Text

Proposed Tech Specs Providing NRC W/Opportunity to Communicate at Early Stage Any Concerns W/Respect to Differences from NUREG-1431
	ML17263A728
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/15/1994
From:	; ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML17263A729	List: ML17263A728; ML17309A550;
References
	RTR-NUREG-1431 NUDOCS 9407190408
	Download: ML17263A728 (175)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:1.12Frecruenc'otationThefrequencynotationspecifiedfortheperformanceofsurveillancerequirementsshallcorrespondtotheintervalsdefinedbelow.NotationPrecruencS,EachShiftD,DailyTwiceperweekW,WeeklyB/W,BiweeklyM,MonthlyB/M,BimonthlyQ,QuarterlySA,SemiannuallyA,AnnuallyN.A.Atleastonceper12hoursAtleastonceper24hoursAtleastonceper4daysandatleasttwiceper7daysA<leastonceper7daysAtleastonceper14daysAtleastonceper31daysAtleastonceper62daysAtleastonceper92daysAtleastonceper6monthsAtleastoncepe12monthsAtleastonceper18monthsPriortoeachstartupNotApplicablePriortoeachstartupifnotdonepreviousweekWithin12hourspriortoeachrelease1.13OffsiteDoseCalculationManualODCY'heODCMisamanualcontainingthemethodologyand.parameterstobeusedforcalculatingtheoffsiteqq07>cocoaesO7>sPDRADOCK05000244pPDR 3~EmerencCoreCoolinSstemAuxilaCoolnSsteA'rRecirculationFanCoolersContainmentSraandarcoalHEPAFiltersOb'e'veTodefineseconditionsforoationthatareneces-sary:(1)toremoveecayhearomthecoreinemergencyornormalshutdownsituat,'2)toremoveheatfromcontain-mentinnormalcratingandergencysituations,(3)toremoveaiorneiodinefromthecainmentatmospherefollxnqapostulatedDesignBasisAccidenand(4)tominimizecontainmentleakagetotheenvironmentsubse~nttoaDesignBasisAccident.~/3.3.1SafetIn'ectionandResidualHeatRemovalSstems3.3.1.1Thereactorshallnotbetakenabovethemodeindicatedunlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:CQ3,5.4SR,o.5.'t~<SQ.Z.S.~.R.a~b.Abovecoldshutdown,therefuelingwaterstoragetankcontainsnotlessthan300,000gallonsofwater,withaboronconcentrationofatleast2000ppm.Aboveareactorcoolantsystempressureof1600psig,(3,vi4C.u3.S.Z.L3~L.Iic~exceptduringperformanceofRCShydrotest,eachaccumulator,ispressurizedtoatleast700psigwithanindicatedlevelofatleast50<andamaximumof824withaboronconcentrationofatleast1800ppm.Atoraboveareactorcoolantsystemtemperatureof350F,threesafetyinjectionpumpsareoperable. AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350oF,tworesidualheatremovalpumpsareoperable.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350'F,tworesidualheatremovalheatexchangersareoperable.Attheconditionsrequiredinathrougheabove,allvalves,"interlocksandpipingassociatedwiththeabovecomponentswhicharerequiredtofunctionduringaccidentconditionsareoperable.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350F,A.C.powershallberemovedfromthefollowingvalveswiththevalvesintheopenposition:safetyinjectioncoldleginjectionvalves878BandD.A.C.powershallberemovedfromsafetyinjectionhotleginjectionvalves878AandCwiththevalvesclosed.D.C.controlpowershallberemovedfromrefuelingwaterstoragetankdeliveryvalves896A,896Band856withthevalvesopen.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350F,checkvalves853A,853B,867A,867B,878G,and8788shallbeoperablewithlessthan5.0gpmleakageeach.TheleakagerequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3.1.5.2.1arestillapplicable.Aboveareactorcoolantsystempressureof1600psig,exceptduringperformanceofRCShydrotest,A.C.powerishallberemovedfromaccumulatorisolationvalves841and865withthevalvesopen.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350F,A.C.powershallberemovedfromSafetyInjectionsuctionvalves825AandBwiththevalvesintheopenposition,andfromvalves826A,B,C,Dwiththevalvesintheclosedposition. 3'12o~.~.9i3~i.v3.3.1.3L,C-O'Z.s.i(iQ3.3.1.4L.c.o-,s,23.3.1.5~~lCo3.5.2Iftheconditionsof3.3.1.1aarenotmet,thensatisfytheconditionwithin1hourorbeathotshutdowninthenext6hoursandatleastcoldshutdownwithinanadditional30hours.Therequirementsof3.3.l.lband3.3.l.limaybemodifiedtoallowoneaccumulatortobeinoperableorisolatedforuptoonehour.Iftheaccumulatorisnotoperableorisstillisolatedafteronehour,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandbelowaRCSpressureof1600psigwithinanadditional6hours.Therequirementsof3.3.1.lcmaybemodifiedtoallowonesafetyinjectionpumptobeinoperableforupto72hours.Ifthepumpisnotoperableafter72hours,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandbelowaRCStemperaturelessthan350oFwithinanadditional6hours.Therequirementsof3.3.1.1dthroughh.maybemodifiedtoallowcomponentstobeinoperableatanyonetime-MorethanonecomponentmaybeinoperableatanyonetimeprovidedthatonetrainoftheECCSisoperable.Iftherequirementsof3.3.1.1dthroughh.arenotsatisfiedwithinthetimeperiodspecifiedbelow,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithin6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350Finanadditional6hours.aeOneresidualheatremovalpumpmaybeoutofservice~-'q+~-q+~cayg.'rovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin72hours. 4'.5.2b.cooneresidualheatremovalheatexchangermaybeoutofserviceforaperiodofnomorethan72hours.Anyvalve,interlock,orpipingrequiredforthefunc-tioningofonesafetyinjectiontrainand/oronelowheadsafetyinjectiontrain(RHR)maybeinoperableprovidedrepairsarecompletedwithin72hours(exceptasspeci-fiedine.below).Powermayberestoredtoanyvalvereferencedin3.3.1.1gforthepurposesofvalvetestingprovidednomorethanLc.o".s.2.Cuow')e.onesuchvalvehaspowerrestoredandprovidedtestingiscompletedandpowerremovedwithin12hours.Thosecheckvalvesspecifiedin3.3.1.1hmaybeinopera-ble(greaterthan5.0gpmleakage)providedtheinlineMovsarede-energizedclosedandrepairsarecompletedwithin12hours. a~Thefacilityhasfourservicewaterpumps.Onlyonineededduringtheinjectionphase,andtworeiredduringtherecirculationphasepostuatedloss-of-coolantaccident.'TheontrolroomergencyairtreatmentsystemisdignedtofilterthcontrolroomatmosphereduringeriodswhenthecontroloomisisolatedandtomaiIainradiationlevelsintcontrolroomataceptablelevelsfollowing"heesignBasisAcc'nt.'Reactoroperationmaycotinueforalimitedtimewhilerepairsarebeingdetotairtreatmentsystemsinceit.isunlikelytattesystemwould,beneeded.'ZechnicalSpecification3.3.5appliesonlytotheequipmen"necessaryoilterthecontrolroomatmosphere.Equipmetnecesrytoinitiateisolationof.t!>econtrolroomiscove)edhyanotherspecfication.Thelimitsrtheaccumulatorpessureandvolumeassuretherequiredamountofwater'njection'uringanaccint,andarebasedonvalueusedfortheaccidtanalyses.Theindicated1velof50%corespondsto1108cubicfeetofwatrinthea.cumulatorandtheindicatedlevelof82%coespondsto1134cubicfeet.Thelimitationofnomorethan.onesafetyinjetionpumptobeoperablewhenoverpressureprotection'sbeingprovidedbyaRCSventof>1.1sq.in.insures3.3-13Amendmen'tNo.gg,48 hatthemassadditionfromtheinadvertentoperationsetyinjectionwillnotresultinRHRsystempresreexcedingdesignlimits.Thelimitationonnoafetyinjecionpumpsoperableandthedischargelinessolatedwhenovrpressureprotectionisprovidedbytpressur-izerPOR'sremovesmassinjectionfrominadvertentsafetyinjetionasaneventforwhichthiconfigurationofoverpresseprotectionmustbedes'gnedtoprotect.iinoperabilityasafetyinjectionmpmaybeverifiedfromthemaincotrolboardwithtepumpcontrolswitchinpullstop,ortepumpbreakeinthetestrackedoutpositionsuchthatthepumpcouldnotstartfromaninadvertentsafetyi'ectinsignal.Isolationofasafetyinjectionpump'argepathtotheRCSmaybeverifiedfromthemainrolboardbythedischargeMOVswitchpositionindictingosed,orthedischargevalveclosedwithA.C.werremoed,oramanualdischargepathisolationvlveclosedshthatoperationoftheassociatedsaftyinjectionpumpouldnotresultinmassinjectionttheRCS.Highconctrationboricacidisnoneededtomitigatetheconequencesofadesignbasisac'dent.Reference(10)emonstratesthatthedesignbasisccidentscanbemigatedbysafetyinjectionflowofRWSToncentration.erefore,SIpumpsuctionistakenfromthRWST.Requiringthatthesafetyinjectionsuctionvves(825Aand8,826A,B,CandD)arealignedwithA..powerremovedinsuresthatthesafetyinjectionsystewouldnotbeexposedtohighconcentrationboricacidantheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysisaresatisfied.AmendmentNo.,573.3-14 eferences()Deleted(2)UFSARSection6.3.3.1(3)UFSARSection6.2.2.1(4)FSARSection15.6.4.3(5)UARSection9.2.2.4(6)UFSSection9.2.2.4(7)Deleed(8)UFSARection9.2.1.2(9)UFSARSction6.2.1.1(ContainmtIntegrity)andUFSARSetion6.4(CREmergencyAirTreatment)(10)MestinghoseReport,"R.E.G'aBoricAcidStorageTankBoroConcentrationeductionStudy"datedNov.1992C.J.McHughdJ.J.SprysbakendmentNo.P,5733.14a Channelescitio10.RodPositionBankCountersTABLE4.1-1(Continued)~CeckCalibrateTestS(1,2)H.A.H.A.1)2)liemarksWithrodpositionindicationLogrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofservicell.SteamGeneratorLevel12.ChargingFlow13.ResidualHeatRemovalPumpFlowH.A.fl.A.H.A.H.A.14.BoricAcidStorageTankLevelDH.A.Note4saz.s.~.>15.RefuelingWaterStorageTankLevelH.A.H.A.16.VolumeControlTankLevelN.A.N.A.17.ReactorContainmentPressureM(1)1)IsolationValvesignal18.RadiationMonitoringSystem19.BoricAcidControlN.A.N.A.AreaMonitorsRltoR9,SystemMonitorR17SRa.~eiS.z20.ContainmentDrainSumpLevelH.A.N.A.21.ValveTemperatureInterlocksH.A.H.A.22.Pump-ValveInterlock23.TurbineTripSet-Pointsas.s.i.2.24.AccumulatorLevelandsa3.s.i.2,pressureN.A.N.A.N.ADM(1)N.A.1)BlockTripAmendmentNc.g574.1-6 2'R.ii.~~~TABLE41-2MINIMUMFREUENCIFSFOREUIPMNTANDSAMLINGTESTS1.ReactorCoolantChemistrySamples2.ReactorCoolantBoronChlorideandFluorideOxygenBoronConcentration~Frou~onc3times/weekandatleasteverythirdday5times/weekandatleasteveryseconddayexceptwhenbelow2504FMeekly3.RefuelingWaterSpp.gq2,StorageTankWaterZ.Jt,'a1,$Sample4.BoricAcidStorageTankBoronConcentrationBoronConcentrationWeeklyTwice/Week"'.ControlRods6a.FullLengthControlRod6b.FullLengthControlRod7.PressurizerSafetyValves8.HainSteamSafetyValves9.ContainmentZsolationTrip10.RefuelingSystemZnterlocksRoddroptimesofallfulllengthrodsHoveanyrodnotfullyinsertedasufficientnumberofstepsinanyonadirectiontocauseachangeofposi.tionasindicatedbytherodpositionindicationsystemHoveeachrodthroughitsfulllengthtoverifythatthorodpositioni.ndicationsystemtransitionsoccurSotpointSetpointFunctioningFunctioningAftervesselheadremovalandatleastoncepor18months(1)MonthlyEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefueli.ngShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownPriortoRefuelingOperationsAmendmentNo.,574.1-8 11.ServiceMaterSystemT69tFunctioning~Fe~encEachRefuelingShutdown12.FireProtectionPumpandPowerSupply13.SprayAddi.tiveTankQg,S,S.i."(14.AccumulatorFunctioningNaOHConcentBoronConcentration15.PrimarySystemEvaluateLeakage16.DieselFuelSupplyFuelXnventoryMonthlyMonthlyBi-MonthlyDailyDailyKQ'atZ.t'~'ih<P.'ii.c.17.SpentFuelPit18.SecondaryCoolantSamplesBoronConcentrationGrossActivityMonthly72hours(2)(3)19.CirculatingMaterFloodProtectionEquipmentCalibrateEachRefuelingShutdownNotes:Alsorequiredforspecificallyaffectedindividualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontrolroddrivesystemwhichcouldaffectthedrotimeofthspecificrods.Notrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.(3)AnisotopicanalysisforI-131equivalentactivityisrequiredatleastmonthlywheneverthegrossactivitydeterminationindicatesiodineconcentrationgreaterthan104oftheactivit,deteallowablelimitbutonlyonceper6monthswhtheneveregrossy,eerminationindicatesiodineconcentrationbelow104oftheallowablelimit.(4)WhenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable.AmendmentNn.g,5741-9 4.5SafetIniection,ContainmentSoraandIodineRemovalSstemsTests4AolicabilitAppliestotestingoftheSafetyInjectionSystem,theContain-mentSpraySystem,andtheAirZiltratiorSysteminsideCcn-V~~'l"7~Vtainment.Obiective:Toverifythatthesubjectsystemswillrespondpromptlyandperformtheirintendedfunctions,ifrequired.\JI~t4.5.l.1SafetInectionSstema.Systemtestsshallbeperformedateachreactorrefuel.inginterval.Thetestshallbeperformedinaccordancewiththefollowing:Withthereactorcoolantsystempressurelessthanor,equalto350psigandtemperaturelessthanorequalto350F,atestsafetyinjectionsignalwillbeappliedtoinitiateoperationofthesystem.Thesafetyinjectionandresidualheatremovalpumpmotorsarepreventedfromstartingduringthetest.4.5-1 ThcsystemtestwillbcconsideredsatisfactoryifZRcontrolboardindicati;nandvisualobservationsindicatethatallvalveshavereceivedtheSafetyinjectionsignalandhavecomplctcdtheirtravel.\$~yThcproperscnucnceandtimingofthcrotatingcomponentsaretobcverifiedinconjunctionxvith~~Section4.6.1b.4.5.l.2ContainmcntSnraS~stema.Systemtestsshallbcperformedat.eachrc"ctorre-fuelinginterval.Thetestshall.bcperformedwithtncssolatacnvalves,inthcspraysupplylines,atthccon-tainmcntblocltcdclosed.Ppcrationofthesystemf'~Ie~~ts)nitiatcdbytrippingthcnormalactuationinstrumcn-mctation.b.Thcsprayno@alesshallbccheckedforproperfunctioninr;%~C~atleasteveryfiveyears.Thctestwillbcconsideredsatisfactoryifvisualobser-vationsindicateallc'Opponentshaveoperatedsatisfac-torily.4.5.2ComonentTests4.5.2.1PumpsExceptduringcoldorrefuelingshutdown)sthhsafetyl'njectxonpumps,residualheatrea'ovalpu~s,andS'a3.g.z.."IQQ~cccontainmcntspraypumpsshallbesa,artedatintervalsnottoexceedonemonth.Thepumpsshallbetestedpriortostartupifthetimesincethelasttestexceeds1month.4.S-2 0 3.e.i.l~~3'X.4.L.b.Acceptablelevelsofperformanceforthepumpsshallbethatthepumpsstart,operate,anddeveloptheminimumdischargepressurefortheflowslistedinthetablebelow:DISCHARGEPRES&JRE.ContainmentSprayPumpsResidualHeatRemovalPumpsSafetyInject:ionPumps35.gpm[200gpmj450gpm[50gpml150gpm240psig[140psigJ138psig[1420psigj1356psigNotes(2)Table4.5-3.Notes(1)Itemsinsquarebracketsareeffectiveuntiltheinstallationoft:henewresidualheatremovalminimumflowrecirculationsystem.(2)Itemsinsquarebracketsareeffectiveuntilinstallationofthenewsafetyinjectionminimumflowrecirculationsystem.4.5.2.2Ve3.vesa.Exceptduringcoldorrefuelingshutdownsthespray4additivevalvesshallbetestedatintervalsnottoexceedonemonth.WiththepumpsshutdownandthevalvesupstreamanddownstreamAaandramtNo.3345-3

3Q,ill4.5.2.3of"hesprayadditivevalvesclosed,eachvalvewillbeopenedandclosedbvoperatoract'on.Thistestshallbeperarmedpriortostartupi=hetimesincethelasttestexceedsonemon&.heaccumulatorcheckvalvesshallbecheckedoroperabili"yduringeachrefuelingshutdown.Air.'"ratanSystem4.5.2.3.1At'eas"=nceevezv18monthsorateevery720hoursafchac"atra"ionsvstemoperat'onsincethelasttest,~o11orallowingpainting,ieorchemicalreleaseinanyve.-a-'"."."onecommunicatingwiththesvstem,the"ostaccidenta.The"ressuredropaczossthecharcoaladsorberbankischar""a'ystemshallhavethefollowingcond'iansdemonstrtedb.lessthan3inchesazwateratdes'gnzlowrate(~105).InplaceFreontesting,underambientconc't'ons,shallC~showatleast99%removal.Theiad'neremovaleffic'ncyozatleastonecharcoalfi'ercellsha'1bemeasured.Theftercel'obetestedshallbeselectedrandomlyfromthosecellswiththelongestin-ban3cresidencetime.The.;mi~a~4py414acceptablevalueforiltereficiencyis90%'rre-movalo"methyliod'dewhentestedatatleast2S6'Fand954RHandat1.5ta2.0mg/m3load'..gwithtaggec.CK3I.45-4 ATTACHMENTCProposedRevisedR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsRevisethepagesasfollows:RemoveTableofContentsEntireSection1.0EntireSection2.0EntireSection3.0EntireSection4.0EntireSection5.0EntireSection6.0InsertGinnaStationITSTableofContentsGinnaStationITSSection1.0GinnaStationITSSection2.0GinnaStationITSSection3.0GinnaStationITSSection4.0GinnaStationITSSection5.0ONLYSECTION3.5ISPROVIDEDATTHISTIME Accumulators3.5.13.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.1AccumulatorsLCO3.5.1TwoECCSaccumulatorsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2,MODE3withpressurizerpressure>1600psig.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneaccumulatorinoperableduetoboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.A,1Restoreboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.72hoursB.OneaccumulatorinoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionA.B.1RestoreaccumulatortoOPERABLEstatus.1hourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmet.C.1ANDC.2BeinMODE3.Reducepressurizerpressureto<1600pslg.6hours12hoursD.Twoaccumulatorsinoperable.D.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-1 Jtl Accumulators3.5.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.1.1Verifyeachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveisfullyopen.12hoursSR3.5.1.2Verifyboratedwatervolumeineachaccumulatorisz1120cubicfeet(50%)andg1190cubicfeet(82%).12hoursSR3.5.1.3Verifynitrogencoverpressureineachaccumulatoris>700psigandS790psig.12hoursSR3.5.1.4VerifyboronconcentrationineachaccumulatorisZ1800ppmandg2900ppm.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.5.1.5Verifypowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveoperatorwhenpressurizerpressureis>1600psig,31daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-2 ECCS-Operating3.5.23.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.2ECCS-OperatingLCO3.5.2TwoECCStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.-NOTES1.InMODE3,bothsafetyinjection(SI)pumpflowpathsmaybeisolatedbyclosingtheisolationvalvesforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetestingperSR3.4.14.1.Powermayberestoredtomotoroperatedisolationvalves878A,878B,878C,and878Dforupto12hoursforthepurposeoftestingperSR3.4,14.1providedthatpowerisrestoredtoonlyonevalveatatime.2.OperationinMODE3withECCSpumpsdeclaredinoperablepursuanttoLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"isallowedforupto4hoursoruntilthetemperatureofbothRCScoldlegsexceeds375'F,whichevercomesfirst.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onetraininoperable.ANDAtleast100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainavailable,A.1RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-3 IIV41~au ECCS-Operating3.5.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B,lANDBeinMODE3.6hoursB.2BeinMODE4.12hoursC.Twotrainsinoperable.C.1EnterLCO3.0.3ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.2.1VerifythefolloWingvalvesareinthe~~~~listedposition.NumberPositionFunction12hours825AOpen825BOpen826AClosed826BClosed826CClosed8260Closed851AOpen851BOpen856Open878AClosed878BOpen878CClosed878DOpen896AOpen896BOpenRWSTSuctiontoSIPumpsRWSTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsSumpBtoRHRPumpsSumpBtoRHRPumpsRWSTSuctiontoRHRPumpsSIInjectiontoRCSHotLegSIInjectiontoRCSColdLegSIInjectiontoRCSHotLegSIInjectiontoRCSColdLegRWSTSuctiontoSIandContainmentSprayRWSTSuctiontoSIandContainmentSpray(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-4

4-~"5L3,~'~II.II ECCS-Operating3.5.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.2.2VerifyeachECCSmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheflowpath,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.5.2.3Verifyeachbreakerorkeyswitch,asapplicable,foreachvalvelistedinSR3.5.2.1,isinthecorrectposition,31daysSR3.5.2.4VerifyeachECCSpump'sdevelop'edheadatthetestflowpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.5.2.5VerifyeachECCSautomaticvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.5.2.6VerifyeachECCSpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-5 ECCS-Shutdown3.5.33.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.3ECCS-ShutdownLCO3.5.3OneECCStrainshallbeOPERABLE.'PPLICABILITY:MODE4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RequiredECCSresidualheatremoval(RHR)subsysteminoperable.A.1InitiateactiontorestorerequiredECCSRHRsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyB.RequiredECCSSafety~~~injection(SI)subsysteminoperable.B.1RestorerequiredECCSSIsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.1hourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionBnotmet.C.1BeinMODE5.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-6 ECCS-Shutdown3.5.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.3.INOTE-AnRHRtrainmaybeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapableofbeingmanuallyrealignedtotheECCSmodeofoperation.ThefollowingSRisapplicableforallequipmentrequiredtobeOPERABLE:SR3.5.2.4InaccordancewithapplicableSRR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-7

~~~>y RWST3.5.43.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)LCO3.5.4TheRWSTshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RWSTboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.A.lRestoreRWSTtoOPERABLEstatus.8hoursB.RWSTwatervolumenot~~~~~withinlimits.B.IRestoreRWSTtoOPERABLEstatus.IhourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmet.C.lBeinMODE3.ANDC.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-8 SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCERWST3.5.4FREQUENCYSR3.5.4.1VerifyRWSTboratedwatervolumeisZ300,000gallons(88%).7daysSR3.5.4.2VerifyRWSTboronconcentrationisZ2000ppmandg2900ppm.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-9 'pf~1$ AccumulatorsB3.5.1B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.1AccumulatorsBASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionsoftheECCSaccumulatorsaretosupplywatertothereactorvesselduringtheblowdownphaseofalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),toprovideinventorytohelpaccomplishtherefillphasethatfollowsthereafter,andtoprovideReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)makeupforasmallbreakLOCA.TheblowdownphaseofalargebreakLOCAistheinitialperiodofthetransientduringwhichtheRCSdepartsfromequilibriumconditions,andheatfromfissionproductdecay,hotinternals,andthevesselcontinuestobetransferredtothereactorcoolant.Thereactorcoolantinventoryisvacatingthecoreduringthisphasethroughsteamflashingandejectionoutthroughthebreak.TheblowdownphaseofthetransientendswhentheRCSpressurefallstoavalueapproachingthatofthecontainmentatmosphere.IntherefillphaseofaLOCA,whichimmediatelyfollowstheblowdownphase,thecoreisessentiallyinadiabaticheatup.Thebalanceofaccumulatorinventoryisavailabletorefloodthecoreandhelpfillvoidsinthelowerplenumandreactorvesseldowncomersoastoestablisharecoverylevelatthebottomofthecore.Theaccumulatorsarepressurevesselspartiallyfilledwithboratedwaterandpressurizedwithnitrogengas.Theaccumulatorsarepassivecomponents,sincenooperatororcontrolactionsarerequiredinorderforthemtoperformtheirfunction.InternalaccumulatortankpressureissufficienttodischargetheaccumulatorcontentstotheRCS,ifRCSpressuredecreasesbelowtheaccumulatorpressure.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-1 lg,'IJl~ills<<yif:,I4I,>.tkl,ll>i,)hPaII AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)EachaccumulatorispipedintoanRCScoldlegviaanaccumulatorlineandisisolatedfromtheRCSbyamotoroperatedisolationvalveandtwocheckvalvesinseries.Themotoroperatedisolationvalves(841and865)aremaintainedopenwithACpowerremovedunderadministrativecontrolwhenpressurizerpressureis)1600psig.Thisfeatureensuresthatthevalvesmeetthesinglefailurecriterionofmanually-controlledelectricallyoperatedvalvesperBranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18(Ref.1).ThisisalsodiscussedinReferences2and3.rTheaccumulatorsize,watervolume,andnitrogencoverpressureareselectedsothatoneofthetwoaccumulatorsissufficienttopartiallycoverthecorebeforesignificantcladmeltingorzirconiumwaterreactioncanoccurfollowingaLOCA,TheneedtoensurethatoneaccumulatorisadequateforthisfunctionisconsistentwiththeLOCAassumptionthattheentirecontentsofoneaccumulatorwillbelostviatheRCSpipebreakduringtheblowdownphaseoftheLOCA.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheaccumulatorsareassumedOPERABLEinboththelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalysesatfullpower(Ref.4).ThesearetheDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatestablishtheacceptancelimitsfortheaccumulators.ReferencetotheanalysesfortheseDBAsisusedtoassesschangesintheaccumulatorsastheyrelatetotheacceptancelimits.InperformingtheLOCAcalculations,conservativeassumptionsaremadeconcerningtheavailabilityofECCSflow.IntheearlystagesofalargebreakLOCA,withorwithoutalossofoffsitepower,theaccumulatorsprovidethesolesourceofmakeupwatertotheRCS.TheassumptionoflossofoffsitepowerisrequiredbyregulationsandconservativelyimposesadelaywhereintheECCSpumpscannotdeliverflowuntiltheemergencydieselgeneratorsstart,cometoratedspeed,andgothroughtheirtimedloadingsequence.Incoldlegbreakscenarios,theentirecontentsofoneaccumulatorareassumedtobelostthroughthebreak.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-2(continued) .~i:ceeua.giSiI,)4>4Ii> AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThelimitinglargebreakLOCAisadoubleendedguillotinebreakatthedischargeofthereactorcoolantpump.Duringthisevent,theaccumulatorsdischargetotheRCSassoonasRCSpressuredecreasestobelowaccumulatorpressure.Asaconservativeestimate,nocreditistakenforECCSpumpflowuntilaneffectivedelayhaselapsed.ThisdelayaccountsforSIsignalgeneration,thedieselsstarting,andthepumpsbeingloadedanddeliveringfullflow.Duringthistime,theaccumulatorsareanalyzedasprovidingthesolesourceofemergencycorecooling.NooperatoractionisassumedduringtheblowdownstageofalargebreakLOCA.TheworstcasesmallbreakLOCAanalysesalsoassumeatimedelaybeforepumpedflowreachesthecore.Forthelargerrangeofsmallbreaks,therateofblowdownissuchthattheincreaseinfuelcladtemperatureisterminatedsolelybytheaccumulators,withpumpedflowthenprovidingcontinuedcooling.Asbreaksizedecreases,theaccumulatorsandsafetyinjectionpumpsbothplayapartinterminatingtheriseincladtemperature.Asbreaksizecontinuestodecrease,theroleoftheaccumulatorscontinuestodecreaseuntiltheyarenotrequiredandthesafetyinjectionpumpsbecomesolelyresponsibleforterminatingthetemperatureincrease.ThisLCOhelpstoensurethatthefollowingacceptancecriteriaestablishedfortheECCSby10CFR50.46(Ref.5)willbemetfollowingaLOCA:a.Haximumfuelelementcladdingtemperatureisg2200'F;b.Haximumcladdingoxidationisg0.17timesthetotalcladdingthicknessbeforeoxidation;c.Haximumhydrogengenerationfromazirconiumwaterreactionis<0.01timesthehypotheticalamountthatwouldbegeneratedifallofthemetalinthecladdingcylinderssurroundingthefuel,excludingthecladdingsurroundingtheplenumvolume,weretoreact;andd.Coreismaintainedinaeoolablegeometry.SincetheaccumulatorsdischargeduringtheblowdownphaseofaLOCA,theydonotcontributetothelongtermcoolingrequirementsof10CFR50.46.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-3(continued) AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ForboththelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalyses,anominalcontainedaccumulatorwatervolumeisused.Thecontainedwatervolumeisthesameasthedeliverablevolumefortheaccumulators,sincetheaccumulatorsareemptied,oncedischarged.forsmallbreaks,anincreaseinwatervolumeisapeakcladtemperaturepenaltyduetothereducedgasvolume.Apeakcladtemperaturepenaltyisanassumedincreaseinthecalculatedpeakcladtemperatureduetoachangeinaninputparameter.Forlargebreaks,anincreaseinwatervolumecanbeeitherapeakcladtemperaturepenaltyorbenefit,dependingondowncomerfillingandsubsequentspillthroughthebreakduringthecorerefloodingportionofthetransient.Theanalysisusesanominalaccumulatorvolumeandincludesthelinewatervolumefromtheaccumulatortothecheckvalveduetothesecompetingeffects.TheminimumboronconcentrationsetpointisusedinthepostLOCAboronconcentrationcalculation.ThecalculationisperformedtoassurereactorsubcriticalityinapostLOCAenvironment.OfparticularinterestisthelargebreakLOCA,sincenocreditistakenforcontrolrodassemblyinsertion.AreductionintheaccumulatorminimumboronconcentrationwouldproduceasubsequentreductionintheavailablecontainmentsumpconcentrationforpostLOCAshutdownandanincreaseinthemaximumsumppH.ThemaximumboronconcentrationisusedindeterminingthetimeframeinwhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThemaximumboronconcentrationlimitisbasedonthecoldestexpectedtemperatureoftheaccumulatorwatervolumeandonchemicaleffectsresultingfromoperationoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpraySystem.Avalueof2,900ppmwouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheaccumulatorassumingacontainmenttemperatureof40'F(Ref.6).Analysesperformedinresponseto10CFR50.49(Ref.7)assumedachemicalspraysolutionof2000to3000ppmboronconcentration(Ref.6)whichprovidesamarginof100ppm.ThechemicalspraysolutionimpactssumppHandtheresultingeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.ThesumppHalsoaffectstherateofhydrogengenerationwithincontainmentduetotheinteractionofContainmentSprayandsumpfluidwithaluminumcomponents.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-4 PaS AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalysesareperformedattheminimumnitrogencoverpressure,sincesensitivityanalyseshavedemonstratedthathighernitrogencoverpressureresultsinacomputedpeakcladtemperaturebenefit.Themaximumnitrogencoverpressurelimitpreventsaccumulatorreliefvalveactuationat800psig,andultimatelypreservesaccumulatorintegrity.Theeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesfromtheaccumulatorsareaccountedforintheappropriateanalyses(Refs.8and9).TheaccumulatorssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOestablishestheminimumconditionsrequiredtoensurethattheaccumulatorsareavailabletoaccomplishtheircorecoolingsafetyfunctionfollowingaLOCA.Twoaccumulatorsarerequiredtoensurethat100%ofthecontentsofoneaccumulatorwillreachthecoreduringaLOCA.Thisisconsistentwiththeassumptionthatthecontentsofoneaccumulatorspillthroughthebreak.IflessthanoneaccumulatorisinjectedduringtheblowdownphaseofaLOCA,theECCSacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50.46(Ref.5)couldbeviolated.ForanaccumulatortobeconsideredOPERABLE,themotor-operatedisolationvalvemustbefullyopen,powerremovedabove1600psig,andthelimitsestablishedintheSRsforcontainedvolume,boronconcentration,andnitrogencoverpressuremustbemet.APPLICABILITYInNODES1and2,andinNODE3withRCSpressure>1600psig,theaccumulatorOPERABILITYrequirementsarebasedonfullpoweroperation.Althoughcoolingrequirementsdecreaseaspowerdecreases,theaccumulatorsarestillrequiredtoprovidecorecoolingaslongaselevatedRCSpressuresandtemperaturesexist.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-5 ,0byI"az AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASES(continued)APPLICABILITY(continued)ThisLCOisonlyapplicableatpressures>1600psig.Atpressuresg1600psig,therateofRCSblowdownissuchthattheECCSpumpscanprovideadequateinjectiontoensurethatpeakcladtemperatureremainsbelowthe10CFR50.46(Ref.5)limitof2200'F.InNODE3,withRCSpressure<1600psig,andinNODES4,5,and6,theaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalvesareclosedtoisolatetheaccumulatorsfromtheRCS.ThisallowsRCScooldownanddepressurizationwithoutdischargingtheaccumulatorsintotheRCSorrequiringdepressurizationoftheaccumulators.ACTIONSA,1Iftheboronconcentrationofoneaccumulatorisnotwithinlimits,itmustbereturnedtowithinthelimitswithin72hours'nthisCondition,abilitytomaintainsubcriticalityorminimumboronprecipitationtimemaybereduced.TheboronintheaccumulatorscontributestotheassumptionthatthecombinedECCSwaterinthepartiallyrecoveredcoreduringtheearlyrefloodingphaseofalargebreakLOCAissufficienttokeepthatportionofthecoresubcritical.Oneaccumulatorbelowtheminimumboronconcentrationlimit,however,willhavenoeffectonavailableECCSwaterandaninsignificanteffectoncoresubcriticalityduringrefloodsincetheaccumulatorwatervolumeisverysmallwhencomparedtoRCSandRWSTinventory.BoilingofECCSwaterinthecoreduringrefloodconcentratesboroninthesaturatedliquidthatremainsinthecore.Inaddition,currentanalysistechniquesdemonstratethattheaccumulatorsarenotexpectedtodischargefollowingalargemainsteamlinebreak.Eveniftheydodischarge,theirimpactisminorandnotadesignlimitingevent.Thus,72hoursisallowedtoreturntheboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-6 AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASES(continued)ACTIONS(continued)B.1Ifoneaccumulatorisinoperableforareasonotherthanboronconcentration,theaccumulatormustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.InthisCondition,therequiredcontentsofoneaccumulatorcannotbeassumedtoreachthecoreduringaLOCA.DuetotheseverityoftheconsequencesshouldaLOCAoccurintheseconditions,the1hourCompletionTimetoopenthevalve,removepowertothevalve,orrestoretheproperwatervolumeornitrogencoverpressureensuresthatpromptactionwillbetakentoreturntheinoperableaccumulatortoOPERABLEstatus.TheCompletionTimeminimizesthepotentialforexposureoftheplant'oaLOCAundertheseconditions.C.1andC.2IftheaccumulatorcannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3within6hoursandpressurizerpressurereducedto~1600psigwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.D.1Ifbothaccumulatorsareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-7(continued) I+~l'")4f=,kl,>la><~siyi~hr5 AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.5.1.1Eachaccumulatormotor-operatedisolationvalveshouldbeverifiedtobefullyopenevery12hours.Useofcontrolboardindicationforvalvepositionisanacceptableverification.Thisverificationensuresthattheaccumulatorsareavailableforinjectionandensurestimelydiscoveryifavalveshouldbelessthanfullyopen.Ifanisolationvalveisnotfullyopen,therateofinjectiontotheRCSwouldbereduced.Althoughamotoroperatedvalvepositionshouldnotchangewithpowerremoved,aclosedvalvecouldresultinnotmeetingaccidentanalysesassumptions.ThisFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthatensureamispositionedisolationvalveisunlikely.SR3.5.1.2andSR3.5.1.3Theboratedwatervolumeandnitrogencoverpressureshouldbeverifiedevery12hoursforeachaccumulator.ThisFrequencyissufficienttoensureadequateinjectionduringaLOCA.Becauseofthestaticdesignoftheaccumulator,a12hourFrequencyusuallyallowstheoperatortoidentifychangesbeforelimitsarereached.Haincontrolboardalarmsarealsoavailablefortheseaccumulatorparameters.OperatingexperiencehasshownthisFrequencytobeappropriateforearlydetectionandcorrectionofoffnormaltrends.SR3.5.1.4Theboronconcentrationshouldbeverifiedtobewithinrequiredlimitsforeachaccumulatorevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTFrequencysincethestaticdesignoftheaccumulatorslimitsthewaysinwhichtheconcentrationcanbechanged.The31daySTAGGEREDTESTFrequencyisadequatetoidentifychangesthatcouldoccurfrommechanismssuchasstratificationorinleakage.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-8 It'tIIt~ AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.5.1.5Verificationevery31daysthatpowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatorisolationvalveoperatorwhenthepressurizerpressureis>1600psigensuresthatanactivefailurecouldnotresultintheundetectedclosureofanaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalve.Ifthisweretooccur,noaccumulatorswouldbeavailableforinjectioniftheLOCAweretooccurinthecoldlegcontainingtheonlyOPERABLEaccumulator.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hours,the31dayFrequencywillprovideadequateassurancethatpowerisremoved.REFERENCES1.BranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18"ApplicationoftheSingleFailureCriteriontoHanually-ControlledElectricallyOperatedValves."2.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E,Haier,RGLE,

Subject:

"SEPTopicsVI-7.F,VII-3,VII-6,andVIII-2,"datedJune24,1981.3.LetterfromR.A.Purple,NRC,toL,D.White,RG&E,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendment7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedHay14,1975.4.UFSAR,Section6.3.5.10CFR50.46.6.UFSAR,Section3.11.7.10CFR50.49.8.UFSAR,Section6.2.9.UFSAR,Section15.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-9 ECCS-Operating83.5.2B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.2ECCS-OperatingBASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionoftheECCSistoprovidecorecoolingandnegativereactivitytoensurethatthereactorcoreisprotectedafteranyofthefollowingaccidents:a.Lossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andcoolantleakagegreaterthanthecapabilityofthenormalcharging=system;b.Rodejectionaccident;c.Lossofsecondarycoolantaccident,includinguncontrolledsteamreleaseorlossoffeedwater;andd.Steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR).Theadditionofnegativereactivityisdesignedprimarilyforthelossofsecondarycoolantaccidentwhereprimarycooldowncouldaddenoughpositivereactivitytoachievecriticalityandreturntosignificantpower.TherearetwophasesofECCSoperation:coldleginjectionandcoldlegrecirculation.Intheinjectionphase,wateristakenfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)andinjectedintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)throughthecoldlegsandreactorvesselupperplenum.WhensufficientwaterisremovedfromtheRWSTtoensurethatenoughboronhasbeenaddedtomaintainthereactorsubcriticalandthecontainmentsumphasenoughwatertosupplytherequirednetpositivesuctionheadtotheECCSpumps,suctionisswitchedtoContainmentSumpBforcoldlegrecirculation.Afterapproximately20hours,simultaneousECCSinjectionisusedtoreducethepotentialforboilinginthetopofthecoreandanyresultingboronprecipitation.TheECCSconsistsoftwoseparatesubsystems:safetyinjection(SI)andresidualheatremoval(RHR).Eachsubsystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains.TheECCSaccumulatorsandtheRWSTarealsopartoftheECCS,butarenotconsideredpartofanECCSflowpathasdescribedbythisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-10 IIt'l~,dfl1 ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)TheECCSflowpathswhichcomprisetheredundanttrainsconsistofpiping,valves,heatexchangers,andpumpssuchthatwaterfromtheRWSTcanbeinjectedintotheRCSfollowingtheaccidentsdescribedinthisLCO.ThemajorcomponentsofeachsubsystemaretheRHRpumps,heatexchangers,andtheSIpumps.TheRHRsubsystemconsistsoftwo100%capacitytrainsthatareinterconnectedandredundantsuchthateithertrainiscapableofsupplying100%oftheflowrequiredtomitigatetheaccidentconsequences.TheSIsubsystemconsistsofthreeredundant,50%capacitypumpswhichsupplytwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.Eachinjectionlineiscapableofproviding100%oftheflowrequiredtomitigatetheconsequencesofanaccident.Theseinterconnectingandredundantsubsystemdesignsprovidetheoperatorswiththeabilitytoutilizecomponentsfromoppositetrainstoachievetherequired100%flowtothecore.DuringtheinjectionphaseofLOCArecovery,suctionheaders'upplywaterfromtheRWSTtotheECCSpumps.AcommonsupplyheaderisusedfromtheRWSTtothesafetyinjection(SI)andContainmentSpraySystempumps.Thiscommonsupplyheaderisprovidedwithtwoin-seriesmotor-operatedisolationvalves(896Aand896B)thatreceivepowerfromseparatesourcesforsinglefailureconsiderations.TheseisolationvalvesaremaintainedopenwithDCcontrolpowerremovedviaakeyswitchlocatedinthecontrolroom.TheremovalofDCcontrolpowereliminatesthemostlikelycausesforspuriousvalveactuationwhilemaintainingthecapabilitytomanuallyclosethevalvesfromthecontrolroomduringtherecirculationphaseoftheaccident(Ref.1).TheSIpumpsupplyheaderalsocontainstwoparallelmotor-operatedisolationvalves(825Aand825B)whicharemaintainedopenbyremovingACpower.TheremovalofACpowertotheseisolationvalvesisanacceptabledesignagainstsinglefailuresthatcouldresultinundesirablecomponentactuation(Ref.2).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-11 UILllsq"f(P'Isgs ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)Aseparatesupplyheaderisusedfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.Thissupplyheaderisprovidedwithacheckvalve(854)andmotoroperatedisolationvalve(856)whichismaintainedopenwithDCcontrolpowerremovedviaakeyswitchlocatedinthecontrolroom.TheremovalofDCcontrolpowereliminatesthemostlikelycausesforspuriousvalveactuationwhilemaintainingthecapabilitytomanuallyclosethevalvefromthecontrolroomduringtherecirculationphaseoftheaccident(Ref.3).ThethreeSIpumpsfeedtwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.SIPumpsAandBeachfeedsoneofthetwoinjectionlineswhileSIPumpCcanfeedbothinjectionlines.ThedischargeofSIPumpCiscontrolledthroughuseoftwonormallyopenparallelmotoroperatedisolationvalves(871Aand871B).TheseisolationvalvesaredesignedtoclosebasedontheoperatingstatusofSIPumpsAandBtoensurethatSIPumpCprovidesthenecessaryflowthroughtheRCScoldleginjectionlinecontainingthefailedpump.ThedischargesofthetwoRHRpumpsandheatexchangersfeedacommoninjectionlinewhichpenetratescontainment.Thislinethendividesintotworedundantcoredelugeflowpathseachcontaininganormallyclosedmotoroperatedisolationvalve(852Aand852B)andcheckvalve(853Aand853B)whichprovideinjectionintothereactorvesselupperplenum.ForLOCAsthataretoosmalltodepressurizetheRCSbelowtheshutoffheadoftheSIpumps,thesteamgeneratorsprovidecorecoolinguntiltheRCSpressuredecreasesbelowtheSIpumpshutoffhead.DuringtherecirculationphaseofLOCArecovery,RHRpumpsuctionismanuallytransferredtoContainmentSumpB(Refs.4and5).ThistransferisaccomplishedbystoppingtheRHRpumps,isolatingRHRfromtheRWSTbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve856,openingtheContainmentSumpBmotoroperatedisolationvalvestoRHR(850Aand850B)andthenstartingtheRHRpumps.TheSIandContainmentSpraySystempumpsarethenstoppedandtheRWSTisolatedbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve896Aand896BfortheSIandContainmentSpraySystempumpcommonsupplyheaderandclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve897or898fortheSIpumpsrecirculationline.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-12 S'I+1k$<rI~lg)IA)>~l"llIIl'.II~(0~) ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)TheRHRpumpsthensupplytheSIandContainmentSpraySystempumps(asneededforpressurecontrolpurposes)iftheRCSpressureremainsabovetheRHRpumpshutoffhead(Ref.6).Thishigh-headrecirculationpathisprovidedthroughRHRmotoroperatedisolationvalves857A,857B,and857C.Theseisolationvalvesareinterlockedwithvalves896A,896B,897,and898.ThisinterlockpreventsopeningoftheRHRhigh-headrecirculationisolationvalvesunlesseither896Aor896Bareclosedandeither897or898areclosed.IfRCSpressureislessthanapproximately140psig,theSIandContainmentSpraypumpsremaininpull-stopandonlyRHRisusedtoprovidecorecooling.Duringrecirculation,flowisdischargedthroughthesamepathsastheinjectionphase.Afterapproximately20hours,simultaneousinjectionbytheSIandRHRpumpsisusedtopreventboronprecipitation(Ref.7).ThisconsistsofprovidingSIthroughtheRCScoldlegsandintothelowerplenumwhileprovidingRHRthroughthecoredelugevalvesintotheupperplenum.ThetworedundantflowpathsfromContainmentSumpBtotheRHRpumpsalsocontainamotoroperatedisolationvalvelocatedwithinthesump(851Aand851B).Theseisolationvalvesaremaintainedopenwithpowerremovedtoimprovethereliabilityofswitchovertotherecirculationphase.Theoperatorsforisolationvalves851Aand851Barealsonotqualifiedforcontainmentpostaccidentconditions.TheremovalofACpowertotheseisolationvalvesisanacceptabledesignagainstsinglefailuresthatcouldresultinanundesirableactuation(Ref.2).TheSIsubsystemoftheECCSalsofunctionstosupplyboratedwatertothereactorcorefollowingincreasedheatremovalevents,suchasamainsteamlinebreak(HSLB).Thelimitingdesignconditionsoccurwhenthenegativemoderatortemperaturecoefficientishighlynegative,suchasattheendofeachcycle.DuringlowtemperatureconditionsintheRCS,limitationsareplacedonthemaximumnumberofECCSpumpsthatmaybeOPERABLE.RefertotheBasesforLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"forthebasisoftheserequirements.(continued)~~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-13 J('~0~aW~tJI6$~ ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)TheECCSsubsystemsareactuateduponreceiptofanSIsignal.Theactuationofsafeguardloadsisaccomplishedinaprogrammedtimesequence.Ifoffsitepowerisavailable,thesafeguardloadsstartimmediatelyintheprogrammedsequence.Ifoffsitepowerisnotavailable,theEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)busesshednormaloperatingloadsandareconnectedtotheemergencydieselgenerators(EDGs).Safeguardloadsarethenactuatedintheprogrammedtimesequence.Thetimedelayassociatedwithdieselstarting,sequencedloading,andpumpstartingdeterminesthetimerequiredbeforepumpedflowisavailabletothecorefollowingaLOCA.TheactiveECCScomponents,alongwiththepassiveaccumulatorsandtheRWSTcoveredinLCO3.5.1,"Accumulators,"andLCO3.5.4,"RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST),"providethecoolingwaternecessarytomeetAIF-GDC44(Ref.8).APPLICABLETheLCOhelpstoensurethatthefollowingacceptanceSAFETYANALYSIScriteriafortheECCS,establishedby10CFR50.46(Ref.9),willbemetfollowingaLOCA:a.Maximumfuelelementcladdingtemperatureisg2200'F;b.Maximumcladdingoxidationis<0.17timesthetotalcladdingthicknessbeforeoxidation;c.Maximumhydrogengenerationfromazirconiumwaterreactionisg0.01timesthehypotheticalamountgeneratedifallofthemetalinthecladdingcylinderssurroundingthefuel,excludingthecladdingsurroundingtheplenumvolume,weretoreact;d.Coreismaintainedinaeoolablegeometry;ande.Adequatelongtermcorecoolingcapabilityismaintained.TheLCOalsolimitsthepotentialforaposttripreturntopowerfollowinganMSLBeventandhelpsensurethatcontainmenttemperaturelimitsaremetpostaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-14 es'h ECCS-Operating83.5.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)BothECCSsubsystemsaretakencreditforinalargebreakLOCAeventatfullpower(Refs.6and10),ThiseventestablishestherequirementforrunoutflowfortheECCSpumps,aswellasthemaximumresponsetimefortheiractuation.TheSIpumpsarecreditedinasmallbreakLOCAevent.Thiseventestablishestheflowanddischargeheadatthedesignpointforthepumps.TheSGTRandHSLBeventsalsocredittheSIpumps.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsfortheECCSarebasedonthefollowingLOCAanalysisassumptions:a~AlargebreakLOCAevent,withlossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneRHRpump(bothEDGtrainsareassumedtooperateduetorequirementsformodelingfullactivecontainmentheatremovalsystemoperation);andb.AsmallbreakLOCAevent,withalossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneECCStrain.DuringtheblowdownstageofaLOCA,theRCSdepressurizesasprimarycoolantisejectedthroughthebreakintothecontainment.Thenuclearreactionisterminatedeitherbymoderatorvoidingduringlargebreaksorcontrolrodinsertionforsmallbreaks.Followingdepressurization,emergencycoolingwaterisinjectedbytheSIpumpsintothecoldlegs,flowsintothedowncomer,fillsthelowerplenum,andrefloodsthecore.TheRHRpumpsinjectdirectlyintothecorebarrelbyupperplenuminjection.Theeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesareaccountedforinappropriateanalyses(Refs.10and11).TheLCOensuresthatanECCStrainwilldeliversufficientwatertomatchboiloffratesquicklyenoughtominimizetheconsequencesofthecorebeinguncoveredfollowingalargeLOCA.ItalsoensuresthattheSIpumpswilldeliversufficientwaterandboronduringasmallLOCAtomaintaincoresubcriticality.ForsmallerLOCAs,theSIpumpsdeliversufficientfluidtomaintainRCSinventory.ForasmallbreakLOCA,thesteamgeneratorscontinuetoserveastheheatsink,providingpartoftherequiredcorecooling.TheECCStrainssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-15 ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASES(continued)LCOInMODES1,2,and3,twoindependent(andredundant)ECCStrainsarerequiredtoensurethatsufficientECCSflowisavailable,assumingasinglefailureaffectingeithertrain.Additionally,individualcomponentswithintheECCStrainsmaybecalledupontomitigatetheconsequencesofothertransientsandaccidents.InMODES1,2,and3,anECCStrainconsistsofanSIsubsystemandanRHRsubsystem.Eachtrainincludesthepiping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTuponanSIsignalandtransferringsuctiontoContainmentSumpB.ThisincludessecuringthemotoroperatedisolationvalvesasspecifiedinSR3.5.2.1inpositionbyremovingthepowersourcesaslistedbelow.EINPositionSecuredinPositionB825A825B826A826B826C826D851A851B856878A878B878C878D896A896BOpenOpenClosedClosedClosedClosedOpenOpenOpenClosedOpenClosedOpenOpenOpenRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalofACPowerofACPowerofACpowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACpowerofACPowerofDCControlPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofDCControlPowerofDCControlPowerThemajorcomponentsofanECCStrainconsistsofanRHRpumpandheatexchangertakingsuctionfromtheRWST(andeventuallyContainmentSumpB),andcapableofinjectingthroughoneofthetwoisolationvalvestothereactorvesselupperplenumandoneofthetwolineswhichprovidehigh-headreci}culationtotheSIandContainmentSpraySystempumps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-16 eeNWH' ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASES(continued)LCO(continued)AlsoincludedwithintheECCStrainaretwoofthreeSIpumpscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandContainmentSumpB(via.RHR),andinjectingthroughoneofthetwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.InthecasewhereSIPumpCisinoperable,bothRCScoldleginjectionlinesmustbeOPERABLEtoprovide100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttotoasingletrainofSIduetothelocationofcheckvalves870Aand870B.TheflowpathforeachtrainmustmaintainitsdesignedindependencetoensurethatnosinglefailurecandisablebothECCStrains.APPLICABILITYInNODES1,2,and3,theECCSOPERABILITYrequirementsforthelimitingDesignBasisAccident,alargebreakLOCA,arebasedonfullpoweroperation.Althoughreducedpowerwouldnotrequirethesamelevelofperformance,theaccidentanalysisdoesnotprovideforreducedcoolingrequirementsinthelowerMODES.TheSIpumpperformancerequirementsarebasedonasmallbreakLOCA.MODE2andMODE3requirementsareboundedbytheMODE1analysis.ThisLCOisonlyapplicableinMODE3andabove.BelowMODE3,theSIsignalsetpointismanuallybypassedbyoperatorcontrol,andsystemfunctionalrequirementsarerelaxedasdescribedinLCO3.5.3,"ECCS-Shutdown."AsindicatedinNote1,theflowpathmaybeisolatedfor2hoursinMODE3,undercontrolledconditions,toperformpressureisolationvalvetestingperSR3.4.14.1.Theflowpathisreadilyrestorablefromthecontrolroomorfieldtestpersonnel.ThenotealsoallowsanSIisolationMOVtobepoweredforupto12hoursfortheperformanceofthistesting.AsindicatedinNote2,operationinMODE3withECCStrainsdeclaredinoperablepursuanttoLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"isnecessarysincetheLTOParmingtemperatureisneartheMODE3boundarytemperatureof350'F.LCO3.4.12requiresthatcertainpumpsberenderedinoperableatandbelowtheLTOParmingtemperature.WhenthistemperatureisneartheMODE3(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-17 ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASES(continued)APPLICABILITY(continued)boundarytemperature,timeisneededtorestoretheinoperablepumpstoOPERABLEstatus.InMODES4,5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.Mode4corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-Mode4,"andLCO3.5.3,"ECCS-Shutdown."CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4,7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.5,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevel,"andLCO3.9.6,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-LowWaterLevel."ACTIONSA.1Withonetraininoperableandatleast100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainavailable,theinoperablecomponentsmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimeisbasedonanNRCreliabilityevaluation(Ref.12)andisareasonabletimeforrepairofmanyECCScomponents.AnECCStrainisinoperableifitisnotcapableofdelivering100%designflowtotheRCS.Individualcomponentsareinoperableiftheyarenotcapableof-performingtheirdesignfunctionornecessarysupportingsystemsarenotavailable.TheLCOrequirestheOPERABILITYofanumberofindependentsubsystems.Duetotheredundancyoftrainsandthediversityofsubsystems,theinoperabilityofonecomponentinatraindoesnotrendertheECCSincapableofperformingitsfunction.Neitherdoestheinoperabilityoftwodifferentcomponents,eachinadifferenttrain,necessarilyresultinalossoffunctionfortheECCS.TheintentofthisConditionistomaintainacombinationofequipmentsuchthat100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainremainsavailable.Thisallowsincreasedflexibilityinplantoperationsundercircumstanceswhencomponentsinoppositetrainsareinoperable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,5-18(continued) ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASES(continued)ACTIONS(continued)InthecasewhereSIPumpCisinoperable,bothRCScoldleginjectionlinesmustbeOPERABLEtoprovide100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingletrainofSIduetothelocationofcheckvalves870Aand870B.AneventaccompaniedbyalossofoffsitepowerandthefailureofanEDGcandisableoneECCStrainuntilpowerisrestored.Areliabilityanalysis(Ref.2)hasshownthattheimpactofhavingonefullECCStraininoperableissufficientlysmalltojustifycontinuedoperationfor72hours.B.landB.2IftheinoperabletraincannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoHODE3within6hoursandHODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1IfbothtrainsofECCSareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.Withoneormorecomponent(s)inoperablesuchthat100%oftheflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainisnotavailable,thefacilityisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-19(continued) 0itVJl'a-II04Vlt~FPrill ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.5.2.1VerificationofpropervalvepositionensuresthattheflowpathfromtheECCSpumpstotheRCSismaintained.Useofcontrolboardindicationforvalvepositionisanacceptableverification.MisalignmentofthesevalvescouldrenderbothECCStrainsinoperable.ThelistedvalvesaresecuredinpositionbyremovalofACpowerorkeylockingtheDCcontrolpower.Thesevalvesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolssuchthatanychangeswithrespecttothepositionofthevalvebreakersorkeylocksisunlikely.TheverificationofthevalvebreakersandkeylocksisperformedbySR3.5.2.3.MispositioningofthesevalvescandisablethefunctionofbothECCStrainsandinvalidatetheaccidentanalyses.A12hourFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthatensureamispositionedvalveisunlikely.SR3.5.2.2Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheECCSflowpathsprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforECCSoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesewereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.Avalvethatreceivesanactuationsignalisallowedtobeinanonaccidentpositionprovidedthevalvewillautomaticallyrepositionwithintheproperstroketime.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition,The31dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevalvesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrol,andanimpropervalvepositioninmostcases,wouldonlyaffectasingletrain.ThisFrequencyhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-20 ~I'I0~pVIIWy1<It~ai>s<w'E.'1>>>'4~f' ECCS-Operating83.5.2BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS(continued)SR3.5.2.3Verificationevery31daysthatACorDCpowerisremoved,asappropriate,foreachvalvespecifiedinSR3.5.2.1ensuresthatanactivefailurecouldnotresultinanundetectedmispositionofavalvewhichaffectsbothtrainsofECCS.Ifthisweretooccur,noECCSinjectionorrecirculationwouldbeavailable.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hours,the31dayFrequencywillprovideadequateassurancethatpowerisremoved.SR3.5.2.4PeriodicsurveillancetestingofECCSpumpstodetectgrossdegradationcausedbyimpellerstructuraldamageorotherhydrauliccomponentproblemsisrequiredbySectionXIoftheASHECode.Thistypeoftestingmaybeaccomplishedbymeasuringthepumpdevelopedheadatasinglepointofthepumpcharacteristiccurve.Thisverifiesboththatthemeasuredperformanceiswithinanacceptabletoleranceoftheoriginalpumpbaselineperformanceandthattheperformanceatthetestflowisgreaterthanorequaltotheperformanceassumedintheplantsafetyanalysis.SRsarespecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASHECode.SectionXIoftheASHECodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytherequirements.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-21 8F44Cl ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.5.2.5andSR3.5.2.6TheseSurveillancesdemonstratethateachautomaticECCSvalveactuatestotherequiredpositiononanactualorsimulatedSIsignalandthateachECCSpumpstartsonreceiptofanactualorsimulatedSIsignal.Thissurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformtheseSurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforunplannedplanttransientsiftheSurveillanceswereperformedwiththereactoratpower.The24monthFrequencyisalsoacceptablebasedonconsiderationofthedesignreliability(andconfirmingoperatingexperience)oftheequipment.TheactuationlogicistestedaspartofESFActuationSystemtesting,andequipmentperformanceismonitoredaspartoftheInserviceTestingProgram.REFERENCES1.LetterfromR.A.Purple,NRC,toL.D.White,.RG&E,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendment7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedHay14,1975.2.BranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18,"ApplicationoftheSingleFailureCriteriontoManually-ControlledElectricallyOperatedValves."3.LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendmentNo.42toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(TACNo.79829),"datedJune3,1991.4.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicVI-7.B:ESFSwitchoverfromInjectiontoRecirculationMode,AutomaticECCSRealignment,Ginna,"datedDecember31,1981.5.NUREG-0821.6.UFSAR,Section6.3.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-22 'Il~P~varhlier~4~'4c<WaswcI<e ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASES(continued)REFERENCES(continued)7.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RGLE,

Subject:

"SEPTopicIX-4,BoronAdditionSystem,R.E.Ginna,"datedAugust26,1981.8.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC44,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.9.10CFR50.46.10.UFSAR,Section15.6.ll.UFSAR,Section6.2.12.NRCHemorandumtoV.Stello,Jr.,fromR.L.Baer,"RecommendedInterimRevisionstoLCOsforECCSComponents,"December1,1975.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-23 f,h1II4eCCIII4if'1~fIhd~+ktIII4 ECCS-ShutdownB3.5.383.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.3ECCS-ShutdownBASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionforBases3.5.2,"ECCS-Operating,"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE4,therequiredECCStrainconsistsoftwoseparatesubsystems:safetyinjecti'on(SI)andresidualheatremoval(RHR).TheECCSflowpathsconsistofpiping,valves,heatexchangers,andpumpssuchthatwaterfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)canbeinjectedintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)followingtheaccidentsdescribedinBases3.5.2.TheRHRsubsystemmustalsobecapableoftakingsuctionfromcontainmentSumpBtoproviderecirculation.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheApplicableSafetyAnalysessectionofBases3.5.2alsoappliestothisBasessection.DuetothestableconditionsassociatedwithoperationinMODE4andthereducedprobabilityofoccurrenceofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),theECCSoperationalrequirementsarereduced.Itisunderstoodinthesereductionsthatcertainautomaticsafetyinjection(SI)actuationisnotavailable.InthisMODE,sufficienttimeexistsformanualactuationoftherequiredECCStomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBA(Ref.I).OnlyonetrainofECCSisrequiredforMODE4.ThisrequirementdictatesthatsinglefailuresarenotconsideredduringthisMODEofoperation.TheECCStrainssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOInMODE4,oneofthetwoindependent(andredundant)ECCStrainsisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatsufficientECCSflowisavailabletothecorefollowingaDBA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-24 ECCS-ShutdownB3.5.3BASES(continued)LCO(continued)InMODE4,anECCStrainconsistsofanSIsubsystemandanRHRsubsystem.Eachtrainincludesthepiping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandtransferringsuctiontothecontainmentsump.ThemajorcomponentsofanECCStrainduringMODE4consistsofanRHRpumpandheatexchanger,capableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWST(andeventuallyContainmentSumpB),andabletoinjectthroughoneofthetwoisolationvalvestothereactorvesselupperplenum.AlsoincludedwithintheECCStrainareoneofthreeSIpumpscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandinjectingthroughoneofthetwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.Thehigh-headrecirculationflowpathfromRHRtotheSIpumpsisnotrequiredintheMODE4sincethereisnoaccidentscenariowhichpreventsdepressurizationtotheRHRpumpshutoffheadpriortodepletionoftheRWST.BasedonthetimeavailabletorespondtoaccidentconditionsduringMODE4,ECCScomponentsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingreconfiguredtotheinjectionmodefromthecontrolroomwithin10minutes.ThisincludestakingcreditforanRHRpumpandheatexchangerasbeingOPERABLEiftheyarebeingusedforshutdowncoolingpurposes.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,theOPERABILITYrequirementsforECCSarecoveredbyLCO3.5.2.InMODE4withRCStemperaturebelow350'F,oneOPERABLEECCStrainisacceptablewithoutsinglefailureconsideration,onthebasisofthestablereactivityofthereactorandthelimitedcorecoolingrequirements.InMODES5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.5,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevel,"andLCO3.9.6,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-LowWaterLevel."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-25(continued) I\S4,a"),~. ECCS-ShutdownB3.5.3BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.1WithnoECCSRHRsubsystemOPERABLE,theplantisnotpreparedtorespondtoalossofcoolantaccidentortocontinueacooldownusingtheRHRpumpsandheatexchangers.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelytoinitiateactionsthatwouldrestoreatleastoneECCSRHRsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionistakentorestoretherequiredcoolingcapacity.Normally,inMODE4,reactordecayheatisremovedfromtheRCSbyanRHRloop.IfnoRHRloopisOPERABLEforthisfunction,reactordecayheatmustberemovedbysomealternatemethod,suchasuseofthesteamgenerators.ThealternatemeansofheatremovalmustcontinueuntiltheinoperableRHRloopcomponentscanberestoredtooperationsothatdecayheatremovaliscontinuous.WithbothRHRpumpsandheatexchangersinoperable,itwouldbeunwisetorequiretheplanttogotoMODE5,wheretheonlyavailableheatremovalsystemistheRHR.Therefore,theappropriateactionistoinitiatemeasurestorestoreoneECCSRHRsubsystemandtocontinuetheactionsuntilthesubsystemisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.B.lWithnoECCSSIsubsystemOPERABLE,duetotheinoperabilityoftheSIpumporflowpathfromtheRWST,theplantisnotpreparedtoprovidehighpressureresponsetoDesignBasisEventsrequiringSI.The1hourCompletionTimetorestoreatleastoneSIsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionistakentoprovidetherequiredcoolingcapacityortoinitiateactionstoplacetheplantinMODE5,whereanECCStrainisnotrequired.C.1WhentheRequiredActionsofConditionBcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,acontrolledshutdownshouldbeinitiated.Twenty-fourhoursisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE5inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystemsoroperators.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-26(continued) ~8"4II4slv'hIt)owl'l ECCS-ShutdownB3.5.3BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTSSR3.5.3.1TheapplicableSurveillancedescriptionfromBases3.5.2apply.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsanRHRtraintobeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapableofbeingmanuallyrealigned(remoteorlocal)totheECCSmodeofoperationandnototherwiseinoperable.ThisallowsoperationintheRHRmodeduringHODE4,ifnecessary.REFERENCESTheapplicablereferencesfromBases3.5.2apply.1.WCAP-12476,"EvaluationofLOCADuringHode3andHode4OperationforWestinghouseNSSS,"November1991.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-27 N'~' RWSTB3.5.4B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)BASESBACKGROUNDTheRWSTsuppliesboratedwatertobothtrainsoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpraySystemduringtheinjectionphaseofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)recovery.AcommonsupplyheaderisusedfromtheRWSTtothesafetyinjection(SI)andContainmentSpraySystempumps.Aseparatesupplyheaderisusedfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.IsolationvalvesandcheckvalvesareusedtoisolatetheRWSTfromtheECCSandContainmentSpraySystempriortotransferringtotherecirculationmode.TherecirculationmodeisenteredwhenpumpsuctionistransferredtothecontainmentsumpbasedonRWSTlevel.UseofasingleRWSTtosupplybothtrainsoftheECCSandContainmentSpraySystemisacceptablesincetheRWSTisapassivecomponent,andpassivefailuresarenotrequiredtobeassumedtooccurcoincidentallywithDesignBasisEvents.TheRWSTislocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichisnormallymaintainedbetween50'Fand104'F(Ref.1).ThesemoderatetemperaturesprovideadequatemarginwithrespecttopotentialfreezingoroverheatingoftheboratedwatercontainedintheRWST.DuringnormaloperationinNODES1,2,and3,thesafetyinjection(SI)andresidualheatremoval(RHR)andContainmentSpraySystempumpsarealignedtotakesuctionfromtheRWST.TheECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumpsareprovidedwithrecirculationlinesthatensureeachpumpcanmaintainminimumflowrequirementswhenoperatingatornearshutoffheadconditions.TherecirculationlinesfortheRHRandContainmentSpraySystempumpsaredirectedfromthedischargeofthepumpstothepumpsuction.TherecirculationlinesfortheSIpumpsaredirectedbacktotheRWST.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-28 f4NI"0 RWSTB3.5.4BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)WhenthesuctionfortheECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumpsistransferredtothecontainmentsump,theRWSTandSIpumprecirculationflowpathsmustbeisolatedtopreventareleaseofthecontainmentsumpcontentstotheRWST,whichcouldresultinareleaseofcontaminantstotheAuxiliaryBuildingandtheeventuallossofsuctionheadfortheECCSpumps.ThisLCOensuresthat:a.TheRWSTcontainssufficientboratedwatertosupporttheECCSduringtheinjectionphase;b.SufficientwatervolumeexistsinthecontainmentsumptosupportcontinuedoperationoftheECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumpsatthetimeoftransfertotherecirculationmodeofcooling;andc.ThereactorremainssubcriticalfollowingaLOCA.InsufficientwaterintheRWSTcouldresultininadequateNPSHfortheRHRpumpswhenthetransfertotherecirculationmodeoccurs.ImproperboronconcentrationscouldresultinareductionofSDMorexcessiveboricacidprecipitationinthecorefollowingtheLOCA,aswellasexcessivecausticstresscorrosionofmechanicalcomponentsandsystemsinsidethecontainment.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringaccidentconditions,theRWSTprovidesasourceofboratedwatertotheECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumps.Assuch,itprovidescontainmentcoolinganddepressurization,corecooling,andreplacementinventoryandisasourceofnegativereactivityforreactorshutdown(Ref.3).ThedesignbasistransientsandapplicablesafetyanalysesconcerningeachofthesesystemsarediscussedintheApplicableSafetyAnalysessectionofB3.5.2,"ECCS-Operating";B3.5.3,"ECCS-Shutdown";andB3.6.6,"ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems."TheseanalysesareusedtoassesschangestotheRWSTinordertoevaluatetheireffectsinrelationtotheacceptancelimitsintheanalyses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-29 0(,~v'aajarp4>fiI RWSTB3.5.4BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)TheRWSTmustalsomeetvolume,boronconcentration,andtemperaturerequirementsfornon-LOCAevents.Thevolumeisnotanexplicitassumptioninnon-LOCAeventssincethevolumerequiredforReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)makeupisasmallfractionoftheavailableRCSvolume.ThedeliverablevolumelimitissetbytheLOCAandcontainmentanalyses.FortheRWST,thedeliverablevolumeisselectedsuchthatswitchovertorecirculationdoesnotoccuruntilsufficientwaterhasbeenpumpedintocontainmenttoprovidenecessaryNPSHfortheRHRpumps.Theminimumboronconcentrationisanexplicitassumptioninthemainsteamlinebreak(HSLB)analysistoensuretherequiredshutdowncapability.ThemaximumboronconcentrationisanexplicitassumptionintheevaluationofchemicaleffectsresultingfromtheoperationoftheContainmentSpraySystem.ForalargebreakLOCAanalysis,theminimumwatervolumelimitof300,000gallonsandthelowerboronconcentrationlimitof2000ppmareusedtocomputethepostLOCAsumpboronconcentrationnecessarytoassuresubcriticality.ThelargebreakLOCAisthelimitingcasesincethesafetyanalysisassumesthatallcontrolrodsareoutofthecore.Theupperlimitonboronconcentrationof2900ppmisusedtodeterminethetimeframeinwhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThemaximumboronconcentrationlimitisbasedonthecoldestexpectedtemperatureoftheRWSTwatervolumeandonchemicaleffectsresultingfromoperationoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpraySystem.Avalueof2,900ppmwouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheRWSTassuminganAuxiliaryBuildingtemperatureof50'F(Ref.1).Analysesperformedinresponseto10CFR50,49(Ref.2)assumedachemicalspraysolutionof2000to3000ppmboronconcentration(Ref,1)whichprovidesamarginof100ppm.ThechemicalspraysolutionimpactssumppHandtheresultingeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.ThesumppHalsoaffectstherateofhydrogengenerationwithincontainmentduetotheinteractionofContainmentSprayandsumpfluidwithaluminumcomponents.TheRWSTsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-30(continued) irs~kFw~c--.>>ilIV, RWSTB3.5.4BASES(continued)LCOTheRWSTensuresthatanadequatesupplyofboratedwaterisavailabletocoolanddepressurizethecontainmentintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),tocoolandcoverthecoreintheeventofaLOCA,tomaintainthereactorsubcriticalfollowingaDBA,andtoensureadequatelevelinthecontainmentsumptosupportECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumpoperationintherecirculationmode.TobeconsideredOPERABLE,theRWSTmustmeetthewatervolumeandboronconcentrationlimitsestablishedintheSRs.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,RWSTOPERABILITYrequirementsaredictatedbyECCSandContainmentSpraySystemOPERABILITYrequirements.SinceboththeECCSandtheContainmentSpraySystemmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4,theRWSTmustalsobeOPERABLEtosupporttheiroperation.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.5,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevel,"andLCO3.9.6,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-LowWaterLevel."ACTIONSA.lWithRWSTboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits,itmustbereturnedtowithinlimitswithin8hours.UndertheseconditionsneithertheECCSnortheContainmentSpraySystemcanperformitsdesignfunction.Therefore,promptactionmustbetakentorestorethetanktoOPERABLEcondition.The8hourlimittorestoretheRWSTboronconcentrationtowithinlimitswasdevelopedconsideringthetimerequiredtochangetheboronconcentrationandthefactthatthecontentsofthetankarestillavailableforinjection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-31 J'w~t,ai~~l~l,Iia,ti>i",>liewi~h RWST83.5.4BASES(continued)ACTIONS(continued)B.lWiththeRWSTwatervolumenotwithinlimits,itmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.InthisCondition,neithertheECCSnortheContainmentSpraySystemcanperformitsdesignfunction.Therefore,promptactionmustbetakentorestorethetanktoOPERABLEstatusortoplacetheplantinaHODEinwhichtheRWSTisnotrequired,Theshorttimelimitof1hourtorestoretheRWSTtoOPERABLEstatusisbasedonthisconditionsimultaneouslyaffectingredundanttrains.C.1andC.2IftheRWSTcannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSR3.5.4.1TheRWSTwatervolumeshouldbeverifiedevery7daystobeabovetherequiredminimumlevelinordertoensurethatasufficientinitialsupplyisavailableforinjectionandtosupportcontinuedECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumpoperationonrecirculation.SincetheRWSTvolumeisnormallystableandtheRWSTislocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichprovidessufficientleakdetectioncapability,a7dayFrequencyisappropriateandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-32 IH~y~0H'Ia1 RWSTB3.5.4BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.5.4.2TheboronconcentrationoftheRWSTshouldbeverifiedevery7daystobewithintherequiredlimits.ThisSRensuresthatthereactorwillremainsubcriticalfollowingaLOCA.Further,itassuresthattheresultingsumppHwillbemaintainedinanacceptablerangesothatboronprecipitationinthecorewillnotoccurandtheeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponentswillbeminimized.SincetheRWSTvolumeisnormallystable,a7daysamplingFrequencytoverifyboronconcentrationisappropriateandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience,REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section3.11.2.10CFR50.49.3.,UFSAR,Section6.3andChapter15.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-33 ATTACHMENTDMarkedUpCopyofImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(NUREG-1431)Includedpages:AllpagescontainedinNUREG-1431.ONLYITS3.5ISPROVIDEDATTHISTIME Accumulators3.5.13.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.1AccumulatorsLCO3.5.1~~0+Fet+PECCSaccumulatorsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2,1400MODE3withpressurizerpressure>+NO~psig.hACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneaccumulatorinoperableduetoboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.A.1Restoreboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.72hoursB.OneaccumulatorinoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionA.B.lRestoreaccumulatortoOPERABLEstatus.1hourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmet.C.1ANDC.2BeinMODE3.Reducepressurizerpressureto~@40@psig.~4oo6hours12hoursD.Twoe~m~accumulatorsinoperable.0.1EnterLCO3.0.3.Immediately3.5-1 Accumulators3.5.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY5i.'tMaco~c4SR3.5.1.1Verifyeachaccumulatorisolationvalveisfullyopen.12hoursSR3.5.1.2Verifyboratedwatervolumeineachtt~dIll.a~Q;~~P(54Ta)>>RO~S'cC+(ZXI>)12hoursSR3.5.1.3Verifynitrogencoverressureineachaccumulatoris>psigandgPRR-Tpssg.~no79012hoursSR3.5.1.4Verifyboronconcentrationineachaccumulatoris>-@9~pmand<~~pm.iso+?.,0oo31dayson~Rw~recavae,Rs'<fANDGL.cil.-----NOTE------nlyrequiredbeperformefraffectedacumulatorsOnceithi6houtereachsltionvolumencreaseof>[[galons,()%ofind'catedleel]thatisntheresutadditionromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank3.5-2(continued) Accumulators3.5.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.5.1.5Verifypowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatorisolationvalveoeratorwhenpressurizepressureispslg.>/4~31days(Q~+ro~dk3.5-3 ECCS-Operating3.5.23.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.2ECCS-OperatingLCO3.5.2TwoECCStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.gg.Va.'eNOTES1InMODE3,bothsafetyinjection(SI)pumpflowpathsmaybeisolatedby'closingtheisolationvalvesforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetestingperSR3.4.14.1.v-sa~~>s<<SOperationinMODE3withpumpsdeclaredinoperablepursuanttoLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"isallowedforupto4hoursoruntilthetemperatureof~E~wRCScoldlegsexceeds+75@F,whichevercomesfirst.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEsz.vi.~A.Onetrai~inoperabe.ANDAtleast100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainavailable.A.l4RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinNODE4.6hours12hours3a53.5-4 Insert3.5.3(sQC.Twotrainsinoerable.C.1EnterLCO'3.0.3immediatelyInsert3.5.14Powermayberestoredtomotoroperatedisolationvalves878A,878B,878C,and878Dforupto12hoursforthepurposeoftestingperSR3.4.14.1providedthatpowerisrestoredtoonlyonevalveatatime. II~III~~IIN~~II~III~'~IIIIII~I~III~IIII~I~~'I~~~'~II~~III~Ii~a~i%AIL~~ Insert3.5.4EINPositionFunction5Z.vii'i825A825B826A826B826C826D851A851B856878A878B878C878D896A896BOpenOpenClosedClosedClosedClosedOpenOpenOpenClosedOpenClosedOpenOpenOpenRWSTSuctiontoSIPumpsRWSTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsSumpBSuctiontoRHRPumpsSumpBSuctiontoRHRPumpsRWSTSuctiontoRHRPumpsSIInjectiontoRCSHotLegSIInjectiontoRCSColdLegSIInjectiontoRCSHotLegSIInjectiontoRCSColdLegRWSTSuctiontoSIandSprayRWSTSuctiontoSIandSprayInsert3.5.15SR3.5.2.3Verifythebreakerorkeyswitch,asapplicable,foreachvalvelistedinSR3.5.2.1,isinthecorrectposition.31days ECCS-Operating3.5.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3...7Verify,foreachECCSthrottlevalvelistedbelow,eachpositionstopisecorrectposition.ValveNumbe[18]ms[]SR3.5.2.8isualinspection,eachECCStraincontainmenetio'notrestrictedbyde'lettsandscreensshownoevidenceostructuraldistressorabnormalcorrosion.onths3.5-6 ECCS-Shutdown3.5.33.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)3.5.3ECCS-ShutdownLCO3.5.3OneECCStrainshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODE4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME.RequiredECCSresidualheatremoval(RHR)subsysteminoperable.A.IInitiateactiontorestorerequiredECCSRHRsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.Immediatelys'<4'n)~o~()T)B.RequiredECCShead.subsystem+inoperable.B.IRestorerequiredECCSIhourS'Zsubsyste~toOPERABLEstatus.C.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTime+ofConditionEPnotmet.C.lBeinMODE5.24hours3.5-7 ECCS-Shutdown3.5.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.3.1-NOTEAnRHRtrainmaybeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapableofbeingmanuallyrealignedtotheECCSmodeofoperation.Thefol1owiogSibraapplicableforallequipmentrequiredtobeOPERABLE:InaccordancewithapplicableS~SR3.5.2.43.5-8 RWST3.5.43.5EHERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)3.5.4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)LCO3.5.4TheRWSTshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.RWSTboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.A.1RestoreRWSTtoOPERABLEstatus.8hoursRWSTbooratertemperaturenot'ini'ts.B.RWSTrablreasoneitionAvalgus~~(~s~>~~~~sWB.lRestoreRWSTtoOPERABLEstatus.1hourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.o4c~&in~4oc-<C.lBeinHODE3.ANDC.2BeinHODE5.6hours36hours3.5-9 RWST3.5.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.NOTEuiredtobeperformedwhentairtempera'3'[100]'F.iyRWSTboratedwatertemperatureis>[35]'Fandg[100]F.hoursSR3.5.4~VerifyRWSTboratedwatervolumeis73oo,oooq~~g(3KI,)7daysSR3.5.4.3VeriyRWSTboronconcentrationis000~pmandZ~98jppm.Z,QOO7days3.5-10 SealInjectionFlow3.5.3.5ERGENCYCORECOOLING'SYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.5S1InjectionFlowLCO3.5.5Reactorcoolantpumpsealinjectionflowshallbe[40]gpmwith[centrifugalchargingpumpdischargeheaderpressure>[2480]psigandthe[chargingflow]controlvvefullopen.APPLICABILITY:MODEI,2,and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Sealinjectionflownotwithinlimit.A.Adjustmanalsealinjectionthrottlevalvesgiveaflowwithinimitwithcentifugalchargingpmpdischargeheer]pressure80]psigandthechaingflow]controvalvefullopen.4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet..IBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE4.6hoursl2hours3.5-11 (QsSealInjectionFlow3.5.SURILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUCYSR3.5.5.NOTE--Notrequiredtobeperformeduntil4hoursaftertheReactorCoolantSystempressurestabilizesat>[2215psigand2255psig].Verimanualsealinjectionthrottlevalveareadjustedtogiveaflowwithilimit'th[centrifugalchargingpumpdischarheader]pressure>[2480]pgandthe[argingflow]controlvalvfullopen.31days3.5-12 3.5ERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.6BoonInjectionTank(BIT)LCO3.5.6TheBITshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MES1,2,and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIOCOMPLETIONTIMEA.BITinoperable.RestoreBtoOPERABLstatus.1hourB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.8.1ANDB.2ANDB.38inMODE3.BoraetoanSDMequivlentto[l]%hkat200'F.RestoreBIToOPERABLEstats.6hours6hours7daysC.RequiredActinandassociatedmpletionTimeofCoditionBnotmet.C.1BeinMODE4.12hours3.5-13 0SURVEIANCEREQUIREMENTSlSURVEILLANCE83..6FREENCYSR3.5.6.1VerifyBITboratedwatertemperatureisZ[145]'F.24oursSR3.5.6.2VeriyBITboratedwatervolumeisz[110]gallons.7daysSR3.5.6.3VerifyBI~T)oronconcentrationis>[20,000]pmand<[22,500]pp.7days3.5-14 AccumulatorsB3.5.1B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.1AccumulatorsBASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionsoftheECCSaccumulatorsaretosupplywatertothereactorvesselduringtheblowdownphaseofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),toprovideinventorytohelpaccomplishtherefillphasethatfollowsthereafter,andtoprovideReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)makeupforasmallbreakLOCA.~~~ECcofa.n%in,e~ruWVa.~a.4wq~<<a~~g@ho.su~~+c,wQL~4,~q~4~~%a+.ou+~auN~o&~5'I.<v.~TheblowdownphaseofalargebreakLOCAistheinitialperiodofthetransientduringwhichtheRCSdepartsfromequilibriumconditions,andheatfromfissionproductdecay,hotinternals,andthevesselcontinuestobetransferredtothereactorcoolant.TheblowdownphaseofthetransientendswhentheRCSpressurefallstoavalueapproachingthatofthecontainmentatmosphere.IntherefillphaseofaLOCA,whichimmediatelyfollowstheblowdownphase,n-ed@-@he-eugh-4haa,kremlin.~ecoreisessentiallyinadiabaticheatup.balanceofaccumulatorinventoryis~availabletoelpfillvoidsinthelowerplenumandreactorvesseldowncomersoas,toestablisharecoverylevelatthebottomfthecore.$'l.iv.hTheaccumulatorsarepressurevesselspartiallyfilledwi.thboratedwaterandpressurizedwithnitrogengas.Theaccumulatorsarepassivecomponents,sincenooperatororcontrolactionsarerequiredinorderforthemtoperformtheirfunction.InternalaccumulatortankpressureissufficienttodischargetheaccumulatorcontentstotheRCS,ifRCSpressuredecreasesbelowtheaccumulatorpressure.EachaccumulatorispipedintoanRCScoldlegviaanaccumulatorlineandisisolatedfromtheRCSbyamotoroperatedisolationvalveandtwocheckvalvesinserieemooroeraeisoaionvaveareinterlocw1'zerpressuremeannelstoensurethatthevalvesw'sRCSpressureiaovethepermissivecircuitP-(continued)B3.5-1 Insert3.5.1(841and865)aremaintainedopenwithACpowerremovedunderadministrativecontrolwhenpressurizerpressureis>1600psig.Thisfeatureensuresthatthevalvesmeetthesinglefailurecriterionofmanually-controlledelectricallyoperatedvalvesperBranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18(Ref.1)ThisisalsodiscussedinReferences2and3~ AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)5l.iv.a.T>>i'rlockalsopreventsinadvertentclosureevalvesdurrmaloperationpriorto)dent.Thevalveswillautoma'pen,h,asaresultofanSIsignal.Thesefeaturesethatthevalvesmeettherequirementsoftheastuteof'calandElectronicEngineersItandard279-1971(Ref."operatingbypaandthattheaccumulatorswillbeavailar'ectionwithoutrelianceonoperatoraction.oneMoTheaccumulatorsize,water(volume,andnitroencover~~ressureareselectedsothat~g~ofteaccumulatorsi~sufficienttopartiallycoverthecorebeforesignificantcladmeltingorzirconiumwaterreactioncanoccurfollowingqLOCA.Theneedtoensurethatg~>u~~accumulator~~'adequateforthisfunctionisconsistentwiththeLOCAassumptionthattheentirecontentsofoneaccumulatorwillbelostviatheRCSpipebreakduringtheblowdownphaseoftheLOCA.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheaccumulatorsareassumedOPERABLEinboththelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalysesatfullpower(Ref.~."ThesearetheDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatestablishtheacceptancelimitsfortheaccumulators.ReferencetotheanalysesfortheseDBAsisusedtoassesschangesintheaccumulatorsastheyrelatetotheacceptancelimits.InperformingtheLOCAcalculations,conservativeassumptionsaremadeconcerningtheavailabilitofECCSflow.IntheearlystagesofaLOCA,witorwithoutalossofoffsitepower,theaccumulatorsprovidethesolesourceofmakeupwatertotheRCS.TheassumptionoflossofoffsitepowerisrequiredbyregulationsandconservativelyimposesadelaywhereintheECCSpumpscannotdeliverflowuntiltheemergencydieselgeneratorsstart,cometoratedspeed,andgo.throughtheirtimedloadingsequence.Incoldlegbreakscenarios;theentirecontentsofoneaccumulatorareassumedtobelostthroughthebreak.ThelimitinglargebreakLOCAisadoubleendedguillotinebreakatthedischargeofthereactorcoolantpump.Duringthisevent,theaccumulatorsdischargetotheRCSassoonasRCSpressuredecreasestobelowaccumulatorpressure.(continued)B3.5-2 ~VgSBASESSLgsgaoSLcgvm~+onAccumulatorsB3.5.1APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)~~5'I.iV,Z.5I.i.v,4.Asaconservativeestimate,nocreditistakenforECCSpumpflowuntilaneffectivedelayhaselapsed.Thisdelayaccountsfothedieselsstarting,andthepumpsbeingloadedanddeliveringfullflow.0igliti,h1lydasprovidingthesolesourceofemergencycorecooling.NooperatoractionisassumedduringtheblowdownstageofalargebreakLOCA.TheworstcasesmallbreakLOCAanalysesalsoassumeatimedelaybeforepumpedflowreachesthecore.Forthelargerrangeofsmallbreaks,therateofblowdownissuchthattheincreaseinfuelcladtemperatureisterminatedsolelybytheaccumulators,withpumpedflowthenprovidingcontinuedcoolin.Asbreaksizedecreases,theaccumulatorsands~~cpumpsbothplayapartinterminatingeriseinciatemperature.Asbreaksizecontinuestodecrease,theroleoftheaccumulatorscontinuestodecreaseuntiltheyarenotrequiredandthecga&+in$~ipumpsbecomesolelyresponsibleforterminatingetemperatureincrease.ThisLCOhelpstoensurethatthefollowingacceptancecriteriaestablishedfortheECCSby10CFR50.46(Ref.~willbemetfollowingaLOCA:a.Haximumfuelelementcladdingtemperatureis<2200'F;b.Haximumcladdingoxidationisg0.17timesthetotalcladdingthicknessbeforeoxidation;c.Haximumhydrogengenerationfromazirconiumwaterreactionisg0.01timesthehypotheticalamountthatwouldbegeneratedifallofthemetalinthecladdingcylinderssurroundingthefuel,excludingthecladdingsurroundingtheplenumvolume,weretoreact;andd.Coreismaintainedinaeoolablegeometry.SincetheaccumulatorsdischargeduringtheblowdownphaseofaLOCA,theydonotcontributetothelongtermcoolingrequirementsof10CFR50.46.ForboththelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalyses,anominalcontainedaccumulatorwatervolumeisused.Thecontained(continued)B3.5-3 ~~c.hc~~~~~~c3n,~cBASES2.,wv.~AccumulatorsB3.5.1VUL&~~Q.y~~Q~APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)watervolumeisthesameasthedeliverablevolumefortheaccumulators,sincetheaccumulaorsareemptied,oncedischarged.Forsmallbreaks,anincreaseinwatervolumeisapeakcladtemperaturepenaltyForlargebreaks,anincreaseinwatervolumecanbeeitherapeakcladtemperaturepenaltyorbenefit,dependingondowncomerfillingandsubsequentspillthroughthebreakduringthecorerefloodinportionofthetransient.TheanalysislinewatervolumefromtheaccumulatortoecvaveTesafetyanaysisassenes-~Fso[646gand-g&X9]hm.oallowforinstrumentinaccuracy20]gaonsKmf-[6820]clamsareesI.iv'.hSi.v5'I,iv,QTheminimumboronconcentrationsetpointisusedinthepostLOCAboronconcentrationcalculation.ThecalculationisperformedtoassurereactorsubcriticalityinapostLOCAenvironment.OfparticularinterestisthelargebreakLOCA,sincenocreditistakenforcontrolrodassemblyinsertion.AreductionintheaccumulatorminimumboronconcentrationwouldproduceasubsequentreductionintheavailablecontainmentsumpconcentrationforpostLOCAshutdownandanincreaseinthemaximumsumppH.Themaximumboronndetermininvere-~m+A4%88~ump-pk,4-~~~.s;aThelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalysesareperformedattheminimumnitrogencoverpressure,sincesensitivityanalyseshavedemonstratedthathighernitrogencoverpressureresultsinacomputedpeakcladtemperaturebenefit.Themaximumnitrogencoverpressurelimitpreventsaccumulatorreliefvalveactuation,andultimatelypreservesaccumulatorintegrity.+ck,20QpgsgTheeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesfromtheaccumulatorsareaccountedforintheappropriateanalyses(Refs.~nd4f.TheaccumulatorssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.B3.5-4(continued) Insert3.5.2thetimeframeinwhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThemaximumboronconcentrationlimitisbasedonthecoldestexpectedtemperatureoftheaccumulatorwatervolumeandonchemicaleffectsresultingfromoperationoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpraySystem.Avalueof2,900ppmwouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheaccumulatorassumingaContainmenttemperatureof60F(Ref.6).Analysesperformedinresponseto10CFR50.49(Ref.7)assumedachemicalspraysolutionof2000to3000ppmboronconcentration(Ref.6)whichprovidesamarginof100ppm.ThechemicalspraysolutionimpactssumppHandtheresultingeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.ThesumppHalsoaffectstherateofhydrogengenerationwithincontainmentduetotheinteractionofContainmentSprayandsumpfluidwithaluminumcomponents. AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASES(continued)LCOSt.l.u,aSl.v'1TheLCOestablishestheminimumconditionsrequiredtoensurethattheaccumulatorsareavailabletoaccomplishtheircorecoolingsafetyfunctionfollowingaLOCA.~HŽaccumulatorsarerequiredtoensurethat100%ofthecontentsofaccumulator&willreachthecoreduringaLOCA.Thisisconsistentwiththeassumptionthatthecontentsofoneaccumulatorspillthroughthebreak.Iflessthan3M~ccumulatorW~injectedduringtheblowdownphaseofaLOCA,theECCSacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50.46(Ref.@couldbeviolated.62.bout.2(el0('s'imbForanaccumulatortobeconsideredOPERABLE,)the~isolationvalvemustbefullyopen+sWPpowerremove,andthelimitsestablishedintheSRsforcontainedvolume,boronconcentration,andnitrogencoverpressuremustbemet.APPLICABILITYl(ooS'L.i.aCRInMODES1and2,andinMODE3withRCSpressure>~0psig,theaccumulatorOPERABILITYrequirementsareased.onfullpoweroperation.Althoughcoolingrequirementsdecreaseaspowerdecreases,theaccumulatorsarestillrequiredtoprovidecorecoolingaslongaselevatedRCSpressuresandtemperaturesexist.1(o00<taaThisLCOisonlyapplicableatpressures>~psig.Atpressuresg4M~sig,therateofRCSblowdownissuchthattheECCSpumpscanprovideadequateinjectiontoensurethatpeakcladtemperatureremainsbelowthe10CFR50.46(Ref.glimitof2200F.i(.ooInMODE3,withRCSpressure<P680psig,andinMODES4,5,and6,theaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalvesareclosedtoisolatetheaccumulatorsfromtheRCS.ThisallowsRCScooldownanddepressurizationwithoutdischargingtheaccumulatorsintotheRCSorrequiringdepressurizationoftheaccumulators.ACTIONSA.1Iftheboronconcentrationofoneaccumulatorisnotwithinlimits,itmustbereturnedtowithinthelimitswithin72hours.InthisCondition,abilitytomaintainsubcriticalityorminimumboronprecipitationtimemaybe(continued)B3.5-5 Accumulators83.5.1BASESACTIONS8taxCu~O~iauap4.MlVibhu~t2,u~Suartahg~~~~~Q+cR.cS~RlA.mR'V'.~aA.l(continued)reduced.TheboronintheaccumulatorscontributestotheassumptionthatthecombinedECCSwaterinthepartiallyrecoveredcoreduringtheearlyrefloodingphaseofalargebreakLOCAissufficienttokeepthatportionofthecoresubcritical.Oneaccumulatorbelowtheminimumboronconcentrationlimit,however,willhavenoeffectonavailableECCSwaterandaninsignificanteffectoncoresubcriticalitdurinreflooBoilingofECCSwaterinthecoreduringreloodconcentratesboroninthesaturatedliquidthatremainsinthecore.Inaddition,currentanalysistechniquesdemonstratethattheaccumulators4e.note..~+dischargefollowingalargemainsteamlinebreak@em-@he*Eveniftheydodischarge,theirimpactisminorandnotadesignlimitingevent.Thus,72hoursisallowedtoreturntheboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.B.1Ifoneaccumulatorisinoperableforareasonotherthanboronconcentration,theaccumulatormustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithi1hour.InthisCondition,therequiredcontentsoPaccumulator~annotbeassumedtoreachthecoreduringaLOCA.DuetotheseverityoftheconsequencesshouldaLOCAoccurintheseconditions,the1hourCompletionTimetoopenthevalve,removepowertothevalve,orrestoretheproperwatervolumeornitrogencoverpressureensuresthatpromptactionwillbetakentoreturntheinoperableaccumulatortoOPERABLEstatus.TheCompletionTimeminimizesthepotentialforexposureoftheplanttoaLOCAundertheseconditions.C.landC.2IftheaccumulatorcannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoNODE3within6hoursandpressurizerpressurereducedtoslggdpsigwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)B3.5-6 AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESACTIONS(continued)SL.cv,wD.lQ.~Tf~1t1pPl,thpltaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSL.cvA.SL.i.v.Qumph,Wa~(t5bg~bKAKl~oA,9r.v~~i4o~iSR3.5.1.1~~r~@~~+lRbhOWOA.Eachaccumulatorvalveshouldbeverifiedtobefullyopenever12hours.Thisverificationensuresthattheaccumulatorsareavailableforinjectionandensurestimelydiscoveryifavalveshouldbelessthanfullyopen.Ifanisolationvalveisnotfullyopen,therateofinjectiontotheRCSwouldbereduced.Althoughamotoroperatedvalvepositionshouldnotchangewithpowerremoved,aclosedvalvecouldresultinnotmeetingaccidentanalysesassumptions.ThisFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthatensureamispositionedisolationvalveisunlikely.s~uh4~u~gP~QSl.ivgSl.hv.wBoosg~~~s~~e~<hiePpro~>~SR3.5.1.2andSR3.5.1.3~hd1d1gfh1t.Thl1dissuicienttoensureadequateinjectionduringaLOCA.Becauseofthestaticdesignoftheaccumulator,a12hourFrequencyusuallyallowstheoperatortoidentifychangesbeforelimitsarereached.0cratingexperiencehasshownthisFrequencytobeappropriateforearlydetectionandcorrectionofoffnormaltrends.~SgRbbCRal~SR3.5.1.4fTheboronconcentrationshouldbeverifiedtobewithinsi.i~irequiredlimitsforeachaccumulatorevery31dayssincetheignoftheac~um~l~t~rslimitsthewasinwhitheconcentrationcanbechanged.The31dayrequencyisadequatetoidentifychangesthatcouldoccurfrommechanismssuchasstratiicationorinleakaegccumuatorwitinera1%volumeincreasewillideeakagehascausedare'oronconcentrationtobeo(continued)'B3.5-7 AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.5.1.4(continued)Itisnotnecessarytoverifyboronconcentratitheaddedwa'oryisfromtherefue'rstoragetank(RWST),becaontainedintheRWSTiswithintheaccumulonconcen'quirements.Thisisco'iththerecommendationofNUtQ~Lo~+m~~e'tvW~~ah4~~A+Mxe,t~~o~OP4RAQm>ttaCIOSi.iv.0ash.Va~afCPthg,+Ca~CVtA'-,@C.U~~QFAR.w~~a-charttCAX9-po<th~~C~('3TcSB-iZ"pppli~e,~04+~Si~<a,iu~~Au~W4aevau~.~~~VaQ.Kl~aVealaf~,'R3.5.1.5Verificationevery31daysthatpowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatorisolationvalveoperatorwhenthepressurizerpressureissigensuresthatanactivefailurecouldnoresu>ntheundetectedclosureofanaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalve.Ifthisweretooccur,accumuaorswoueaieforinjectioSincepowerisremoveduneradministrativecontrolthe31dayFrequencywillprovideadequateassurancethatpowerisremoved.SRallowspowertobesuppliedtothemotoropera~isolatealveswhenpressurizerpressureis<28psig,thusallowingrationalflexibilitybyavoi'unnecessarydelaysnipulatethe~bealCersduringplantstartupsorshutdowns.ithpoWersuppliedtothevalves,inadvertentclosure'tedbytheRCSpressureinterlockassociatedi4".thevalves.Shouldcloofavalveoccurinspiteoftheinck,theignalprovidedtothevalveswouldopenacloseveintheeventofaLOCA.REFERENCESUFSAR,Qmp4er~c..a10CFR50.46.~~~~@~~Caea~AcM,W<+,~g.GC<+~g)~:"St=PaCaP<<<ivt7FVal3Vtt-~fChAaEhV<lh-24.0W&uvveWN,t8~L.~sA-.~FSAR,ChapterQHhqtJPggRc~~(5'3.M~WeveR,FI,P~e-~QA.+~L.ath,W4a'tatQ.Ge4,Ca4AmVh~~-l+CaPnutaaaifta30~'th-'eatfVQ~a~~~0.bPR.tg'4~~~iw,tsas..WOGSTSB3.5-8Cn~&PRlOtQ~~~ace-B.9,7.tOCF'PSo.HR.Rev.0,09/28/92 ECCS-OperatingB3.5.283.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.2ECCS-OperatingBASESBACKGROUND5~.s.'yi',Yis4,with.~elflfeAaaki'~QA+nMAA5Z.~Ya.ca.Sa~~~MCC-~asutah~W~~(ta~+M.vt'..bThefunctionoftheECCSistoprovidecorecoolingandnegativereactivitytoensurethatthereactorcoreisprotectedafteranyofthefollowingaccidents:a.Lossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)>>coolantleakagegreaterthanthecapabilityofthenormalchargingsystem;b.Rodejectionaccident;c.Lossofsecondarycoolantaccident,includinguncontrolledsteamreleaseorlossoffeedwater;andd.Steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR).Theadditionofnegativereactivityisdesignedprimarilyforthelossofsecondarycoolantaccidentwhereprimarycooldowncouldaddenoughpositivereactivitytoachievecriticalityandreturntosignificantoer.~o~44.sa.Thereare44veephasesofECCSoperation:injection~coldlegrecirculationIntheinjectionphase,wateristakenfromtherefuelingwaterstoraetankRWSTandin'ectedintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)througtecoegs.WhensufficientwaterisremovedfromtheRWSTtoensurethatenoughboronhasbeenaddedtomaintainthereactorsubcriticaland495containmentsump'noughwatertosupplytherequirednetpositivesuctionheadtotheECCSpumps,suctionisswitchedto4Q-containmentgumpforcoldlegrecirculation.AfterapproximatelyIiours,*oilinginthetopofthecoreandanyresutingoronprecipitation.TheECCSconsissof@H.-e@separatesubsystems:safetyinjection(SIandresidualheatremoval(RHR)Eachsubsystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains.TheECCSaccumulatorsandtheRWSTarealsopartofthe(continued)B3.5-9 ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)5'2..vi.~ECCS,butarenotconsideredpartofanECCSflowpathasdescribedbythisLCO~~~tJL~f4M~4,~~~~aVXaQTheECCSflowpathsconsistofpiping,valves,heatexchangers,andpumpssuchthatwaterfromtheRWSTcanbeinjectedintotheRCSfollowingtheaccidentsdescribedinthisLCO.ThemajorcomponentsofeachsubsystemaretheeRHRpumsheatexchaner~g.~aandtheSIpumps.ubsyste~onsistsoftwo100%capacitytrainshatareinterconnectedandredundantsuchthateithertrainiscapableofsupplying100%oftheflowrequiredtomitigatetheaccidentconsequences.~ThWinterconnectingandredundantsubsystemdesign',provide+theoperatorswiththeabilitytoutilize,componentsfromoppositetrainstoachievetherequired100%flowtothecore.SQ.vi..ODuringtheinjectionphaseofLOCArecovery,4suctionheadlwaterfromtheRWSTtotheECCSumps.~~~atepipingsuppieseachsusysem.andeacrawithinsubsystem.Thedischargefromthecifugalchargingpumpmbinespriortoenterinoroninjectiontank(BI'ftheplantu'esaBIT)andthendividesagainintofourss,eachofwhichfeedstheinjectionlinetoonecoeg.ThedischargefromtheSIandRHRpumps'desandfeeds'njectionlinetoeachoftheRCSdlegs.ControlvalvesarttobalancetowtotheRCS.Thisbalanceensuressuff'tflowtothecoretomeettheanalysisassumptiowingaLOCAinoneoftheRCScoldlegs.ForLOCAsthataretoosmalltodepres'heRCSbelowtheshutoffheadoftheSIpumps,themuntiltheRCSressureecreasesbelowtheSIumshutoffadL4~~~nMcx'pcQvAsE~~~WLMQ,52..vi..<3.s'.9@+0~2.2.7DuringtherecircuationphaseofLOCArecovery,fgIRpumpsuctionistransferredto4heMntainments%m.gheRHRpumpsensy.recirculatio..'uthesamesaseinJectionhase.s.w.s.g(continued)B3.5-10 Insert3.5.55QVa~a~TheSIsubsystemconsistsof.threeredundant,50%capacitypumpswhichsupplytwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.Eachinjectionlineiscapableofproviding100%oftheflowrequiredtomitigatetheaccidentconsequences.Insert3.5.65~.Va~AcommonsupplyheaderisusedfromtheRWSTtothesafetyinjection(SI)andContainmentSpraySystempumps.Thiscommonsupplyheaderisprovidedwithtwoin-seriesmotor-operatedisolationvalves(896Aand896B)thatreceivepowerfromseparatesourcesforsinglefailureconsiderations.TheseisolationvalvesaremaintainedopenwithDCcontrolpowerremovedviaakeyswitchlocatedinthecontrolroom.TheremovalofDCcontrolpowereliminatesthemostlikelycausesforspuriousvalveactuationwhilemaintainingthecapabilitytomanuallyclosethevalvesfromthecontrolroomduringtherecirculationphaseoftheaccident(Ref.1).TheSIpumpsupplyheaderalsocontainstwoparallelmotor-operatedisolationvalves(825Aand825B)whicharemaintainedopenbyremovingACpower.TheremovalofACpowertotheseisolationvalvesisanacceptabledesignagainstsinglefailuresthatcouldresultinundesirablecomponentactuation(Ref.2).Aseparatesupplyheaderisusedfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.Thissupplyheaderisprovidedwithacheckvalve(854)andmotoroperatedisolationvalve(856)whichismaintainedopenwithDCcontrolpowerremovedviaakeyswitchlocatedinthecontrolroom.TheremovalofDCcontrolpowereliminatesthemostlikelycausesforspuriousvalveactuationwhilemaintainingthecapabilitytomanuallyclosethevalvefromthecontrolroomduringtherecirculationphaseoftheaccident.ThethreeSIpumpsfeedtwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.SIPumpsAand8eachfeedsoneofthetwoinjectionlineswhileSIPumpCcanfeedbothinjectionlines.ThedischargeofSIPumpCiscontrolledthroughuseoftwonormallyopenparallelmotoroperatedisolationvalves(871Aand871B).TheseisolationvalvesaredesignedtoclosebasedontheoperatingstatusofSIPumpsAandBtoensurethatSIPumpCprovidesthenecessaryflowthroughtheRCScoldleginjectionlinecontainingthefailedpump.ThedischargesofthetwoRHRpumpsandheatexchangersfeedacommoninjectionlinewhichpenetratescontainment.Thislinethendividesintotworedundantcoredelugeflowpathseachcontaininganormallyclosedmotoroperatedisolationvalve(852Aand852B)andcheckvalve(853Aand853B)whichprovideinjectionintothereactorvesselupperplenum.

Insert3.5.7B(Refs.4and5).ThistransferisaccomplishedbystoppingtheRHRpumps,isolatingRHRfromtheRWSTbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve856,openingtheContainmentSumpBmotoroperatedisolationvalvestoRHR(850Aand850B)andthenstartingtheRHRpumps.TheSIandContainmentSpraySystempumpsarethenstoppedandtheRWSTisolatedbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve896Aor896BfortheSIandContainmentSpraySystempumpcommonsupplyheaderandclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve897or898fortheSIpumprecirculationline.Insert3.5.8SIandContainmentSpraySystempumps(asneededforpressurecontrolpurposes)iftheRCSpressureremainsabovetheRHRpumpshutoffhead(Ref.6).Thishigh-headrecirculationpathisprovidedthroughRHRmotoroperatedisolationvalves857A,857B,and857C.Theseisolationvalvesareinterlockedwithvalves896A,896B,897,and898.Thisinterlockpreventsopeningofthe,RHRhigh-headrecirculationisolationvalvesunlesseither896Aor896Bareclosedandeither897or898areclosed.IfRCSpressureislessthanapproximately140psig,theSIandContainmentSpraySystempumpsremaininpull-stopandonlyRHRisusedtoprovidecorecooling.DuringInsert3.5.9Afterapproximately20hours,simultaneousinjectionbytheSIandRHRpumpsisusedtopreventboronprecipitation(Ref.7).ThisconsistsofprovidingSIthroughtheRCScoldlegsandintothelowerplenumwhileprovidingRHRthroughthecoredelugevalvesintotheupperplenum.ThetworedundantflowpathsfromContainmentSumpBtotheRHRpumpsalsocontainamotoroperatedisolationvalvelocatedwithinthesump(851Aand851B).Theseisolationvalvesaremaintainedopenwithpowerremovedtoimprovethereliabilityofswitchovertotherecirculationphase.Theoperatorsforisolationvalves851Aand851Barealsonotqualifiedforcontainmentpostaccidentconditions. ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASESSx.vi..tBACKGRO.(continued)5K.V1..C.S.~ThesubsystemoftheECCSalsofunctionstosupplyboratedwatertothereactorcorefollowingincreasedheatremovalevents,suchasamainsteamlinebreak(HSLB).Thelimitingdesignconditionsoccurwhenthenegativemoderatortemperaturecoefficientishighlynegative,suchasattheendofeachcycle.DuringlowtemperatureconditionsintheRCS,limitationsareplacedonthemaximumnumberofECCSpumpsthatmaybeOPERABLE.RefertotheBasesforLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"forthebasisoftheserequirements.TheECCSsubsystemsareactuateduponreceiptofanSIsignal.Theactuationofsafeguardloadsisaccomplishedinaprogrammedtimesequence.Ifoffsitepowerisavailable,thesafeguardloadsstartimmediatelyintheprogrammedsequence.Ifoffsitepowerisnotavailable,theEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)busesshednormaloperatingloadsandareconnectedtotheemergencydieselgenerators(EDGs).Safeguardloadsarethenactuatedintheprogrammedtimesequence.Thetimedelayassociatedwithdieselstarting,sequencedloading,andpumpstartingdeterminesthetimerequiredbeforepumpedflowisavailabletothecorefollowingaLOCA.TheactiveECCScomponents,alongwiththepassiveaccumulatorsandtheRWSTcoveredinLCO3.5.1,"Accumulators,"andLCO3.5.4,"RefuelingWaterStoraeTank(RWST),"providethecoolingwaternecessarytomeet(Ref.$AaP-SQC.4tAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheLCOhelpstoensurethatthefollowingacceptancecriteriafortheECCS,establishedby10CFR60.46(Ref.2f,willbemetfollowingaLOCA:9'.Haximumfuelelementcladdingtemperatureis~2200'F;b.Haximumcladdingoxidationisg0.17timesthetotalcladdingthicknessbeforeoxidation;B3.5-11(continued) ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)C.Maximumhydrogengenerationfromazirconiumwaterreactionisg0.01timesthehypotheticalamountgeneratedifallofthemetalinthecladdingcylinderssurroundingthefuel,excludingthecladdingsurroundingtheplenumvolume,weretoreact;d.Coreismaintainedinaeoolablegeometry;ande.Adequatelongtermcorecoolingcapabilityismaintained.SZ.iv.c52.~~.hTheLCOalsolimitsthepotentialfearaposttripreturntopowerfollowinganHSLBeventanden'sur@Pthatcontainmenttemperature1imitsareme@ok~~~~,~~EtbWG.~"Each'CCSsubsystemsM-takencreditforinalargebreakLOCAeventatfullpower(Refs.3and+.ThiseventestablishestherequirementforrunoutflowfortheECCSpumps,aswellasthemaximumresonsetimefortheiractuation.TheSIpumpsarecreditedinasea1breakDitAeven.sseventestablishestheflowanddischargeheadatthedesignpointforthepums.TheSGT+andNSLBeventsalsocrestepumps.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsforteECCSarebasedonthefollowingLOCAanalysisassumptions:'a~AlargebreakLOCAevent,withlossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneRHRpump(bothEDGtrainsareassumedtooperateduetorequirementsformodelingfullactivecontainmentheatremovalsystemoperation);andb.AsmallbreakLOCAevent,withalossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneECCStrain.DuringtheblowdownstageofaLOCA,theRCSdepressurizesasprimarycoolantisejectedthroughthebreakintothecontainment.Thenuclearreactionisterminatedeitherbymoderatorvoidingduringlargebreaksorcontrolrodinsertionforsmallbreaks.Followingdepressurization,emergencycoolingwaterisinjectedintothecoldlegs,flowsintothedowncomer,fillsthelowerplenum,andrefloodsthecore.5Z,arran>APHR.Pu~gwvkgt,c.'r4a~~a~~u~ubcsxs.<>~mpp~/~a-vtv~w.gleane$~pu~(continued)B3.5-12 ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Qap1c3tC5z.vi~SKp~~sTheeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesareaccountedforinappropriateanalyses(Refs.'Wand.TheLCOensuresthatanECCStrainwilldeliversufficientwateromatcoioraes'~enoughtominimizetheconsequencesofthecorebeinguncoverefollowinalargeLOCA.ItalsoensuresthatthecSIpumpswilldeliversufficientwaterandboronduringasmallLOCAtomaintaincoresubcriticality.ForsmallerLOCAs,tdeliver&sufficientfluidtomaintainRCSinventory.ForasmallbreakLOCA,thesteamgeneratorscontinuetoserveastheheatsink,providingpartoftherequiredcorecooling.TheECCStrainssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOInNODES1,2,and3,twoindependent(andredundant)ECCStrainsarerequiredtoensurethatsufficientECCSflowisavailable,assumingasinglefailureaffectingeithertrain.Additionally,individualcomponentswithintheECCStrainsmaybecalledupontomitigatetheconsequencesofothertransientsandaccidents.5'~qa.aOcsQ.Va.InMODES1ECCStrainconsistsof~anSIsubsystem~andanRHRsubsystem.Eachtrainincludesthepiping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTuponanSIsignalandtransferringsuctionto444containmentjumpn.<-~.DurieventrequiringECCSactuation,aflowisrequiredto'anabundantsupplyoffromtheRWSTtotheRCSviaCSpumpseirrespectivesupplyheaderstoeachoftcoldleginjectionnozzles.Intheionm,thisflowmaybeswitchedtotakeitssfromthecontainmentsumpsupplyitsfltheRCShotandcoldlegs.TheflowpathforeachtrainmustmaintainitsdesignedindependencetoensurethatnosinglefailurecandisablebothECCStrains.(continued)83.5-13 Insert3.5.10ThisincludessecuringthemotoroperatedisolationvalvesasspecifiedinSR3.5.2.1inpositionbyremovingthepowersourcesaslistedbelow.EINPositionSecuredinPositionB825A825B826A826B826C826D851A851B856878A8788878C878D896A896BOpenOpenClosedClosedClosedClosedOpenOpenOpenClosedOpenClosedOpenOpenOpenRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofDCControlPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofDCControlPowerofDCControlPowerThemajorcomponentsofanECCStrainconsistsofanRHRpumpandheatexchangercapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWST(andeventuallyContainmentSumpB),andabletoinjectthroughoneofthetwoisolationvalvestothereactorvesselupperplenumandoneofthetwolineswhichprovidehigh-headrecirculationtotheSIandContainmentSpraySystempumps.AlsoincludedwithintheECCStrainaretwoofthreeSIpumpscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandContainmentSumpB(viaRHR),andinjectingthroughoneofthetwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.InthecasewhereSIPumpCisinoperable,bothRCScoldleginjectionlinesmustbeOPERABLEtoprovide100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingletrainofSIduetothelocationofcheckvalves870Aand870B. ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYSk.vi.~Nz~~tt0Crae.+~JULCydvW-4~vaaa&okhq3oSRau)ScsAS,Z+O~pCa~4.Qa-asp+4L~~u~~s-~~<rvtata.etc',O~~52..VL.I<g'2..ii..hInMODESI,2,and3,theECCSOPERABILITYrequirementsforthelimitingDesignBasisAccident,alargebreakLOCA,arebasedonfullpoweroperation.Althoughreducedpowerwouldnotrequirethesamelevelofperformance,theaccidentanalysisdoesnotprov'linrequirementsinthelowerMODEThecentrifugalchar'erosCA,whichestablishesrormancecceonower.epumpperformancerequirementsareaseonasmabreakLOCA.MODE2andMODE3requirementsareboundedbytheMODEIanalysis.ThisLCOisonlyapplicableinMODE3andabove.BelowHODE3,theSIsignalsetpointismanuallybypassedbyoperatorcontrol,andsystemfunctionalrequirementsarerelaxedasdescribedinLCO3.5.3,"ECCS-Shutdown."AsindicatedinNoteI,theflowpathmaybeisolatedfor2hoursinMODE3,undercontrolledconditions,toperformpressureisolationvalvetestingperSR3.4.14.1.Theflowpathisreadilyrestorablefromthecontrolroo.AsindicatedinNote2,operationinMODE3withECCStrainsdeclaredinoperablepursuanttoLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverressureProtection(LTOP)System,"isnecessaryCAPs*~~LTOParmingtemperaturneartheNOOE3oundarytemperatureof350'F.LCO3.4.12requiresthatcertainpumpsberenderedinoperableatandbelowtheLTOParmingtemperature.Whenthistemperatureis@~neartheMODE3boundarytemperature,timeisneededtorestoretheinoperablepumpstoOPERABLEstatus.InMODES,and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilitofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisexremeyow.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8;"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."NODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.5,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevel,"andLCO3.9.6,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-LowWaterLevel."~tala~~~au~~3.W.C.,"gC,S~~F~Qb48$~Q+c-t>j'.3,cccs-s~)Q(continued)B3.5-14

ECCS-Operating83.5.2BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.I6X.vi..o-Sa.vi,c.0Withone~trainer'inoperableandatleast100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainavailable,theinoperablecomponentsmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimeisbasedonanNRCreliabilityevaluation(Ref.'andisareasonabletimeforrepairofmanyECCScomponents.tota'7oAnECtrainisinoperableifitisnotcapableofdeliveringdesignflowtotheRCS.Individualcomponentsareinoperableiftheyarenotcapableofperformingtheirdesignfunctionorsuortingsystemsarenotavailable.met.msTheLCOrequirestheOPERABILITYofanumberofindependentsubsystems.Duetotheredundancyoftrainsandthediversityofsubsystems,theinoperabilityofonecomponentinatraindoesnotrendertheECCSincapableofperformingitsfunction.Neitherdoestheinoperabilityoftwodifferentcomponents,eachinadifferenttrain,necessarilyresultinalossoffunctionfortheECCS.TheintentofthisConditionistomaintainacombinationofequipmentsuchthat100%oftheECCSflowequivalent'toasingleOPERABLEECCStrainremainsavailable.Thisallowsincreasedflexibilityinplantoperationsundercircumstanceswhencomponentsinoppositetrainsareinoperable.3.5'.2bAneventaccompaniedbyalossofoffsitepowerandthefailureofanEDGcandisableoneECCStrainuntilpowerisrestored.Areliabilityanalysis(Ref.'hasshownthattheimpactofhavingonefullECCStraininoperableissufficientlysmalltojustifycontinuedoperationfor72hours.66Re6describessituationsinwhichonecornsuchasanssovervalve,candisablECCStrains.Withoneoromponeinoperablesuchthat100%oftheflowequivale'eOPERABLEECCStrainisnotavailableacilityisina'onoutsidetheaccidentsos.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbe'ately(continued)B3.5-15 Insert3.5.21InthecasewhereSIPumpCisinoperable,bothRCScoldleginjectionlinesmustbeOPERABLEtoprovide100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingletrainofSIduetothelocationofcheckvalves870Aand870B. ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASESACTIONScontinued)5l.,v'Ia~3,s'.iiB.landB.2IftheinoperabletraincannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3within6hoursandHODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.52.i.iSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSZ..i.vC.52.v'i.oW~vt9cvah+ooc'QQ~vcLQJphpoLl+o~<~a.~chekaUcAiWm9aoe,SR3.5.2.1VerificationofpropervalvepositionensuresthattheflowpathfromtheECCSpumpstotheRCSismaintained.c,HisalignmentofthesevalvesorederbothECCStrainsinocrabSecuringthesevalvesinposition0welposltlonensurethattangepositionaslurerbeinadvertentlmisali4,thesevalvescandisablethefunctionofbothECCSrainsaninvalidatetheaccidentanalyses.A12hourFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthat~ensureamispositionedvalveisunlikely.SR3.5.2.2Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheECCSflowpathsprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforECCSoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesewereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.Avalvethatreceivesanactuationsignalisallowedtobeinanonaccidentpositionprovidedthevalvewillautomaticallyrepositionwithintheproperstroketime.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevalvesareoperated(continued)B3.5-16 Insert3.5.11C.1IfbothtrainsofECCSareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.Withoneormorecomponent(s)inoperablesuchthat100%oftheflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainisnotavailable,thefacilityisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.Insert3.5.12ThelistedvalvesaresecuredinpositionbyremovalofACpowerorkeylockingtheDCcontrolpower.Thesevalvesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolssuchthatanychangeswithrespecttothepositionofthevalvebreakersorkeylocksisunlikely.TheverificationofthevalvebreakersandkeylocksisperformedbySR3.5.2.3. ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSZ.s.igSR3.5.2.2(continued)underadministrativecontrol,andanimpropervalvepositionwouldonlyaffectasingletrain.ThisFrequencyhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.3.5.2.3Withtheceptionoftheoperatingcentrifugalchingpump,theEumpsarenormallyinastandbyonoperatingmode.Assuch,wpathpipinghasthentialtodevelopvoidsandpotsofentraineses.MaintainingthepipingfromtheECCmpstoeRCSfullofwaterensuresthatthesystemwilormproperly,injectingitsfullcapacityintotheRponand.Thiswillalsopreventwaterhammerumpcavitatio,andpumpingofnoncondensiblee.g.,air,nitrogen,hydrogen)intothereactorselfollowinganSIsignalorringshutdowncoolinhe31dayFrequencytakesintoconsitionthegranatureofgasaccumulationintheECCSpipindeproceduralcontrolsgoverningsystemoperation.SR3.5.2.4PeriodicsurveillancetestingofECCSpumpstodetectgrossdegradationcausedbyimpellerstructuraldamageorotherhydrauliccomponentproblemsisrequiredbySectionXIoftheASHECode.Thistypeoftestingmaybeaccomlishedbmeasuringthepumpdevelopedheadat.po>ntofthepumpcharacteristiccurve.Thisverifiesoththatthemeasuredperformanceiswithinanacceptabletoleranceoftheoriginalpumpbaselineperformanceandthattheperformanceatthetestflowisgreaterthanorequaltotheperformanceassumedintheplantsafetyanalysis.SRsarespecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASHECode.SectionXIoftheASHECodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytherequirements.SR3.5.2.5andSR3.5.2.6TheseSurveillancesdemonstratethateachautomaticECCSvalveactuatestotherequiredpositiononanactualor(continued)B3.5-17 Insert3.5.17SR3.5.2.3Verificationevery31daysthatACorOCpowerisremoved,asappropriate,foreachvalvespecifiedinSR3.5.2.1ensuresthatanactivefailurecouldnotresultinanundetectedmispositionofavalvewhichaffectsbothtrainsofECCS.ifthisweretooccur,noECCSinjectionorrecirculationwouldbeavailable.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hours,the31dayFrequencywillprovideadequateassurancethatpowerisremoved. ~C3BASESAMWOMKGoMCAgg~p~M~~~V~~~~c~mM,cc-c4e~~uGKAPPA,g&~~~4,~ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTShR3.5.2.5andSR3.5.2.6(continued)simulatedSIsignalandthateachECCSpumpstartsreceiptofanactualorsimulatedSIsignal.ThemohFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformtheseSurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforunplannedplanttransientsifthurveillanceswereperformedwiththereactoratpower.ThmonthFrequencyisalsoacceptablebasedonconsiderationofthedesignreliability(andconfirmingoperatingexperience)oftheequipment.TheactuationlogicistestedaspartofESFActuationSystemtesting,andequipmentperformanceismonitoredaspartoftheInserviceTestingProgram.S5.2.7RealignmentoesintheflowpathonanSIsiisnecessaryforpropererformance.Theveshavestopstoallowproperpositi'orictedflowtoarupturedcoldleg,ensuringtthercoldlegsreceiveatleasttherequired'umflow.Thisveillanceisnotrequiredfontswithflowlimitingori.The18montquencyisbasedonthesamereasonsastsinSR3.5.2.5andSR3.5.2.6.S.5.2.8~~~3.5'.<>Periodicinsionsofthecontainmentsumpsuctioninleensurethatitisstrictedandstaysinproperatingcondition.The18monequencyisbasedeneedtoperformthisSurveillanceunthecionsthatapplyduringaplantoutage,onthehaveaccesstothelocation,andbecauseofpotentialanunplannedtransientiftheilancewereperforme'hereactoratr.ThisFrequencyhasbeenfoundsuff'todetectabnormaldegradationandisconfiroperatingexperience.REFERENCES10CFR50.46.A~~~~~m~m~~n,~C.AgFQ%bc-~0,~ssuah.Ar~w~wp(continued)B3.5-18 Insert3.5.131.LetterfromR.A.Purple,NRC,toL.D.White,RG&E,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendment7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedMay14,1975.2.3.4.5.BranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18,"ApplicationoftheSingleFailureCriteriontoManually-ControlledElectricallyOperatedValves."LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendmentNo.42toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18-R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(TACNo.79829),"datedJune3,1991.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicVI-7.B:ESFSwitchoverfromInjectiontoRecirculationMode,AutomaticECCSRealignment,Ginna,"datedDecember31,1981.NUREG-0821.7.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicIX-4,BoronAdditionSystem,R.E.Ginna,"datedAugust26,1981,ll.UFSAR,Section6.2.~~~ ECCS-OperatingB3.5.2BASESREFERENCES(continued)4o.3iFSAR,Section~AVFShR~Eois4NRCMemorandumtoV.Stello,Jr.,fromR.L.Baer,"RecommendedInterimRevisionstoLCOsforECCSComponents,"December1,1975.B3.5-19 ECCS-ShutdownB3.5.3B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.3ECCS-ShutdownBASESsa.vi.4BACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionforBases3.5.2,"ECCS-Operating,"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.za4.+i+)~%on(s~)52.~vInMODE4thereuiredECCStrainconsistsoftwoseparatesubsystems:andresidualheatremoval(RHR)"TheECCSflowpathsconsistofpiping,valves,heatexchangers,andpumpssuchthatwaterfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)canbeinjectedintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)followingtheaccidentsdescribedinBases3.5.2.<~a~e.~~~~Svc.+o~~~~~0.i~~~~C.Wcw~hoJngweAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheApplicableSafetyAnalysessectionofBases3.5.2alsoappliestothisBasessection.DuetothestableconditionsassociatedwithoperationinMODE4andthereducedprobabilityofoccurrenceofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),theECCSoperationalrequirementsarereduced.Itisunderstoodinthesereductionsthatcertainautomaticsafetyinjection(SI)actuationisnotavailable.InthisMODE,sufficienttimeexistsformanualactuationoftherequiredECCStomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBA.4c.aa.5.OnlyonetrainofECCSisrequiredforMODE4.ThisrequirementdictatesthatsinglefailuresarenotconsideredduringthisMODEofoperation.TheECCStrainssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCO5'z.vi'.~InMODE4,oneofthetwoindependent(andredundant)ECCStrainsisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatsufficientECCSflowisavailabletothecorefollowingaDBA.InMODE4,anECCStrainconsistsofaZ~subsystemandanRHRsubsystem.Eachtrainincluesepiping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflow(continued)B3.5-20 ECCS-ShutdownB3.5.3BASESLCO(continued)pathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandtransferringsuctiontothecontainmentsump.~neventrequiringECCSactuation,aflowsrequiredo'anabundantsupplyoffromtheRWSTtotheRCSviaSpumeirrespectivesupplyheaderstoeachofldleginjectionnozzles.Intheerm,thisflowpabeswitchedtotakepplyfromthecontainmentsumpandverowtotheRCShotandcoldlegs.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,and3,theOPERABILITYrequirementsforECCSarecoveredbyLCO3.5.2.InMODE4withRCStemperaturebelow350'F,oneOPERABLEECCStrainisacceptablewithoutsinglefailureconsideration,onthebasisofthestablereactivityofthereactorandthelimitedcorecoolingrequirements.InMODES5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.5,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevel,"andLCO3.9.6,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-LowWaterLevel."ACTIONSA.IWithnoECCSRHRsubsystemOPERABLE,theplantisnotpreparedtorespondtoalossofcoolantaccidentortocontinueacooldownusingtheRHRpumpsandheatexchangers.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyto'initiateactionsthatwouldrestoreatleastoneECCSRHRsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionistakentorestoretherequiredcoolingcapacity.Normally,inMODE4,reactordecayheatisremovedfromtheRCSbyanRHRloop.IfnoRHRloopisOPERABLEforthisfunction,reactordecayheatmustberemovedbysomealternatemethod,suchasuseofthesteamgenerators.Thealternatemeansofheatremovalmust83.5-21(continued)

Insert3.5.16ThemajorcomponentsofanECCStrainduringNODE4normallyconsistsofanRHRpumpandheatexchanger,capableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWST(andeventuallyContainmentSumpB),andabletoinjectthroughoneofthetwoisolationvalvestothereactorvesselupperplenum.AlsoincludedwithintheECCStrainareoneofthreeSIpumpscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandinjectingthroughoneofthetwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.Thehigh-headrecirculationflowpathfromRHRtotheSIpumpsisnotrequiredinMODE4sincethereisnoaccidentscenariowhichpreventsdepressurizationtoRHRpumpshutoffheadpriortodepletionoftheRWST.BasedonthetimeavailabletorespondtoaccidentconditionsduringNODE4,ECCScomponentsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingreconfiguredtotheinjectionmodefromthecontrolroomwithin10minutes.ThisincludestakingcreditforanRHRpumpandheatexchangerasbeingOPERABLEiftheyarebeingusedforshutdowncoolingpurposes. ECCS-ShutdownB3.5.3BASESACTI0NSA.l(continued)continueuntiltheinoperableRHRloopcomponentscanberestoredtooperationsothatdecayheatremovaliscontinuous.WithbothRHRpumpsandheatexchangersinoperable,itwouldbeunwisetorequiretheplanttogotoMODE5,wheretheonlyavailableheatremovalsystemistheRHR.Therefore,theappropriateactionistoinitiatemeasurestorestoreoneECCSRHRsubsystemandtocontinuetheactionsuntilthesubsystemisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.5Q,vt~QB.1S~WithnoECCS~subsystemOPERABLEQuetotheinoperabilityofthepumporflowpathfromtheRWST,theplantisnotpreparedCo,providehighpressureresponsetoDesignBasisEventsrequiringSI.The1hourCompletionTimetorestoreatleastoneubsystemtoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionistakentoprovidetherequiredcoolingcapacityortoinitiateactionstoplacetheplantinMODE5,whereanECCStrainisnotrequired.C.1WhentheRequiredActionsofConditionBcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,acontrolledshutdownshouldbeinitiated.Twenty-fourhoursisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE5inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystemsoroperators.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS+ms.;SR3.5.3.1TheapplicabieSurvei11ancedescriptiongfromBases3.5.2apply.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsanRHRtraintobeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapableofbeingmanuallyrealigned(remoteorlocal)totheECCSmodeof(continued)B3.5-22 ECCS-ShutdownB3.5.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.5.3.1(continued)operationandnototherwiseinoperable.ThisallowsoperationintheRHRmodeduringMODE4,ifnecessary.REFERENCESTheapplicablereferencesfromBases3.5.2apply.B3.5-23

RWSTB3.5.4B3.5EHERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)B3.5.4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)BASESBACKGROUND+/,t.t<0,TheRNSTsupj~ieboratedwatertong-eendiNebs~y-System-Our-ing-aceMe~mMi~ns.'5/.CS.s43,g,lsbothtrainsoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpraySystem~~duringtheinjectionphaseofaossocooanaccident(LOCArecovery.p~He.5f.Ci.hpumpsuctiontheCVCSvolumecontroi~anR(VCT)totheRWSTthroughtheusisolationva.'LvWs.EachsetofisolationvalvesisinteresothattheVCTisolationalveswillbeintocloce'Sisot'alvevgnRTlaionsarefullyopen.SietheVCTisunressure,thepreferredpumctionwillbefromtheVtilthetankisisol.Thiswillresultinadelayinob'gtheRoratedwater.Theeffectsofthisdelayaredissedamdtherecirculationmodeisenterewarto>>ransferredtothecotainmentsumpUseoasingletosupplybotrainsoftheanContainmentSpraySystemisacceptabl'esincetheRWSTisapassivecomponent,andpassivefailuresarenotrequiredtobeassumedtooccurcoincidentallywithDesignBasisEvents.itchoverfromnormaloperationtotheinjectio~paseofECCS.ationrequireschangingcentrifugachargingM~CL%W'AAJE~Cp~~~~~~~a%~~~a+a~~~W~~~O~Y.~Ad4a.~M~~S~(continued)S'l,t.t.,a~ntheApplicableSafetyAnalysessectionoftheseBases.~'J.s'.Isgoringnormal.operationinNODESl,2,and3,thesafetyinjection(SI)andresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumpsarealignedtotakesuctionfromtheRWST.Cvma~tv.v~TheECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumpsareprovidedwithrecirculationlinesthatensureeachpumpcanmaintainminimumflowrequirementswhenoeratinatornetof.headconditions.~~~~~o~it~~~~~R-ApB3.5-24 Insert3.5.18AcommonsupplyheaderisusedfromtheRWSTtothesafetyinjection(SI)andContainmentSpraySystempumps.Aseparatesupplyheaderisusedfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.IsolationvalvesandcheckvalvesareusedtoisolatetheRWSTfromtheECCSandContainmentSpraySystempriortotransferringtotherecirculationmode.Insert3.5.19TheRWSTislocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichisnormallymaintainedbetween50Fand104F(Ref.1).ThesemoderatetemperaturesprovideadequatemarginwithrespecttopotentialfreezingoroverheatingoftheboratedwatercontainedintheRWST.

BASESRWSTB3.5.4~+AMpu~BACKGROUND(continued)58.ii4WhenthesuctionfortheECCSandContainmentSpraySypumpsistransferredtothecontainmentsump,theRWSTflowpathsmustbeisolatedtopreventareleaseofthecontainmentsumpcontentstotheRWST,whichcouldresultinareleaseofcontaminantstothehere"andtheeventuallossofsuctionheadfortheECCSpumps.Qlhihk'l~gThisLCOensuresthat:<.ii~<'~~~~~WPzH+~~<<Mpu~a.TheRWSTcontainssufficientboratedwatertosupporttheECCSduringtheinjectionphase;b.SufficientwatervolumeexistsinthecontainmentsumptosupportcontinuedoperationoftheECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumpsatthetimeoftransfertotherecirculationmodeofcooling;andc.ThereactorremainssubcriticalfollowingaLOCA.InsufficientwaterintheRWSTcouldresultinwhenthetransfertotherecirculaionmodeoccurs.mproperboronconcentrationscouldresultinareductionofSDMorexcessiveboricacidprecipitationinthecorefollowingtheLOCA,aswellasexcessivecausticstresscorrosionofmechanicalcomponentsandsystemsinsidethecontainment.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringaccidentconditions,theRWSTprovidesasourceofboratedwatertotheECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumps.Assuch,itprovidescontainmentcoolinganddepressurization,corecooling,andreplacementinventoryandisasourceofnegativereactivityforreactorshutdown(Ref.+2ThedesignbasistransientsandapplicablesafetyanalysesconcerningeachofthesesystemsarediscussedintheApplicableSafetyAnalysessectionofB3.5.2,"ECCS-Operating";83.5.3,"ECCS-Shutdown";andB3.6.6,"ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems."TheseanalysesareusedtoassesschangestotheRWSTinordertoevaluatetheireffectsinrelationtotheacceptancelimitsintheanalyses.TheRWSTmustalsomeetvolume,boronconcentration,andtemperaturerequirementsfornon-LOCAevents.Thevolumeisnotanexplicitassumptioninnon-LOCAeventssincetheB3.5-25(continued) BASES&l.s.i6RWSTB3.5.4~~~)~~~Z~<~C<~bma~pAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)analsistoensuretherequiredshutdowncaability~TheVtstovaem-RcsrequiredG~I&isasmallfractionoftheavailablevolume.*ThedeliverablevolumelimitissetbytheLOCAandcontainmentanalses.FortheRWSTtdel'verablevolumeoavoumecontaine'thedesignofthetnba.'anheminimumoronconcentrationisanexplicitassumptioninthemainsteamlinebreak(HSL~So~Lo4~w,tcgLk~opsx~o~oW~~~0.vva,v~~s.~~1vaueissmaorunitsoninjectiontank(BITwiconcentration.ForunitswithnoucedBITboronrequireoronconcentrationlimitisanimporanassumptioninensuringereuiresuowncapability.ThemaximumpronrationisanexiciassumioinertentECCSacuaionanaysis,althoughitistypicaonlimitingeventandtheresultsveryinsensitivetoconcentrations.TaximumtemperatureensuresthaamocoolingprovidedfromtheRWSTduringtheheatuafeedlinebreakisconsistentwithsaanalysisassump'heminimumisanassumpti'ththeNSLBandinadvertenactu'nalyses,althoughtheinadvertentECCSacentisticallnonlimiting.g{,tttTLBanalysishasconsideredadelayassociatedwithinterloctweentheVCTandRWSTisolationvalvestheresultsshowthedeparturefromnucleate'ngdesign~~~~'asisismet.Thehasbeenestabl's[27]seconds,withoffsiwera'le,or[37]secondswithoutoffsitepower.Thissetimeincludes[2]secondsforelectro'elay,asecondstroketime'ortheRWSTvalv,anda[10]secondstrtimefortheVCTvalves.ntswithaBITneednotbeconcewiththedesincetheBITwillsupplyhighlyboratedwatoRWSTswitchover,providedtheBITisbetweenthepumpsandthecore.KthaAuJ~ForalarebreakLOCAanalysis,thewatervolumelimitofaallonsandthelowerboronconcentrationlimitof+000~pmareusedtocomputethepostLOCAsumpboronconcentrationnecessarytoassuresubcriticality.ThelargebreakLOCAisthelimitingcasesincethesafetyanalysisassumesthatallcontrolrodsareoutofthecore.g,BooTheupperlimitonboronconcetrationof~~ppmisusedtodetermine=.Za,z(continued)B3.5-26

Insert3.5.20isselectedsuchthatswitchovertorecirculationdoesnotoccuruntilsufficientwaterhasbeenpumpedintocontainmenttoprovidenecessaryNPSHfortheRHRpumps.Insert3.5.22thetimeframeinwhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThemaximumboronconcentrationlimitisbasedonthecoldestexpectedtemperatureoftheRWSTwatervolumeandonchemicaleffectsresultingfromoperationoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpraySystem.Avalueof2,900ppmwouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheRWSTassuminganAuxiliaryBuildingtemperatureof50F(Ref.1).Analysesperformedinresponseto10CFR50.49(Ref.2)assumedachemicalspraysolutionof2000to3000ppmboronconcentration(Ref.1)whichprovidesamarginof100ppm.ThechemicalspraysolutionimpactssumppHandtheresultingeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.ThesumppHalsoaffectstherateofhydrogengenerationwithincontainmentduetotheinteractionofContainmentSprayandsumpfluidwithaluminumcomponents, 00 RWSTB3.5.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)recircuwingaLOCA.ThepurofromcoldlegtohotsoavoidboronsnthecorefollowieatheECCSanalysis,thecontainmentspraytemperaturessassutobeequaltotheRWSTlowertemperaturelimit[35]'F.thelowertemperaturelimitisviolatedecontainmentayfurtherreducescontainmentpsure,whichdecreasesrateatwhichsteamcanventedoutthebreakandincreapeakcladtempeure.Theuppertemperaturelimitof[I'FisusenthesmallbreakLOCAanalysisandcontainmentOPYanalysis.Exceedingthistemperaturewillresunigherpeakcladtemperature,becauseteislesshtransferfromthecoretotheinjectwaterforthesmaleakLOCAandhighercontainpressuresduetoreducedtainmentspraycool'apacity.Forthecontainmentressefollow'nHSLB,thelowerlimitonboronconcentr'onaeupperlimitonRWSTwatertemperatureareusedaximizethetotalenergyreleasetocontainment.TheRWSTsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheRWSTensuresthatanadequatesupplyofboratedwaterisavailabletocoolanddepressurizethecontainmentintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),tocoolandcoverthecoreintheeventofaLOCA,tomaintainthereactorsubcriticalfollowingaDBA,andtoensureadequatelevelinthecontainmentsumptosupportECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumpoperationintherecirculationmode.TobecopsideredOPERABLE,theRWSTmustmeetthewater'1i~litestablishedintheSRs.hAPPLICABILITYInHODESI,2,3,and4,RWSTOPERABILITYrequirementsaredictatedbyECCSandContainmentSpraySystemOPERABILITYrequirements.SinceboththeECCSandtheContainmentSpraySystemmustbeOPERABLEinHODESI,2,3,and4,theRWSTmustalsobeOPERABLEtosupporttheiroperation.CorecoolingrequirementsinHODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSB3.5-27(continued)

RWSTB3.5.4BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)Loops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."NODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.5,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevel,"andLCO3.9.6,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-LowWaterLevel."ACTIONSA.1WithRWSTboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits,CgfaustbereurnetowithinimMiswithin8hours.UndertheseconditionsneithertheECCSnortheContainmentSpraySystemcanperformitsdesignfunction.Therefore,promptactionmustbetakentorestorethetanktoOPERABLEcondition.The8hourlimittorestoretheRWSTboronconcentrationtowithinlimitswasdevelopedconsleringthetimerequiredtochange~~theboronconcentrationandthefactthatthecontentsofthetankarest>11av'ailableforinjection.8.1ma~votal~h~~KiwuhanWiththeRWSTinoperaeorreasonsotherthanConditionAe.g.,waervolumelmustberesoreosauswl1nour.InthisCondition,neithertheECCSnortheContainmentSpraySystemcanperformitsdesignfunction.Therefore,promptactionmustbetakentorestorethetanktoOPERABLEstatusortoplacetheplantinaNODEinwhichtheRWSTisnotrequired.TheshorttimelimitofIhourtorestoretheRWSTtoOPERABLEstatusisbasedonthisconditionsimultaneouslyaffectingredundanttrains.C.landC.2IftheRWSTcannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3within6hoursandtoNODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfull(continued)B3.5-28

RWSTB3.5.4BASESACTIONSC.1andC.2(continued)powerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSS5.4.1TheRWSTborwatertemperatureshouldbever'devery24hourstobew~'helimitsassumedieaccidentanalysesband.Thisencyissuff'nttoidentifyatemperaturechangethatwoupeitherlimitandhasbeenshowntobeacceptableoperatingexperience.TheSRismodifiedaNotethateliminaherequirementtoperformthiurveillancewhenambientairraturesarewithieoperatinglimitsoftheRWST.Witha'taireratureswithintheband,theRWSTtemperatureuldnotexceedthelimits.~555.5.4.TheRWSTwatervolumeshouldbeverifiedevery7daystobeabovetherequiredminimumlevelinordertoensurethatasufficientinitialsupplyisavailableforinjectionandtosupportcontinuedECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumpoperationonrecirculation.SincetheRWSTvolumeisnormaystaeana7dayFrequencyisappropriateandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.5.4MTheboronconcentrationoftheRWSTshouldbeverifiedevery7daystobewithintherequiredlimits.ThisSRensuresthatthereactorwillremainsubcriticalfollowingaLOCA.Further,itassuresthattheresultingsumppHwillbemaintainedinanacceptablerangesothatboronprecipitationinthecorewillnotoccurandtheeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponentswillbeminimized.SincetheRWSTvolumeisnormallystable,a7daysamplingFrequencytoverifyboron(continued)B3.5-29

RWSTB3.5.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.5.4.3(continued)concentrationisappropriateandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.REFERENCESs'a~~(o.3FSAR,4hay4ev~andChapter$15+uP~OAm~om2.)liscFR.So.~g83.5-30 QssSealInjectionFlowB3.5.B3.EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.5SealInjectionFlowBASESBACKGROUNDThisLCOisapplicableonlytothoseunitsatutilizethecentrifugalchargingpumpsforsafetyinjtion(SI).TheunctionofthesealinjectionthrottleivesduringanacidentissimilartothefunctionofeECCSthrottlevaesinthateachrestrictsflowfrthecentrifugalchaingpumpheadertotheReactoroolantSystem(RCS).Thererictiononreactorcoolanpump(RCP)sealinjectionflowli'tstheamountofECCSowthatwouldbedivertedfromthe'njectionpathfollow'nganaccident.ThislimitisbasedosafetyanalysissumptionsthatarerequiredbecauseRCPealinjectionowisnotisolatedduringSI.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESAllECCSsubsystesatakencreditforinthelargebreaklossofcoolaccident(LOCA)atfullpower(Ref.I).TheLOCnalysisestablishestheminimumflowfortheECCSpump.hecentrifugalchargingpumpsarealsocreditedinthemallreakLOCAanalysis.Thisanalysisestablishesthflowandischargeheadatthedesignpointforthecentfugalchar'ngpumps.Thesteamgeneratortuberupturandmainstealinebreakeventanalysesalsocreditthcentrifugalcharingpumps,butarenotlimitingintheirdesign.Referencetheseanalysesismadeinassess'changestotheSealnjectionSystemforevaltionoftheireffectsinelationtotheacceptancelim'intheseanalyses.isLCOensuresthatsealinjectioflowofZ[40]gpm,ithcentrifugalchargingpumpdischrgeheaderpressure>{2480]psigandchargingflowcontrvalvefullopen,willbesufficientforRCPsealintegriybutlimitedsothattheECCStrainswillbecapableofeliveringsufficientwatertomatchboiloffratessnenoughtominimizeuncoveringofthecorefollowinglargeLOCA.ItalsoensuresthatthecentrifugalchargingpmpswilldeliversufficientwaterforasmallLOCAandufficientborontomaintainthecoresubcritical.ForslierLOCAs,thechargingpumpsalonedeliversufficientfluitoovercomethelossandmaintainRCSinventory.Se1(coninued)B3.5-31R BASSealInjectionFloB3..5APPLICAESAFETYALYSES(continud)injectionflowsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPicyStatement.LCOTheintentoftheLCOlimitonsealinjectonflowistomakesurethatflowthroughtheRCPsealaterinjectionineislowenoughtoensurethatsuffientcentrifugalcargingpumpinjectionflowisdirectdtotheRCSviathein'ectionpoints(Ref.2).TheL0isnotstrictlyaflowlim't,butratheraflowlimitasedonaflowlineresisnce.Inordertoestablitheproperflowlinesistance,apressureandflowmusbeknown.TheflowineresistanceisdeterminedbyassuminthattheRCSpreureisatnormaloperatingpressureanthatthecentr'galchargingpumpdischargepressureiseaterthanoequaltothevaluespecifiedinthisLCO.Thecentrifugchargingpumpdischargeheaderpressureremainessent'lyconstantthroughalltheapplicableMODESfth'sLCO.AreductioninRCSpressurewouldresultinmeowbeingdivertedtotheRCPsealinjectionlinethantnormaloperatingpressure.ThevalvesettingsestablishdattheprescribedcentrifugalchargingpumpdischargehederressureresultinaconservativevalvepositionouldSpressuredecrease.Theadditionalmodifierofth'sLCO,thcontrolvalve(chargingflowforfourloopunisandairoratedsealinjectionforthreeloopunits)eingfullopeisrequiredsincethevalveisdesignedtfailopenforthaccidentcondition.Miththedischargpressureandcontrovalvepositionasspecifiedbythe0,aflowlimitisesblished.Itisthisflowlimitatisusedintheaccidtanalyses.Theimitonsealinjectionflow,ombinedwiththecetrifugalchargingpumpdischargeeaderpressurelimitdanopenwideconditionofthechagingflowcontrolalve,mustbemettorendertheECCSPERABLE.Iftheseconditionsarenotmet,theECCSfloww11notbeasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.APPLICABITYInNODESI,2,and3,thesealinjectionflowimitisdictatedbyECCSflowrequirements,whicharesecifiedfor(ntinued)B3.5-32

~ssSealInjectionFlow'~B3.5BASESAPPLICABILTY(continue)NODESI,2,3,and4.Thesealinjectionflow1im'snotapplicableforHODE4andlower,however,becauseighsealinjectionflowislesscriticalasaresultofelowerinitialRCSpressureanddecayheatremovalreirementsintheseNODES.Therefore,RCPsealinjectionfowmustbelimitedinNODESI,2,and3toensureadeqteECCSerformance.ACTIONSA.1Withtsealinjectionflowexceengitslimit,theamountofchar'ngflowavailabletotheCSmaybereduced.UnderthisCond'tion,actionmustbetentorestoretheflowtobelowits'mit.Theoperatoras4hoursfromthetimetheflowisknotobeabovetheimittocorrectlypositionthemanualvavesandthusbincompliancewiththeaccidentanalyis.TheColetionTimeminimizestheotentialexoseofthelanttoaLOCAwithinsufficientingectionowansealinjectionflow~iMw1imig<ThistimeisconservativewithrcttotheCompletionTimesofotherECCSLCOs;itisbasonoperatingexperienceandissufficientfortak'orrectiveactionsbyoperationspersonnel.B.landB.2WhentheRuiredActionscantbecompletedwithintherequiredompletionTime,acorolledshutdownmustbeinitiat.TheCompletionTimef6hoursforreachingNODE3romNODEIisareasonabltimeforacontrolledshutdn,basedonoperatingexpernceandnormalcooldownrat,anddoesnotchallengeplantafetysystemsor'pators.ContinuingtheplantshutownbeguninRequiredAionB.1,anadditional6hoursisareasonabletime,asedonoperatingexperienceandnormacooldownrates,toreachNODE4,wherethisLCOisnolongeapplicable.B3.5-33R

BASES(continued)SealInjectionFlowB3.5SURVEILLAEREQUIREHENSR3.5.5.1Verificationevery31daysthatthemanualsealnjectionthrottlevalvesareadjustedtogiveaflowwiinthelimitensuresthatpropermanualsealinjectionthrttlevalveposition,andhence,propersealinjectionfow,isaintained.TheFrequencyof31daysisbedongineeringjudgmentandisconsistentwiotherECCSvalveSuveillanceFrequencies.TheFrequencyhasproventobeacctablethroughoperatingexperienc.Asnod,theSurveillanceisnotreuiredtobeperformeduntil4hoursaftertheRCSpressurhasstabilizedwithina+20psirangeofnormaloperatipressure.TheRCSpressurequirementisspecificsincethisconfigurationwillproductherequiredpresreconditionsnecessarytoassurethatemanualvalvesresetcorrectly.Theexceptionis'mitedto4horstoensurethattheSurveillanceistimely.REFERENCES1.FSAR,Chapter2.10CFR50.46.andChapter[15].B3.5-34 BITB3.5.6i83.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.6BoronInjectionTank(BIT)BASESBACKGROUNDTheBITispartoftheBoronInjectionSystemwhichistherimarymeansofquicklyintroducingnegativreactivitytotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)onaafetyinjection()signal.TheinflowpaththroughtheBoronIectionSystemisfromedischargeofthecentrifugalchargingpumpsthroughlineseuippedwithaflowelementadtwovalvesinparallelthatopenonanSIsignal.Thevalvescanbeoperatedomthemaincontrolbod.Thevalvesandflowelementshaemaincontrolboardindications.Downstreamofthesevalves,theflowenterseBIT(Ref.I).TheBITisastinlesssteeltankcontainingconcentratedboricacid.Twotrainsoftripheatersaremountedonthetanktokeepthemperatreoftheboricacidsolutionabovetheprecipitaionoint.ThestripheatersarecontrolledbytemperteelementslocatednearthebottomoftheBIT.ThetempatureelementsalsoactivateHighandLowalarmsonthemnontrolboard.InadditiontothestripheatersonteBIT,thereisarecirculationsystemwithaheattrac'systeincludingthepipingsectionbetweenthemotoperated'solationvalves,whichfurtherensuresthatteboricacidtaysinsolution.TheBITisalsoequippewithaHighPreurealarmonthemaincontrolboard.TheentirecontentsofheBITareinjectedwhenrequired;hus,thecontainedandeliverablevolumesarethesameDurinnormaloperation,oneofthewoBITrecirculationpumptakessuctionfromtheboronin'tionsurgetank(BT)anddischargestotheBIT.TheolutionthenreturnsttheBIST.Normally,onepumpisrunn'ngandoneisshutff.OnreceiptofanSIsignal,theruningpumpshutsoffandtheairoperatedvalvesclose.FlowttheBITisthensuppliedfromthecentrifugalchargingpumpsThesolutionoftheBITisinjectedintotheRCSthroughtRCScoldlegs.B3.5-35(contined) BIB3.56BAS(continued)APPLICALESAFETYALYSESDuringamainsteamlinebreak(MSLB)orlossofcolantaccident(LOCA),theBITprovidesanimmediatesrceofconcentratedboricacidthatquicklyintroducesegativereactivityintotheRCS.ThecontentsoftheBITarenotcreditedfocorecoolingorimmediateborationintheLOCAanalysis,btforpostLOCArecovery.TheBITmaximumboronconcenttionof22,500]ppmisusedtodeterminethem'nimumtimeforhot1recirculationswitchover.Themimumboroncoentrationof[20,000]ppmisusetodeterminetheminiummixedmeansumpboronconcetrationforpostLOCAshutdnrequirements.FortheSLBanalysis,theBIT'stheprimarymechanismforinjectingoronintothecoreocounteractanypositiveincreasesireactivitycausdbyanRCScooldown.TheanalysisusetheminimumbronconcentrationoftheBIT;whichalsoafctsbothtdeparturefromnucleateboilingandcontainmentdesignaalyses.ReferencetotheLOCAandMSLBanalysesissedassesschangestotheBITtoevaluatetheirefctntheacceptancelimitscontainedintheseanalyses.Theminimumtempeturlimitof[l45]'FfortheBITensuresthatthesolutiodoestreachtheboricacidprecipitationint.Thetemperatureofthesolutionismonitoredandalarmedontemaincontrolboard.TheBITbonconcentration'mitsareestablishedtoensurethattheoreremainssubcritialduringpostLOCArecovery.TheBITillcounteractanyposiveincreasesinreactivitycausedyanRCScooldown.TheITminimumwatervolumelimit[1100]gallonsisusedtoensurethattheappropriatequantiofhighlyboratedwterwithsufficientnegativereactivyisinjectedintoheRCStoshutdownthecorefollowingnMSLB,todeterminethehotlegrecirculationswitcovertime,andtosafeguardagainstboronprecipitation.TheBITsatisfiesCriteria2and3oftheNRColicyStatement.(contined)83.5-36 BITB3.5.BAS(continued)LCOThisLCOestablishestheminimumrequirementsforctainedvolume,boronconcentration,andtemperatureofthBITinventory(Ref.2).ThisensuresthatanadequasupplyofboratedwaterisavailableintheeventofaLOorHSLBtomaintainthereactorsubcriticalfollowingtheeaccidents.TobeconsideredOPERABLE,thelimitsestabshedintheSRorwatervolume,boronconcentration,andtemperaturemustbmet.IfeequipmentusedtoverifyBITpaameters(temperature,volumandboronconcentration)isterminedtobeinoperle,thentheBITisalsoinerable.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,and3,theBITERABILITYrequirementsareconsistentwitthoseofLCO.5.2,"ECCS-Operating."InNODES4,5,an6,theespectiveaccidentsarelesssevere,sotheBIisnorequiredintheselowerMODES.ACTIONSA,lIftherequiredvlumeisntpresentintheBIT,boththehotlegrecircutionswitchvertimeanalysisandtheboronprecipitationnalysiswouldntbemet.Undertheseconditions,omptactionmustetakentorestorethevolumetoaoveitsrequiredlimstodeclarethetankOPERABLE,rtheplantmustbeplaedinaMODEinwhichtheBITisnrequired.TheBIboronconcentrationisconsidedinthehotlegrecirulationswitchovertimeanalysis,heboronpreipitationanalysis,andthereactivitanalysisforanMSB.Iftheconcentrationwerenotwithitherequiredmits,theseanalysescouldnotbereliedo.Undertheseconditions,promptactionmustbetakentoreoretheconcentrationtowithinitsrequiredlimits,ortheplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheBITisnotequired.TheBITtemperaturelimitisestablishedtoensureatthesolutiondoesnotreachthebo}icacidcrystallizatiopoint.Ifthetemperatureofthesolutiondropsbelowthe(continueB3.5-37R 0 BASBITB3.5ACTIONSA.I(continued)minimum,promptactionmustbetakentoraisethtemperatureanddeclarethetankOPERABLE,oreplantmustbeplacedinaHODEinwhichtheBITisnotruired.TheIhourCompletionTimetorestoretheBtoOPERABLEstatusisconsistentwithotherCompletioTimesestablishedorlossofasafetyfunctionandensurethattheplantw1notoperateforlongperiodsoutsieofthesafetyanayses.B.IB.andB.3WhenRequedActionA.1cannotecompletedwithintherequiredCpletionTime,acotrolledshutdownshouldbeinitiated.ixhoursisarsonabletime,basedonoperatingexpience,torehHODE3fromfullpowerconditionsandobeboratdtotherequiredSDHwithoutchallengingplansystemsoroperators.BoratingtotherequiredSDHassuiesthgtheplantisinasafecondition,withoutneedforah,a6itionalboration.AfterdeterminingththeBITisinoperableandtheRequiredActionsofB.andB.2havebeencompleted,thetankmustberetuedtOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.TheseactionsenurethattheplantwillnotbeoperatedwithaninoperleBITforalengthyperiodoftime.ItshouldbenotlI,however,ttchangestoapplicableHODEScannotbemaeuntiltheBIT'srestoredtoOPERABLEstatuspursuanttotheprovisionsofCO3.0.4.C.1EvenhoughtheRCShasbeenboratedoasafeandstableconitionasaresultofRequiredActinB.2,eithertheBITmtberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus(ReuiredActionC.l)oreplantmustbeplacedinaconditionswhichtheBITisnotrequired(HODE4).The12hourCompleionTimetoreachHODE4isreasonable,basedonoperatingexerienceandnormalcooldownrates,anddoesnotchallengplantsafetysystemsoroperators.83.5-38(coninued) BB3..6BAS(continued)SURVEILLNCERE(UIREMTSSR3.5.6.1Verificationevery24hoursthattheBITwateremperatureisatorabovethespecifiedminimumtemperatreisfrequentenoughtoidentifyatemperaturechangethawouldapproachtheacceptablelimit.Thesolutiontemperureisalsomonitoredbyanalarmthatprovidesfurtrassuranceofprotectionagainstlowtemperature.Th'requencyhasbeenowntobeacceptablethroughoperatigexperience.SR.5.6.2Verifitionevery7daysthateBITcontainedvolumeisabovethrequiredlimitisfrquentenoughtoassurethatthisvoluwillbeavailablforquickinjectionintotheRCS.Iftvolumeistooow,theBITwouldnotprovideenoughboratdwatertoenuresubcriticalityduringrecirculationrtoshutownthecorefollowinganHSLB.SincetheBITlumeisormallystable,a7dayFrequencyisappropriateadhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperieceSR3.5.6.3Verificationery7dathattheboronconcentrationoftheBITisw'inthereqiredbandensuresthatthereactorremainssubriticalfollowgaLOCA;itlimitsreturntopowerfolwinganHSLB,anmaintainstheresultingsumppHinanaceptablerangesothaboronprecipitationwillnotoccurithecore.Inadditiotheeffectofchlorideandcaust'cstresscorrosiononmecnicalsystemsandcompnentswillbeminimized.TeBITisinarecirculationloopatprovidescontinuousirculationoftheboricacidsolutiothroughtheBITandtheboricacidtank(BAT).Therearenumberofpointsalongtherecirculationloopwherelocasamplescanbetaken.TheactuallocationusedtotakesampleofthesolutionisspecifiedintheplantSurveilanceprocedures.SamplingfromtheBATtoverifytheconcenttionoftheBITisnotrecommended,sincethissamplemaynotbehomogenousandtheboronconcentrationofthetwotanksmdiffer.(coinued}83.5-39 BITB3.5.BASESSURVEILLAEREQUIREMENSR3.5.6.3(continued)ThesampleshouldbetakenfromtheBITorfrompointintheflowpathoftheBITrecirculationloop.REFERENCES1.FSAR,Chapter[6]andChapter[15].2.10CFR50.46.B3.5-40 ATTACHMENTECrossReferenceBetweenGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsandNUREG-1431ONLYRELEVANTSECTIONSAREPROVIDEDATTHISTINE GINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETONUREG-1431GINNASTATIONTS8NUREG-1431ATTACH.ANOTES3.3.1.1.A3.3.1.1.A3.3.1.1.A3.3.1.1.63.3.1.1.B3.3.1.1.B3.3.1.1.C3.3.1.1.D3.3.1.1.E3.3.1.1.F3.3.1.1.F3.3.1.1.F3.3.1.1.G3.3.1.1.I3.3.1.1.I3.3.1.1.J3.3.1.23.3.1.33.3.1.43.3.1.53.3.1.5.A3.3.1.5.B3.3.1.5.C3.3.1.5.D4.54.5.1.1.A4.5.1.1.B4.5.2.1.A4.5.2.1.B4.5.2.2.CTABLE4.1-1,15TABLE4.1-1,24TABLE4.1-1,24TABLE4.1-2,14TABLE4.1-2,14TABLE4.1-2,14TABLE4.1-2,3TABLE4.5-1LCO3.5.4SR3.5.4.1SR3.5.4.2LCO3.5.1LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.1LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.4LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.1SR3.5.1.5LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.4LCO3.5.1LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2SR3.5.2.5SR3.5.2.5SR3.5.2.4SR3.5.2.4SR3.5.4.1SR3.5.1.2SR3.5.1.3SR3.5.1.4SR3.5'.2SR3.5,2.313.II13.VII13.VI13.I13.III13.VIII13.II13.I13.IV32.IV32.I32.II32.II32.III28.I.A28.II.C28.II.A28.II.B28.II.D32.II*AttachmentA,SectionC.2notenumberwhichdiscussesandjustifiesallchangestotheGinnaTSsection. Sl)))l'IFI}}

ML17263A728

Text

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Navigation menu

Search