled

removal of decay heat as called for by the emergency

operating

procedures.

Other plants may also have inadequate

PM programs for the emergency

and the essential

lighting systems and may provide inadequate

illumination

for the operation

of safe shutdown equipment.

This event also points out that the inadvertent

repositioning

of emergency

lighting units can cause inadequate

illumination.

By verifying

the orientation

of these units, the licensees

can ensure that the lights are positioned

properly.Emergency

lighting is a key fire protection

feature for the operation

of the safe shutdown equipment.

Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 requires 8-hour emergency

lighting units in areas used for the operation

of safe shutdown equipment

and in access and egress routes thereto. The staff relies on the exercise of good engineering

design practice and design criteria that conform to industry standards

to ensure the ability of the lighting system to provide adequate station lighting in all vital areas during all types of accident or transient

conditions

and in the access routes to and from these areas.This information

notice requires you have any questions

about the of the technical

contacts listed no specific action or written response.

If information

in this notice, please contact one below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts: N. K.(301)Trehan, NRR 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR (301) 492-3062 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices Document Name: INADQUATE

LIGHTING D/DOEA:NRR

CERossi 09/ /90 OGCB:DOEA:NRR

PCWen Fcv'09/a4/9 O C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

CHBerlinger

09/ /90 SELB:DST:NRR

NKTrehanJLS

09/ A/90 RPB:ADM TechEd 09/ /90 C/SELB : IRR FRo 094S9 AD/AD45 BABoger 09/ /9OqJ2s D/DST:NRRrt

t'AThadani 09/ /90 D/PD5 JEDyer 09/ /90 PD5:DRSP:NRR

SRPeterso

e o9,o/90 C/S P s13 sT :PJR Ce EmcctfcKW

Document Name: INADQUATE

LIGHTING Requestor's

ID: WERTMAN Author's Name: peter wen Document Comments: S34 information

notice