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| {{#Wiki_filter:DonaldC.Cool<NuclearPlantUnits1tk2FailureModesandEffectAnalysis(FMEA)ProtectionSet1FoxboroSpec200ReactorProtectionandControlSystemReplacementProjectReportNumber2985-HEI-14,Rev.0~Sub'ect:ThisreportshalldocumenttheresultsofaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)comparisonstudyperformedfortheDonaldC.CookReactorProtectionAndControlSystemUpgrade.ThisanalysisreflectstheinstallationofFoxboroSpec200/Spec200MicroequipmentutilizedtoreplacetheoriginalFoxboroHLineequipment. | | {{#Wiki_filter:DonaldC.Cool<NuclearPlantUnits1tk2FailureModesandEffectAnalysis(FMEA)Protection Set1FoxboroSpec200ReactorProtection andControlSystemReplacement ProjectReportNumber2985-HEI-14, Rev.0~Sub'ect: |
| | ThisreportshalldocumenttheresultsofaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)comparison studyperformed fortheDonaldC.CookReactorProtection AndControlSystemUpgrade.Thisanalysisreflectstheinstallation ofFoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microequipment utilizedtoreplacetheoriginalFoxboroHLineequipment. |
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| ==References:== | | ==References:== |
| 1.FoxboroDocument92-FM-02F;FMEA:D.C.CookNuclear,Spec200Configuration;October30,1992(AppendixA).2.FoxboroDocumentFM-502;FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis,Spec200/Spec200MicroForTheUpgradeOfTheReactorProtectionProcessInstrumentation;November16,1992(Appendix8).3.FoxboroDocument92-SA-50F;Study:A.E.P.D.C.CookNuclearReliabilitySpec200Configuration;August31,1992.4.FoxboroDocument92-SA-66F;Study:A.E.P.D.C.CookNuclearReliability"H"LineConfiguration;November17,1992.5.IEEEStd.352-1987;IEEEGuideforGeneralPrinciplesofReliabilityAnalysisofNuclearPowerGeneratingStationProtectionSystems.6.IEEEStd.577-1976;IEEEStandardRequirementsforReliabilityAnalysisintheDesignandOperationofSafetySystemsforNuclearPowerGeneratingStations.7.IEEEStd.279-1971;IEEEStandard:CriteriaforProtectionSystemsforNuclearPowerGeneratingStations.D.C.CookUnits1Ec2r2ReactorProtectionSystemReplacem=nt*Ep<...I92121u~+Pg~ping+PDRFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)ProtectionSet1Spec200EquipmentReportNumher2985-HEI-14Rev.0Pa<e1of10 8.SpecificationNo.DCC-IC-500-QCN;ReactorProtectionandControlInstrumentation;Revision0.9.HurstEngineeringReportNo.2985-HEI-06;PowerQualityEvaluation;Revision0.10.HurstEngineeringReportNo.2985-HEI-12;TemperatureandHumidityEffects;Revision0.11.HurstEngineeringReportNo.2985-HEI-02;GroundingIssues;Revision0.12.HurstEngineeringReportNo.2985-HEI-09;SupplementalCabinetHeatRiseTesting;Revision0.13.HurstEngineeringReportNo.2985-HEI-01;ResponseTimeEvaluation;Revision0.14.HurstEngineeringReportNo.2985-HEI-10;LithiumBatteryAnalysis;Revision0.15.HurstEngineeringReportNo.2985-HEI-13;IsolationEvaluation;Revision0.16.HurstEngineeringReportNo.2985-HEI-14;EMI/RFIEvaluation;Revision0.17.FoxboroDocumentFM-503;FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis,HLineForTheUpgradeOfTheReactorProtectionProcessInstrumentation;November23,1992(AppendixC).Issue:TheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant,ReactorProtectionandControlSystemisbeingupgradedtoFoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microequipment.GeneralDesignCriteriaandtheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantlicensingbasisrequirethatthequalityandtypesofinstrumentationprovidedareadequateforsafeandorderlyoperationofallsystemsandprocessesoverthefulloperatingrangeoftheplant.Protectionsystemsmustbedesignedforhighfunctionalreliability.Redundancyandindependencemustbesufficienttoassurethatnosinglefailureorremovalfromserviceofanycomponentorchannelofsuchasystemwillresultinlossoftheprotectionfunction.Thesystemshallbedesignedtofailintoasafestateorintoastateestablishedastolerableonadefinedbasis,forallcrediblefailuremodes.IEEE279,"CriteriaForProtectionSystemsForNuclearPowerGeneratingStations"requiresthatprotectionsystemsshall,withprecisionandreliability,automaticallyinitiateappropriateprotectiveactionwheneveraconditionmonitoredbythesystemreachesapresetlevel.Componentsandmoduleswhichcomprisetheprotectionsystemshallbeofaqualitythatisconsistentwithminimummaintenancerequirementsandshallhavelowfailurerates.D.C.CookUnits18c22ReactorProtectionSystemReplacementAEPCmcaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)ProtectionSetISpec200EquipmentReportNumber2985-HEI-14Rev.0Page2of10 TheFMEAisaneffectivetoolinidentifyingsignificantfailuresandtheirconsequences.Itprovidesaqualitativereliabilityanalysisusedtolocatepossiblefailuresandidentifyproperprecautionsthatwillreducethefrequencyorconsequencesofsuchfailures.Aspartofthedesignprocess,acomparisonevaluationbetweentheoriginalFoxboroHLineequipmentandthenewFoxboroSpec200equipmentisbeingundertaken.ThisevaluationwilltaketheformofalimitedFMEAwhichdocumentstheProtectionSet1design.Thisanalysisrepresentsthe"Typical"protectionsetandisintendedtobeboundingforallfourprotectionsetchannels.ThegoalofthisevaluationistodocumentthatthenewSpec200equipmentisequivalenttotheoriginalHLineinstrumentationwithregardtofailuremodes,andthattheoriginallicensingbasisasdefinedintheDonaldC.CookFSARisvalid,applicableandbounding.~Scoe:ThescopeofthisFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)islimitedtotheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant,ProtectionSet1,ReactorProtectionandControlSystem.Thedetailedanalysispresentedwithinthisreporthasbeenconfiguredtoprovideasystematicapproachtoevaluatesystemdesign.ThislimitedFMEAisconfinedtotheboundsoftheSpec200equipmentandisnotintendedtobeacomprehensiveprotectionsystemanalysis.ThisFMEAisrepresentativeofallfourprotectionsetsindesignphilosophyandoverallintent.TheanalysispresentedisintendedtodocumentthatthenewSpec200systemdesignisconsistentwiththeoriginalequipmentdesignbasis.ProtectionSets2,3,and4willbereviewedtovalidatethatthisFMEAisbounding.Thiswillbedocumentedbyseparatereportatalaterdate.Discussion:TheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantReactorProtectionandControlSystemreplacementprojectwillreplaceandupgradetheoriginalFoxboroHLineinstrumentationwithFoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microequipment.Thistaskrepresentsasignificantdesignchangeeffortandrequiresextensiveanalysistoensurethattheprotectionsystemhasbeenconfiguredtomeetregulatoryguidance,andthattheplantlicensingbasisismaintained.TheFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)isatoolutilizedtoidentifycrediblefailuremodesandtheirconsequences.Byutilizingasystematicapproachinevaluatingthedesign,theprotectionsystemreliabilitycanbequantified.D.C.CookUnits1Ec,2ReactorProtectionSystemReplacementAEPfmccFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)ProtectionSet1Spec200EquipmentReportNumber2985-HEI-14Rev.0Page3of10 DescritionofChane:Theoriginalequipment,ReactorProtectionandControlInstrumentationwillbeupgradedduetosparepartsunavailability,obsolescence,andincreasingfailurerates.SpecificationNo.DCC-IC-500-QCNwasdevelopedtoprovidethetechnical,commercialandqualityassurancerequirementsnecessarytoimplementthereplacementproject.Theupgradewillinvolvecompletereplacementoftheprotectionsystemsignalprocessingelectronics,internalpowersupplies,testpanels,andassociatedhardware,locatedin27racks/cabinets.ThenewFoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microinstrumentationwillbeinstalledintheexistingracks/cabinets.TheSpec200equipmenthasbeenconfiguredtobefunctionallyidenticaltotheoriginalsystem.Assuch,thedesignbasis,protectiveactions,bypassandtestingfunctions,andoperationareessentiallyunchangedfromthatdescribedinChapter7oftheDonaldC.CookFSAR.TheSpec200systemutilizesa"modular"designapproach.PowerSupplies,Input,Output,SignalProcessingModulesandassociatedhardwareareinstalledindedicated"nest"locations.Theappropriatenumberofnestassembliesandpowersuppliesarearrangedintherack/cabinetandinterconnectedtoproducethedesiredloopconfiguration.TheSpec200Microisamicroprocessorbasedcontrolcardwhichcanbeconfiguredtoperformawidevarietyofoperations.Loopspecific"controlblocks"aredevelopedutilizingflexiblealgorithmswhichperformthedesiredcontrolactions.Alloutputsignalsareroutedthroughqualifiedisolationdevices.A+/-15VoltDCmulti-nestpowersupplyisinstalledineachracktoprovidesystempowerrequirements.FieldinterfaceattheinputtotheSpec200systemisprovidedbyinputmoduleswhichconvertthefieldsignal,andfunctionasbufferstoprotectthesystemagainstmalfunctions,aswellasprovidesomemeasureofnoiserejection.Eachinterfacemoduleisindividuallyfusedsuchthataccidentalshortcircuit,ortheconnectionofanincorrectvoltagepotential,willnotpropagatetoothersystemcomponents.A75VoltDCpowersupplyisprovidedineachracktopowermultipletransmitterloops.Theprotectionsystemhasbeenprovidedwithredundantmulti-nestandtransmitterlooppowersupplies.Asdescribedabove,eachrack/cabinetcontainsa+/-15VoltDCand75VoltDCpowersupply.Shouldtheprimarypowersupplyfail,theredundantsourceshavebeensizedtoprovideadequatesystempowerrequirements.The118VoltACregulatedfeedwhichenergizestheprotectionsetisparalleledtoeachrack/cabinet.D.C.CookUnits1K2ReactorProtectionSystemReplacementAEPfincaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)ProtectionSet1Spec200EquipmentReportNumber2985-HEI-14Rev.0Page4of10
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TheFoxborosystemhasbeenevaluatedforvariousoperationalandqualificationissueswhicharenotthesubjectofthisreport.Theseare:PowerQualityEvaluation(Reference¹9)TemperatureandHumidityEffects(Reference¹10)GroundingIssues(Reference¹11)CabinetHeatRiseEffects(Reference¹12)ResponseTimeEvaluation(Reference¹13)LithiumBatteryEvaluation(Reference¹14)VoltagetoCurrentCardIsolationEvaluation(Reference¹15)EMI/RFIEvaluation(Reference¹16)SstemInterfaces:TheprimaryProtectionSetinterfaceiswiththeReactorTripLogicchannelsandtheEngineeredSafeguardsSystem.Theprotectionchannelsalsointerfacewithorprovideinputtovariouscontrolsystems,RegulatoryGuide1.97readoutdevices,plantcomputersandannunciatorsystems.TheseinterfacesareidentifiedontheapplicablefunctionaldrawingsidentifiedinTable1ofthisdocument.FailttreModesandEffectsAnalysis~~AsstatedinSectionIVofthisdocument,thescopeofthisFMEAisconfinedtotheboundsoftheProtectionSet1,Spec200equipmentandisnotintendedtobeacomprehensiveprotectionsystemanalysis.TheFMEAwhichfollowshasbeenlimitedtothemajormodulesintheSpec200configuration.Ingeneral,thetechniquesofAppendixAofANSI/IEEEStd.352-1987,"IEEEGuideforGeneralPrinciplesofReliabilityAnalysesofNuclearPowerGeneratingStationSafetySystems"havebeenutilized.TheFMEAhasbeenassembledtoprovideasystematicapproachtoevaluatingtheoveralldesignandreliabilityoftheSpec200protectionsetinstrumentation.TheapplicablereferencedrawingsareidentifiedinTablesI&2ofthisdocument.TheformatoftheFMEAisasfollows;AppendixA:FoxboroDocumentNo.92-FM-02F;FMEA:A.E.P.D.C.CookNuclearSpec200Configuration.'hisAppendixidentitiesthemajorSpec200modulesutilizedfortripfunctionsintheReactorProtectionandControlSystemreplacementprojectandtheircrediblefailuremodeswhichwillbeconsideredinthisFMEA.D.C.CookUnitsl8;2ReactorProtectionSystetnReplacementAEPfinaaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)ProtectionSetISpec200EquipmentReportNumber2985-HEI-14Rev.0Pae5of10 AppendixB:FoxboroDocumentNo.FM-502;FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis,Spec200/Spec200Micro.ThisAppendixprovidesthedetailedFMEAfortheProtectionSet1instrumentation.Thisanalysisincludesalltripfunctions,analogoutputfunctions,Spec200powersupplies,andpowerdistributionmodules.AppendixC:FoxboroDocumentNo.FM-503;FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis,HLine.ThisAppendixprovidesthedetailedFMEAfortheoriginalequipmentFoxboroHLineinstrumentation.Thisanalysisincludesalltripfunctionsandanalogoutputfunctions.Concltision:TheFMEAwhichhasbeenperformedontheSpec200/Spec200Microinstrumentationadequatelydocumentsthatthesystemhasbeendesignedtoprovideahighlevelofreliability.TheSpec200instrumentationhasbeenconfiguredtoinitiateprotectiveactionswithprecisionandreliabilityoverthefullrangeofoperation.Allprotectivefunctionshavebeendesignedtofailinthesafestateorintoastatewhichhasbeendefinedanddeterminedtobetolerable.TheFMEAhasidentifiedthosecrediblefailuremodeswiththehighestprobabilityofoccurrencewithregardtoindividualmoduleeffectsandoverallloopimpacts.Reviewoftheanalysishasnotidentifiedanydifferentsignificantfailuremodesthanthoseidentifiedfortheoriginalequipment.TheSpec200systemdesignisconsistentwiththatoftheoriginalequipmentFoxboroHLine.Operation,functionality,andinterfacesasdescribedinSection7oftheDonaldC.CookFSARareunchanged.WhiletheFMEAdoesnotspecificallyaddress"MethodofDetection"forthefailuremodesidentified,thedesignhasincorporatedthedetectiontechniqueswhichexistedfortheoriginalequipmentsystem.Additionally,theSpec200systemprovidesincreasedfailuredetectioncapabilitieswithalarmsthatareinitiateduponrack/cabinetpowersupplyfailureandSpec200Microcontrolcardfailure.Insummary,thenewProtectionSet1ReactorProtectionandControlSystemutilizingFoxboroSpec200/Spec200MicroinstrunientationhasbeendesignedtomeetregulatoryrequirementsandtheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantspecificlicensingbasis.ThesystemhasincorporatedallfacetsofprotectionsystemdesignasspecifiedinIEEE279-1971.D.C.CookUnitsI42ReactorProtectionSystemReplacementAEPfniiaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)ProtectionSetlSpec200EquipmentReportNumber2985-HEI-14Rev.0Pane6ofl0 0AsimilaranalysisshallbeperformedforProtectionSets2,3and4toensurethatthisisaboundingFMEA.Theseevaluationswillbedocumentedbyseparatereportatafuturedate.~Arovals:PreparedBytlag'l~DateRevieweIf$$fZ.DateApprovedByDateD.C.CookUnits18c2ReactorProtectionSystemReplacetnentAEPlinaFailureMadesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)ProtectionSet1Spec200EquipmentReportNumber2985-HEI-14Rev.0Pae7of10 TableIDRAWINGLIST-FOXBOROSPFC200EUIPMENTFUNCTIONALDRAWINGNO.DESCRIPTIONFD-2101sh.IFD-2101sh.2FD-2101sh.3FD-2101sh.4FD-2101sh.5FD-2101sh.6FD-2102sh.IFD-2102sh.2FD-2102sh.3FD-2102sh.4FD-2103sh.IFD-2103sh.2FD-2103sh.3FD-2103sh.4FD-2104sh.IFD-2104sh.2FD-2104sh.3FD-2104sh.4PRESSURlZERPRESSUREPRESSURIZERLEVELREACTORCOOLANTFLOWLOOPI&2REACTORCOOLANTFLOWLOOP3&4STEAMGENERATOR2&3LEVELAUXILIARYFEEDWATERFLOWS/G//3Tave/DELTATLOOPIOVERTEMP/OVERPOWERDELTATSTATICGAINUNITWIDERANGEHOTLEGTEMPLOOP2&4STEAMFLOW/FEEDFLOWS/G//IPRESSURES/G//I&2STEAMFLOW/FEEDFLOWS/G//2LOWERCTMTPRESSUREMAINFEEDWATERSTARTUPFLOWTURBINEIMPULSEPRESSURES/GO'ISTEAMFLOW/FEEDFLOWS/GA'3PRESSURES/GP3&4STEAMFLOW/FEEDFLOWS/GA'4D.C.CookUnitsI&2ReactorProtectionSystentReplacementAEPfincaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)ProtectionSetISpec200EquipmentReportNumber29SS-HEI-14Rev.0Pa"e8of10 0TableIcont.DRAWINGLISTFOXBOROSPEC200EUIPMENTDRAWINGNO.DESCRIPTIONRL-2101RL-2102RL-2103RL-2104PWR-2101PWR-2102PWR-2103PWR-2104RACKLOADING,PROTECTIONSETIRACKIRACKLOADING,PROTECTIONSETIRACK2RACKLOADING,PROTECTIONSETIRACK3RACKLOADING,PROTECTIONSETIRACK4POWERDISTRIBUTIONDRAWINGPROTECTIONSETIRACKIPOWERDISTRIBUTIONDRAWINGPROTECTIONSETIRACK2POWERDISTRIBUTIONDRAWINGPROTECTIONSETIRACK3POWERDISTRIBUTIONDRAWINGPROTECTIONSETIRACK4D.C.CookUnitsISc2ReactorProtectionSystemReplacementAEPfmaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)ProtectionSetISpec200EquipmentReportNumber2985-HEI-14Rev.0Page9of10 Table2DRAWINGLIST-FOXBOROHLINEFUIPMFNTFUNCTIONALDRAWINGDESCRIPTIONCD-1Sh.ICD-1Sh.2CD-1Sh.3CD-1Sh.xCD-2Sh.I&2CD-2Sh.3CD-3Sh.ICD-3Sh.2CD-3SI1.3CD-3Sh.xCD-4Sh.1CD-4Sh.2CD-4Sh.3PRESSURIZERFLOW,LEVELANDPRESSUREPRIMARYCOOLANTFLOWSYSTEMSTEAMGENERATOR2&3LEVELS/G//3AUXILIARYFEEDWATERFLOWREACTORCOOLANTLOOP//1Tave&DeltaTREACTORCOOLANTWIDERANGEHOTLEGTEMPERATURELOOPS2&4S/G//ISTEAMFLOW,FEEDFLOW,PRESSURES/GiQSTEAMFLOW,FEEDFLOW,PRESSURECONTAINMENTPRESSURES/G//IMAINFEEDWATERSTARTUPFLOWS/G//3STEAMFLOW,FEEDFLOW,PRESSURES/G//4STEAMFLOW,FEEDFLOW,PRESSURETURBINEIMPULSEPRESSURED.C.CookUnitsI&2ReactorProtectionSystemReplacetnentAEPI'mrnaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)ProtectionSetISpec200EquipmentReportNumber2985-HEI-I4Rev.0PaeIOof10}}
| | 1.FoxboroDocument92-FM-02F; FMEA:D.C.CookNuclear,Spec200Configuration; October30,1992(Appendix A).2.FoxboroDocumentFM-502;FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis, Spec200/Spec200MicroForTheUpgradeOfTheReactorProtection ProcessInstrumentation; November16,1992(Appendix 8).3.FoxboroDocument92-SA-50F; Study:A.E.P.D.C.CookNuclearReliability Spec200Configuration; August31,1992.4.FoxboroDocument92-SA-66F; Study:A.E.P.D.C.CookNuclearReliability "H"LineConfiguration; November17,1992.5.IEEEStd.352-1987; IEEEGuideforGeneralPrinciples ofReliability AnalysisofNuclearPowerGenerating StationProtection Systems.6.IEEEStd.577-1976; IEEEStandardRequirements forReliability AnalysisintheDesignandOperation ofSafetySystemsforNuclearPowerGenerating Stations. |
| | 7.IEEEStd.279-1971; IEEEStandard: |
| | CriteriaforProtection SystemsforNuclearPowerGenerating Stations. |
| | D.C.CookUnits1Ec2r2ReactorProtection SystemReplacem=nt |
| | *Ep<...I92121u~+P g~ping+PDRFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection Set1Spec200Equipment ReportNumher2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Pa<e1of10 8.Specification No.DCC-IC-500-QCN; ReactorProtection andControlInstrumentation; Revision0.9.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-06; PowerQualityEvaluation; Revision0.10.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-12; Temperature andHumidityEffects;Revision0.11.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-02; Grounding Issues;Revision0.12.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-09; Supplemental CabinetHeatRiseTesting;Revision0.13.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-01; ResponseTimeEvaluation; Revision0.14.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-10; LithiumBatteryAnalysis; Revision0.15.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-13; Isolation Evaluation; Revision0.16.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-14; EMI/RFIEvaluation; Revision0.17.FoxboroDocumentFM-503;FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis, HLineForTheUpgradeOfTheReactorProtection ProcessInstrumentation; November23,1992(Appendix C).Issue:TheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant,ReactorProtection andControlSystemisbeingupgradedtoFoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microequipment. |
| | GeneralDesignCriteriaandtheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantlicensing basisrequirethatthequalityandtypesofinstrumentation providedareadequateforsafeandorderlyoperation ofallsystemsandprocesses overthefulloperating rangeoftheplant.Protection systemsmustbedesignedforhighfunctional reliability. |
| | Redundancy andindependence mustbesufficient toassurethatnosinglefailureorremovalfromserviceofanycomponent orchannelofsuchasystemwillresultinlossoftheprotection function. |
| | Thesystemshallbedesignedtofailintoasafestateorintoastateestablished astolerable onadefinedbasis,forallcrediblefailuremodes.IEEE279,"Criteria ForProtection SystemsForNuclearPowerGenerating Stations" requiresthatprotection systemsshall,withprecision andreliability, automatically initiateappropriate protective actionwheneveracondition monitored bythesystemreachesapresetlevel.Components andmoduleswhichcomprisetheprotection systemshallbeofaqualitythatisconsistent withminimummaintenance requirements andshallhavelowfailurerates.D.C.CookUnits18c22ReactorProtection SystemReplacement AEPCmcaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection SetISpec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Page2of10 TheFMEAisaneffective toolinidentifying significant failuresandtheirconsequences. |
| | Itprovidesaqualitative reliability analysisusedtolocatepossiblefailuresandidentifyproperprecautions thatwillreducethefrequency orconsequences ofsuchfailures. |
| | Aspartofthedesignprocess,acomparison evaluation betweentheoriginalFoxboroHLineequipment andthenewFoxboroSpec200equipment isbeingundertaken. |
| | Thisevaluation willtaketheformofalimitedFMEAwhichdocuments theProtection Set1design.Thisanalysisrepresents the"Typical" protection setandisintendedtobeboundingforallfourprotection setchannels. |
| | Thegoalofthisevaluation istodocumentthatthenewSpec200equipment isequivalent totheoriginalHLineinstrumentation withregardtofailuremodes,andthattheoriginallicensing basisasdefinedintheDonaldC.CookFSARisvalid,applicable andbounding. |
| | ~Scoe:ThescopeofthisFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)islimitedtotheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant,Protection Set1,ReactorProtection andControlSystem.Thedetailedanalysispresented withinthisreporthasbeenconfigured toprovideasystematic approachtoevaluatesystemdesign.ThislimitedFMEAisconfinedtotheboundsoftheSpec200equipment andisnotintendedtobeacomprehensive protection systemanalysis. |
| | ThisFMEAisrepresentative ofallfourprotection setsindesignphilosophy andoverallintent.Theanalysispresented isintendedtodocumentthatthenewSpec200systemdesignisconsistent withtheoriginalequipment designbasis.Protection Sets2,3,and4willbereviewedtovalidatethatthisFMEAisbounding. |
| | Thiswillbedocumented byseparatereportatalaterdate.Discussion: |
| | TheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantReactorProtection andControlSystemreplacement projectwillreplaceandupgradetheoriginalFoxboroHLineinstrumentation withFoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microequipment. |
| | Thistaskrepresents asignificant designchangeeffortandrequiresextensive analysistoensurethattheprotection systemhasbeenconfigured tomeetregulatory |
| | : guidance, andthattheplantlicensing basisismaintained. |
| | TheFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)isatoolutilizedtoidentifycrediblefailuremodesandtheirconsequences. |
| | Byutilizing asystematic approachinevaluating thedesign,theprotection systemreliability canbequantified. |
| | D.C.CookUnits1Ec,2ReactorProtection SystemReplacement AEPfmccFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection Set1Spec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Page3of10 DescritionofChane:Theoriginalequipment, ReactorProtection andControlInstrumentation willbeupgradedduetosparepartsunavailability, obsolescence, andincreasing failurerates.Specification No.DCC-IC-500-QCN wasdeveloped toprovidethetechnical, commercial andqualityassurance requirements necessary toimplement thereplacement project.Theupgradewillinvolvecompletereplacement oftheprotection systemsignalprocessing electronics, internalpowersupplies, testpanels,andassociated |
| | : hardware, locatedin27racks/cabinets. |
| | ThenewFoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microinstrumentation willbeinstalled intheexistingracks/cabinets. |
| | TheSpec200equipment hasbeenconfigured tobefunctionally identical totheoriginalsystem.Assuch,thedesignbasis,protective actions,bypassandtestingfunctions, andoperation areessentially unchanged fromthatdescribed inChapter7oftheDonaldC.CookFSAR.TheSpec200systemutilizesa"modular" designapproach. |
| | PowerSupplies, Input,Output,SignalProcessing Modulesandassociated hardwareareinstalled indedicated "nest"locations. |
| | Theappropriate numberofnestassemblies andpowersuppliesarearrangedintherack/cabinetandinterconnected toproducethedesiredloopconfiguration. |
| | TheSpec200Microisamicroprocessor basedcontrolcardwhichcanbeconfigured toperformawidevarietyofoperations. |
| | Loopspecific"controlblocks"aredeveloped utilizing flexiblealgorithms whichperformthedesiredcontrolactions.Alloutputsignalsareroutedthroughqualified isolation devices.A+/-15VoltDCmulti-nest powersupplyisinstalled ineachracktoprovidesystempowerrequirements. |
| | Fieldinterface attheinputtotheSpec200systemisprovidedbyinputmoduleswhichconvertthefieldsignal,andfunctionasbufferstoprotectthesystemagainstmalfunctions, aswellasprovidesomemeasureofnoiserejection. |
| | Eachinterface moduleisindividually fusedsuchthataccidental shortcircuit,ortheconnection ofanincorrect voltagepotential, willnotpropagate toothersystemcomponents. |
| | A75VoltDCpowersupplyisprovidedineachracktopowermultipletransmitter loops.Theprotection systemhasbeenprovidedwithredundant multi-nest andtransmitter looppowersupplies. |
| | Asdescribed above,eachrack/cabinetcontainsa+/-15VoltDCand75VoltDCpowersupply.Shouldtheprimarypowersupplyfail,theredundant sourceshavebeensizedtoprovideadequatesystempowerrequirements. |
| | The118VoltACregulated feedwhichenergizes theprotection setisparalleled toeachrack/cabinet.D.C.CookUnits1K2ReactorProtection SystemReplacement AEPfincaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection Set1Spec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Page4of10 |
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| | TheFoxborosystemhasbeenevaluated forvariousoperational andqualification issueswhicharenotthesubjectofthisreport.Theseare:PowerQualityEvaluation (Reference |
| | ¹9)Temperature andHumidityEffects(Reference |
| | ¹10)Grounding Issues(Reference |
| | ¹11)CabinetHeatRiseEffects(Reference |
| | ¹12)ResponseTimeEvaluation (Reference |
| | ¹13)LithiumBatteryEvaluation (Reference |
| | ¹14)VoltagetoCurrentCardIsolation Evaluation (Reference |
| | ¹15)EMI/RFIEvaluation (Reference |
| | ¹16)SstemInterfaces: |
| | TheprimaryProtection Setinterface iswiththeReactorTripLogicchannelsandtheEngineered Safeguards System.Theprotection channelsalsointerface withorprovideinputtovariouscontrolsystems,Regulatory Guide1.97readoutdevices,plantcomputers andannunciator systems.Theseinterfaces areidentified ontheapplicable functional drawingsidentified inTable1ofthisdocument. |
| | FailttreModesandEffectsAnalysis~~AsstatedinSectionIVofthisdocument, thescopeofthisFMEAisconfinedtotheboundsoftheProtection Set1,Spec200equipment andisnotintendedtobeacomprehensive protection systemanalysis. |
| | TheFMEAwhichfollowshasbeenlimitedtothemajormodulesintheSpec200configuration. |
| | Ingeneral,thetechniques ofAppendixAofANSI/IEEE Std.352-1987, "IEEEGuideforGeneralPrinciples ofReliability AnalysesofNuclearPowerGenerating StationSafetySystems"havebeenutilized. |
| | TheFMEAhasbeenassembled toprovideasystematic approachtoevaluating theoveralldesignandreliability oftheSpec200protection setinstrumentation. |
| | Theapplicable reference drawingsareidentified inTablesI&2ofthisdocument. |
| | TheformatoftheFMEAisasfollows;AppendixA:FoxboroDocumentNo.92-FM-02F; FMEA:A.E.P.D.C.CookNuclearSpec200Configuration.'his Appendixidentities themajorSpec200modulesutilizedfortripfunctions intheReactorProtection andControlSystemreplacement projectandtheircrediblefailuremodeswhichwillbeconsidered inthisFMEA.D.C.CookUnitsl8;2ReactorProtection SystetnReplacement AEPfinaaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection SetISpec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Pae5of10 AppendixB:FoxboroDocumentNo.FM-502;FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis, Spec200/Spec200Micro.ThisAppendixprovidesthedetailedFMEAfortheProtection Set1instrumentation. |
| | Thisanalysisincludesalltripfunctions, analogoutputfunctions, Spec200powersupplies, andpowerdistribution modules.AppendixC:FoxboroDocumentNo.FM-503;FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis, HLine.ThisAppendixprovidesthedetailedFMEAfortheoriginalequipment FoxboroHLineinstrumentation. |
| | Thisanalysisincludesalltripfunctions andanalogoutputfunctions. |
| | Concltision: |
| | TheFMEAwhichhasbeenperformed ontheSpec200/Spec200Microinstrumentation adequately documents thatthesystemhasbeendesignedtoprovideahighlevelofreliability. |
| | TheSpec200instrumentation hasbeenconfigured toinitiateprotective actionswithprecision andreliability overthefullrangeofoperation. |
| | Allprotective functions havebeendesignedtofailinthesafestateorintoastatewhichhasbeendefinedanddetermined tobetolerable. |
| | TheFMEAhasidentified thosecrediblefailuremodeswiththehighestprobability ofoccurrence withregardtoindividual moduleeffectsandoverallloopimpacts.Reviewoftheanalysishasnotidentified anydifferent significant failuremodesthanthoseidentified fortheoriginalequipment. |
| | TheSpec200systemdesignisconsistent withthatoftheoriginalequipment FoxboroHLine.Operation, functionality, andinterfaces asdescribed inSection7oftheDonaldC.CookFSARareunchanged. |
| | WhiletheFMEAdoesnotspecifically address"MethodofDetection" forthefailuremodesidentified, thedesignhasincorporated thedetection techniques whichexistedfortheoriginalequipment system.Additionally, theSpec200systemprovidesincreased failuredetection capabilities withalarmsthatareinitiated uponrack/cabinetpowersupplyfailureandSpec200Microcontrolcardfailure.Insummary,thenewProtection Set1ReactorProtection andControlSystemutilizing FoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microinstrunientation hasbeendesignedtomeetregulatory requirements andtheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantspecificlicensing basis.Thesystemhasincorporated allfacetsofprotection systemdesignasspecified inIEEE279-1971. |
| | D.C.CookUnitsI42ReactorProtection SystemReplacement AEPfniiaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection SetlSpec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Pane6ofl0 0Asimilaranalysisshallbeperformed forProtection Sets2,3and4toensurethatthisisaboundingFMEA.Theseevaluations willbedocumented byseparatereportatafuturedate.~Arovals: |
| | PreparedBytlag'l~DateRevieweIf$$fZ.DateApprovedByDateD.C.CookUnits18c2ReactorProtection SystemReplacetnent AEPlinaFailureMadesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection Set1Spec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Pae7of10 TableIDRAWINGLIST-FOXBOROSPFC200EUIPMENTFUNCTIONAL DRAWINGNO.DESCRIPTION FD-2101sh.IFD-2101sh.2FD-2101sh.3FD-2101sh.4FD-2101sh.5FD-2101sh.6FD-2102sh.IFD-2102sh.2FD-2102sh.3FD-2102sh.4FD-2103sh.IFD-2103sh.2FD-2103sh.3FD-2103sh.4FD-2104sh.IFD-2104sh.2FD-2104sh.3FD-2104sh.4PRESSURlZERPRESSUREPRESSURIZER LEVELREACTORCOOLANTFLOWLOOPI&2REACTORCOOLANTFLOWLOOP3&4STEAMGENERATOR 2&3LEVELAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOWS/G//3Tave/DELTATLOOPIOVERTEMP/OVERPOWER DELTATSTATICGAINUNITWIDERANGEHOTLEGTEMPLOOP2&4STEAMFLOW/FEEDFLOWS/G//IPRESSURES/G//I&2STEAMFLOW/FEEDFLOWS/G//2LOWERCTMTPRESSUREMAINFEEDWATER STARTUPFLOWTURBINEIMPULSEPRESSURES/GO'ISTEAMFLOW/FEEDFLOWS/GA'3PRESSURES/GP3&4STEAMFLOW/FEEDFLOWS/GA'4D.C.CookUnitsI&2ReactorProtection SystentReplacement AEPfincaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection SetISpec200Equipment ReportNumber29SS-HEI-14 Rev.0Pa"e8of10 0TableIcont.DRAWINGLISTFOXBOROSPEC200EUIPMENTDRAWINGNO.DESCRIPTION RL-2101RL-2102RL-2103RL-2104PWR-2101PWR-2102PWR-2103PWR-2104RACKLOADING,PROTECTION SETIRACKIRACKLOADING,PROTECTION SETIRACK2RACKLOADING,PROTECTION SETIRACK3RACKLOADING,PROTECTION SETIRACK4POWERDISTRIBUTION DRAWINGPROTECTION SETIRACKIPOWERDISTRIBUTION DRAWINGPROTECTION SETIRACK2POWERDISTRIBUTION DRAWINGPROTECTION SETIRACK3POWERDISTRIBUTION DRAWINGPROTECTION SETIRACK4D.C.CookUnitsISc2ReactorProtection SystemReplacement AEPfmaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection SetISpec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Page9of10 Table2DRAWINGLIST-FOXBOROHLINEFUIPMFNTFUNCTIONAL DRAWINGDESCRIPTION CD-1Sh.ICD-1Sh.2CD-1Sh.3CD-1Sh.xCD-2Sh.I&2CD-2Sh.3CD-3Sh.ICD-3Sh.2CD-3SI1.3CD-3Sh.xCD-4Sh.1CD-4Sh.2CD-4Sh.3PRESSURIZER FLOW,LEVELANDPRESSUREPRIMARYCOOLANTFLOWSYSTEMSTEAMGENERATOR 2&3LEVELS/G//3AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOWREACTORCOOLANTLOOP//1Tave&DeltaTREACTORCOOLANTWIDERANGEHOTLEGTEMPERATURE LOOPS2&4S/G//ISTEAMFLOW,FEEDFLOW,PRESSURES/GiQSTEAMFLOW,FEEDFLOW,PRESSURECONTAINMENT PRESSURES/G//IMAINFEEDWATER STARTUPFLOWS/G//3STEAMFLOW,FEEDFLOW,PRESSURES/G//4STEAMFLOW,FEEDFLOW,PRESSURETURBINEIMPULSEPRESSURED.C.CookUnitsI&2ReactorProtection SystemReplacetnent AEPI'mrna FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection SetISpec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-I4 Rev.0PaeIOof10}} |
DC Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 Failure Modes & Effect Analysis (FMEA) Protection Set 1 Foxboro Spec 200 Reactor Protection & Control Sys Replacement Project.| ML17329A713 |
| Person / Time |
|---|
| Site: |
Cook  |
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| Issue date: |
12/16/1992 |
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| From: |
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP. |
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| To: |
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| Shared Package |
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| ML17329A705 |
List: |
|---|
| References |
|---|
| 2985-HEI-14, 2985-HEI-14-R, 2985-HEI-14-R00, NUDOCS 9212180073 |
| Download: ML17329A713 (11) |
|
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|---|
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1999-09-28
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999
LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr
ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented
ML17335A5631999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 991012 Ltr
ML17335A5621999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 991012 Ltr
ML17335A5481999-09-30030 September 1999
Non-proprietary DC Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 Mods to Containment Sys W SE (Secl 99-076,Rev 3).
ML17335A5451999-09-28028 September 1999
Rev 1 to Containment Sump Level Design Condition & Failure Effects Analysis for Potential Draindown Scenarios.
ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999
LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary
ML17326A1481999-09-17017 September 1999
Independent Review of Control Rod Insertion Following Cold Leg Lbloca,Dc Cook,Units 1 & 2.
ML17326A1211999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2.With 990915 Ltr
ML17326A1201999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1.With 990915 Ltr
ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999
LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed
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LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs
ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999
LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4
ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999
LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830
ML17335A5461999-08-0202 August 1999
Rev 0 to Evaluation of Cook Recirculation Sump Level for Reduced Pump Flow Rates.
ML17326A0871999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990812 Ltr
ML17326A0861999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Units 2.With 990812 Ltr
ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999
LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves
ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999
LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr
ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999
LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis
ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999
LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr
ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written
ML17326A0511999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990709 Ltr
ML17326A0501999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990709 Ltr
ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999
LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified
ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed
ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions
ML17326A0061999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Dcp.With 990609 Ltr
ML17326A0071999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990609 Ltr
ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999
LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions
ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999
LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made
ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999
LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed
ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised
ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared
ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design
ML17335A5301999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990508 Ltr
ML17335A5291999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990508 Ltr
ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold
ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999
LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation
ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate
ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures
ML17325B5491999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2.With 990408 Ltr
ML17325B5441999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990408 Ltr
ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing
ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling
ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed
ML17325B5671999-03-0202 March 1999
Summary of Unit 1 Steam Generator Layup Chemistry from 980101 to 990218.
ML17325B4631999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With 990308 Ltr
ML17325B4621999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990308 Ltr
ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
DonaldC.Cool<NuclearPlantUnits1tk2FailureModesandEffectAnalysis(FMEA)Protection Set1FoxboroSpec200ReactorProtection andControlSystemReplacement ProjectReportNumber2985-HEI-14, Rev.0~Sub'ect:
ThisreportshalldocumenttheresultsofaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)comparison studyperformed fortheDonaldC.CookReactorProtection AndControlSystemUpgrade.Thisanalysisreflectstheinstallation ofFoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microequipment utilizedtoreplacetheoriginalFoxboroHLineequipment.
References:
1.FoxboroDocument92-FM-02F; FMEA:D.C.CookNuclear,Spec200Configuration; October30,1992(Appendix A).2.FoxboroDocumentFM-502;FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis, Spec200/Spec200MicroForTheUpgradeOfTheReactorProtection ProcessInstrumentation; November16,1992(Appendix 8).3.FoxboroDocument92-SA-50F; Study:A.E.P.D.C.CookNuclearReliability Spec200Configuration; August31,1992.4.FoxboroDocument92-SA-66F; Study:A.E.P.D.C.CookNuclearReliability "H"LineConfiguration; November17,1992.5.IEEEStd.352-1987; IEEEGuideforGeneralPrinciples ofReliability AnalysisofNuclearPowerGenerating StationProtection Systems.6.IEEEStd.577-1976; IEEEStandardRequirements forReliability AnalysisintheDesignandOperation ofSafetySystemsforNuclearPowerGenerating Stations.
7.IEEEStd.279-1971; IEEEStandard:
CriteriaforProtection SystemsforNuclearPowerGenerating Stations.
D.C.CookUnits1Ec2r2ReactorProtection SystemReplacem=nt
- Ep<...I92121u~+P g~ping+PDRFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection Set1Spec200Equipment ReportNumher2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Pa<e1of10 8.Specification No.DCC-IC-500-QCN; ReactorProtection andControlInstrumentation; Revision0.9.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-06; PowerQualityEvaluation; Revision0.10.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-12; Temperature andHumidityEffects;Revision0.11.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-02; Grounding Issues;Revision0.12.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-09; Supplemental CabinetHeatRiseTesting;Revision0.13.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-01; ResponseTimeEvaluation; Revision0.14.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-10; LithiumBatteryAnalysis; Revision0.15.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-13; Isolation Evaluation; Revision0.16.HurstEngineering ReportNo.2985-HEI-14; EMI/RFIEvaluation; Revision0.17.FoxboroDocumentFM-503;FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis, HLineForTheUpgradeOfTheReactorProtection ProcessInstrumentation; November23,1992(Appendix C).Issue:TheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant,ReactorProtection andControlSystemisbeingupgradedtoFoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microequipment.
GeneralDesignCriteriaandtheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantlicensing basisrequirethatthequalityandtypesofinstrumentation providedareadequateforsafeandorderlyoperation ofallsystemsandprocesses overthefulloperating rangeoftheplant.Protection systemsmustbedesignedforhighfunctional reliability.
Redundancy andindependence mustbesufficient toassurethatnosinglefailureorremovalfromserviceofanycomponent orchannelofsuchasystemwillresultinlossoftheprotection function.
Thesystemshallbedesignedtofailintoasafestateorintoastateestablished astolerable onadefinedbasis,forallcrediblefailuremodes.IEEE279,"Criteria ForProtection SystemsForNuclearPowerGenerating Stations" requiresthatprotection systemsshall,withprecision andreliability, automatically initiateappropriate protective actionwheneveracondition monitored bythesystemreachesapresetlevel.Components andmoduleswhichcomprisetheprotection systemshallbeofaqualitythatisconsistent withminimummaintenance requirements andshallhavelowfailurerates.D.C.CookUnits18c22ReactorProtection SystemReplacement AEPCmcaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection SetISpec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Page2of10 TheFMEAisaneffective toolinidentifying significant failuresandtheirconsequences.
Itprovidesaqualitative reliability analysisusedtolocatepossiblefailuresandidentifyproperprecautions thatwillreducethefrequency orconsequences ofsuchfailures.
Aspartofthedesignprocess,acomparison evaluation betweentheoriginalFoxboroHLineequipment andthenewFoxboroSpec200equipment isbeingundertaken.
Thisevaluation willtaketheformofalimitedFMEAwhichdocuments theProtection Set1design.Thisanalysisrepresents the"Typical" protection setandisintendedtobeboundingforallfourprotection setchannels.
Thegoalofthisevaluation istodocumentthatthenewSpec200equipment isequivalent totheoriginalHLineinstrumentation withregardtofailuremodes,andthattheoriginallicensing basisasdefinedintheDonaldC.CookFSARisvalid,applicable andbounding.
~Scoe:ThescopeofthisFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)islimitedtotheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant,Protection Set1,ReactorProtection andControlSystem.Thedetailedanalysispresented withinthisreporthasbeenconfigured toprovideasystematic approachtoevaluatesystemdesign.ThislimitedFMEAisconfinedtotheboundsoftheSpec200equipment andisnotintendedtobeacomprehensive protection systemanalysis.
ThisFMEAisrepresentative ofallfourprotection setsindesignphilosophy andoverallintent.Theanalysispresented isintendedtodocumentthatthenewSpec200systemdesignisconsistent withtheoriginalequipment designbasis.Protection Sets2,3,and4willbereviewedtovalidatethatthisFMEAisbounding.
Thiswillbedocumented byseparatereportatalaterdate.Discussion:
TheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantReactorProtection andControlSystemreplacement projectwillreplaceandupgradetheoriginalFoxboroHLineinstrumentation withFoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microequipment.
Thistaskrepresents asignificant designchangeeffortandrequiresextensive analysistoensurethattheprotection systemhasbeenconfigured tomeetregulatory
- guidance, andthattheplantlicensing basisismaintained.
TheFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)isatoolutilizedtoidentifycrediblefailuremodesandtheirconsequences.
Byutilizing asystematic approachinevaluating thedesign,theprotection systemreliability canbequantified.
D.C.CookUnits1Ec,2ReactorProtection SystemReplacement AEPfmccFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection Set1Spec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Page3of10 DescritionofChane:Theoriginalequipment, ReactorProtection andControlInstrumentation willbeupgradedduetosparepartsunavailability, obsolescence, andincreasing failurerates.Specification No.DCC-IC-500-QCN wasdeveloped toprovidethetechnical, commercial andqualityassurance requirements necessary toimplement thereplacement project.Theupgradewillinvolvecompletereplacement oftheprotection systemsignalprocessing electronics, internalpowersupplies, testpanels,andassociated
- hardware, locatedin27racks/cabinets.
ThenewFoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microinstrumentation willbeinstalled intheexistingracks/cabinets.
TheSpec200equipment hasbeenconfigured tobefunctionally identical totheoriginalsystem.Assuch,thedesignbasis,protective actions,bypassandtestingfunctions, andoperation areessentially unchanged fromthatdescribed inChapter7oftheDonaldC.CookFSAR.TheSpec200systemutilizesa"modular" designapproach.
PowerSupplies, Input,Output,SignalProcessing Modulesandassociated hardwareareinstalled indedicated "nest"locations.
Theappropriate numberofnestassemblies andpowersuppliesarearrangedintherack/cabinetandinterconnected toproducethedesiredloopconfiguration.
TheSpec200Microisamicroprocessor basedcontrolcardwhichcanbeconfigured toperformawidevarietyofoperations.
Loopspecific"controlblocks"aredeveloped utilizing flexiblealgorithms whichperformthedesiredcontrolactions.Alloutputsignalsareroutedthroughqualified isolation devices.A+/-15VoltDCmulti-nest powersupplyisinstalled ineachracktoprovidesystempowerrequirements.
Fieldinterface attheinputtotheSpec200systemisprovidedbyinputmoduleswhichconvertthefieldsignal,andfunctionasbufferstoprotectthesystemagainstmalfunctions, aswellasprovidesomemeasureofnoiserejection.
Eachinterface moduleisindividually fusedsuchthataccidental shortcircuit,ortheconnection ofanincorrect voltagepotential, willnotpropagate toothersystemcomponents.
A75VoltDCpowersupplyisprovidedineachracktopowermultipletransmitter loops.Theprotection systemhasbeenprovidedwithredundant multi-nest andtransmitter looppowersupplies.
Asdescribed above,eachrack/cabinetcontainsa+/-15VoltDCand75VoltDCpowersupply.Shouldtheprimarypowersupplyfail,theredundant sourceshavebeensizedtoprovideadequatesystempowerrequirements.
The118VoltACregulated feedwhichenergizes theprotection setisparalleled toeachrack/cabinet.D.C.CookUnits1K2ReactorProtection SystemReplacement AEPfincaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection Set1Spec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Page4of10
TheFoxborosystemhasbeenevaluated forvariousoperational andqualification issueswhicharenotthesubjectofthisreport.Theseare:PowerQualityEvaluation (Reference
¹9)Temperature andHumidityEffects(Reference
¹10)Grounding Issues(Reference
¹11)CabinetHeatRiseEffects(Reference
¹12)ResponseTimeEvaluation (Reference
¹13)LithiumBatteryEvaluation (Reference
¹14)VoltagetoCurrentCardIsolation Evaluation (Reference
¹15)EMI/RFIEvaluation (Reference
¹16)SstemInterfaces:
TheprimaryProtection Setinterface iswiththeReactorTripLogicchannelsandtheEngineered Safeguards System.Theprotection channelsalsointerface withorprovideinputtovariouscontrolsystems,Regulatory Guide1.97readoutdevices,plantcomputers andannunciator systems.Theseinterfaces areidentified ontheapplicable functional drawingsidentified inTable1ofthisdocument.
FailttreModesandEffectsAnalysis~~AsstatedinSectionIVofthisdocument, thescopeofthisFMEAisconfinedtotheboundsoftheProtection Set1,Spec200equipment andisnotintendedtobeacomprehensive protection systemanalysis.
TheFMEAwhichfollowshasbeenlimitedtothemajormodulesintheSpec200configuration.
Ingeneral,thetechniques ofAppendixAofANSI/IEEE Std.352-1987, "IEEEGuideforGeneralPrinciples ofReliability AnalysesofNuclearPowerGenerating StationSafetySystems"havebeenutilized.
TheFMEAhasbeenassembled toprovideasystematic approachtoevaluating theoveralldesignandreliability oftheSpec200protection setinstrumentation.
Theapplicable reference drawingsareidentified inTablesI&2ofthisdocument.
TheformatoftheFMEAisasfollows;AppendixA:FoxboroDocumentNo.92-FM-02F; FMEA:A.E.P.D.C.CookNuclearSpec200Configuration.'his Appendixidentities themajorSpec200modulesutilizedfortripfunctions intheReactorProtection andControlSystemreplacement projectandtheircrediblefailuremodeswhichwillbeconsidered inthisFMEA.D.C.CookUnitsl8;2ReactorProtection SystetnReplacement AEPfinaaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection SetISpec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Pae5of10 AppendixB:FoxboroDocumentNo.FM-502;FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis, Spec200/Spec200Micro.ThisAppendixprovidesthedetailedFMEAfortheProtection Set1instrumentation.
Thisanalysisincludesalltripfunctions, analogoutputfunctions, Spec200powersupplies, andpowerdistribution modules.AppendixC:FoxboroDocumentNo.FM-503;FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis, HLine.ThisAppendixprovidesthedetailedFMEAfortheoriginalequipment FoxboroHLineinstrumentation.
Thisanalysisincludesalltripfunctions andanalogoutputfunctions.
Concltision:
TheFMEAwhichhasbeenperformed ontheSpec200/Spec200Microinstrumentation adequately documents thatthesystemhasbeendesignedtoprovideahighlevelofreliability.
TheSpec200instrumentation hasbeenconfigured toinitiateprotective actionswithprecision andreliability overthefullrangeofoperation.
Allprotective functions havebeendesignedtofailinthesafestateorintoastatewhichhasbeendefinedanddetermined tobetolerable.
TheFMEAhasidentified thosecrediblefailuremodeswiththehighestprobability ofoccurrence withregardtoindividual moduleeffectsandoverallloopimpacts.Reviewoftheanalysishasnotidentified anydifferent significant failuremodesthanthoseidentified fortheoriginalequipment.
TheSpec200systemdesignisconsistent withthatoftheoriginalequipment FoxboroHLine.Operation, functionality, andinterfaces asdescribed inSection7oftheDonaldC.CookFSARareunchanged.
WhiletheFMEAdoesnotspecifically address"MethodofDetection" forthefailuremodesidentified, thedesignhasincorporated thedetection techniques whichexistedfortheoriginalequipment system.Additionally, theSpec200systemprovidesincreased failuredetection capabilities withalarmsthatareinitiated uponrack/cabinetpowersupplyfailureandSpec200Microcontrolcardfailure.Insummary,thenewProtection Set1ReactorProtection andControlSystemutilizing FoxboroSpec200/Spec200Microinstrunientation hasbeendesignedtomeetregulatory requirements andtheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantspecificlicensing basis.Thesystemhasincorporated allfacetsofprotection systemdesignasspecified inIEEE279-1971.
D.C.CookUnitsI42ReactorProtection SystemReplacement AEPfniiaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection SetlSpec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Pane6ofl0 0Asimilaranalysisshallbeperformed forProtection Sets2,3and4toensurethatthisisaboundingFMEA.Theseevaluations willbedocumented byseparatereportatafuturedate.~Arovals:
PreparedBytlag'l~DateRevieweIf$$fZ.DateApprovedByDateD.C.CookUnits18c2ReactorProtection SystemReplacetnent AEPlinaFailureMadesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection Set1Spec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Pae7of10 TableIDRAWINGLIST-FOXBOROSPFC200EUIPMENTFUNCTIONAL DRAWINGNO.DESCRIPTION FD-2101sh.IFD-2101sh.2FD-2101sh.3FD-2101sh.4FD-2101sh.5FD-2101sh.6FD-2102sh.IFD-2102sh.2FD-2102sh.3FD-2102sh.4FD-2103sh.IFD-2103sh.2FD-2103sh.3FD-2103sh.4FD-2104sh.IFD-2104sh.2FD-2104sh.3FD-2104sh.4PRESSURlZERPRESSUREPRESSURIZER LEVELREACTORCOOLANTFLOWLOOPI&2REACTORCOOLANTFLOWLOOP3&4STEAMGENERATOR 2&3LEVELAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOWS/G//3Tave/DELTATLOOPIOVERTEMP/OVERPOWER DELTATSTATICGAINUNITWIDERANGEHOTLEGTEMPLOOP2&4STEAMFLOW/FEEDFLOWS/G//IPRESSURES/G//I&2STEAMFLOW/FEEDFLOWS/G//2LOWERCTMTPRESSUREMAINFEEDWATER STARTUPFLOWTURBINEIMPULSEPRESSURES/GO'ISTEAMFLOW/FEEDFLOWS/GA'3PRESSURES/GP3&4STEAMFLOW/FEEDFLOWS/GA'4D.C.CookUnitsI&2ReactorProtection SystentReplacement AEPfincaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection SetISpec200Equipment ReportNumber29SS-HEI-14 Rev.0Pa"e8of10 0TableIcont.DRAWINGLISTFOXBOROSPEC200EUIPMENTDRAWINGNO.DESCRIPTION RL-2101RL-2102RL-2103RL-2104PWR-2101PWR-2102PWR-2103PWR-2104RACKLOADING,PROTECTION SETIRACKIRACKLOADING,PROTECTION SETIRACK2RACKLOADING,PROTECTION SETIRACK3RACKLOADING,PROTECTION SETIRACK4POWERDISTRIBUTION DRAWINGPROTECTION SETIRACKIPOWERDISTRIBUTION DRAWINGPROTECTION SETIRACK2POWERDISTRIBUTION DRAWINGPROTECTION SETIRACK3POWERDISTRIBUTION DRAWINGPROTECTION SETIRACK4D.C.CookUnitsISc2ReactorProtection SystemReplacement AEPfmaFailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection SetISpec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-14 Rev.0Page9of10 Table2DRAWINGLIST-FOXBOROHLINEFUIPMFNTFUNCTIONAL DRAWINGDESCRIPTION CD-1Sh.ICD-1Sh.2CD-1Sh.3CD-1Sh.xCD-2Sh.I&2CD-2Sh.3CD-3Sh.ICD-3Sh.2CD-3SI1.3CD-3Sh.xCD-4Sh.1CD-4Sh.2CD-4Sh.3PRESSURIZER FLOW,LEVELANDPRESSUREPRIMARYCOOLANTFLOWSYSTEMSTEAMGENERATOR 2&3LEVELS/G//3AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOWREACTORCOOLANTLOOP//1Tave&DeltaTREACTORCOOLANTWIDERANGEHOTLEGTEMPERATURE LOOPS2&4S/G//ISTEAMFLOW,FEEDFLOW,PRESSURES/GiQSTEAMFLOW,FEEDFLOW,PRESSURECONTAINMENT PRESSURES/G//IMAINFEEDWATER STARTUPFLOWS/G//3STEAMFLOW,FEEDFLOW,PRESSURES/G//4STEAMFLOW,FEEDFLOW,PRESSURETURBINEIMPULSEPRESSURED.C.CookUnitsI&2ReactorProtection SystemReplacetnent AEPI'mrna FailureModesandEffectsAnalysis(FMEA)Protection SetISpec200Equipment ReportNumber2985-HEI-I4 Rev.0PaeIOof10