ML17251A343

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LER 88-009-00:on 880930,two 6-inch Diameter Pipes Found to Have Degraded Blocks Around Pipe Sleeves & Improper Fire Barrier Fill.Caused by Inadequate Fire Barrier Insp Procedures.Procedure Will Be upgraded.W/881031 Ltr
ML17251A343
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/1988
From: Biedenbach R, Mecredy R
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-88-009, LER-88-9, NUDOCS 8811090368
Download: ML17251A343 (10)


Text

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AC CELERATZD DISIRIBUYION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8811090368 DOC.DATE: 88/10/31 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR. AFFILIATION BIEDENBACH,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

MECREDY,R.C. . Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 88-009-00:on 880930,inadequate fire barrier insp procedure identified through breaches.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

I ENCL 2 W/8 SIZE:

05000244 8 NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

RECIPIENT RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME COPIES LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME PD1-3 PD

'TTR ENCL PD1-3 LA 1 1 1 1 STAHLE,C 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 ARM/DCTS/ DAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NRR/DREP/RAB 10 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1

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~ \ aa A R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 0 5 0 0iO 2 4 4 88 009 0 OF IlxlIII a>>aaa IAaaa aa aaaa>>e4, aaa An aaat>>ac laiaa JIIaa II ll A PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 100% steady state with no major activities in progress.

full power SCRIP ION OF EVENT A. Dates and approximate times for major occurrences:

September 16, 1988, 13:45 EDST: A-25.1, Ginna Station Event Report 88-107: Re: Partial penetrations and open conduit September 16, 1988, 13:45 EDST: Discovery date and time September 16, 1988, 14:00 EDST: M-56.1 initiated to temporarily seal Fire Barrier Penetrations September 16, 1988, 14;30 EDST: M-56.1 completed and barriers in compliance with Technical Specifications September 30, 1988, 08:50 EDST: A-25.1, Ginna Station Event Report 88-100: Re: Fiberglass insulation for fire seal and partial penetrations ~

September 30, 1988, 08:50 EDST: Discovery date and time September 30, 1988, 09:00 EDST: M-56.1 initiated to temporarily seal Fire Barrier Penetrations September 30, 1988, 09:00 EDST: Fire watch initiated, M-56.1 completed at 12:00 EDST and all barriers in compliance with Technical Specifications October 20, 1988, 00:00 EDST: A-25,1, Engineering Work Request EWR-3986 - Design Analysis: "Effects of Heat Transfer to Fire. Wrapped Conduit Through Conduit Supports During Potential Fires"

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oIO 2I44 88 00 9 00 OF lA) Itt Vtttt Wvt tt tttvwtV vtt ttt t ~ ~ AAC ttv )IIO t ~ It B. EVENT On September 16, 1988 at approximately 13:45 EDST, during a .routine inspection augmented with information on industry events and NRC inspectors identification of certain configurations, it was identified that seven (7) partial penetrations approximately 1" in diameter existed in the Turbine building basement south wall.

This Technical Specification wall separates the Turbine building from the Intermediate building. These partial penetrations appeared to have been left by the removal of equipment from the wall.

Also identified was one (1) open conduit approximately 1" in diameter in the Turbine building Intermediate level east wall. The open conduit is required to have a smoke seal per Station procedure EE-24. This Appendix R wall separates the Turbine building from the Tem o ar Ceramic Fiber Penet ation F' eals, was initiated within one (1) hour after identification of the deficient fire barriers and was completed at 14:30 EDST.

On September 30, 1988 at approximately 08:50 EDST during a routine inspection it was identified that two (2) six (6) inch diameter pipes had degraded block around the pipe sleeves which penetrated the Service building east wall. This Technical Specification wall separates the Service building from the Intermediate building. Upon further investigation, it was determined the two (2) penetrations were packed with fiberglass.

Continuing the inspection, access was gained above the ceiling where nine (9) partial penetrations were identified. The nine .(9) partial penetrations appear to have been from the original construction of the plant where approximately 50% of the original blocks had been cross sectionalized and installed in such a manner that the inspection would not disclose the partial penetration configuration from the accessible side. On the unexposed side of the wall, in the Service building,

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<l 4)I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION A ~ AAOvl0 OUl hO. )I)OMIOI f At<1ll l<)l<ll IAC<l<)' hAMl III OOCAll AVMllAI)I llA <<VMCIA IlI 110l I)l I I O V IU'< I 1A 1 <<Iv<I<oh R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant h U 1 o0 244 8 009 0 04 <<0 8 ll AT II<<<<<<< Mvvv <<<vs<<v<<, vU ~ <<u UA ~ ~ <<>C I v<U )II<< II II the cross sectionalized portion of the block was filled with an approximate 8 inch block.

A Fire watch was initiated at 09:00 hours and an M-56.1, Placement of Tem orar Ceramic Fiber Penetration Fire Seals was completed.

On October 20, 1988 a study was completed on the effects of heat transfer to fire wrap conduit through conduit supports during postulated fires. It. was concluded from this study that one redundant circuit could possibly reach or exceed its short circuit temperature by the conduction of heat through conduit supports in a postulated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire as required by Appendix "R".

Although the fire wrap is not a Technical Specification requirement, the wrapping of conduit supports was a commitment in our Appendix "R" submittal and is included in this LER for your information.

C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetration I-199A-9.

D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

None.

E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

These events were discovered as a result of routine Fire Barrier Inspections and as a result of asbestos inspection in a service corridor.

The fire wrap conduit support event was discovered through an NRC concern which resulted in an Engineering Analysis.

F. OPERATOR ACTION:

The Control Room Operators were notified by the Fire Protection and Safety Coordinator at. which time they performed the following:

Initiated an A-25.1 Ginna Station Event, Re ort hAC <OAM )I ~ 1

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o s o ohio 244 8 09-0 0 05 <<0 8 Notified Plant Superintendent Notified NRC Resident Inspector III USE 0 EVENT A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

Nine (9) of the partial penetrations were caused as a result of poor original construction practices.

Two (2) of the penetrations were packed with fiberglass insulation as per acceptable procedures at time of installation. The fiberglass insulation was missed as a part of our upgrade program.

Seven (7) of the partial penetrations were caused as a result of equipment being removed from the wall.

One (1) of the penetrations was a result of an open conduit failing to be capped or filled with a fire retardant material.

Where fire wrap encapsulation was not acceptal or adequate, field installation directions and Engineering specifications were not adequate.

B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE None.

C. ROOT CAUSE:

The root cause was determined to be an inadequate procedure. ISI-100 was to provide instructions to visually inspect fire barrier penetration seals and fire retardant coating for cables to insure that they are intact. A Procedure Change Notice has been submitted to provide instructions to visually inspect Fire Barriers, Fire Barriers Penetrations Seals and Fire Retardant Coating for Cables.

The root cause for the fire wrap was determined to be inadequate specification after re-analysis of the transmission of heat through support members.

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rr1C Svrr )AAA V l IIVCLtA1 AICVI,AIOAe COMMIttIOA It 4)I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION ArrAOvtO OMl AO. )ISOWIOI taerAtt Ir)I/ll ACILlte HAMI lll l 0 0C 1 I rr V M I I rl I) I llA IIVMtt1 ltl JAOt III elAA ~ lovlrrrAL rvr 1 vl vMerr 1

R.E. Ginna Nuclear PalAcr Plant 0 0 0 0 OF 5 0 0 ltAI llr rrvr Mvrr rr rrevvre. vv revr over rvlc lvrv )IAI II II B. Action taken or planned to prevent recurrence:

As the root cause was determined to be inadequate procedures. A Procedure Change Notice was written for ISI-100.

A Non-Conformance Report (NCR) was written to address penetration problems and corrective actions for permanent repairs.

VI DDITION L INFORMATIO A. Failed Components:

None.

B. Previous LER's on similar'vents:

None.

C. Special Comments:

None.

IrAC IOAIA NIA

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%car ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 0001 October 31, 1988 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

LER 88-009, Inadequate Fire Barrier Inspection Procedure Identified Only Through Breaches Causing Partial Breaches To Go Undetected.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power plant Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(i)(B), which requires reporting of, "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications", the attached Licensee Event Report 'LER 88-009 is hereby submitted.

In accordance with NUREG 1022 the 16 partial fire barrier penetrations and the design analysis on the effects of heat transfer to fire wrap conduit through conduit supports during a potential fire is voluntarily submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public health and safety.

Ver Truly Yours, obert C. M cred General Manager Nuclear Production xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector