LR-N14-0141, Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accid.

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Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accid.
ML14168A375
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 06/16/2014
From: Perry J F
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N14-0141
Download: ML14168A375 (48)
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Text

Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report i Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary

............................................................................................................... 1 2. Introduction ...............................................................................................................

............. 1 3. Staffing Assessment Process Overview ................................................................................ 2 4. NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Assessment Results

............................................................................... 4 5. NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Actions ................................................................................................... 5 6. Staffing Assessment Details ................................................................................................

.. 5 6.1 Assumptions ...............................................................................................................

.... 6 6.1.1 NEI 12 Assumptions for Staffing Assessment ................................................. 6 6.1.2 NEI 10 Applicable Assumptions ....................................................................... 7 6.1.3 NEI 12-06 Assumptions ........................................................................................... 7 6.1.4 Plant Specific Assumptions ..................................................................................... 9 6.2 Methodology ...............................................................................................................

.... 9 6.3 Security Considerations ................................................................................................ 11

7. Strategy Resource Loading .................................................................................................

11 8. Conclusions ................................................................................................................

......... 14 9. References .................................................................................................................

......... 14 10. Table of Acronyms

............................................................................................................... 15 Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report 1 1. Executive Summary PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) conducted an assessm ent of the capability of the on-shift organization as defined by the Emergency Pl an, Fire Protection staffing procedures, and Operations shift staffing procedures to im plement mitigation strategies in response to a beyond-design-basis extended loss of AC power (ELAP) event, based on lessons learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.

The on-shift staffing analysis was facilitated by EP Consulting, LLC and was conducted in accordance with the guidance in NEI 12-01, "Guideline for Assessing Be yond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities."

This report describes the methods and results of the staffing assessment for Salem Generating Station (SGS) Units 1 and 2. It takes into account actions that would be taken by Hope Creek Generating Station (HCGS) and actions of shared site resources such as the Fire Brigade and personnel for equipment hauling and debris removal.

This assessment concluded that sufficient on-sh ift resources are available at all times to implement the strategies developed to mainta in or restore core cooling, containment and spent fuel pool cooling during a beyond-design-basis external event (BDBEE) that results in an ELAP affecting all on-site units simultaneously. The personnel that are assumed to be on-site during the BDBEE are part of the minimum complement allowed by the PSEG Emergency Plan, except for two personnel resources that are assumed to be available on site for equipment hauling a nd debris removal. These two personnel resources are part of the 12-hour shift prov iding continuous on-site coverage and will be subject to administrative controls for shift staffing to support the SGS and HCGS BDBEE mitigation strategies.

2. Introduction This report documents the anal ysis performed to meet t he commitments for conducting a staffing assessment for a BDBEE at a multi-unit site affecting all units. This report is in response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) March 12, 2012, request for information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) regarding the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) review of insights from the Fukush ima Dai-ichi accident (Reference 1). The assessment uses NEI 12-01, "Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communication Capabi lities," (Reference 2) and NEI 12-06, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide," (Reference 3) to determine the response of on-shift and augmented resources to an ELAP incident impacting all units at a site. The a ssessment addresses Phas e 2 of the analysis applicable to implementation of existing and FLEX strategies for an ELAP, which is applicable to all units at a multi-unit site during the initial and trans ition phases of the event, utilizing the methodology of NEI 10-05, "Assessment of On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Capabilitie s" (Reference 4). The assessment was performed to support the SGS response.

The assessment was conducted using draft FL EX Support Guidelines (FSGs) in place as of February 27, 2014 and draft revisions to Operations procedures. The assessment Salem G NEI 12-0 conside r (first 24 the abili t during t h 3. Sta f Draft st r (SGS U nanalysi s the on-s delayed

The Ph a the mini with the (consist e implem eenerating S t 0 1 Phase 2 S r s required hours). C o t y to receiv h e final ph a ffing Asse s r ategies in c n its 1 and 2 s by a multi

-shift staff to arrival of t h ase 2 staffi nmum staffi n suppleme n e nt with N E e nt the stra t tation S taffing Ass eactions pe o nsistent w e and depl o a se (24+ h o ssment Pr o c luding FS G 2 , and HC G-discipline t perform a n h e augme n ng assess m n g in the P S n tal staff all E I 12-06).

T tegies con s essment Re rformed du i th NEI 12-0 o y offsite r e o urs followi n o cess Ov e Gs for resp o G S) were e v t eam. The n y required n ted Emerg e m ent requir e S EG Emer g owed by m T able 3-1 i d sidered in t h p ort 2 ring the ini t 0 1 and NE I esources a r n g the EL A erview o nding to a n v aluated d u staffing an a emergenc y e ncy Resp o e s that the g ency Plan m inimum ad d entifies th e h is staffing tial and tra n I 12-06, ne a r e conside r A P). n ELAP aff e u ring the N Ealysis also y respons e o nse Orga n ELAP sce n (consiste nministrativ e e personn e assessme n n sition pha s ar-normal s red to be e s e cting all o n E I 12-01 P haddressed e functions p nization (E R n ario be ev a n t with NEI e staffing p r e l that were n t. s es of an E s ite access s tablished n-site units h ase 2 staf f the ability p rior to the RO). aluated usi n 12-01) alo n r ocedures used to E LAP and f ing of n g n g Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report 3 1 One Unit Supervisor assigned to each unit.

2 Two Control Room Communicators for offsite notifications which typically includes one additional RO and one additional Equipment Operator.

3 This position is staffed by a dedicated Equipment Operator.

4 Two RP Technicians on shift per station. This assessment assumes the two SGS technicians are available, and did not use Hope Creek (HCGS) technicians to support SGS.

5 One Chemistry Technician per station, for a total of two, provides chemistry sampling support. This assessment assumes the SGS technician is available, and did not use the HCGS technician to support SGS.

6 Fire Department is a separate department serving the entire site. The Fire Brigade for each shift consists of one Fire Department Leader and five Fire Department Members.

7 Rescue Operations/First Aid are a collateral duty of the Fire Department.

8 One Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Technician and one Shift Electrician per station. This assessment assumes the SGS I&C Technician and Shift Electrician are available, and did not use HCGS personnel to support SGS.

9 Maintenance Mechanic (MM) refers to resources capable of performing debris removal and heavy equipment towing (see Appendix 1)

Table 3-1PSEG Nuclear LLC Emergency Plan, Rev 28 On-Shift Staffing Emergency Response Organization Supplemental Administrative Staff (NEI 12-06) Position On-shiftOn-Shift Shift Manager (SM) 1 Control Room Supervisor (SRO) 1 2 Field Supervisor/Initial Operations Support Center (OSC) Coordinator 1 Shift Technical Advisor (STA) 1 Reactor Operator (RO) 2 Plant Operator (RO) 2 Control Room Communicator 2 2 Equipment Operator (EO) 5 Radwaste Operator 3 (EO)1 Radiation Protection (RP) Technician 4 4 Chemistry Technician 5 2 Shift Maintenance Supervisor 1 Scheduled I&C Technician 8 2 Shift Electrician 8 2 Total:28 Fire Department 6 5 Rescue Operations/First Aid 7 2 Security Sec plan MM resources 9 2 Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report 4 4. NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Assessment Results The minimum on-shift staff as shown in Ta ble 3-1 performed all actions required by operating and emergency plan proc edures in the first one-hour period, relying only on installed structures, systems and components remaining in the initial phase of the response. PSEG determined that the draft FSGs were capable of being successfully implemented via table top exercise, using on-sh ift resources during the first six (6) hours and augmented responders from six (6) to twenty-four (24) hours.

No conflicts or overlaps in functions or tasks required to be performed by on-shift operations and support personnel we re identified during this analysis. Transition phase actions were required within the first six hours of the event.

Resources that may be shared between SG S and Hope Creek (HCGS) such as RP Technicians and Chemistry Technicians were not used for the SGS analysis, with the exception of supplemental maintenance me chanics (MMs). One MM from each site was used. A parallel asse ssment for HCGS was conducted to ensure there was no conflict over resources shared with SGS.

An evaluation of each FSG was conducted in order to determine the resources needed and estimated duration of each task associated with the strategy. The total number of resources identified and task duration were t hen used to identify the two most resource limiting FLEX strategies. This analysis identi fied that the two most resource limiting FLEX strategies are:

Restoration of 125 vdc Battery Chargers (FSG-5, Attachment 1) Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) pump hookup an d Service Water (SW) pressurization (FSG-5, Attachment 3).

Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report 5 5. NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Actions During the tabletop procedural analysis, the following actions to support the conclusions of this staffing assessment were identified: 1. Revise Attachment 18 of OP-SA-112-101-1001, "Shift Turnover Responsibilities (Reference 6) and Attach ment 5 of OP-HC-112-101-1001, "Shift Turnover Responsibilities" (Reference 7), to reflec t the addition of one Maintenance Mechanic resource for each station.

2. Review final FSGs and associated stati on procedure revisions a gainst this staffing assessment and reconcile any significant diffe rences (i.e., changes affecting staffing resource needs).
6. Staffing Assessment Details The Phase 2 Staffing Analysis for SGS was conducted on February 25, 2014, using the guidance of NEI 12-01, NEI 12-06 and NEI 10-05.

Table 6-1 identifies t he personnel who participated in the assessment.

Table 6-1 Phase 2 Assessment Participants Personnel (Position/Title) NumberOrganization/Department Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) 2 Fukushima Team (formerly licensed at SGS)

Nuclear Control Operator (RO) 1 Fukushima Team (formerly licensed at SGS)

Nuclear Equipment

Operator (NEO) 1 Operations Radiation Protection Technician 1 RP Chemistry Superintendent 1 Chemistry EP Manager 1 EP Fire Department Supervisor1 Site Protection Maintenance Supervisor 1 Maintenance EP Specialist 2 EP Consulting, LLC Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report 6 6.1 Assumptions The extended loss of AC power event was evaluated using the following assumptions, consistent with NEI 12-01, NEI 12-06, and applicable assumptions from NEI 10-05.

6.1.1 NEI 12 Assumptions for Staffing Assessment

1. A large-scale external ev ent occurs that results in: all on-site units affected extended loss of AC power impeded access to the units 2. Initially, all on-site reactors are o perating at full power and are successfully shut down. 3. No Hostile Action is dire cted at the affected site duri ng the period that the site is responding to the event. 4. The event impedes site access as follows: A. Post-event time: 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> - No site access. This duration reflects the time necessary to clear roadway obstructions, use different travel routes, mobilize alternate transportation capabilities (e.g., private resource providers or public se ctor support), etc. B. Post-event time: 6 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> - Li mited site access. Individuals may access the site by walking, personal vehicle or via alternate transportation capabilities (e.g., private resource prov iders or public sect or support). C. Post-event time: 24+ hours - Improved site access. Site access is restored to a near-normal status and/or augmented tr ansportation resources are available to deliver equipment, supplies and large numbers of personnel. 5. On-shift personnel are limited to the minimum complement allowed by the Emergency Plan (i.e., the minimum required number for each required position), supplemented with additiona l on-shift staff consistent with NEI 12-06 (Assumption #12 in Su bsection 6.1.3, below). 6. Following the accident at Fukushima Da i-ichi, the Institut e of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) issued three Industr y Event Reports (IERs) requiring the assessment and implementation of a range of actions intended to improve the capabilities for responding to a BDBEE and ELAP, including events that impact the cooling of spent fuel. T he Phase 2 staffing assessment includes the INPO IER improvement actions already implemented at the time of the assessment.

Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report 7 6.1.2 NEI 10 Applicable Assumptions

1. On-shift personnel can report to their assigned response locations within timeframes sufficient to allow fo r performance of assigned actions. 2. The on-shift staff possesses the necessa ry Radiation Worker qualifications to obtain normal dosimetry and to enter Radi ologically Controlled Areas (but not high, locked high or very high radiation areas) without the ai d of a Radiation Protection Technician. 3. Personnel assigned to the major response area of plant operations and safe shutdown meet the requirements and guidance established by NRC regulations and are able to satisfac torily perform the functions and tasks necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. Staff performance within

this area is not evaluated as part of this assessment, unless a

role/function/task from another major response area is assigned as a

collateral duty. 4. On-site security organization: Perfo rmance of this function is regularly analyzed through other station progra ms and will not be evaluated here, unless a role or function from another major response area is assigned as a

collateral duty. 5. Individuals holding the position of Radiation Protection Technician or Chemistry Technician are qualified to per form the range of tasks expected of their position. 6. The task of making a simple and brie f communication has minimal impact on the ability to perform other assigned functions/tasks, and is therefore an acceptable collateral duty for all positi ons. This assumption does not apply to emergency notification to an Offsite Re sponse Organizati on (ORO) or the NRC. 7. The task of performing a peer check has minimal impact on the ability to perform other assigned functions/tasks, and is therefore an acceptable collateral duty for all positions. 8. The analyzed events occur during o ff-normal work hours at a time when augmented ERO responders ar e not at the site (e.g., during a backshift, weekend or holiday). For purposes of this analysis, and consistent with NEI 12-01 Assumption #4, 360 minutes (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />) will be used as the time period for the conduct of on-shift ERO response actions.

6.1.3 NEI 12-06 Assumptions

1. Prior to the event both units have been operating at 100 percent rated thermal power for at least 100 days or have just been shut down from such a power history as required by pl ant procedures in advance of the impending event.

Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report 8 2. At the time of the postulated event, both units' reactors and supporting systems are within normal operating ranges for pressure, temperature, and water level for the appropriate plant condition. All plant equipment is either normally operating or available from t he standby state as described in the plant design and licensing basis. 3. No specific initiating event is used.

The initial condition is assumed to be a loss of off-site power (LOOP) at a plant site resulting from an external event that affects the off-site power system eit her throughout the grid or at the plant with no prospect for recovery of off-site power for an extended period. The LOOP is assumed to affect all units at a plant site. 4. All installed sources of emergency on-site ac power and SBO Alternate ac power sources are assumed to be not available and not imminently

recoverable. 5. Cooling and makeup water inventorie s contained in systems or structures with designs that are robust with respec t to seismic events, floods, and high winds, and associated missiles are available. 6. Normal access to the ultimate heat sink is lost, but the water inventory in the UHS remains available and robust pi ping connecting the UHS to plant systems remains intact. The motive force for UHS flow, i.e., pumps, is assumed to be lost with no prospect for recovery. 7. Fuel for FLEX equipment stored in stru ctures with designs which are robust with respect to seismic events, floods and high winds and associated missiles, remains available. 8. Permanent plant equipment t hat is contained in stru ctures with designs that are robust with respect to seismi c events, floods, and high winds, and associated missiles, are available. 9. Other equipment, such as portable ac power sources, portable back up dc power supplies, spare batteries, and equipment for 50.54(hh)(2), may be used provided it is reasonably protected from the applicable external hazards per Sections 5 through 9 and Secti on 11.3 of this guidance and has predetermined hookup strategies with appropriate procedures/guidance and the equipment is stored in a relative close vicinity of the site 10. Installed electrical distribution system, including inverters and battery chargers, remain available provided they are protected cons istent with current station design. 11. No additional events or failures are assumed to occur immediately prior to or during the event, including security events. 12. On-site staff is at administrative minimum shift staffing levels per Section 2 of the NEI 12-06 guidance. All personnel on-site are available to support site response.

Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report 9 13. Reliance on the fire protection system ring header as a water source is acceptable only if the header meets the criteria to be considered robust with respect to seismic events, floods, and high winds, and associated missiles. 6.1.4 Plant Specific Assumptions

1. Spent Fuel Pool Time-to-Boil is 43 hours4.976852e-4 days <br />0.0119 hours <br />7.109788e-5 weeks <br />1.63615e-5 months <br /> from the time of the loss of Fuel Pool Cooling based on 100 days of operations since refueling outage with a heat up rate of 2.1

ûF/hour (reference S1(2).OP-AB.SF-001). 2. The AFW Storage Tank has a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> capacity as the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TD AFW) pump source during seismic events. 3. The AFW Storage Tank is unavailabl e as the TD AFW pump source during hurricane (high wind) and tornado events. 4. The 28 vdc batteries have gr eater than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of capacity with implementation of deep load shed. 5. The 125 vdc batteries have greater than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of capacity with implementation of deep load shed. 6. NEOs have access to vital area door keys to allow access to areas/rooms without security support. 7. Two FLEX diesel generators are staged in the area between the Unit 2 auxiliary and fuel hand ling buildings ("canyon ar ea") and are reasonably protected from external events. The canyon area is provided with temporary flood protection. 6.2 Methodology An assessment of on-shift staffing wa s performed using NEI 12-01, NEI 12-06 and NEI 10-05. Subject matter experts and consul tants were assembled to provide analysis support. The assessment was conducted via a tabletop procedural analysis using SGS procedures to determine if tasks have been sufficiently analyzed for performance by the minimum on-shift staff as designated in the Emergency Plan and supplemental administrative staff. The fo llowing provides a summary of the process that was used.

The existing on-shift staff structure and si ze is defined by Figure 3-1 of the PSEG Emergency Plan (Reference 5) and References 6 through 9.

Each on-shift position used in this staffing analysis was entered in A ppendix 1, Table 1.

For position titles with more than one position holder, a uniqu e sequential number was assigned to each position. The PSEG Emergency Plan reference that describes the requirement for the position to be on-sh ift was then entered into column 3 of Appendix 1, Table 1.

Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report 10 Using only the on-shift positions enter ed in Appendix 1, Table 1, the following Appendix 1 tables were completed by enteri ng the shift position t hat fills a described role, or performs a specific function or task: Table 2, "Plant Operations & Safe Shutdown" (Minimum Operations Crew Necessary to Implement AOPs and EOPs, FSGs or SAMGs if applicable) Table 2A, "Procedure Task Timing (Hurricane Response)" Table 2B, "Procedure Task Timing (Tornado Response)" Table 3, "Firefighting" (not applicable for this event analysis) Table 4, "Radiation Pr otection & Chemistry" Table 5, "Emergency Plan Implementation" Following completion of each of the above tables, each on-shi ft position assigned to the associated table was located on Appendix 1, Table 1. Fo r each position, the table number and associated line number was then entered in column 4, "Role in

Table#/Line#". If the associ ated task required additional actions, a "Yes" was placed in the last column and the additional action was in cluded in Section 5 of this report, i.e., establish administrative controls to ensure t he availability of personnel to perform debris removal and equipment hauling.

The assessment was conducted us ing the following process:

1. Selection of the mu lti-disciplined work group 2. Scheduling the tabletop with access to required procedures and administrative documents 3. Conduct of a pre-job briefing outlining the requirements of NEI 12-01, NEI 12-06 and NEI 10-05 4. Review of the event initial conditions and assumptions
5. Performance of the tabletop procedural analysis 6. Documentation of the results of the tabletop by EP Consulting using the NEI 10-05 forms modified to extend to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

This review provided the team with a bas ic understanding of the event and resulting emergency classifications. The SRO reviewed EOP, AOP and FSG actions and

identified them to t he team. Specific site procedures referenced during assessment of this postulated event are provided in Tables 2A and 2B. Specific resources needed to perform initial event response actions were identified from the EOP, AOP, or FSG procedures and documented. The team det ermined when other on-shift resources, such as the RP or Chemistry Technician, would be required and identified the time required to perform expected emergency plan functions. This information was

documented on the applicable tables in Appendix 1 of this report. Finally, the on-shift resources and their actions were summariz ed in the tables using the NEI 10-05 documentation process in A ppendix 1, Table 1.

Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report 11 6.3 Security Considerations Mitigation strategies for a BDBEE do not r equire the use of Security Department personnel to perform duties unrelated to their security roles, e.g

., the SGS mitigation strategies do not rely on Security Officers to perform any collateral duties such as equipment hauling or debris removal.

7. Strategy Resource Loading An evaluation of each FSG was conduct ed to determine the resources needed and estimated duration of each task associated wit h the strategy. This evaluation is not associated with any specific event. Res ource loading analyses are contained in Table 7-1.

Table 7-1 FLEX Support Guideline (FSG) Resource Requirements FSG Description ResourcesDuration Notes FSG-1 RCS Long Term RCS Inventory Control (Service

Water to 13 Charging Pump)

EO (4) RO (2) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Contingency Action FSG-2 Alternate Aux Feedwater Suction Source (align to HCGS FP Tank)

EO (2) SP (2) 55 minutes Time sensitive -

S/G Inventory FSG-3 Alternate Low Pressure Feedwater EO (4) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Time sensitive -

S/G Inventory FSG-4 ELAP DC Bus Load Shed/Management EO (2) 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Time sensitive - extend battery capacity FSG-5 Initial Assessment and Flex Equipment Staging Vent generator H 2 (both units) SP (1) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Task completed in series by one

person Att 1, Part 1 Restore 125 vdc Battery Chargers EO (2) EM (1) 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Time sensitive -

battery charger restoration Att 1, Part

2 Restore 230 vac MCCs EO (2) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> N/A Att 2 Debris Removal and Equipment Transport for Salem MM (2) 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Performed in conjunction with HCGS debris

removal and

deployment (HCGS - 2.5

hours)

Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report 12 FSG Description ResourcesDuration Notes Att 2 Energize Flex 480 vac bus EO (2) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Time sensitive -

bus restoration Att 2 Energize the A 460/230 bus.

EO (2) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Time sensitive -

bus restoration Att 3 Debris removal and pump deployment (UHS)

MM (2) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Time sensitive -

S/G Inventory Att 3 UHS pump hookup and SW header pressurized Sec (1) EO (2) MM(2) 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Time sensitive -

S/G Inventory (augmented resources used) Att 7 Feed Steam Generators EO (2) continuous Time sensitive -

S/G Inventory FSG-6 Alternate Aux Feedwater Storage Tank Makeup N/A N/A Not required during initial or transition phase FSG-7 Loss of Vital Instrume ntation or Control Power Att 1 Addressed by FSG 5 N/A N/A N/A Att 2 Manual Steam Generator Pressure Control EO (4) 30 minutes Contingency Action Att 3 Steam Generator Pressure EO (4) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Contingency Action Att 4 RCS Pressure Indication IC (1) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Contingency Action Att 5 Alternate CETs IC (1) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Contingency Action Att 6 Containment Pressure Indication IC (1) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Contingency Action Att 7 Aux Feedwater Storage Tank Level Indication EO (1) 30 minutes Contingency Action Att 8 Pressurizer Level Indication IC (1) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Contingency Action Att 9 Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Indication EO (1) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Contingency Action FSG-8 Alternate RCS Boration (Flex Charging pump from Boric

Acid Storage Tank) EO (4) 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Contingency Action FSG-9 Low Decay Heat Temperature Control EO (2) RO (2) 30 minutes Contingency Action FSG-10 Passive RCS Injection Isolation RO (2) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> N/A FSG-11 Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Makeup and Cooling (Makeup

from Fresh/Fire Protection) EO ( 2) 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Not required during initial or

transition phase Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report 13 FSG Description ResourcesDuration Notes FSG-12 Alternate Containment Cooling N/A N/A Not required during initial or

transition phase FSG-13 Transition from FLEX Equipment N/A N/A Not required during initial or

transition phase Time Sensitive Task 14 8. Conclusions The existing on-shift staff structure and size is described in the documents referenced in Section 6.2 of this report.

Collectively these documents de scribe a staff structure and size that is sufficient to carry out the FSG actions for the most limiting BDBEE situations.

One resource (currently designated as MM in the Appendix 1 tables) is being added to References 6 and 7 for Salem and Hope Creek, respectively. For the purposes of this analysis the team assumed t hat one resource capable of performing debris removal and equipment towing assigned to Salem and one assigned to Hope Creek would be available as anticipated by FSG-5. Ho wever, any qualified personnel who are not already assigned to minimum shift staffing / emergency response / Fire Brigade roles

may be so assigned. 9. References

1. NRC letter, "Request for Information Pursuan t to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regar ding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"

March 12, 2012 2. NEI 12-01, "Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities," Revision 0, May 2012 3. NEI 12-06, "Diverse and Fl exible Coping Strategies (F LEX) Implementation Guide," Revision 0, August 2012 4. NEI 10-5, "Assessment of On-Shift Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Capabilities," Revision 0, June 2011 5. PSEG Nuclear LLC Emergency Plan Revision 28 6. OP-SA-112-101-1001 Revision 3, "Shift Turn over Responsibilities" (Attachment 18) 7. OP-HC-112-101-1001 Revision 18, "Shift Tur nover Responsibilitie s " (Attachment 5) 8. FP-AA-012 Revision 2, "Fire Prot ection Organization, Duties and Staffing" 9. OP-AA-101-111 Revision 4, "Roles and Responsibilities of On-Shift Personnel"

15 10. Table of Acronyms Acronym Definition AC Alternating Current AFW Auxiliary Feed Water AOP Abnormal Operating Procedure BDBEE Beyond-Design-Basis External Event B/O Blackout BOP Balance of Plant CFST Critical Function Status Tree CT Chemistry Technician DC Direct Current DG Diesel Generator ELAP Extended Loss of AC Power EM Electrical Maintenance EO Equipment Operator EOP Emergency Operating Procedure EP Emergency Plan ERO Emergency Response Organization (on shift and supplemental) FB Fire Brigade FLEX Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies FP Fire Protection FSG FLEX Support Guideline H2 Hydrogen HCGS Hope Creek Generating Station I&C Instrumentation and Control IER Industry Event Report 16 Acronym Definition INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations LOOP Loss of Off-site Power MCC Motor Control Center MDAFP Motor-driven Auxi liary Feedwater Pump MM Maintenance Mechanic NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NEO Nuclear Equipment Operator NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OATC Operator at the Controls ORO Offsite Response Organization OSA On-Shift Staffing Analysis OSC Operations Support Center PO Plant Operator PSEG Public Service Enterprise Group LLC RCS Reactor Coolant System RO Reactor Operator RP Radiation Protection SAMG Severe Accident Management Guideline SBO Station Blackout SAS/CAS Secondary Alarm Station/Central Alarm Station SEC1 Security - SAS/CAS Operator SEC Safeguards Equipment Controller SGS Salem Generating Station SM Shift Manager SMS Shift Maintenance Supervisor SP Site Protection 17 Acronym Definition SRO Senior Reactor Operator STA Shift Technical Advisor SW Service Water TD Turbine-driven TSC Technical Support Center U1 Unit 1 U2 Unit 2 UHS Ultimate Heat Sink

Salem Generating Station NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment Report Appendix 1 - Staffing Tables

Salem Generating Station Operations On-Shift Personnel Assignments Used During Analysis Position DesignationAssignment Shift Manager SM Shift Manager/Emergency Director Control Room Supervisor SRO1 Unit 1 Control Room Supervisor Control Room Supervisor SRO2 Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor Field Supervisor SRO3 Field Supervisor/Initial OSC Coordinator Shift Technical Advisor STA Shift Technical Advisor Reactor Operator RO1 Unit 1 Operator At Controls (OATC) Plant Operator PO1 Unit 1 Balance of Plant (BOP) Reactor Operator RO2 Unit 2 Operator At The Controls (OATC) Plant Operator PO2 Unit 2 Balance of Plant (BOP) CR Communicator CM1 Offsite Communications CR Communicator CM2 Offsite Communications Equipment Operator EO1 Unit 1 Aux Building EO Equipment Operator EO2 Unit 2 Aux Building EO Equipment Operator EO3 Unit 1 Turbine Building EO Equipment Operator EO4 Unit 2 Turbine Building EO Equipment Operator EO5 Outside EO Equipment Operator EO6 Radwaste Operator

Other On-Shift Personnel Assignments Used During Analysis Position DesignationAssignment RP Technician RP1 Offsite Dose Assessment (SRPT) RP Technician RP2 RP Support (ORPT) Chemistry Technician CT1 Chemistry Sampling/Count Room Shift Maintenance Supervisor SMS OSC Coordinator Scheduled I&C Technician IC1 I&C Maintenance Support Shift Electrician EM1 Electrical Maintenance Support Site Protection SP1 Fire Department Chief Site Protection SP2 Fire Department Responder Site Protection SP3 Fire Department Responder Site Protection SP4 Fire Department Responder Site Protection SP5 Fire Department Responder SAS/CAS Operator SEC1 Accountability Maintenance MM1 Maintenance Maintenance MM2 Maintenance

APPENDIX 1 Loss of all AC Power TABLE 1 - On-shift Positions Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Role in Table#/Line#

Action Required? 1. Shift Manager/SM PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L1 T5/L1 T5/L2 T5/L3 T5/L5 T5/L6 T5/L7 T5/L9 T5/L13 No 2. Control Room Supervisor - U1 (SRO1)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L2 No 3. Control Room Supervisor - U2 (SRO2) PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure

3-1 T2/L3 No 4. Reactor Operator - U1 OATC (RO1) PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L4 No 5. Plant Operator - U1 BOP (PO1)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L5 No 6. Reactor Operator - U2 OATC (RO2)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L6 No 7. Plant Operator - U2 BOP (PO2) PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L7 No 8. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L8 No 9. CR Communicator (CM1) (Equipment Operator)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L15 T5/L8 No N o t e 1 Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Role in Table#/Line#

Action Required? 10. CR Communicator (CM2) (Reactor Operator)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L16 T5/L8 T5/L12 No N o t e 1 11. Equipment O perator (EO1)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L9 No 12. Equipment O perator (EO2)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L10 No 13. Equipment O perator (EO3)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L11 No 14. Equipment Operator (EO4) PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L12 No 15. Equipment O perator (EO5)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L13 No 16. Equipment Oper ator - Radwaste Operator (EO6)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure

3-1 T2/L14 No 17. RP Technician (RP1) PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T4/L1 No 18. RP Technician (RP2)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T4/L3 No 19. Shift Maintenance Supervisor (SMS) PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L17 No 20. Scheduled I&C Technician (IC1) PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L18 No 21. Shift Electrician (EM1) PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L19 No 22. Site Protection (SP2)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L20 No 23. Site Protection (SP3)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L21 No Line On-shift Position Emergency Plan Reference Role in Table#/Line#

Action Required? 24. Site Protection (SP4)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L22 No N o t e 225. Site Protection (SP5)

PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T2/L23 No 26. Maintenance Mechanic (MM1) N/A T2/L24 Yes N o t e 327. Maintenance Mechanic (MM2 -

HCGS) N/A T2/L25 Yes N o t e 328. Security PSEG Nuclear LLC - EP, Figure 3-1 T5/L14 No Notes: Note 1 - No conflict; Table 2 and Table 5 functions are the same. Note 2 - Assumes that venting hydrogen from generators will be addressed as part of FSG-5 approval and familiarization.

Note 3 - Establish administrative controls to ensure availability of on-shift MMs.

APPENDIX 1 TABLE 2 - Plant Operations & Safe Shutdown Two Units - One Control Room Minimum Operations Crew Necessary to Implement AOPs and EOPs, FSGs, or SAMGs if applicable Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position Task Performance Validation

1. Shift Manager Shift Manager Operator Training
2. Shift Supervisor Control Room Supervisor - U1 (SRO1) Operator Training
3. Shift Supervisor Control Room Supervisor - U2 (SRO2) Operator Training
4. Reactor Operator (OATC) Reactor Operator - U1 (RO1) Operator Training
5. Reactor Operator (BOP) Plant Operator - U1 (PO1) Operator Training
6. Reactor Operator (OATC) Reactor Operator - U2 (RO2) Operator Training
7. Reactor Operator (BOP) Plant Operator - U2 (PO2) Operator Training
8. Shift Technical Advisor Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Operator Training
9. Auxiliary Operator E quipment Operator (EO1) Operator Training
10. Auxiliary Operator E quipment Operator (EO2) Operator Training
11. Auxiliary Operator E quipment Operator (EO3) Operator Training
12. Auxiliary Operator E quipment Operator (EO4) Operator Training
13. Auxiliary Operator E quipment Operator (EO5) Operator Training
14. Auxiliary Operator E quipment Operator (EO6) Operator Training
15. Auxiliary Operator C ontrol Room Communicator (CM1) EP Training
16. Reactor Operator Control Room Communicator (CM2) EP Training Notes: See Tables 2A and 2B for AOP/EO P/FSG support actions for hurricane and tornado BDBEE, respectively.

APPENDIX 1 TABLE 2 - Plant Operations & Safe Shutdown (continued) Two Units - One Control Room Other (non-Operations) Personnel Necessary to Implement AOPs and EOPs, FSGs, or SAMGs if applicable Line Generic Title/Role On-Shift Position Task Performance Validation

17. Shift Maintenance Supv Shift Maintenance Supervisor (SMS) EP/Maintenance Training 18. I&C Technician Scheduled I&C Technician (IC1) I&C Training
19. Electrician Shift Electrician (EM1) Electrical Mnt Training 20. Fire Brigade Site Protection (SP2) Fire Brigade Training
21. Fire Brigade Site Protection (SP3) Fire Brigade Training
22. Fire Brigade Site Protection (SP4) Fire Brigade Training
23. Fire Brigade Site Protection (SP5) Fire Brigade Training
24. Maintenance Maintenance Mechanic (MM1) Maintenance Training 25. Maintenance Maintenance Mechanic (MM2) (HCGS) Maintenance Training Notes: See Tables 2A and 2B for AOP/EOP/FS G support actions for hurricane and tornado BDBEE, respectively.

APPENDIX 1 Table 2A - Procedure Task Timing (Hurricane Response)

12-01 Phase 2 OSA applicable to Salem Generating Station Table 2A - Procedure Task Timing (Hurricane Response)

Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time After Procedure Implementation Minutes - Hour 1 Hour Step Task Resource 0- 10 10-20 20- 30 3 0- 4 0 4 0-5 0 5 0- 6 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 EOP-LOPA-1

Step 1-9

Post Trip Actions SRO1 SRO2 RO1 PO1 RO2 PO2 x S1-OP-SO-AF-

0001 S2-OP-SO-AF-

0001 Identify AF source.

PO1 PO2 x FSG-2 Align AFW source (flood water)

EO1 EO2 x FSG-2 Monitor and control Aux Feed EO1 EO2 x EP-EP-102 Enter Emergency Plan SM CM1 CM2 SMS x x EOP-CFST-1 Monitoring CFSTs STA x EOP-LOPA-1 Step 10 Deenergize SECs PO1 PO2 EO3 EO4 x EOP-LOPA-1,step 10.1 Perform B/O coping actions, includes initial 125vdc load

shed. PO1 PO2 EO5 EO6 x Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time After Procedure Implementation Minutes - Hour 1 Hour Step Task Resource 0- 10 10-20 20- 30 3 0- 4 0 4 0-5 0 5 0- 6 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 EOP-LOPA-1

Steps12-14 Vital Power restoration RO1 RO2 x EOP-LOPA-1 Steps12-15 Start Diesel Generators EO3 EO4 IC1 EM1 x EOP-LOPA-1, step 18 Align charging pump suction Prioritized by SM as resources are

available EOP-LOPA-1, step 19 Service water isolation Prioritized by SM as resources are

available EOP-LOPA-1, step 21-23 SI Initiation and reset RO1 RO2 x EOP-LOPA-1, step 24 Remove control power from MDAFP Prioritized by SM as resources are

available EOP-LOPA-1, step 25 Restore Off-site power Per AB-LOOP-1 PO1 PO2 x EOP-LOPA-1, step 27 Isolate RCP seals EO3 EO4 x EOP-LOPA-1, step 28 Isolate S/G RO1 RO2 x Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time After Procedure Implementation Minutes - Hour 1 Hour Step Task Resource 0- 10 10-20 20- 30 3 0- 4 0 4 0-5 0 5 0- 6 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 EOP-LOPA-1, step 29 ELAP declaration SM SRO1 SRO2 x EOP-LOPA-4 Step 1 Implement FSG-4 FSG-4 Perform the Deep Load shed.(1.5 hr completion time)

EO5 EO6 x FSG-5 Att. 1 Part 1 Restore 125 and 28 VDC battery

chargers EO3 EO4 EM1 x FSG-5 Att 2 Energize Flex 480 VAC bus, EO5 EO6 x FSG-5 Att 2 Energize the A 460/230 bus.

EO5 EO6 x FSG-5 Vent generator H 2 SP4 x FSG-5 Att 3 Initiate Att 3 (SW), debris removal and

pump deployment (UHS) ERO Augment MM1 MM2(HCGS) x FSG-5 Att 3 UHS pump hookup and SW header

pressurized ERO Augment Sec (1)

Ops (2)

Maint (2) x FSG-3 Low Pressure AF Prioritized by SM as resources are

available Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time After Procedure Implementation Minutes - Hour 1 Hour Step Task Resource 0- 10 10-20 20- 30 3 0- 4 0 4 0-5 0 5 0- 6 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 EOP-LOPA-4

Step 12-13 Depressurize S/Gs RO1 RO2 x EOP-LOPA-4 Step 16.1 Initiate FSG-8 FSG-8 Att 1 Section 2.3 Alternate RCS boration from Boric

Acid Storage Tank.

RO1 RO2 EO1 EO2 x (Periodic)

FSG-10 Isolate accumulators RO1 RO2 x FSG-5 Att. 1 Part 2 Energize remaining 230 VAC busses.

EO3 EO4 x EOP-LOPA-4 Step 16.5 S/G depressurization for

Long Term Cooling RO1 RO2 x EOP-LOPA-4 Step 20 Return to Step 3 RO1 RO2 FSG-5 Fuel Flex Generators Augment EO (1) x x x x Notes: Communications maintained with Equipm ent Operators at Aux Feedwater using sound powered phones and radios.

Pre-Augmentation Post-Augmentation Site Area Emergency Declaration - SS1 General Emergency Declaration - SG1 FLEX Strategy (FSG)

Task completion time estimate

APPENDIX 1 Table 2B - Procedure Task Timing (Tornado Response)

12-01 Phase 2 OSA applicable to Salem Generating Station Table 2B- Procedure Task Timing (Tornado Response)

Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time After Procedure Implementation Minutes - Hour 1 Hour Step Task Resource 0- 10 10-20 20- 30 3 0- 4 0 4 0-5 0 5 0- 6 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 EOP-LOPA-1

Step 1-9

Post Trip Actions SRO1 SRO2 RO1 PO1 RO2 PO2 x S1-OP-SO-AF-

0001 S2-OP-SO-AF-

0001 Identify AF source.

PO1 PO2 x FSG-2 Align AFW source Feed Steam

Generators (HCGS

FP Tank) EO1 EO2 SP2 SP3 x (55 minute task)

FSG-2 Align AFW source and monitor fire

pump (FP crosstie) SP5 x FSG-5 Att 7 Monitor and control AFW EO1 EO2 x EP-EP-102 Enter Emergency Plan SM CM1 CM2 SMS x x EOP-CFST-1 Monitoring CFSTs STA x Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time After Procedure Implementation Minutes - Hour 1 Hour Step Task Resource 0- 10 10-20 20- 30 3 0- 4 0 4 0-5 0 5 0- 6 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 EOP-LOPA-1

Step 10 Deenergize SECs PO1 PO2 EO3 EO4 x EOP-LOPA-1,step 10.1 Perform B/O coping actions, includes initial 125vdc load

shed. PO1 PO2 EO5 EO6 x EOP-LOPA-1 Steps12-14 Vital Power restoration RO1 RO2 x EOP-LOPA-1 Steps12-15 Start Diesel Generators EO3 EO4 IC1 EM1 x EOP-LOPA-1, step 18 Align charging pump suction Prioritized by SM as resources are

available EOP-LOPA-1, step 19 Service water isolation Prioritized by SM as resources are

available EOP-LOPA-1, step 21-23 SI Initiation and reset RO1 RO2 x EOP-LOPA-1, step 24 Remove control power from MDAFP Prioritized by SM as resources are

available Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time After Procedure Implementation Minutes - Hour 1 Hour Step Task Resource 0- 10 10-20 20- 30 3 0- 4 0 4 0-5 0 5 0- 6 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 EOP-LOPA-1, step 25 Restore Off-site power Per AB-LOOP-1 PO1 PO2 x EOP-LOPA-1, step 27 Isolate RCP seals EO3 EO4 x EOP-LOPA-1, step 28 Isolate S/G RO1 RO2 x EOP-LOPA-1, step 29 ELAP declaration SM SRO1 SRO2 x EOP-LOPA-4 Step 1 Implement FSG-4 FSG-4 Perform the Deep Load shed.(1.5 hr completion time)

EO5 EO6 x FSG-5 Att 2 Debris removal and towing.

(2.5 hrs)(HCGS)

and an additional 1

hr for SGS MM1 MM2(HCGS) x FSG-5 Att. 1 Part 1 Restore 125vdc battery chargers EO3 EO4 EM1 x FSG-5 Att 2 Energize Flex 480vac bus, EO5 EO6 x FSG-5 Att 2 Energize the A 460/230 bus.

EO5 EO6 x Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time After Procedure Implementation Minutes - Hour 1 Hour Step Task Resource 0- 10 10-20 20- 30 3 0- 4 0 4 0-5 0 5 0- 6 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 FSG-5 Vent the Main Generator SP4 x FSG-5 Att 3 Initiate Att 3 (SW), debris removal and

pump deployment (UHS) MM1 MM2(HCGS) x FSG-5 Att 3 UHS pump hookup and SW header

pressurized ERO Augmentation

Sec (1)

Ops (2)

Maint (2) x FSG-2 Shift Aux feed suction to SW EO (2) x FSG-3 Low Pressure AF Prioritized by SM as resources are

available EOP-LOPA-4 Step 12-13 Depressurize S/Gs RO1 RO2 x EOP-LOPA-4 Step 16.1 Initiate FSG-8 FSG-8 Att 1 Section 2.3 Alternate RCS boration from Boric

Acid Storage Tank.

RO1 RO2 EO1 EO2 X (Periodic)

FSG-10 Isolate accumulators RO1 RO2 x FSG-5 Att. 1 Part 2 Energize remaining 230vac busses.

EO3 EO4 x Procedure Step/Actions Performance Time After Procedure Implementation Minutes - Hour 1 Hour Step Task Resource 0- 10 10-20 20- 30 3 0- 4 0 4 0-5 0 5 0- 6 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 15 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 EOP-LOPA-4

Step 16.5 S/G depressurization for

Long Term Cooling RO1 RO2 x EOP-LOPA-4 Step 20 Return to Step 3 RO1 RO2 FSG-5 Fuel Flex generators Augment EO (1) x x x x Notes: Communications maintained with Equipment Operators at Aux Feedwater using sound powered phones and radios.

Pre-Augmentation Post-Augmentation Site Area Emergency Declaration - SS1 General Emergency Declaration - SG1 FLEX Strategy (FSG)

Task completion time estimate

APPENDIX 1 TABLE 3 - Firefighting Line Performed By Task Analysis Controlling Method

1. Not required by scenario N/A
2. Not required by scenario N/A
3. Not required by scenario N/A
4. Not required by scenario N/A
5. Not required by scenario N/A Notes: Fire Brigade response not required for this event.

APPENDIX 1 TABLE 4 - Radiation Protection & Chemistry Line Position Performing Function/Task Performance Time Period After Event Initiation Minutes Hours 0-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 9-10 1. In-Plant Survey On-Shift Position: RP1 X 2. Out of Plant Survey On-Shift Position: RP2 3. Personnel Monitoring On-Shift Position:

X (Control Point Coverage)

4. Job Coverage On-Shift Position: 5. Offsite Radiological Assessment

On-Shift Position: RP 6. Other Site-Specific RP - Describe:

On-Shift Position: 7. Chemistry function/task #1

- Describe:

On-Shift Position: CT1 Note 1 8. Chemistry function/task #2

- Describe:

On-Shift Position: CT1 Note 1 Notes: Note 1 - The Phase 2 scenario did not resu lt in the use of this on-shift position. Augmented resources available to support actions after T=6 hours - no actions identified requiring support.

TABLE 4 - Radiation Protection & Chemistry Line Position Performing Function/Task Performance Time Period After Event Initiation (hours) 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 17-18 18-19 19-20 20-21 21-22 22-23 23-24 1. In-Plant Survey On-Shift Position: RP1

2. Out of Plant Survey On-Shift Position: RP2
3. Personnel Monitoring On-Shift Position:
4. Job Coverage On-Shift Position:
5. Offsite Radiological Assessment

On-Shift Position: RP/CSF

6. Other Site-Specific RP - Describe:

On-Shift Position:

7. Chemistry function/task #1 -

Describe:

On-Shift Position: CT1

8. Chemistry function/task #2 - Describe:

On-Shift Position: CT2 Notes: Augmented resources avail able to support actions after T=6 hours. No response actions identified requiring support.

APPENDIX 1 TABLE 5 - Emergency Plan Implementation Line Function/Task On-Shift Position

1. Declare the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) Shift Manager
2. Approve Offsite Protective Action Recommendations Shift Manager
3. Approve content of State/local notifications Shift Manager
4. Approve extension to allowable dose limits Not Required
5. Notification and direction to on-shift st aff (e.g., to assemble, evacuate, etc.)

Shift Manager

6. ERO notification Shift Manager N o t e 1 7. Complete State/local notification form Shift Manager
8. Perform State/local notifications CM1 CM2 9. Complete NRC event notification form Shift Manager
10. Activate ERDS Not Available
11. Offsite radiological assessment Not Available N o t e 2 12. Perform NRC notifications CM2
13. Perform other site-specific ev ent notifications (e.g., INPO, ANI, etc.)

Shift Manager

14. Personnel accountability Security Notes: Note 1 - Self activation of ERO based on event (wide spread loss of grid) Note 2 - Dose Assessment capability is impacted by ELAP - no data available to perform dose assessment. In addition, no radiological release exists - dose assessment not required.
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