ML061910159
| ML061910159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Robinson  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/2006 |
| From: | Patel C P NRC/NRR/ADRO/DORL/LPLII-2 |
| To: | Walt T D Carolina Power & Light Co |
| Patel C P, NRR/DLPM, 415-3025 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML062200158 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC MC5709 | |
| Download: ML061910159 (19) | |
Text
July 11, 2006Mr. Thomas D. Walt, Vice President Carolina Power & Light Company H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, South Carolina 29550
SUBJECT:
H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 - ISSUANCE OFAN AMENDMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALTERNATE SOURCE TERM FOR THE LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NO. MC5709)
Dear Mr. Walt:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 207 to RenewedFacility Operating License No. DPR-23 for the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 (HBRSEP2). This amendment is in response to your application dated January 21, 2005, as supplemented by letters dated May 26, 2005, September 19, 2005, and March 31, 2006.The amendment approves the implementation of the alternative source term methodology for aloss-of-coolant accident at HBRSEP2.A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in theCommission's biweekly Federal Register notice. Sincerely,/RA/ Chandu P. Patel, Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor RegulationDocket No. 50-261
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 207 to DPR-23
- 2. Safety Evaluationcc w/encls: See next page Mr. T. D. WaltH. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant,Carolina Power & Light Company Unit No. 2 cc:
David T. ConleyAssociate General Counsel II - Legal Department Progress Energy Service Company, LLC Post Office Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602-1551Ms. Margaret A. ForceAssistant Attorney General State of North Carolina Post Office Box 629 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionResident Inspector's Office H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 2112 Old Camden Road Hartsville, South Carolina 29550Mr. Dan StoddardPlant General Manager H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 Carolina Power & Light Company 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, South Carolina 29550Mr. William G. NollDirector of Site Operations H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 Carolina Power & Light Company 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, South Carolina 29550Public Service CommissionState of South Carolina Post Office Drawer 11649 Columbia, South Carolina 29211J. F. LucasManager - Support Services - Nuclear H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 Carolina Power & Light Company 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, South Carolina 29550Mr. C. T. BaucomSupervisor, Licensing/Regulatory Programs H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 Carolina Power & Light Company 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, South Carolina 29550Ms. Beverly Hall, Section ChiefN.C. Department of Environment and Natural Resources Division of Radiation Protection 3825 Barrett Dr.
Raleigh, North Carolina 27609-7721Mr. Robert P. GruberExecutive Director Public Staff - NCUC 4326 Mail Service Center Raleigh, North Carolina 27699-4326Mr. Henry H. Porter, Assistant DirectorSouth Carolina Department of Health Bureau of Land & Waste Management 2600 Bull Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201Mr. Chris L. BurtonManager Performance Evaluation and Regulatory Affairs PEB 7 Progress Energy Post Office Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602-1551Mr. John H. O'Neill, Jr.Shaw, Pittman, Potts, & Trowbridge 2300 N Street NW.
Washington, DC 20037-1128
ML061910159Tech.spec.pages ML062190041 NRR-058OFFICELPL2-2/PMLPL2-2/LADRA/BCOGCLPL2-2/BCNAMECPatelCSolaMKotzalasSHamrickMMarshall(LRaghavan for)DATE 6/20/066/20/066/23/067/6/06 7/11/06 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANYDOCKET NO. 50-261H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSEAmendment No. 207Renewed License No. DPR-231.The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:A.The application for amendment by Carolina Power & Light Company (thelicensee), dated January 21, 2005, as supplemented by letters dated May 26, 2005, September 19, 2005, and March 31, 2006, complies with thestandards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;B.The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of theAct, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;C.There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by thisamendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with theCommission's regulations;D.The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defenseand security or to the health and safety of the public; andE.The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of theCommission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.2.Accordingly, the license is hereby amended and paragraph 3.B. of Renewed FacilityOperating License No. DPR-23 is revised to read as follows: B. Technical SpecificationsThe Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised throughAmendment No. 207, are hereby incorporated in the license. Carolina Power &
Light Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the TechnicalSpecifications.3.This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall beimplemented within 60 days. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/RA/ Michael L. Marshall, Jr., Branch Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-23Date of Issuance: July 11, 2006 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 207RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-23DOCKET NO. 50-261Replace page 3 of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-23 with the attac hed page 3.
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONRELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 207 TORENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-23CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANYH. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2DOCKET NO. 50-26
11.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated January 21, 2005, as supplemented by letters dated May 26, 2005,September 19, 2005, and March 31, 2006, the Carolina Power & Light Company(CP&L, licensee) requested an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License DPR-23 forH. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 (HBRSEP2). The amendment would implement the alternative source term (AST) methodology for a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).The May 26, 2005, September 19, 2005, and March 31, 2006, letters provided clarifyinginformation that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards considerationdetermination.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
A licensee's adoption of AST requires analyses of those accidents appropriate for the type ofreactor facility. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidance on the performance ofsuch analyses is presented in Regulatory Guide 1.183 "Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors," July 2000. An acceptable demonstration involves showing that both the exclusion area boundary (EAB) and low population zone (LPZ) doses are less than 25 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) or some fraction thereof, depending upon the accident. In addition, the licensee must demonstrate that the control room operator dose meets Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR) Part 50.67 criteria. Accidents which are typically analyzed are based upon reactor type. For a pressurized-waterreactor, the typical accidents analyzed include a main steam line break (MSLB), locked rotor, rod ejection, steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), fuel handling accident, and a large break LOCA. The licensee has previously received approval for use of the AST methodology for a fuel handling accident in Amendment 195, and for accidents involving a MSLB, SGTR, locked rotor, and single-rod control cluster assembly withdrawal in Amendment 201.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
3.1 Assessment
of Radiological Consequences3.1.1 CP&L Analysis of Large Break LOCAThe licensee calculated the potential consequences of a postulated large break LOCA. Doseswere calculated for individuals located at the EAB, at the LPZ, in the control room, and in the technical support center (TSC)/emergency operating facility (EOF). CP&L postulated that the occurrence of a LOCA would result in releases to the environmentfrom two sources, namely, containment leakage and Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Systems recirculation leakage. For the containment leakage pathway, it was postulated that the release of aerosols, and elemental and particulate forms of iodine within containment would be reduced by containment sprays, diffusiophoresis, and by natural deposition. Removal would be based upon the physical form of the release and whether sprays were in operation. HBRSEP2 has containment fan coolers that would promote mixing between the sprayed and unsprayed regions of containment. Licensee's calculations assumed containment leakage occurred at the maximum allowable leakage provided in the containment leakage rate testing program in the technical specifications for HBRSEP2. At 24-hours post-LOCA, licensee assumed that the containment leakage ratewas reduced to 50 percent of the maximum allowable value for the duration of the accident.CP&L proposed to take credit for the removal of aerosols in containment by diffusiophoresis. Most licensees who have requested the implementation of AST into their licensing bases have assumed such a credit.Diffusiophoresis is the movement of a particle due to concentration gradients of the componentgases in an isothermal gas mixture. For a LOCA environment, diffusiophoresis is due to the water vapor gradient and will occur at the relatively cold containment walls where thecondensation of water vapor takes place. The calculation of the diffusiophoresis removal rate is a function of the vapor condensation rate. The HBRSEP2 containment response to a large break LOCA was evaluated in detail by theWestinghouse Commercial Atomic Power (WCAP) report, WCAP-15304 "Carolina Power &
Light Company, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, LOCA Containment Integrity Analysis, September 1999." The output of that WCAP report analysis consists of tables ofmass and energy releases and containment atmospheric conditions.From that report, the licensee extracted containment relative humidity, containmentatmospheric total pressure and steam temperature, sump water temperature, break flow, and break flow energy/enthalpy. The licensee determined the WCAP report event progression and compared it to the LOCA AST dose consequence event progression. The licensee did this to determine the suitability of the WCAP report results for use in dose applications.The WCAP report does not contain steam condensation rates as a direct output. Therefore,the licensee used the WCAP report outputs and steam tables to determine steam condensation rates for the HBRSEP2 LOCA. Break flow mass and energy inputs from the WCAP report wereused to determine a steam addition rate that was assumed to be balanced by steam condensation rates during times when the containment pressure was not changing rapidly. The licensee modeled steam condensation for active heat removal mechanisms, such as containment fan coolers and containment sprays as well as for the derived condensation onheat sinks within the containment. The licensee compared the results of these calculations to two previous applications of diffusiophoresis in Fort Calhoun and Beaver Valley. The licensee found the HBRSEP2 condensation rate results similar, but conservative, compared to the other two applications.The licensee calculated diffusiophoresis factors based upon a method provided in "DirectMeasurement of Diffusiophoretic Deposition of Particles at Elevated Temperatures," Buntz, H.,
and Schock, W., Aerosol: Science, Technology , and Industrial Applications of AirborneParticles, Proceedings of the First International Aerosol Conference, September 17-21, 1984,Minneapolis, Minnesota. This method converts the plant-specific containment steam/vaporfractions into a ratio of aerosol deposition velocity to the steam deposition velocity and then uses that ratio, along with the time dependent steam density and steam condensation rate in the containment to determine time dependent removal coefficients. While the licenseecalculated time dependent removal coefficients, it assumed a constant rate diffusiophoretic factor for HBRSEP2. In addition, the licensee limited the application of this factor to only the sprayed region of the containment and only during those times in which the sprays were operating. A March 5, 2004, submittal in support of Amendment 201 addressed the mechanical mixing inthe containment by the fan coolers. In prior applications to implement AST for a LOCA, CP&Lhad initially assumed that the fan coolers removed 130,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) of airfrom the sprayed region and transferred that air to the unsprayed region. It was also assumed that 130,000 cfm of the air in the unsprayed region was then transferred to the sprayed region. The March 5, 2004, submittal provided an analysis that justified assuming that 65,000 cfm of airis taken from the sprayed region and transferred to the unsprayed region and visa versa.In the January 21, 2005, submittal it was assumed that the removal of elemental iodine ceasedwhen a decontamination factor (DF) of 200 was achieved and that this occurred at 2.01 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />spost-LOCA for train A sprays and at 2.03 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> for train B. The January 21, 2005, submittal also assumed that the spray removal rate would decrease once a DF of 50 was achieved for aerosol forms of iodine. The January 21, 2005, submittal indicated that the DF of 50 occurredat 2.58 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br /> post-LOCA for train A and at 2.62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br /> post-LOCA for train B. At the time that aDF of 50 was achieved, the spray removal rate for aerosol iodine would be reduced by a factor of 10. For the ESF recirculation leakage pathway, the licensee assumed emergency core coolingsystem leakage was twice the limit in the HBRSEP2 Technical Requirements Manual 3.23 "PostAccident Recirculation Heat Removal System Leakage." The value presently in the Manual is2 gallons per hour (gph). CP&L assumed that leakage began at the earliest time that recirculation flow starts and continues for the duration of the accident.In the September 19, 2005, letter, the licensee made two substantive changes to the LOCAanalysis in its January 21, 2005, submittal. The first change was related to the diffusiophoresis aerosol removal rate. In the original submittal this factor was presented as 0.5 per hour. In the determination of the value for this factor one of the inputs is the density of steam. The densityof steam can be calculated using either the total containment pressure or the partial steam pressure. In the January 21, 2005, letter, the licensee calculated the containment steamdensity using the steam temperature at saturated steam conditions, which is equivalent to using the saturated steam partial pressure. The NRC staff indicated that use of the total containment pressure would be more appropriate. Therefore, in its September 19, 2005, letter, CP&L revised the diffusiophoresis removal factor based upon total containment pressure. The revised removal rate was 0.2 per hour.The second substantive change was associated with the flashing fraction used to determine theairborne quantity of iodine originating from the ESF leakage outside containment. The January 21, 2005, letter assumed the portion which flashed was 5.3 percent. In its letter dated September 19, 2005, CP&L revised the flashing portion to 10 percent. This value is consistent with the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.183. With the change in flashing portion, the licenseealso reduced the assumed ESF leakage from 4 gph to 2 gph. With this change, the leakage value in HBRSEP2 Technical Requirements Manual 3.23 will need to be changed to 1 gph from 2 gph.As a result of the above changes, revised LOCA calculations were performed and the revisedconsequences were provided in the September 19, 2005, letter. 3.1.2 Staff Analysis of Large Break LOCA The NRC staff performed confirmatory calculations of the potential consequences of a LOCAbased upon information provided in the licensee's January 21, 2005, May 26, 2005, and September 19, 2005, letters. The staff calculated the doses to individuals located at the EAB,LPZ, control room and TSC. The LOCA calculation assumptions, and the atmospheric dispersion factors utilized by the NRC staff are presented in the attached Tables 1 and 2,respectively. The staff finds the licensee's use of the diffusiophoresis removal mechanism acceptable because:1) They used total containment pressure not steam pressure; 2)The calculation of the diffusiophoresis removal factors was based uponplant-specific containment response to a large break LOCA, including plant-specific containment steam/vapor fractions and time dependent steam density and steam condensation rate in containment; 3) Diffusiophoresis removal is only accounted for during the times sprays areoperational; and 4)The spray removal coefficient does not include the impact of diffusiophoresis. The NRC staff's assumptions utilized for the control room and TSC doses are presented in theattached Tables 3 and 4, respectively. The consequences as determined by the NRC staff arepresented in Table 5 (attached).The estimate of diffusiophoretic removal rates is based on a calculated effective steamcondensation rate in the containment as evaluated by WCAP-15304. The NRC staff reviewedthe methodology and questioned the basis for the choice of steam density based upon the steam partial pressure, rather than containment pressure in the determination of thediffusiophoretic removal rate. As noted above, in response to a staff question, the licensee chose to revise its analysis. In the September 19, 2005, letter, the licensee proposed a reviseddiffusiophoresis removal rate using the steam density based on the total containment pressure.
This change is acceptable to the NRC staff. The NRC staff reviewed the change in flash portion of the ESF leakage component. The NRCstaff finds the change to 10 percent acceptable and consistent with the guidance in RegulatoryGuide 1.183.In the September 19, 2005, letter, the licensee calculated a revised time at which a DF of 50was achieved for aerosol forms of iodine to be 2.66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> for train A and 2.70 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br /> for train B.
The NRC staff determined that train B would be the limiting case (i.e., result in the larger doseconsequence). The NRC staff calculated that for the limiting condition the DF of 50 would beachieved at approximately 2.53 hours6.134259e-4 days <br />0.0147 hours <br />8.763227e-5 weeks <br />2.01665e-5 months <br /> post-LOCA. For the dose to the control room operators, refer to Section 3.2 for additional details. For theTSC calculation the licensee assumed an unfiltered inleakage flow rate of 500 cfm. There is no evidence that the licensee has confirmed this inleakage rate. None of the submittals in support of this amendment request provided any documentation that indicated that the licensee hadconfirmed the value of 500 cfm. However, the NRC staff finds that this value would provide anacceptable dose in the TSC in the event of a design-basis accident.The NRC staff's calculations confirmed that HBRSEP2's implementation of AST for a LOCAmet the 10 CFR 50.67 dose acceptance criteria.3.2 Assessment of Control Room HabitabilityThe licensee calculated the dose to the control room operators. The licensee assumed that thenormal ventilation system would be operating for 35 seconds post-LOCA before a safetyinjection signal would result in the automatic initiation of the control room's emergency ventilation system. During this period of operation of the normal ventilation system, thelicensee assumed that the inleakage rate to the control room envelope (CRE) was 170 cfm.
When operated to mitigate the consequences of an accident, the control room emergency ventilation system brings 400 cfm of outside air, passes it through a filter and a charcoalabsorber, and distributes the air to the CRE. Air from the CRE is recirculated back through the filter and the charcoal absorber at a rate of 2600 cfm. The control room emergency ventilation system is actuated either by a safety injection signal ora signal from a radiation monitor. During the period when the normal control room ventilation system is operating, it is assumed that the normal makeup air to the CRE is 400 cfm, which isunfiltered, and that the unfiltered inleakage into the envelope is 170 cfm.
During the periods when the control room's emergency filtrati on system is operating, it isassumed that the unfiltered inleakage is initially at 170 cfm. After 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the unfiltered inleakage is assumed to be reduced by 70 cfm when the inleakage from the Hagan Room is reduced. The Hagan Room is a source of unfiltered inleakage into the CRE, when there is a loss of the auxiliary building exhaust fan HVE-7. Loss of this fan results in the Hagan Room,which is adjacent to the CRE, being at a higher pressure than the CRE. The Hagan Room willremain in this condition until operators can take certain actions that will result in the reduction ofthe pressure in the Hagan Room to below that of the CRE. The licensee's analysis assumed that it would take approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to implement the actions and reduce the pressure in theHagan Room.The licensee performed testing of the HBRSEP2 CRE to establish its inleakage characteristics. A summary of these testing results were presented in an April 10, 2003, letter to the NRC staff. One of the tests determined the CRE's inleakage characteristics when the normal control roomventilation system was operating. This test measured inleakage of 141 cfm +/- 5 cfm. TheApril 10, 2003, letter did not specify the pressure condition of the Hagen Room relative to the CRE when the test was performed. Therefore, there was a degree of uncertainty as to whether the test reflected the limiting condition for this operating scheme. However, in its March 31, 2006, letter, the licensee provided supplemental information on test data for the test performed with the normal control room ventilation system operating. This test data confirmedthat the pressure in the Hagan Room was at negative pressure with respect to the CRE during the test with the normal control room ventilation system operating.The NRC staff performed calculations to determine whether the licensee's implementation ofthe AST would result in postulated doses which would meet 10 CFR 50.67. The staff calculations confirmed that dose to the control room operators meet 10 CFR 50.67. 4.0
SUMMARY
The NRC staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, thatimplementation of the AST methodology for a LOCA can be approved.
5.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of South Carolina official wasnotified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facilitycomponent located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff hasdetermined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and nosignificant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there isno significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (70 FR 29786). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categoricalexclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) thereis reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered byoperation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with theCommission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to thecommon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.Principal Contributor: A. Drozd J. HayesDate: July 11, 2006Attachments: Tables Table 1 Staff Assumptions for the LOCAParameterValueCore Thermal Power Level (MWt)2346Gap Release Fraction:Halogens Noble Gases Alkali Metals All others 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00Early In-Vessel Release Fraction:Halogens Noble Gases Alkali Metals Tellurium Metals
Ba, Sr Noble Metals Cerium Group Lanthanides 0.35 0.95 0.25 0.05 0.02 0.0025 0.0005 0.0002Containment Leak Rate (%/Day) 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s> 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 0.1 0.05LOCA Release Phase Timing Gap Early In-Vessel0 - 30 minutes30 minutes to 1.8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />sEngineered Safety Feature (ESF)Systems Leakage Rate (gph)21 minutes - 30 days2ESF Leakage Flash Fraction0.10 ESF Release Location Auxiliary Building Residual HeatRemoval Heat Exchanger RoomContainment Sump Water Volume(ft 3)21-40 minutes 40-51.5 minutes 51.5 minutes - 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> 35,850 40,889 43,939Containment Natural AerosolDeposition Rate (hr
-1)0.1Containment Spray Operation(minutes post LOCA)RWST Initiation RWST Termination
3 77 Containment Sump InitiationContainment Sump Termination 87 167Containment Spray Volume (ft 3)Train A Train B 1,623,618 1,596,199Containment Unsprayed Volume (ft 3)Train A Train B 334,908 362,327Spray Removal Rate (hr
-1)Elemental Iodine AerosolsPre-DF=50Train A Train BPost DF=50Train A Train B 20 3.484 3.427 0.3484 0.3427Time to Reach Elemental Iodine DF= 200 (hrs.)
2.0Time to Reach Particulate Iodine DF= 50 (hrs) 1.535Diffusiophoresis Removal Rate (hr
-1)0.2Containment Fan Cooler Flow Rate(cfm) 65,000Containment Fan Cooler InitiationTime (Seconds Post LOCA) 76Breathing Rates (m 3/sec)Offsite0-8 hours 8-24 hours 1-30 days3.47E-41.75E-4 2.32E-4Control Room/TSC3.47E-4 Table 2 Robinson Atmospheric Dispersion (X/Q) ValuesOffsite X/Q Values (s/m 3)Location0 - 2 hrs2 - 8 hrs8 - 24 hrs1 - 4 days4 - 30 days EAB Limiting 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> interval 1.77 E-3LPZ8.92 E-53.50 E-52.19 E-57.95 E-61.85 E-6Control Room and TSC/EOF X/Q Values (s/m 3)Release -Receptor Pair0-2 hrs2-8 hrs8-24 hrs1-4 days4-30 daysContainment Nearest Point -
CR 4.15E-032.74E-031.17E-038.18E-046.74E-04Containment Nearest Point -TSC/EOF1.64E-041.43E-046.49E-054.41E-053.50E-05RHR Heat Exchanger Room - CR 7.13E-035.49E-032.29E-031.71E-031.37E-03RHR Heat Exchanger Room -TSC/EOF1.38E-041.23E-045.52E-053.78E-053.01E-05CR - Control RoomTSC/EOF - Technical Support Center/Emergency Offsite FacilityRHR - Residual Heat Removal Table 3 Assumptions for Control RoomParameterValueFree Air Volume (ft 3)20,124Normal Ventilation Flow Rates (cfm)Makeup Inleakage 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 400 170Emergency Ventilation SystemActivated (Hours Post LOCA) 35Emergency Mode Flow Rates (cfm)Filtered Makeup Filtered Recirculation Inleakage 1 hour> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 400 2600 170 100Filter & Absorber Efficiencies (%)Elemental Iodine Organic Iodine Particulate 94.05 94.05 98.01 Table 4 Assumptions for TSCParameterValueFree Air Volume (ft 3)262,640Normal Ventilation Flow Rates (cfm)Makeup Inleakage 3420 500Emergency Ventilation SystemActivated (Hours Post LOCA) 2Emergency Mode Flow Rates (cfm)Filtered Makeup Filtered Recirculation Inleakage 3420N/A 500 Filter & Absorber Efficiencies (%)Elemental Iodine Organic Iodine Particulate 98.01 98.01 98.01Table 5 Robinson Dose Consequences (TEDE)DoseExclusion AreaBoundaryLow-Population Zone Control Room OperatorsTSCContainmentLeakageESF Leakage Total (AcceptanceCriteria)16.8 0.97 17.8 (25)1.08 0.221 1.30 (25)2.09 1.90 3.99 (5)1.37 0.19 1.56 (5)