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CAC:MF6363, Clarify Application of Setpoint Methodology for LSSS Functions (Approved, Closed) |
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML23304A1422024-02-0101 February 2024 Issuance of Environmental Scoping Summary Report Associated with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staffs Review of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, & 3, Subsequent License Renewal Application ML24005A2492024-01-24024 January 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting) IR 05000269/20243012024-01-11011 January 2024 Notification of Licensed Operator Initial Examination 05000269/2024301, 05000270/2024301, and 05000287/2024301 ML23331A7982023-12-14014 December 2023 Review of the Fall 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report (01R32) ML23262A9672023-12-13013 December 2023 Alternative to Use RR-22-0174, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/Replacement Activities in Class 2 and 3 Systems Section XI, Division 1 ML23317A3462023-11-14014 November 2023 Duke Fleet - Correction Letter to License Amendment Nos. 312 & 340 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000269/20230032023-11-14014 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2023003, 05000270/2023003, and 05000287/2023003; and IR 07200040/2023001; and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion ML23219A1402023-10-10010 October 2023 Audit Report Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-752, Risk Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/Replacement Activities in Class 2 and 3 Systems XI, Division 1 ML23269A1102023-10-0606 October 2023 Letter to Steven Snider-Revised Schedule for the Environmental Review of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, 2, and 3, Subsequent License Renewal Application ML23256A0882023-09-25025 September 2023 Issuance of Alternative to Steam Generator Welds ML23195A0782023-08-29029 August 2023 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000269/20230112023-08-25025 August 2023 Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000269/2023011 and 05000270/2023011 and 05000287/2023011 IR 05000269/20230052023-08-25025 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 (Report 05000269/2023005, 05000270/2023005, and 05000287/2023005) IR 05000269/20230022023-07-28028 July 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2023002, 05000270/2023002 and 05000287/2023002 ML23208A0972023-07-27027 July 2023 Subsequent License Renewal List of Threatened and Endangered Species That May Occur in Your Proposed Project Location or May Be Affected IR 05000269/20230102023-07-19019 July 2023 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000269/2023010 and 05000270/2023010 and 05000287/2023010 and Notice of Violation ML23178A0682023-07-0303 July 2023 Audit Plan Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-752, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/Replacement Activities in Class 2 & 3 Systems Section XI, Division 1 ML23132A2392023-06-0101 June 2023 Summary of the April 2023 Remote Environmental Audit Related to the Review of the Subsequent License Renewal Application ML23144A0192023-05-25025 May 2023 Review of the Spring 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report (O3R31) IR 05000269/20230012023-05-12012 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269/2023001 and 05000270/2023001 and 05000287/2023001 ML23121A0552023-05-0303 May 2023 Acknowledgement of Withdrawal Request to Revise TS 5.5.2 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program ML23118A0762023-05-0101 May 2023 Approval for Use of Specific Provision of a Later Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI ML23117A0432023-04-20020 April 2023 Framatome, Inc., Part 21 Notification of Existence of a Defect ML23075A0732023-04-0505 April 2023 License Renewal Regulatory Audit Regarding the Environmental Review of the Subsequent License Renewal Application Supplement (EPID Number L-2021-SLE-0002) ML23045A1332023-03-15015 March 2023 Request for Scoping Comments Concerning the Supplemental Environmental Review of Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Achp Letter ML23045A1402023-03-15015 March 2023 Request for Scoping Comments Concerning the Supplemental Environmental Review of Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Shpo Letter ML23045A1432023-03-15015 March 2023 Request for Scoping Comments Concerning the Supplemental Environmental Review of Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Subsequent License Renewal Application - State Tribe Letter ML22332A4932023-03-10010 March 2023 William States Lee III 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Relocation of the Emergency Operations Facility ML23069A1102023-03-10010 March 2023 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection ML23061A1772023-03-0303 March 2023 Notification of Oconee Nuclear Station Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection - NRC Inspection Report 05000269/2023011, 05000270/2023011 and 05000287/2023011 IR 05000269/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for Oconee Nuclear Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 (NRC Inspection Report 05000269/2022006, 05000270/2022006, and 05000287/2022006) ML23039A1632023-02-0808 February 2023 Requalification Program Inspection ML23037A0772023-02-0606 February 2023 402 Cyber Notification and RFI Letter Final IR 05000269/20220042023-02-0202 February 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000269 2022004 and 05000270/2022004 and 05000287/2022004 ML22363A3942023-01-12012 January 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Environmental Report Supplement - Proposed Review Schedule ML22356A0512022-12-14014 December 2022 Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division, Letter Regarding Potential Efect in a Configuration of the 11/2 Inch Quick Disconnect Connector Cable Assemblies Supplied to Duke Energy (See Attached Spreadsheet) for a Total of 460 of Connectors Only Suppl ML22321A0492022-12-0808 December 2022 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 426, 428 and 427, Additional Mode Change Limitations Applicable to the Adoption of TSTF- 359, Revision 9, Increase Flexibility in Mode Restraints ML22329A1042022-11-29029 November 2022 Review of the Fall 2021 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML22321A1582022-11-22022 November 2022 Summary of Conference Call Regarding the Fall 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspections ML22096A0032022-11-18018 November 2022 McGuire Nuclear Station and Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Authorization of RA-19-0352 Regarding Use of Alternative for RPV Head Closure Stud Examinations ML22256A2532022-11-14014 November 2022 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-541, Rev. 2 IR 05000269/20220032022-11-0707 November 2022 Integrated Inspection Station 05000269/2022003 and 05000270/2022003 and 05000287/2022003 ML22301A0112022-11-0303 November 2022 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure Regarding the SLR Application - September 2, 2022 ML22298A0752022-10-27027 October 2022 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure Regarding the Subsequent License Renewal Application Duke Energy Letter Dated July 25, 2022 ML22264A0322022-10-20020 October 2022 _Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure Regarding the Subsequent License Renewal Application - Duke Energy Letter Dated July 8, 2022 IR 05000269/20220112022-09-26026 September 2022 NRC Inspection Report 05000269/2022011 and 05000270/2022011 and 05000287/2022011 ML22258A0302022-09-15015 September 2022 Evacuation Time Estimate Reports ML22222A0072022-09-14014 September 2022 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure Regarding the Subsequent License Renewal Application ML22231B1362022-09-0101 September 2022 Review of the Draft Environmental Assessment and Findings of No Significant Impact for Catawba Nuclear Station, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, and Oconee Nuclear Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Decommissioning Fundi ML22234A0062022-08-30030 August 2022 SLRA - Closed Public Meeting Summary - August 18, 2022 2024-02-01
[Table view] Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARRA-23-0275, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Appendix E, Responses to Requests for Additional Information (Rai), and Request for Confirmation of Information (RCI)2023-10-12012 October 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application, Appendix E, Responses to Requests for Additional Information (Rai), and Request for Confirmation of Information (RCI) RA-23-0136, Duke Energy Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative for Steam Generator Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)2023-07-20020 July 2023 Duke Energy Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative for Steam Generator Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) RA-23-0154, Duke Energy - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative for Pressurizer Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)2023-07-20020 July 2023 Duke Energy - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative for Pressurizer Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) RA-23-0142, Mcguire, Units 1 and 2, Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3, H. B. Robinson, Unit 2, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Restrictive Technical Specification Surveillance Require2023-07-0707 July 2023 Mcguire, Units 1 and 2, Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3, H. B. Robinson, Unit 2, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Restrictive Technical Specification Surveillance Require RA-23-0146, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Appendix E, Responses to Requests for Additional Information (Rai), and Request for Confirmation of Information (RCI)2023-06-20020 June 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application, Appendix E, Responses to Requests for Additional Information (Rai), and Request for Confirmation of Information (RCI) RA-23-0104, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Oconee Unit 3, Refuel 31 (O3R31) Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2023-04-26026 April 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Oconee Unit 3, Refuel 31 (O3R31) Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report RA-23-0051, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Proposed Alternative to Use American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Case N-752, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/Replacement Activities2023-03-0909 March 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Proposed Alternative to Use American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Case N-752, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/Replacement Activities RA-22-0270, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Address Technical Specifications Mode Change Limitations2022-10-0707 October 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Address Technical Specifications Mode Change Limitations RA-22-0192, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to ONS SLRA Second Round RAI B2.1.7-4a2022-09-0202 September 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to ONS SLRA Second Round RAI B2.1.7-4a RA-22-0160, Subsequent License Renewal Application: Responses to ONS SLRA - Second Round RAIs - Trp 76 (Irradiation Structural) - FE 3.5.2.2.2.62022-07-25025 July 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application: Responses to ONS SLRA - Second Round RAIs - Trp 76 (Irradiation Structural) - FE 3.5.2.2.2.6 RA-22-0193, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to ONS SLRA Second Round RAI B2.1.7-4b2022-07-0808 July 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to ONS SLRA Second Round RAI B2.1.7-4b RA-22-0158, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Response to ONS SLRA Second Round RAI B2.1.9-2a2022-06-0808 June 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Response to ONS SLRA Second Round RAI B2.1.9-2a RA-22-0159, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to ONS SLRA Request for Additional Information (RAI) 3.1.2-12022-05-27027 May 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to ONS SLRA Request for Additional Information (RAI) 3.1.2-1 RA-22-0137, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to ONS SLRA Second Round RAI 4.6.1-1a2022-05-20020 May 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to ONS SLRA Second Round RAI 4.6.1-1a RA-22-0147, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request for Relocating the Duke Energy Emergency Operations Facility2022-05-13013 May 2022 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request for Relocating the Duke Energy Emergency Operations Facility RA-22-0145, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to NRC Requests for Confirmation of Information - RAI 3.5.2.2.2.6-L2022-05-11011 May 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to NRC Requests for Confirmation of Information - RAI 3.5.2.2.2.6-L RA-22-0124, Subsequent License Renewal Application Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information Set 42022-04-22022 April 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information Set 4 RA-22-0129, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Response to ONS SLRA 2nd Round RAI B4.1-32022-04-20020 April 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application, Response to ONS SLRA 2nd Round RAI B4.1-3 RA-22-0089, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.7, Low Pressure Service Water System, to Extend the Completion Time for One Required Inoperable LPSW2022-04-14014 April 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.7, Low Pressure Service Water System, to Extend the Completion Time for One Required Inoperable LPSW RA-22-0111, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Follow-up Request for Additional Information Set 2 and 3 Updates2022-03-31031 March 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application, Follow-up Request for Additional Information Set 2 and 3 Updates RA-22-0105, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Responses to NRC Requests for Confirmation of Information - Set 42022-03-22022 March 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Responses to NRC Requests for Confirmation of Information - Set 4 ML22075A2032022-03-11011 March 2022 Email from Duke to NRC - Follow-Up Items from March 7, 2022 Public Meeting ML22074A0022022-03-11011 March 2022 Email from Duke to NRC - Follow-up Item from March 7, 2022 Public Meeting - SSW Tendon AMP RA-22-0040, Subsequent License Renewal Application: Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information Set 32022-02-21021 February 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application: Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information Set 3 RA-22-0023, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Response to NRC Requests for Confirmation of Information - Set 32022-01-21021 January 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Response to NRC Requests for Confirmation of Information - Set 3 RA-22-0025, Supplemental Information for Relief Request to Utilize an Alternative Acceptance Criteria for Code Case, PWR Class 1 Primary Piping Alloy 600 Full Penetration Branch Connection Weld Metal Buildup for Material2022-01-20020 January 2022 Supplemental Information for Relief Request to Utilize an Alternative Acceptance Criteria for Code Case, PWR Class 1 Primary Piping Alloy 600 Full Penetration Branch Connection Weld Metal Buildup for Material RA-21-0332, Subsequent License Renewal Application Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information Set 1 and Second Round Request for Additional Information B2.1.27-1a2022-01-0707 January 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information Set 1 and Second Round Request for Additional Information B2.1.27-1a ML22019A1182022-01-0707 January 2022 Enclosures 1,2 & 3: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Appendix E, Environmental Report - Index of Duke Energy'S Responses, Responses to NRC Requests for Confirmation of Information and NRC Reque ML22019A1232022-01-0707 January 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application, Appendix E, Responses to Requests for Additional Information and Request for Confirmation of Information ML22019A1202022-01-0707 January 2022 Appendix K ML22019A1192022-01-0707 January 2022 Appendix 1-A - Oconee Nuclear Station 122.21(r)(2)-(13) Submittal Requirement Checklist ML22019A1242022-01-0707 January 2022 Attachment 1: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Appendix E - HDR, Inc., 2020 Clean Water Act Documents ML22019A1212022-01-0707 January 2022 Appendix 13-B Peer Reviewer Communication Log ML22019A1222022-01-0707 January 2022 Calculation of Permeability by the Falling Head Method RA-22-0002, Appendix 10-B - Pump and Pipe Selection Calculations for a Hypothetical Cooling Tower Retrofit at Oconee Nuclear Station2022-01-0707 January 2022 Appendix 10-B - Pump and Pipe Selection Calculations for a Hypothetical Cooling Tower Retrofit at Oconee Nuclear Station ML22007A0152022-01-0707 January 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application, Appendix E Responses to Requests for Additional Information (Rai), and Request for Confirmation of Information RA-21-0325, Response to NRC Requests for Confirmation of Information - Set 22021-12-17017 December 2021 Response to NRC Requests for Confirmation of Information - Set 2 RA-21-0307, Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to NRC Requests for Confirmation of Information - Set 12021-12-0202 December 2021 Subsequent License Renewal Application Response to NRC Requests for Confirmation of Information - Set 1 RA-21-0269, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative Request to Utilize American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case OMN-282021-11-0909 November 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative Request to Utilize American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case OMN-28 RA-21-0270, Response to Second Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Relief Request to Utilize an Alternative Acceptance Criteria for Code Case N-8532021-10-28028 October 2021 Response to Second Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Relief Request to Utilize an Alternative Acceptance Criteria for Code Case N-853 RA-21-0242, Response to Request for Additional Information, Regarding Relief Request to Utilize an Alternative Acceptance Criteria for Code Case N-853, PWR Class 1 Primary Piping Alloy 600 Full Penetration Branch Connection2021-08-31031 August 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information, Regarding Relief Request to Utilize an Alternative Acceptance Criteria for Code Case N-853, PWR Class 1 Primary Piping Alloy 600 Full Penetration Branch Connection RA-21-0219, Response to Request for Additional Information for Request for Alternative for Implementation of Extended Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection Intervals2021-08-0505 August 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information for Request for Alternative for Implementation of Extended Reactor Vessel Inservice Inspection Intervals RA-21-0063, 1, 2; Catawba Nuclear Station 1, 2; H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 2; Mcgguire Nuclear Station 1, 2; Oconee Nuclear Station 1, 2, 3; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 1 - Response to RAI Re Amend for Emergency Plan2021-03-11011 March 2021 1, 2; Catawba Nuclear Station 1, 2; H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 2; Mcgguire Nuclear Station 1, 2; Oconee Nuclear Station 1, 2, 3; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 1 - Response to RAI Re Amend for Emergency Plan RA-21-0032, Duke Energy - Response to Requests for Additional Info for Request to Use a Provision of Later Edition & Addenda of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for Repair/Replacement Activities in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(42021-02-11011 February 2021 Duke Energy - Response to Requests for Additional Info for Request to Use a Provision of Later Edition & Addenda of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for Repair/Replacement Activities in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4)( RA-20-0267, Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise Oconee Nuclear Station Current Licensing Basis for High Energy Line Breaks Outside of Containment Building - Responses to Request for Additional Information2020-09-17017 September 2020 Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise Oconee Nuclear Station Current Licensing Basis for High Energy Line Breaks Outside of Containment Building - Responses to Request for Additional Information RA-19-0281, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information for the Fall 2018 Oconee Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Inspection Report (RA-19-0093)2019-07-31031 July 2019 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information for the Fall 2018 Oconee Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Inspection Report (RA-19-0093) RA-19-0301, Proposed Amendment to Renewed Facility Operating Licenses Regarding Revisions to Final Safety Analysis Report Sections Associated with Oconee Tornado Licensing Basis -Responses to Request for Additional Information2019-07-31031 July 2019 Proposed Amendment to Renewed Facility Operating Licenses Regarding Revisions to Final Safety Analysis Report Sections Associated with Oconee Tornado Licensing Basis -Responses to Request for Additional Information RA-19-0134, Duke Energy Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Oconee License Amendment Request 2018-052019-03-0707 March 2019 Duke Energy Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Oconee License Amendment Request 2018-05 RA-19-0116, Duke Energy Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Oconee License Amendment Request 2017-052019-02-26026 February 2019 Duke Energy Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Oconee License Amendment Request 2017-05 RA-19-0026, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Proposed Alternative to the Depth Sizing Qualification Requirement of Appendix Viii, Supplements 2 and 10 (18-GO-001)2019-02-11011 February 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Proposed Alternative to the Depth Sizing Qualification Requirement of Appendix Viii, Supplements 2 and 10 (18-GO-001) 2023-07-07
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tDUKE SttL. BasenENERGY Vice President Oconee Nuclear StationDuke EnergyONO1VP 7800 Rochester HwySeneca, SC 296720; 864.873.3274864.873.4208 0NS-201 5-096 10 C FR 50.90 Scott.Batson@duke-energy.com August 20, 2015ATTN: Document Control DeskU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville PikeRockville, MD 20852Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Units 1, 2, and 3Docket Numbers 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287Renewed License Numbers DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55
Subject:
License Amendment Request (LAR) to Add High Flux Trip for 3 Reactor CoolantPump Operation License Amendment Request No. 2014-05, Supplement 1On May 19, 2015, Duke Energy submitted a License Amendment Request (LAR) proposing toadd a Reactor Protective System (RPS) Nuclear Overpower
-High Setpoint trip for three (3)reactor coolant pump (RCP) operation to Technical Specification Table 3.3.1-1.
By letter datedAugust 6, 2015, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested Duke Energy submitsupplemental information to enable the NRC Staff to complete the acceptance review for theLAR.The enclosure provides the supplemental information.
If there are any additional questions, please contact Boyd Shingleton, ONS Regulatory
- Affairs, at (864) 873-4716.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed onAugust 20, 2015.Sincerely, Scott L. BatsonVice President Oconee Nuclear Station
Enclosure:
Duke Energy Response to Acceptance Review Information Request A jwww.duke-energy.com U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 20, 2015Page 2cc w/enclosure:
Mr. Victor McCreeAdministrator Region IIU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 Mr. James R. HallSenior Project Manager(by electronic mail only)Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike-Mail Stop O-8G9ARockville, MD 20852Mr. Jeffrey A. WhitedProject Manager(by electronic mail only)Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville PikeMail Stop O-8B1ARockville, MD 20852Mr. Eddy CroweNRC Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear StationMs. Susan E. Jenkins,
- Manager, Infectious and Radioactive Waste Management Bureau of Land and Waste Management Department of Health & Environmental Control2600 Bull StreetColumbia, SC 29201 ENCLOSURE Duke Energy Response to Acceptance Review Information Request License Amendment Request No. 20 14-05, Supplement 1 Page 1 of 6August 20, 2015Enclosure Duke Energy Response to Acceptance Review Information RequestNRC Information Request 1Provide a more in-depth discussion on which regulatory criteria are applicable to the LAR. TheLAR cited 10 CFR 50.36 as its regulatory basis. 10 CFR 50.36 states that limiting conditions foroperation (LCO's) must be established for items meeting one of the four criteria cited in theregulation.
Specifically, provide which of the 50.36 criteria are applicable to the proposed newsetpoint, and a discussion of whether the existing TS requirements are sufficient to ensureoperation within the bounds of the accident analysis.
Duke Energy ResponseThe NRC's regulatory requirements related to the content of the Technical Specification (TS)are contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.36. Paragraph (c)(2)(i) of 10 CFR 50.36 states that Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) are the lowestfunctional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of thefacility.
Paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of 10 CFR 50.36 lists four criteria for determining whether particular items are required to be included in the TS LCOs. The third criterion applies to a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuatesto mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents achallenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.
The Nuclear Overpower
-High Setpointtrip function meets Criterion
- 3. The proposed change adds an additional trip setpoint for threereactor coolant pump (RCP) operation.
A new trip function is not added.In MODES 1 and 2, the Nuclear Overpower
-High Setpoint trip, along with other ReactorProtective System (RPS) trips, are required to be OPERABLE because the reactor can becritical in these MODES. These trips are designed to take the reactor subcritical to maintain theTS Safety Limits during anticipated transients and to assist the ESPS in providing acceptable consequences during accidents.
While the existing overpower protection for three reactorcoolant pump (RCP) operation (provided by the Nuclear Overpower Flux/Flow/Imbalance tripfunction) is adequate, the proposed Nuclear Overpower flux trip setpoint for three RCPoperation provides improved protection for power excursion events initiated from three RCPoperation, most notably the small steam line break accident.
The Nuclear Overpower flux tripprovides an absolute setpoint that can be actuated regardless of transient or Reactor CoolantSystem (RCS) flow conditions.
The faster response time provides additional departure fromnucleate boiling (DNB) and RCS protection than provided by the slower acting nuclearoverpower flux/flow/imbalance trip function.
The proposed high flux trip setpoint will result insignificant margin improvement to the departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) acceptance criterion.
NRC Information Request 2Provide the regulatory basis for the new reactor trip. Please describe which regulations the newreactor trip is intended to comply with (e.g., 10 CFR Part 100, GDC 10 or alternative criteria thatestablish the Oconee licensing basis).
License Amendment Request No. 2014-05, Supplement 1 Page 2 of 6Enclosure
-Duke Energy Response to Acceptance Review IssuesAugust 20, 2015Duke Energy ResponseThe regulation of General Design Criteria (GDC) 10 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, "Reactordesign,"
requires that the reactor core and associated
- coolant, control, and protection systemsbe designed with appropriate margin to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits arenot exceeded during any condition of normal operation, including the effects of anticipated operational occurrences.
The regulation of GDC 20 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, "Protection System Functions,"
requires protection system functions to be designed to 1) to initiate automatically the operation of appropriate systems including the reactivity control systems, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) to sense accident conditions and to initiate the operation of systems andcomponents important to safety.The principal design criteria (POC) for ONS were developed in consideration of the seventyGeneral Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permits proposed by the AtomicEnergy Commission (AEC) in a proposed rule-making published for 10CFR Part 50 in theFederal Register on July 11, 1967. The ONS, Units 1, 2, and 3, construction permits wereissued on November 6, 1967, preceding the issuance of the GDC specified in 10 CFR 50Appendix A. The proposed trip setpoint is intended to comply with PDC 6 and 14, which arecomparable to GDC 10 and 20, respectively.
PDC 6 specifies that the reactor core shall be designed to function throughout its design lifetimewithout exceeding acceptable fuel damage limits which have been stipulated and justified.
Thecore design, together with reliable process and decay heat removal systems, shall provide forthis capability under all expected conditions of normal operation with appropriate margins foruncertainties and for transient situations which can be anticipated, including the effects of theloss of power to recirculation pumps, tripping out of a turbine generator set, isolation of thereactor from its primary heat sink, and loss of all off-site power. ONS Updated Final SafetyAnalysis Report (UFSAR) Section 3.1.6 states that the reactor is designed with the necessary margins to accommodate, without fuel damage, expected transients from steady-state operation including the transients given in the criterion.
The design margins allow for deviations oftemperature,
- pressure, flow, reactor power, and reactor turbine power mismatch.
Above 15percent power, the reactor is operated at a constant average coolant temperature and has anegative power coefficient to damp the effects of power transients.
The Reactor Control Systemwill maintain the reactor operating parameters within preset limits, and the Reactor Protective System will shut down the reactor if normal operating limits are exceeded by preset amountsPDC 14 specifies that core protective
- systems, together with associated equipment, shall bedesigned to act automatically to prevent or to suppress conditions that could result in exceeding acceptable fuel damage limits. ONS UFSAR Section 3.1.14 states that the ONS reactor designmeets this criterion by reactor trip provisions and engineered safety features.
The ONS ReactorProtective System is designed to limit reactor power which might result from unexpected reactivity
- changes, and provides an automatic reactor trip to prevent exceeding acceptable fueldamage limits.
License Amendment Request No. 20 14-05, Supplement 1 Page 3 of 6Enclosure
-Duke Energy Response to Acceptance Review IssuesAugust 20, 2015NRC Information Request 3Provide a description of the accident analysis that demonstrates the 80.5% reactor trip setpointis adequate to meet the applicable AAO*/Accident acceptance criteria.
The description shouldbe at a level consistent with the description of accidents in the FSAR and include the analysiscodes and methods, key analysis assumptions as well as the applicable acceptance criteria.
- AAO should be AOO (anticipated operational occurrence) per telecon with Randy Hall, ONSNRR Project Manager on August 11, 2015.Duke Energy ResponseThe main accident for which credit will be taken for the proposed three RCP High Flux Tripsetpoint is the UFSAR Chapter 15.17 Small Steam Line Break (SSLB) transient initiated fromthree RCP operation.
Other accidents initiated from three RCP operation could credit theproposed trip function, but the motivation for the proposal is the SSLB transient analysis.
Theaccident starts at the maximum power level allowed when operating with three RCPs and isanalyzed in such a manner as to maximize the primary system overcooling and subsequent power increase while avoiding and/or delaying a valid RPS trip signal. The existing three RCPSSLB credits two flux related RPS trip functions.
The first is the existing TS High Flux tripfunction and setpoint, which is set at 105.5% Rated Thermal Power (RTP). The second is theFlux/Flow/Imbalance trip function, which is a dynamic setpoint based on the measured powerand measured RCS flow rate. Since SSLB is an overcooling event, as the RCS gets colder thecoolant becomes more dense, the measured RCS flow rate increases.
This overcooling causestwo responses to the Oconee RPS. First, the colder reactor vessel downcomer fluid attenuates neutrons and masks the excore detectors from measuring the true core power. This causes thetrue power to potentially increase much higher than what the excore detectors would indicateand hence, delay and or avoid either a high flux trip or a flux/flow/imbalance trip, both of whichuse indicated (i.e., excore detectors) core power as an input. The SSLB event in UFSARChapter 15.17 conservatively models downcomer attenuation and its impact on the excoredetector signal. The second response is that the colder, more dense coolant, causes measuredRCS flow to increase which causes the flux/flow/imbalance trip to increase.
This also delaysand/or avoids reactor trip on flux/flow/imbalance.
This is a physical phenomenon and no specialmodeling techniques are required to account for this effect. With four RCPs operating, the highflux trip is more effective at tripping the reactor than the flux/flow/imbalance trip, even before theflux/flow/imbalance trip setpoint increases due to increasing flow. With three RCPs operating, the flux/flow/imbalance trip is the main trip function and, with the dynamic setpoint increasing asthe coolant becomes more dense, a much larger increase in true core power occurs relative tothe power increase calculated with four RCPs in operation.
Therefore, the current limiting SSLBaccident documented in UFSAR 15.17 for the DNBR acceptance criterion is the SSLB initiated from three RCP operation.
The NRC-approved analysis (documented in DPC-NE-3005-PA) of the SSILB transient uses theNRC approved code RETRAN-3D to determine a limiting combination of steam line break sizeand moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) to produce the largest true core power excursion thereby challenging DNBR and centerline fuel melt (CFM), both of which are acceptance criteria License Amendment Request No. 2014-05, Supplement 1 Page 4 of 6Enclosure
-Duke Energy Response to Acceptance Review IssuesAugust 20, 2015for the UFSAR Chapter 15.17 event. A larger break size increases the primary systemovercooling while a more negative moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) maximizes thepower excursion as a result of that overcooling.
Too large a break will result either in a low RCSpressure or variable low pressure-temperature reactor trip or a faster power increase resulting ina high flux or flux/flow/imbalance trip. Too negative an MTC will result in a faster powerincrease resulting in a high flux or flux/flow/imbalance trip. The most conservative combination of break size and MTC either avoids a RPS trip altogether or delays it long enough to maximizethe true core power.Centerline fuel melt is only a concern for 4 RCP operation and will not be addressed further inthis LAR. Departure from nucleate boiling ratio calculations are performed with the NRCapproved VIPRE-01 code using the RETRAN-3D forcing functions as input. Departure fromnucleate boiling ratio is more limiting for three RCP operation (vs. four RCP operation) due tothe combination of lower RCS flow and higher relative power increase.
The type of steam linebreaks analyzed in UFSAR 15.17 can only occur if there were an actual pipe break (vs. valvefailures),
which is classified as an infrequent fault and therefore, DNB fuel failures are allowed.However, Duke Energy treats the SSLB as a fault of moderate frequency with respect to theDNB acceptance criteria and consequently, no DNB related fuel failures are allowed.
Theanalysis of the three RCP SSLB with the proposed high flux trip setpoint for when three RCPsare operating demonstrates that true core power is significantly reduced before reactor tripoccurs. In fact, with the proposed high flux trip setpoint for three RCP operation, the limitingSSLB transient with respect to both CFM and DNB becomes the SSLB initiated from four RCPs.NRC Information Request 4Provide a sample calculation that shows the uncertainty determination in the elements of thesetpoint calculations for the high flux trip.Duke Energy ResponseAs stated in the [AR, the 80.5% RTP setpoint was chosen to maintain the delta betweennominal 100% RTP and the current TS allowable value of 105.5% RTP. The 5.5% RTP delta issimply added to the maximum power level allowed for three RCP operation, which is 75% RTP.Adding 5.5% RTP to 75% RTP results in the proposed high flux trip setpoint of 80.5%RTP.
Thisvalue is verified acceptable in the SSLB analysis initiated from three RCP operation.
The method described in the NRC-approved DPC-NE-3005-PA (Chapter 4), for performing Chapter 15 analyses specifies that the trip setpoint assumed in the analyses is the TS tripsetpoint plus (or minus) an uncertainty to account for the trip setpoint uncertainty itself. Anyuncertainty or adjustments in the signal that is used to compare to the setpoint is accounted forin the specific
- analysis, if applicable.
For the SSLB DNB analyses, the Statistical Core Design(SCD) method is employed (NRC approved DPC-NE-2005-PA) which accounts for the variousuncertainties in core power and RCS flow in the DNB limit itself. What is not accounted for inthe SCD method is transient effects such as downcomer attenuation, which the SSLBRETRAN-3D analysis specifically accounts for as described in DPC-NE-3005-PA.
Asmentioned previously, reactor vessel downcomer attenuation affects the excore detector signal License Amendment Request No. 2014-05, Supplement 1 Page 5 of 6Enclosure
-DLdke Energy Response to Acceptance Review IssuesAugust 20, 2015response and acts to mask the true power increase.
Basically, if this were put in mathematical terms, it would be:q~r > s + trip setpoint uncertainty allowance Where era = flux measured at excore detectors adjusted for transient effects (e.g.,downcomer attenuation) and excore detector calibration tolerances
=~p Technical Specification allowable value trip setpointTrip setpoint uncertainty
= current analysis assumes 1.0% RTP for convenience sincethat is the old analog RPS trip bistable uncertainty and it bounds the uncertainty on thesetpoint in the digital RPS. There is no uncertainty on the trip setpoint in the digital RPS.NRC Information Request 5Identify and describe the procedure that will be used by control room operators to manuallyinsert the high flux trip setpoint when going from 4 RCP operation to 3 RCP operation.
Pleasealso describe how this procedure accomplishes the setpoint changes to avoid overpower operation or spurious trips.Duke Energy ResponseIf a condition arises which requires Operations to reduce reactor power on an operating unit sothat a reactor coolant pump can be shutdown, Operations procedural guidance(OP/I1,2,3/A/11102/004
-Operation at Power) triggers a notification to maintenance personnel tochange the RPS high flux trip set point from the four RCP value to the three RCP value. This isdone following power reduction and shutdown of the problematic RCP. A maintenance procedure (AM/I1,2,3/A/031 5/017 -TXS RPS Channels A, B, C, and D Parameter Changes ForAbnormal/Normal Operating Conditions) is utilized to perform the following action one RPSchannel at a time. The RPS is a digital system. From the RPS service unit, a graphical servicemonitor screen which has design features specific to changing the high flux trip set point is usedto lower the high flux set point to the required three RCP value.When conditions permit returning to four RCP operation, the fourth RCP is placed in service, thehigh flux trip set point for each RPS channel is changed to the four RCP value via Operations notification to Maintenance who use the same Maintenance procedure to change the set point,and then escalation to full power operation is allowed.
License Amendment Request No. 2014-05, Supplement 1 Page 6 of 6Enclosure
-Duke Energy Response to Acceptance Review IssuesAugust 20, 2015NRC Information Request 6Provide an explanation of how the 80.5% RTP high flux trip setpoint will be verified to beapplicable to each new reactor core loading.Duke Energy ResponseMaximum allowed peaking limit curves are generated with the VIPRE-01 computer code for theSSLB transient, and will continue to be generated for the three RCP SSLB transient once theproposed high flux trip setpoint is approved and implemented.
These peaking limit curves areperformed once for the bounding analysis then verified acceptable for each reload core. Thepeaking limit curves for SSLB restrict peaking to preclude the occurrence of DNB. Duke Energyverifies that the DNB acceptance criteria is met for each reload by comparing potential pinpowers from the SIMULATE neutronics code to the peaking limit curves generated by VIPRE.Duke Energy intends to continue this practice for the SSLB transient initiated from three RCPoperation unless and until it is demonstrated that the four RCP SSLB transient is more limitingand bounding than the three RCP SSLB transient.
If such a situation were to occur, DukeEnergy would perform reload checks to the four RCP SSLB peaking limit curves and only verifythe three RCP SSLB peaking limits remain bounded for any future fuel design change, DNBcorrelation change, or any plant modification that would be unbounded by the existing UFSARChapter 15.17 analysis assumptions.