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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATZD DISIRIBUYION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM.'REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8811090368 DOC.DATE: | | {{#Wiki_filter:AC CELERATZD DISIRIBUYION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM.'REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8811090368 DOC.DATE: 88/10/31 NOTARIZED: |
| 88/10/31NOTARIZED: | | NO FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G AUTH.NAME AUTHOR.AFFILIATION BIEDENBACH,R.C. |
| NOFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester GAUTH.NAMEAUTHOR.AFFILIATION BIEDENBACH,R.C.
| | Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.MECREDY,R.C. |
| Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C. | | .Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000244 |
| .Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET05000244 | |
|
| |
|
| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER88-009-00:on 880930,inadequate firebarrierinspprocedure identified throughbreaches.
| | LER 88-009-00:on 880930,inadequate fire barrier insp procedure identified through breaches.W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL 2 SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). |
| W/8DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR IENCL2SIZE:TITLE:50.73LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). | | 05000244 8: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-3 LA STAHLE,C COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME'TTR ENCL PD1-3 PD 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON ACRS WYLIE AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES/DSIR/EIB RGN1 FILE 01 EXTERNAL EG&G WI LLIAMS I S , H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DOA ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7E NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR/DREP/RAB 10~N~~IB 9A RES/DSR/PRAB FORD BLDG HOY, A LPDR NSIC HARRIS,J 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I D NVZE IO ALL iIBIDSn RECIPIENTS PIZASE HELP US IO REIXKZ WASTE.'GMI'ACT THE DOCUMENT CXÃIBOL DESK, BOOM Pl-37 (EXT.20079)IO EXZtGNA!KE |
| 050002448:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-3LASTAHLE,CCOPIESLTTRENCL1111RECIPIENT COPIESIDCODE/NAME
| | ~NAME PRCH DISTRIKKIGN |
| 'TTRENCLPD1-3PD11INTERNAL: | | ~POR DOCUMENI'S YOU DGN~T NEED)A D, S TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 42 ENCL 41 |
| ACRSMICHELSON ACRSWYLIEAEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRONRR/DEST/CEB 8HNRR/DEST/ICSB 7NRR/DEST/MTB 9HNRR/DEST/RSB 8ENRR/DLPQ/HFB 10NRR/DOEA/EAB 11NRR/DREP/RPB 10NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES/DSIR/EIB RGN1FILE01EXTERNALEG&GWILLIAMSIS,HSTLOBBYWARDNRCPDRNSICMAYS,G111111111111111111112211111144111111ACRSMOELLERAEOD/DOAARM/DCTS/DABNRR/DEST/ADS 7ENRR/DEST/ESB 8DNRR/DEST/MEB 9HNRR/DEST/PSB 8DNRR/DEST/SGB 8DNRR/DLPQ/QAB 10NRR/DREP/RAB 10~N~~IB9ARES/DSR/PRAB FORDBLDGHOY,ALPDRNSICHARRIS,J22111110111111111111111111111111IDNVZEIOALLiIBIDSnRECIPIENTS PIZASEHELPUSIOREIXKZWASTE.'GMI'ACT THEDOCUMENTCXÃIBOLDESK,BOOMPl-37(EXT.20079)IOEXZtGNA!KE
| | ~~~,~~~~~~0~~~~~RSRBMO~~~I~~~Ig ERI81%m R C%A A R R R Q Q I,~~~~~~~~~~~~~RR~raaaaaaamaam aaaaa~aaaaa hh8 0~~'~~~~0~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| ~NAMEPRCHDISTRIKKIGN | | aa XCal aa>>a)AAA IC)I LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUAT v I>>vclIAA AIcvIAloalv coee4)io>>Aaa>>O>>lo oei>>o.)110MIOa Ix~illII la)laII I AC ICII v IIAeI III R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 0 0 C x I I>>v aa~I 11 I)I v)AA IIX>>Vaa~IX III IIOVI>>liAV |
| ~PORDOCUMENI'S YOUDGN~TNEED)AD,STOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED: | | ~\ aa A~ I v>I>>I>> aAOI III Ilxl III a>> aaa IAaaa aa aaaa>>e4, aaa An<aaat>> ac laiaa JIIaa II ll 0 5 0 0iO 2 4 4 88-009- 0 OF A PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 100% steady state full power with no major activities in progress. SCRIP ION OF EVENT A. Dates and approximate times for major occurrences: |
| LTTR42ENCL41
| | September 16, 1988, 13:45 EDST: A-25.1, Ginna Station Event Report 88-107: Re: Partial penetrations and open conduit September 16, 1988, 13:45 EDST: Discovery date and time September 16, 1988, 14:00 EDST: M-56.1 initiated to temporarily seal Fire Barrier Penetrations September 16, 1988, 14;30 EDST: M-56.1 completed and barriers in compliance with Technical Specifications September 30, 1988, 08:50 EDST: A-25.1, Ginna Station Event Report 88-100: Re: Fiberglass insulation for fire seal and partial penetrations |
| ~~~,~~~~~~0~~~~~RSRBMO~~~I~~~IgERI81%mRC%AARRRQQI,~~~~~~~~~~~~~RR~raaaaaaamaam aaaaa~aaaaahh80~~'~~~~0~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | | ~September 30, 1988, 08:50 EDST: Discovery date and time September 30, 1988, 09:00 EDST: M-56.1 initiated to temporarily seal Fire Barrier Penetrations September 30, 1988, 09:00 EDST: Fire watch initiated, M-56.1 completed at 12:00 EDST and all barriers in compliance with Technical Specifications October 20, 1988, 00:00 EDST: A-25,1, Engineering Work Request EWR-3986-Design Analysis: "Effects of Heat Transfer to Fire.Wrapped Conduit Through Conduit Supports During Potential Fires">>AC IONIC)I~A OC>At~)vAA C)I LICENSE PENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUA, N O i ttttCllAA AICovAIOAV COtvlttl)tOtt AttAOVIO OOI ttO)I)OWIOA lAttAII lt)ttll I ACII,II)ttAtAI Ill R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOCAII ttvvt~IA I)I ll A ttttvt)l A III\I OVI EIIAV~t A V I V tl VI A~t A~Aol I)I lA)Itt Vtttt Wvt tt tttvwtV vtt ttt t~~AAC ttv)IIO t~It oIO 2I44 88-00 9-00 OF B.EVENT On September 16, 1988 at approximately 13:45 EDST, during a.routine inspection augmented with information on industry events and NRC inspectors identification of certain configurations, it was identified that seven (7)partial penetrations approximately 1" in diameter existed in the Turbine building basement south wall.This Technical Specification wall separates the Turbine building from the Intermediate building.These partial penetrations appeared to have been left by the removal of equipment from the wall.Also identified was one (1)open conduit approximately 1" in diameter in the Turbine building Intermediate level east wall.The open conduit is required to have a smoke seal per Station procedure EE-24.This Appendix R wall separates the Turbine building from the Tem o ar Ceramic Fiber Penet ation F'eals, was initiated within one (1)hour after identification of the deficient fire barriers and was completed at 14:30 EDST.On September 30, 1988 at approximately 08:50 EDST during a routine inspection it was identified that two (2)six (6)inch diameter pipes had degraded block around the pipe sleeves which penetrated the Service building east wall.This Technical Specification wall separates the Service building from the Intermediate building.Upon further investigation, it was determined the two (2)penetrations were packed with fiberglass. |
| aaXCalaa>>a)AAAIC)ILICENSEEENTREPORT(LERITEXTCONTINUAT vI>>vclIAAAIcvIAloalv coee4)io>>
| | Continuing the inspection, access was gained above the ceiling where nine (9)partial penetrations were identified. |
| Aaa>>O>>looei>>o.)110MIOaIx~illIIla)laIIIACICIIvIIAeIIIIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant00CxII>>vaa~I11I)Iv)AAIIX>>Vaa~IXIIIIIOVI>>liAV | | The nine.(9)partial penetrations appear to have been from the original construction of the plant where approximately 50%of the original blocks had been cross sectionalized and installed in such a manner that the inspection would not disclose the partial penetration configuration from the accessible side.On the unexposed side of the wall, in the Service building,~tAC I OAtt 1~IA h<l 1 C I~<<<<)vl*4)I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION V l AVCLIAA AlCVVAIOAT COMM<i)<Oh A~AAOvl0 OUl hO.)I)OMIOI f At<1ll l<)l<ll IAC<l<)'hAMl III R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOCAll AVMllA I)I llA<<VMCIA IlI I I O V I'<I<A 1 U 1<<Iv<I<oh h U 1 110l I)l ll AT II<<<<<<<Mvvv<<<vs<<v<<, vU~<<u UA~~<<>C I v<U)II<<II II o0 244 8-009-0 04<<0 8 the cross sectionalized portion of the block was filled with an approximate 8 inch block.A Fire watch was initiated at 09:00 hours and an M-56.1, Placement of Tem orar Ceramic Fiber Penetration Fire Seals was completed. |
| ~\ aaA~ Iv>I>>I>> aAOIIIIIlxlIIIa>> aaaIAaaaaaaaaa>>e4, aaaAn<aaat>> aclaiaaJIIaaIIll0500iO24488-009- 0OFAPLANTCONDITIONS Theplantwasatapproximately 100% steadystatefullpowerwithnomajoractivities inprogress. | | On October 20, 1988 a study was completed on the effects of heat transfer to fire wrap conduit through conduit supports during postulated fires.It.was concluded from this study that one redundant circuit could possibly reach or exceed its short circuit temperature by the conduction of heat through conduit supports in a postulated 1 hour fire as required by Appendix"R".Although the fire wrap is not a Technical Specification requirement, the wrapping of conduit supports was a commitment in our Appendix"R" submittal and is included in this LER for your information. |
| SCRIPIONOFEVENTA.Datesandapproximate timesformajoroccurrences:
| | C.D.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetration I-199A-9.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: None.E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY: |
| September 16,1988,13:45EDST:A-25.1,GinnaStationEventReport88-107:Re:Partialpenetrations andopenconduitSeptember 16,1988,13:45EDST:Discovery dateandtimeSeptember 16,1988,14:00EDST:M-56.1initiated totemporarily sealFireBarrierPenetrations September 16,1988,14;30EDST:M-56.1completed andbarriersincompliance withTechnical Specifications September 30,1988,08:50EDST:A-25.1,GinnaStationEventReport88-100:Re:Fiberglass insulation forfiresealandpartialpenetrations | | These events were discovered as a result of routine Fire Barrier Inspections and as a result of asbestos inspection in a service corridor.The fire wrap conduit support event was discovered through an NRC concern which resulted in an Engineering Analysis.F.OPERATOR ACTION: The Control Room Operators were notified by the Fire Protection and Safety Coordinator at.which time they performed the following: |
| ~September 30,1988,08:50EDST:Discovery dateandtimeSeptember 30,1988,09:00EDST:M-56.1initiated totemporarily sealFireBarrierPenetrations September 30,1988,09:00EDST:Firewatchinitiated, M-56.1completed at12:00EDSTandallbarriersincompliance withTechnical Specifications October20,1988,00:00EDST:A-25,1,Engineering WorkRequestEWR-3986-DesignAnalysis: | | Initiated an A-25.1 Ginna Station Event, Re ort hAC<OAM)I~1 1(Iv<<>~A C)I~~II LICENSEE<ENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINVAT<<Octal*>I a)CIIS<<IO<<'I COVV>il>O<< |
| "EffectsofHeatTransfertoFire.WrappedConduitThroughConduitSupportsDuringPotential Fires">>ACIONIC)I~A OC>At~)vAAC)ILICENSEPENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUA, NOittttCllAA AICovAIOAV COtvlttl)tOtt AttAOVIOOOIttO)I)OWIOAlAttAIIlt)ttllIACII,II)ttAtAIIllR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantOOCAIIttvvt~IAI)IllAttttvt)lAIII\IOVIEIIAV~tAVIVtlVIA~tA~AolI)IlA)IttVttttWvttttttvwtVvtttttt~~AACttv)IIOt~ItoIO2I4488-009-00OFB.EVENTOnSeptember 16,1988atapproximately 13:45EDST,duringa.routineinspection augmented withinformation onindustryeventsandNRCinspectors identification ofcertainconfigurations, itwasidentified thatseven(7)partialpenetrations approximately 1"indiameterexistedintheTurbinebuildingbasementsouthwall.ThisTechnical Specification wallseparates theTurbinebuildingfromtheIntermediate building. | | *It<<0v)0 Ovl<<0)IIO&IOI I a~><<ll I>)I>ll*CII I)T<<A VI III R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOC<<l I<<>>V~I<<I)>cl<<<<vv~IC III~IOOI<<I>~4 v I 1>y>I<<)<<<<~AOC I)I lCT III>>>V>~I>><<le>>et, eV>W>>~>>~><<lC lt>>>>)II~>II II o s o ohio 244 8-09-0 0 05<<0 8 Notified Plant Superintendent Notified NRC Resident Inspector III USE 0 EVENT A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: Nine (9)of the partial penetrations were caused as a result of poor original construction practices. |
| Thesepartialpenetrations appearedtohavebeenleftbytheremovalofequipment fromthewall.Alsoidentified wasone(1)openconduitapproximately 1"indiameterintheTurbinebuildingIntermediate leveleastwall.TheopenconduitisrequiredtohaveasmokesealperStationprocedure EE-24.ThisAppendixRwallseparates theTurbinebuildingfromtheTemoarCeramicFiberPenetationF'eals,wasinitiated withinone(1)hourafteridentification ofthedeficient firebarriersandwascompleted at14:30EDST.OnSeptember 30,1988atapproximately 08:50EDSTduringaroutineinspection itwasidentified thattwo(2)six(6)inchdiameterpipeshaddegradedblockaroundthepipesleeveswhichpenetrated theServicebuildingeastwall.ThisTechnical Specification wallseparates theServicebuildingfromtheIntermediate building.
| | Two (2)of the penetrations were packed with fiberglass insulation as per acceptable procedures at time of installation. |
| Uponfurtherinvestigation, itwasdetermined thetwo(2)penetrations werepackedwithfiberglass.
| | The fiberglass insulation was missed as a part of our upgrade program.Seven (7)of the partial penetrations were caused as a result of equipment being removed from the wall.One (1)of the penetrations was a result of an open conduit failing to be capped or filled with a fire retardant material.B.Where fire wrap encapsulation was not acceptal or adequate, field installation directions and Engineering specifications were not adequate.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE C.None.ROOT CAUSE: The root cause was determined to be an inadequate procedure. |
| Continuing theinspection, accesswasgainedabovetheceilingwherenine(9)partialpenetrations wereidentified. | | ISI-100 was to provide instructions to visually inspect fire barrier penetration seals and fire retardant coating for cables to insure that they are intact.A Procedure Change Notice has been submitted to provide instructions to visually inspect Fire Barriers, Fire Barriers Penetrations Seals and Fire Retardant Coating for Cables.The root cause for the fire wrap was determined to be inadequate specification after re-analysis of the transmission of heat through support members. |
| Thenine.(9)partialpenetrations appeartohavebeenfromtheoriginalconstruction oftheplantwhereapproximately 50%oftheoriginalblockshadbeencrosssectionalized andinstalled insuchamannerthattheinspection wouldnotdisclosethepartialpenetration configuration fromtheaccessible side.Ontheunexposed sideofthewall,intheServicebuilding,
| | 1~~~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I I~~0~~~~I I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I~~~4~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~I~I I I~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~ |
| ~tACIOAtt1~IA h<l1CI~<<<<)vl*4)ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LERITEXTCONTINUATION VlAVCLIAAAlCVVAIOAT COMM<i)<Oh A~AAOvl0OUlhO.)I)OMIOIfAt<1lll<)l<llIAC<l<)'hAMlIIIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantOOCAllAVMllAI)IllA<<VMCIAIlIIIOVI'<I<A1U1<<Iv<I<ohhU1110lI)lllATII<<<<<<<Mvvv<<<vs<<v<<,vU~<<uUA~~<<>CIv<U)II<<IIIIo02448-009-004<<08thecrosssectionalized portionoftheblockwasfilledwithanapproximate 8inchblock.AFirewatchwasinitiated at09:00hoursandanM-56.1,Placement ofTemorarCeramicFiberPenetration FireSealswascompleted. | |
| OnOctober20,1988astudywascompleted ontheeffectsofheattransfertofirewrapconduitthroughconduitsupportsduringpostulated fires.It.wasconcluded fromthisstudythatoneredundant circuitcouldpossiblyreachorexceeditsshortcircuittemperature bytheconduction ofheatthroughconduitsupportsinapostulated 1hourfireasrequiredbyAppendix"R".AlthoughthefirewrapisnotaTechnical Specification requirement, thewrappingofconduitsupportswasacommitment inourAppendix"R"submittal andisincludedinthisLERforyourinformation.
| |
| C.D.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTED TOTHEEVENT:Inoperable FireBarrierPenetration I-199A-9. | |
| OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:
| |
| None.E.METHODOFDISCOVERY: | |
| Theseeventswerediscovered asaresultofroutineFireBarrierInspections andasaresultofasbestosinspection inaservicecorridor.
| |
| Thefirewrapconduitsupporteventwasdiscovered throughanNRCconcernwhichresultedinanEngineering Analysis.
| |
| F.OPERATORACTION:TheControlRoomOperators werenotifiedbytheFireProtection andSafetyCoordinator at.whichtimetheyperformed thefollowing: | |
| Initiated anA-25.1GinnaStationEvent,ReorthAC<OAM)I~1 1(Iv<<>~AC)I~~IILICENSEE<ENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINVAT | |
| <<Octal*>I a)CIIS<<IO<<'I COVV>il>O<< | |
| *It<<0v)0Ovl<<0)IIO&IOIIa~><<llI>)I>ll*CIII)T<<AVIIIIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantOOC<<lI<<>>V~I<<I)>cl<<<<vv~ICIII~IOOI<<I>~4 vI1>y>I<<)<<<<~AOCI)IlCTIII>>>V>~I>><<le>>et,eV>W>>~>>~><<lClt>>>>)II~>IIIIosoohio2448-09-0005<<08NotifiedPlantSuperintendent NotifiedNRCResidentInspector IIIUSE0EVENTA.IMMEDIATE CAUSE:Nine(9)ofthepartialpenetrations werecausedasaresultofpoororiginalconstruction practices. | |
| Two(2)ofthepenetrations werepackedwithfiberglass insulation asperacceptable procedures attimeofinstallation. | |
| Thefiberglass insulation wasmissedasapartofourupgradeprogram.Seven(7)ofthepartialpenetrations werecausedasaresultofequipment beingremovedfromthewall.One(1)ofthepenetrations wasaresultofanopenconduitfailingtobecappedorfilledwithafireretardant material.
| |
| B.Wherefirewrapencapsulation wasnotacceptaloradequate, fieldinstallation directions andEngineering specifications werenotadequate. | |
| INTERMEDIATE CAUSEC.None.ROOTCAUSE:Therootcausewasdetermined tobeaninadequate procedure. | |
| ISI-100wastoprovideinstructions tovisuallyinspectfirebarrierpenetration sealsandfireretardant coatingforcablestoinsurethattheyareintact.AProcedure ChangeNoticehasbeensubmitted toprovideinstructions tovisuallyinspectFireBarriers, FireBarriersPenetrations SealsandFireRetardant CoatingforCables.Therootcauseforthefirewrapwasdetermined tobeinadequate specification afterre-analysis ofthetransmission ofheatthroughsupportmembers. | |
| 1~~~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~II~~0~~~~III~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I~~~4~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~I~III~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~ | |
| ~~~~~~i~~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0~~~~g~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | | ~~~~~~i~~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0~~~~g~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| r~rr1CSvrr)AAAIt4)ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION VlIIVCLtA1AICVI,AIOAe COMMIttIOA ArrAOvtOOMlAO.)ISOWIOItaerAttIr)I/llACILlteHAMIlllR.E.GinnaNuclearPalAcrPlantltAIllrrrvrMvrrrrrrevvre.vvrevroverrvlclvrv)IAIIIII00C1IlrrVMIIrlI)I05000elAAllAIIVMtt1ltl~lovlrrrAL rvr100vlvMerr1JAOtIIIOFB.Actiontakenorplannedtopreventrecurrence: | | r~rr1C Svrr)AAA It 4)I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION V l IIVCLtA1 AICVI,AIOAe COMMIttIOA ArrAOvtO OMl AO.)ISOWIOI taerAtt Ir)I/ll ACILlte HAMI lll R.E.Ginna Nuclear PalAcr Plant ltA I llr rrvr Mvrr rr rrevvre.vv revr over rvlc lvrv)IAI II II 0 0C 1 I l rr V M I I rl I)I 0 5 0 0 0 elAA llA IIVMtt 1 ltl~lovlrrrAL rvr 1 0 0 vl vMerr 1 JAOt III OF B.Action taken or planned to prevent recurrence: |
| Astherootcausewasdetermined tobeinadequate procedures.
| | As the root cause was determined to be inadequate procedures. |
| AProcedure ChangeNoticewaswrittenforISI-100.ANon-Conformance Report(NCR)waswrittentoaddresspenetration problemsandcorrective actionsforpermanent repairs.VIDDITIONLINFORMATIO A.B.C.FailedComponents:
| | A Procedure Change Notice was written for ISI-100.A Non-Conformance Report (NCR)was written to address penetration problems and corrective actions for permanent repairs.VI DDITION L INFORMATIO A.B.C.Failed Components: |
| None.PreviousLER'sonsimilar'vents: | | None.Previous LER's on similar'vents: |
| None.SpecialComments: | | None.Special Comments: None.IrAC IOAIA NIA |
| None.IrACIOAIANIA | | %car Saba't ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION |
| %carSaba'tROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION | | ~89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649 0001 October 31, 1988 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 |
| ~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER, N.Y.146490001October31,1988U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, DC20555 | |
|
| |
|
| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| LER88-009,Inadequate FireBarrierInspection Procedure Identified OnlyThroughBreachesCausingPartialBreachesToGoUndetected.
| | LER 88-009, Inadequate Fire Barrier Inspection Procedure Identified Only Through Breaches Causing Partial Breaches To Go Undetected. |
| R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerplantDocketNo.50-244Inaccordance with10CFR50.73, LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(i)(B), | | R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power plant Docket No.50-244 In accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(i)(B), which requires reporting of,"Any operation or condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications", the attached Licensee Event Report'LER 88-009 is hereby submitted. |
| whichrequiresreporting of,"Anyoperation orcondition prohibited bytheplantsTechnical Specifications",
| | In accordance with NUREG 1022 the 16 partial fire barrier penetrations and the design analysis on the effects of heat transfer to fire wrap conduit through conduit supports during a potential fire is voluntarily submitted. |
| theattachedLicenseeEventReport'LER88-009isherebysubmitted.
| | This event has in no way affected the public health and safety.Ver Truly Yours, obert C.M cred General Manager Nuclear Production xc: U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector}} |
| Inaccordance withNUREG1022the16partialfirebarrierpenetrations andthedesignanalysisontheeffectsofheattransfertofirewrapconduitthroughconduitsupportsduringapotential fireisvoluntarily submitted.
| |
| Thiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublichealthandsafety.VerTrulyYours,obertC.McredGeneralManagerNuclearProduction xc:U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaUSNRCSeniorResidentInspector}}
| |
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LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr
ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr
ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved
ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr
ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr
ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed
ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr
ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr
ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp
ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr
ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery
ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR
ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr
ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr
ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells
ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998
LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified
ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998
LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status
ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr
ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr
ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset
ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage
ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997
LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr
ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr
ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr
ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997
LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe
ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr
ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997
LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr
ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996
LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr
ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996
LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr
ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996
LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr
ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996
LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr
ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996
LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr
ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996
LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr
ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996
LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr
ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996
LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr
ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996
LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr
ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996
LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr
ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996
LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed
ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996
LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr
ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996
LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr
ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996
LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr
ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995
LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr
ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995
LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr
1999-09-22
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999
LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr
ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed
ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999
LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians
ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999
LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored
ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr
ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999
LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr
ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999
LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr
ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999
LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr
ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr
ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved
ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr
ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr
ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed
ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr
ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr
ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp
ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr
ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery
ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR
ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr
ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr
ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells
ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998
LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified
ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998
LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status
ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr
ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr
ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset
ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage
ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997
LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr
ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr
ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr
ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997
LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe
ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr
ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997
LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr
ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996
LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr
ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996
LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr
ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996
LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr
ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996
LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr
ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996
LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr
ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996
LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr
ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996
LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr
ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996
LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr
ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996
LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr
ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996
LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr
ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996
LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed
ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996
LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr
ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996
LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr
ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996
LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr
ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995
LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr
ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995
LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr
1999-09-22
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17265A7601999-10-0505 October 1999
Part 21 Rept Re W2 Switch Supplied by W Drawn from Stock, Did Not Operate Properly After Being Installed on 990409. Switch Returned to W on 990514 for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis
ML17265A7621999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 991008 Ltr
ML17265A7531999-09-23023 September 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Corrective Action & Closeout of 10CFR21 Rept of Noncompliance Re Unacceptable Part for 30-4 Connector. Unacceptable Parts Removed from Stock & Scrapped
ML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999
LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr
ML17265A7471999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990909 Ltr
ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed
ML17265A7341999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990806 Ltr
ML17265A7291999-07-29029 July 1999
Interim Part 21 Rept Re safety-related DB-25 Breaker Mechanism Procured from W Did Not Pas Degradatin Checks When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed Into BUS15/03A.Holes Did Not line-up & Tripper Pan Bent
ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999
LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians
ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999
LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored
ML17265A7131999-07-22022 July 1999
Special Rept:On 990407,radiation Monitor RM-14A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Failed Communication Link from TSC to Plant Process Computer Sys.Communication Link Was re-established & RM-14A Was Declaed Operable on 990521
ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr
ML17265A7211999-07-19019 July 1999
ISI Rept for Third Interval (1990-1999) Third Period, Second Outage (1999) at Re Ginna Npp.
ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999
LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr
ML17265A7661999-06-30030 June 1999
1999 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted Without Prior NRC Approval for Jan 1998 Through June 1999, Per 10CFR50.59.With 991020 Ltr
ML17265A7011999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990712 Ltr
ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999
LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr
ML17265A6761999-06-16016 June 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Defects & noncompliances,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii), Which Requires Written Notification to NRC on Identification of Defect or Failure to Comply. Relays Were Returned to Eaton for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis
ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999
LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr
ML17265A6681999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990608 Ltr
ML17265A6651999-05-27027 May 1999
Interim Rept Re W2 Control Switch,Procured from W,Did Not Operate Satisfactorily When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed in Main Control Board for 1C2 Safety Injection Pump. Estimated That Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001
ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr
ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved
ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr
ML17265A6591999-05-17017 May 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Relay Deficiency Detected During pre-installation Testing.Caused by Incorrectly Wired Relay Coil.Relays Were Returned to Eaton Corp for Investigation. Relays Were Repaired & Retested
ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr
ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed
ML17265A6381999-05-0707 May 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Replacement Turbocharger Exhaust Turbine Side Drain Port Not Functioning as Design Intended.Caused by Manufacturing Deficiency.Turbocharger Was Reaasembled & Reinstalled on B EDG
ML17265A6391999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990510 Ltr
ML17265A6361999-04-23023 April 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Power Supply That Did Not Work Properly When Drawn from Stock & Installed in -25 Vdc Slot.Power Supply Will Be Sent to Vendor to Perform Failure Mode Assessment.Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001
ML17265A6301999-04-18018 April 1999
Rev 1 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp.
ML17265A6251999-04-15015 April 1999
Special Rept:On 990309,halon Systems Were Removed from Svc & Fire Door F502 Was Blocked Open.Caused by Mods Being Made to CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys.Continuous Fire Watch Was Established with Backup Fire Suppression Equipment
ML17265A6551999-04-0909 April 1999
Initial Part 21 Rept Re Mfg Deficiency in Replacement Turbocharger for B EDG Supplied by Coltec Industries. Deficiency Consisted of Missing Drain Port in Intermediate Casing.Required Oil Drain Port Machined Open
ML17265A6291999-03-31031 March 1999
Rev 0 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp.
ML17265A6241999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Ginna Station.With 990409 Ltr
ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr
ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr
ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp
ML17265A5661999-03-0101 March 1999
Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation.
ML17265A5961999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990310 Ltr
ML17265A5371999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990205 Ltr
ML17265A5951998-12-31031 December 1998
Rg&E 1998 Annual Rept.
ML17265A5001998-12-21021 December 1998
Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation.
ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr
ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery
ML17265A4761998-11-30030 November 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981210 Ltr
ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR
ML17265A4531998-10-31031 October 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981110 Ltr
ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr
ML17265A4291998-09-30030 September 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981009 Ltr
1999-09-30
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Text
AC CELERATZD DISIRIBUYION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM.'REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8811090368 DOC.DATE: 88/10/31 NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G AUTH.NAME AUTHOR.AFFILIATION BIEDENBACH,R.C.
Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.MECREDY,R.C.
.Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000244
SUBJECT:
LER 88-009-00:on 880930,inadequate fire barrier insp procedure identified through breaches.W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL 2 SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
05000244 8: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-3 LA STAHLE,C COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME'TTR ENCL PD1-3 PD 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON ACRS WYLIE AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES/DSIR/EIB RGN1 FILE 01 EXTERNAL EG&G WI LLIAMS I S , H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DOA ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7E NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR/DREP/RAB 10~N~~IB 9A RES/DSR/PRAB FORD BLDG HOY, A LPDR NSIC HARRIS,J 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I D NVZE IO ALL iIBIDSn RECIPIENTS PIZASE HELP US IO REIXKZ WASTE.'GMI'ACT THE DOCUMENT CXÃIBOL DESK, BOOM Pl-37 (EXT.20079)IO EXZtGNA!KE
~NAME PRCH DISTRIKKIGN
~POR DOCUMENI'S YOU DGN~T NEED)A D, S TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 42 ENCL 41
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aa XCal aa>>a)AAA IC)I LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUAT v I>>vclIAA AIcvIAloalv coee4)io>>Aaa>>O>>lo oei>>o.)110MIOa Ix~illII la)laII I AC ICII v IIAeI III R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 0 0 C x I I>>v aa~I 11 I)I v)AA IIX>>Vaa~IX III IIOVI>>liAV
~\aa A~I v>I>>I>>aAOI III Ilxl III a>>aaa IAaaa aa aaaa>>e4, aaa An<aaat>>ac laiaa JIIaa II ll 0 5 0 0iO 2 4 4 88-009-0 OF A PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 100%steady state full power with no major activities in progress.SCRIP ION OF EVENT A.Dates and approximate times for major occurrences:
September 16, 1988, 13:45 EDST: A-25.1, Ginna Station Event Report 88-107: Re: Partial penetrations and open conduit September 16, 1988, 13:45 EDST: Discovery date and time September 16, 1988, 14:00 EDST: M-56.1 initiated to temporarily seal Fire Barrier Penetrations September 16, 1988, 14;30 EDST: M-56.1 completed and barriers in compliance with Technical Specifications September 30, 1988, 08:50 EDST: A-25.1, Ginna Station Event Report 88-100: Re: Fiberglass insulation for fire seal and partial penetrations
~September 30, 1988, 08:50 EDST: Discovery date and time September 30, 1988, 09:00 EDST: M-56.1 initiated to temporarily seal Fire Barrier Penetrations September 30, 1988, 09:00 EDST: Fire watch initiated, M-56.1 completed at 12:00 EDST and all barriers in compliance with Technical Specifications October 20, 1988, 00:00 EDST: A-25,1, Engineering Work Request EWR-3986-Design Analysis: "Effects of Heat Transfer to Fire.Wrapped Conduit Through Conduit Supports During Potential Fires">>AC IONIC)I~A OC>At~)vAA C)I LICENSE PENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUA, N O i ttttCllAA AICovAIOAV COtvlttl)tOtt AttAOVIO OOI ttO)I)OWIOA lAttAII lt)ttll I ACII,II)ttAtAI Ill R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOCAII ttvvt~IA I)I ll A ttttvt)l A III\I OVI EIIAV~t A V I V tl VI A~t A~Aol I)I lA)Itt Vtttt Wvt tt tttvwtV vtt ttt t~~AAC ttv)IIO t~It oIO 2I44 88-00 9-00 OF B.EVENT On September 16, 1988 at approximately 13:45 EDST, during a.routine inspection augmented with information on industry events and NRC inspectors identification of certain configurations, it was identified that seven (7)partial penetrations approximately 1" in diameter existed in the Turbine building basement south wall.This Technical Specification wall separates the Turbine building from the Intermediate building.These partial penetrations appeared to have been left by the removal of equipment from the wall.Also identified was one (1)open conduit approximately 1" in diameter in the Turbine building Intermediate level east wall.The open conduit is required to have a smoke seal per Station procedure EE-24.This Appendix R wall separates the Turbine building from the Tem o ar Ceramic Fiber Penet ation F'eals, was initiated within one (1)hour after identification of the deficient fire barriers and was completed at 14:30 EDST.On September 30, 1988 at approximately 08:50 EDST during a routine inspection it was identified that two (2)six (6)inch diameter pipes had degraded block around the pipe sleeves which penetrated the Service building east wall.This Technical Specification wall separates the Service building from the Intermediate building.Upon further investigation, it was determined the two (2)penetrations were packed with fiberglass.
Continuing the inspection, access was gained above the ceiling where nine (9)partial penetrations were identified.
The nine.(9)partial penetrations appear to have been from the original construction of the plant where approximately 50%of the original blocks had been cross sectionalized and installed in such a manner that the inspection would not disclose the partial penetration configuration from the accessible side.On the unexposed side of the wall, in the Service building,~tAC I OAtt 1~IA h<l 1 C I~<<<<)vl*4)I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION V l AVCLIAA AlCVVAIOAT COMM<i)<Oh A~AAOvl0 OUl hO.)I)OMIOI f At<1ll l<)l<ll IAC<l<)'hAMl III R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOCAll AVMllA I)I llA<<VMCIA IlI I I O V I'<I<A 1 U 1<<Iv<I<oh h U 1 110l I)l ll AT II<<<<<<<Mvvv<<<vs<<v<<, vU~<<u UA~~<<>C I v<U)II<<II II o0 244 8-009-0 04<<0 8 the cross sectionalized portion of the block was filled with an approximate 8 inch block.A Fire watch was initiated at 09:00 hours and an M-56.1, Placement of Tem orar Ceramic Fiber Penetration Fire Seals was completed.
On October 20, 1988 a study was completed on the effects of heat transfer to fire wrap conduit through conduit supports during postulated fires.It.was concluded from this study that one redundant circuit could possibly reach or exceed its short circuit temperature by the conduction of heat through conduit supports in a postulated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire as required by Appendix"R".Although the fire wrap is not a Technical Specification requirement, the wrapping of conduit supports was a commitment in our Appendix"R" submittal and is included in this LER for your information.
C.D.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetration I-199A-9.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: None.E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
These events were discovered as a result of routine Fire Barrier Inspections and as a result of asbestos inspection in a service corridor.The fire wrap conduit support event was discovered through an NRC concern which resulted in an Engineering Analysis.F.OPERATOR ACTION: The Control Room Operators were notified by the Fire Protection and Safety Coordinator at.which time they performed the following:
Initiated an A-25.1 Ginna Station Event, Re ort hAC<OAM)I~1 1(Iv<<>~A C)I~~II LICENSEE<ENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINVAT<<Octal*>I a)CIIS<<IO<<'I COVV>il>O<<
- It<<0v)0 Ovl<<0)IIO&IOI I a~><<ll I>)I>ll*CII I)T<<A VI III R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOC<<l I<<>>V~I<<I)>cl<<<<vv~IC III~IOOI<~4 v I 1>y>I<<)<<<<~AOC I)I lCT III>>>V>~I>><<le>>et, eV>W>>~>>~><<lC lt>>>>)II~>II II o s o ohio 244 8-09-0 0 05<<0 8 Notified Plant Superintendent Notified NRC Resident Inspector III USE 0 EVENT A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: Nine (9)of the partial penetrations were caused as a result of poor original construction practices.
Two (2)of the penetrations were packed with fiberglass insulation as per acceptable procedures at time of installation.
The fiberglass insulation was missed as a part of our upgrade program.Seven (7)of the partial penetrations were caused as a result of equipment being removed from the wall.One (1)of the penetrations was a result of an open conduit failing to be capped or filled with a fire retardant material.B.Where fire wrap encapsulation was not acceptal or adequate, field installation directions and Engineering specifications were not adequate.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE C.None.ROOT CAUSE: The root cause was determined to be an inadequate procedure.
ISI-100 was to provide instructions to visually inspect fire barrier penetration seals and fire retardant coating for cables to insure that they are intact.A Procedure Change Notice has been submitted to provide instructions to visually inspect Fire Barriers, Fire Barriers Penetrations Seals and Fire Retardant Coating for Cables.The root cause for the fire wrap was determined to be inadequate specification after re-analysis of the transmission of heat through support members.
1~~~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I I~~0~~~~I I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I~~~4~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~I~I I I~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~
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r~rr1C Svrr)AAA It 4)I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION V l IIVCLtA1 AICVI,AIOAe COMMIttIOA ArrAOvtO OMl AO.)ISOWIOI taerAtt Ir)I/ll ACILlte HAMI lll R.E.Ginna Nuclear PalAcr Plant ltA I llr rrvr Mvrr rr rrevvre.vv revr over rvlc lvrv)IAI II II 0 0C 1 I l rr V M I I rl I)I 0 5 0 0 0 elAA llA IIVMtt 1 ltl~lovlrrrAL rvr 1 0 0 vl vMerr 1 JAOt III OF B.Action taken or planned to prevent recurrence:
As the root cause was determined to be inadequate procedures.
A Procedure Change Notice was written for ISI-100.A Non-Conformance Report (NCR)was written to address penetration problems and corrective actions for permanent repairs.VI DDITION L INFORMATIO A.B.C.Failed Components:
None.Previous LER's on similar'vents:
None.Special Comments: None.IrAC IOAIA NIA
%car Saba't ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
~89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649 0001 October 31, 1988 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
LER 88-009, Inadequate Fire Barrier Inspection Procedure Identified Only Through Breaches Causing Partial Breaches To Go Undetected.
R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power plant Docket No.50-244 In accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(i)(B), which requires reporting of,"Any operation or condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications", the attached Licensee Event Report'LER 88-009 is hereby submitted.
In accordance with NUREG 1022 the 16 partial fire barrier penetrations and the design analysis on the effects of heat transfer to fire wrap conduit through conduit supports during a potential fire is voluntarily submitted.
This event has in no way affected the public health and safety.Ver Truly Yours, obert C.M cred General Manager Nuclear Production xc: U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector
